THE USE OF FORCE IN THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

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FLAVIO CAÚLA AMÉRICO DOS REIS, LTC, BRAZILIAN ARMY
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This work intends to analyze the reasons for the deployment of the so-called Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in 2013, as well as its contributions to the peace process. The FIB is the first UN force in history authorized to carry out offensive operations to neutralize groups considered threats to peace processes. The focus of the analysis is why the United Nations decided to increase the use of force in DRC considering the background of failed attempts to use force by peacekeepers in the DRC, since 1960. The study is going to be accomplished by describing the foundations of the use of force in the DRC to the analytical questions that were established in order to frame the two screening criteria: utility of force and policy. The analysis is going to be based on the deterrence theory and some assumptions of the English School of international relations theory. Regarding peacekeeping, deterrence helps prevent conflicts from spilling over into noncombatant areas, thus reducing and limiting violence. In the classic English School, the international system is perceived as a society where members consent to common rules to avoid chaos. These rules are expressed in a set of institutions such as international law, diplomacy, the great powers, balance of power and war.

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Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Andrew S. Harvey, Ph.D.

_____, Member
Lieutenant Colonel Mark A. Connolly, MDS

_____, Member
Larry L. Turgeon, M.A.

Accepted this 14th day of June 2019 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE USE OF FORCE IN THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, by Major Flavio Caúla Américo dos Reis, Brazilian Army, 108 pages.

This work intends to analyze the reasons for the deployment of the so-called Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in 2013, as well as its contributions to the peace process. The FIB is the first U.N. force in history authorized to carry out offensive operations to neutralize groups considered threats to peace processes. The focus of the analysis is why the United Nations decided to increase the use of force in DRC considering the background of failed attempts to use force by peacekeepers in the DRC, since 1960. The study is going to be accomplished by describing the foundations of the use of force in the DRC to the analytical questions that were established in order to frame the two screening criteria: utility of force and policy. The analysis is going to be based on the deterrence theory and some assumptions of the English School of international relations theory. Regarding peacekeeping, deterrence helps prevent conflicts from spilling over into noncombatant areas, thus reducing and limiting violence. In the classic English School, the international system is perceived as a society where members consent to common rules to avoid chaos. These rules are expressed in a set of institutions such as international law, diplomacy, the great powers, balance of power and war.

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ACRONYMS

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
APCLS	The Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (French: *Alliance des Patriotes Pour un Congo Libre et Souverain*)
CNDP	National Congress for the Defense of the People (French: *Congrès national pour la défense du people*)
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FARDC	Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (French: *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo*)
FDLR	Rwandan Liberation Democratic Forces (French: *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda)*
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
M23	Movement of 23 March (French: *Mouvement du 23 Mars*)
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MINUSCA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic (French: *Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Centrafrique*)
MINUSMA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (French: *Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au Mali*)

MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (French: *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en Congo*)
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (French: *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo)*
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFL	The National Force of Liberation
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo (French: *Organisation des Nations Unies en Congo*)
PSCF	Peace Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region
RDC	Rally for Congolese Democracy
SADC	South African Development Community
SLBM	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

The end of the Cold War changed a well-defined political situation between two ideologically antagonistic blocs into a qualitatively different international environment, marked by the quasi-absence of well-characterized threats and an increasing number of intrastate wars. Although the possibility of a high-intensity East-West conflict was considered improbable, the new world order displayed a scenario of political instability and internal conflicts in some parts of Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia, and Middle East. In the bipolar era, both the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) used to contain disputes within their areas of influence, making the system more stable. Therefore, the former static and vertical global order comprised of more rational and predictable actors changed to a diffused and dynamic one with reshaped alliances and a more active role for non-state actors. The new system has been considered unstable, complex, multipolar, characterized by intrastate conflicts and the so-called "new threats." The industrial war paradigm between States was gradually replaced by a new paradigm called "war amongst the people."[1] Figure 1 provides an overview of the rising number of intrastate conflicts overtime. Although a decline can be noticed after 1991, the gap between intrastate and wars increases.

[1] Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Vintage, 2007).

The United Nations (UN) acts on the global stage to maintain international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations, achieve international cooperation and acts as a center for harmonizing the actions of nations.[2] In this sense, since the deployment of the first labeled UN peacekeeping mission in 1956, peacekeeping operations have been used to maintain peace and stabilize the international system, based on the core principles of neutrality, impartiality, and minimum use of force.[3] The way peacekeepers have accomplished their tasks has varied over time, given both the end of the Cold War and the failure of some peace operations in the 1990's, remarkably in Bosnia. Somalia and Rwanda, which are considered cornerstones for major changes in their *modus operandi*.



Figure 1. Number of Armed Conflicts and Wars

Source: Peace Research Institute Oslo, "Data on Armed Conflict," accessed 26 April 2019, https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict.

[2] United Nations (UN), *Charter of the United Nations* (New York: United Nations, 1945).

[3] Lise Morjé Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

During the Cold War era, except for the UN Force in Korea (1950) and the UN Operation in Congo (ONUC-1960), the majority of UN peacekeeping missions were deployed to monitor and verify peace agreements, relying basically on lightly armed troops and unarmed military observers. At that time, the primary role of the military forces was to prevent the escalation of conflicts and then pave the way for diplomatic efforts to solve the conflicts.[4] Force was authorized only in self-defense. Balance of power among the five permanent members of the UNSC, particularly between the two superpowers, prevented the UN from moving towards a more assertive use of force. At the end of the 1980's, as the Cold War was coming to an end, the Soviet Union's power had decreased dramatically and was no longer able to counterbalance western interests. Consequently, the UN and peacekeeping became heavily influenced by values of the liberal democratic order, such as human rights, democracy, and the open market. Between 1988 and 1993, the UN conducted more peace operations than over the previous forty years.[5] Peacekeeping became the conflict resolution tool of choice. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping was broadened to take in the promotion of post-Westphalian conception of stable peace[6] and to carry out complex operations

[4] Alex J. Bellamy, Paul D. Williams, and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010).

[5] Ibid.

[6] According to Bellamy and Williams, the post Westphalian conception of stable peace holds that states receive their sovereign rights only if they fulfil their responsibilities to their citizens, such as protections and prosperity. In the post-Westphalian perspective, peace operations need to be in the business of protecting human rights where host states proving unwilling or unable to do so, Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 38.

qualitatively different from earlier missions, combining a wide spectrum of issues, which includes not only disengagement of belligerent troops, but also a broad process of disarm, demobilize and reintegrate (DDR) of former combatants, protection of civilians, border demarcation, sexual violence, gender equality, human rights, and much more. The dilemma about when and how to use force was still an issue, as peacekeepers became involved in civil wars and nation-building.[7] Figure 2 displays a brief overview of UN peacekeeping operations by type, between 1973 and 2013. The number of operations considerably increases between 1983 and 1993. Moreover, enforcement mission and multidimensional mission answer for most of the mandates.

How to use military force has been an issue since the early UN missions and has influenced theory and practice. Authors have categorized different kinds of peacekeeping basically in terms of scope, aims, and extent of use of force. "Traditional"[8] or "multidimensional"[9] operations, "Chapter VI" or "Chapter VII" mandates, peacekeeping or peace enforcement, all of them can be differentiated, among other things, in terms of

[7] Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* (Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, 2002).

[8] Missions consisted of unarmed military observers and lightly armed troops with primarily monitoring, reporting and confidence-building roles. United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping, "Our History," United Nations, accessed 26 April 2019, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our_history.

[9] Peacekeeping missions in support of the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements that typically includes organizing post-conflict election; the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; and supporting national reconciliation process, Cedric De Coning, Chiyuki Aoi, and John Karlsrud, eds. *UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era: Adapting to Stabilization, Protection and New Threats* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 8.

use of force. Because strengths and weakness of UN peace operations may be amplified depending on how force is handled, the concept is central for conducting mission analysis and determining the end state. Despite the existence of some cases of success, to a large degree, failure in the field has marked the use of force in peacekeeping operations.[10]



Figure 2. UN Peacekeeping Operations by Type

Source: Håvard Hegre, Lisa Hultman and Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, "Peacekeeping Works: An Assessment of the Effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping Operations" (PRIO Policy Brief, Peace Research Institute Oslo, Norway, 2015).

The history of UN peace operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is not different than what has been described, the use of military force being a key issue. Since 1960, the UN deployed three different missions in the country without consistent positive outcomes. The first mission, the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC

[10] Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*.

- *Opération des Nations Unies au Congo*) was deployed after the country's independence from Belgium in 1960. The operation was designed to perform "traditional" peacekeeping, but, ultimately, ONUC carried out tasks that differed little from large-scale-combat operations. Although it has been argued that the mission achieved some of its given objectives, sustainable peace was not one of them, and the UN peacekeepers had to return in 1999. The United Nations Observer Mission in the Congo (MONUC - *Mission de l'Organisation de Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo*) was deployed as a small military team and, by 2008, it became the biggest and most expensive mission ever deployed by the UN. Moreover, MONUC's mandate was at the time the most comprehensive and robust ever issued to a peacekeeping operation. However, despite the robust mandate, MONUC was surprisingly reluctant in the use of force.[11] and although it achieved positive results in terms of preserving the independence and territorial integrity of the DRC, the mission was unable to protect people from violence perpetrated by rogue elements and militias or to dismantle foreign armed groups.[12] In this fashion, the general perception of failure about MONUC's performance, according to Denis Tull, is rooted in conceptual and operational problems that relate to the use of force.[13] In order to address these problems, on 28 May 2010, by resolution

[11] Otto Spijkers, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo," *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 19, no. 1-2 (2015): 113.

[12] Sadiki Koko, "MONUC and the Quest for Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Assessment of a Peacekeeping Mission," *African Security Review* 20, no. 2 (2011): 37.

[13] Denis M. Tull, "Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: waging peace and fighting war," *International Peacekeeping* 16, no. 2 (2009): 227.

1925, the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) renamed MONUC as the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (*Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo* - MONUSCO). In general terms, the mission was expected to cooperate with the government of the DRC to protect civilians under threat and to stabilize and consolidate the peace. Notwithstanding the intentions, in practice MONUSCO became a scaled down version of MONUC and criticism increased as rebel groups sized towns, including the capital of the eastern Congo, Goma, in the presence of UN troops.

In 2013, by resolution 2098, the UNSC assigned the so-called "force intervention brigade" (FIB) to MONUSCO in response to increasing violence in the eastern side of the country. The mandate authorized MONUSCO to use all necessary means to carry its mission out including, among other things, the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts. Furthermore, the resolution states the intervention brigade, comprised of three infantry battalions, one artillery and one Special force and Reconnaissance company, would carry out targeted offensive operations to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, and to disarm them.[14] In short, that means to execute military offensive operations to defeat opposing forces. It was the first time in UN history a peacekeeping

[14] United Nations Security Council (UNSC), S/RES/2098 (2013), Resolution 2098 (2013), United Nations, 2013, accessed 13 September 2018, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2098.

force was assigned to perform such kind of tasks. Thus, MONUSCO's case is a cornerstone showing that peace operations may have evolved from their traditional defensive pre-Cold War design, which used to interpose personnel between opposing armies and to monitor cease-fire agreements, to a more assertive posture with the use of robust means of warfare, like special forces operations, attack helicopters and field artillery.

The reliance on the use of force as key element in the conflict resolution process is contested by some authors. For instance, Fortna[15] argues that if most of the causal mechanisms through which peacekeeping influences the parties to a conflict are nonmilitary, the peacekeeping failures in Rwanda and Bosnia, for example, as well as the role of military intervention for human rights purposes in multidimensional operations do not explain by themselves the main reason why an institution created to promote peace has been increasing the use of force to achieve its goals. Particularly in the case of the DRC, it is not clear why the United Nations has increased the use of force despite the background of apparently political ineffectiveness of it.

The debate around the effectiveness of the use of force in peacekeeping operations is also influenced by the conventional notions of deterrence. In the post-Cold War era, factors such as the advancements in transportation and communication have led to the rise of non-state actors within the international system. In terms of conflict, this means the increasing number of intrastate conflicts and civil wars in comparison of conventional interstate wars. The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and

[15] Virginia P. Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

Guidelines, known as "Capstone Doctrine", states that 'the ultimate aim of the use of force is to influence and deter spoilers working against the peace process or seeking to harm civilians; and not to seek their military defeat.'[16] Thus, understanding how deterrence theory impacts the use of force in peacekeeping operations is more important than a simple theoretical inquiry. Deterrence is an essential element of security, prosperity, and ensuring international order. For this reason, it is important to reexamine the United Nations ability to deter conflict and secure the international system in the current environment that consists of a variety of challenges to traditional order.

Research Problem

This paper is going to examine the reasons why the UN has decided to increase the use of force in the DRC assigning an intervention brigade to MONUSCO as well as how this military formation was used to achieve UN political objectives on the ground. On 28 March 2013, through Resolution 2098, the United Nations Security Council authorized the deployment of the so-called intervention brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The intervention brigade is the first UN force authorized the carry out offensive operations to neutralize armed groups considered a threat to the peace process. Since 1960, the UN has deployed different peace operations in the DRC. Force has been used more than one time since then without any consistent result. Therefore, considering the described background on the use of force, this work intends to analyze

[16] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, (DPKO/DFS), *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (New York: United Nations, 2010), 35.

the reasons for another attempt and how the brigade was used to achieve UN objectives on the ground.

