TUAREGS AND MOORS RECURRENT REBELLIONS IN MALI: THE MALIAN SUCCESSIVE GOVERNMENTS’ RESPONSIBILITIES

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategic Studies

by

ABDOULAYE DIAKITÉ, MAJOR, MALIAN AIR FORCE
B.S., Faculty of Sciences and Technology, Bamako, Mali, 2004

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2019

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. United States Fair Use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the use of pictures, maps, graphics, and any other works incorporated into the manuscript. This author may be protected by more restrictions in their home countries, in which case further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible.
Since the 1960s, when a majority of African states gained independence from European colonial empires, African countries have confronted internal instabilities such as coup d’état, inter-ethnic conflicts, democratic movements, and insurgencies. One African country, which reflects the stereotypical image of Africa in perpetual conflict is Mali. The Republic of Mali has endured countless internal instabilities profoundly undermining its economic and social development. Mali has seen four upsurges, three coup d’états, a decade of domestic riots for democracy, and minor inter-ethnic issues. However, the most critical concern over others issues that have hindered the country’s momentum toward development is its cyclical Tuareg and Moor rebellions. Using the DIME framework, the author examines the Malian successive authorities’ counterinsurgency response to the recurrent upsurges occurring in the northern regions. The purpose of this study is to make recommendations for gaining and maintaining long-lasting peace and security in Mali. The cornerstone of these recommendations is a genuine economic and military engagement of the central Government.
Name of Candidate: Abdoulaye Diakité

Thesis Title: Tuaregs and Moors Recurrent Rebellions in Mali: The Malian Successive Governments’ Responsibilities

Approved by:

__________________________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Daniel C. Honken, M.S.

__________________________________________, Member
Phillip G. Pattee, Ph.D.

__________________________________________, Member
Michael J. Burke, M.Ed.

Accepted this 14th day of June 2019 by:

__________________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

TUAREGS AND MOORS RECURRENT REBELLIONS IN MALI: THE MALIAN SUCCESSIVE GOVERNMENTS’ RESPONSIBILITIES, by Major Abdoulaye Diakité, 87 pages.

Since the 1960s, when a majority of African states gained independence from European colonial empires, African countries have confronted internal instabilities such as coup d’état, inter-ethnic conflicts, democratic movements, and insurgencies. One African country, which reflects the stereotypical image of Africa in perpetual conflict is Mali. The Republic of Mali has endured countless internal instabilities profoundly undermining its economic and social development. Mali has seen four upsurges, three coup d’états, a decade of domestic riots for democracy, and minor inter-ethnic issues. However, the most critical concerns over others issues that have hindered the country’s momentum toward development is its cyclical Tuareg and Moor rebellions. These insurgencies always originate from the area called North Mali. Using the DIME framework, the author examines the Malian successive authorities’ counterinsurgency response to the recurrent upsurges occurring in the northern regions. The purpose of this study is to make recommendations for gaining and maintaining long-lasting peace and security in Mali. The cornerstone of these recommendations is a genuine economic and military engagement of the central Government.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Given the complexity and the particularity of this topic, it would be challenging to conduct this research without crucial advice, guidance, and support from people who deserve my acknowledgments. First of all, I express my sincere gratitude to my wife, Mrs. Diakité Assaita Nansa Diallo, who never stopped encouraging and supporting me. I would not have finished this paper without her insistence, prodding, and inspiring presence beside me during this challenging academic year in America. After that, I am profoundly grateful to my committee members, Dr. Phillip G. Pattee, Mr. Michael J. Burke, and the chairman of the committee, Mr. Daniel C. Honken. Their constant supervision, guidance, feedback, and reframing, whenever needed, were essential to the achievement of this research. Despite their absorbing schedule, they made themselves always available to help me keep up with this critical research. I feel blessed to have these sharp-witted instructors in my research committee. This paper could not be completed without the committee’s substantial contribution. It would be hard to end this acknowledgment without mentioning here the insistent advice and feedback that was provided by my Fort Leavenworth sponsor and friend, Colonel Frank Scott Victor. Throughout this research, he constantly suggested valuable feedback that was needed to improve the paper writing style and mechanics. Also, this paper considerably benefited from Mrs. Bonnie Joranko’s valuable advice. She significantly contributed to enhance the editing aspect of the research. Lastly, I am deeply grateful to the MMAS program’s staff, particularly Mrs. Anne Chapman, whose advice and critiques concerning the discipline and legal aspects of the research was indispensable to complete this paper.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Mali</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research question</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of Terms</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of the Study</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterinsurgency or COIN</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malian Insurgencies</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connection Between Insurgency and Terrorism in Mali</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study Methodology</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualitative Case Study Methodology</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures of Effectiveness</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lankan Diplomacy During the Tamil Insurgency</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Pages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REFERENCE LIST**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference List</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACRONYMS

AQIM  Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb

CNRDRE  Comité Nationale pour le Redressement de la Démocratie et la Restauration de l’État [National Committee for the Rehabilitation of Democracy and the Restoration of the State]

COIN  Counterinsurgency

DIME  Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic

GDP  Gross Domestic Product

GSPC  Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat [Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting]

LTTE  Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam


OE  Operational environment

RAFT  Relationships, Actors, Functions, and Tensions

US  United States
ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

Figure 1. Mali in Africa........................................................................................................1

Figure 2. Mali.......................................................................................................................4

Figure 3. Tuareg Traditional Regions in the Sahara .................................................................7
Since its independence, Mali has dealt with cyclic Tuareg and Moor rebellions. However, in early 2012, with strong support from Islamic terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb or AQIM and the *Mouvement pour l’Unicité du Jihad en
Afrique Occidentale [Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa], an unprecedented attack by Tuareg and Moor rebel forces swiftly defeated the Malian Armed Forces in the northern part of the country (Stewart 2013, 37). Within three months, the rebel and terrorist alliance successfully conquered eleven Malian military garrisons, one after another. Malian soldiers presented a feeble resistance to their adversaries and eventually retreated toward the southern part of the country, leaving the northern population at the mercy of Islamic extremist groups. The terrorist-allied rebellion groups then occupied almost 60 percent of the country. They introduced a fundamental form of Islamic sharia in their conquered territories, in which cutting off hands and arms for mere robbery or beating women for not covering their heads became routine in the northern part of the country. After inflicting these atrocities on the northern Malian people, the terrorist fighters sought to push southward with the deliberate intention of conquering the entire country.

Since the beginning of the conflict, the Malian Government desperately called for military assistance and intelligence-sharing from France to fight back against terrorist-allied rebellion groups as it has the most operational military forces deployed in the Saharan region. At first, France declined Malian calls for assistance in the name of the principle of non-interference. However, in January 2013, the French military eventually intervened to prevent a total control of Mali by extremist groups, and stopped the terrorists in the center of Mali at the village called Konna (Sayare and Polgreen 2013). This timely French military intervention was more aimed at preventing the region from widespread terrorism than genuinely helping the Malian state. French forces later helped
Malian Armed Forces retake control of its major cities, meanwhile enabling the Tuareg and Moor fighters to re-occupy Kidal region located in north eastern Mali.

In the south, the situation was as distressing as it was in the north. Since a military junta called in French Comité Nationale pour le Redressement de la Démocratie et la Restauration de l’État [National Committee for the Rehabilitation of Democracy and the Restoration of the State] (CNRDRE) had overthrown the democratically-elected Malian government nine months before, and was in dispute over power-sharing with a new civilian government backed by neighboring countries. Chaos prevailed in this desperate country. During the catastrophic downfall of the Malian nation, neighboring countries and the world largely were astonished by the rapidity and the effectiveness of terrorist-allied rebellion groups to occupy the vast territory (Stewart 2013, 37). More surprisingly, the Malian people were profoundly disappointed by the reduced level of performance their armed forces displayed while facing this adversity. Additionally, the world was stunned by the obvious weakness of Malian institutions to deal with the new threats the country was facing.

The typical question by Malians when this tragedy happened was, why had the Malian authorities disgracefully failed to protect its people against a mere Tuareg rebellion and their terrorist’s allies? For a more comprehensive answer to the issue, it is necessary to trace the problem back to its roots. Hence, relevant questions must be elaborated upon, such as who are the Tuaregs and Moors in Malian society, and what are their claims? Why did successive Malian governments fail to solve the rebellion issues since the first uprising in 1963? Why is this country enduring cyclical Tuareg and Moor
insurgencies? Why are their solutions flawed? How did the terrorist groups blatantly settle in the country without any proper reaction from the authorities?

The Republic of Mali, commonly called Mali, is a land locked country located in West Africa. Mali shares part of the vast region of the savanna and Sahara Desert north of the tropical rain forests along the Guinean coast. It encompasses over 478,841 square miles (1,240,192 square kilometers), approximately twice the size of Texas in the United States. Around 65 percent of its territory is either desert or semi-desert, and the remaining part is the sub-Saharan savanna.

Figure 2. Mali

The longest course of Africa’s third largest river, the Niger River, runs through Mali. This river is viewed as the lifeblood of the country since it drives the secondary and tertiary economies. Mali is one of the most impoverished countries in the world. The Human Development Index, used by the United Nations to measure a country’s progress, ranked Mali 182 out 189 countries (UNDP 2018). The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Mali was worth $15.29 billion in 2017, holding the 109th nominal GDP position, with a GDP per capita of $762.22 according to Trading Economics (Trading Economics 2018). Its national debt in 2016 was $5,040 million, (35.89 percent debt-to-GDP ratio), and its public debt per capita is $280 per inhabitant according to the same source (Trading Economics 2018). Agricultural and livestock ranging are the main activities of the population, which provides more than half of the GDP. The three largest exports are gold, livestock, and cotton.

As a former French colony, the official language is French; however, at least forty different African languages are spoken in Mali. The country is ranked at the 62nd position by population of 196 countries since Malian population was estimated at 19,285 million inhabitants in 2018 (World Population Review 2018). Islam is the principal religion since 90 percent of population claim themselves as Muslim, and the remaining majority are Catholic Christians or Protestants. The country is sparsely populated; around 90 percent of the population live in the arid southern part where the climate is less harsh and encompasses around 40 percent of the country’s area. The dominant ethnic groups living in the south are the Mandinka (such as Mandinka, Sarakole, Kassonké, Bambara, Dogon), which represent more than 70 percent of the total population.
The northern part of the country, where the rebellions frequently rise from, is populated with only 10 percent of the Malian inhabitants. The dominant ethnic groups living in this large part of the country are the Tuaregs, Moors, and Songhai. In comparison to the rest of the country, this area is very impoverished, not only due to the climate (desert), but also because of the lack of necessary infrastructures to connect the region to the southern part of the country. “The states in this region lack the resources, both financial and institutional capacity, to effectively meet the challenges of organized militancy and criminality” (Stewart 2013, 6).

Tuaregs and Moors are two ethnic groups mainly living in the Sahara. The Tuaregs are the descendants of the Berbers, and are reputed to be the first inhabitants of the Sahara (Lecocq 2010). The Moors, however, are related to the Maghreb Arabic settlers coming from the Middle-East. Besides living in the Sahara and having lighter skin color than the other Malian ethnic groups, the Tuaregs and Moors have a nomadic way of life economically and culturally centered on livestock. In contrast to the other Malian ethnic groups living in the south, whose main economic activities are agriculture, fishing, goldmining, and herding, they perceive the Sahara as their land and are profoundly pastoralist (Lecocq 2010, 11). Therefore, some of their leaders want a country centered on the Sahara. According to several sources, the unwillingness of the northern populace to be part of Mali since the eve of independence is the primary origin of the Malian rebellions.
Just before the end of its colonization, France officially created the l’Organisation Commune des Regions Sahara [The Common Organization of the Sahara Regions] to promote the Saharan region and enabled its economic expansion according to the French official discourses. However, from the perspective of the leaders of future Saharan countries, such as Mali, Niger, Chad, and Algeria, this new organization was an attempt by France to create a new country under their direct domination, and to weaken African
independence movements. While the African leaders were strongly opposed to this new organization, several prominent Tuareg and Moors personalities in French Sudan (the future Mali) were actively advocating for the Common Organization of the Sahara Regions. They perceived this organization as a premise for a future Saharan-centered country where they would not be the minority ethnic groups. Lecocq asserted that the Tuaregs in particular did not want to be part of Mali (Lecocq 2010, 157). That is the reason some of the Tuaregs and Moors essential figures strived during the colonization era for the creation and development of the Common Organization of the Sahara Regions, hoping this organization will be the blueprint of a future Sahara-centered state (Lecocq 2010, 44).

