SEVENTEEN YEARS OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA: WILL
BORDER SECURITY BARRIER WORK IN NIGERIA AS A
COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY TO CONTAIN AND
DEGRADE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY?

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by

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Since 2002, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, West Africa has been beleaguered by the menace of Boko Haram Insurgency, which has been a constant threat to the security and stability of Nigeria, specifically in the northeast. Nigeria's unsecured borders facilitate freedom of movement for Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin region. Lake Chad Basin region's vast rural areas allow Boko Haram to operate with impunity resulting in growing instability of the region. Nigeria and the three other Lake Chad Basin region efforts have seen varying level of success, but the problem still persists after 17 years. Some countries, such as Israel, have built Physical Barriers including security fences and walls for deterrence and denial. This has inspired a research on adapting this same approach as by the Nigerian policy makers stakeholders in the establishment of physical security system as part of Nigeria's more encompassing Counterinsurgency strategy.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or
any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing
statement.)

ABSTRACT

SEVENTEEN YEARS OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA: WILL BORDER SECURITY BARRIER WORK IN NIGERIA AS A COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY TO CONTAIN AND DEGRADE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY? by Major Adeniran Dairo, 91 pages.

Since 2002, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, West Africa has been beleaguered by the menace of Boko Haram Insurgency, which has been a constant threat to the security and stability of Nigeria, specifically in the northeast. Nigeria's unsecured borders facilitate freedom of movement for Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin region. Lake Chad Basin region's vast rural areas allow Boko Haram to operate with impunity resulting in growing instability of the region. Nigeria and the three other Lake Chad Basin region efforts have seen varying level of success, but the problem persists after 17 years. Some countries, such as Israel, have built Physical Barriers including security fences and walls for deterrence and denial. This has inspired a research on adapting this same approach by the Nigerian policy makers stakeholders in the establishment of physical security system as part of Nigeria's more encompassing Counterinsurgency strategy.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACRONYMS

AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
COIN	Counterinsurgency
DOTMLPF-P	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Policy, Facilities, Personnel
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FINER	Feasible, Interesting, Novel, Ethical, And Relevant
ISWAP	Islamic State West African Province
MUJIWA	Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
NACTEST	National Terrorism Counter Strategy
NIS	Nigeria Immigration Service
NBC	National Boundary Commission
NCS	Nigeria Customs Service
ODS	Operation Defensive Shield
RAND	Research and Development

ILLUSTRATIONS

TABLES

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This research will examine the necessity of a physical security barrier along the

Nigerian borders as a counter insurgency strategy to degrade and contain Boko Haram

insurgency in Nigeria. This chapter will cover an overview of the security threat posed by

the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, the border security in Nigeria, the research

primary and secondary questions, the assumptions, limitations, scope and delimitations,

significance of this research work and summary and conclusion.

Primary Research Question

In view of the continued operation of the Boko Haram insurgency, despite

ongoing counterterrorism efforts, it is imperative that a reevaluation or assessment needs

to be made to Nigerian counter insurgency strategy. The government's use of military

action has resulted in a seventeen-year war of attrition. Growing loss of life, escalating

refugee crisis the in north east Nigeria attests to the criticality of the situation (Meservey

2015). However, in Nigeria, there are no indicators that security fences are being

considered as part of its counterinsurgency strategy to address transborder terrorist

activities or movement after years of incessant terrorist attacks. This leads to the primary

research question that this thesis seeks to answer: "Will border barriers system work in

Nigeria as a counter insurgency strategy to significantly reduce Boko Haram insurgency

operations?"

<u>Secondary Research Questions</u>

In order to adequately answer the primary question, "Will border barriers system work in Nigeria as a counter insurgency strategy to significantly reduce Boko Haram insurgency operations?" the following secondary questions must be answered. Answering these questions is critical for a reasonable assessment of the current Nigerian counter-insurgency strategy and identify shortfalls or gaps and areas of improvement. The secondary research questions are as follows "What is the current status of the Nigerian Border (Land)?", second, "Does Nigeria possess the ability to secure its borders?", third, If Nigerian establishes a physical security system along its borders what is the impact on its existing counterinsurgency strategy?" If these questions are answered in order, it will provide the researcher with adequate information to address the primary question and draw logical conclusions and recommendation.

<u>Assumptions</u>

First, this research assumes that the Nigeria government with its current hard power approach in combating Boko Haram insurgency may have capability gaps in its current counterinsurgency strategy. Second, the establishment of physical security system along the Nigeria northeast borders will enhance its capability in conjunction with current use of hard power to significantly degrade and contain Boko Haram insurgency operations in Nigeria.

Fourth, the use of physical security system will have an immediate and enduring impact in the fight against Boko Haram as it has in other countries who have implemented this option in their combat against terrorism. Fifth, this research assumes that the Nigeria government is committed to implement strategies to address its long-

standing security border concerns. Sixth, that the border security strategy will also address other illegal activities occurring in the northeast border states of Nigeria.

Definitions and Terms

Counterinsurgency: This is the blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. Some of the key objectives of COIN operations are to reduce violence, address core grievances, and enable the HN government to exercise political control over its population territory via a system of legitimate governance. COIN is fundamentally an armed political competition between a government and its partners and insurgents and their supporters. Military operations to kill or capture insurgents, degrade their capabilities, and disrupt their organizations are a critical element of a broader comprehensive approach" (JCS 2018).

Insurgency: This is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region (DoS 2009).

Boko Haram: A terrorist group that aims to replace the Nigerian Government with an Islamic state under strict sharia and, ultimately, establish an Islamic caliphate across Africa; avenge military offenses against the group and destroy any political or social activity.

Borders: These are geographic boundaries of political entities or legal jurisdictions, such as governments, sovereign states, federated states, and other subnational entities (Wikipedia). Border Security is defined as protecting our borders from the illegal movement of weapons, drugs, contraband, and people, while promoting

3

lawful trade and travel, is essential to homeland security, economic prosperity, and national sovereignty (DHS).

DOTMLPF-P: The acronym DOTMLPF-P used in the Military stands for Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Policy, Facilities, Personnel (AcqNotes 2015). Doctrine analysis examines the way the military fights its conflicts with emphasizes on maneuver warfare and combined air-ground campaigns to see if there is a better way that might solve a capability gap (Acqnotes 2015). The organization analysis examines how we are organized to fight; divisions, air wings, Marine-Air Ground Task Forces and other. It looks to see if there is a better organizational structure or capability that can be developed to solve a capability gap (Acqnotes 2015). The training analysis examines how we prepare our forces to fight tactically from basic training, advanced individual training, various types of unit training, joint exercises, and other ways to see if improvement can be made to offset capability gaps (Acqnotes 2015).

Also, the materiel analysis examines all the necessary equipment and systems that are needed by our forces to fight and operate effectively and if new systems are needed to fill a capability gap (Acqnotes 2015). Leadership and education analysis examine how we prepare our leaders to lead the fight from squad leader to 4-star general/admiral and their overall professional development (Acqnotes 2015). Personnel analysis examines availability of qualified people for peacetime, wartime, and various contingency operations to support a capability gap by restructuring (Acqnotes 2015). The facilities analysis examines military property, installations and industrial facilities (e.g. government owned ammunition production facilities) that support our forces to see if

they can be used to fill in a capability gap (Acqnotes 2015). Lastly, policy is any Department of Defense, interagency, or international policy issues that may prevent effective implementation of changes in the other seven DOTMLPF-P categories (Acqnotes 2015).

Operation Defensive Shield: The Operation "Defensive Shield" was a large-scale military operation undertaken by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) against Palestinian terrorists in the West Bank. This was triggered by a series of a deadly terrorist attacks and in direct response to the Passover massacre in which a Palestinian terrorist killed 30 people during the Jewish holiday on March 27, 2002. The Operation "Defensive Shield" sought to renew Israel defense forces control over the major cities in the West Bank in order to destroy the terrorist network that had been building within them.

RAND: The Research and Development: (RAND) corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decision making through research and analysis. RAND focuses on the issues that matter most such as health, education, national security, international affairs, law and business, the environment, and more (RAND).

NACTEST: The National Terrorism Counter Strategy (NACTEST) is the Nigerian government counter terrorism strategy document first published in 2014, with a revised version published in 2016 (Nigeria NSA 2016).

The Polisrio Front: A Sahrawi Liberation Movement is an organization founded in 1973 advocating the territory's independence - and aims to restart negotiations over the status of the territory. The Polistro front operates in the West Sahara area (CIA Western Sahara)

Limitations and Delimitations

One of the limitations of this study is the geographical distance from location (United States of America) to Nigeria. Secondly, inability to conduct interviews with the security stakeholders, Nigerian border patrol personnel, state and governmental officials, former Boko Haram members, resident witnesses in the affected area, would have added more credibility to the sources of this research. Time constraints made it impractical to use these sources. Sources used for this research were garnered from available local and international publications, government releases, press release and reports available for public disclosure, which will shape the scope of potentially valuable information for the literature review and analysis.

To conduct the study on this thesis, the researcher has encountered time constraints due to the rigor and academic requirements of the almost eleven months at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. In respect to constraints, this research work will focus on northeast region of Nigeria, being the epicenter of the Boko Haram insurgency. Another delimitation is the focus on one of the five stipulated Nigerian counterinsurgency objectives which is Secure- to strength protection capacity against terrorist attacks (Nigeria NSA 2016). This aligns with the focus of this research, in reference to border security measures approach. The remaining four objectives listed in the strategy document cover other aspects holistically to include: tackling radicalization of individuals, intelligence gathering, early detection, reducing vulnerability of citizens to attack, mobilization of intra and inter-governmental efforts.

Physically, this study is limited to land component of border security and excludes other domains considering, land border is most commonly exploited by Boko

Hakam. Another delimitation is the purview on Nigeria as a framework rather than the entire Lake Chad region that includes Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Benin. The application of the DOTMPLF-P model, a United States Department of Defense model will be specifically using three of the eight categories, namely Policy, Organization, Training, Facility. These four categories provide a measure of relevance and clarity to a civil discourse.

<u>Scope</u>

My intention for choosing this research topic is to bring attention and emphasis to different approach for consideration on counterinsurgency strategies in the Nigeria counterinsurgency environment. This work will focus on Nigeria as it is the epicenter of Boko Haram. This work also focuses Nigerian counterinsurgency efforts against Boko Haram and not other trans-border threats (organized crime and other illegal activity) faced by Nigeria. Nigerian maritime and air border security measures assessment will be excluded in this research. In addition, this research concentrates singularly on the Nigerian government's counterinsurgency efforts against Boko Haram.

<u>Chapter Summary</u>

The seventeen years of Boko Haram insurgency activities in Nigeria despite the employment of hard power using military intervention with varying level of success have led to the development of the primary question, " Will border barriers system work in Nigeria as a counter insurgency strategy to significantly reduce Boko Haram insurgency operations?". Chapter 2 will expand on the relevant literature structured on the primary, and secondary questions. The secondary questions are:

1. What is the current status of the Nigerian Border (Land)?

2. Does Nigeria possess the ability to secure its borders?

3. If Nigerian establishes a physical security system along its borders what is the impact on its existing counterinsurgency strategy?