Research Question

The primary question is: Why has the UN decided to increase the use of force in the DRC after March 2013? The secondary research questions are:

1. What is the relationship between the increasing use of military force and the MONUSCO's reputation as a credible conflict-resolution military force?

2. Did the increasing use of military force enhance the MONUSCO's capability to deter non-state actors?

Assumptions

The analysis is going to be based on some assumptions of the English School of international relations theory. In the classic English School, the international system is perceived as a society where members consent to common rules to avoid chaos. These rules are expressed in a set of institutions such as international law, diplomacy, the great powers, balance of power and war. According to this theory, in the international society, there would be a consensual constraint of national interests on the basis of something understood as beneficial to this society as a whole, such as restraints on the use of force.[17]

[17] Martin Wight, *Power Politics* (London, UK: A&C Black, 2002).

Scope

The work is going to be limited to the peacekeeping operations led by the United Nations in the DRC. The methodological analysis is going to be quali-quantitative (QQA) and the research method descriptive as the study aims to understand the characteristics of UN peace operations.

Limitations and Delimitations

A case study approach of the MONUSCO's intervention brigade activities from 2013 to 2016 will be used to understand the reasons for its deployment as well as its possible achievements for sustainable peace. The selected period considers the years of the major operations carried out by the FIB.

The research is going to be complemented with the author's background as an army officer with academic and practical experience on the subject. He worked as a military observer in the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), from 2010 to 2011, and attended the first United Nations Ceasefire Agreement Mediation and Monitoring Course held by the Norwegian International Defence Centre (2012). The author is a post-graduate in International Relations at Getúlio Vargas Foundation (2009-2010) and has a master's degree in military science at the Brazilian Army Advanced School (2007-2009).

Definitions

For the purpose of this research, power is described as an ability to do things and control others, to get others to do what they otherwise would not.[18] The ability to control

[18] Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations.*

others is often associated with the possession of certain resources such as military power.[19] Findlay argues that the more willing and able UN operations are to use force the less likely they are to have to use it. In the case of MONUSCO, however, a more likely use of force has been observed. UNSC resolutions, sanctions and multidimensional field missions have not been enough to dissuade spoilers to the peace process. The use of force, on regular basis, may be assessed as a proof of dissuasive weakness, the failure of the UN's capacity to deal with the utility of force.

Significance of Study

New trends of UN peacekeeping are directly linked to the Brazilian interests. The 2016 National Defense Policy establishes that Brazil should prepare its Armed Forces in order to perform humanitarian actions and peace operations for a greater international insertion strategy.[20] That means people, government, and the military must understand how force can be useful in peace operations.

[19] Joseph S. Nye, "Soft Power," *Foreign policy* 80 (1990): 153-171.

[20] Federative Republic of Brazil, *National Defense Policy* (Brasília, BR: Defense Ministry, 2016), 33, accessed 13 September 2018, https://www.defesa.gov.br-/estado-e-defesa/politica-nacional-de-defesa.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this study is to assess the implications of the current deterrence theory in the use of military force in the MONUSCO. In doing this, it is important to look at the literature that has informed the scholarship and debate regarding deterrence. This chapter will specifically look at the definition of deterrence, its types and main assumptions, the criticism of deterrence theory, and the use of deterrence in intrastate conflicts. A brief overview about the evolution of the UN peacekeeping operations theory and practice is going to be provided in order to define terms and key ideas that underpin the subject.

The Deterrence Theory and Strategy: The Nuclear Era

International crises and war have been a central topic in the field of international relations. The ability to prevent war and crises through deterrence has develop substantial theory in order to deal with some key questions of international politics such as how force is manipulated to achieve political goals and how wars can be avoided. [21] According to Michael Howard, deterrence aims to convince an adversary that the cost of using military force to solve political conflicts will outweigh its benefits. [22] Lawrence Freedman defines deterrence in terms of the role of threat in international affairs. In

[21] Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," *World Politics* 31, no. 2 (1979): 290.

[22] Michael Howard. "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs* 61, no. 2 (Winter 1982): 309-324.

particular, he looks at the threat to use force in order to stop others acting in harmful way. Freedman further suggests that deterrence is comprised of three inter-related elements: an underlying power relationship; the interests and norms at stake; and the narrative that links the two first elements.[23] Deterrence has a paradoxical nature because each side pursues security, not by protecting itself, but by threatening to cause unacceptable damage on the other.[24] Deterrence, also, is based on credibility. Aspects such as strength, the ability to carry out a threat and to defend against other's actions, as well as reputation influence on credibility.[25] In this fashion, the credibility of deterrence is related to its capacity to hurt. Freedman affirms that a threat is credible if either it is not matched by a counterattack or it is automatically implemented by the adversary misbehavior.[26] Patrick Morgan states that deterrence is not new. The classic balance of power systems was based on deterrence. In these systems deterrence was applied by actors not only to prevent wars but via wars.[27]

Although deterrence is popularly associated with the use of the military force, it is possible to achieve deterrence effects employing all other instruments of national power,

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[23] Lawrence Freedman, "Deterrence: A Reply," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 5 (2005): 789.

[24] Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," 292.

[25] Ibid., 9.

[26] Lawrence Freedman, "The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,* ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 765.

[27] Patrick M. Morgan, "The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today," *Contemporary Security Policy* 33, no. 1 (2012): 86.

such as Diplomatic, Informational and Economic. In fact, Paul K. Huth broadens Howard's and Freedman's definition affirming that deterrence is the use of any threat to refrain another party from initiating a course of action. According to him, policies of deterrence can include both military and non-military threats that are intended to prevent undesirable courses of actions from other states.[28] Deterrence, therefore, is maximized not only with the availability of military power but also when all instruments of national power are synchronously applied in pursuing a given national goal. More than a theoretical approach, deterrence can also be a strategy. When A tries to influence B's behavior through warning about the consequences of the acts that B might be considering, then deterrence becomes a strategy.[29] Although this kind of strategy is criticized for not aiming to create harmonious relationship between countries, the stability it creates may set conditions for further developments in term of diplomatic engagements.[30] It is important to highlight, therefore, that failures in the use of deterrence as strategy are normally connected to the focus in the use of military resources only.

Morgan identifies two cases of deterrence. According to him, direct deterrence is concerned with the protection of one's own territory while extended deterrence aims to protect another state territory. Direct and extended deterrence are subdivided in two

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[28] Paul K. Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 26.

[29] Freedman, "Deterrence: A Reply," 790.

[30] Patrick M. Morgan, "Taking the Long View of Deterrence," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 5 (2005): 751-763.

categories: immediate and general deterrence. The former is essentially reactive and aims to deter a short-term threat of attack. The last, however, is preventive by nature and aims to avoid the rise of such short-term threats. Huth explains that major powers have been the primary states to practice extended deterrence. Situations of direct deterrence, on the other hand, are centered in territorial conflicts between neighboring states in which the major powers are not directly involved.[31] The author further sustains that the ability to prevent war may not indicate the existence of a successful deterrence policy. In his point of view, if a state accepts extremely high diplomatic demands from a potential attacker in order to avoid conflict, deterrence has failed. Thus, general deterrence fails when short-term crises arise; immediate deterrence when war begins; and both general and immediate deterrence fail when the avoidance of conflict results in maximum diplomatic concessions.[32] Freedman believes that deterrence works better in a general than an immediate sense, by cautioning both parties of the risks in raising the tensions too far.[33] Robert Jervis identifies a third kind of deterrence, called "self-deterrence." "Self-deterrence" happens when actors are deterred by their own imagination. They identify threats or risks that do not exist.[34] Finally, theorists use four sets of variables when

[31] Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates," 27.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Freedman, "Deterrence: A Reply," 792.

[34] Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," 14.

analyzing deterrence: the balance of military forces, costly signaling and bargaining behavior, reputations, and interest at stake.[35]

The literature for deterrence theory is identified in four different periods of time, called "waves." The first wave appeared immediately after World War II. That time, nuclear superiority was seen as key counter to USSR advantages in manpower and geography.[36] Bernard Brodie, Jacob Viner, and Arnold Wolfers are among the key theorists from this period. They concentrated their studies on the implications of nuclear weapons. The work they developed was strongly influenced by the realist school of international relations theory and centered on assumptions such as the rational actor.[37] The atomic bomb changed the calculations of engagements between great powers. The possibility of nuclear destruction made states consider their actions differently. Therefore, the role of the military within nuclear powers changed from wining wars to preventing them. According to this line of thought, nuclear weapons must be ready, yet they might never be used.[38] The sole long-term role of nuclear weapons was to deter their use by the

[35] Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates," 25; Michael J. Mazarr, *Understanding Deterrence* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 9.

[36] Freedman, "The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists," 739.

[37] William W. Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence," in *US Nuclear Strategy*, ed. Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory F. Treverton (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989), 12.

[38] Bernard Brodie, "The Anatomy of Deterrence," *World Politics* 11, no. 2 (1959): 173.

enemy.[39] In the first wave, deterrence became associated with preventive strategies and with the concepts known as "massive retaliation".[40] and Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). During the first wave, there were discussions about the possibility of the use of tactical nuclear weapons in order to obtain advantages in a conventional confrontation without causing exceptional damage to the local communities, for instance. It soon became clear, however, that their radius of destruction was too large and their effects too pervasive to employ them in such a way. According to Brodie, people saved by the use of tactical nuclear weapons over their territories would be the last to ask for help again.[41] The First Wave theorists are also responsible for the development of the critical concept of "first strike and second strike." According to Albert Wohlstetter, first-strike capability is not simply related to the initial shots, but also with the destruction of all the enemy's means of retaliation. On the other hand, a second-strike capability is represented by the ability to survive the first strike and still carry out a devastating retaliation on the aggressor.[42] Finally, another feature of the period covered by the first wave was the role of the United Nations (UN). As an international institution created in part to practice deterrence through the five nuclear powers of its Security Council, Morgan sustains that

[39] Freedman, "The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists," 738.

[40] John Slessor, "The Place of the Bomber in British Policy." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 29, no. 3 (1953): 303.

[41] Bernard Brodie, "More about Limited War," *World Politics* 10, no. 1 (1957): 117.

[42] Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Survival* 1, no. 1 (1959): 8-17.

the UN made deterrence protection available to numerous additional states, and sometimes to actors within states.[43]

The second wave arose in the 1950s and 1960s. It is marked by the use of rational choice and game-theoretic models to develop a nuclear strategy in situations in which the first choice of both parties is to stand firm, but in which both prefer retreating and letting the other side win to a mutually disastrous confrontation. Rational deterrence theory focused on how military threats can persuade an aggressor that the outcome of military aggression may be costly and unsuccessful.[44] Herman Kahn, Glenn Snyder and Thomas Schelling are main names of the second wave.

Kahn coined the term "escalation dominance."[45] The idea is to explain the process of escalation in terms of a metaphorical ladder, with each of the 44 rungs representing a different level of intensity in the crisis or confrontation. The lowest rung represents normal peacetime conditions, with higher rungs full-blown conventional war, limited nuclear warfare, and, finally, all-out strategic nuclear exchange. According to Khan, the ideal aspiration is to achieve a position of "escalation dominance," a condition in which an actor has the ability to escalate a conflict in ways that will be disadvantageous to the adversary while he cannot retaliate, either because it has no

[43] Morgan, "The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today," 87.

[44] Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates," 29.

[45] Herman Kahn, *On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios* (London, UK: Routledge, 2017).

escalation options or because the options would not improve his situation.[46] Khan believed that the key aspect of the deterrence strategy was the second-strike capability. In his point of view, it does not matter how successful the first-strike was if the other side still has the capability to retaliate.[47] For instance, the importance given to the capability to retaliate is responsible for the development of the submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). As the antisubmarine warfare was not developed enough to challenge the survivability of a submarine force, a full first-strike success became very unlikely. That means the other side would still have the capacity to retaliate after a first-strike on its land-based nuclear assets. According to Schelling, the SLBMs were celebrated as being positively stabilizing in a world were both superpowers believed in the critical role of the offensive advantages of the first-strike to win.[48]

In *Arms and Influence*, Schelling further elaborated in this concept sustaining that military strategy must include the art of coercion. His thoughts were centered in the deterrence capability of punishment, particularly the capacity to hurt another state to avoid an undesirable action.[49] Snyder presented the distinction between deterrence by

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[46] Forrest E. Morgan, Karl P. Mueller, Evan S. Medeiros, Kevin L. Pollpeter, and Roger Cliff, *Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008), 14.

[47] Herman Kahn and Evan Jones, *On Thermonuclear War* (London, UK: Routledge, 2017), 557.

[48] Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University press, 1980), 288.

[49] Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword* (New Heaven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008).

denial and deterrence by punishment. The first influences the state's decision to achieve his objective while the second increases the costs of doing so.[50] If "A" is able to reduce the chances of "B" success by denning capabilities, the probability of conflict decreases, and stability increases. By increasing the cost of "B" actions, although the probability of conflict decreases the instability may increase.

