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ACTIVATION, TRAINING, AND ASSIGNMENT OF TECHNICAL SERVICE UNITS.

Robert E. Holman
Lt. Col. Inf.

24 May 1949

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE 4021
Department of Logistics
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

May 24 1949

STUDENT RESEARCH DIRECTIVE FOR SUBJECT NUMBER 6-7

STUDENT Holman, Robert E. Lt. Co. Inf
(Name) (Rank) (ASN)

FACULTY ADVISOR Lt Col Cunin 247 8146
(Name) (Room No.) (Tele. No.)

SUBJECT Activation, Training, and Assignment of Technical Service Units.

PURPOSE: To develop the most efficient assignment of responsibility for activation training and assignment of technical service units.

SCOPE: (Brief outline of subject coverage)

1. Review and analyze briefly the assignments of responsibility for and the systems used for activation, training, and assignment of technical service units during World War II. Point out the advantages and disadvantages inherent in the systems used, the major difficulties experienced, what measures were taking to overcome those difficulties and the success or failure of those measures.

2. Review and analyze the development of the present assignment of responsibility for activation training and assignment of technical service units, and the present system of activation, training and assignment of these units. From the points of view of both the Army Field Forces and the Chiefs of Technical Services show the advantages and disadvantages inherent in the present setup. Evaluate these advantages and disadvantages with respect to present peacetime and future wartime conditions.

3

3. Present and analyze in the same manner one or more alternate solutions to this problem.

4. Make specific recommendations concerning the adoption of the most efficient (from Department of the Army viewpoint) solution to this problem.

NOTE TO STUDENTS:

1. The scope suggested above is intended as a guide only and is not to be construed as a limitation on the students perusal of the subject. The student is encouraged to modify the above scope as he may find necessary to outline and define the specific problem he visualizes and proposes to develop in his research study.

(over)

PAM SEC.

125..... Activation of Service Units, Analytical Study, Dept. of Logistics, 1947-48 (This has extensive bibliography).

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

Logistics Specialized Course
Regular Class 1948 - 1949

Activation, Training, and Assignment of Technical Service Units.

Robert E. Holman
Lt. Col.Inf.

24 May 1949

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Department of Logistics
Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas

24 May 1949

File No. 6-7

SUBJECT: ACTIVATION, TRAINING, AND ASSIGNMENT OF TECHNICAL SERVICE UNITS.

1. PROBLEM. -- To develop the most efficient assignment of responsibility for activation, training and assignment of technical service units.

2. ASSUMPTION. -- The organization of the General Staff, Department of the Army will be changed in case of an emergency or total war.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM. -- a Lack of definite responsibility in the past caused much inefficiency and confusion in the activation, training, and assignment of technical service units. b Current organization does not eliminate many problems relative to training of technical service units.

4. DISCUSSION. --

a. Historical.

(1). The period prior to World War I and to World War II was characterized by a lack of long range planning. (Annex III)

(2). The result of the reorganization of the War Department in March 1942 was to provide a divided responsibility among the Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces and Army Air Force. (Annex IV)

(3). Period July 1943 to May 1946, responsibility for tables of Organization and Equipment, Troop Basis, Activation and Training, was assigned to each of The Major Forces by type of unit. (Annex IV).

(4). Training of Technical Service Units was an acute problem throughout World War II. (Annex IV)

b. Current Plans.

(1). Centralized responsibility was not attained in the reorganization of May 1946. (Annex VI.)

(2). Responsibility of Army Field Forces is not clearly defined. (Annex VI.)

(3). Current planning envisions the activation of technical service units prior to combat units. (Annex VII.)

(4). The Logistical Division is a basic nucleus for a balanced service force. (Annex VII.)

5. CONCLUSION. -- a The United States Army has not profited by the lessons learned in World Wars I and II with respect to the activation, training, and assignment of technical service units as divided responsibility still exists. b The Logistical Division is the most adaptable unit for combined service support.

6. ACTION RECOMMENDED. --

a. That responsibility for troop basis, tables of organization and equipment, and assignment of technical service units be retained and centralized in the General Staff, Department of the Army.

b. That the Chiefs of Technical Services be responsible for activation and all technical training of units and personnel of their respective services.

c. That the Logistical Division be included in the Troop Basis of the United States Army.

d. That this study be forwarded to the Director, Logistics Division, GSUSA, for his consideration and appropriate action.

ROBERT E. HOLMAN
Lt. Col. Inf.

ANNEXES

1 - Staff memorandum to Commanding General, Fort Leavenworth.

2 - Ltr. to The Director, Logistics Division, GSUSA, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

3 - Historical Development.

4 - Activation, Training, and Assignment of Technical Service Units during World War II.

5 - Review and Analysis of the systems used for Activation, Training, and Assignment of Technical Service Units during World War II.

6 - Current Operations of the Department of the Army for the Activation, Training, and Assignment of Technical Service Units.

7 - Current Developments of the Department of the Army to Insure Technical Service Units in the Event of Another National Emergency.

8 - Alternate Solution for the Activation, Training and Assignment of Technical Service Units.

9 - Bibliography.

CONCURRENCES (omitted)

NONCONCURRENCES (omitted)

COORDINATION OF NON-CONCURRENCES (omitted)

ANNEXES ADDED (none)

APPROVED 24 May 1949

F.A. HENNING
Colonel, F.A.
Director
Dept. of Logistics

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

SUBJECT: Activation, Training, and Assignment of Technical Service Units.

(IDENTIFY THIS MEMORANDUM SLIP WITH PAPERS TO WHICH ATTACHED.)