The results of the literature review will be further analyzed in Chapter 4. The analysis of the secondary questions in Chapter 4 will be instrumental in answering the primary question.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this research is to add to the body of knowledge and provide an additional approach for consideration to the military intervention to contain and degrade Boko Haram in the combat against terrorism in answering the primary and secondary questions in this research work. Primary question is "Will border barrier system work in Nigeria as part of counter insurgency strategy to significantly reduce Boko Haram insurgency operations?". The secondary research questions are as follows, first, "What is the current status of the Nigerian Border (Land)?", second, "If Nigerian establishes a physical security system along its borders what is the impact on its existing counterinsurgency strategy?", third, "Does Nigeria possess the ability to secure its borders?". This chapter will examine the Boko Haram Insurgency, state and management of the Nigerian border., Second, an overview of the status of the Nigerian land border, review of the factors contributing to the porosity of the Nigerian border and lastly a review of four countries, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Turkey who implemented border security measures to counter transborder insurgency.

Overview of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

"Terrorism is the most serious security threat confronting Nigeria today. This is due to the actions of persons or groups who choose to advance their cause by committing acts of extreme violence against members of the society" (Nigeria NSA). This assertion was made by Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari in Nigeria's first counter terrorism strategy document published in 2016. He further reiterated that the emergence of Boko

Haram extremism stems not solely from religious fundamentalism but also from political, social and economic factors (Nigeria NSA 2016).

The name Boko Haram also known as Jama'atu Ahlissunnah Lidda'awati wal Jihad is interpreted as the "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad" (Onuoha 2013). The Boko Haram terrorist organization was founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf, an Islamic cleric in Maiduguri, Northern Nigeria before his demise in 2009 (Al Jazeera, 2016). His aim was to establish a Sharia form of government. He then embarked on building a mosque and a religious facility to accommodate the poor and downtrodden in his community, but also used this as a ploy to recruit future jihadists as his followers.

Yusuf Abubakar Shekau became the leader of the Boko Haram insurgent group, in July 2009 and his ascension brought about increased extremism and violence by the emanating in brutal killings of thousands of people resulting in over 2 million internally displaced people Al Jazeera, 2016). This worrisome trend has led to a rise in the group's level of sophistication, which has emboldened them to launch strikes across the entire nation, causing substantial damage to live and property. Their modus operandi of armed assault has evolved over the years to more lethal dimensions in collateral damage to mass hostage takings and the sinister use of children and women as suicide bombers (Vision of Humanity 2018).

The Boko Haram ideology advocates complete removal of western influence and replacement of the Nigerian government with an Islamic system of government based on Sharia law (Nigeria NSA 2016). The United States Department of State has designated Abubakar Shekau, Abubakar Adam Kambar, and Khalid al-Barnawi as leaders of the

Boko Haram insurgents and as global terrorists who all have ties to the Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, another foreign terrorist organization. The most visible leader according to the U.S Department of State is Shekau Abubakar according to the U.S Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent report published on 21st June, 2012.

Boko Haram was designated a foreign terrorist organization by the United States Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism report on 11th November, 2013 and responsible for thousands of deaths in northeast and central Nigeria for several years including targeted killings of civilians. It remains one of the most active terrorist organization in Nigeria and the deadliest terror group in sub-Sharan Africa as of 2017 (Vision of Humanity 2018). Furthermore, it has run rampage across the Northeast Nigeria as well as the Lake Chad Basin region comprising of West African countries of Chad, Cameroon, Niger leaving in its trail, violence against government and civilian targets, destruction of lives and property and mayhem. Boko Haram is listed as one of four terrorist groups responsible for 10,632 deaths or 56.5 percent of death in 2017 (Vision of Humanity 2018).The other three groups are the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Taliban and Al-Shabaab. Furthermore, these same groups were responsible for 32 percent of all deaths from terrorism in 2012 (Vision of Humanity 2018).

Furthermore, the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP), the largest splinter group from Boko Haram, claimed responsibility for attacks on midwives and humanitarian aid workers in 2018. ISWAP claimed the women were "apostates" for working with non-Muslim agencies (Cohen 2018). Boko Haram and its splinter groups

have a command structure like the one depicted in figure 1 (Mahmood and Ani 2018).

The existence of a command structure and synchronization in the Boko Haram

insurgency seems plausible in view of the deadly coordinated attacks reported over the

years. The imam is the ideological spiritual leader and ultimate decision maker, while the

shore council members serve as his advisers.

Figure 1. A Generic Depiction of the Command Structure of
Boko Haram Factions in Lake Chad Basin

Source: Mahmood and Ani 2018, 31-33.

How Boko Haram Funds Itself

Boko Haram has developed various methods of funding its activities. It's funding network is perceived as both complex and seemingly impervious (McCoy 2014). It has been linked with Al Qaeda and its affiliates such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Somali militant group Al-Shabaab, and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJIWA) for training and financial support (Hussein 2012). Chiefly among its many interesting means of funding is the abduction of wealthy individuals for ransom, with returns in excess of millions of dollars (Asfura-Heim and McQuaid 2015). They have also employed extortion of the population through violence and coercion, black-market dealings and from local and international benefactors (Hussein 2012).

Boko Haram participates in the local trades in the Lake Chad basin areas controlling certain territories for profit, specially livestock rustling and fishing. Livestock rustling is known to be a million-dollar business supporting Boko Haram (Mahmood and Ani 2018). Mahmood observed that in January 2017, the Al-Hayah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria estimated that 169,000 cows and 63,000 rams, goats and sheep had been lost to Boko Haram– an indication of the scale of the problem. Boko Haram has also been involved in illicit drug trafficking to include codeine, tramadol trafficking with little returns (Mahmood and Ani 2018). In addition, kidnaping for ransom is another approach embarked on by Boko Haram to fund their illegal activities. Fourth, illicit trafficking of drugs, human and weapons in the region.

The Nigerian banned the import and production of codeine and other opium produced medicine due to the rise of Tramadol trafficking (Mahmood and Ani 2018). The drugs are mostly used internally and not much revenue generation Even though the

13

establishment of a multinational joint task force by Nigerian government has seem varying levels of success to combat the insurgency the problem persists. Nigerian counter insurgency strategy in combating Boko Haram is becoming more complex with the emergence of other extremist groups, especially the Fulani extremists, who have brutally attacked both civilians and military forces in the country (Vision of Humanity 2018). The challenge is that both the Fulani extremist groups and Boko Haram are collocated in the northern region of the country and conduct attacks both on civilians and military forces alike. The Fulani extremist mostly part of the local populace and are herdsmen's a common occupation of the northern part Nigeria, making a separation of an offender and innocent victim may not be as easy as it seems.

<div align="center">Overview of the Nigerian Government Tactics against Boko Haram</div>

In May 2013, Nigerian, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in the northern eastern Nigerian to address the growing security threat of Boko Haram (Asfura-Heim and McQuaid 2015). Also, the emergence of the Military Joint Task Force (JTF) comprising of the Nigerian Army, National police, and custom officials as a unified force to combat Boko Haram insurgents has met with suspicion by the local populace in the northern east region due to incidents of indiscriminate arrests, detentions, abuses such as rape and theft and in some cases extra-judicial killings (Asfura-Heim and McQuaid 2015). The measurable outcome is the frustration and resentment of the military forces by the people, which is counterproductive to the Joint force efforts to garner relevant intelligence from the people to assist in curtailing the Boko Haram security threat in the area (Asfura-Heim and McQuaid 2015).

Nigerian government also instituted the Civilian Joint Task Force in the early days of the insurgency (Felbab-Brown 2018). This task force is made of local militias trained by the government and who partner with the Nigerian police to provide intelligence to the police and to protect the local population form Boko Haram attacks (Felbab-Brown 2018). Felbab-Brown argues that future "disarmament, demobilization, justice, accountability, and reconciliation processes for armed actors beyond Boko Haram including the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) will be critical" (Felbab-Brown 2018).

The Nigerian counter insurgency strategy in combating Boko Haram is becoming more challenging with the emergence of other extremist groups, especially the Fulani extremists, who have brutally attacked both civilians and military forces in the country (Vision of Humanity 2018). Nigeria is challenged in its fight with Boko Haram due to inadequate resourcing its sizable air force and a 150, 000-man military force (Asfura-Heim and McQuaid 2015). Other contributing factors are endemic government corruption, lack of synchronization among security agencies, misappropriation of resources, slow implementation of anti-terrorism laws. Despite these challenges the Nigerian government has experienced some success combating Boko Haram. Unfortunately, Boko Haram remains a credible threat 17 years later (Asfura-Heim and McQuaid 2015). Other contributing factors ae corruption, lack of synchronization among security agencies, misappropriation of resources, slow implementation of anti-terrorism laws. Even though the Nigerian government has seen varying levels of success to combat the Boko insurgency over the years the threat persists, 17 years later.

Overview of the State of the Nigerian Borders

A 2007 RAND study "Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks" hypothesizes two dimensions, ungovernability and conduciveness to terrorism as the basic conditions that enables terrorist organizations to thrive (Rabasa et al. 2007). The openness of the Nigerian borders in the northeast due to lack of adequate border security forces, formal government presence, and international border arrangements permits uninhibited access for Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin region The effectiveness of border security is an essential component of any integrated comprehensive national counter-terrorism strategy and requires the cooperation by neighboring states, international and regional organizations (UNSC CTC 2001).

Nigerian porous borders are common trends in Africa, due to improper demarcation and delimitation of national borders (Ikome 2012). Demarcation and delimitation issues were resolved legally like the International Court of Justice ruling in 2008 with the Greentree Agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon settling a prolonged dispute over an oil rich peninsula (UNSG 2008). This agreement was the result of years of sporadic armed conflict on both sides. Some border disputes remain unresolved like the Djiboutian–Eritrean border or the Sudan-Kenya-Ethiopian borders named the Ilemi Triangle. Onuoha also noted that "the high level of insecurity on African borders is largely due to the way they are administered and managed, and less to do with how colonialists drew them" (Onuoha 2013)

Nigerian porous borders have been identified as the principal reason for the ease with which governance-related national conflicts in individual states have spilled over to entire regions (Ikome 2012). Northeast Nigeria is the epicenter of Boko Haram's

operation (Nigeria NSA 2016) as the map depicted in figure 2 shows the international

border lines and Boko Haram epicenter of operation.

Figure 2.   Map of the Democratic Republic of Nigeria

Source: Geology.com.
NOTE: Notice the International Boundaries Lines the Northeast from extending vicinity of Yola to Lake Chad. This covers the epicenter of Boko Haram insurgency.

Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria (especially the northeast zone) has

been facilitated by Nigeria's porous borders with Cameroon (1,690 kilometers) in the

east, Niger (1,497 kilometers) in the north, Benin (773 kilometers) in the west, and Chad

(87 kilometers) in the northeast (Onuoha 2013). The Nigeria borders not sufficiently

manned with security and law enforcement officials. Furthermore, the officials are poorly

17

trained and provided with inadequate and obsolete equipment. The border communities themselves were long been neglected by the government (Onuoha 2013). There are over 1,499 illegal and 84 legal entry routes into the country-over 1,400 more than the approved border entry routes, a reoccurring indicator of the dire situation on porosity of the borders setting the conditions for illicit transnational arms trafficking and actively exploited by the Boko Haram terrorist group (Onuoha 2013). As of 2017, there are 144 approved legal entry points, but no indication in the reduction of illegal entry points (NIS 2017).

Most of these border areas are either mountainous or in the tropical forest, but irrespective of the terrain feature, a common feature of the nation's borders is its porosity (Onuoha 2013). Furthermore, since May 2011 to October 2018, Boko Haram has been responsible for over 15,000 deaths of both military and civilian in Nigeria (Campbell 2018). In figure 2 and 3 below shows the terrorist attacks perpetuated by the Boko Haram and other state actors in Nigeria.

TERROR INCIDENCES BETWEEN 2009 - 2016

Figure 3.   Terror Incidences in Nigeria, 2009-2016

Source: Nigeria NSA 2016.

Figure 4.   Countryside Death Tracker in Nigeria

Source: Nigeria NSA 2016.

The second chart shows the death perpetrated by Boko Haram and other state actors and sectarian actors, with Boko Haram responsible for over 15, 000 deaths. The other key state actors include Fulani extremists-armed herdsmen largely populated in the northern region of Nigeria, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

(MEND), a militant group established in the oil rich south east region of Nigerian. To successfully contain and degrade Boko Haram insurgency, it is imperative the Nigerian Government assess its border security system in its counter insurgency strategy evaluation. The impact of continuous attacks by the Boko Haram militia on the local populace has escalated refugee crisis at the north-east border states. Between 2014 to 2015, 90,000 out of 128,000 internally displaced people fled from Yobe state, Nigeria to Niger, and out of 402,000 internally displaced people who crossed the border from Borno state, Nigeria to Chad and Cameroon were 11,320 and 35,000 respectively as depicted in figure 4 below. This humanitarian crisis was as a result of multiple Boko Haram .attacks in the northeast border states of Nigeria as shown in figure 4.

Figure 5.   Map of the Democratic Republic of Nigeria

Source: ReliefWeb.
NOTE: Notice the International Boundaries, Sate Boundaries and the high number of Individual Displaced Persons (IDP) as a result of Boko Haram Insurgency.

<u>Overview of the Management of the Nigerian Borders</u>

The Nigerian government has tasked three key organization or agencies to address the challenges of the management of its borders, namely the National Boundary Commission, the Nigerian Customs Services (NCS) and the Nigerian Immigration Services (NIS) (Temisan 2019). National Boundary Commission's duties include "deal with any boundary disputes that may arise between Nigeria and any of her neighbors with a view to settling the dispute, …define, and delimitate boundaries between states, local government areas or communities in the Federation and between Nigeria and her neighbors in accordance with delimitation instrument or document established for that purpose, …encourage negotiated settlement of border disputes in preference to litigation monitor trans-border relations between Nigeria and her neighbors with a view to detecting areas of tension and possible conflict…" (Nigeria National Assembly 2006).

The Nigerian Customs Services (NCS) and the Nigerian Immigration Services (NIS) on the other hand are designated as the border control and security agencies. According to the Nigerian Immigration Services (NIS) official website, its mission task is to "strengthen the security and prosperity of Nigeria through proactive, effective and efficient border security and migration management" (NIS). Among its five key responsibilities in its core mandate statement is the responsibility to establish border surveillance and patrol of the Nigerian borders. The Nigerian Immigration Service organizational structure is made of eight directorates and seven units that includes the directorate for Border Management.

The Nigerian Immigration Services (NIS) 2017 annual report indicates that there is currently a total of 155 control outposts, 144 of which are at land borders, 6 at the

seaports and 5 at the airports (NIS 2017). As of 31 December 2017, the total manpower for the Nigerian Immigration Services (NIS) operations is 22,822 personnel including officers that seem inadequate to effectively man the large number of outposts being reported. In addition, the report also mentioned the establishment of a border aerial surveillance equipment being established at one of the remote land outposts in Yobe State located in the northeast region of Nigeria to boost its intelligence capability against illegal immigration at the borders (NIS 2017). The Nigerian Customs Services core functions according to its official website are, collection and accountability of revenue, import and excise duties, and secondly counter-narcotic operations. Despite the establishment of these agencies, illegal activities and trans-border terrorist crimes across the Nigerian borders persists (Temisan 2019).

In addition, Nigeria's counter terrorism strategy document indicates the existence of Counter Terrorism Center under the supervision of the National Security Adviser's office responsible for the implementation of the national counter terrorism strategy. From research conducted, no specified actionable program or measures have been produced or implemented by the Counter Terrorism Center to demonstrate measurable performance aligned to counter terrorism in Nigeria. Furthermore, the agencies and stakeholders involved in counter terrorism in Nigeria do not possess the strong analytical expertise, coordination and information sharing structure to integrate and analyze data collected (Mentone 2018).

The border security management concerns are not unique only to Nigeria, but a trend common to all member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), this belief is accentuated in the framework of the African Union (AU) draft

strategy for enhancing border management and effective response to terrorism (Lamptey 2013). The document extract stipulates that "the objectives of the draft strategy and implementation plan is to provide ECOWAS Member States with the right tools to undertake rapid, timely and effective response to terrorism when it occurs; disrupting terrorists' planning, networks and their activities; bringing terrorist leaders and their followers, supporters and sympathizers to justice and cutting terrorists funding and access to equipment training and meeting ground as well as creating a hostile environment for terrorists in the region" (AU Border Program 2012).

In other words, the enforcement of a strong border security measures is on security of the borders as a precursor to effectively disrupt and undermine terrorist activities in the region. Lamptey, Afua Agyeiwaa noted in his article "Rethinking Border Management Strategies in West Africa" expressed that the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework under section 68 emphasizes cross-border initiatives as a means of reducing tensions, fighting cross-border crime and enhancing community welfare, among other concerns.

This further strengthens the notion of the regional concern of border insecurity prevalent in the West Africa region and urgency to implement viable initiatives to address it. Lamptey concludes that these initiatives do not provide a holistic strategy to address the underlying issues of border insecurity even though illegal arms proliferation were ongoing. Lamptey stated that "the ease and speed with which rebels, weapons and contraband materials were smuggled into the Sahel from Libya further exposed the inadequacy of established structures in terms of agencies, systems, policies, laws and procedures relating to border security management" (Lamptey 2013). Lamptey also

argued that border security issues are not always embedded as part of the national and economic strategies, and the border personnel are not properly equipped, trained and resourced. This trend is similar to the condition status of the Nigerian porous border thriving smuggling of ammunitions, armies and money laundering activities (Temisan 2019).

Furthermore, Dr. Onuoha, Freedom stated in her journal report for the Al Jazeera Center for Studies titled "Porous Borders and Boko Haram's Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria", that since 2009, the acts of domestic terrorism perpetrated by the Jama'atu Ahlissunnah Lidda'awati wal Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad"), also known as Boko Haram, have overshadowed Nigeria's enduring security threats such as piracy, militancy, kidnappings, and armed robbery. She noted that the porous Nigerian borders in northern Nigeria, especially the north east region have exacerbated the Boko Haram insurgency (Onuoha 2013).

Underlying Issues of the Nigerian Border Management

Currently, the Nigerian immigration stakeholders and security agencies are reviewing and validating the Nigerian Immigration Service National Border Management Strategy Document for publication soon (Emejor 2019). In addition, Temisan highlighted pertinent information on the state of the Nigerian borders in his report titled "Management of Nigeria Borders: An Imperative For Effective National Security". He observed that five major factors are responsible for the increased illegal activities across the Nigerian border namely the development of global markets, the increased international transaction can disguise criminal activities, advancement in technology in communications and transportation, accelerating increased transborder movement of

people, goods and cargo and criminals. Economic instability in developing countries such as Nigeria are conducive environment for criminal activities to thrive, insecurity and corruption to thrive (Temisan 2019). The porosity of the Nigerian borders has created a conducive environment for the proliferation of illegal arms and insurgent activities in the country (Babatola 2015).

Furthermore, bribery and corruption are rampant at the entry points, perpetrated by immigration service personnel and refusal to comply will deny passage until compliance (Odunsi 2018). This security lapse has enabled people to capitalize on the opportunity to transport illegal goods and cargo through the borders unabated while border security personnel continue to extort from unsuspecting victims (Odunsi 2018). In addition, until the border security agents are sensitized, and their welfare is improved, border crimes such as proliferation of arms by insurgency will continue to escalate and insecurity continues to deteriorate (Mobolaji and Alabi 2017). According to Asfura-Heim and Julia McQuaid in their research on "Diagnosing the Boko Haram Conflict: Grievances, Motivations, and Institutional Resilience in Northeast Nigeria" they indicated that the merger compensation received by the Nigerian border officials for the hardship posting has led them to extort bribes and furthermore enable smugglers and human traffickers access across the borders as long as they are paid (Asfura-Heim and McQuaid 2015)

These factors are a byproduct of the issues currently facing the current mismanagement of the Nigerian border and terrorism (Temisan 2019). He postulated that the border management policies are incorporated in various government agencies that operate independent of one another and this arrangement is ultimate devoid of any form

25

of synergy especially in the operations of the international borders, a precursor to the porous security at the Nigerian borders (Temisan 2019). Another issue he highlighted where the incomplete pre independence border delineation and demarcation measures that remain till today due to lack of fund allocation by the government to the Nigerian Boundary commission to facilitate the process.

Furthermore, the Nigerian border security architecture is not linear but based on the multi-agency arrangement (Temisan 2019). The key agencies responsible for border security are the Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), the Nigerian Immigration Services (NIS) and the Nigerian Police and are assigned to different ministries independent of one another (Temisan 2019). In addition, these agencies are responsible for different aspects of control and security management at the border but no assigned responsibility for the physical security operation is accounted for (Temisan 2019). The Nigerian Comptroller General, Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), Muhammed Babandede, himself asserted that the inter-agency rivalry among security agencies tasked to oversee the Nigerian borders is undermining proper border management across the country (Emejor 2019).

Also, the protocol on free movement established by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) of free movement of persons adopted in 1979, designed to aid free transborder movement of persons, goods and services across member states is readily exploited by terrorist or criminals for trafficking arms and other illegal goods into the country (Temison 2019). In addition, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) protocol of free movement grants a 90-day free entry for citizens of member states. The option of no visa identification or inspection makes it difficult to

adequately track records of inflow and outflow of people in this context, Boko Haram terrorists. (Temison 2019).