Emerging in the late 1960s, the third wave challenged the rational actor assumption created by the second wave theorists by using statistical and case-study methods to test the deterrence theory, particularly in cases of conventional deterrence.[51] Third wave theorists also tried to distinguish their work by addressing some major difficulties not yet developed by earlier theorists. These difficulties are related to the lack of systematization of deterrence as theory. Deterrence, in their opinion, could be better analyzed by through its implications, particularly looking at which elements of the theory are essential, which contradict each other, and those that need modification. According to this line of thought, deterrence relies too much on deduction and more empirical data would be necessary to investigate whether decision makers behave as the theory says they would or if the actions taken achieve the desired effects.[52] Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein are considered some of the main writers of this period. They argued

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[50] Glenn H. Snyder, "Deterrence and Power," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 4, no.2 (1960): 163-178.

[51] Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 534.

[52] Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," 301-303.

that some of the main assumptions of deterrence theory such as rationality are contradicted by empirical evidence.[53]

One of the main determinants of deterrence theory is what a state is going to win or lose if it stands firm. Different than the previous generations of theorists, the third wave stresses the costs of retreating. Among the interests a state would have to sacrifice are the values that it places on the issue at stake (intrinsic interest), the degree to which a retreat would compromise its position on other issues (strategic interest), and the ability to manipulate the costs of retreating by enhancing its bargaining position (commitment). Between these three values, third-wave theorists believe that intrinsic interest is determinant in most cases.[54] In this sense, the greater the intrinsic interest the greater the possibility for an actor to prevail, because the cost of retreating would be higher than those of the opponent. Furthermore, intrinsic interest is key for strategic interest. If a state retreats on an issue that other actors know is central for it, therefore others will assume that the state has no power to stand firm and then will do the same when facing future issues.[55]

Deterring Non-State Actors: The Fourth Wave

The end of the Cold War and the rise of concerns about asymmetrical threats, most notably the terrorist attacks of September 11th, are responsible for the emergence of

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[53] Richard N. Lebow and Janice G, Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (1988): 626.

[54] Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," 314.

[55] Ibid., 315.

the fourth wave. Because it was oriented to present answers to a real-life problem, the fourth wave is more oriented to the development of a strategy than a theory.[56] All efforts and theory developed by the previous waves were focused on states and nuclear weapons and aimed to reach a common outcome: non-aggression. The challenge in the post-Cold War era was to match a theory designed for relationship between nuclear powers to asymmetrical threats[57], such as rogue states, weak states and non-state actors, in an international environment of expanded normative constraints on using force.[58] How to deter an asymmetrical threat has mixed implications, however. During the Cold War, deterrence failure might have meant an unacceptable outcome such as mutual destruction. In an asymmetric environment, although deterrence failure may result in the suffering of many, different calculations are possible because national survival is not at stake. All the

[56] Jeffrey W. Knopf, "The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research," *Contemporary Security Policy* 31, no. 1 (2010): 2.

[57] U.S. President John F. Kennedy, addressing the West Point Class of 1962, defined asymmetrical threat as 'another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts.' Association of the United States Army, "Defining Asymmetric Warfare," 1 October 2006, accessed 26 April 2019, https://www.ausa.org/publications/defining-asymmetric-warfare.

[58] Freedman, "Deterrence: A Reply," 795; Morgan, "The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today," 89.

literature in the fourth wave agrees on a key point: deterrence remains relevant and useful against the new threats, though diminished in significance. [59]

The fourth wave has some ideas in common with the second and third waves, such as the role of assurances in making deterrence effective and the importance of integrating deterrence into a larger framework. The main difference is its empirical focus. Fourth wave theorists are concerned about how deterrence would operate in situations different than nuclear power relationships. [60] In sum, they stress more on the reach of deterrence rather than its limitations. [61] The main assumption of the forth wave is the state's willingness to use not only military assets to deter, but also all available instruments of national power. Based on this assumption, in an asymmetric environment deterrence works because the weaker opponent believes that the deterrent state will use all necessary means to achieve or defend its interests. [62] Thus, deterrence theory has been used in the fourth wave to develop strategic concepts such as preemption attack and active defense. [63]

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[59] Knopf, "The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research," Colin S Gray, "Maintaining Effective Deterrence" (Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, August 2003).

[60] Knopf, "The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research," 2.

[61] Ibid., 5.

[62] Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates," 29.

[63] A. R. Knott, "Does 9/11 Mark the End of Deterrence and the Birth of 'Detercion'?." *Defence Studies* 4, no. 1 (2004): 40-63.

In addition to strategies already stated within this work, such as deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment, new approaches developed in the fourth wave include indirect deterrence, deterrence by counter-narrative, and deterrence by concession. Because of the difficulties in directly targeting non-states actors, indirect deterrence goes after the facilitating network that supports them. Normally, facilitators are business-driven opportunists and have no connections with the political motivation of the non-state actors. By threating facilitators, the desired outcome is to reduce the non-state actors' access to vital resources to conduct their operations.[64] Deterrence by counter-narrative challenges the political justification to fight. When the armed group narrative is discredited, its legitimacy erodes. Therefore, the group's ability to recruit and raise funds for its cause is severely damaged. [65] On the other hand, deterrence by concession moves in the opposite direction when aiming to address grievances and grant concessions to non-state actors. Some armed groups emerge in regions where the national state has failed to provide the basic needs to its population. Thus, is it possible to identify some legitimate grievances among the group's objectives. By accommodating these objectives (and then holding that accommodation at risk) the deterrent actor may prevent the armed groups from conducting undesirable actions or even cooperating with other

[64] Jeffrey W. Knopf, "The fourth wave in deterrence research," *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol 31, no. 1: 4.

[65] Scott Helfstein, *White Paper on Terrorism, Deterrence and Nuclear Weapons,* Prepared for the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 30 October 2008), 30.

groups.[66] Moreover, Freeman argues that once non-state actors are considered rational parties and follow some sort of strategic logic, then this logic can be challenged.[67]

One of the problems addressed by the fourth wave is how to deal with insurgency and conflict within failed states. After the Cold War, the lack of support from the Soviet Union and the effects of globalization on underdeveloped countries have contributed to the collapse of internal political order in some states, particularly in the African continent. The possibility to use military force to protect human lives under threat and promote regional stability has increased the role of multinational organizations such as NATO and the United Nations and has risen deterrence to a central position in their political considerations.[68] According to Morgan, extended deterrence is at the heart of liberal peace theory as now applied. In this fashion, international institutions and alliances promote deterrence when helping states to avoid disruptive internal political struggles on security issues and to keep them from being security threats to each other. Morgan, however, highlights that the main problem of extended deterrence promoted by collective actors is that they are likely to implement their deterrence threat unevenly, because of the different interests between members. In his opinion, collective actors perform better when combining threats with the use of incentives.[69] One useful concept

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[66] Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done," *International Security* 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/2006): 89.

[67] Freedman. "Deterrence: A Reply," 797.

[68] Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates," 44.

[69] Morgan, "The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today," 92.

to adjust deterrence theory to collective actors is Timothy W. Crawford's 'pivotal deterrence'. In pivotal deterrence a third party seeks to keep two or more associates (or members) from fighting. The pivotal deterrer, however, must have the capabilities to intervene and determine the outcome for the theory to be successful.[70]

Recently, because of the developments in several new domains, from space to cyberspace, and the increasing tension between the United States and major revisionist powers such as Russia and China, there have been new discussions on how deterrence should work in a multipolar world. Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. believes that in such scenario it is hard to accurately identify a military balance of power.[71] In a world of three nuclear rival great powers, none can maintain military parity with the other two. In addition to this situation, the deterrence provided by nuclear weapons has been questioned in Russia and China where key leaders believe that some kinds of nuclear weapons are acceptable for use in conventional warfare, such as those used to create an electromagnetic pulse. The result, in the Krepinevich's point of view, is that the firebreak between conventional and nuclear war is slowly disappearing. Thus, Moscow and Beijing may find conventional aggression as not too risky, if they can use nuclear weapons if things go wrong.[72] Michael J. Mazarr believes that the multipolar rivalry requires more

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[70] Timothy W. Crawford, *Pivotal Deterrence: Third-party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).

[71] Andrew F.J. Krepinevich, "The Eroding Balance of Terror: The Decline of Deterrence," *Foreign Affairs* 98 (2019): 64.

[72] Krepinevich, "The Eroding Balance of Terror: The Decline of Deterrence," 65-66.

effective deterrence. In his opinion, deterrence and dissuasion must be conceived to shape the thinking of the target, considering its interests, motive, imperatives as well as its view on deterrence.[73] It is the perception of the potential aggressor that matters. Deterrence will succeed by creating a subjective perception in the minds of the decision-makers of the target.[74]

The Criticism of Deterrence

There are many criticisms of deterrence. The literature on deterrence does not reach a common ground regarding the effectiveness of the theory and the strategies it supports. In general, deterrence elaborates little about how to move from hostile relations into peaceful ones. It basically deals with relations characterized by high conflict, when the main outcome is non-aggression. Because of the influence of the realist school of international relations[75] on deterrence, the theory overestimates the power of threats and, thus, neglects other feasible approaches such as rewards and compromises.[76] Realists believe that states achieve their goals using superior power. Superior power and retreat are in opposite corners of the ring. This assumption makes statesmen believe that giving

[73] Mazarr, *Understanding Deterrence*, 2.

[74] Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 160.

[75] According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2010), Realism, also known as political realism, is a view of international politics that stresses its competitive and conflictual side. Realists consider the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national interests, and struggle for power.

[76] Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," 295.

rewards to the other side or even searching any kind of compromise would at best postpone an upcoming conflict and at worst show weakness, what could encourage the other side to raise new demands. In addition, because deterrence theory is very influenced by western values, culture and experience, it assumes that the other side has the same values at stake.[77] This is one the main causes of failure. Deterrence, therefore, may fail when the deterrent party misunderstands the adversary's values, way to see the world, strength, and options.[78]

Jervis sustains that third-wave research, for instance, has revealed important deficiencies in deterrence theory but has not developed new theories. Nor has it shown exactly what can be retained from older views, what must be discarded, and what can be reformulated in bounded, conditional terms. Third wave theorists differ from those of the second in the aspect of the costs of retreating. They distinguish intrinsic interest, strategic interest and commitment as the values that would be sacrificed by retreats.[79] Third wave theorists believe that intrinsic interest is more important in most cases. Furthermore, intrinsic interest leads to strategic interest: if a state gives in on an issue which both sides know is more important to it than to its adversary, then others are likely to infer that the state is weak in military power or resolve that it will retreat in a wide range of future issues.

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[77] Ibid., 296.

[78] Ibid., 306

[79] Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," 314.

One of the biggest criticisms of deterrence theory is that it overestimates the rationality of decision-makers, particularly in high stress situations.[80] The definition of rationality is not simple. Rational behavior varies according to different cultures, beliefs, perceptions and personalities. The rationality paradigm that evolves deterrence may be questioned, for example, in authoritarian regimes. In general, authoritarian leaders can be extremely risk tolerant and believe they can beat the odds.[81] They are rational in the sense they can create a logical way of how to achieve their goals, but this rationality does not necessarily mean reasonableness. They tend to ignore inconvenient facts and unpleasant information in order to construct convoluted scenarios that allow them to believe events will play out in the way they want.[82] Also, rationality may not be necessary for deterrence. A potential aggressor is less likely to carry out his plans if he fears the defender will respond without properly analyzing the risks involved. If decision makers were totally rational, deterrence would have never worked in a world of mutually assured destruction (MAD). If the aggressor believed the defender would retaliate and then destroy its own world, it would have assumed the defender was less than rational.[83]

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[80] Ibid., 299.

[81] Krepinevich, "The Eroding Balance of Terror: The Decline of Deterrence," 70.

[82] Amatzia Baram, "Deterrence Lessons from Iraq: Rationality Is Not the Only Key to Containment," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 4, (2012): 78.

[83] Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," 299.

The Evolution of the UN Peacekeeping Theory and Practice

For this work, definition of key terms regarding peace operations is adopted from the UN Capstone Doctrine. The following terms from the UN documents are repeatedly used:

> *Conflict prevention* involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict. Ideally, it should build on structured early warning, information gathering and a careful analysis of the factors driving the conflict.
>
> *Peacemaking* generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. Peacemakers may be envoys, governments, groups of states, regional organizations or the United Nations.
>
> *Peacekeeping* is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.
>
> *Peace enforcement* involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority.
>
> *Peacebuilding* involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that affect the functioning of society

> and the State and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.[84]

The term peacekeeping is not found in the UN Charter. The Charter neither explicitly mentions it, nor contains provisions for peacekeeping.[85] The term was invented in the 1950s.[86] The idea behind it comes from the Article 1 of the UN Charter. The article describes the UN as an institution created to maintaining international peace and security able to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace.[87] The definition of what constitutes a threat to international peace, however, has been influenced by perception as well as by changes in the global strategic environment over time.[88] In this sense, peacekeeping has evolved as ad hoc responses to counter threats to international peace and its key concepts were developed through practice.[89]

When the UN Charter was signed, in 1945, threats to international peace and security were identified basically as an aggression by one state against another.[90] After World War II, the fall of the last empires and the decolonization process spread the Westphalian nation-state order throughout the globe. Between 1945 and 1960, the

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[84] DPKO/DFS, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 18-19.

[85] Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 49.