TO	SUBJECT MATTER	FROM DATE AND INITIAL
Commandant C & GSC	1. I concur in the recommendations of the attached research study. 2. Request that this study be transmitted to the Director, Logistics Division, GSUSA, by means of a letter (Annex II) which has been prepared for your signature. Annex I	24 May 1949 Annex I F.A. Henning Colonel, F.A. Director Dept. of Log.

USE REVERSE SIDE IF NECESSARY)

P9-1328—C&GSC—15 Feb 49—20M

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

May 24, 1949

SUBJECT: Activation, Training, and Assignment of Technical Service Units.



TO: The Director
Logistics Division, GSUSA
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D.C.

1. The attached staff study, title, "Activation, Training, and Assignment of Technical Service Units" is transmitted for consideration and appropriate action.

2. The research study was prepared by a student in this college and concurred in by the Director, Department of Logistics. The recommendations made for the most efficient assignment of responsibility for activation, training and assignment of technical service units, appear to have considerable merit.

M.S. Eddy
Lt. General, USA
Commandant

ANNEX II

ANNEX III HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

In presenting the problem of Activation Training, and Assignment of Technical Service Units, it is necessary to study the past history of this problem to determine what factors influenced decisions at that time, what policies were developed which influenced future trends, and what courses were adapted from these policies which affect our present day planning.

Prior to the beginning of World War I, the activation, training and assignment of service units was not considered a major problem. It is easy to understand this point of view, as the service troops that existed in this period were more laborers than technicians. The full impact of the industrial revolution had not, at this time, been felt in the army, neither had the army kept pace with the technological developments that existed in industry at this time.



The policy which existed in this period only allowed for the expansion of the then existing technical services by training unskilled personnel on the job. This policy did not in any way try to classify personnel as to their civilian occupation or previous employment. Its only concern was to get a body and train him to do a job. This policy was not effected at first by the organization of a General Staff in 1903 because the first three Chiefs of Staff were old fashion soldiers, fighting men who had won their spurs in Indian Wars in the Philippines and in China. They cared little for the administrative and supply problems of the Army. (I)

The planning of the General Staff and War Department in the period 1903 to 1917 failed because it did not fully evaluate the changes which were taking place in the military and industrial field and their effects on war, as stated by Hagood "Without going into further detail, it can be seen that

(I) The services of Supply -Hagood page 15

the whole General Staff and War Dept. organization, generally, fell like a house of cards and a new organization had to be created during the process of War." (I)

With the entry of the U.S. in World War I, the U.S. Army immediately found itself in a period of transition, both technically and in man-power. This change was noticeable in the field of weapons which was characterized by a change from single shot weapons to automatic weapons, the field of transportation changed from horse drawn vehicles to motor vehicles, communication changed from simple telephone and telegraph to radio, also airplanes, and multi-circuit telephones and telegraphs.

The impact of these revolutionary changes in the arms had a most definite effect on the technical services. All plans which had been previously developed for the support of the arms, (the activation, training, and assignment of technical service units) were found to be inadequate because the conflict had developed along lines quite different than had been planned. It was immediately apparent that there existed a shortage of trained technical personnel, and that there was an insufficiency of specialized service units in the various technical fields.

Most fortunate, at this period, this deficiency was recognized by the Chiefs of Technical Services and efforts were made to institute training programs to provide technical trained personnel.

The problem had reached such a vexing state in the spring of 1918 that combat operations could not be supported with the then existing service forces. It was felt that the service organization which existed at this time, Field Service Organization as outlined in the 1914 edition, did not provide any coordination or flexibility between the then existing services and their efforts were almost entirely devoted to

(I) Services of Supply - Hagood page 27

independent action. The outgrowth of this problem was the creation of the "Service of Supply" in 1918, and a proposal was made to the War Dept. by General Pershing as follows: (I)

Cable no. 1426 - S

G.H.Q. July 7, 1918

AG. WAR
WASHINGTON

Paragraph 1-F In order to organize salvage units, laundry units, mobile gas treatment units, postal express service, renting, requisitions, and claims service, headquarters battalions, and companies for the service of Supply, casual and replacement depots, organization and training centers, labor bureaus and leave areas, convalescent camps, permanent camps, orthopedic camps, rest camps, guard companies, garden companies, prisoner of War companies, etc., there should be allowed in the Army Expeditionary Forces in France for the Army Service Corps a total of 4,000 officers and 100,000 enlisted men of such grades provided by law for the Army at large as may be ordered by the Commander-in-Chief. AEF in addition to organizations transferred above.

Sub-paragraph G/ If this be approved, proposed tables of organization will be submitted from time to time covering such units as will have to be organized in the United States. For units that will have to be formed from personnel already in France, and to meet local conditions, the question of organization should be handled locally, for example, the administrative personnel of all leave area. Pershing.

The above cable was the magna Carta for technical service units. With the establishment of a S.O.S. Headquarters to give flexibility and coordination to the use of the technical services, these units were the specialized tools with which to do the job.

(I) Services of Supply - Hagood. page 194

Previous to this time, service troops were procured from the arms on more or less a temporary basis. The one lesson learned from World War I as expressed by Hagood is: "If we do not have an Army Service Corps in time of peace, it should be one of the first arms to be established at the out-break of war, and it should be assigned the great bulk of the officers and men of the organizations back of the lines, known as the L.O.C. or S.O.S. It should be the big pool into which the draft boards should dump all skilled labor in order to avoid the devastating raids upon divisions in search of Specialist." (I)

American participation in World War I meant primarily a contribution of manpower to the Allied cause. The armies of France and England, by the spring of 1918, had suffered serious losses in manpower in the trench warfare of the Western Front. It was for that reason that such large numbers of men were shipped to France in the summer and fall of 1918, to be supplied largely by England and France.