**History of Mali**

Mali has been the place of significant medieval empires of Sahara and sub-Saharan. This history was passed on to the rest of the world thanks to prominent world-known, Arabic historians such as Ibn Battuta or Ibn Khaldun. The area known as Mali was once part of three famed West African empires, characterized by strong leadership, which economic and political power was based upon trade in gold and salt with the rest of the world (Federal Research Division 2005).

The first great sub-Saharan empire was the Empire of Ghana, which came into existence sometime after 500 CE and lasted until late in the twelfth century (Conrad 2005). Situated in Western Sahara, its territory encompassed the south of current Mauritania and the west of current Mali. It was founded by the Sarakoles, one of the Mandinka ethnic groups, in the eighth century, and lasted four centuries before invasions by the Almoravids from the Kingdom of Morocco.
The second great empire, which gave its name to current Mali, was the Empire of Mali. It was founded in 1235 by a Mandinka prince named Soundiata Keita. The social scientist, Maria Bessler, contended that Emperor Soundiata, known as a kind and respectful ruler, ruled over the Empire of Mali that expanded through smaller surrounding kingdoms who pledged their allegiance. The new empire encompassed the salt mines of the north and the gold mines of south. The Niger River was the main source of water for this landlocked empire (Bessler 2008).

The Empire of Mali was built upon the reunification of several Mandinka kingdoms in southwest Sahara. This empire became the most prominent in the western sub-Saharan region during the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries according to Ibn Khaldun (Conrad 2005). At the culmination of its glory, the Malian Empire encompassed part of the current territories of Mali, Guinea, Senegal, Burkina-Faso, Mauritania, and Niger. The dynasty of Keita ruled this territory for more than three centuries. Even though Soundiata Keita’s brilliant story remains in the south of the Sahara, his successors were known worldwide. Among the well-known princes of the Empire is the eighth Emperor “Mansa” of Mali, Abu-Bakr II, and his successor Kanku Moussa (Conrad 2005).

A profound explorer, the Mansa Abu-Bakr II abdicated his throne to see “the End” of the Atlantic Ocean. According to the Malian narrative, he left his native Mali and headed west through the Atlantic, accompanied with hundreds of boats loaded with men, nourishment, and gold, but never came back. His next successor, the Mansa Kanku Moussa, another famous prince of the Malian Empire, marked West African history. He became well known throughout the world after his travel to Mecca in Arabia for a
pilgrimage bringing thousands of camels loaded with gold, where “he awakened the world to the stupendous wealth of Mali” (Graft-Johnson 2018). This famous imperial pilgrimage caused tremendous inflation in the value of gold throughout the world, which lasted for decades.

After the decline of the Malian Empire in the fifteenth century, Mali’s last great empire was known as the Songhai Empire. Even though it encompassed the same territory as the previous Malian Empire, its area, wealth, and influence largely surpassed the previous empire. Its capital city was the city of Gao, located in the southernmost part of the Sahara along the Niger River. Two principal dynasties ruled the Songhai Empire, the Sonni Dynasty from 1464 to 1493 and the Askia Dynasty from 1493 to 1591. The first prominent leader of the Sonni Dynasty, called Sonni Ali Ber, brought the Songhai Empire to greatness during his rule from 1464 to 1492 by battling the Mossi and later the Tuareg at Timbuktu, and the Dogon and Fulani at Bandiagara (DLI 2001). After the decline of Songhai Empire, Mali saw several small kingdoms fighting each other until the invasion of the territory by the French Colonial Army in the late nineteenth century. During French colonization, the territory was called the French Sudan.

The historical contest among the European great empires did not spare the African continent. West African territories were the scene of imperial dispute between France and Great Britain. The current Malian boundaries were derived from the French West African territory called Sudan, named by the first Arabic historian-geographer as Billad es Sudan meaning the “Land of the Blacks.” According to McNamara, the three most essential elements underlying the French invasion of Africa were France’s defeat by the Prussians in 1870, the need of raw materials, and a fear that Great Britain would annex those
territories if France did not (McNamara 1989). But later the French also perceived Africa as a source of military manpower that could balance Germany’s burgeoning population while France’s stagnated. Later this perception was reinforced by experience in two World Wars. McNamara contended that the earliest substantial and sustained French contact with Africa involved the slave trade.

The expression of France’s desire to create an African empire can be dated from the appointment of Louis Faidherbe as Governor of Senegal in 1854. Faidherbe first sought to consolidate a French base in Senegal and later to extend French influence far beyond the Niger River to the west. Three West African kingdoms threatened this ambitious project. According to McNamara, the greatest immediate threat blocking Faidherbe’s plan was a large and aggressive Tokolor army led by El Hadj Omar. El Hadj Omar and his successors resisted French invasion for twenty-six years before being completely defeated in 1880. After that, the most potent of these threats came from the Mandinka people and their leader, Samory Touré, who successfully created an empire for himself with its seat at Kankan in the Futa Djallon region of what is now Guinea (McNamara 1989). In all, it took several years of intermittent fighting to defeat Samory, who was finally captured in 1889 and exiled to the inhospitable climate of southern Gabon, where he died two years later. After the defeat of Samory, the French Colonial Army suffered no resistance until the end of the Second World War.

In the late 1940s, French West Africa, including Mali, saw burgeoning optimism regarding political activity. In 1946, the Bamako Conference produced French Africa’s first and most successful mass inter-territorial political party, the Rassemblement Democratique Africain [African Democratic Rally], a giant step toward decolonization.
The pace of events in French Africa had accelerated after the defeat of the French in 1954 at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam and the outbreak of civil war in Algeria (McNamara 1989).

The 1950s in Africa was marked by general protests and political demands for independence. The French Sudanese politicians, like their West African peers, engaged in an intense non-violent political struggle (demonstration, strike, and debate) to free the region, which later became the Republic of Mali. However, facing the tenacious disapproval of Saharan political leaders, France eventually terminated the development and empowerment of the Common Organization of the Sahara Regions accordingly. In early 1960, African states started to declare their independence, basing their borders on the French former colonies’ boundaries.

On 22 September 1960, the Republic of Mali declared its independence from France after the failed attempt to form a federation with Senegal in early 1960. Modibo Keita, the leader of the Malian struggle for independence, became the first president. Three years later, the country endured its first Tuareg and Moor insurgency. After a violent military retaliation, Malian armed forces dismantled the insurgency. Five years later, a military committee overthrew President Modibo Keita, and Lieutenant Moussa Traoré became the president from 1968 to 1991.

Malian people lived in relative peace in the 1970s and 1980s, but in 1990s, the Tuareg and Moor insurgents struck again resulting in the second Tuareg and Moor rebellion. Better equipped, organized, and trained than the first insurgency, this rebellion accomplished several military victories. The Malian authorities led by General Moussa Traoré was under fierce pressure from both sides of the country. In the south, domestic protestors for the establishment of democracy paralyzed the major cities, while in the
north, successive military defeats caused by the insurgents destabilized the region. Therefore, the Government signed a peace agreement called “Accord of the Tamanraset,” which permitted President Traoré to shift troops from the North the South to deal with the riot. Ironically, one year after the peace agreement, President Moussa Traoré was overthrown by a second military coup which brought the Republic of Mali to “democratic” governance. Unfortunately, the country endured another Tuareg and Moor rebellion in 2006.

The fourth Tuareg and Moor insurgency launched in 2011 was the most alarming threat for the international community. For Malian soldiers, it was the deadliest insurgency facing the greatest combat power by rebel forces. The insurgents allied their forces with well-organized Islamic extremist groups, such as MUJAO in French *Mouvement pour l’Unicité du Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest*, AQIM, and *An Sardine*, flourishing in Mali for a decade. After defeating the Malian Armed forces in the North in 2012, the two former allies fought each other. Eventually, the Islamic terrorist groups triumphed over the Tuareg and Moor insurgents, who ended up retreating toward Burkina Faso and Mauritania.

From the late 2012 to the early 2013, the North Mali was entirely controlled by the terrorist groups. The French Military Intervention, called in French *Operation Serval*, launched in January 2013, stopped the terrorist groups from their attempt to invade the South Mali. Subsequently, the Security Council of the United Nations, adopted the resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013. Through the deployment of a peacekeeping mission, this resolution was aimed to consolidate security and support political processes in the country. The French military intervention and the deployment of the UN peacekeeping
force in Mali demonstrates Malian authorities’ failure to address this old-aged instability in the Northern region and to provide peace and security.

**Research Question**

In this study, the primary research question is why has Mali historically been unable to find a lasting solution for Tuareg and Moor rebellions?

The author will answer this question through three secondary questions that are:

1. What types of approaches the different Malian governments adopted to address the northern issues?

2. How did Tuareg and Moors rebellions become cyclical?

3. Why did the governmental responses fail to durably address the northern issues?

**Assumptions**

To remain on track for qualitative research, there is a need to make some assumptions that will not be covered by the topic, but will inevitably affect the outcome of this research.

1. The Malian government and the insurgent groups, after signing the latest peace agreement, called *Accord d’Alger*, will encounter several difficulties to implement the term of this peace agreement.

2. The terrorist groups implanted in the northern Mali will continue to broaden their influence southward while the central government will strengthen its military and administrative power to counter the threat.

4. The later evidence of the tacit cooperation between the insurgents in the terrorist groups will force France to stop it unilateral cooperation with the Tuareg and Moors insurgents and work exclusively with the Malian legitimate authorities, which is the Malian Government.

**Scope**

The high mobility of the Saharan nomadic population and the concept of nonexistent borders in the Sahara by its inhabitant lead the Saharan countries to share similar issues. Therefore, this research will be centered upon the Malian case of Tuareg and Moor rebellions. The simultaneity of Tuareg and Moor uprisings in both Mali and Niger, a neighboring country, will be considered. However, the main focus will be on the interaction between these insurgents and the central government of Mali. The research will be driven by a qualitative analysis of the broad literature upon the topic, supported by the author’s personal experience in the field during the last insurgency.

This research will not thoroughly address the radicalization of Islam in northern Mali nor the terrorism groups’ interaction with the central government.

The Sri Lankan case study will essentially focus on COIN strategy of President Rajapaksa from 2005 to 2015, who ultimately crushed the Tamil insurgency.
Definition of Terms

**Gao:** Region of Mali located in northeastern Mali and largely populated by the Songhaï, but also has significant Tuareg, Moors, and Peulh population;

**Ifoghas, Adagh, or Tigharghar Mountain:** A mountainous area located between the northeastern part of Mali in Kidal region, southwest of Algeria. Its highest peak is about three thousand feet.

**Islamic Sharia:** Pronounced SHA-ree-ah in Arabic, means “way” or “path.” It is the overall way of life of Islam, and laws that drove this way of life from 700 to 900 CE after the Prophet Muhammad died in 632 CE. It is based on interpretations of the Qur’an (the Holy Book of Islam) and words and actions by the Prophet Muhammad. Sharia can evolve with Islamic societies to address their needs today (An-Nai’m 2019).

**Kidal:** Region of Mali located in the most northeastern area of Mali. It is largely populated by Tuaregs, and it is reputed to be the stronghold of the Tuaregs.

**Ménaka:** Region located in the easternmost part of Mali and largely populated by Tuareg, but also has a significant Tuareg Peulh population.

**Mandinka:** Manding, Malinke, or Manding is a West African ethnic group who speak the *Mandekan*. They are divided into numerous independent groups dominated by a hereditary nobility, which make their particularity in south Saharan region (Pauls 2019, s.v. “Malinke,” accessed 7 April 2019, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Malinke). The Manding people account for approximatively 50 percent of Malian population and living in the southern part of the country.

**North Mali:** The Republic of Mali is administratively divided into nineteen regions. The area called North Mali encompasses the five regions located in the
northeastern part of the country. Those regions are Tombouctou, Gao, Kidal, and Menaka.

  **Tombouctou:** Region located in the northeastern part of Mali and largely populated by both Moors and Songhaï, but also has a significant Peulh population.

  **Taoudeni:** Region located in the easternmost part of the Mali and largely populated by the Moors and Tuaregs.

**Significance of the Study**

There are several books written about the peoples living in Sahara, particularly the Tuareg, usually called “the Blue Men.” Those writings mainly focus on the way of life in the dry, hot, and harsh desert. Several other writings tackle the Tuareg insurgencies in Mali in the manner of magnifying and legitimating it. This research is conducted in the unique purpose of identifying the core reasons for Tuareg and Moor insurgencies, focusing on their cyclical aspect. To that extent, the historic background will be useful. Understanding the historical context and the underlying factors which made the problem so complex is the main objective of the author.