[86] Ibid., 3.

[87] UN, *Charter of the United Nations*, 3.

[88] Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 50.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 49.

number of sovereign nation-states expanded from around fifty to more than 160.[91] Along with a possible nuclear war, threats to self-determination and sovereignty were the major concerns among the UN members. In 1970, for instance, the General Assembly's Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations gave voice to those concerns stating that the strict observance by states of the obligation not to intervene in the affairs of any other state is an essential condition to ensure peace.[92] That is the reason why the majority of peace operations between 1948 and 1989 were deployed only to assist the peaceful settlement of disputes between states and with the consent of the belligerent states.[93] Labelled as "traditional peacekeeping," these military operations were built on the model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, relying basically on lightly armed troops and unarmed military observers. At that time, the primary role of the military forces was to prevent the escalation of conflicts and then pave the way for diplomatic efforts to solve the conflicts.[94] Force was authorized only in self-defense. Balance of power among the five permanent members of the UNSC, particularly between the two superpowers, prevented the UN from moving

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[91] Armstrong, David, "The Evolution of International Society," in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations,* ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (Oxford: UK, Oxford University Press, 2001), 46.

[92] United Nations General Assembly, *Declaration on Principles of International Law Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,* United Nations, 24 October 1970, accessed 28 March 2019, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/3dda1f104.pdf.

[93] Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 5.

[94] Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 5.

towards a more assertive use of force. Internal national affairs issues such as human suffering within borders were not addressed by peacekeeping unless these issues would have threatened the security between states. [95]

At the end of the 1980's, as the Cold War was coming to an end, the Soviet Union's power had decreased dramatically and was no longer able to counterbalance western interests. Consequently, the UN and peacekeeping became heavily influenced by assumptions of the liberal peace theory and Westphalian conception of stable peace. The liberal peace theory affirms that liberal democratic states are the least likely to descend into civil war and anarchy. According to this line of thought, dmocracies, in general, assure basic human rights and offer non-violent approaches for the resolution of disputes. [96] The post Westphalian conception of stable peace holds that states receive their sovereign rights only if they fulfil their responsibilities to their citizens, such as protection and prosperity. In the post-Westphalian perspective, peace operations need to be in the business of protecting human rights where host states prove unwilling or unable to do so as well as promoting democracy. [97] Together, these two concepts reframed the understanding of international relations, particularly the concept of state sovereignty. [98]

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[95] UN, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 18.

[96] Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 29.

[97] Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 38.

[98] Oliver P. Richmond, "Introduction: NGOs, Peace and Human Security," *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 1 (2003): 2.

Accountability became the corollary for sovereignty.[99] States enjoy sovereign rights only if they fulfil their responsibilities to their citizens, especially the protection of civilians.[100]

In an international scenario marked by internal civil conflicts and violations to human rights, multinational intervention became the conflict resolution tool of choice. Figure 3 displays the number of UN peace operations between 1947 and 2014.



Figure 3. UN Peace Operations, 1947-2014

Source: Our World in Data, "UN Peace Operations Between 1947 and 2014," University of Oxford Global Data Change Lab, accessed 13 March 2019, https://ourworldindata.org/peacekeeping.

Between 1988 and 1993, for instance, the UN conducted more peacekeeping operations than over the previous forty years.[101] Peacekeeping was broadened to carry

[99] Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild, and I. William Zartman, *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 1.

[100] Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 38.

[101] Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 38.

out complex operations qualitatively different from earlier missions, combining a wide spectrum of issues which includes not only disengagement of belligerent troops, but also a broad process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, protection of civilians, border demarcation, free elections, sexual violence, gender equality, human rights and much more. The dilemma about when and how to use force was still an issue, as peacekeepers became involved in civil wars and nation-building.[102]

In fact, how to use military force has been an issue since the early UN missions and has influenced theory and practice. Authors have categorized different kinds of peacekeeping basically in terms of scope, aims, and extent of use of force. Traditional"[103] or "multidimensional"[104] operations, "Chapter VI", "Chapter VII" or "Chapter VIII" mandates, peacekeeping or peace enforcement, all of them can be differentiated, among other things, in terms of use of force. Since 2004, the UN has named some of its missions as "stabilization operations." These operations have deployed peacekeepers in environments where there are no clear parties to the conflict from whom mediation, negotiation and especially consent can be sought. Moreover, in these environments,

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[102] Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, 124.

[103] Missions consisted of unarmed military observers and lightly armed troops with primarily monitoring, reporting and confidence-building roles. UN Peacekeeping, "Our History."

[104] Peacekeeping missions in support of the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements that typically includes organizing post-conflict election; the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; and supporting national reconciliation process. De Coning, Aoi, and Karlsrud, *UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era: Adapting to Stabilization, Protection and New Threats*, 8.

peacekeepers have used more military force, including the execution of offensive operations, engagement in intelligence, and deployment of special weapons and tactics, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, snipers, and special forces. Peace operations, therefore, has been pushed to the limit of the definition of peacekeeping.[105] However, despite the existence of some cases of relative short-term success, to a large degree, failure in the field has marked the use of force in peacekeeping operations.[106]

The term stabilization is not formally defined in the United Nations documents at the time of this work. Nor is there doctrine covering this type of operation. The definition of stabilization used in this work is adopted from the United States Joint Publication 3-0 "Joint Operations." According to the manual, stability is one of the 16 different operations military forces need to be ready to perform. The term "stability" encompasses the various military missions and tasks conducted in coordination with the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential activities such as governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.[107] The manual also defines what stabilization or stabilize phase of a conflict is. A phase is defined as a period in which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or

[105] De Coning, Aoi, and Karlsrud, *UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era: Adapting to Stabilization, Protection and New Threats*, 1.

[106] Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, 351.

[107] Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2017), V-2.

mutually supporting activities for a common purpose.[108] The stabilization phase involves potentially long-term operations to perform stability tasks. Combat operations involving offensive and defensive mission are likely to occur during the stability phase. The desired end state for this phase is to create a favorable environment to transitioning to full civilian authority and enabling civil authority as the threat wanes and civil infrastructures are minimally reestablished.[109] Therefore, it is possible to say that UN forces deployed to stabilize a country need to have capabilities and political will to carry out combat operations. Deterrence, in this sense, relies in a credible and capable military force committed to execute stability activities during a long-term deployment.

The previous reason why, as discussed before is that Findlay argues that the more willing and able UN operations are to use force, the less likely they are to have to use it. In the case of the new peacekeeping missions, however, a more likely use of force has been observed. It seems that the current approach has not been powerful or integrated enough to dissuade spoilers to the peace process. Thus, the use of force on regular basis may be assessed as a proof of dissuasive weakness; i.e. the failure of the UN's capacity to deal with the utility of force.

Conclusion

Deterrence was not created during the beginning of the nuclear age. Also, it is not only about nuclear weapons. Deterrence became a very comprehensive and elaborated theory and strategy during the Cold War due to the demand to solve real-world problems.

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[108] JCS, JP 3-0, V-12.

[109] Ibid., VIII-25.

Three waves of thought developed the theory as well as strategies and approaches to deal with the problem of how to deter in a mutually assured destruction environment.

The disintegration of the USSR and the September 11 attacks displayed a new world scenario where the international systems of states had to deal with asymmetrical threats. Notably, the challenge for the state system became how to deter non-state actors. The fourth wave of deterrence addresses this issue. Basically, it envisions how to adapt a theory designed for relationships between nuclear state powers to asymmetrical threats, such as rogue states, weak states and non-state actors, in an international environment of expanded normative constraints on using force.

The fourth wave is relevant not only for nation-states concerned of their national security, but also for the collective security institutions committed to international peace. After 1990, the increasing number of intrastate conflicts has demanded actions from international institutions such as NATO and the UN. In particular, the UN has faced great expansion in the number of peace operations assigned to intervene in civil conflicts and to help weak-states in fighting insurgency or terrorism within their borders. The challenge of establishing sustainable peace in hostile environment, while preserving core peacekeeping principles such as impartiality, neutrality, and minimum use of force pushed the UN to adapt.

One of the most discussed adaptations is related to the use of force. The UN has been criticized when using and not using military force. Deterrence is central in this matter. The greater the deterrence capability the lesser the use of force. In UN peace operations, while the term “enforcement” may sound like a military strategy, it is essentially political, with the military use of force playing supporting role involving

deterrence and compellence when required. It will be the ultimate sanction in case it needs to coerce one side or the other to behave.[110] In the new UN stabilization operations, such as MONUSCO, this means to deploy a credible and capable military force committed to execute stability activities during a long-term deployment. In the next chapter the methodology used to investigate the primary and secondary research questions regarding MONUSCO based on deterrence theories from this chapter will be outlined. It will involve the use of an inductive reasoning method to tease out broad concepts that may be universally applicable in a general sense.

[110] Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, 376-377.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Methodology is a set of systematic and rational activities that assist the scientist to reach the research objective by tracing a way to be followed.[111] Therefore, this chapter explains what kind of research methodology is used in order to collect and organize data as well as analyze and interpret results. It also clarifies how the chosen methodology addresses the research problem and outlines what steps the researcher will take to obtain the information needed to address the primary and secondary questions.

Purpose of the Research

The purpose of this research is to explain why the UN decided to increase the use of force in the DRC by assigning an intervention brigade to MONUSCO. The primary question is: Why has the UN decided to increase the use of force in the DRC after March 2013? The two secondary research questions are: What is the relationship between the increasing use of military force and the MONUSCO's reputation as a credible conflict-resolution military force? Did the increasing use of military force enhance the MONUSCO's capability to deter non-state actors?

Methodology

In order to achieve such purpose, a quali-quantitative methodology based on a case study approach was chosen because qualitative methodologies help to understand

[111] Mariana A. Marconi and Eva M. Lakatos, *Foundation of Scientific Methodology*, 7th ed. (Rio de Janeiro, BR: Atlas, 2010).

intangible things such as meanings, values, biases, and beliefs. However, quantitative data will help to mitigate the impact of subjective analysis. The case study approach will be beneficial because it helps to understand complex issues and can extend experience or add strength to what is already known through previous research.[112]

Essentially, this project will look at the use of force in the DRC based on deterrence theories and will use an inductive reasoning method to tease out broad concepts that may be universally applicable in a general sense. Erickson (1986) argues that since the general lies in the particular, lessons learned from a particular case can be transferred to similar situations. However, according to the author, it is the reader, not the researcher, who determines what can be applied to other contexts.[113] While the specifics differ from case to case, the goal is to highlight generalities to make qualified assumptions for future analysis. Thus, if deterrence-based theories provide explanation for the increasing use of force in the DRC, they may apply to other UN-led stabilization operations, based upon the evidence given. In this sense, the case study will be looked at to determine whether the deterrence theory supports the increasing use of military force in the DRC, to what degree the UN force failed to deter non-state actors, and what are the implications for the future of UN peace operations as a credible conflict-resolution tool. By addressing each of these, it may be possible to provide an analysis of the impact of deterrence theory on UN peacekeeping operations. Because of the stability nature of

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[112] Susan K. Soy, "The Case Study as a Research Method" (unpublished paper, University of Texas, Austin, TX, 11 November 1998).

[113] Frederick Erickson, *Qualitative Methods in Research on Teaching* (East Lansing, MI: Institute for Research on Teaching, 1985).

MONUSCO's mission and the task to neutralize armed groups given to the FIB, the bulk of this study will be looking to the fourth wave of deterrence theory but is not limited to it.

Case Selection

The MONUSCO was chosen for analysis because it was the first time in the United Nations history a peacekeeping force was assigned to execute offensive operations to neutralize non-state actors. This first time use by the UN peacekeeping force of offensive operations to neutralize non-state actors makes it a critical case. It is both a unique case and a test of a significant theory.[114]

Hypothesis

As stated in Chapter 2, deterrence is based on credibility. In peacekeeping operations, the MONUSCO ability to use military force to defend the mandate influenced its credibility. Therefore, a UN peace operation could be considered credible if either it is not matched by counterattacks led by spoilers to the peace process or coercion is automatically implemented by the spoiler's misbehavior. In analyzing MONUSCO, the hypothesis sustained in this work is that there is a relationship between increasing the use of force in the DRC and the effectiveness of MONUSCO as a credible deterrent peacekeeping force. Consequently, the null hypothesis assumes that there is no meaningful relationship between the increased use of military force in the DRC and the

[114] Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research Design and Methods*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003), 40-41.

effectiveness of UN peace operation as a credible deterrent peacekeeping force. In this fashion, deterrent credibility is central to test the null hypothesis.

Criteria and Metrics

Deterrent credibility is going to be evaluated based on three criteria. The first one is defined by Freedman (2005) and adapted to the MONUSCO's case study context: the capability to use force in order to stop others acting in harmful way. Particularly, the MONUSCO's ability to deter violence against civilians, the overall goal of every peacekeeping mission. The second criterion is the implementation of the FIB's mandated key task; that is to carry out targeted offensive operations to neutralize armed groups in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by them on state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities.[115] Mandate implementation is the most widely used criterion to assess UN peace operations. It examines standards that the UN has set itself.[116] Therefore, the FIB's mandated key task is a valid evaluation criterion. The third and last criterion involves the perception of MONUSCO as a credible deterrent military force by the key actors in the Great Lakes region. That would be analyzed by the decisions taken at the regional forums, particularly the ICGLR and the African Union.