Lessons learned in World War I as related to the problem of activation, training, and assignment of technical service units are:

(a) That sufficient technically trained personnel cannot be obtained from civilian life to fill the requirements of the Army.

(b) Due to the increase of mechanical and electrical equipment, and other specialized units, such as, medical, engineering, etc., there should be an increase in special technical service units.

(c) The necessity for a service force to coordinate the activation, training, and assignment of technical service units.

(d) That women can be utilized in certain military specialties to relieve men for combatant duty.

(I) Services of Supply - Hagood page 196

(e) The logistical support of combat operations can be accomplished only through long range planning prior to the operation.

The post war period after World War I. did not utilize all the lessons learned in World War I. The National Defense Act as amended June 4, 1920 had provided that "for purposes of administration, training , and technical control, the continental area of the United States should be divided on a basis of Military population into Corps Areas." The Act went on to provide that each corps area should contain at least one division of the National Guard of the organized reserve, and such other troops as the President might direct. (I)

This arrangement did not prove to be successful from the beginning, as it soon became apparent that certain types of installations could be controlled and their activities better coordinated by a central headquarters; as a result of this, through the 1920's, various field installations of the War Dept. were exempt from the control of the Corps Area Commanders.

By War Dept. Letter on Oct. 3, 1940 such field forces as were under the Corps Area Commander were transferred to the control of General Headquarters. At the time, the field forces were relieved from any responsibility for administration and supply. The duties were grouped under organizational units and designated service commands, which were created in each of the Corps Areas.

This arrangement still did not prove adequate as there were no coordinating agencies between the various Corps Areas, the Service Commands, and the War Dept.

One of the major developments in the interim period between World War I. and World War II was the use of the CCC in the training of 2,600,000 young men in skills that could

(I) Army Service Forces page 255
Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1943

be converted to a military use. The number trained in various crafts were:

Auto mechanic	88,500
Carpentry	82,500
Truck driving	75,000
Photography	26,000
Cooking & baking	23,000
Surveying	21,500
Radio	17,500
Blacksmithing	13,500
Welding	13,000
Electricity	12,000
Drafting	12,000
Company Clerk	8,500
Supply Steward	5,000
Mess Steward	5,000 (I)

The War Department did not take advantage of this program to place the trained men in reserve units which could have been used in future mobilization.

With the entry of the United States into World War II., the Service's of Supply was organized as a war time measure under the Authority of the First War Powers Act, approved 18th. of December 1941. (2)

By Exective Order 9082, dated 28th. Feb. 1942, the Army was divided into three major commands, The Army Ground Forces, The Army Air Forces, and Services of Supply.

(I) The CCC and Defense of the Nation

(2) Public Law 354, 77th. Congress

ANNEX IV ACTIVATION, TRAINING, AND ASSIGNMENT OF TECHNICAL SERVICE UNITS DURING WORLD WAR II.

Prior to World War II, and during World War II prior to March 1942 when the three major forces were established by War Department Circular No. 59, (I) 1942 series, all units of the technical services were under the control of such services, and the services were responsible for tables of organization and equipment, troop basis, activation, and training of such units.

There was no centralized staff responsibility for the distribution and assignment of personnel.

Activation orders customarily read to the effect that personnel would be supplied from reception centers by the Adjutant General upon requisition from or on recommendation of the appropriate Chief of Service.

There was no centralized staff for balancing of requirements against personnel availabilities as they fluctuated from week to week, nor was there any centralized staff responsibility for follow up to see that prompt action was being taken by responsible commands to procure personnel for newly activated units.

This lack of a centralized responsibility over distribution and assignment of personnel, at least as it affected service type troop units, did not create any great amount of difficulty and confusion prior to the early summer of 1942, because it was not until that period that heavy activation requirements developed with a corresponding acceleration of service type unit activation schedules. (2)

(I) War Dept. Circular No 59 dated 2nd. March 1942 (appendix 1)
(2) Distribution of Military Personnel 1st. Sept. 1939, 1st. Sept. 1945. Military Personnel Division Army Service Forces M - N - 1011

One of the branches under the Army Service Force was the Military Personnel Division. This branch was created in the reorganization of the War Dept. in March 1942 with the mission and responsibility of instituting follow-up procedures and of making certain that the required number of Officers, Warrant Officers, and enlisted personnel arrived at the assigned place at the designated time in the "Military Occupational Specialty" (MOS) desired. The activities of this branch were coordinated with the Operations Division, War Department General Staff. (I)

The result of the reorganization of 9th. March 1942 was to provide a divided responsibility among the three major forces. This policy was further complicated by the W.D. on 30th. May, 42 with a policy that the using command will train a unit.

1. Commanding General, Army Air Force, would train all units serving Air Forces.

2. Commanding General, Service of Supply, would train units organized to operate installations and activities controlled by him and those units organized in the U.S. solely for S.O.S. installations and activities in overseas bases and theaters.

3. Commanding General of Defense Commands and independant commands would be responsible for the training of units assigned to them.

4. Commanding General, Army Ground Force, would be responsible for the training of all units not falling in 1,2, or 3 above.

5. By mutual agreement, Commanding General A.G.F, A.A.F, and S.O.S. might transfer to one another the responsibility for the training of certain units.

The War Department declaration of policy did not take into account those units which had a dual mission, such as Quartermaster truck regiments and Engineer general service regiments which could be used in either combat or communication zones.

(I) A.S.F. Circular 121, dated 1944

Services of Supply and Army Ground Force claimed dual right to train such borderline cases. The War Department published a list of units to be trained by each on the 20th. June, 1942.