On one hand, all four major rebellions which occurred in Mali are inter-related and inherent to a profound independentism aspiration of some Tuareg and Moor people. On the other hand, seriously impeded by opportunism, corruption, and lack of long-term vision, the different central governments have never really controlled or governed the northern territory (65 percent of the country’s total surface). After, analyzing all the interaction between these two antagonists, this research will provide a feasible solution to overcome the Malian problem.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Insurgency

Insurgency is an uprising or a rebellion of a group of people against a government or a local authority. Throughout the world and throughout history, many countries endured this violent form of protest. There are several similar definitions of insurgency in world literature. O’Neil defines insurgency “as a struggle between a non-ruling group and a ruling authority” (O’Neill 2005, 1). Another writer, Captain Christopher Ford, from the United States (US) Military Academy at West Point, contends that an insurgency is “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict” (Ford 2007, 7). One of the most complete definitions of insurgency is in the RAND Counterinsurgency Paper 4, where the authors use the Central Intelligence Agency’s definition of an insurgency that stated:

Insurgency is a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. Insurgent activity— including guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political mobilization—is designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy. The common denominator of most insurgent groups is their desire to control a particular area (RAND 2007, 7).

Insurgency has probably been the most prevalent armed conflict since the creation of organized political community (state), which consists of those who interact in regular basis in process of making binding decisions (O’Neill 2005). It is usually waged by a group that is unable to reach their objectives through the legal process of the country concerned by this issue. An insurgency could be waged either to change a policy, to
implement new policy or law, or to gain autonomy or independence. O’Neil suggests nine causes of insurgency or types of insurgents:

1. Anarchist: One who does not believe in authority system and seeks to destroy it.

2. Egalitarian: One who tends to fight for an ultimate value of distributional equality and centrally controlled power. Some groups bearing this form of insurgency claim communist ideal as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia.

3. Traditionalist: One who demands primordial and sacred values rooted in ancestral ties and religion. One of the best examples is the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

4. Apocalyptic-Utopian: One who fights for establishing a world order as the result of an apocalypse precipitated by their act of terrorism.

5. Pluralist: One who seeks a system that emphasizes the values of individual freedom, liberty, and compromise, in which political structures are differentiated and autonomous.

6. Secessionist (or Separatist): One who seeks to withdraw from the political community. The Tuareg and Moor insurgency in Mali, Vietminh in Indochina, or the American Confederate States are some of the illustrations of this type of insurgency.

7. Reformist: One who focuses on the economic, psychological, and political benefits that society has to offer.

8. Preservationist: One who is “oriented toward maintaining the status quo because of their relative political, economic, and social privileges they derive from.”
8. Commercial: One who fights for political power that will allow them to control the country’s legal or illegal trade (O’Neill 2005).

As mentioned above, the causes of an insurgency could be multiple and complex. However, the success of an insurgency depends upon the definition and the explanation of its causes, which must be profound and sensitive enough be to legitimate. Galula explained that the early combatants and active elements of an insurgency are recruited by a profound persuasion. Therefore, “the best cause for insurgent’s purpose is one that, by definition, can attract the largest number of supporters and repel the minimum of opponents” (Galula 1964, 13).

In addition, Mets and Millen argue that “the greater the pool of bored, angry, unoccupied young men in a society, the more fruitful ground for insurgent organizers to work” (Metz and Millen 2004, 4). Also, they continued that “many states in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and even on the periphery of Europe were ruled by weak, corrupt regimes; unpopular dictators; new, fragile governments; or colonial occupiers” (Metz and Millen 2004, 8). Those states are very likely to be confronted with an insurgency. Besides this, the Cold War provoked several insurgencies as a “form of proxy conflict caused by the nuclear stalemate between the superpowers. Because direct confrontation between the West and East risked escalation to the thermonuclear level, proxy conflict was considered a safe option” (Metz and Millen 2004, 10).

However, besides the causes, an insurgency has other criteria and variables that will positively or negatively affect the outcome of the struggle. Thus, O’Neil suggested the magnitude of popular and external support, organization, cohesion, environment, and the government’s role as criteria (O’Neill 2005). Also, Clausewitz listed five conditions
under which a general uprising could be effective (Clausewitz 1984). The first is the theater of the operations has to be located within the country. The second is the decision to wage insurgency must be decided unanimously. The third is the theater of operation must be very large. The fourth is the insurgency’s need to have a national character. The last is the country must be inaccessible and rough.

Among these variables, geographic conditions have a tremendous impact on the success of an insurgency. Galula contended that when a country is isolated, insurgents will have less chance of success, while the larger the country, the more difficult for a government to control it. Furthermore, a country easy to compartmentalize hinders insurgency. As an example, Galula cited Indonesia, which crushed rebellions in the Moluccas, Amboina, and another islands. Also, the climate and terrain help insurgents when it is rugged and difficult, such as the Sierra Maetra in the Cuban revolutionary’s case. As to rough terrain, the Malian case is a good illustration since the Sahara Desert constituted a safe haven for all rebel and terrorist groups operating in both Mali and Niger. Also, Baron de Jomini explained that, “The nature of the country may be such as to contribute to the facility of a national defense. In mountainous countries the people are always most formidable; next to these are countries covered with extensive forests. . . . Large forests, as well as rocky regions, favor this kind of defense” (Jomini 1868, 30). The national war that de Jomini is referring to is an insurgency waged to fight an invading army in the Napoleonic wars. Besides the terrain, external support to an insurgency can be either moral, political, or financial, and a military is profoundly critical for the success of an insurgency (Galula 1964).
Additionally, an effective insurgency will require crafting the most suitable and realistic strategy to permit the final victory. O’Neil came out with four popular strategies in recent and present times. They are conspiratorial, protracted popular warfare, military focus approach, and urban warfare. On one hand, conspiratorial strategy focuses on an elite group and conducts low scale violence while protracted popular warfare concentrates upon political primacy by gathering a large group of supporters and waging gradual violence. On the other hand, a military focus approach stresses military primacy and concentrates efforts on conducting straightforward guerilla or conventional warfare while the urban warfare emphasizes terrorist and guerrilla attacks in urban centers.

**Counterinsurgency or COIN**

COIN is the response of a government or local authority to an insurgency. In the RAND Counterinsurgency Paper 4, the authors use the Central Intelligence Agency’s definition of counterinsurgency, which “consists of those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (RAND 2007). According to O’Neil, Professor Walter Sonderlund explained that the outcome of an insurgency does not merely depend upon the insurgents’ strategy and effectiveness, but instead more importantly upon the initial “vigor, determination and skill with which the incumbent regime acts to defend himself both politically and militarily” (O’Neill 2005, 155). To do so, a reactive regime will set upfront an effective COIN program that depends on “an accurate, substantive, and comprehensive profile of the adversary and the environmental. . . . The more government responses are informed, prudent, relevant, determined, and disciplined, the greater the burden on the insurgents” (O’Neill 2005, 155).
However, the success of the government response will be affected by four factors contended by Galula. The first is a national consensus, as in Thailand—the Thais’ love for their King underpinned any insurgency. The second is the resoluteness of counterinsurgent leadership. A genuine determination by the government to keep strain upon an insurgency will inevitably undermine the insurgents’ effectiveness. Next, the COIN leaders’ knowledge of counterinsurgency warfare is essential to conduct regular forces toward victory. Lastly, the government needs to possess an assertive system to control the population long before the uprising. Galula listed four instruments of control that are indispensable for the success of COIN. These instruments are a good political structure, an effective administrative bureaucracy, a vigilant and proactive police force, and, more importantly, an efficient armed force (Galula 1964).

A successful COIN operation leans upon four pillars. The first is population support. Metz and Millen contended that the US Army doctrine’s model of insurgency war follow a triangular logic in which “the insurgents and the counterinsurgents are simultaneously at war with one another and competing for public support” (Metz and Millen 2004, 17). Therefore, the government must prioritize civil assistance and security operation to win the hearts and minds of the population. The second is the adaptability and quick learning of COIN leaders (Metz and Millen 2004). Since insurgents usually tend to be flexible and fight in a very known terrain, the COIN forces need to learn rapidly and develop creative and critical thinking skills indispensable in the realm. The third is time, COIN leaders always need time to react quickly and efficiently. An attrition war usually benefits the insurgents; Metz and Millen made this metaphor “As with health care, a small effort early is more effective than a major one later on” in COIN war (Metz
and Millen 2004, 27). And finally, the last is unified action. Metz and Millen cited that “full integration of all government agencies under unified control (and preferably unified command) is the only way to synchronize the elements of national power effectively” (Metz and Millen 2004, 29).

**Malian Insurgencies**

Beyond the political dimension as the core reasons for insurgencies in Mali, some northern populations consider themselves differently from the vast majority of the southern population regarding their culture and tradition. One of the best illustrations of this assertion is Lecocq’s book, *Disputed Desert*, in which the former rebel, Bibi ag Ghassi, contended, “We had no ideological concepts that come with a revolution. We were essentially motivated to save our identity, and by the wish to reconquer the independence the French had given to us, and which the Malians had confiscated to their own benefit” (Lecocq 2010, 160).

However, the deep and tacit motivation of the Tuareg and Moor insurgencies could be racial, as Moyar said, “Racial differences also account for conflict between the Tuaregs and other Malians. The Tuaregs once helped enslave the Manding, and they have since continued to view the Manding as inferior” (Moyar 2015, 5). Besides this, Lecocq cited a confession of a Tuareg fighter captured during the first rebellion by the Malian forces, who referred to the same issues. Captured rebel Amouksou ag Azandeher asserted, “The reasons are numerous, but the main ones are: nomads of the white race, can neither conceive nor accept to be commanded by blacks whom we always had as servants and slaves” (Lecocq 2010, 159). However, it is important to mention that the author, Baz Lecocq, contested the credibility of this confession since he believes that it
was obtained under torture. In a summation, there are several main triggering factors of the Tuareg and Moor rebellions, which range from economic to identity dimensions. Also, it is worth mentioning that several other reasons were brought out by the different insurgents throughout the last four decades.

Connection Between Insurgency and Terrorism in Mali

Mali saw three Tuareg and Moor rebellions from 1963 to 1996 without any direct connection to terrorism. However, the 2011’s insurgency, by far the deadliest and the more efficient, was underpinned by a tacit alliance between rebel groups and the terrorist groups. There are several writings about how the terrorist groups settled in Mali without any genuine opposition of the Malian government. The terrorism in Mali originated from the neighboring country, Algeria. This country, after a decade of violent struggle against terrorist groups, defeated them and made a peace agreement which most of the terrorist groups signed and stopped combat. However, minor obstinate groups such the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) refused to sign the peace agreement and resumed combat. Eventually, the Algeria Armed Forces overwhelmed the recalcitrant terrorist groups and drove them out their country.

Northern Mali has been an ungoverned and unstable place for decades, due to the weakness of the Malian state combined with the recurrent rebellions and the economic fragility of the region. It became the ideal safe haven for terrorist groups fleeing Algeria. In 2007, GSPC officially pledged support for Al-Qaeda and became Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Moyar explained that, “AQIM capitalized on the lack of effective Malian central government presence in the region while leveraging the existing conflict between the Tuareg and the central government to their benefit” (Stewart 2013,
Moreover, to win the hearts and minds, terrorist groups substituted themselves for local authorities by providing security to the local population and conducting several food and wealth distributions, thanks to the money gained from hostage-taking and drug and cigarette trafficking. Moyar also attributed AQIM’s recruiting successes in the region to its ability to provide food in areas where the government could not offer any services (Moyar 2015, 15).

In this situation, the main concern was the complacency and laxity of both local Moor and Tuareg authorities and the Malian central government. According to Thurston, “AQIM also cultivated contacts among Malian Arabs and the Tuareg. Additionally, AQIM and its intermediaries built networks of collusion with Malian state officials who tolerated smuggling and kidnapping” (Thurston 2017, 17). Moreover, several strong accusations are weighed over Malian statesmen. Moyar contended that, “Foreign diplomats complained that the Arab militias were collaborating with AQIM and participating in drug trafficking and kidnapping, but President Touré appeared unconcerned, content to condone smuggling by both the Arabs and AQIM since he could take fees from both groups.