Seven armed groups are cited in the UNSC Resolution 2098, as follows: the M-23, the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR), the *Alliance des Patriotes Pour un Congo Libre et Souverain* (APCLS), the Lord's Resistance Army

[115] UNSC, Resolution 2098 (2013), 7.

[116] Howard. *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars,* 7.

(LRA), The National Force of Liberation (FNL) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). The document implicitly set priorities when describing the threat posed by these armed groups. The M-23 seems to be the main concern of the UNSC. It is cited nine times in the document, followed by the LRA (seven times), the FDLR (three times), the ADF (two times) and other groups (one time).[117] Thus, this work will analyze mandate implementation based on the described priorities.

Deterrent credibility will be verified between 2010 and 2012 and between 2013 and 2016. The first period verifies deterrent credibility from the creation of MONUSCO and the assignment of the intervention brigade. On 1 July 2010, the UNSC, by resolution 1925, created the MONUSCO. The mission was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to support the government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts. The resolution also stated that future configurations of MONUSCO would be determined as the situation evolved on the ground, including the completion of ongoing military operations in North and South Kivu as well as Orientale provinces; improved government capacity to protect the population effectively; and the consolidation of state authority throughout the territory.[118] These three tasks can be seen as major stabilization tasks that defined mission accomplishment. On 28 March 2013, the UNSC adopted resolution 2098 creating a specialized intervention brigade or Force

[117] UNSC, Resolution 2098 (2013).

[118] United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO), "Background," United Nations, accessed 23 March 2019, https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/background.

Intervention Brigade (FIB) to strengthen the peacekeeping operation.[119] Thus, the idea when studying the first period is to assess a possible relationship between failure to deter and the creation of the intervention brigade. Because simply saying that deterrence has failed in such a broad sense, the analysis will also look at the level of failure and the specific implications for the failure. The second period provides a comparison with a specialized intervention brigade. Measuring the criteria during this period can assist in determining if increased capability improved the deterrence ability of the force.

Organization of the Research Process

The first step in this research process was to identify informational resources to collect, study and gain an understanding of theories regarding deterrence. Reviewing multiple data sources, which included reports, news articles, scholarly journal articles, books, student papers and in-depth, peer-reviewed academic studies increased the credibility and validity of the research.[120] The second step was to categorize information resources and distinct relations of primary and secondary research questions. The final step in this research process was to assess and analyze all related information and data in order to formulate a clear and concise conclusion.

Data Collection

In order to assess the violence against civilians in the DRC, this work collected data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project. The data

[119] UNSC, Resolution 2098 (2013).

[120] Yin, *Qualitative Research from Start to Finish*.

includes the number of attacks against civilians in the DRC carry out the M-23, the FDLR, the LRA, and the ADF as well as the number of fatalities caused by these attacks. The ACLED project considers violence against civilians the following events: armed attacks, abduction, sexual violence, and forced disappearance. However, because numbers of violence against civilians in conflict zones tend to be imprecise due to lack of resources and poor security situation for data gathering activities, this work use, in addition to violence against civilians, the number of internally displaced persons (IDP). IDP's numbers are used to have an idea of the intensity and impact of violence towards the populace. People only leave their homes when violence reaches very critical standards.[121] The data on IDPs in the DRC were collected from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). It is the world's authoritative source of data and analysis on internal displacement. By crossing the data of violence against civilians and the number of IDPs it will be possible to have a more accreted picture of the security situation in the DRC.

Additional data is going to be collected based on resources in English, Spanish, and Portuguese available at the U.S. Army Command and Staff College Library; the United Nations website; online databases such as EBSCOhost, JSTOR, ProQuest, Taylor and Francis and Google Scholar; journals, magazines and newspapers on the international security subject area; U.S. Army field manuals and NGOs-led studies on peace operations

[121] Jessica Di Salvatore and Andrea Ruggeri, "Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations," *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2017), 2.

such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). This research does not conduct any human interviews.

Data Analysis Method

The analysis will adopt the "step" approach for the methodology. The first step is the literature review from Chapter 2. It provides a comprehensive literature review of the scholarship and debate regarding deterrence. It specifically looks at the definition of deterrence, its types and main assumptions, the criticism of deterrence theory, and finally the use of deterrence in intrastate conflicts. This provides the theoretical basis for the analysis. The second step is the development of a hypothesis and evaluation criteria necessary to evaluate the primary and secondary research questions. Step three and four is to analyze the primary and then secondary questions using the evaluation criteria against the data provided by the case of two MONUSCO time periods. Specifically, the relationship between deterrence and the increasing use of military force in DRC against: 1) the capability to use force - measured by the number of acts of aggression against the civilians, 2) implementation of the FIB's mandated key task – measured against standards set by the UN, and 3) the perception of MONUSCO as a credible deterrent force by key regional actors. In Step five, the study will aggregate the findings once the evaluation criteria have been applied in order to answer the primary research question. Finally, in step six, this work will present conclusions and recommendations in Chapter 5.

Validity and Limitations

Due to the temporal proximity of facts, deterrent credibility will be evaluated based on its short and medium terms implications. Since the intervention brigade was

created in 2013, it is not possible to fully assess its long-term effects to the peace process. Short-term analysis will focus on the developments in 2013 while medium-term in the three years after the creation of the intervention brigade, testing, again, the number of acts of aggression taken against civilians and the MONUSCO ability to automatically use force to counter the armed group's misbehavior. Specifically, as security is considerably the most important step to achieve stable peace[122], the study will also look at the immediate conflict-reducing capacity of the use of force in the MONUSCO and its capability to enable and strengthen the peace process.[123] The conclusions and recommendations are based on the findings from step 5 of the data analysis. They will also elaborate on how transferable the findings from the DRC case study to other UN-led stabilization peacekeeping operations are. Particularly, the implications of the findings in the UN stabilization mission created after March 2013, such as the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA - *Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au Mali*) and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA - *Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Centrafrique*).

Limitations of this research are related to the decision to use a case study approach to analyze the problem and the unique nature of the UN stabilization missions. Because case studies focus on single cases, the issue of generalizability looms larger than with other types of qualitative research. Although a rich and deep analysis of

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[122] Di Salvatore and Ruggeri, "Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations," 11.

[123] Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman, *Evaluating Peace Operations* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010).

MONUSCO may be desired, there are limitations regarding the time and resources available to devote to such an undertaking. Case study findings and conclusions may also be influenced by the researcher perspectives, background and biases. Finally, since 2004, the UN has named some of its peacekeeping missions as stabilization operations. There is no definition or doctrine in the UN handbooks, manuals, or documents for "stabilization." In 2015, the Report on High-Level Panel on Peace Operations noted that the usage of the term "stabilization" by the UN requires clarification.[124] In this fashion, this work will adopt the US Army definition whenever omissions are found on the UN doctrine and documents.

Summary

Chapter 3 provided a description of the methodology used for this research. The chapter addressed how the data was gathered, outlined the methodology, and explained how the data will be analyzed. Chapter 4 provides a review of the specific case data and an analysis based on the qualitative content analysis method outlined above.

[124] United Nations Security Council (UNSC), General Assembly, A/70/95–S/2015/446*, *Report on High-Level Panel on Peace Operations,* United Nations, 17 June 2015, accessed 25 March 2019, http://www.un.org /en/ga/search/view_doc.asp? symbol= S/2015/446.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

The DRC is a country located in central Sub-Saharan region of the African continent. It is the second largest country in Africa, with an estimated area of 2,345,409 km^2 and a population of around 91,931,000.[125] The country became independent from Belgium in 1960 and then was named Republic of the Congo. It is sometimes referred to as former Zaire, which was its official name from 1971 until 1997. In 1997, following the First Congo War, the country was eventually renamed as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The official language is French. Although extremely rich in mineral resources, the DRC displays low levels of development. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (nominal) is U$501, and the Human Development Index (HDI) is 0.470, ranking 176^{th} out of 187 countries.[126] Kinshasa is the major city and capital, located in the western side of the country and with an estimated population of 12 million people.[127] Figure 4 provides information about the country's political divisions.

[125] International Monetary Fund (IMF), "Democratic Republic of the Congo," 25 April 2017, accessed 25 April 2017, https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/COD.

[126] United Nations Development Program (UNDP), "Global Human Development Indicators: Congo," United Nations, 2018, accessed 25 April 2019, http://hdr.undp.org/en/ countries/profiles /COD.

[127] World's Capital Cities, "Capital Facts for Kinshasa, DR Congo," accessed 25 April 2019, https://www. worldscapitalcities.com/capital_facts_for_kinshasa_dr_congo/.

Figure 4. DRC Political Map

Source: Maps of World, "Political Map of Democratic Republic of Congo," accessed 30 March 2019, https://www.mapsofworld.com/democratic-republic-of-congo/democratic-republic-of-congo-political-map.html.

The DRC has faced several internal conflicts since 1960. Some of them escalated to the regional level due to the interference of neighbor countries and extracontinental powers, such as the USA and the USSR. The eastern portion is considered the country's most instable region, particularly the provinces of South and North Kivu, Ituri, Haut-Uele, Tanganyka, and Katanga. These regions are the home of more than 200 different ethnic groups and have received large numbers of refugees over time, products of the numerous and violent conflicts in the Great Lakes Region, such as the Rwandan Civil War of 1994. The International Organization for Migration estimates that currently there

are over 1.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in eastern DRC due to tribal conflict and internal violence.[128]

A Flash Briefing on the United Nation Peace Operations in the DRC

The DRC has hosted UN peacekeeping forces during three different periods. The first mission, the ONUC was deployed after the country's independence from Belgium in 1960. The operation is viewed as an exception when compared to the Cold War era peacekeeping operations. During that time, UN peacekeeping missions were basically deployed in the last phase of conflict, when some sort of agreement between the parties had been already achieved.[129] Although designed to perform "traditional" peacekeeping, ONUC carried out tasks that differed little from large-scale-combat operations and, ultimately, became the most violent peacekeeping mission conducted by the UN during the Cold War era. One hundred twenty-seven peacekeepers died in action and other 133 were wounded.[130]

Trevor Findlay, when analyzing the use of force in ONUC, identified ten lessons to learn for future UN operations. Among these lessons, one is strictly connected to deterrence. Military capability of peace operations should match the expectations of their mandates. In Findlay's point of view, ONUC needed better military capabilities to carry

[128] International Organization for Migration (IOM), "Countries," 25 April 2019, accessed 25 April 2019, https://www.iom.int/countries/ democratic_republic_congo.

[129] Di Salvatore and Ruggeri, "Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations," 17.

[130] United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping, "Republic of Congo: ONUC Background," United Nations, 28 April 2019, accessed 28 April 2019, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onucB.htm.

out more assertive actions than an observation role. The author further states that a major reason for having a militarily capable force is deterrence. The more powerful the force the greater the deterrent and the less likely the force will be used. The force needs to be designed for both most likely and most dangerous scenarios in order to maintain "escalation dominance."[131] Findlay states that in ONUC some of the fighting could be avoided if the weakness of the UN military force had not encouraged the parties to commit acts of violence.[132] Although it has been argued that ONUC mission achieved some of its given objectives, sustainable peace was not one of them, and the UN peacekeepers had to return to DRC after 1990.

Two major conflicts marked the Great Lakes regions in the 1990's. Known as the First and the Second Congo wars (1996-97 and 1998-2003), they can be described as a concoction of interconnected conflicts at the local and regional levels.[133] The regime changing in Rwanda that followed the 1994 genocide sparked a massive influx of ethnic Tutsis and Hutus refugees, including some perpetrators of the genocide, to eastern Zaire (DRC was called Zaire during that time). The region was inhabited by different ethnic groups that had fought each other for centuries. The Rwandan ethnic Hutu refugees set up camps in eastern Zaire and allied themselves with local militias. Soon, they managed to have access to mines and weapons and started fighting Tutsis refugees as well as launching attacks against Rwandan forces from eastern Zaire territory. Thus, in order to

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[131] Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, 378.

[132] Ibid., 83-84.

[133] Tull, "Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War," 216.

counter the Hutu militia, the Rwandan government began training Tutsi militias within Zairean borders. Due to poor administration and lack of military capabilities, the government of Zaire was not able to stabilize the region. A Tutsi-led insurgency began in 1996, aided by Rwandan and Ugandan forces. The rebellion managed to mobilize the Congolese society against the central government and, eventually, took power in 1997, renaming Zaire as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).[134]

The new government proved to be disappointingly similar to the former, marked by corruption and economic stagnancy. Moreover, it was unable to stabilize the ethnic tension in eastern DRC.[135] In 1998, a rebellion known as the Second Congo War began against the new government and seized large areas of eastern DRC. Angola, Chad, Namibia and Zimbabwe supported the DRC government while Uganda and Rwanda were backing the rebels. As the situation escalated from national to regional level, the UNSC called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the DRC, urging bordering states not to interfere and aggravate the situation. In July 1999, the DRC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement that brought an end to the hostilities within the territory of the DRC. Following the signature of the peace agreement, the UNSC, by its resolution 1279 of 30

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[134] United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), "MONUC Background." United Nations Peacekeeping, 25 April 2019, accessed 25 April 2019, https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/ past/monuc/background. shtml.