The Army Ground forces in a statement of responsibility for the training of non-divisional units after the reorganization of March 1942 is as follows:

1. Subject to supervision of War Department, Army Ground Forces had complete jurisdiction over training of ground-type non-divisional units. Preparation of training programs was Army Ground Forces prerogative.

2. Army Ground Force was responsible for training all personnel of ground arms; the Army Service Force had to furnish officers of the service branches and for training of such enlisted technicians as could not be provided within the units.

Mobilization Division of the Army Ground Force determined the Activation Schedules for Non-Divisional Service units in the Army Ground Force. The Special Staff section prepared general training programs and directives for these service units. (I)

In a large number of cases, identical type service units appeared in the troop basis of each of the major forces. In some instances, service units allocated in the troop basis to Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces were activated by the Army Service Forces and the technical services, and in most instances, such units were trained by the chiefs of technical services or the Army Service Forces and then assigned to the responsible major forces upon completion of MTP training. Table of organization and equipment responsibility in such cases was arbitrarily assigned to one of the major forces by the War Department. Coordination was required with the other major forces having an interest.

(I) Problems of Non-divisional Training in the Army Ground Forces Historical Section: Army Ground Forces.

Officers and personnel, particularly cadre personnel and trained specialists, were furnished by the Army Service Forces or the services. Each major force made recommendations for the number of each type unit to be included in the troop basis of that force, resulting in considerable confusion, duplications, and omissions.

With few exceptions, divided troop basis responsibility for identical type units was clarified and terminated in July 1943, insofar as Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces were concerned. At that time, table of organization and equipment, troop basis, activation, and training responsibility for each type unit was assigned to either Army Ground Forces or Army Service Forces. Army Air Forces continued to duplicate a number of type units allotted each of the other forces. While there are a number of minor exceptions, and many changes were made during this time, the period from July 1943 to the reorganization of the War Department in May 1946 can be summarized generally as one in which:

a. Troop Basis responsibility for each type unit was assigned to one or the other of the major forces, except in the case of Army Air Forces which retained some duplications, but with a number of very similar type units performing the same or similar functions allocated in the troop basis to two or more of the major forces. Responsibility for submitting appropriate recommendations as to the number of each type units to be included in the troop basis followed troop basis allocation.

b. Table of organization and equipment responsibility followed troop basis allocation.

c. Activation responsibility followed troop basis allocation.

d. Training responsibility followed troop basis allocation.

However, the Chiefs of technical services and Army Service Forces continued to train technically a large number of Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces type units at the request of these forces. In a number of instances, where such units were not trained for Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces, cadres were furnished by the technical services and Army Service Forces. In addition to the units trained and cadres furnished, the Chiefs of technical services and Army Service Forces furnished or trained for the other major forces a large number of the more highly technical individual specialists required. Also, while each major force furnished replacements required by such forces in this country, the overseas loss replacements for Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces, and in some cases for Army Air Forces, units of the services were trained by Army Service Forces and the Technical Services. Officer procurement and training of officers for the services, irrespective of the major force to which ultimately assigned, was in general accomplished by the services and Army Service Forces. While the basis for the allocation of units to major forces during the period July 1943 to May 1946 as the anticipated ultimate major functional assignment in theaters of operation, the actual assignment was in a large number of cases necessarily arbitrary since so many service units are required in both the combat and communication zones. At such time as the units were assigned overseas, the overseas commander actually allocated such units interchangeably to perform missions in the combat zone, communication zone, or with the air forces as required and in such a manner as to permit maximum flexibility and economy irrespective of the major force which had organized and trained such units. In most instances, the assignment of such units was based upon recommendations of the respective chiefs of services of the theater, or controlled by such chiefs of services.

The majority were assigned to the communication zone. A few examples of units which were frequently assigned to the communication zone, the combat zone, or air forces, irrespective of major force responsibility are listed on the following page:

TYPE UNIT	RESPONSIBLE MAJOR FORCE
Cml Maintenance Co.	AGF
Cml Smoke Generator Co.	ASF
Engr. General Service Regt.	ASF
Engr. Construction Bn	ASF
Engr. Aviation Bn	AAF
Engr. Maintenance Co.	AGF
Engr. Water Supply Co.	AGF
Engr. Dump Truck Co.	ASF
Med. Ambulance Co.	AGF
Med. Field Hospital	ASF
MP Co, Post Camp & Station	ASF
MP Co, Post Camp & Station, Aviation	AAF
Ord Ammunition Co.	AGF
Ord Maintenance Co (several types)	AGF
Ord Tire Repair Platoon	ASF
Ord Bomb Disposal Squad	ASF
QM Truck Co.	AGF
QM Truck Co, Aviation	AAF
QM Bakery Co.	ASF
QM Salvage Collecting Co.	AGF
QM Service Co	ASF
QM Laundry Co	ASF
QM Gas Supply Co	AGF
Sig Repair Co	AGF
Sig Construction Bn, Heavy	ASF
Sig Construction BN, Light	AGF
Sig Construction Bn, Aviation	AAF

. At the time of the defeat of Germany, the following non-divisional troops of the services and Army Service Forces staff divisions having troops were included in the troop basis in units:

SERVICE	ASF	AGF	AAF	TOTAL
Adjutant General	47,489	-	-	47,489
Chemical Warfare Serv.	13,829	24,371	8,539	46,739
Engineers	244,886	204,727	113,741	563,354
Finance	4,412	-	238	4,650
Medical	245,649	74,194	5,174	325,017
Military Police	85,730	16,648	11,497	113,875
Miscellaneous	17,876	-	-	17,876
Ordnance	47,090	161,240	26,410	234,740
Quartermaster	200,459	154,978	36,022	391,459
Signal	99,035	62,392	93,119	254,546
Transportation	204,060	-	-	204,060
TOTAL	1,210,515	698,550	294,740	2,203,805

In addition, there were approximately 160,000 troops of the services organized to the 89 divisions in existence at that time.