Condensed Review of Four Countries with Established Physical Security Systems along Their Borders as a Counterinsurgency Strategy

Three countries were selected based on the strategic approach for emplacement of physical security system to expand their border security capacity based on purpose, terrain and commonality of combating terrorism. The countries are Morocco and West Sahara, Saudi-Arabia and Iraq, Turkey and Syria and Israel and West Bank. First, Morocco and West Sahara, with Morocco emplacing landmines, sand berms, sensors along its border due primarily to resolve land dispute with West Sahara and the follow-on guerilla activities as a result of the non-resolution of the land dispute along its borders, second, Saudi-Arabia and Iraq. Saudi-Arabia emplaced their physical security systems to deny access to terrorists' infiltration from Iraq as a result of the ongoing war in Iraq, third, Israel and West Bank, Palestine. Another reason is the similarity in geographical features, mostly arid region.

Why these four choices?

The Morocco-West Sahara Sand Berm is a different barrier model compared to the rest as it is more rudimentary and simplified compared to the rest. It is made up mainly of extensive sand berms and landmines. Second the structure was completed in 1987, more than four decades ago emphasizing the longevity of the barrier. Third, the application of cutting-edge technology was limited at the time of completion compared to today's environment. Fourth, the Morocco-West Sahara is in Africa and features a desert landscape area similar to the northeast regions of Nigeria.

The Saudi-Arabia-Iraqi border is one of the most sophisticated and capital-intensive projects of the three due to the investment of the Saudi Arabia government installing a robust platform of cutting-edge technology and systems to strengthen its border security capacity. The barrier system is still being expanded to date. This border was built to address transborder terrorist infiltration of the Saudi Arabia from the ongoing trouble spots in Iraq, similar to the security threat of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Second, the border was established in Saudi Arabia to prevent influx of Iraqi refugees fleeing Iraq from unauthorized entry into Saudi Arabia.

Furthermore, the Israeli-Palestine barrier system emanated from the commitment of the Israeli government to stop the growing threat of indiscriminate terrorist suicide bombing and attacks along the border settlements of the Israeli-Palestine borders terrorist for decades. This got to a critical state after an intense terrorist attack in 2002 that resulted in death of thousands of Israeli citizens. This brazen attack triggered the decision by the Israeli Government to use a different approach by building a border barrier system to prevent the uninhibited access of terrorists. The barriers installation began in earnest and is being expanded till date. In addition to the security implications of the border barrier security system, it also serves to improve the economic situation in Israel. The terrorist attacks in the densely populated areas in Israeli had caused a decline in the economy affecting the tourism industry, with the economy losses of 10-14 billion shekels (Nusseibeh 2002). Thirdly the security barrier enables Israel to counter the growing concerns of illegal immigrants and workers infiltrating its borders.

The Turkish-Syrian border barrier system was selected in view of the emerging crisis in Syria with the ongoing civil war. The Turkish government anticipated the

potential infiltration of refugees as well as ISIS militants seeking safe havens within the Turkey borders. The Turkey government directed the installation of barrier system as a deterrent to terrorists attempting to encroach into and operate within its borders.

Some commonality in all four cases is the similarity of the arid geographical terrain features prevalent in the northeast region of Nigeria where Boko Haram operates. Second, the barrier systems in all four countries were primarily established to counter terrorist infiltration as a major threat within its borders and secondary factors were immigration concerns.

<u>Morocco-Western Sahara Sand Berm</u>

Western Sahara is a non-self-governing territory bordering Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania in the Northern Atlantic coast of North Africa. The terrain is mostly low, flat desert with large areas of rocky or sandy surfaces rising to small mountains in south and northeast. It was colonized by the Spain in 1884 until 1976. Morocco on the other hand was occupied by Spain in the northern region since 1860 and the remaining region by French. Northern Africa, bordering the North Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, between Algeria and Western Sahara. Morocco received independence from French in 1956 and implemented a constitutional monarchy as form of government. The terrain in Morocco has a mountainous northern coast (Rif Mountains) and interior (Atlas Mountains) bordered by large plateaus with intermontane valleys, and fertile coastal plains (CIA Western Sahara).

In 1979, Morocco annexed two-thirds of Western Sahara and claimed the remaining territory once Spain departed Western Sahara. This escalated into a long guerrilla war with the Polisario Front opposing Morocco's occupation of the area. A

cease fire was enacted in 1991 in conjunction with the establishment of a UN peace keeping operation. A proposed referendum on Western Sahara independence or integration into Morocco did not materialize due to lack of voter eligibility (CIA Western Sahara). In addition, the International court of Justice recognized Sahrawis right to self - determination, but Morocco has remained adamant on its claim to territorial rights of the West Sahara region (McNeish 2015). There after the approximately 1, 600 km defensive sand berm was built from 1980 to 1987 separating the two opposing forces. Morocco occupies the western territory of the berm and maintains border security measures, with sporadic ethnic tension between the native Sahrawi population and Moroccan immigrants' incidences in the region (CIA Western Sahara).

The Moroccan- Western Sahara wall is a fortified 10-foot tall sand barrier, 16 times longer than the Berlin wall dividing the contested territory. It is regarded as the longest minefield in the world with almost 7 million landmines. figure 7 shows the Moroccan-West Sahara border and yearly expansion of the border walls still completion in 1987. The western portion is controlled by the Moroccans and the eastern portion by the Polisario Front. This barrier completed in seven years from 1980 to 1987 was built to deter infiltration of Polisario guerilla forces and refugees into Morocco.

Although hostilities ceased in 1991, the Moroccan government still maintains heavy presence of security personnel and surveillance sensors in the area. There have been incidents of Polisario Front militias known to burrow through under the wall there have no significant cases of armed conflict since the ceasefire in 1991. Furthermore, civilian fatalities have been reported due to the numerous landmines emplaced along the berm. Civilian refugees also reside in settlements on either side of the berm. Although the

sand berm barriers and landmines has posed as a deterrent to the Polisario Front militias, the fragile peaceful coexistence between the Moroccan government and the Sahrawi people of West Sahara is still a threat to the stability of the region (Armstrong 2017). Also, the Sahrawi refugees born and raised in exile continue to clamor for outright war to reclaim lost territory (Armstrong 2017).

Figure 6.   Map Showing the Moroccan-Western Sahara Wall

Source: Wikimedia.

Saudi Arabia's-Iraqi Fence

Spencer wrote that Saudi Arabia successfully building a 600-mile-long wall, a layered process with a combination of fence and ditch along its border with Iraq to

prevent incursions of the Islamic State of Iraq terrorists into its territory. In the course of

building the wall, Saudi Arabia outpost was attacked by terrorist militias resulting in

fatalities on both sides, further reemphasizing the urgency for the barrier (Spencer 2015).

Figure 7.   Saudi Arabia-Iraqi Wall

Source: Spencer 2015.

Spencer observed that the Saudi-Arabia-Iraqi border barrier system is well

fortified which includes five layers of fencing, the state-of-the-art technology to optimize

its capability to secure its borders against terrorist infiltrators or illegal immigrants and

other security concerns. These sensors and surveillance equipment include underground

movement sensors, surveillance reconnaissance vehicles, radars sensors and surveillance

aircraft. Spencer writes that 30,000 Soldiers were also deployed to the border area to increase security presence at the border (Spencer 2015). The employment of cutting-edge technology surveillance systems and reinforced by border security personnel has been a significant deterrent to insurgency operation along its borders

The Israeli Palestine Fence

The Israeli security fence consists primarily of a network of chain link fences and vehicle barrier trenches designed to increase the effort and risk required to conduct terrorist attacks against Israel. At the onset of the building the security fence, the then Israeli Defense Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer stated that "it obliges us to establish a barrier wall which is the only thing that can minimize the infiltration of these male and female suicide bombers".

Figure 8.   Israeli-Palestine Security Fence

Source: Bard 2019.

The fence was constructed with a crossing point on average every 1.8 miles to enable the controlled access of people and goods, as well as to allow the Israeli security forces to conduct formal surveillance and exit screening because the interventions were geographically focused, while most of the statistical data is regional (Gibbs 2010). Israel in June 2002, after two years during which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict escalated, and major military operations did not stop terrorist acts, the Israeli government adopted a military recommendation to erect a security fence to prevent terrorist infiltration from the Palestinian territories into Israel (Gross 2005). Since the construction of the fence, the

number of attacks has reduced by more than 90% according to the reports from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, assessed, 10 October 2018. Ben-Eliezar in his book titled, "Operation Defensive Shield" documents the series of Palestine led terrorist attacks against Israel in 2002, accounting for hundreds of casualties on both sides. These incidents increased pressure on the Israeli government to make a strong response. They summarily declared the Palestine Authority as a "terrorist organization".

Furthermore, the Israeli Defense Forces embarked on a large-scale operation to reoccupy most of the contentious areas of the West Bank region which increased the political tensions between the Israel-Palestine relations (Ben-Eliezer 2012). The book details the decisive approach the Israeli government embarked on to address the root cause of unrestricted access by insurgents across its borders to perpetrate terrorist acts against its people. Barak-Erez Daphne in his international law review journal, titled, Israel: The security barrier—between international law, constitutional law, and domestic judicial review" asserted that the construction of the security barrier is based on a series of decisions accepted by the Israeli Government since 2001 and the aftermath of the collapse of peace process between Israel and the Palestinians in the 1990s (Barak-Erez 2006).

Barak-Erez Daphe writes that the law review expands on the challenges and opposition that may emanate from implementing a border security strategy and the international legal ramifications it entails. Secondly the unsuccessful anti-terrorism measures by Israeli to include deportation, house demolition, and administrative detentions failed to reduce the terrorist attacks and amplified the need the requirement for the barrier construct. These antiterrorism measures are reflective of the perceived threat

of small groups or individual militants and or arms smugglers to civilian population or military installations in Israel. (Barak-Erez 2006). The Israeli government through its foreign affairs office has stipulated four main reasons for the fence construction which began in 2002 as follows,

1. Most of the terrorists come from the West Bank.

2. The Palestinian leadership is doing nothing to stop the terrorists and even encourages them.

3. Currently there is no physical barrier that can stop them.

4. There are no terrorist infiltrations from Gaza because a security fence already exists there (Israel MFA 2003).

According to the Jewish Virtual Library the measurable outcome of the deliberate measures taken by the Israeli government to build a security fence since the violence broke out in September, 2000 up till the construction of the first segment of the security fence in July, 2003, Samaria-based terrorist conducted 73 attacks in which 293 Israelis were killed and 1,950 wounded, but in contrast, in 11 months later at the end of June, 2004, only three successful attacks was reported. Incidentally, between the erection of the first segment in August, 2003 till reported that 73 attacks were carried out by the outcomes of the decision and implementation during the 34 months from the beginning of the violence in September, 2000 until its completion (Bard 2018) In addition, the number of Israelis killed and wounded has decreased astronomically by 70% and 85% respectively, after the building of the security fence (Bard 2018).