During this same period, however, Salafist preachers were making inroads with elements of Mali’s Tuareg population. AQIM members were strengthening their ties with Tuaregs through marriages and business relationships.” Even more, Moyar said that, “Further complicating American assistance to Mali’s security forces was a lack of commitment from the top of Mali’s government. President Touré was talking of getting tough with AQIM, vowing to wage a “total struggle,” but in practice, he was not vigorous in combating AQIM. Other countries suspected that Touré had a “non-aggression” pact
with AQIM in order to augment his personal wealth and avoid attacks in Bamako and other cities that would undermine the image of a great leader he was seeking to cultivate” (Moyar 2015, 18).

Therefore, the terrorists settled Northern Mali as a stronghold and continued to conduct their illicit operations such as drug and cigarette trafficking from this place with total impunity. From this safe haven, they captured and held several European hostages, who were exchanged for money to enable them to broaden their influence throughout the host country and perform more hostage taking. Tuareg and Moor insurgent leaders realized the excellent organization and combat power of the terrorist groups, and seized the opportunity by forming an alliance with them. Strengthened by more combatants coming from Libya after the downfall of Kaddafi’s regime and allying their forces to the terrorist groups, the insurgent leaders launched the Moors and Tuareg’s fourth rebellion to conquer northern Mali in the name of independence of Azawad.

**Case Study Methodology**

According to Zaina, the qualitative case study is “an intensive analysis of an individual unit (as a person or community) stressing developmental factors in relation to environment” (Zaina 2007). Furthermore, Yin argued that the case study focused on decisions in order to explain why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result (Yin 2014, 15). Since case study method requires a profound examination of the data within a specific context, the author will follow Yin’s four principles while compiling data, which are:

1. Use multiple sources of evidence.
2. Create a case study data base.


**Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME)**

According to Shehadey, the US military leaders utilize the DIME to highlight the necessity of employing other instruments of national power besides military power to address a conflict. Combined with financial, intelligence, and law enforcement, the DIME-financial, intelligence, and law enforcement consists of the whole statecraft resources within the national security framework to be applied to the operational environments (Shehadey 2013). According to the Joint Doctrine Note 1-18, *Strategy*, the DIME perspective facilitates the employment of national power’s instruments involving certain critical departments of the nation such as the Departments of State, Defense, and Economy as well as the intelligence community (JCS 2018a).

In the Joint Doctrine Note 1-18, the diplomatic aspect of the DIME analyzes how a nation interacts with state or non-state actors to find or protect some form of agreement in the interest of both conflicting parties. Meanwhile, the use of the informational instrument of national power creates and exploits information as well as disrupting knowledge (JCS 2018a). Concerning the military portion of the DIME, the nation’s military instrument of power is merely the use of military force, threatening its application, or enabling other parties for the purpose of imposing the country’s will on another party to achieve strategic ends (JCS 2018a). Lastly, according to Joint Publication 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, the use of the economic instrument of the national power consists of stimulating or restricting change in people’s economic capability.
Summary

The literature portrays insurgency as an uprising or a rebellion of a group of people against a government or a local authority. Many countries endure this violent form of protest, which sometimes brought freedom and democracy while other times causes chaos and stalemate. To face an insurgency, official authorities utilize COIN, which also could take various forms. COIN is the response of a government or local authority to an insurgency. The Central Intelligence Agency’s definition of counterinsurgency is “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency” (RAND 2007).

In Malian context, the Tuareg and Moor insurgencies are described as motivated by political and economic reasons combined with age old racial tensions in the region. The Tuaregs once contributed to the enslavement of the Manding people through the slave trade between the southern Sahara and the Middle East. From its independence, Mali endured three rebellions before seeing the 2011’s insurgency, which were a tacit alliance between rebel groups and terrorist groups, and was by far the deadliest. There are several writings about terrorist groups settling in Mali, which started after their defeat in Algeria.

This research will utilize the DIME framework to analyze Malian Tuareg and Moor insurgencies through a qualitative case study, which will compare and contrast Malian insurgencies to the Tamil insurgencies in Sri Lanka.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In this study, the primary research question is why has Mali historically been unable to find a lasting solution for Tuareg and Moor rebellions? The subsidiary questions are:

1. What types of approaches did the different Malian governments adopt to address the northern issues?
2. How did Tuareg and Moors rebellions become cyclical?
3. Why did the governmental responses fail to durably address the northern issues?

Regarding this paper’s questions and the significance of the topic, the research will follow the pattern of qualitative case study research methodology. This method is adopted because of the inherent strength of case study methodology.

Qualitative Case Study Methodology

According to Zaina, the qualitative case study is “an intensive analysis of an individual unit (as a person or community) stressing developmental factors in relation to environment” (Zaina 2007). In this study, the units referred to hereafter as “the cases” are the Malian COIN strategies from 1963 to 2012 and the Sri Lankan COIN strategies from 1983 to 2009. Following Zaina’s definition of case study, the author will compare and contrast the two cases to have better comprehension of the Malian governmental responses to the northern insurgencies and suggest recommendations. Furthermore, Baxter and Jack contended that qualitative case study methodology is an attempt that
enables exploration of a phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources (Baxter and Jack 2008). The case study is tremendously relevant in research where the primary question is either “why” or “how,” and is based on contemporary events as contended by Yin (Yin 2014). As mentioned previously, this research is based on Malian Tuareg and Moor insurgencies, which are a contemporary preoccupation in Western Africa. It is worth noting that case study research constrains the researcher to having less control over research collection data and the final analysis. This type of research permits the utilization of a large spectrum of evidence, such as documents and observation.

Yin argued that the case study focuses on decisions in order to explain why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result (Yin 2014, 15). In the Malian case, the main concerns will be the profound analysis of solutions the Malian government implemented, and learn why they failed to solve the issue. The author will try to understand both Malian and the Sri Lankan contemporary insurgencies through case study methodology, in hope that the understanding is likely to involve important conditions that are relevant to the final analysis. Yin contended that both single and multiple cases could be utilized in the case study research in order to draw a set of “cross-case” conclusions (Yin 2014, 20). Therefore, the author will analyze the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka in addition to the Malian Tuareg and Moor case to compare and contrast the Malian authority’s effectiveness with the Sri Lanka governmental response. The author follows Yin’s suggestion of qualitative case study.

First, there is a need to design the research by finding the cases and establishing the logic of the case study. In this first part, determining the five components of a research design are especially important. The first three components are case study
questions, propositions, and units of analysis. The first three components will drive the research to define the data to be collected. After that, the author will concentrate on the last two components to define the logic linking the data to the proposition and the criteria for interpreting the finding. Those last two will enable the data use and what outcome to expect from the analysis (Yin 2014).

Secondly, the author will collect relevant evidence for the analysis. Yin contended that several sources need to be utilized for good qualitative case study (Yin 2014). Among the six sources suggested by Yin (documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and physical artifact), this research will be conducted by using documentation and archival records. This choice is motivated by the fact that documentation and archival records are more established (Yin 2014). However, the author will strive to collect the most informative data for the cases and pay particular attention to his own bias, which can negatively affect the analysis as he has been directly involved in the Malian case as mentioned earlier. Also, to render the study more objective, there is a need to acknowledge some of the common criticisms toward the case study, such as bias toward verification. This bias is a tendency to confirm the researcher’s preconceived notions according to Flyvbjerg (Flyvbjerg 2011). This type of concern needs to be watched carefully during the collection process.

Finally, after collecting data, the author will analyze evidence by using the logic method technique because it stipulates and operationalizes a complex chain of events over an extended period of time (Yin 2014). This technique is relevant insofar as both Tamil and Tuareg and Moor insurgencies lasted over several decades.
Both rebellions have gone through significant changes since their first uprising in both ideology and military concepts used to achieve their objectives. To that extent, the study will be conducted through US military doctrine as the primary reference, which will be utilized to compare and contrast the insurgencies in Mali and Sri Lanka. Using US doctrine as a reference is relevant since the US Army has gained a tremendous amount of experience in conducting efficient COIN operation in and outside the country. Some of the best examples that illustrate the US Army’s COIN experience are the American Indian wars (seventeenth-nineteenth centuries), the Philippines war (1899-1902), Vietnam (1954-1973), Dominican Republic (1965), Somalia (1992-1994), Afghanistan (since 2001), and Iraq (since 2003). Therefore, US doctrine is particularly constructive in this study to serve as a reference to compare Tuareg and Moors insurgencies in Mali and the late Tamil insurgencies in Sri Lanka.

**Measures of Effectiveness**

In US military doctrine, Joint Publication 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, highlights that COIN is the mixture of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat insurgency while addressing its root causes to prevent subsequent upsurge (JCS 2018b, III-1). US COIN strategy consists of gaining and maintaining legitimacy as well as political influence through protection of the local population from violence, enhancing the local government legitimacy, and strengthening its capacity to isolate the insurgents economically, physically, socially, psychologically, and politically (JCS 2018b, I-3).

The analysis of the two COIN strategy from both Mali and Sri Lanka will focus on one of the frameworks, the Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economics (DIME)
that the US military utilizes to address armed conflicts over the past few decades. According to Shehadey, these tools are frequently considered by US military leaders to highlight the necessity of utilizing other instruments of national power besides the military power to address a conflict. This structure is known as “Whole-of-Government,” which, including financial, intelligence, and law enforcement, consists of the whole statecraft resources within the national security framework to be applied to the operational environments (Shehadey 2013). According to the Joint Doctrine Note 1-18, the DIME perspective facilitates the employment of the national power’s instruments involving certain critical national departments, such as the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury as well as the intelligence community (JCS 2018a).

During the analysis, the author will first examine the use of the diplomatic instruments by the COIN leaders. The diplomatic aspect of a conflict consists of analyzing how a nation interacts with state or non-state actors to find or protect some form of agreement in the interest of both conflicting parties (JCS 2018a).

The author will analyze the efficiency of the diplomatic policies of the Malian and Sri Lankan governments in both cases. Within the diplomatic perspective, the author will evaluate diplomatic efforts, understanding of the operational environment (OE), and the internal counter-insurgency policies of the authorities.

After that, the author will analyze the use of informational instruments by COIN leaders. The use of the informational instruments of national power concerns creates and exploits information as well as disrupting knowledge (JCS 2018a). The author will utilize national narratives during operations and organizational assets to inform the people as criteria to analyze the informational perspective.
Even though the use of informational power is different from the use of intelligence in a COIN campaign, the informational tools and intelligence services from both sides will be analyzed for the sake of better comprehension of the complex Malian situation. The author will utilize the COIN leaders’ strategy to collect and utilize intelligence from both sides as important criteria in the analysis of information portion.

After that, the author will look at the authorities’ use of the military instrument. The nation’s military instrument of power is merely the use of military force, threatening its application, or enabling other parties to apply for the purpose of imposing the country’s will on another party to achieve strategic ends (JCS 2018a). To that extend, the author will analyze COIN forces’ military effectiveness through several criteria, such as the understanding of the OE, appropriate use of military forces, and population security.

Finally, the author will analyze the use of economic instruments by COIN leaders. According to Joint Publication 3-24, the use of the economic instrument of the national power consists of stimulating or restricting change in people’s economic capability. From the economic perspective, the emphasis will be on the countries’ internal economic inequity by comparing the regions affected by insurgencies to the rest of the country in both cases. Therefore, economical inequity and the governmental solution to address these issues prior to the uprisings will be the main criteria in this portion of the study.

The ultimate goal of this research is to identify primary responsibilities inherent to the perpetual conflict, and produce reasonable solutions based on facts and perspectives that could be implemented to turn the page of cyclical confrontation among Malian people.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

This chapter will focus on analyzing the data gathered during the research process about the Malian Tuareg and Moor insurgency in contrast to the success of the Sri Lankan’s latest COIN operation against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The analysis will be conducted using a DIME perspective to compare and contrast the two cases.

Diplomatic

In COIN operations, a nation should leverage all its available diplomatic assets to influence the spectrum of actors that could help reach the country’s strategic objectives. Usually, insurgencies gain support from external actors through political, psychological, and material resources. This support holistically strengthens the insurgent fighters’ operational capabilities while undermining the COIN forces operations. Therefore, the government needs to utilize the diplomatic power to isolate the insurgents from their psychologic, logistic, financial, military, and economic support. In an insurgency based on a religious or ideological extremism concept, it could be sometimes more natural and practical to isolate this insurgency from its social, political, ideological, and economic support through population control and border security in order to let the insurgency run out of resources before crushing it (HQDA 2006, 1-23).