TRAINING OF TECHNICAL SERVICE UNITS IN WORLD WAR II.

As previously stated, the problem of training personnel and units for the various technical services, was recognized from the beginning of the War, but due to the lack of facilities and with the emphasis on creating units, training suffered greatly. This lack of proper training was reflected in the inefficiency of many of the technical service units in the theaters of operation. In the summer of 1943, efforts were made to correct the deficiencies in training and changes were made at this time to increase the training programs both for personnel and units. (I) .

The general plan for the training of technical service personnel and units during World War II was divided into the following phases:

1. Replacement Training Centers:

Enlisted personnel assigned to the Army Service Force at the reception centers were sent to one of seventeen replacement training centers operated by the Army Service Forces. In the early part of the War, the courses of instruction given in these centers was not standardized, ranging two to five weeks of basic military instruction and from eight to eleven weeks of technical training. At the beginning of the fiscal year of 1943, a standard course of instruction was set up for all replacement training centers, namely, four weeks of basic military training and eight weeks of technical training. Men finishing the course of instruction at replacement training centers were usually assigned to specific units for further training or to specialist schools. Some were sent to Officer Candidate Schools, some went overseas, while others went to permanent installations within the United States. At the end of the fiscal year of 1943, these 17 replacement training centers had an overall capacity of training 158,787 enlisted men.

(I) Army Service Forces Report FY 1943

On First of September 1943, the training program for all Army Services Forces replacement training centers was increased from 13 to 17 weeks. The basic military course was increased from 4 to 6 weeks; 8 weeks were devoted to technical or specialist training; and 3 weeks to training under field conditions. In May 1944, all military training, excluding the technical phases, were standardized. In the 6-week basic military program, every soldier received the same training regardless of his branch of service. Standard courses were prescribed for clerks, motor vehicle operators, anti-aircraft machine gunners, automotive maintenance men, and bakers and cooks. Time allotted for concurrent training in basic military subjects during the technical training periods was also fixed. The final 3 weeks were spent in basic team training while living in the field. The importance of this change was that regardless of a soldier's branch, he was a soldier first and a technician second. This change greatly improved the training status of technical service personnel.

In April 1944, 15 replacement training centers and 11 unit training centers were redesignated Army Service Force Training Centers, and were combined when located at the same post. This change eliminated many personnel and training difficulties.

During the fiscal year 1945 all mobilization training programs were revised. The new basic military training program for newly inducted personnel contained a three week refresher program for those with previous service. The sixth week of basic military was given under field conditions. All mobilization training programs contained complete directives governing the conduct of training. A new mobilization program had to be established during the year for men leaving essential industry who were below the minimum physical standards for general military service. Some 6200 men in this category were being trained at the end of the year at Camp Ellis.

2. Unit Training Program:

During the fiscal year 1942-1943 it was necessary to operate 17 unit training centers. These unit training centers of the Army Service Forces received personnel from the replacement training centers and here activated technical service units and devoted their time to mastering the specific functions assigned to each unit.

An average of 1,780 table of organization units, representing 298,000 were in training at all times during the fiscal year 1944. These units consisted of 130 different types, organized to perform as many different functions.

In the fiscal year 1945, the number of troop units trained by the A.S.F. declined steadily as new activations decreased and units were sent overseas. In July 1944, there were 1361 troop units being trained with a total personnel of 213,000 enlisted men. By January 1945, the number had declined to 826, and by June to 278, with an enlisted strength of 42,000. It is worthy to note that the system of unit training had steadily increased the efficiency of the units being trained, and that an inspection of the Inspector General of 467 units during 1945 found 33, or 7% of them, not qualified under the requirements of the War Department overseas movement directive. (I)

Reports from oversea theaters indicated that more time in unit training should be devoted to basic military subjects, which was accomplished, in September 1943, by lengthening the basic military training period for all units from 4 to 6 weeks. The total initial training period for ASF units was increased to 17 weeks, of which a minimum of 11 was to be devoted to training together as a unit. Greater emphasis was placed upon teamwork and realism in training: "battle inoculation" courses, with close overhead machine-gun firing, became a general requirement.

(I) Army Service Forces Report FY - 1945

Extended mobilization training programs were published in 1944 for the training of units which were filled with a high percentage of men graded in classes IV and V on the Army General Classification Test, where training tests indicated that additional time was needed to develop the units to a satisfactory level of proficiency.

During 1942 and the early part of 1943, replacement training centers had been a source of trained personnel for units to replace men lost by normal attrition during the training period. The availability of this filler personnel steadily decreased as the replacement training center output decreased and overseas requirements increased, so that by the latter part of 1943 very few men were assigned to units from this source. When it became apparent that trained fillers from replacement training centers would not be available, units were authorized an overstrength to take care of normal training attrition. As the strength of the Army approached its peak, and personnel for new units was required, authorized overstrengths were discontinued. Shifts of personnel between units were necessary in order to obtain trained personnel for units scheduled for immediate overseas shipment.

The Inspector General during 1944 inspected 719 ASF units committed for overseas movement; he found 140 of them not qualified. The principal cause of deficiencies was lack of adequate training time. In some instances, this lack arose from a demand for a unit before it had finished its training; another reason was the abnormal turnover of personnel. A vicious circle was created by the necessity of transferring trained men from units to fill an alerted unit, and later, of alerting recently depleted units before sufficient time had elapsed for the training of new personnel. Of 77 unqualified units inspected between 1st. January and 30th. June 1944, 43 were units demanded by overseas commanders before they had finished their training. (I)

(I) Army Service Forces Report FY - 1944

Activation schedules for the Army Service Forces were based upon a War Department forecast of troop requirements for 6 months in advance. As emergency demands arose from overseas theaters, the ASF had to activate additional units.