[135] Erik Kennes, "The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Structures of Greed, Networks of Need," in *Rethinking the Economics of War. The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed,*.ed. Cynthia J. Arnson and William Zartman (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005), 140-177.

November 1999, established the MONUC for an initial period until March 2000, to observe the ceasefire and disengagement of forces and maintain liaison with all parties to the Lusaka Agreement.[136] The new presence of UN peacekeepers in the DRC can be better understood when divided by phases.[137] Phase one was marked by the initial deployment of UN military liaison personnel to support the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement. Phase two began in 2003, when the Transitional Government took the oath of office in accordance with the 2002 Pretoria Accord.[138] The third phase of the UN operations started in 2009 with a more robust peacekeeping mandate in order to deal with the increasing instability promoted by armed groups in the eastern DRC. The Fourth and final phase began on 28 May 2010, when the UN mission was reframed as a stabilization mission by the UNSC Resolution 1925.[139]

[136] MONUS, "MONUC Background."

[137] Center on International Cooperation, "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Country Profile," Global Peace Operations Review, 2011, 26, accessed 25 April 2019, https://peaceoperationsreview.org/country-and-regional/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/.

[138] The Pretoria Accord was an agreement made between Rwanda and the DRC in an attempt to bring about an end to the Second Congo War. Rwanda agreed to the withdrawal of the estimated 20,000 Rwandan troops from the DRC in exchange for international commitment towards the disarmament of the Hutu militias.

[139] Center on International Cooperation, "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Country Profile," (2011), 27.

Phase one began with the deployment of a small team of 90 military liaison officers, together with the civilian, political, humanitarian and administrative staff.[140] There was no mention of the use of force by UN personal, but only the traditional tasks of monitoring and observation of the peace agreement implementation. On 24 February 2000, however, concerned with the security and humanitarian situations in the country, the UNSC decided to expand MONUC's strength to 5,537 military personnel, including up to 500 observers. This new mandate highlighted that MONUC should act under Chapter VII, taking the necessary actions to protect UN personnel and installations as well as civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.[141]Late 2002, MONUC gained some more teeth to accomplish its mission as the troop ceiling was boosted to 8,700 soldiers.[142]

MONUC's size and strength, however, did not deter violence against civilians, one of the key tasks of its mandate. In 2003, for instance, around 400 civilians were massacred in the presence of 700 UN peacekeepers in a city called Bunia, in the Ituri Province, eastern DRC. A year later, MONUC failed to prevent killings and human rights

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[140] United Nations Security Council (UNSC), *S/RES/1258 (1999),* Resolution 1258 (1999), United Nations, 6 August 1999, accessed 25 April 2019, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions /doc/1258.

[141] United Nations Security Council (UNSC), *S/RES/1291 (2000),* Resolution 1291 (2000), United Nations, 24 February 2000, accessed 25 April 2019, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions /doc/1291.

[142] United Nations Security Council (UNSC), *S/RES/1445 (2002),* Resolution 1445 (2002), United Nations, 4 December 2002, accessed 25 April 2019, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions /doc/1445.

violations when rebel forces led by a former RCD[143] general occupied Bukavu, the provincial capital of South Kivu.[144] MONUC was being tainted by a perception of impotence.[145] During that time, the UNSC tool of choice to deal with a deteriorating human rights situation was to broaden the concept of use of force by increasing the number of blue helmets and expanding their mandate. The existent gap between ambitions and political willingness to use force, however, remained huge.[146]

Thus, MONUC's strength continued to rise in an attempt to break the escalation of violence in the country. By 2008, it became the biggest and most expensive mission ever deployed by the UN with 18,434 uniformed personnel. Moreover, MONUC's mandate was at that time the most comprehensive and robust ever issued to a peacekeeping operation. However, despite the robust mandate, MONUC was surprisingly reluctant in the use of force.[147]

Although MONUC achieved some positive results in terms of preserving the independence and territorial integrity of the DRC as well as promoting the first free elections for over four decades in the country (2006), the mission was unable to protect

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[143] Rally for Congolese Democracy is a political party and a former rebel group that operated in the eastern region of the DRC.

[144] Tull, "Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War," 218.

[145] James Traub, "The Congo Case," *New York Times*, 3 July 2005, accessed 30 March 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/03/magazine/the-congo-case.html.

[146] Katarina Månsson, "Use of Force and Civilian Protection: Peace Operations in the Congo," *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 4 (2005): 503.

[147] Spijkers, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo," 112.

people from violence perpetrated by rogue elements and militias, or to dismantle foreign armed groups.[148] In this fashion, the general perception of failure about MONUC's performance, according to Denis Tull, is rooted in conceptual and operational problems that relate to the use of force. Furthermore, equally important in analyzing MONUC's poor performance is to understand problems in interpreting and implementing the vague concept of robust peacekeeping and flaws in adapting strategies to a quickly changing situation.[149]

Séverine Autessere highlights that the conceptual problem regarding the use of force in MONUC is related to its reactive approach. In her point of view the UNSC resolutions related to MONUC interpreted protection of civilians in a very restrictive way. Protection was seen as a reaction to imminent threats, rather than deterrent actions to prevent such threats in the first place. Preventing conflicts was never explicitly mentioned in any of these resolutions. Therefore, preventive actions on the ground were rare, and normally they were no more than side-effects of programs unrelated to civilian protection.[150]

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[148] Koko, "MONUC and the Quest for Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Assessment of a Peacekeeping Mission," 37.

[149] Tull, "Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War," 216.

[150] Severine Autesserre, "The Responsibility to Protect in Congo: The Failure of Grassroots Prevention," *International Peacekeeping* 23, no. 1 (2016): 33.

The First Three Years of MONUSCO

On 28 May 2010, by resolution 1925, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) renamed MONUC as MONUSCO. The resolution is the milestone of the fourth phase of the UN deployment in the country. In general terms, the mission was expected to cooperate with the government of the DRC to protect civilians under threat and to stabilize and consolidate the peace. The mission was authorized to deploy a maximum of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 personnel of formed police units, in addition to the appropriated civilian, judiciary and correction components.[151] Nevertheless, the mission reached the peak of its troops levels only after 2013, when figures reached around 19,000 soldiers.[152]Figure 5 provides the data regarding UN authorized personnel versus actual personnel in the DRC between 1999 and 2017. The smaller the gap the greater the UNSC political commitment in providing military capabilities to the mission.

In its early years, MONUSCO seemed to suffer from the same issues as MONUC regarding the use of military force. Despite the fact MONUSCO was the largest mission in UN history, criticism of the mission's performance increased as rebel groups sized towns, increasing the number of IDPs and civilian casualties. For instance, in November 2012, the rebel group M23 took the capital of the North-Kivu Province, Goma; a

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[151] United Nations, *Resolution 1925* (New York, NY: United Nations Security Council, 28 May 2010), accessed 26 April 2019, http://unscr. com/en/resolutions /doc/1925.

[152] Denis M Tull, "Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: waging peace and fighting war," *International Peacekeeping*, vol 16, no. 2 (2009): 223.

commercial hub in eastern DRC. The seizure of Goma represented a strategic victory for the group and an embarrassment for MONUSCO.[153]

[153] Global Peace Operations Review. *Democratic Republic of the Congo – Achieve Profile* (New York, NY: New York University Center for International Conflicts, 2014), accessed 26 April 2019, https://peaceoperationsreview.org /country-and-regional/democratic_republic_of_the_congo/.



Figure 5. MONUC/MONUSCO - Authorized vs. Deployed Personnel

Source: Global Peace Operations Review, "Featured Data: Authorized vs. Deployed Personnel: Uniformed Personnel on MONUC/MONUSCO, 1999-present," 2017, accessed 30 March 2019, https://peaceoperationsreview.org/featured-data#authorized.

The impact of the seizure of Goma on MONUSCO's credibility was great. According to the New York Times, "witnesses said United Nations peacekeepers sat in their armored personnel carriers and watched."[154] In an interview to the BBC, the French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius called for MONUSCO's mandate had to be altered to give it more powers. He assessed the seizure of Goma by the M23 in the presence of

[154] Jeffrey Gettleman and Josh Kron, "Congo Rebels Seize Provincial Capital," *The New York Times,* 20 November 2012, accessed 26 April 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/21/world/africa/Congolese_rebels_reach_goma_reports_say.html.

peacekeepers as "absurd."[155] In December of the same year, two MONUSCO helicopters came under fire by M23 elements, the second time in less than thirty days that UN helicopters had been targeted.[156] MONUSCO was struggling for credibility. According to The Guardian, "critics of the UN performance had given the hashtag #MONUSELESS on Twitter."[157]

Increasing insecurity during the first three years of MONUSCO can be expressed in numbers. As stated in Chapter 3, this work collected data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project to assess violence against civilians in eastern DRC. The data includes the number of attacks against civilians in the DRC as well as the number of fatalities caused by these attacks. In addition to violence against civilians, the number of internally displaced persons (IDP) is going to be considered to provide an idea of the intensity and impact of violence towards the populace. The data on IDPs in the DRC was collected from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). By crossing the data of violence against civilians and the number of IDPs it will be possible to have a more accurate picture of the violence against civilians in the eastern DRC.

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[155] Gabriel Gatehouse, "Goma: M23 rebels capture DR Congo city." *BBC*, 20 November 2012, accessed 26 April 2019, https://www.bbc .com/news/world-africa-20405739.

[156] Center on International Cooperation, "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Country Profile," Global Peace Operations Review, 2013, accessed 26 April 2019, https://peaceoperationsreview.org/country-and-regional/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/.

[157] Christoph Vogel, "Congo: Why the UN peacekeepers have a credibility problem," *The Guardian*, 30 August 2013, accessed 30 April 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/30/congo_un_peacekeepers_problem.

Figure 6 displays the number of attacks led by armed groups in eastern DRC as well as the number of fatalities within the populace. Between 2010 and 2012, the number of attacks increased four times and the fatalities doubled. This trend can be observed when analyzing the data regarding IDPs on figure 7. During the same period, there was a remarkable increase in the number of IDPs in the DRC.



Figure 6. Violence against Civilians in the DRC

Source: Created by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, "Data Export Tool," accessed 23 March 2019, https://www.acleddata.com/data.



Figure 7. Internal Displacement Caused by Conflict in the DRC

Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, "Democratic Republic of the Congo," accessed 24 April 2019, http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo.

The data of violence against civilians shown in figure 6 is broken-down by armed groups in figures 8 and 9, between 2010 and 2012.



Figure 8. Violence against Civilians Executed by Armed Groups

Source: Created by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, "Data Export Tool," accessed 23 March 2019, https://www.acleddata.com/data.



Figure 9. Number of Fatalities Caused by Armed Groups Attacks

Source: Created by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, "Data Export Tool," accessed 23 March 2019, https://www.acleddata.com/data.

The FDLR led the ranking of the major perpetrators of violence against civilians in the DRC between 2010 and 2012. The group was founded through an amalgamation of many ethnic Hutu groups in September 2000 and has been opposing the Tutsi influence in eastern DRC. The FDLR is one of the last factions of Rwandan genocidaires still active in the Congo. Although the number of violent attacks against civilians decreased from 2011 to 2012, the fatalities caused by these attacks almost doubled from 2011 to 2012. In 2012, the FDRL's most violent attacks were executed during the first six months. 100 out of 131 total casualties in 2012 resulted from attacks carried out between January and July 2012.

The M23 ranks second among the four groups analyzed in this work. The name is a reference to the 23 March 2009 peace agreement,[158] which the M23 leadership claims was never fully implemented. The group was created in May 2012 by former members of the National Congress for the Defense of the People militia (CNDP - *Congrès national pour la défense du peuple*), what explains why there is no data related to the M23 before 2012. High tempo operations and violence marked the beginning of the M23 activities. Only in 2012, the M23 executed 92 acts of violence against civilians which left 102 fatalities. Its logistical, financial and recruitment support came from Rwanda and to a lesser extent Uganda. Considering the number of citations within Resolution 2098, the

[158] The Peace Agreement Between the Government and *Le Congres National Pour la Defense du Peuple* (CNDP) aimed to cease CNDP military activities, integrate its combatants into the Congolese National Police and the Armed Forces, transform the group into a political party, and seek solutions to its concerns through political means in accordance to the DRC law.

M23 seemed to be UN's main concern among the armed groups which operates in eastern DRC and eventually became the FIB's priority target.

The LRA is a rebel group which operates not only in the DRC, but particularly in northern Uganda, South Sudan, the Central African Republic. It is considered an ultra-radical Christian group that pursues the establishment of a theocratic government in Uganda, ruled according to a unique interpretation of the Ten Commandments. The group has been accused of widespread human rights violations, including murder, abduction, mutilation, child-sex slavery, and forcing children to participate in hostilities. During the first three years of MONUSCO, the number of acts of violence against civilians executed by the LRA increased considerably from 2010 to 2011 and then decreased in 2012. The number of fatalities, conversely, decreased from 2010 to 2011 and then increased again in 2012.