Even though this specific study is oriented on internal conflict, the diplomatic instrument cannot be disassociated from the political aspect of the conflict. Therefore, in this case study, the focus will be on the internal political portion of both cases. Internal
policies and how they shape diplomatic power will be compared. Politics drives all critical domains of a nation and are inseparable from diplomacy. According to Field Manual 3-24, General Chang Ting-Chen of Mao Zedong’s Central Committee once stated that “revolutionary war was 80 percent political action and only 20 percent military” (HQDA 2006, 1-123). Even if this argument depends on the context of a specific insurgency, and more importantly on the OE, political factors do have a crucial role in COIN. Internal politics are as important as the external politics.

According to Joint Publication 3-24, political objectives guide the COIN approach. Therefore, military leaders should always consider how operations contribute to strengthening the legal government’s legitimacy and achieving political objectives. The internal politics drive COIN operations. Careful use of politics is the principal instrument to isolate and annihilate the adversaries. Insofar, political, and diplomatic leaders should actively participate in all aspects (planning, preparation, execution, and assessment) of COIN (JCS 2018b).

Moreover, insurgents tend to leverage the operational environment (OE) to their advantage militarily and politically. Any solid fight is impossible without understanding the operational variables. According to Joint Publication 3-24, the OE “is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. The OE is uncertain, complex, and rapidly changing” (JCS 2018b, I-4). This uncertainty and complexity of the OE tend to be more advantageous for insurgents. For that reason, COIN forces need to be creative, adaptive, and rapid in learning and mastering the OE. The US military doctrine utilizes some frameworks such as Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure,
Information, Physical Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT); and Relationships, Actors, Functions, and Tensions (RAFT). These frameworks facilitate and accelerate better understanding of the critical domain of war in general and notably COIN operations. Field Manual 24 explains that successful conduct of COIN operations depends on thoroughly understanding the society and culture within which they are being conducted. Counterinsurgents must understand the environment by being able to expand on a critical domain of the society, such as the organization of key groups in the society, the relationships and tensions among groups or RAFT, and the ideologies and narratives. Insurgency generally starts in an environment that is profoundly mastered by the insurgents, particularly the RAFT and the geography aspects. Therefore, the victory of COIN forces is almost impossible without a better understanding of the insurgents’ strength.

Sri Lanka

Before analyzing Sri Lankan diplomatic achievement during Tamil insurgency, the author provides a quick summary of this rebellion. Sri Lanka, officially the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, is a Southeast Asian island country, located in the Indian Ocean to the southwest of the Bay of Bengal. The Gulf of Mannar and the Palk Strait separate the island from the Indian subcontinent, which exercises an historical and cultural influence upon Sri Lanka. The island’s political capital is Sri Jayawardenepura Kotte, located in a suburb of the largest city, Colombo, which is also the economic capital. Sri Lanka’s geographic location in the crossroads of maritime routes traversing the Indian Ocean, exposed it to cultural influences from other Asian civilizations (Arasaratnam and Peiris 2018).
According to the World Atlas, the country was populated with 20,359,430 inhabitants in 2012 with the Sinhalese as the largest ethnic group (more than 70 percent of the population). The Sinhalese speak the Sinhala language, which is part of the Indo-European linguistic group (Sawe 2017). The Tamil ethnic group makes up about 11.2 percent of the total population and the Moors or Muslims represent 7.1 percent of Sri Lanka’s population (Sawe 2017)

Rawat explains that the historical poems in the Pali language reveal that the earliest history of Sri Lanka can be traced back to fifth century BCE when the Sinhalese ethnic group arrived at the island of the present-day Indian state of Orissa. Two hundred years later, the Tamils started arriving at India’s present-day state of Tamil Nadu (Rawat 2012). The onset of Western colonial occupation was marked by the arrival of the Portuguese in 1505. After founding a fort in Colombo in 1517, the Portuguese gradually took occupation of the entire coastal areas. They were pushed out by the Dutch in 1658, who established control over the nation, except for the Central Kingdom of Kandy (Rawat 2012). Later, Sri Lanka was entirely controlled by the British Empire, including the Kandy Kingdom 1815 until its independence in 1940. Under British rule, the major ethnic groups coexisted peacefully. However, the early independence was marked by politico-ethnical rivalry between the Sinhalese and the Tamils, and eventually ignited the Tamil separatist ambitions. According to Peiris, the first clash between the major ethnic groups occurred in 1955 about the adoption of the country’s official language.

The Tamil militant separatism commenced in 1969 after the formation of the political organization called Tamil Liberation Organization. This organization is composed of several sub-organizations such as the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Peiris 2009). The different Tamil separatist groups went through years of internal disputes and armed combats. The LTTE rose out of these fratricidal fights as the predominant faction and the biggest threat to the Sri Lanka Armed Forces (Peiris 2009). On 23 July 1983, the LTTE ambushed a Sri Lankan Army patrol and killed thirteen soldiers. This event led to the Black July riots against the Tamil community in Sri Lanka, in which over one thousand Tamils were reportedly killed and tens of thousands fled their homes (Rawat 2012). That period is considered to be the starting point of insurgency radicalization in Sri Lanka. The LTTE emergence is mainly due to the LTTE opposition to Indian peacekeeping forces and their ferocity to combat and massacre any other Tamil rivals.

In 1987, India, as the local hegemon, was requested by the Sri Lankan government to deploy the Indian peacekeeping forces in the Tamil regions, and succeeded in disarming the Tamil insurgents, except the LTTE (Kingsbury 2012). In 1990, the Indian government decided to withdraw the Indian peacekeeping forces after anti-Indian force feelings emerged among both the Tamil and Sinhalese populations. In May 2009, government forces declared victory after killing the LTTE leader, Prabhakaran, bringing an end to a twenty-six-year-long insurgency in Sri Lanka (Rawat 2012).

Sri Lankan Diplomacy During the Tamil Insurgency

Being an island makes the Sri Lanka’s insurgency case easier to address than the Malian landlocked, desert country. However, understanding the OE is the key to success in both cases. In Sri Lanka, diplomatic power has been one of the primary solutions to the Tamil insurgencies. President Chandrika accomplished tremendous success in 1997 by
declaring LTTE as a terrorist organization by the international community and maneuvering for a peaceful solution at the same time. This achievement later facilitated the isolation of LTTE (Roberts 2006, 75). Sri Lankan authorities continuously communicated the LTTE’s attacks on civilians, politicians, and rulers, such as the assassination of President Chandrika’s husband, to the rest of the world. The assassination attempt on Army General Sareth Fonseka by a pregnant suicide bomber of the Black Tigers profoundly alarmed the international community about the LTTE’s brutal insurgency. Sri Lanka’s successive authorities demonstrated that the LTTE had definitively moved from a so-called “freedom fighters” to a “terrorist organization” to the international community. Therefore, the European Union prescribed them as a terrorist organization in May 2006, and accordingly imposed numerous financial sanctions on LTTE trading funds from its European diaspora. External support for the LTTE then became much more complex and even illegal after that (Roberts 2006, 68).

Furthermore, in this area, it was important for President Rajapaksa’s government to focus on an intensive diplomatic effort with China and India, the two major powers of the region, in order to physically, economically, and ideologically isolate the Tamil insurgents. As a result, these two superpowers became thoroughly involved in the war against the Tamil. According to Popham, China holistically prevented the United Nations Security Council from intervening in Sri Lanka while getting Pakistan to sell more military equipment and providing pilot training to the Sri Lanka government. Additionally, China became Sri Lanka’s biggest donor in 2007 by increasing its aid to the island through the donation of six F7 fighter jets and tens of millions of dollars’ worth of sophisticated weapons (Popham 2010). After a diplomatic agreement between India and
President Rajapaksa’s government, the two countries conducted strong, discrete military cooperation through their intelligence services, navies, and coast guards. This strategic cooperation succeeded in breaking the backbone of the “Sea Tigers,” the LTTE’s navy forces, which completely paralyzed the Tamil logistics system and suffocated the Tamil insurgency (The Times of India 2009).

As mentioned previously, the internal political maneuver is part of the politico-diplomatic instrument of power, and goes beyond the usual political parties when one can attempt to interfere in the adversaries’ internal affairs to create disorder and schism. Kronstadt and Vaughn explained that the commander of the LTTE’s military operations in the Eastern Province, Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan alias Colonel Karuna, took approximately six thousand soldiers with him and split with the supreme commander of the LTTE Veluppillai Prabhakaran, while negotiating with the central government. This strategic political agreement, which led to a schism within the Tamil insurgents, turned out to be detrimental to the insurgency and caused considerable damage to the longstanding LTTE’s claim to be the sole representative of Tamil people in Sri Lanka. The Karuna’s group fought its ex-Tamil comrades later on in cooperation with the governmental forces (Kronstadt and Vaughn 2009).

President Rajapaksa, through a dynamic foreign policy, established a productive relationship with the Indian authorities and gained their support against the LTTE, especially in the intelligence domain (Khan 2013, 32). Thanks to this cordial relation, Sri Lankan Armed Forces benefited from Indian intelligence services. As an illustration, Sri Lanka’s navy was able to locate and target the Sea Tigers’ boats after getting fresh intelligence from India (Khan 2013).
Mali

Algeria and France are two countries that have been profoundly involved, not only in Malian history, but more importantly in the resolution of Malian cyclical rebellions. France is the colonial superpower with a solid tie with its former colonial territories; meanwhile Algeria is the biggest, richest, and by far the military superpower of the region. Moreover, Algeria has its own Tuareg and Moor community. However, unlike Sri Lanka with India, Malian authorities failed to build a beneficial diplomatic relationship with these two regional superpowers. According to Lecocq, during the Tuareg and Moor first uprising, the fighters received unofficial support from these two countries. The rebels were allowed to cross the Algerian border to treat their wounded or to obtain supplies at the French nuclear base at Takormiasses where they received limited help from the French employees (Lecocq 2010, 164).

The Malian diplomatic policy in the region was not capable of conducting an active regional dynamic with its neighbors to help address the Tuareg and Moor insurgencies adequately. According to Dona J. Stewar, Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger developed a Joint Military Command in 2010 to operationalize counterterrorism cooperation in the Saharan region. However, after several operations conducted in Malian territory by Algeria and Mauritania, Algeria withdrew its cooperation due to the Malian laxity toward its the insurgents (Stewart 2013, 51). Northern Mali has become the center of illegal trafficking in the region, providing great revenues to insurgents, and allowing terrorist groups to operate in Malian, uncontrolled Saharan territories. In March 2017, a MINUSMA report revealed that transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking flourishing in northern Mali were the primary income for the fighters and extremist
groups operating in the region (Boutellis and Zahar 2017, 33). Malian diplomacy lost its credibility in the face of its regional and historical partners when it was unable to come up with any sustainable form agreement to help the country tackle the insurgencies.

**Information**

In COIN operations, a state needs to leverage information to enable short- and long-term victory over its adversaries. Therefore, a state must disseminate, gather, process, and utilize information thoroughly by creating and exploiting its infrastructure, capabilities, and processes to achieve the state’s strategic informational objectives (JCS 2018a). Intelligence is a strategic domain that is inherent to a nation’s informational power. Intelligence is the ability to collect information in order to anticipate and drive military and political activities (JCS 2018a). In a classic war, the collection and utilization of intelligence precedes every single operation. This preponderant role of intelligence is more accentuated in COIN conflict.

Insurgency is generally a nebulous conflict with no clear front line, no official or identifiable uniforms from the insurgents’ side, and, more importantly, no clear status for a large part of the population since they could simultaneously be both civilian and combatant. Therefore, COIN forces could claim neither legitimacy nor protection of the population without continuously receiving accurate intelligence. According to Joint Publication 3-24, intelligence is the backbone of the COIN operations. Effective operations are planned by rapid, specific, and accurate intelligence, gathered, and processed at the lowest echelon, and disseminated throughout the force. Metz and Millen argued that the insurgents have an initial advantage regarding information operations due to their inherent proximity to certain people (Metz and Millen 2004). Therefore, for
COIN forces, information operations must be conducted delicately through very structured information operations campaign that will wrest the initiative from the adversaries.

Sri Lanka

In Sri Lanka’s case, President Rajapaksa’s initial response to the country’s long-lasting insurgency was a hard and exclusive attritional COIN war to annihilate the insurgents. However, this solution would not be effective without a wise usage of the informational power to influence Sri Lanka’s political milieu. According to Major Khan, President Rajapaksa utilizes political maneuver toward the internal and external audience as a prerequisite to a valid military action against the LTTE. Sri Lanka Authorities COIN Model is a full commitment in a dynamic political strategy in order to avoid domestic and international pressure and give the military the space to crush the Tamil insurgency (Khan 2013, 29).