Turkish-Syrian Fence

The Turkish government embarked on construction of the concrete wall along its 560 mile Turkish-Syria border in 2015 to curtail influx of Syria migrants seeking refuge from their war-torn country and to deter infiltration by terrorists militia migrating in from Syria. Tomlinson observes that the Turkish government also strengthened their border walls with additional security plans include modular walls, wire fencing in certain areas, installation of flood lights, a 365km long ditch, drones and reconnaissance aircraft security measures to begin building build (Tomlinson 2015). The announcement to harden their borders stemmed from series of deadly terrorist attack involving ISIS suicide bombing that killed 32 Turkish activists the town of Suruc long the Syrian border and isolated incidences of attacks on Turkish police (Tomlinson 2015).

Ziese also writes that the vulnerability of the Syrian border further escalated unrest of potential fighting spilling over into Turkey. Of the 19 official legal entry points along the Turkish-Syrian Border, only two remain open as legal options for Syrian refugees and closely monitored (Weise 2016). Other measures the Turkish government has taken to expand border physical security system is to fortify its border physical security system with additional patrol, personnel and equipment. Overall, land borders of Turkey (with Iran, Bulgaria, Greece, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Iraq and Syria) are secured by 50.000 military personnel, in addition, 90 percent of the operations of unmanned air vehicles are focused in Syrian border area to detect illegal crossing and smuggling activities (Turkey MFA).

Figure 9.   Turkish-Syrian Wall

Source: Tomlinson 2015.

Adaption of Rating Scale for the Evaluation Criteria

In 2015, Sylvan A. Smith conducted a research work on the topic "If We Don't, Who Will? The Employment of the United States Army to Combat Potential Pandemic Outbreaks in West Africa". In the research work he applied an evaluation criteria framework to determine the degree the Army is obligated to respond to a potential outbreak in West Africa. He determined the degree of obligation by assigning point value to three categories as the evaluation criteria, namely little (one point), moderate (two points), and explicit (three points) (Smith 2015). The scores from the aggregates of the

responses derived from the literature review were tallied and the higher score was the indicator for the best selection. This rating scale will be adapted to answer the secondary question "If Nigerian establishes a physical security system along its borders what is the impact on its existing counterinsurgency strategy?" The evaluation criteria will be assessed as minimal or no impact (1 point), moderate impact (2 points) and significant impact (3 points). Each criterion will be answered and explained individually in Table 1 as shown in the research methodology in Chapter 3.

<u>Chapter Conclusion</u>

The information data collated and addressed in the literature review on border physical security systems and other measures to counterinsurgency is critical to this research. The use of border security systems as a counterinsurgency strategy in conjunction with military force is not a new phenomenon, it further rejuvenates the inspiration for this research. There are different variations and purposes for the different physical security systems used, they range from walls, barbed wires, minefields, berms, fences, barriers and sensors. The focal point of this border security measures is to expand the border security capacity of the country is to prevent, degrade or contain terrorism. The secondary effect is to contain illegal immigration of people and or goods or cargo, foreign invasion, border disputes. There are oppositions internally and, in some cases, internationally as to the rationale for building a barrier to isolate country from their neighbors.

The reoccurring theme is the investment of resources, manpower, each country is willing to commit to its border physical security systems. This will be analyzed in chapter 4 referencing the primary question, "Will border barrier system work in Nigeria as part of

counter insurgency strategy to significantly reduce Boko Haram insurgency operations?",

and the secondary questions, "Can Nigeria secure its borders?, and lastly "If Nigerian

establishes a physical security system along its borders what is the impact on its existing

counterinsurgency strategy? In Chapter 3, we will detail the methodology used for this

research.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Chapter Introduction

A completed research design will provide the most practical, most efficient, most promising and the most accessible way to answer the research question (Mauch and Park 2003). The purpose of this chapter to is provide detailed information on the methodologies that will be utilized in this research to answer the primary and secondary questions. The primary question is "Will border barrier systems work in Nigeria as a counterinsurgency strategy. The secondary questions are, "What is the current status of the Nigerian Border (Land)?, second, if Nigerian establishes a physical security system along its borders what is the impact on its existing counterinsurgency strategy?'' and third, "Does Nigeria possess the ability to secure its borders?" Two methodologies will be used to answer both the primary and secondary questions.

This research cannot be solved or evaluated through questionnaires, or the collection of numerical data. The first methodology for this research is a review and qualitative meta-analysis of the literature (Martinez 2017). This methodology was applied by Major Martinez in her thesis titled "Women's Work: Incorporating Females into the United States Military Strategy to Contain and Degrade Boko Haram" published in 2017. A parallel can be drawn in the context of the application of an innovative approach to reinforce military action-hard power in proposing a change to U.S counterinsurgency strategy to degrade and contain Boko Haram insurgency. In this case the focal point is a recommendation to adapt or reevaluate the Nigeria counterinsurgency strategy to use hybrid power and not just hard power through the military might to combat Boko Haram.

a Nigeria to combat terrorism. An in-depth review of relevant the answer will be derived and will provide the context with which to answer both primary and secondary questions (Martinez 2017). If the literature review analysis dos not suffice, the primary and secondary questions will be answered using a set of evaluation criteria. Based on the research findings and answers, of the primary and secondary questions, conclusions and recommendations will be developed.

<div align="center">Evaluation Criteria</div>

The evaluation criteria for this research are developed around the eight elements that the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System uses to develop capabilities. The Department of Defense (DoD) uses the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to enable decision makers to develop capabilities to meet requirements. This capability development will be prioritized through integrated doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) solutions that are affordable, useful, effective and supportable (Director Joint Staff 2018). In addition, provides the baseline for documentation, review, and validation of new capability (Director Joint Staff 2018).

The evaluation criteria based on a DOTMLPF-P construct will be applied to the primary and secondary research question when a literature review and analysis does not sufficiently answer the question (Martinez 2017). From the eight DOTMLPF-P elements, three key elements were selected based on the greatest potential to be impacted by the adaption of physical security systems as part of the Nigerian counterinsurgency strategy (Martinez 2017). The element of Organization defined in the context of the Department of Defense examines how we organize to fight. It looks to see if there is a better

organizational structure or capability that can be developed to solve a capability gap (Acqnotes 2015). In contrast to the existing border management agencies, the need to examine how the current Nigeria border agency organizational structure manages the border threat is a measurable outcome of how effective they are. The second element selected from the DOTMLPF-P model for this research is Policy. It is defined in the context of the Department of Defense as any interagency, or international policy issues that may prevent effective implementation of changes (Acqnotes 2015).

This resonates with the criticality in implementing authorized and approved security measures to implement to address the Boko Haram threat. Examining the impact on the policy change as an evaluation criterion is an indicator of the commitment of the Nigerian government to address this threat. Third, the choice of Training as an evaluation criterion for this research methodology. Training in the DOTMLPF-P model is described as how we prepare our forces to fight tactically from basic training, advanced individual training, various types of unit training, joint exercises, and other ways to see if improvement can be made to offset capability gaps (Acqnotes 2015). This translates to the requirement for examination and assessment of the need or requirement for training of personnel and stakeholders mandated with the responsibility of border management to implement border barrier systems and border security. Table 1 depicts the set of criteria that will be applied. The application of these criteria will lead to a determination of the impact of integrating border physical security systems to the Nigerian strategy to contain and degrade Boko Haram. Each criterion will be assessed and analyzed in chapter 4.

Research Framework

The researcher will be conducting a research following a qualitative study of the necessity of border physical security systems along its borders will contain or degrade Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, using the following sequenced approach.

Step 1: The first step in the research design is to develop and refine the primary research question. The research question will be developed using the FINER criteria (Hulley et al. 2013). According to the FINER criteria, the research question will be assessed to determine if the research question was feasible, interesting, novel, ethical, and relevant. The viability of answering the question will be assessed through the lens of the following questions, Is the question answerable? Do you have access to all the materials you will need to do the study? Do you have access to enough subjects? Will you have enough time and money? Do you have the expertise to do this study or can you collaborate with someone who does? To determine if the question is interesting the following questions will be asked: Is the question interesting to the investigator? Is the question intriguing or interesting to others? To assess whether the research question was novel, two questions will be asked (Hulley et al. 2013)

Has this study been done before? Does it add to the current body of knowledge and future research? To determine if this research is ethical, the following questions will be asked and answered. Can the study be done in a way that does not subject to excess risks? Will an Institutional Review Board approve the study? Finally, to determine the relevancy of the question, one further question will be answered: Will the results change practice, policy or point towards further avenues of research? (Hulley et al. 2013)

Step 2: The next step in the research design will be to conduct a literature review. The scope of this review will be focused on literature that will allow the researcher to answer the secondary research questions. The results of this literature review are presented in chapter 2 of this thesis. An analysis of the literature review results will be presented in chapter 4 of this thesis.

Step 3: The third step in the research design is to develop an evaluation framework, based on the DOTMLPF-P construct. This framework will consist of evaluation criteria to determine answer to the secondary research questions, " If Nigeria establishes a physical security system along its borders what is the impact on its existing counterinsurgency strategy? and "Does Nigeria possess the ability to secure its borders? Step 4: The fourth step in the research design is to analyze the findings from the application of the DOTMLPF-P based evaluation criteria. This, when combined with the results of the literature review will provide an answer to both the secondary and primary research questions. Step 5: The final step will be to draw conclusions from the information aggregated in steps one through three of the research design. Once conclusions are drawn, recommendations for policy makers and future research will be proposed.

The Organization, Training and Policy criteria selected from the DOTMLPF-P construct are considered by the researcher as the ones with the greatest potential to be impacted by the implementation of a border barrier security system strategy by the Nigerian government. Taking into consideration the wholistic view of a change in counter insurgency strategy , the application of the evaluation criteria will be helpful in setting the level of impact by stipulating point values to three categories: Minimal or no

impact (1 point), moderate impact (two points), and significant impact (three points). On combining these responses from the pertinent literature review the scores will be added. The higher score collated will signify the criteria that will be most impacted.

Criterion 1: Does establishing a border physical security system change the Organization of the agencies responsible for border control and security in Nigeria? The mandate and management responsibility for the border security measure will change significantly due to the current multi-agency border security architecture in Nigeria. The main agencies are Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS), Nigerian Customs Service (NCS), The National Boundary Commission (NBC), the Nigerian Police. There is no singular agency or specialized agency with full rein of full control and security management of the borders at present. The Nigerian Military force are engaged with the Boko Haram insurgents within the confines of the borders but are not physically patrolling the borders as part of their responsibility.

Criterion 2: Does establishing a border physical security system change the Policy for the agencies responsible for border control and security in Nigeria? The current policy does not stipulate the establishment or requirement for a border barrier security system or similar plan to address the security threat of Boko Haram. The current policy enables the security agencies to work independent of one another with none solely tasked to oversee security along the borders.