The ADF is an Islamist rebel group originally based in western Uganda that has operated into eastern DRC's North-Kivu province. The ADF was created by Ugandan Muslims in the 1990s aiming to fight for the rights of the Tablighi Jamaat[159] (Society for Spreading Faith). In order to gain support and reach a wider audience, the ADF has broadcasted videos which feature a flag similar to the Islamic State. The group calls for martyrdom and violence against infidels. However, despite its religious inspiration, reports have linked the ADF operations in eastern DRC to banditry. The group is also considered a terrorist organization by the Ugandan government. The number of acts of

[159] Tablighi Jamaat is a non-political global Sunni Islamic missionary movement that focuses on urging Muslims to return to primary Sunni Islam, and particularly in matters of ritual, dress, and personal behavior.

violence against civilians carried out by the ADF decreased from 2010 to 2012. In the considered period of time, the ADF's numbers are modest when compared to the other three groups. In 2010, the group executed 9 attacks which resulted in 32 fatalities. In 2012, the data shows only three attacks with no fatalities recorded.

The FIB and the Attempt to Overcome Insurgence in the DRC

Because MONUSCO appeared to be either incapable or unwilling to deal with the security situation in eastern DRC, regional actors took the initiative. For most of 2012, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)[160] mediated the crisis through negotiations between the M23 and Kinshasa. The ICGLR partners agreed to send its own Intervention Force, with the approval of, and in close cooperation with, the African Union.[161] Initially, the DRC government, however, did not welcome the deployment of an ICGLR force within its borders. Because Uganda and Rwanda were accused of providing logistic and financial support to many armed groups in the DRC, including the M23, the ICGLR negotiations were not seen as neutral by the DRC

[160] The ICGLR is an inter-governmental organization of the countries in the African Great Lakes Region. Its establishment was based on the recognition that political instability and conflicts in these countries have a considerable regional dimension and thus require a concerted effort in order to promote sustainable peace and development. The organization is composed of twelve member states, namely: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Republic of South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia.

[161] Spijkers, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo," 100.

government, and therefore, fraught with difficulties from the start.[162] The UN identified the issue as an opportunity. Anxious to regain the initiative after Goma, and to avoid a parallel force deployment in the DRC, the United Nations proposed to incorporate the ICGLR idea of an intervention brigade into MONUSCO.[163] This was the genesis of the UN Intervention Brigade.

The fall of Goma served to mobilize the UN into two-steps of action. The first step involved an international diplomatic effort under the coordination of the UN, African Union (AU), and South African Development Community (SADC) in the search for a settlement among key actors in the Great Lakes Region. In February 2013, 11 countries reached an agreement on a Peace Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region (PSCF).[164] The document recognizes that eastern DRC has continued to suffer from recurring violence by armed groups with displacement figures ranking among the highest in the world. The PSCF established principles of engagement at the national, regional and international levels to improve the security situation in the eastern DRC. For the government of the DRC, the PSCF asked for renewing political commitment anchored on the implementation of something similar to a liberal-peace agenda in the

[162] Naomi Kok, "From the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region-led negotiation to the Intervention Brigade: Dealing with the latest crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *African Security Review* 22, no. 3 (2013): 177.

[163] Patrick Cammaert and Fiona Blyth, "The UN Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" (Issue Brief, International Peace Institute, New York, July 2013), 2.

[164] Mats Berdal, "The state of UN Peacekeeping: Lessons from Congo," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 41, no. 5 (2018): 735.

country; based on free elections, open market and respect for human rights. For the Great Lakes Region, the PSCF requested the countries not to interfere in the internal affairs of neighboring states and neither tolerate nor support any armed groups activities. Finally, the PSCF asked the international community to remain engaged in supporting both DRC and Great Lakes Region stability. Particularly, the PSCF requested a strategic review of MONUSCO in order to address the security challenges in the eastern DRC.[165]

This last request from the PSCF is responsible for the second step taken in response to the fall of Goma. The UN decided to strengthen MONUSCO's military capability to actively engage armed groups in eastern DRC.[166]In other words, MONUSCO should be able to carry out offensive operations. Consequently, in 2013, by resolution 2098, the UNSC assigned an "Force Intervention Brigade" consisting of three infantry battalions, one artillery, one special force, and a reconnaissance company[167] with headquarters in Goma, under direct command of the MONUSCO Force Commander. The document states the FIB key task on paragraph 12, as follows:

> In support of the authorities of the DRC, on the basis of information collation and analysis, and taking full account of the need to protect civilians and mitigate risk before, during and after any military operation, carry out targeted offensive operations through the Intervention Brigade referred to in paragraph 9 and paragraph 10 above, either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC, in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with

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[165] Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, *Peace Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region* (Addis Ababa, 24 February 2013), accessed 30 April 2019, http://www.globalr2p.org/media/ files/au-peace-and-security-drc.pdf.

[166] Berdal, "The State of UN Peacekeeping: Lessons from Congo," 736.

[167] The FIB initial strength consisted of some 3000 troops from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi.

> international law, including international humanitarian law and with the human rights due diligence policy on UN-support to non-UN forces (HRDDP), to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, and to disarm them in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by armed groups on state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities;[168]

Although Resolution 2098 was issued in 28 March 2013, the FIB reached full force only by July 2013. It executed its first offensive operations in August, aiming at M23 positions in the eastern DRC, particularly outside of Goma. The initial success was exploited using a variety of offensive capabilities in joint operations with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC - *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo*). The actions proved to be effective and by November 2013, the M23 renounced its insurgency. The remaining M23 combatants fled to Uganda, where they surrendered and were disarmed.[169] The actions against the M23 impacted the group's capability to attack civilians, as shown in Figure 10.

Figure 11 provides an overview, month by month, of the M23's ability to execute acts of violence against civilians in 2013. It shows that both the numbers of acts of violence against civilians and fatalities increased in the first six months, before the effective deployment and beginning of the offensive operations. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations from 2000 to August 2008, in his book "The Fog of Peace," explains that the expectation that physical protection is about to be provided by peacekeepers to civilians threatened by an armed group may prompt

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[168] UNSC, Resolution 2098 (2013), 6.

[169] Jay Benson, "The UN Intervention Brigade: Extinguishing Conflict or Adding Fuel to the Flames," A One Earth Future Discussion Paper 2 (June 2016), 1-12.

that group to step up attacks against the threatened population before effective protection can be provided. [170] Another explanation for the increasing number of acts of violence against civilians, before the initial operations of the FIB, is the absence of FARDC and MONUSCO forces in Goma, as the city had been taken by the M23. After the initial operations of the FIB, in Aug 2013, the number of attacks against civilians as well as fatalities decreases exponentially.



Figure 10. M23: Acts of Violence against Civilians, 2013-2016

Source: Created by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, "Data Export Tool," accessed 23 March 2019, https://www.acleddata.com/data.

[170] Jean-Marie Guéhenno, *The Fog of Peace: A Memoir of International Peacekeeping in the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), 159.



Figure 11. M23: Violence against Civilians, 2013

Source: Created by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, "Data Export Tool," accessed 23 March 2019, https://www.acleddata.com/data.

Figure 12 and 13 display information regarding acts of violence against civilians and fatalities, respectively, by the other three studied armed groups in 2013.



Figure 12. Acts of Violence against Civilians Executed by Armed Groups, 2013

Source: Created by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, "Data Export Tool," accessed 23 March 2019, https://www.acleddata.com/data.



Figure 13. Fatalities Caused by Armed Groups Violence against Civilians, 2013

Source: Created by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, "Data Export Tool," accessed 23 March 2019, https://www.acleddata.com/data.

The pattern identified in figures 12 and 13 is remarkedly different of that shown in figure 11. In general terms, the acts of violence against civilians and fatalities decreased between March and August. In September, however, the numbers increased. Specifically, in the cases of the LRA and the ADP, the joint operations of the FARDC and the FIB did not deter the groups to commit acts of violence against civilians. Actually, according to the numbers, the groups were more active after the beginning of the operations.

In order to check if this pattern persists in a longer timeframe, figures 14 and 15 provide information on the acts of violence against civilians and fatalities, respectively, between 2013 and 2016. Except for the LRA, all groups increase their acts of violence against civilians between 2013 and 2014. 2015 is a turning point that impacts all groups activities. After 2015, the number of acts of violence against civilians decreases exponentially. It is important to highlight, however, that even decreasing after 2015, the

number of acts of violence against civilians executed by the FDLR in 2016, remains higher than in 2013.



Figure 14. Acts of Violence against Civilians, 2013-2016

Source: Created by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, "Data Export Tool," accessed 23 March 2019, https://www.acleddata.com/data.



Figure 15. Fatalities by Acts of Violence against Civilians, 2013-2016

Source: Created by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, "Data Export Tool," accessed 23 March 2019, https://www.acleddata.com/data.

Figure 15 displays the number of fatalities caused by acts of violence against civilians. Again, except for the LRA, the numbers increase between 2013 and 2014 and

then decrease abruptly after 2015. Like the acts of violence against civilians, the number of fatalities caused by the FDLR remains higher in 2016 than in the beginning of the period.

Figure 16 provides the number of battles in which MONUSCO and the FARDC were involved, between 2013 and 2016. As stated before, UNSC Resolution 2098 assigned MONUSCO the task to carry out targeted offensive operations through the FIB, either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC. Between 2013 and the end of 2015,[171] not only has MONUSCO joined the FARDC in fighting armed groups, but also shared intelligence, assigned tactical enablers to FARDC operations, and provided logistical support to the Congolese forces. Therefore, in order to understand the developments regarding security in eastern DRC, this work considered the military battles fought by MONUSCO and the FARDC, either unilaterally or jointly. MONUSCO and FARDC forces have been used to achieve similar operational objectives.

Following the timeline in figure 16, the numbers of battles and fatalities increase between 2013 and 2016, reaching a peak at the end of the period. The data also indicates an increment in the lethality ratios[172] between 2014 and 2016. In 2014, the rate was 1.641 fatality per battle. In 2015 and 2016, it jumps to 2.35 and 2.42, respectively. When compared to the figures 14 and 15, the data shows an existing relationship between use of force and acts of violence against civilians. In the case of the eastern DRC, between 2013 and 2016, the use of force against armed groups did decrease the acts of violence against

[171] Late 2015, MONUSCO suspended its military support for the FARDC due to of the latter's human rights violations.

[172] Number of fatalities relative to number of battles.

civilians. The initial engagement may increase the group's activities, which explains the rising figures between 2013 and 2015. However, a persistent willingness to coerce armed groups to prevent undesirable actions caused the figures to decrease. The increase in lethality of the engagements after 2014 may indicate better military capabilities and higher political commitment to stabilize the eastern DRC.



Figure 16. Battles and the Resulting Fatalities between DRC Forces/ MONUSCO and Armed Groups in Eastern DRC

Source: Created by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, "Data Export Tool," accessed 23 March 2019, https://www.acleddata.com/data.

There was also a reduction in the number of IDPs. Figure 17 presents the number of IDPs in the DRC between 2013 and 2016. There is a remarkable reduction from 2013 and 2015, that may reveal a more secure environment. However, from 2015 to 2016 the number of IDPs increased again. The suspension of joint operations between MONUSCO and the FARDC and the accusations of the latter's human rights violations may have

impacted the security environment in the eastern DRC in 2015.[173] Another intervening variable to be considered in this case was the decision to fight the armed groups one by one. As show in figures 18 and 19, while the engagements between the FARDC/MONUSCO and the M23 are concentrated in 2013, most of the fight against the other armed groups, particularly the ADF and the FDLR, are concentrated in 2015. These two groups have operated in eastern DRC for more than 20 years, which might indicate strong ties with local communities. The fight against them, therefore, has greater potential of displacing people.



Figure 17. Numbers of IDP's in the DRC, 2013-2016

Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, "Democratic Republic of the Congo," accessed 24 April 2019, http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo.

[173] Denis M. Tull, *United Nations Peacekeeping and the Use of Force: The Intervention Brigade in Congo is no Model for Success,* SWP Comment 20 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2016), 4, accessed 4 May 2019, https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/46787.



Figure 18. Number of Battles Between the FARDC/MONUSCO and the Armed Groups in Eastern DRC

Source: Created by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, "Data Export Tool," accessed 23 March 2019, https://www.acleddata.com/data.



Figure 19. Resulting Fatalities from the Battles Between the FARDC/ MONUSCO and the Armed Groups in Eastern DRC

Source: Created by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, "Data Export Tool," accessed 23 March 2019, https://www.acleddata.com/data.

Conclusion

Within Chapter 4, the data from the case study was examined and analyzed to determine the deterrent effect of the UN Intervention Brigade versus various armed groups in the DRC. By comparing the results over time, it is seen that the results were mixed regarding the success of the more robust mandate and capabilities.

Chapter 5 further outlines the answers to the main and supporting research questions, key findings, and recommendations for future study.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

This work intends to explain why the UN decided to increase the use of force in the DRC by assigning an intervention brigade to MONUSCO in March 2013. One primary question and two secondary questions were elaborated in order to provide guidance to the search for answers and contributing factors. The primary question was: Why has the UN decided to increase the use of force in the DRC after March 2013? The two secondary research questions were: What is the relationship between the increasing use of military force and the MONUSCO's reputation as a credible conflict-resolution military force? Did the increasing use of military force enhance the MONUSCO's capability to deter non-state actors?