Insofar, the President appointed Basil Rajapaksa, his brother and senior advisor, as a member of Parliament from the national list. Basil Rajapaksa’s primary mission was to leverage Sri Lanka political milieu to gain and retain internal political support across the elected government and within the Parliament to enable necessary legislation and budgetary approval (Roberts 2006, 82).

Concerning the intelligence aspect, the country has numerous separate intelligence services, such as the Terrorism Investigation Department, Criminal Investigation Department, Colombo Crimes Division, State Intelligence Service, Police Special Branch, and the Western Province Intelligence Division, none of which shared information and intelligence nor de-conflicted activities. Their ability to provide the
nation with crucial and usable intelligence was questionable. Hence, President Rajapaksa’s Minister of Defense, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, placed all these intelligence departments under a unique command, the National Intelligence (Roberts 2006, 86). The Minister of Defense then closely supervised intelligence activities and appointed one of his trusted men as the Chief of the National Intelligence.

Furthermore, the Sri Lankan government and military staff received formal professional education and training from the world superpowers such as the United States military, particularly related to active usage of the information. The country’s campaign planning closely followed the American pattern of unified action. According to Roberts, President Rajapaksa’s administration deliberately addressed the LTTE insurgency with a multi-faceted, wise diplomatic, informational, and economic campaign combined with military operations. Besides the informational instruments, all the country’s instruments of power were leveraged and synchronized to eradicate the Tamil insurgency once and for all (Roberts 2006, 81). According to Metz and Millen, the history of counterinsurgency shows that the full integration of all government agencies under unified control is a unique pattern to coordinate the instrument of national power wisely. Besides the military aspect, this unity of effort displayed a strong determination to deter the enemy to the country and the rest of the world.

Furthermore, the choice of a rigorous and charismatic leader to lead the COIN operation must be the primary concern of the ruling government. If credible, this choice conveys the degree of commitment of the nation and sends a clear message to the insurgents. This leader must be a “skilled strategist, able to integrate elements of power and take a long-term perspective” (Metz and Millen 2004). According to Major Khan,
President Rajapaksa’s success against LTTE was his ability to achieve the highest political-military coordination by appointing his brother, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, as the Defense Secretary. Gotabhaya, with his prior military service, was the expert of the President’s overall COIN process. Major Khan stated that the new Minister of Defense Gotabhaya Rajapaksa:

understood the requirements of the military and how to equip them for success. He ensured that the political and military objectives coincided and that no gaps existed in the implementation. To lead the military, Gotabhaya brought General Fonseka back from retirement and gave him total freedom to select his team. The Rajapaksa brothers understood that General Fonseka was a firm believer of the use of the military to eliminate the LTTE and gave him the political backing to complete the mission. (Khan 2013, 31)

Besides this, the central government’s determination to drastically address an insurgency could be considered as wise usage of the informational power. According to Major Khan, President Rajapaksa concluded from analyzing the previous three Eelam Wars, that the LTTE used every ceasefire or negotiation to reinforce and consolidate its troops in order to resume attacks whenever the time was appropriate. Seeking for peace when militarily weakened became a regular pattern of LTTE and always came out stronger than before from the ceasefires. Hence, President Rajapaksa emphasized a plan which excluded any negotiation or ceasefire with the LTTE as one of his fundamental strategies to defeat the insurgents (Khan 2013, 30).

Mali

In contrast to President Rajapaksa’s attitude in Sri Lanka, the different Malian authorities failed to adopt appropriate internal informational approaches to find a durable solution to its recurrent rebellions. Unlike Sri Lanka’s latest COIN strategy, the successive Malian authorities adopted a negotiation path with rebels after failing to
oppose consequential military strength. According to Brian S. Westerfield, less than a year after the onset of the 1990 rebellion, the Malian government adopted a strategy of negotiations, which ended up with the Tamanrasset peace agreement and an immediate ceasefire. Like the following peace agreements, the Tamanrasset agreements, signed without being backed by any military victory, favored the rebellion, and turned out to be extremely difficult to implement for the successive Malian governments. As an illustration, in the Tamanrasset Accord as well as the National Pact signed in 1992, it stipulated a withdrawal of the majority of the Malian armed forces from the northern region. This withdrawal meant that the regular armed forces were ordered to vacate an essential part of the national territory to its adversaries in the name of peace. However, the withdrawal of the Malian Army from the northern region did not genuinely stop the fighting for several years while it weakened Malian Armed Forces’ ability to contribute to the security of this open region (Westerfield 2012).

More importantly, the Malian governments made more concessions to the insurgents and continuously avoided military engagement through negotiation, which eventually fostered subsequent uprisings. Both President Konaré and Touré were convinced that giving in to the rebels’ demands would be easier than fighting. This posture is an illustration of the ineffective use of the informational power since it conveys a message of weakness to both the Malian people and the insurgents. Malian governments opted for defensive military actions to prevent the conflict from spreading south. They continuously allowed the Tuareg insurgents to have more local empowerment concurrently with the integration of thousands of fighters into the regular armed forces (Westerfield 2012, 25).
Besides putting out a weak face to its adversaries, the successive Malian governments conducted a feeble informational strategy toward the bulk of the population who consider the past peace agreements processes as exclusionary. The people were completely ignored when it came to information about the military operations occurring in the northern part of the country or negotiations with the insurgents. According to Lode, in 1991, President Moussa Traoré went too far by signing the Tamanrasset peace agreement, which generally satisfied the core demands of the rebel movements but alienated the southern population due to the complete opacity over this peace agreement, (Lode 2002). The lack of information entails a lack of understanding and augments the suspicions among the vast majority of the Malian population. The suspicion hampers the progress of public awareness concerning the necessity to sustain peace in the region.

Malian people have been historically misinformed by the central government concerning the insurgencies occurring in the northern part of the country. This created a lasting suspicion between the minority northern population and the south. Northern people are unfairly perceived as the enemies of the country by some southerners. This situation created a stateless feeling in the northern ethnic people’s minds. Moreover, the Malian national myths, nationalist discourses, and identity-buildings are entirely based on the living histories of the southern Mande and Bambara culture (Lecocq 2010, 61). Since Mali’s independence in 1960, southern Malians dominated the political realm. This fact is understandable since almost 80 percent of the population are southerners. However, the northerner minorities have been gradually losing their identity ties with the country because of disastrous informational policies.
Little was done to rebuild trust and close the growing gap between north and south. According to Lecocq, since independence, Malian schoolbooks presented the history of the new nation almost uniquely through the history of the old empire of Mali. Meanwhile, the northern populations have developed stronger commercial, cultural, and linguistic ties with Algeria and other northern African countries than with Bamako (Ba 2014, 6). The lack of effective informational strategy from the government to unite the country has created a divide between the southern and the northern population. This divide inevitably strengthens the rebellion’s causes, which is the total separation or independence.

The authorities’ informational policies about the rebellions make the people resentful of a national momentum for peace. Ba argued that because of restricted public information about the peace processes, the history of successive rebellions has had a profound adverse effect on public opinion in the south. The latter perceive the northerners as the mistrustful party and deduce from the content of peace agreement as a mere economic premium given to some combatants in order to disarm them (Ba 2014). Many insurgents appointed as representatives for negotiating the peace agreement follow-up process seemed to be more interested in the process than in peace, mostly because of privileges and allowances they benefitted from participating in the process (Boutellis and Zahar 2017, 43). These negotiations and peace agreements have been perceived by the people to encourage further rebellion. Therefore, every peace agreement between the government and the rebel groups is received with resentful public support.
Military

The military instrument of a country’s national power, when used suitably, has a tremendous role to play in COIN operation. A country’s effectiveness in COIN will depend on its ability to raise, train, sustain, and utilize relatively strong armed forces to match the challenges the country will face. Counterinsurgents have to evaluate the appropriate amount of force needed to win COIN operations. Excessive use of power could either lead to collateral damage, causing civilian casualties or undermining the population support of the COIN forces. In a COIN realm, commanders should adopt appropriate and dosed levels of military force to achieve missions without causing unnecessary loss of life or suffering (HEDA 2006, 1-25).

Besides the mere application of military power in the theater of operations, the degree of understanding of the OE and the population security from both cases will be emphasized. Most of insurgencies are generally rooted in political, economic, and societal issues. Therefore, addressing such insurgencies with military force should be inherent to a better understanding of the root cause of the problem as well as understanding the people concerned in the problem, and the geography surrounding the area of operations. The insurgents generally initiate their first series of combat within their best-known region, which is also usually utilized as the foothold. At any echelon in COIN forces, every soldier needs to have a minimum of geographical knowledge required to fight the insurgents. However, the military and civilian leaders and staffs must be knowledgeable about the OE. Insurgents are generally highly adaptable and flexible at the tactical and operational levels. Hence, counterinsurgents have to be adaptive and know the OE (Metz and Millen 2004).
Besides the geographical aspect of the OE, population support is the key to success in any COIN operation. The population is the third angle of the national insurgency triangle. Gaining legitimacy from the people by acquiring their support and their cooperation must be the first concern of all COIN forces. This is known in military jargon as “win the hearts and minds” and should not be taken for granted without providing and maintaining a reasonable level of security to the population. According to Joint Publication 3-24, providing security to the population is crucial for all other efforts and is a cornerstone for lasting stability (JCS 2018b). Also, civilians tend to cooperate with whichever side proves itself capable of providing a predictable and acceptable environment of trust and security.

Since no victory is possible without fresh and accurate intelligence, providing security and serenity to the people will help COIN forces gain and maintain a significant advantage over the insurgents. According to Field Manual 3-24, without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented, and disorder is easily spread. Therefore, commanders should transition as quickly as possible from combat operations to law enforcement whenever needed (HQDA 2006, 1-131). Even though leading and winning tactical combat operations are the first concern of leaders, the success of these operations is vitally linked to the collaboration and support from the population by providing them security in return.

Sri Lanka

Once appointed after the Sri Lanka 2005 Presidential election, President Rajapaksa’s COIN strategy was the military option through the use of an overwhelming combat power to destroy or intimidate the LTTE. Besides a profound reorganization and
restructuration, the Government initiated a strong military re-equipment program through an active diplomatic action. Except for the US, which ended its direct military aid to Sri Lanka as a result of human rights issues, Rajapaksa’s administration strengthened the country’s military cooperation with the world’s military superpowers. According to Roberts, Rajapaksa’s administration launched an intense massive re-armament by ordering new weaponry, aircraft, and sensor packages (from China) as well as improving the Navy’s 30mm cannon (from the United Kingdom) and acquiring the Air Force’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle program (from Israel) (Roberts 2006, 77).

Being an island with only one close neighboring country (India), the particular geographical aspect of this country enables the COIN forces to suffocate the insurgents through an intense maritime activity by Sri Lanka’s navy. According to Robert, in 2004, Sri Lanka formed new squadrons which rapidly crushed the LTTE supply lines and smuggling activities from India, and then, using swarm tactics, decimated the LTTE’s sea fighting ability. Therefore, by May 2009, the Sea Tigers were no longer able to provide active, external support for the LTTE from either Indian or the Tamil Diaspora. The impact of weakening the Sea Tigers was catastrophic for the Tamil insurgents. The LTTE could no longer conduct significant military operations on the front lines due to the lack of supplies. That provided a much more lightly armed opposition for the Sri Lankan Army accordingly (Roberts 2006, 92).

Concerning the population security, Sri Lanka authorities have already built up an entire paramilitary branch, the Home Guard, which had been established by the Mobilization of Supplementary Force Act No. 40 of 1985, initially to protect of the local population from LTTE’s attacks. However, this branch became inefficient and corrupted
with its inherent inferior reputation. According to Robert, President Rajapaksa’s government, once in command, made a tremendous effort to reinvigorate the Home Guard Forces.

They assessed the current state of the Home Guard and implemented necessary changes such as moving its control from the Police Department to a different agency. They created a central command structure nationwide of the Home Guard and placed it under the Ministry of Defense, while progressively doubling its size from 19,200 men to around 41,500 men over three years (Roberts 2006). These strategic changes in the Home Guard became entirely profitable for Sri Lanka’s government. Not only did it become efficient in protecting the people against LTTE and enhance Sri Lanka Armed Force’s reputation among the population, but also it was utilized as a complementary warfighter force in the annihilation of the Tamil insurgents.