The principal change introduced by ASF in activation procedures during the fiscal year 1944 was the introduction of preactivation training discussed below. Otherwise, the time table for the activation of non-division units set up in April 1943 was adhered to during 1944.

Demands for ASF training units increased during the fiscal year as military operations expanded overseas. The strength of authorized units of the Transportation Corps, for example, expanded over 80 percent between 1st. July 1943 and 30th. June 1944. The October 1943 plan for the 1944 troop basis increased the number of signal units by one-third. In order eventually to meet the requirements of the European theater of operations, signal training battalions in the United States were stripped of every available man, specialists were released from the Army specialized training program, and other emergency measures were taken.

One major change was made during 1944 in setting up tables of organization and equipment for service troop units. The wide variety of special jobs to be done overseas required the creation of many different types of units. For example, an overseas commander included among his Quartermaster troops, truck units, laundry units, gasoline supply units, shoe repair units, bakery units, and depot units. Transportation Corps units used overseas included harbor craft companies, amphibian truck companies, and port battalions. In order to reverse the trend toward greater and greater specialization, the ASF began to create composite units which could perform more than one type of work. The creation of composite units not only avoided many small organizations with their own headquarters personnel, but also simplified the task of the theater commander in determining what types of units he needed.

The new practice also reduced the number of tables of organization required for ASF. Most composite units were created within a single branch of service such as the Signal Corps, the Quartermaster Corps, or the Transportation Corps. For example, many Signal Corps units were reduced to one type- the signal heavy construction company- for the installation of communication systems in an overseas theater of operations. In a few instances it was possible to set up composite units with personnel for more than one branch, such as a unit with both ordnance and signal personnel.

3. Schools:

Early in World War II it was apparent to the War Dept. that industry could not furnish the large number of specialist necessary for the technical services: this resulted in the expansion of the existing technical service schools and the addition of many various types of school programs to fullfil the needs of the services. As these expanded, facilities became inadequate to train personnel in the numbers and within the time required; civil establishments were leased and contracts for training in prescribed courses were made with civil schools, factories, industrial plants, and public utilities.

1. Service Schools: This type included schools operated by the Army with army personnel as instructors.

2. Officer Candidate Schools: The mission of these schools was to train potential leaders to assume command of the many newly activated service units.

3. Special Training Units: These units trained illiterates, non-English speaking soldiers, and men classified in Grade V. on the Army General Classification Test in academic and military subjects so that these handicapped individuals would be able to proceed with regular military training and perform useful military service.

4. Army Specialized Training Program: This program was established to take advantage of the facilities of civilian colleges and universities to train technicians.

5. Army Specialized Training Reserve Program: The A.S.T. Reserve program was begun on 9th. Aug. 1943, to provide training for qualified 17-year-old high school graduates before they were called to active duty after they became 18 years of age.

The reserve program was designed to assure a flow of specially qualified yound men into the army and, in limited numbers, into advanced specialized training.

PREINDUCTION TRAINING:

The army required large numbers of men trained in the fundamentals of radio, electricity, mechanics, and allied subjects, to use, maintain, and repair the complicated apparatus of modern war. After induction, the army provided specific training in the use of specialized equipment, but it pre-supposed that many inductees brought with them a mastery of fundamentals.

It was determined that 610 army jobs required specialized training. A basic understanding of electricity contributed to 151 jobs; shopwork to 188 jobs; machine knowledge to 226 jobs; radio training to 35 jobs; and automotive mechanics to 50 jobs. These were defined in a series of pre-induction training manuals prepared by the Industrial Personnel Division of the Army Service Forces. The manuals were designed primarily for use in the secondary schools. On September 30, 1942, for example, nearly 30,000 persons were enrolled in some 250 vocational schools to study radio and communications.

ANNEX V. REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE SYSTEMS USED FOR ACTIVATION, TRAINING, AND ASSIGNMENT OF TECHNICAL SERVICE UNITS DURING WORLD WAR II.

I. Troop Basis: Under the system of divided responsibility which had existed throughout the war, and until May 1946, confusion, duplications, and omissions in planning necessarily resulted. The number of one type unit which should have been included in the troop basis would have depended largely upon the number of another type unit which performs a similar function that had been included by another major force. The inclusion in the troop basis of certain service type units by one major force often required the inclusion of units of another type allocated to a different major force to support or augment such units. It was not possible to plan efficiently on the basis of the number of units required for the combat zone, communication zone, and air forced in a theater since the size of each area or force and the mission varied from time to time and from theater to theater, also depending upon the theater commander's desires and the territory assigned at any particular time to the combat and communication zones. Coordinated, well-balanced troop basis planning should have been obtained by assigning troop basis responsibility for all units of each service to a single agency having all the information and material to permit intelligent evaluation and over-all planning.



II. Tables of Organization: The system of divided responsibility resulted in confusion insofar as the planning for, and development of, tables of organization and equipment was concerned. While the number of identical type units allocated to more than on major force and the resulting arbitrary assignment by the War Department of table of organization and

equipment responsibility for such type units to one of the major forces was limited, there are, as previously pointed out, a large number of units which are very similar, perform the same general mission, and are assigned to more than one of the major forces. Such differences may be in name, only in equipment, or small differences in personnel.

New type units must be developed from time to time in keeping with new equipment and changes in the technical situation. The need for such new units can be foreseen best by the chiefs of services. Existing tables of organization and equipment could be more readily changed by the services in keeping with the development of new equipment and improved methods of procurement, storage, and issue.