Criterion 3: Does establishing a border physical security system change the Training for the agencies responsible for border control and security in Nigeria? The Nigerian military has been actively involvedly in combating Boko Haram over the years. The Nigerian Immigration Services personnel, Nigeria Customs Services have not been

accounted to engage in attacks against Boko Haram as they are not equipped and trained to compared to the Military forces. This disparity in training and resources will pose as a challenge if the Nigerian Immigration and Nigeran Customs Services are mandated to secure the borders with the necessary training to be effective. Even if a specialized agency is established and saddled with the border security management, the personnel in this organization will require specialized training in order to be prepared and resourced to take up this huge responsibility.

████████ DOTMLPF-P Evaluation Criteria			
Criteria	Minimal impact (1 point)	Moderate impact (2 points)	Significant impact (3 points)
1) Does establishing a border physical security system change the Organization of the agencies responsible for border control and security in Nigeria?			
2) Does establishing a border physical security system change the Policy for the agencies responsible for border control and security in Nigeria?			
3) Does establishing a border physical security system change the Training for the agencies responsible for border control and security in Nigeria?			

Source: Adapted by author from Martinez 2017; Smith 2015.

<u>Threats to Validity and Biases</u>

"Bias is defined as any tendency which prevents unprejudiced consideration of a question" (Pannucci et al. 2010). Researcher bias is inherent to the research process. In qualitative research, bias can threaten the internal validity and reliability of the results (Garson 2001, 154). This researcher has a personal potential bias as a someone who is a United States citizen by birth but raised in Nigeria by parents of Nigerian descent

The research design, presented in this chapter, will allow the researcher to effectively answer the primary research question and minimize biases and threats to its validity. The validity of the research is based on the model proposed by Lincoln and Guba. The model address four main components centered on trustworthiness applicable to this research, namely truth-value or credibility, applicability or transferability, consistency or dependability and neutrality or conformability (Thomas and Magilvy 2011). This research will be based on credibility, which is similar to internal validity in comparison to quantitative research (Thomas and Magilvy 2011). .A qualitative research is deemed credible if "when it presents an accurate description or interpretation of human experience that people who also share the same experience would immediately recognize." (Thomas and Magilvy 2011). This is the premise this research is founded on.

Second, the element of transferability. Transferability is defined as "the ability to transfer research findings or methods from one group to another, or "how one determines the extent to which the findings of a particular inquiry have applicability in other contexts or with other subjects/participants," (Thomas and Magilvy 2011). Guba also posits that the element of transferability "is comparable to external validity or generalization in quantitative research" (Guba et al. 1989). Furthermore, Guba suggests that transferability "is relative and depends solely on the degree to which the salient conditions match" (Guba et al. 1989). He concludes that the presumption for transferability lies within the purview of the reader while that of generalization is on the researcher for the research work.

This research is predicated on the premise of credibility to provide the reader an accurate and clear description and in-depth analysis of the subject matter at the same

provide the framework for future continuous study and expansion of the ideas to add to the boy of knowledge. The research design framework process includes the literature review, followed by the operational approach development, and lastly by the application of DOTMLPF-P based criteria to answer the research questions, namely the secondary questions are, first, if Nigerian establishes a physical security system along its borders what is the impact on its existing counterinsurgency strategy? and second, "Does Nigeria possess the ability to secure its borders?". The DOTMLPF-P is a valuable tool to match capabilities to solutions. It provides a framework to consider all aspects of a problem set or capability gap and get important things done. Chapter 4 contains an analysis of the data, pertaining to this question, collected for this study.

Chapter Conclusion

The goal of this research methodology is to allow the researcher to answer the primary research question and secondary questions given the scope, threats to validity, biases, limitations and delimitations. The measurable outcome of the literature review and the application of evaluation criteria will result in answers to both the primary and secondary research questions. The answers to the secondary research questions will allow the researcher to answer the primary research question, "Will border barrier systems work in Nigeria as a counter insurgency strategy?" Chapter 4 presents a detailed analysis of the information collected for this study.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

<u>Introduction</u>

The purpose of this research is to provide an additional approach to military

intervention to contain and degrade Boko Haram Insurgency in the combat against

terrorism in answering the primary and secondary questions in this research work. This

chapter presents the analysis of the data garnered to answer the primary and secondary

questions for this research. The step by step process detailed in Chapter 3 will be used for

this analysis. the research hypothesis depicts that in order to contain and degrade Boko

Haram insurgency in Nigeria, there is the necessity to establish physical security systems

along its borders.

<u>Step 1: Development of the Research Question</u>

Using the FINER criteria benchmarks to answer the primary question, "Will

border barrier systems work in Nigeria as a counterinsurgency strategy to contain and

degrade Boko Haram insurgency?" to determine if the question is feasible, interesting ,

novel, ethical and relevant The feasibility aspect of the criteria as depicted by Huller

stipulates the following questions: Is the question answerable? Yes, in view of the

literature review and an adequately constructed research protocol, this question is

answerable (Martinez 2017). Do you have access to all the materials you will need to do

the study? Yes, the researcher has access to the necessary information available from

local and international publications, governmental and news media public releases and

database to conduct adequate research to answer this question. Do you have access to enough subjects? There are no human subjects needed to answer this question.

Will you have enough time and money? The researcher has approximately nine months to conduct research work. No monetary cost required to answer these research questions. Do you have the expertise to do this study or can you collaborate with someone who does? Even though the researcher's subject expertise is limited, the structure of the researcher's thesis committee member's experiential background and expertise is tailored to the subject matter. Based on the answers to each of these questions the researcher determined that the primary research question could be viably answered. To determine if the question was interesting the following questions were asked: Is the question interesting to the investigator? Yes, the researcher is interested in the option of using border physical security systems to contain and degrade Boko Haram insurgency as counterinsurgency strategy.

Yes, with the growing role of women in the U.S. military and the ongoing counterterrorism fight, other stakeholders would find this question interesting. Because the answer was yes to both questions, the researcher determined that the primary research question was interesting. To assess whether the research question was novel, two questions were asked. Has this study been done before? No, the researcher is unable to find where this question has been asked and answered before. Does it add to the current body of knowledge? Yes, this question would add depth to the existing research surrounding expanding border security capacity by the establishment of physical security systems along the Nigerian border to contain and degrade Boko Haram insurgency. Based on the answers to these questions, the researcher determined that the primary

research question was a novel question. To determine if this research is ethical, the following questions were asked and answered. Can the study be done in a way that does not subject subjects to excess risks? This study did not involve human or animal subjects. Will an Institutional Review Board approve the study? Because there are no human subjects involved, no Institutional Review Board approval is required.

The researcher has determined that this study is ethical because it does not use subjects and does not require Institutional Review Board approval. Finally, to determine the relevancy of the question, one final question was asked and answered: Will the results change practice, policy or point towards further avenues of research? This research has the potential to reform the current Nigerian counterinsurgency strategy first published in 2014 and revised in 2016 as well its security policy and further expand on other avenues of research. Based on the answer to this question the researcher has determined that the primary research question is relevant.

The primary research question "Will border barrier systems work in Nigeria as a counter insurgency strategy to contain and degrade Boko Haram insurgency operations?" meets the application of the FINER criteria that stipulates the question is feasible, interesting, novel, ethical, and relevant. The next step once the primary research question is determined it merits investigation, is the research methodology and thereafter to conduct the literature review.

Step 2: Results of the Literature Review

To answer the primary research question, "Will border barrier systems work in Nigeria as a counterinsurgency strategy to contain and degrade Boko Haram insurgency?

The secondary research questions are as follows, The secondary questions are, "What is the current status of the Nigerian Border (Land)?, second, if Nigerian establishes a physical security system along its borders what is the impact on its existing counterinsurgency strategy?'' and third, "Does Nigeria possess the ability to secure its borders? The researcher determined that the primary and secondary questions can be answered directly from the outcomes of the qualitative literature review.

Will border barrier systems work in Nigeria as a counterinsurgency strategy to contain and degrade Boko Haram insurgency?

The first question, "Will border barrier systems work in Nigeria as a counterinsurgency strategy to contain and degrade Boko Haram insurgency?" This was addressed in the review of countries that have implemented border security measures of constructing physical security systems unique to their environment and invested interest in the security of their borders. The first overview is focused on Moroccan-West Sahara wall constructed to curtail Polisrio guerilla forces from infiltrating their territory, providing deniability capacity and first line of defense.

The sand berm barrier, the extensive land mines emplaced around the border barrier systems and the addition of over 120,000 Moroccan military forces manning the borders have been a deterrent to the Polisrio militants and illegal immigrants to infiltrate its borders (McNeish 2015). Second, the Israeli-Palestine security fence has drastically reduced terrorist suicide bombing in Israel by over 90% within the first two years it was established (Bard 2018).The overall success and effectiveness of these measures has spurred the Israeli government to expand its security wall to the Israeli-Lebanese wall to protect form Hezbollah attacks.

Furthermore, the Saudi Arabia-Iraqi wall with its cutting-edge sophisticated sensor equipment that includes, underground movement sensors, 2,000 radar camera equipment, 40 watch towers with helipads for aerial surveillance, 240 rapid response vehicles, sand berms to slow down infiltration by terrorists. The security parameters imposed by the Saudi Arabia authorities has help to impede the incursion of terrorist militants. Invariably Morocco, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey took deliberate measures after a period of incessant terrorist attacks across its borders to curtail and degrade the ability of these terrorists to perpetuate their nefarious activities. The narratives form the actions of the Moroccan, Israeli and Saudi Arabia governments demonstrates the criticality of a physical security system as a significant deterrent to insurgency activities.

The deterrence effect of physical security system at the Nigerian borders is capable of curtailing Boko Haram insurgency as depicted by the outcome in Saudi Arabia against the ISIS militants, in Israel against Palestine terrorists and in Morocco against the Polisrio militants. In reference to the Nigerian situation, the reports and publications researched postulates that the porosity of the Nigerian borders and vast dimension of its borders is a challenge. In order to set conditions to build a border wall and accompanying surveillance systems and manpower, the border security architecture must be streamlined to adequately fund it, allocate resources appropriately and institute training of personnel.

For these measures to become reality, the Nigerian government must demonstrate its commitment to take appropriate measures, without which no progress can be made. In view of the Boko Haram continued security threats, the Nigerian government needs to reevaluate the implications of the illegal border entry points, the inadequate personnel manning at the Nigerian Immigration Services tasked with the responsibility to enforce

border control and security at its borders. The concerted effort and commitment of the governments of Morocco, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to adapt physical security systems in different forms or models suited to their region demonstrates the urgency of the situation.

What is the current status of the Nigerian Border (Land)?

The fist secondary question, "What is the current status of the Nigerian Border (Land)?",was answered with a review of Nigerian Immigration Services (NIS)border management directorate actions, the modus operandi of Boko Haram and past historic trends in Nigeria. Per the annual report indicates the actions of the Nigerian Immigration Services with its 22,822 personnel pales in comparison to the unauthorized entry points scattered along its borders in addition to the 144 legal entry points accounted for. The inadequate and poorly equipped Nigeria Border patrol personnel and mostly unguarded illegal entry points further exacerbates the situation.