Besides this, the Home Guard played a considerable role in providing intelligence to the whole governmental forces. While protecting the populace is always beneficial for COIN forces, intimidating the people through the use of military power is counterproductive since that only benefits one’s adversaries. Hashim explained that one of the LTTE’s biggest mistakes had been to brutalize and kill some members of middle and commercial classes in the Batticaloa-Ampara district for their support for Karuna. This violence against civilians entailed general support of the populace to the government-backed Kurana’s faction (Hashim 2013)

Mali

At the onset of the last three insurgencies, the Malian Armed Forces presented a feeble resistance to their adversaries. The northern military posts spent most of their time
in a defensive posture allowing the insurgents to gain the initiative and control of the
Area of operations. The first explanation of the Malian military failure resides with the
authorities’ inefficient support of their armed forces. Several internal and international
reports mentioned the armed forces’ poor level of equipment, training, organization, and
discipline. A RAND study mentioned that before the last insurgency, the entire Malian
Armed Forces were in terrible shape and needed restructuring and equipment (Shurkin,
Pezard and Zimmerman 2017, 22).

In the American literature, one of the best illustrations of the Malian Armed
Forces’ condition before the 2011 insurgency is the study by the Naval Post Graduate
School student, Simon J. Powelson. He was personally involved in US military assistance
to the Malian Ministry of Defense in the late 2000s and early 2010s. According to
Powelson:

A survey team from AFRICOM [United States Africa Command] visited Mali to assess the Malian army’s capabilities and requirements . . . As part of the
assessment, from July 7–8, the team visited Malian military facilities at Sévaré, Gao, and Tessalit. As Mali’s northern-most major base, Tessalit remained an
isolating 320-mile drive from Gao—over a rough dirt road. In short, the
assessment team found the conditions on the base to be “atrocious.” Electricity
was available for only two hours a day (provided by an on base generator),
perimeter security was poor (a stone perimeter wall was not yet built), supplies of
all types were in short supply, facilities overall were lacking, the asphalt runway
was in desperate need of resurfacing (Powelson 2013, 16).

It is evident that the Malian military was unprepared to fight against any
organized armed organization in this environment. When the authorities ultimately
realized their inability to counter the nation’s internal or external threats, they called upon
military assistance from countries such as the United States, France, and Algeria. That
was one of the reasons for the alluded Tessalit military post visit by Americans.

However, the holistic situation of the Malian Armed Forces needed more time and money
to be effectively improved before the 2011 terrorist-allied Tuareg and Moor insurgency. The overall condition of the individual equipment in the Malian units was disastrous. The soldiers had shortcomings with proper uniforms, shoes, helmets, magazine pouches, and the conditions of rifles were abysmal. Powelson reported that Malian units operating in the north carried either AK rifles or SKS rifles, which entered service in 1949. The Malian-equipped AK-47 were missing handguards with no front sights, broken rear sights, and wobbly stocks most the time. The soldiers, equipped with SKS utilized ten round stripper clips, and had to reload their rifles with ammunition from their pocket after firing every tenth round (Powelson 2013, 26).

Beyond the absence of a sustaining military equipment program, the lack of knowledge about the operational area completely undermined Malian military COIN operations. Lecocq contended that from the first uprising, the insurgents were more effective in the Adagh, a very rough terrain in the northern Mali, where most clashes between the Army and rebels took place. This terrain’s surface is covered with boulder formations or by small, but sharply broken stones and sudden steep climbs. It is more practicable for camels, which were utilized by the 1963 insurgents than motorized vehicles with heavy machine guns utilized by the Malian Army. Despite the deployment of more than half of its effective strength, the Malian Armed Forces could not bring the rebellion to an end (Lecocq 2010, 164-170).

During the second and third uprising, it appears that Malian Armed Forces did not learn from their past mistakes since they continued on the same path by not taking time to analyze the geographical aspect of the OE. Lecocq argued that the Malian Armed Forces armored cars and artillery employed in the Adagh were ineffective in comparison to the
insurgents fast and agile four-wheel-drive vehicles driven by skilled northerner drivers, who had acquired their desert navigation experiences after years of smuggling freely in the vast Sahara (Lecocq 2010, 254).

One of the examples of the ineffectiveness of Malian Armed Forces was their worst defeat on the night of 4 September 1990 at the wells of Toximine near Mount Tigharghar in the Adagh. Malian Armed Forces demonstrated a feeble understanding of the geographical aspect of the OE. During this battle, a small unit of forty-five rebels, making use of their knowledge of the terrain, completely defeated a regular army unit of around 450 soldiers, supported by armored cars, mortars, and rocket launchers (Lecocq 2010, 257). Moyar also contended that thanks to their training experience and stolen stock of armament acquired from Libya, the Tuareg rebels and their allies were much more competent and far better equipped for desert warfare than the regular Malian Army (Moyar 2015, 21).

Throughout the last two insurgencies, the regular forces have been continuously out-maneuvered by the insurgents, not only due to their lack of the geographic knowledge of the OE but also due to their negligence of the historical aspect of the OE. A RAND study highlighted that the Tuareg community have always been deeply divided between castes and tribes. However, instead of leveraging this weak characteristic of Tuareg insurgents, the Malian military forces’ brutal and nondiscriminatory retaliation oriented toward the northern population antagonized all Tuaregs and united them against Bamako, while gaining broad support from Tuareg castes and tribes (RAND 2011).

Indeed, the Malian brutal military retaliation against both northern combatants and non-combatants at the onset of the first rebellion has been described as the premier
factor of the subsequent Malian military defeats and the cyclical aspect of Tuareg and Moor insurgencies. This military violence alienated a vast majority of the Tuareg community against the southern government while triggering their compassion toward their brother rebel combatants who were a minority among the whole Tuareg community. Ba explained that the Malian Armed Forces’ indiscriminate repressions affected both the Moor and Tuareg communities and contributed to the mobilization of a more substantial part of the northern population against the government and military forces. As an illustration, the only Tuareg uprising militarily defeated by the Malian authorities was the first Tuareg revolt in 1963. During this first Tuareg and Moor uprising, the Malian army was relatively well equipped with Soviet weapons and better structured than their insurgent counterpart.

However, the Malian Forces COIN response was qualified as disproportionate and severely brutal against Tuareg and Moor communities. Almost all the insurgent leaders were arrested. Many of them were assassinated. Some were sent to hard labor, which was a trend at that time. Some reports mentioned that the armed forces poisoned wells, which extremely harmful to the Tuareg community in this desert region. According to Lecocq, “Women and religious persons were arrested or killed, and so were men who had not participated in combat. Wells were poisoned and cattle were killed. It therefore comes as no surprise that many goumiers deserted the Malian forces to join the ifulagen” (Lecocq 2010, 175).

Consequently, the violent and brutal character of this response remains deeply anchored in Malian Tuareg’s collective memory. The hunger and search for revenge has fueled the subsequent uprisings of the future Tuareg generations to secede from Mali.
Several current Tuareg and Moor fighters lost their parents during the 1963 insurgency, such as Colonel Mohamed Ag Najim, the current chief of staff of the Tuareg rebellion, Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad [National Liberation Movement of Azawad]. The Malian government paved the road for the future rebellion through its inappropriate and disproportionate military response to a small uprising, which was the first insurgency in 1963.

Furthermore, one of the specificities of the last insurgency was its violent extremist character related to the AQIM. Indeed, Tuareg and Moor insurgents and their 2011 extremist terrorist allies have had entirely different objectives as well as modus operandis. While the Tuareg and Moor insurgency leaders are authentic Malian citizens, the terrorist leaders mostly come from the neighboring Algerian country. These leaders have fled the successful Algerian COIN operations in the 1990s to eradicate Islamic insurgencies from Algeria. The terrorist groups then adopted North Mali as a safe haven because of its chaos and lawless character.

The extremist groups conducted a meticulous socio-economic program to fill the gap left by the Malian government in the north. Thanks to its crucial financial power acquired from trafficking, criminal networking, and hostage-taking, the terrorist group substituted themselves for the local authorities by acting as a social security provider. AQIM members handed out a large amount of money and medicine to the northern people, who were already disappointed by the lack of economic opportunity in northern Mali. In return, the terrorists benefited from the population support indispensable for their business, freedom of movement, and recruitment (Chauzal and van Damme 2015).
Finally, the Malian Armed Forces weakness in their COIN fight could have a dual economic and political explanation. The relation between the military and political actors have always been tumultuous since the early day of the country’s independence. From 1960 to 2018, Mali has seen three military coups against the civilian authorities and several other attempts to destabilize the different ruling governments. Therefore, it is thought that successive Malian civilian authorities tacitly undermined the Armed Forces to prevent further putsches. According to Moyar, the past military interventions against civilian leaders created an insecurity feeling among the civilian rulers who, in response would instead weaken the Armed Forces to the detriment of the military’s competence, responsiveness, and morale.

For the reasons mentioned above, the political leadership decreases the military budget considerably and, through a vast corruption network, meddled with military recruitment, promotion, and command. This political interference systematically shows its negative impacts on the armed forces during later insurgencies. The regular forces were unable to even patrol in the country’s vast and uncontrolled northern region. Many Malian units were short on basic equipment such as aircraft or tactical wheeled vehicles and supplies (Moyar 2015, 14). Instead of guaranteeing the country territorial integrity and providing security to all citizens, Malian authorities’ use of military instruments contributed to weakening the armed forces in order to prevent further military control of the central government.

**Economic**

A nation’s economic growth is intimately linked to its government’s ability to maintain security and confidence among the people. In fragile states, where the formal
economy may not function correctly, the informal economy based on activities such as exchange, smuggling, and the black market could represent the main occupation of the local populace (JCS 2018a). In a failed state, economic inequity is generally the primary source of internal conflicts such as insurgencies, military putsch, and popular demonstrations. Without a viable economy and employment opportunities, desperate people are more likely to pay attention to false promises offered by insurgents and violent extremist groups.

Hence, causes, symptoms, and solutions of an insurgency are related to a nation’s ability to provide sustained economic health to its people. The internal turmoil as well as economic or political fragility undermine the government’s legitimacy and are usually exploited by the insurgents to acquire the civil population’s support (HQDA 2006). A nation COIN strategy may include an increase population’s economic health by providing expected services such as infrastructure, health, welfare, and education.

Sri Lanka

When compared to the pattern of US doctrine concerning economic power, Sri Lankan’s successive authorities did not demonstrate an effective use of this instrument of national power. Besides the ethnic and religious divergence between the Tamil and Sinhalese, one of the core causes of Sri Lanka’s insurgency was endemic economic underdevelopment of the northern and eastern regions of the country, which were mostly inhabited by the Tamil people. However, it worth mentioning that concurrently to the twenty-six years of civil war, Sri Lanka’s successive governments had to face external trade constraints, such as the multiple rises of the oil price, and natural disasters, such as tsunamis.
According to Devoic, Sri Lanka has demonstrated a very positive trend to decrease the poverty level among the population during the last decade, which decreased from “23% in 2002, to 15% in 2006, and 15% in 2009, and finally reaching the remarkable level (for Asia) of 7.6% in 2010.” However, despite these public improvements, the Tamil-populated areas were disfavored due to the long-lasting insurgency and the lack of state investment, which led to significantly high levels of poverty (Devoic 2013).

Moreover, Sri Lanka’s economic stalemate was aggravated by Presidents Kumaratunga and Rajapaksa’s important decision to increase defense spending at the expense of economic growth and other population wellbeing sectors. In 1995, when fighting resumed after the discussion with the LTTE failed, the intensity of the combat and governmental spending in defense raised considerably and surpassed all previous phases of the conflict. The upsurge of the defense spending consequently exceeded over 6.1 percent of the GDP, which inevitably increased the budget deficit, furthered inflation, and slowed economic growth accordingly (Winslow and Woost 2004, 74-76). These adverse impacts on the economy increased unemployment to generate widespread dissatisfaction among the people on the economic performance of the government (Peiris 2009, 204)

Mali

More than Sri Lanka, Mali is an impoverished country that has always been facing endemic economic and societal challenges such as recurrent droughts, poor infrastructure, high population growth, and land degradation, which underlie endemic food insecurity (Arieff 2018). Therefore, the wise use of the economic instrument of the
Malian national power in a COIN operation became more preponderant than anywhere else. All the findings in this research tend to show that successive Malian governments, like President Rajapaksa’s government Sri Lanka, failed to address appropriate measures to tackle the country’s economic challenges. More specifically, there were limited governmental economic responses in the faces of numerous climatic and developmental challenges that the country in general and the northern part in particular have been facing since the 1960s.