Chapter 5 is where the answers and contributing factors are going to be found. The chapter is divided in two sections. This first section restates the purpose of the research, describes how Chapter 5 is organized and interprets the findings from Chapter 4 in the light of the theoretical background provided by the literature review. The second and last section makes recommendations for further studies on the topic, such as unanswered questions and things that could have been done differently.

Regarding the findings from Chapter 4, some theoretical considerations are required before moving straight to the conclusions. Jeffrey W. Meiser argues that strategy can be better understood as a theory of success than the traditional concept of ends, ways, and means. He states that the purpose of strategy is to create advantage, generate new sources of power, and exploit weaknesses in the opponent. The literature on strategy

makes distinction in applying the instruments of national power to influence the decision of an adversary to use force, by compellence or deterrence, or to influence the capacity of an adversary to use force, by offence and defense.[174]

The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, "The Capstone Doctrine," describes the environment where peacekeepers are deployed as characterized by the presence of non-state actors, such as militias, criminal gangs, and other spoilers to the peace process. According to the document, the UNSC has assigned "robust" mandates to peacekeepers in order to "deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order."[175] The document emphasizes that the ultimate goal of the use of force in peacekeeping operations is to influence and deter spoilers; and not to seek their military defeat.[176] The Capstone Doctrine affirms that the United Nations has learned from experience that a credible peacekeeping operation helps to deter spoilers and diminish the likelihood to use force. Finally, a credible peacekeeping operation is described as a mission with a "a clear and deliverable mandate, with

[174] Kersti Larsdotter, "Military Strategy and Peacekeeping: An Unholy Alliance?" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 42, no. 2 (2019): 194.

[175] DPKO/DFS, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 34.

[176] Ibid., 35.

resources and capabilities to match; and a sound mission plan that is understood, communicated and impartially and effectively implemented at every level."[177]

Chapter 2 provided explanation about the definition of deterrence and what deterrent credibility does mean. According to Michael Howard, deterrence aims to convince an adversary that the cost of using military force to solve political conflicts will outweigh its benefits.[178] Robert Jervis affirms that deterrence is based on credibility. Credibility, in its turn, is based on the capacity to hurt.[179] Freeman goes further and states that deterrent credibility is based on the willingness to automatically implement a threat in the case of the adversary's misbehavior.[180] Willingness and capability are, therefore, key for deterrent credibility.

In peacekeeping operations, deterrent credibility is achieved by the quick deployment of a military contingent capable of using the threat of force to persuade the parties to behave in a way it would otherwise not do. It is not about making the parties defenseless but persuading them not to use organized violence. In this sense, deterrence in peacekeeping is passive in nature. When the force fails to deter, however, compellence can be used to change the status quo and punish the parties, by using limited military force, for instance. If both deterrence and compellence fail and the peacekeeping force is

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[177] DPKO/DFS, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 39.

[178] Howard. "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s," 309-324.

[179] Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," 292.

[180] Freedman, "The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists," 765.

no longer able to influence the decision of the parties to use force, the only option to maintain or regain credibility is to influence the capacity of the parties to use force. This last situation requires the use of offensive and defensive strategies.[181] In the case of offensive strategy, the ultimate goal to defeat the adversary.[182]

Effective peacekeeping missions are those capable of decreasing the intensity of battle violence, protecting civilians, and containing conflict diffusion and recurrence in the postwar phase.[183] Since the deployment of MONUSCO, in 2010, the United Nations has not implemented the lessons learned from its own experience, as described in the Capstone Doctrine. Clearly, the mission did not have either the necessary means or the political will to accomplish its goals, what made the mandate undeliverable. The mission credibility eroded day-by-day due to its incapacity or unwillingness to deal with the very complex environment in eastern DRC. Attacks on MONUSCO's peacekeepers and violation of human rights became frequent, despite the mission's military size and strength. As stated before, the mission was reluctant to use force and the parties took advantage of this weakness.

The seizure of Goma by the M23 culminated a series of tactical and strategic defeats and became the turning point of the status quo. MONUSCO became incapable to influence the decision of the armed groups to use force and was not perceived as a credible deterrent force by the regional actors. The AU and the ICGLR were leading the

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[181] Larsdotter, "Military Strategy and Peacekeeping: an Unholy Alliance?" 194.

[182] Schelling, *Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword,* 96-114.

[183] Di Salvatore and Ruggeri, "Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations," 2.

talks between the M23 and the government of the DRC. These regional actors were also considering deploying their own intervention force to stabilize the eastern DRC. The UN, however, did not want to lose the protagonism as the main conflict-resolution force in the DRC. As deterrence strategy was no longer feasible, the only option to regain credibility was to influence the armed groups capacity to use force. Therefore, MONUSCO increased the use of military force to regain or even to achieve a reputation as a credible conflict-resolution military force. Resolution 2098 can be considered a milestone in this fashion.

From the data provided in Chapter 4, it is possible to make some conclusions about the MONUSCO's efficiency in influencing the armed groups' decision and capability to use force. As soon as the FIB became operational, in July 2013, MONUSCO and FARDC decided to fight one of the major armed groups at a time. The first targeted group was the M23. Figure 20 shows the relationship between the number of offensive operations (battles) carried out by FARDC/MONUSCO against the M23 and the acts of violence against civilians executed by the armed group, from 2013 to 2016.

After defeating the M23, the military operations aimed the neutralization of the ADF, the FDLR and to a lesser extend the LRA. The operations against the LRA reached a peak in 2014 while the peak against the ADF and the FDLR was reached in 2015. Figures 21, 22 and 23 displays the relationship between the number of offensive operations carried out by FARDC/MONUSCO against the ADF, the FDLR, and the LRA and the groups' ability to attack civilians.



Figure 20. Comparison between Number of Battles FARDC/MONUSCO vs. M23 and Number of Acts of Violence against Civilians Executed by the M23

Source: Created by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, "Data Export Tool," accessed 23 March 2019, https://www.acleddata.com/data.



Figure 21. Comparison between Number of Battles FARDC/MONUSCO vs. ADF and Number of Acts of Violence against Civilians Executed by the ADF

Source: Created by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, "Data Export Tool," accessed 23 March 2019, https://www.acleddata.com/data.



Figure 22. Comparison between Number of Battles FARDC/MONUSCO vs. FDLR and Number of Acts of Violence against Civilians Executed by the FDLR

Source: Created by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, "Data Export Tool," accessed 23 March 2019, https://www.acleddata.com/data.



Figure 23. Comparison between Number of Battles FARDC/MONUSCO vs. LRA and Number of Acts of Violence against Civilians Executed by the LRA

Source: Created by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, "Data Export Tool," accessed 23 March 2019, https://www.acleddata.com/data.

The first criterion this work adopted to verify the hypothesis was the

MONUSCO's ability to deter violence against civilians; the overall goal of every

peacekeeping mission. The analysis of figures 20, 21, 22 and 23 indicate that the increased use of military force by the FARDC/MONUSCO impacted the armed groups capability to attack civilians. Specifically, they reduced the number of acts of violence against civilians between 2013 and 2016. The data showed an increasing number of acts of violence against civilians during the initial period of the joint offensive operations. This trend of increase does not persist over time, however. On the contrary, the continuous commitment to use force by the UN and the government of the DRC seemed to influence both the decision and the capability of the armed groups to use force.

In relation to the second criterion, the MONUSCO's ability to neutralize armed groups in the eastern DRC, further studies are required, particularly after 2016, due to MONUSCO's and the DRC decision to fight one group at a time in the eastern DRC. The defeat of the M23 and the decreasing acts of violence against civilians carried out by the LRA and the ADF indicate a partial accomplishment of the mandate. However, other relevant armed groups like the FDLR "continue to pose a threat to the civilian population and the overall stability and development of the eastern DRC and the Great Lakes region."[184] The failure of the FDRL, for instance, to comply with the decisions of the ICGLR, SADC and the United Nations Security Council requires the UN to keep pursuing the military option against the group.

About the third and last criterion, it became evident that, before 2013, MONUSCO was not perceived neither by the key regional actors nor the armed groups as

[184] United Nations Security Council (UNSC), S/2014/957, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Strategic Review of MONUSCO* (New York: United Nations, 30 December 2014), 16.

a credible deterrent military force. The ICGLR decision to deploy its own military force in eastern DRC as well as the increasing numbers of hostile actions against peacekeepers and the civilian population in the eastern DRC sustain this argument. Signaling commitment and willingness to punish violations by deploying a large military contingent is key for deterrence in peacekeeping missions. In this sense, the UNSC Resolution 2098 and the defeat of the M23 by offensive joint operations are important steps to regain credibility and changed the way key actors and the armed groups in the region perceive MONUSCO's deterrent capability. However, further analysis is still necessary to evaluate MONUSCO's commitment and willingness to use force when necessary.

Finally, this work sustains that the UN has decided to increase the use of force in the DRC after 2013 based on two different reasons. The first reason was to regain credibility and maintain its protagonism as the main conflict resolution actor in the DRC. The second reason was to change the status quo. The seizure of Goma by a Rwandan backed group, the M23, changed the regional balance of power in the Great Lakes region. The principal contributors to the FIB, South Africa and Tanzania, saw the M23 as an instrument of Rwandan policy in the region.[185] As shown during the data analysis, the M23 was not the most violent group in the eastern DRC. However, it is the most cited group in the UNSC Resolution 2098 and became the first target of the military campaign to neutralize armed groups carried out by MONUSCO and the FARDC.

[185] Berdal, "The State of UN Peacekeeping: Lessons from Congo," 737.

The number of IDPs was used in this work to verify the perception of security by the populace. People only leave their properties when they believe life is under imminent threat. There was a remarkable reduction in the number of IDPs between 2013 and 2015, what may indicate a more secure environment at the local level. In 2016, however, the number of IDPs increased again. There are two intervening variables that possibly explain that. The first intervening variable was the operational decision to fight one group at a time. The increasing number of IDPs may be related to the intensification of the military operations against the ADF and FDLR in 2015. These two groups have been operating in the eastern DRC for more than 20 years. They have more deep connections with the local population and therefore the fight against them impacts the locals to a greater extend. The second intervening variable was MONUSCO's decision to interrupt the joint operations with the FARDC. In late 2015, MONUSCO suspended its military support for the FARDC due to the latter's human rights violations in eastern DRC. If the FARDC was really violating human rights when executing operations against the armed groups in eastern DRC, the locals could either have perceived the UN actions as partial and felt insecure even in the presence of peacekeepers, or the disruption between the UN and FARDC eroded the capability to fight the armed groups. In fact, the military operations decreased between 2015 and 2016.

There was an unexpected finding in this work. As deterrence is about the ability to influence behavior based on the credibility of the deterrent party, the analysis of the armed groups behavior in 2013 presents mixed results. As the operations against the M23 began and the group was defeated by November 2013, it was expected that such a quick victory had influenced the other groups' decision to execute acts of violence against

civilians. However, except for the LRA, the data shows an increasing number of the acts of violence against civilians carried out by the ADF and the FDLR between in 2013 and 2014. Their decision to use force was not influenced by the offensive operations against the M23. In other words, they were not afraid of being hurt. Only when they were directly target by MONUSCO/FARDC it is possible to see a reduction in the acts of violence against civilians.

Recommendations

Although deterrence is popularly associated with the use of the military force, it is more than simply that. Deterrence is the use of any threat to refrain another party from initiating a course of action. Deterrence is maximized not only with the availability of military power but also when all instruments of power are synchronously applied in pursuing a given goal. In the case of the eastern DRC, further studies are necessary to analyze the use of deterrence through the different strategies elaborated by the fourth wave theorists, such as indirect deterrence, deterrence by counter-narrative, and deterrence by concession. For instance, future works could analyze the use of economic power to deter armed groups misbehavior. Paul Collier affirms that civil wars and intrastate conflicts occur where rebel organizations are financially viable.[186] Challenges to their main source of revenue may have a significant deterrent effect.

[186] Paul Collier, "The Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implication for Policy" (Department of Economics, Oxford University, Oxford, UK, April 2006), 10, accessed 23 September 2018, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.460.9440&rep=rep1&type=pdf .

Further studies are also necessary to evaluate the deterrent effect of the offensive operations in a longer term. First, as described in Chapter 2, the main problem of extended deterrence promoted by collective actors is that they are likely to implement their deterrent threat unevenly, because of the different interests between members. The UNSC and the regional actors seemed to be committed in neutralizing the M23. However, it is important to verify if they will keep the same level of commitment in neutralizing the other armed groups cited within Resolution 2098, particularly the FDLR. Second, it is important to verify if the offensive strategy is going to be translated in deterrent credibility. In other words, if the operations to reduce the armed group's capabilities to use force is going to influence their decision to use force in the future. Will MONUSCO be perceived as an actor capable to automatically implement a threat in the case of the adversary's misbehavior?

Finally, similar research can be developed to assess deterrence credibility in other ongoing stabilization missions, such as MINUSCA and MINUSMA. In particular, how the UN has been perceived by the key actors and how a more robust mission has improved the deterrent credibility of the United Nations in those regions. The results can be significantly different because rational behavior varies according to cultures, beliefs, perceptions, and personalities. Thus, the environmental analysis is central to determine key actors' rationality, the underlying power relationship; the interests and norms at stake; and the narrative that links the two first elements.

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