Furthermore, the ease at which the Boko Haram insurgents infiltrate the porous borders to launch attacks against local communities and seemingly escape undeterred has been cited as an indication of the dire situation of the Nigerian borders. In addition, conduct arms proliferation and kidnapping of innocent citizens for ransom. The continuous attacks by Boko Haram within the north eastern region of Nigerian emanates from the uninhibited access across the porous borders. There have been several countries who have installed different models and types of security barrier customized to their need and terrain features. Four countries, namely Israel, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Turkey discussed in detail in chapter 2 had terrain land features unique to their geographical landscape.

If Nigeria establishes a physical security system along its borders what
is the impact on its existing counterinsurgency strategy?

The second secondary question is "If Nigerian establishes a physical security system along its borders what is the impact on its existing counterinsurgency strategy?". The current Nigerian counter terrorism strategy outlines the serious threat Boko Haram poses to the country especially in the north eastern part of the country but does not stipulate specific actions to implement. This secondary question can be answered from the literature review in conjunction with the evaluation criteria using the DOTMLPF-P construct to answer the question.

The review of the current mission and organizational structure of one of the main border agencies in Nigeria, Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) indicates the agency is tasked among other functions to oversee the border management responsibility of the Nigerian borders. Border surveillance and patrol is listed as one of its statutory functions to perform, despite a manpower strength of 22, 822 personnel as of 2017, covering a vast area of over 2,000 km along the north east border with 1,849 illegal entry points scattered along its route and 144 legal land entry points will be a challenge (NIS 2017). Also, the 2017 Nigerian Immigration Service annual report indicated the initiative of Border Patrol Corps and Rapid response Teams to repel attacks across the borders, the incessant cross border attacks by Boko Haram over the years has not indicated positive turn of event.

Furthermore, with the emphasis on the Nigerian Military forces committing its resources and manpower in combating the Boko Haram Insurgents internally, the borders lines remain poorly secured by the Border Patrol personnel with inadequate. Per the literature the robust sophisticated surveillance systems in addition to security forces at the Saudi Arabia Iraqi borders was the first line of defense against an impeding attack by a

would be terrorist, similarly the multiple-layered barrier, aerial surveillance, roving patrol security forces at the Israeli-Palestine border at first glance will be a strong deterrent to a terrorist group to attempt to illegally infiltrate its borders.

If the Nigerian government were to adapt a similar approach as Israel, Morocco and Saudi Arabia have done, it will require a revision of the Nigerian Counterterrorism strategy to mandate a preventive measure through the investment of funding and establishment of advanced technological surveillance equipment and physical security systems along its borders, deploy adequate security forces to secure its borders, a deviation from its current disposition of employing Military forces internally to counter insurgents within the confines of the country borders.

Does Nigeria possess the ability to secure its borders?

The third secondary question is does Nigerian possess the ability to secure its borders? This question is sufficiently answered with a qualitative review and the analysis of the literature review detailing the status of the Nigerian borders and the management of the Nigerian borders. The answer is Yes. Border security Architecture: In the concept of organization and intent, the Nigerian government has instituted agencies mandated to oversee, control and maintain the integrity of its borders. The National Boundary Commission to handle border delineation, demarcation and disputes both internally and externally, and secondly, the border control and security agencies the Nigerian Immigration Services (NIS) and the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS), this is in addition to the Nigerian Police.

Even though the Nigerian government has established the agencies in place, the vastness of the nation's borders poses a daunting challenge. In addition, each of the

agencies listed are supervised by different echelons in government, for instance the main security agencies are Nigerian Police is slated under the Ministry of Police Affairs, the Nigerian Customs Services (NCS), under the Ministry of Finance and the Nigerian Immigration Services (NIS) supervised by the Ministry of Interior. The lack of unity of effort among the agencies has disrupted their ability to synchronize management of the borders (Temisan 2019).

If this situation is reverted and each agency leadership take deliberate measures to integrate and synchronize their efforts, it will enable them to be effective in carrying out their statutory functions. Second, the corruption, misappropriation of resources prevalent in the governmental circles has also been detrimental to its ability to adequately fund these agencies as required limiting their effectiveness to fulfil their statutory functions. The lack of adequate funding, personnel training and resources from the government contributed immensely to the worsening situation (Musa 2013).

Step 3: Application of the Evaluation Criteria

The third step in the design methodology is to apply evaluation criteria framework to enable the researcher to answer the questions: " If Nigeria establishes a physical security system along its borders what is the impact on its existing counterinsurgency strategy?". Three evaluation criteria were identified to determine if there will be an impact on existing counterinsurgency strategy if a border physical security system is built along its borders.

Criterion 1: Does establishing a border physical security system change the Organization of the agencies responsible for border control and security in Nigeria?. The mandate and management responsibility for the border security measure will change

significantly due to the current multi-agency border security architecture in Nigeria. The main agencies are Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS), Nigerian Customs Service (NCS), The National Boundary Commission (NBC), the Nigerian Police. There is no singular agency or specialized agency with full rein of full control and security management of the borders at present. The Nigerian Military force are engaged with the Boko Haram insurgents within the confines of the borders but are not physically patrolling the borders as part of their responsibility.

From the accounts reported, the Nigerian government strategy has been solely the use of hard power, through imposing its military might to combat Boko Haram sect and less investment in other options and approach (Udounwa 2013). The issue of the porous borders has constantly been a security concern for the Nigeria government. The presence of 1,499 unapproved entry points further accentuates the deteriorating state of the security and integrity of its borders. In 2016, the Nigerian government launched a revised version of their Nigerian counterterrorism strategy (Nigeria NSA 2016).

The strategy document stipulates the Office of the National Security Adviser as the proponent to coordinate, plan and execute the strategy in conjunction with other stakeholders (Nigeria NSA 2016). The strategy enumerates five key efforts to be accomplished, first effort is to forestall, which is focused on prevention of terrorism by providing situational awareness to the citizens, and instituting deradicalization programs (Nigeria NSA 2016). Second effort is to secure-, which implies protection the Nigerian national interest and protection of lives of the citizens and key infrastructure (Nigeria NSA 2016). The third effort is identified- ensuring the terrorists and their sponsors face the full strength of the law and are prosecuted accordingly (Nigeria NSA 2016). Fourth

effort is prepare- to prepare the populace to mitigate the effect of Boko haram security threats to population (Nigeria NSA 2016).Fifth effort is, implement- to design a framework to sustain a population centric governmental approach (Nigeria NSA 2016)

Furthermore, there are three key objectives centered on Secure effort in the document, one is strengthening border security, second, protect critical national infrastructure and third building capacity for security forces (Nigeria NSA 2016). In research work done, no reports has accounted for attacks by the Nigerian Immigration Services against Boko Haram militants The 2017 Nigerian Immigration Services report indicates establishment of a Rapid Response Squad (RRS) and supported patrol vehicles, to repel attacks across the borders, although the report does not detail any encounters with the Boko Haram sect in the course of the year (NIS 2017). The multiple press releases, reports or publications garnered during this research indicates that the security forces in direct contact with Boko Haram has consistently been the Nigerian Military forces personnel.

The organizational structure established by the Nigerian Government to include the National Security Adviser to oversee the execution of the counterinsurgency strategy (Nigeria NSA 2016). The Nigerian Boundary Commission (NBC) is responsible for management of border issues, disputes, resolution in conjunction with other government agencies (Nigeria National Assembly 2006). The Nigeria Customs Service agency is "mandated to exercise control of movement of goods in and out of the Nigeria" (Temisan 2019). The Nigeria Immigration Services is the lead agency responsible for control of transborder movement of people into the country (Temisan 2019). These agencies work

independent of each other and there is no unity of effort in the operations management of the International borders as it relates to its security (Temisan 2019).

Furthermore, Temisan asserts Nigeria's current organization structure contributes to its counterinsurgency challenges. Lack of synergy and unity of effort between Nigerian security agencies contributes insecurity of Nigerian borders which terrorists have exploited to their advantage. In order to address this situation, a change to the current organizational makeup of the Nigeria Immigration service, National Boundary Commission and Nigeria Customs Service will facilitate a more effective border security management of the borders.

United States military utilizes a coordination center in promoting unity of effort and synergy between multinational military and civilian agencies in combatting terrorism. The coordination centers are staffed by key representatives of partner nations and serves as a joint forum to foster situational understanding, enable better integration and synchronization of effort, build mutual trust and elevates teamwork among the participants to accomplish the predetermined objectives or goals (JCS, 2019). Temisan also asserts a synchronization of the Nigerian Immigration Service, National Boundary Commission and Nigeria Customs Services through intelligence sharing and joint patrols will mitigate the current security structure at the Nigerian borders (Temisan 2019).

Temisan also states a change to the current organization of these three agencies can be accomplished if the Nigerian government establish a specialized agency or create a National Guard organization from existing agencies with the resources and responsibility to secure the borders (Temisan 2019). The policy change will also require Nigerian government budgetary changes to be appropriated to fund the installation of a

security fence Temisan, n.d). The Comptroller General of the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), Muhammed Babandede at a workshop facilitated by the International Organization for Migration and other stakeholders to review the National Borders Management Strategy (NBMS) is underway to align with current migratory trends and development (Oyeyemi), and integrate trends These two plans of action will demand a significant impact in the current organizational structure of the Nigeria Immigration Service, National Boundary Commission and Nigeria Customs Service agencies. As discussed in Chapter 3, the category significant impact is indicated by a change in the structure, function and responsibility of the existing organization or agency structure and it is directed by the assigned overall leadership or government, and or the establishment or creation of a new organization or agency has directed by the government and authorized by law.

Taking into consideration the wholistic view of a change in counter insurgency strategy , the application of the evaluation criteria will be helpful in setting the level of impact by stipulating point values to three categories: Minimal or no impact (1 point), moderate (two points), and significant (three points) (Smith 2015). On combining these responses from the pertinent literature review the scores will be added. The higher score collated will signify the most aspect impacted.

Evaluation Criteria-Organization			
Criteria	Minimal to no impact (1 point)	Moderate impact (2 points)	Significant impact (3 points)
Does establishing a border physical security system change the Organization for the Nigerian counterinsurgency strategy			**X**

Source: Adapted and modified by author from Martinez 2017.

Criterion 2: Does establishing a border physical security system change the Policy for the agencies responsible for border control and security in Nigeria? The current policy does not stipulate the establishment or requirement for a border barrier security system or similar plan to address the security threat of Boko Haram. The current policy enables the security agencies to work independent of one another with none solely tasked to oversee security along the borders. In order to accomplish organizational change with the implementation of the specialized security agency or National guard suggested by Temisan, the current national counter insurgency strategy will need to be amended to reflect the changes in the roles and responsibilities of the Nigeria Custom Service, National Boundary Commission and Nigeria Immigration services to provide clarity and defined roles and responsibilities. Furthermore, Temisan argues that the current policy for the National Boundary Commission itself needs to adapt in reflecting current global border management initiatives to address security challenges in order promulgated relevant and more comprehensive border security policy. Therefore, the impact of establishing a border security system along the Nigerian borders will have a significant

impact on policy change in order to set the conditions for its implementation. The significant impact category is indicated by a change in the structure, function and responsibility of the existing organization or agency structure and it is directed by the assigned overall leadership or government, and or the establishment or creation of a new organization or agency has directed by the government and authorized by law.