Besides the identity aspect, the core reason for the Tuareg and Moor insurgencies is economical. Even though Mali economically is one of the poorest countries in the world, the economic unbalance between the north and the south is alarming. The north, far more than the south, lacks basic infrastructures and vital services. Hence, this lack of government interest combined with disadvantageous policies are the triggering factors of the Tuareg and Moor uprisings (Lecocq 2010). A relative socioeconomic exclusion and the lack of infrastructure such as road networks have led the northern populations to establish their own economic activities and a desire to separate from Mali. Lecocq explained that the northerners, whose main income comes from herding, largely disapproved the rise of tax rates on the cattle initiated by the newly Malian independent government in 1962. This cattle tax has been unanimously referred to as the main reason for the Tuareg’s first revolt against the central government in the Kidal region in 1963 (Lecocq 2010, 140).

Later in the 1970s, Mali was struck by an unpreceded drought, which ravaged the entire country. Once again, scholars and international news intensely criticized the government’s response to this natural disaster. In a RAND Corporation analysis, the
second rebellion, launched in 1990, was caused mainly by economic impoverishment of the northern populace resulting from droughts in the 1970s and 1980s. Also, Lode argued that the lack of effective government efforts to relieve northern people after the 1972-73 and 1983-85 droughts is perceived as deliberate negligence, which led many Tuareg to flee to neighboring countries (Lode 2002, 57). Because of the extreme levels of corruption in the administration, the Malian government utterly mismanaged the drought relief funds received from international partners. This second Tuareg and Moor insurgency, which involved more people, was longer and harder for the government than the previous one (RAND 2011, 121).

Some scholars analyze the northern issues as a consequence of the northern political leaders’ underrepresentation at the national level. The argument is that the lack of government investment in the north, which caused the insurrections in the northern part of the country, is due to the lack of representation of northern in the Malian political realm. This under-representation, in turn, derives from the northerner’s weak economic power, which is required to weigh in the political sphere and influence decision making. Unlike Sri Lanka’s long-lasting and continuous rebellion, Ba argued that the cyclical pattern of the Tuareg uprisings is, to some extent, related to the natural impoverishment of the northern Mali, which impedes the Tuaregs elite’s ability to be well represented in political milieu and impact governmental action accordingly.

Malian cyclical insurgencies could have been avoided or more appropriately addressed through an adequate economic investment to trigger development and alleviate suffering in north Mali. According to Moyar, instead emphasizing on military and security aspect of the north problems, the Malian Government and its economic partners
could have solved the northern issues through investment in social and economic
development (Moyar 2015, 51). The long-lasting solutions to Malian conflict could be
strengthening of political institutions, and investing in socioeconomic programs along
with a wise assertive action against the threat of violent extremism (Stewart 2013, 65).

It is worth noting that it takes about four to five days to travel from Bamako to
Kidal by road. Consequently, the northern Malian people have historically been closer to
southern Algerian people and the western Nigerien people than to the rest of the Malian
populace. Northern Malians commonly procure basic consumer goods across the border
from neighboring Algeria rather than obtaining them from Bamako (RAND 2011, 151).
The under-development and the lack of infrastructure, such as medical and transportation
infrastructure, contribute to furthering the isolation of the northern population, who were
already physically and politically far from the south.

Malian economic weakness is the consequence of a high level of corruption
occurring in the country. Like several African countries, Malian politicians, like many
governmental organizations, are corrupt. According to Moyar, “Konaré and other newly
elected politicians employed the state as a means of patronage, dispensing jobs to their
followers without regard for merit. Exploiting the state’s resources for private gains, they
deprived most of the population of governmental services” (Moyar 2015, 7).

This endemic corruption severely hindered the country’s effectiveness in dealing
with both terrorist settlement and Tuareg cyclical rebellions. The country could not even
rely upon its military to neutralize any threat because both corruption and political
leaders’ interference in military business have undermined the Malian Armed Forces’
capabilities.
Summary

The main reason for this research is to identify how the northern Malian conflict remains unsolvable. In order to achieve this, it is a necessity to comprehend the premier actors involved in the conflict, which are the Malian successive governments. In this complex and nebulous environ, a state needs to be firm, fair, and deeply decentralized to be effective while maintaining its presence all over the territory. The state also needs to have a very organized judiciary, security, and defense power. Unlike Sri Lanka, all those assets in Mali are either inexistent or profoundly deficient. Thurston explained that:

The Malian state has struggled to govern northern Mali since independence. The state’s weakness allowed AQIM to gain a foothold there in the early 2000s. The state was not only unable to control crime—certain state officials even colluded with criminals, including AQIM. The weakness of the Malian state triggered events in 2012 that led to state collapse: first, Mali’s armed forces began losing battles to separatist rebels; second, junior officers angered at these defeats launched a successful coup against the civilian government in the south; third, the chaos in Bamako helped AQIM and its allies extend their control in the north. Since Operation Serval, the state has not been able to impose law and order in northern and central Mali; the continuing chaos benefits AQIM (Thurston 2017, 17).

Among the many Malian state deficiencies, the one which by far deprives the country for being effective is corruption. Moyar contended that:

The military deficiencies of the rest of the armed forces received little attention from the United States or other nations. In light of past military interference in politics in Mali and neighboring countries, Mali’s political leaders wanted to keep the military weak, a position accepted by a large number of foreign donors who were similarly suspicious of the military. The political leadership meddled with recruitment, promotion, and command in the military, to the detriment of the military’s competence, organization, and morale. Because of low levels of defense spending as well as high levels of corruption, most Malian units were short on basic equipment and supplies. Lacking in aircraft or tactical wheeled vehicles, they could not seek out the enemy in the country’s vast expanses (Moyar 2015, 14).
Therefore, the Malian government was relatively weak in terms of the diplomatic, informational, economic, organizational, and military powers to deal with the insurgencies. That is why the country ended up with a severe military defeat and the occupation of its territory by terrorist groups.

More than Mali, Sri Lanka’s authorities demonstrated better understanding of the recommendations mentioned in the US military doctrine concerning fighting an insurgency. The Sri Lankans use of their Diplomatic, Informational, and Military instrument of national power was more appropriate and by far more efficient than the Malians to counter their uprisings. However, the COIN authorities, from both sides, displayed an inadequate understanding of the use of their economic instrument of national power.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The Tuareg and Moor recurrent insurgencies, more than destabilizing Mali’s social cohesion and economic development, became an international threat since the subsequent chaos in the northern region, stemming from the country’s instability, was utilized by numerous terrorist groups to propagate their ideas across Sahara and beyond. This research intends to identify why Mali has historically been unable to find a lasting solution for Tuareg and Moor rebellions. To that extent, the author emphasized the types of approach the different Malian governments adopted to address the insurgency issues and the reasons why the governmental responses failed to durably solve the northern communities’ concerns.

From 1963, when the first Tuareg and Moor insurgency broke out, until recent days, the country has seen several governments with different approaches to address the insurgencies that confronted them. Even though every Malian government implemented its particular blueprint to deal with the insurgencies, they were many similarities among the different governmental responses. The following findings highlight the types of approach the different governments adopted to address the northern issues.

First of all, unlike Sri Lanka, the Malian government failed to establish trustful and lasting diplomatic relationships with the neighboring countries and regional superpowers such as France and Algeria, even though diplomatic cooperation between Mali and its neighboring countries and strategic partners occurred. However, this cooperation did not prevent the insurgents from retreating to Algeria whenever needed or
benefiting from logistic and financial support transiting through neighboring countries. For instance, most of the peace agreements between Malian authorities and the Tuareg and Moor insurgents were negotiated and signed in Algeria. Meanwhile, southwest Algeria has historically been the retreat zone for Malian insurgents as well as their casualties and families.

Malian’s successive governments lost the informational war against the insurgents for many reasons. First, the Malian government’s recurrent pattern for seeking negotiations and providing financial remuneration to insurgent leaders subsequent to any uprising was perceived by the population as a sign of weakness and defeat, which fostered subsequent insurgencies. In addition, the lack of trust of the Malian Armed Forces and the feeling of insecurity of the northern population toward the regular forces prevents the Armed Forces from benefitting from substantial information, which is indispensable for any COIN operation.

Malian’s successive governments failed to adopt a sustainable equipment and training program that prepares the Malian Armed Forces to effectivity control and secure the lawless Malian Sahara to deter potential infiltration and settlement by armed groups. This lack of governmental support to the Armed Forces is explained in the literature as the consequence of the fear that politicians felt toward the military due to the latter’s multiple coup d’états throughout Malian history.

Violent Malian military retaliation, as the primary response to the first Tuareg and Moor insurgencies, created massive local support for the insurgents and has fueled subsequent uprisings. The Malian soldiers have been portrayed several times by the international community as responsible for violence against civilians during military
operations in the north Mali. This inappropriate use of force against civilians strengthened the different northern tribes’ unity while it compromised the regular soldiers’ ability to collect information.

The economic unbalance between northern and southern Mali is a premier triggering factor of the Tuareg and Moor recurrent insurgencies. The first upsurge in 1963 was explained as a reaction of Tuaregs and Moors to the rise of tax rates on cattle initiated by the newly independent Malian government. Next, the second insurgency in 1990 is described as one of the consequences of the Malian government’s indifference and mismanagement following the unprecedented drought that hit the country in the 1970s and 1980s. Undoubtedly, successive Malian governments failed to address appropriate measures to tackle the country’s economic challenges and alleviate the population’s lasting suffering and misery, particularly in the northern regions. More than the south, northern Malian regions’ lack of basic infrastructure and vital services show the lack of the presence of the government. Therefore, only efficient use of the country’s economic power could have definitively solved the Tuareg and Moor cyclical insurgencies.

Recommendations

Based on the research finding, the following recommendation should be considered to address lasting solutions to Malian insurgency issue:

1. Mali should develop genuine diplomatic cooperation with its neighboring countries and France focused on intelligence sharing, mutual assistance, military cooperation, border control and security, and cross-border crime to cut the external military, logistic, and financial support to any potential insurgency.
2. Mali should strengthen its cooperation with the world’s super-powers such as the United States of America, Europe, China, and Russia to support the country’s economic, educational, and military development programs while restricting potential insurgency groups from economic support worldwide.

3. The Malian government and Malian Armed Forces should generate a national information campaign oriented toward regaining civil population confidence, support, and cooperation. As no success is possible without the population support, the government should continuously involve and inform the people about the nation’s security and territorial integrity concerns while inviting them to cooperate with the governmental services.

4. The country’s official media and outlets should cover the entire country, particularly the northern regions that are the most remote from the capital city, Bamako, to keep the people more informed. These official outlets should broadcast peaceful, inclusive, and cohesive programs considering the particularity of every community, such as linguistic and cultural. During military operations, some personnel working for trusted media should be embedded within the military to provide timely and accurate information, as experienced by the US Armed Forces.

5. The Malian government should distribute the Malian Armed Forces throughout the entire territory, especially in the Saharan region in respect to executing their primary mission of defending the country’s integrity. The country should never tolerate a portion of its territory, however small, to be without the presence of defense and security forces.

6. Malian Armed Forces should develop its own doctrine for COIN operations and a mission command philosophy modeled after the US Army, structured on small and
highly mobile forces trained to conduct unconventional warfare in the deserted Saharan region.

7. The Malian Armed Forces, like the other governmental services, should adopt a recruitment policy which reflects the country’s multi-ethnic society, where every community is proportionally represented.

8. The Malian government should address the root causes of the Tuareg and Moor insurgencies by investing intensively in the northern regions to balance the state’s representation compared to the other parts of the country by developing basic infrastructure such as schools, roads, and medical facilities.

9. The Malian government should emphasize developing a national transportation network to enhance internal commerce and cohesion and to break the northern regions age-old isolation.

10. The Malian government should establish a national natural disaster response organization capable of intervening rapidly all over the country, particularly the remote areas such as the northern region.

These recommendations answer the findings that stem from the study. They do not pretend to be the unique solutions to an appropriate Malian governmental response to address the Tuareg and Moor recurrent insurgencies. However, they could serve as foundation or reflection pattern for both Malian civilian society and government to prevent further insurgency in the country.

This research, following the case study methodology, did not illustrate an adequate use of economic power, as stipulated in the US Army doctrine, from both Malian and Sri Lankan COIN leaders. Further research could be relevant to answer an
appropriate employ of economical solution to solve or prevent Tuareg and Moor-type of insurgency in country like Mali.

Additionally, the economic-politic insurgents in Mali were overshadowed by extremist Islamic and terrorist’s groups. Therefore, the religious aspect in Malian internal turmoil deserves subsequent research, which should highlight the role of religion in Malian society as well as the roots and impact of terrorism on the Sahara and in Mali more precisely.