III. Activation: The system of divided responsibility for activation of units of the services has necessarily resulted in confusion and inefficiency in the utilization of posts, camps, and stations, training facilities, and the furnishing of equipment to units.

IV. Training: The training of units and the procurement, training, and assignment of personnel, particularly officers and highly specialized enlisted men, are so closely related that it is impracticable to separate one function from the other. The system of divided responsibility in this respect necessarily resulted in duplication in trainers and supervisory staffs, training facilities, and training equipment, which in the case of newly developed equipment was often in very scarce supply. In a number of instances, skilled personnel required by one of the major forces, at the same time, was excess to the needs of another major force and being retrained in some different speciality.

ANNEX VI. CURRENT OPERATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FOR THE ACTIVATION, TRAINING, AND ASSIGNMENT OF TECHNICAL SERVICE UNITS.

Current operations with respect to the activation, training and assignment of technical service units are based upon the War Department Reorganization of 1946. The reorganization was ordered by Circular No 138, 14th. May 1946, which became effective 11th. June 1946. Within the army, its provisions are little changed by the National Security Act of 1947 except for the separation of the Air Force. It may be noted at this time that in the reorganization of 1946, the Army Service Forces were removed as a separate command and the Army General Staff was greatly strengthened. This promoted a staff with simple and flexible organization with clear cut command channels. There were minor changes in 1948, as expressed by Department of Army Circular 64, 10 March 1948, which clearly outlined the responsibilities of the Director of Logistics. Under the present staff arrangement, the Technical Staffs and Services report directly to the Director of Logistics.

Over-all Army troop basis planning is the responsibility of the O. and T. Division, GSUSA. The Logistics Division is responsible for preparing its portion of the troop basis pertaining to the service troop requirements. The Director of Logistics charges the seven technical services with the detailed preparation of their specific requirements; he also consolidates and coordinates these requirements with the O and T Divisions to make them fit into the over-all troop basis.



The activation schedules show when units will be called to active duty or activated. It is an important guide to

all troop planners, because new units require men, weapons, equipment, training areas, and trained specialists. Cadres and housekeeping support must be provided for new units.

After requirements for service units have been determined by the technical service planners, they can determine how many of the units of various types will have to be activated and trained. Then, using the factors of shipping, training, and activation times, the planners can determine activation dates and set up recommended schedules. These will then be sent to the Director of Logistics for his coordination and approval, after which the schedules will be forwarded to the O and T Division for adjustment and coordination within its overall plan. Naturally, all new activations must fit in with current and expected training facilities, with current and expected man power availabilities, and with availability of equipment.

Training policies originate in the Organization and Training Division, GSUSA. They are general in scope but are adequate to provide the technical service planners with the essential training information which they need. Detailed recommended training programs are developed by the technical services and submitted to the Director of Logistics for initial approval before going to the O and T Division, who has final coordination and approval of them before they go to the Chief of Staff for approval. This same procedure is followed for training literature, service schools, and similar training matters.

Early determination of requirements for an allocation of training stations provides a framework for the planning of the procurement and distribution of personnel, activation scheduling, construction requirements, medical and supply

facilities, and strategic distribution on the training forces over the United States. The Director of Logistics plays a vital part in this planning. The technical services recommend allocation of training stations for their units. These recommendations go up through the Logistics divisions to the O and T Division for final disposition. (I)

Phased training schedules are recommended by the technical services for each type of unit and for each type of service (such as artic, jungle, or amphibious). Where periods of training vary or where training conditions differ, separate schedules are prepared or the basic training schedule is designed so that appropriate modifications can be made.

The Army Field Forces have certain interests in the training of these service units. They are charged with supervising the preparation of training plans, training instructions, and training literature employed for the training of units of the field army. Like wise, they are charged with the supervision, coordination, and inspection of all matters pertaining to the training of all individuals and units utilized in a field army.

The zone of interior armies may be called upon to analyze the tentative activation schedules and make recommendations based upon the local situation in each army area. They may be called upon to make recommendations regarding training stations and areas. They are responsible for the training of all units at posts, camps, and stations under their command.

Normally, the training of service units is carried out as follows in the ZI:

(I) Advance Sheet C & G.S., 4637

All division, corps and army types of service units are trained at installations under the ZI Armies. All communications zone and ZI types of service units are trained at installations under command of the chiefs of technical services. Supervision of training for the latter is exercised by the Director of Logistics, under policies originated by the Director of Organization and Training and approved by the Chief of Staff.

The chiefs of technical services are responsible for the operation of technical service schools for the training of officers and of technical specialists for the Army as a whole. These activities are supervised by the Director of Logistics, in accordance with approved Department of the Army policies. However, the Chief, Army Field Forces, has supervision, coordination, and inspection prerogatives at all schools of all aspects of training affecting the field army. By virtue of this, a Department of the Army circular enjoins the closest collaboration and coordination between the Army Field Forces and the technical services. In fact, direct communication for this purpose is authorized between the Chief, Army Field Forces, and chiefs of the technical services.

Assignment of service units to commands is based upon the current needs for their employment, and is made by the Department of the Army at the time the units are reported as complete and proficient in their training. Recommendations for their assignment may be sought from the chiefs of technical services, and from the Chief, Army Field Forces, in the case of those units trained as field army units.

The outstanding advantage of the present system for the Troop Basis, Table of Organization and Equipment, Activation and Assignment of technical service units is placed in the

Department of the Army General Staff and is not divided among the major forces as existed furing World War II. With control centralized in one agency, we may expect to find the following advantages with respect to:

1. Troop Basis:

(a) Sound planning for balanced over-all service support as required by various theaters, army areas, or for a specific operation, irrespective of future assignment.