████████ Evaluation Criteria-Policy			
Criteria	Minimal to no impact (1 point)	Moderate impact (2 points)	Significant impact (3 points)
Does establishing a border physical security system change the Policy for the Nigerian counterinsurgency strategy?			X

Source: Adapted and modified by author from Martinez 2017.

Criterion 3: Does establishing a border physical security system change the Training for the agencies responsible for border control and security in Nigeria? The Nigerian military has been actively involvedly in combating Boko Haram over the years. The Nigerian Immigration Services personnel, Nigeria Customs Services have not been accounted to engage in attacks against Boko Haram as they are not equipped and trained to compared to the Military forces. This disparity in training and resources will pose as a challenge if the Nigerian Immigration and Nigeran Customs Services are mandated to secure the borders without the necessary training requirements to be effective. Even if a specialized agency is established and saddled with the border security management, the

personnel in this organization will require specialized training in order to be prepared and resourced to take up this huge responsibility. Saudi Arabia's General Directorate of the Border Guards conducts regular training exercises of its border guards to fine tune their skills and ensure they are always prepared to protect the land and maritime borders of the country.

These training drills include search and rescue operations, targeting land crossing border by enemy, terrorist attacks (Al-Salami 2017). The newly installed surveillance equipment and security system operations at the Saudi Arabia-Iraqi border will demand a structured continuous training to be more proficient with the application and day to day operation. In the four examples given in Chapter 2, the four countries who have established border barrier systems have used their military forces to secure their borders. With the current arrangement of multiple border management agencies in Nigeria the establishment of a specialized agency to take up this responsibility will require training tailored for this mandate. The requirement for the Nigeria military to patrol the north east borders will largely reduce the requirement for extensive training against Boko Haram and will be assessed as a moderate impact considering the existence of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) already collaborating in joint training and partnership with the Lake Chad Basin forces and in addition to the seventeen years' experience garnered from battling the Boko Haram insurgency.

Evaluation Criteria-Training			
Criteria	Minimal to no impact (1 point)	Moderate impact (2 points)	Significant impact (3 points)
Does establishing a border physical security system change the Training for the agencies responsible for border control and security in Nigeria?		X	

Source: Adapted and modified by author from Martinez 2017.

Step 4: Answer the Primary Research Questions

Step 4 in this research framework is to answer the primary question. The answer derived from the analysis of the literature review and emphasized by the answers to the secondary questions and the evaluation criteria. The summary of the primary and secondary answers is listed below.

Will border barrier systems work in Nigeria as an effective counter insurgency strategy to significantly reduce Boko Haram insurgency operations? The study of the four countries reviewed, Israel, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Turkey who dealt with terrorist security threats were able to significantly contain and degrade insurgency activities.

What is the current status of the Nigerian Border (Land)? The overview of the Nigerian borders shows a state of insecurity and porous borders facilitating illegal immigration, illegal smuggling of goods and other illicit activities to include transborder terrorism. Multiple agencies are tasked with the border management with no synergy and unity of effort pertaining to security of the borders.

Does Nigeria possess the ability to secure its borders? The Nigerian government has established border security agencies and put policies in place, but the added responsibility and management of the physical security of its borders specifically against Boko Haram insurgency has not been earmarked to a designated agency (Temisan 2019).

If Nigerian establishes a physical security system along its borders what is the impact on its existing counterinsurgency strategy? The aggregates scores from the three evaluation criteria assessed as shown in Table 5 below, indicates significant impact on criterion 1 and 2, organizational structure and policy change with point values of 3 points respectively, each totaling 6 points, while criterion 3, training, will have a point value of 2 resulting in a moderate impact which is dependent on the organizational and policy change approach in criterion 1 and 2, embarked by the Nigerian government This indicates that the establishment of physical security system along the Nigerian borders will be a catalyst for policy reforms to empower the agencies designated to take up the responsibility of border physical security control and management. Furthermore, the independent multi-agency arrangement of the border security agencies or organizations such as the Nigerian Immigration services, Nigerian Custom services, Nigerian police, National Boundary Commission will require restructuring as a singular agency or a new organization established to assume the responsibility physical security functions of the

borders, which is unaccounted for with the present Nigerian border management

architecture (Temisan 2019).

Evaluation Criteria			
Criteria	Minimal to no impact (1 point)	Moderate impact (2 points)	Significant impact (3 points)
1) Does establishing a border physical security system change the Organization of the agencies responsible for border control and security in Nigeria?			X
2) Does establishing a border physical security system change the Policy for the agencies responsible for border control and security in Nigeria?			X
3) Does establishing a border physical security system change the Training requirement for the agencies responsible for border control and security in Nigeria?		X	
Total	0	2	6

Source: Adapted and modified by author from Martinez 2017.

Step 5: Conclusions and Recommendations

The fifth and final step in the research process is to deduce conclusions from the data

analysis and make informed recommendation to stakeholders and for future research to

be made. The overall application of the evaluation criteria reinforces significant impact

on the current Nigeria counter insurgency strategy with most impact on the organizational

structure and policy promulgation and moderate impact on training. The conclusions and

recommendations will follow in Chapter 5.

Chapter Conclusion

Will a border barrier system work in Nigeria as a counter insurgency strategy to significantly reduce Boko Haram insurgency operations? The answer is yes. A review and analysis of the literature shows that four different studies where this approach has worked to degrade and contain insurgency activities as a counterinsurgency operation. The application of the evaluation criteria conducted shows that overall there will be moderate impact to the Nigeria counterinsurgency strategy, in that there are agencies already established to address border security, a restructuring is required to make them more effective. Also there have been current policies enacted, they need to be amended to reflect the added responsibilities for the security stakeholders. The analysis also provided recommendations for stakeholders and informed areas for future research opportunities that will be discussed in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

This research is centered on a new approach in combating Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria. The literature reviews and analysis provided answers to two of three secondary questions. The evaluation criteria were used to answer one of the secondary questions. The answers to the secondary questions confirmed the answers to the primary question, "Will border barrier systems work in Nigeria as a counterinsurgency strategy to contain and degrade Boko Haram insurgency?". The answer is yes.

Conclusions

Border barriers will work in Nigeria to reduce the presence and influence of Boko Haram. Boko Haram has managed to survive for seventeen years leaving in its track significant destruction, loss of live of civilians, law enforcement agents, and soldiers Boko Haram is responsible for the kidnapping of 276 Chibook girls, suicide bombing sprees throughout Nigeria, in drive by shootings, raids on villages, and other forms of violence. Poverty of northern Nigeria, an unsecure border sets the conditions for Boko Haram.

Not surprising the Boko Harm sect took full advantage of the situation and continued to consolidate their foothold over time. In recent years, it has been a seesaw battle between the Multinational Joint Task Force and the Boko Haram insurgency at the same time humanitarian crisis is on the rise as a result of increased density of refugees

70

crossing the borers to more safer settlements along the Nigerian borders.

Although some may contend that building a physical security system on the borders may be expensive endeavor and personnel on hand are not adequate to man the borders, the literature review on the four countries examined rebuts that notion. The return on investment to secure one's borders, save lives and establish peace and order. There will be challenges on demarcation and delineation process, the prioritization of funding to the security agencies tasked with this effort, and more importantly the Nigerian government have to be committed to see it through, as in the cases examined, the project takes a few years to establish and once completed to sustain for the long haul.

Recommendations

Recommendation for the Nigerian stakeholders or decision makers: First I recommend to the Nigerian stakeholders and decision makers to exercise the installation of a border barrier system along its north east border region as a first step to serve as a deniability capability as an immediate deterrent to Boko Haram. Second, the Nigerian government prioritize adequate funding to the Nigerian Immigration Services and other security agencies to refine and tailor training to counterinsurgency, equip the agency with the right equipment needed to secure the borders, this can be in form of vehicles, weapons systems, communication equipment, surveillance equipment, aircraft support for aerial surveillance. This option entails the border security agencies will have personnel with the capacity to engage with Boko Haram insurgents with firepower and training reminiscent to the Nigeria military forces. Third, to reinforce manpower capacity by implementing a deliberate recruiting campaign process at the Nigerian Immigration Services and other security agencies to increase its personnel manning to fill the capacity

71

to patrol the Nigeria international borders. Furthermore, the government should improve its anticorruption campaign in its fight against corruption to enable policies or security measures advocated to be implemented with allocated resources and to establish measures of performance and effectiveness in each security agency in order to be able to properly assess how well these policies are being implemented and accounted for.

In 2017, the Nigerian government, the African Union (AU) and member countries of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) signed two Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) to jointly bolster cooperation in their fight against the Boko Haram terrorists. The Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) focused on mobilization of additional support to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), fighting the terrorists in the basin and Support Implementation Agreement (SIA) (The News 2017). The agreement will enable the African Union commission to source for funding from international partner nations to provide logistics support to sustain the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) operations (The News 2017).

This existing framework can be further expanded to include analysis of border security demarcation and delineation to jointly analyze and determine actionable measures and requirements for border security barrier system along their joint borders to ensure situational understanding and prevent confliction of the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) free movement protocol across the border. Thirdly the Nigerian government should establish a state controlled paramilitary organization trained in counterinsurgency techniques and tactics in order to establish a reserve manpower base to supplement border security personnel in their local areas.

Recommendations for Future Research

1. The underlying social, political and cultural issues impacting Nigerian counter Terrorism Strategy.

2. Lessons and best practices learned from Nigerian Counterinsurgency efforts against Boko Haram that are applicable to addressing Fulani extremism?

3. What options does Nigeria have in countering Boko Haram funding?

4. Repatriation and integration of former Boko Haram members back into Nigerian society.

Chapter Conclusion

The notion of installing border barrier systems as a deterrent to illegal immigration and terrorism has been a polarizing discussion issue in different parts of the world for the last few years for many reasons stemming from economic impact on the neighboring countries, ease of movement of people across borders, humanitarian crisis emanating from immigrants fleeing from war torn countries as well as the security threat of terrorists infiltration. At the onset of this research while examining the Boko Haram threat in northeast Nigeria, the researcher was uncertain on the viability of the border security system at the Nigerian borders due to the scale of its porosity. However, after review of similar cases of countries that have established border security systems along their borders with measurable outcomes of tangible results and successes for the short and long term basis, the researcher is convinced if the Nigerian government implement a border barrier system on its northeast borders, it will significantly reduce Boko Haram insurgency operations and bolster its fight against the Boko Haram. It will also set the conditions for the Nigerian government to reverse the volatile environment of fear and

instability created by Boko Haram and begin the process of restoring peace, normality

and stability to the war-torn north-east region.

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