(b) Elimination of duplications and omissions.

(c) Timely provisions for new types of units necessarily created from time to time as a result of the development of new weapons and equipment.

(d) Prevention of the lack of balance as a result of available troops of one type being used to perform a mission for which they were not primarily designed.

2. Tables of Organization:

(a) More efficient, well-balanced tables of organization and equipment to support the over-all mission.

(b) Elimination of duplication in planning staffs.

(c) Prompt development of new types of units and changes in old types of units in keeping with newly developed equipment and technical information.

(d) Elimination of a substantial reduction in the number of different types of units performing the same or very similar mission and the adoption of a fewer number of general purpose units.

3. Activation:

(a) Elimination of duplications in staff and supervisory personnel.

(b) Logical and orderly scheduling of activation of units.

(c) Maximum coordination between the activation of units and the procurement of equipment.

The primary disadvantage of the present system is that one of the major problems which existed throughout World War II has not been completely solved, and that is the clear cut responsibility for the training of the various types of technical service units. Under current plans for the training of service units, the Chief of Army Field Forces has supervision, coordination,and inspection prerogatives at all schools of all aspects of training affecting the field army. This arrangement will produce much confusion in any future movilization because there are many types of service units which can operate either in combat zones or zones of the Interior.

The present organization does present certain advantages from the point of view of the Army Field Forces. Because by close coordination with schools and training, AFF can more closely supervise the execution, functions, and responsibilities related to combat service units.

ANNEX VII. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY TO INSURE TECHNICAL SERVICE UNITS IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER NATIONAL EMERGENCY.

The past history of the United States Army in respect to the problem of activation, training and assignment of technical service units showed a complete lack of long range planning to insure an ample supply of technical service units in the event of War.

Current planning is based on the fact that the need for technical service units exists prior to the activation of combat units. Present long range planning takes into consideration the use of Standard Type Field Army, (I) the Logistical Division, (2) the Affiliation Program, (3) The Organized Reserve Program and the National Guard Program, as the latter two programs are already established in the National Defense program.

Since World War II, considerable effort has been made by the Department of the Army to more closely align the National Guard and the Organized Reserves to the Regular Army. Present plans call for 1,242,000 officers and men by 1951 in civilian components. The training program of these units envisions more active duty training.

Present planning envisions the use of the Affiliation program. This program will furnish many highly trained specialists to the technical services. The specialist, though lacking in military training, could be of great service in zone of the interior installations.



At present, the Type Field Army has not received official recognition from the Department of Army. The value of the

(I) Type Field Army Tentative
(2) Ltrs. Hq. 5th. Army, dated 9 Oct 47, 5 Nov 47, 19 Jan 48
(3) Draft Field Manual "The Logistical Division" proposed by the Command and General Staff College, May 47.

Type Field Army lies in its flexibility and, from the point of the services, would effect a saving in manpower.

The Logistical Division is the basic unit of the combined services. The organic Logistical Division prescribed in Tables of Organization and Equipment 110 is organized, trained, and equipped as a basic nucleus around which a balanced service force may be built quickly by expansion. The reinforced Logistical Division consists of the organic division plus those expansion units added in any specific situation to provide an appropriate service force for that situation.

Although the "Logistical Division" has not received official Department of the Army blessing, it has already had extensive development in reserve units. Twenty-six of these divisions have been activated in reserve units and have proven worthy of further consideration.

Present planning has taken into consideration the effect that improved weapons will have on technical service units, namely, an increase due to technical improvements and dispersion due to range and power of weapons. (I)

(I) Trends in Warfare C & GS 5242

ANNEX VIII. ALTERNATE SOLUTION FOR THE ACTIVATION, TRAINING AND ASSIGNMENT OF TECHNICAL SERVICE UNITS:

An alternate solution for the activation, training and assignment of technical service units is to retain in the General Staff the responsibility for troop basis, activation and assignment of technical service units, but give the responsibility of training technical service units to the Chiefs of Technical Services and relieve Army Field Forces of its responsibility of technical training of combat service units.

The above arrangement would make the Chiefs of Services responsible for technical training of technical service units.

The reasons for this recommendation is that the Chiefs of Services have centralized under their control, technical specialists of highest caliber, complete facilities especially designed for the mission of the service, and have access to all types of equipment in every stage of development. This arrangement would eliminate the duplication which now exists and would be in the interest of economy and efficient training.

Since activation of units follows individual training, the Chiefs of Services would have a larger pool from which to select. The complete unit would then be turned over to Army Field Forces for combined training. The complete centralization of responsibility in the Chiefs of Technical Services for technical training of all technical service units in the Army would result in:

a. Elimination of duplications and maximum use and economy of supervisory staffs, trainers, training facilities, training equipment, schools, and posts, camps, and stations.

b. Elimination of duplication in training of scarce categories of personnel in one force, while trained personnel of the same type are excess to the needs of one of the other major forces.

c. Macimum utilization of new items of equipment which are in scarce supply.

d. Centralization of training at field training centers.

e. Uniformity of training, training methods, and training doctrine.

f. Improved and more uniform instruction.

g. Economy and standardization in production and use of training aids.

h. Quicker and more equitable filling of units, thus avoiding varied levels of training within units.

i. Activation of units at locations where personnel is available.

j. Aggressive development of new organization, new equipment, and training doctrine for such new equipment.

k. Better selection and assignment of personnel.

l. More advantageous utilization of scarce categories of personnel.

m. More efficient screening of personnel for advanced training.

n. More efficient and uniform service throughout the Army.

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