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THE OPERATION OF THE LOGISTICAL DIVISION

LT COL O.K. MARSHALL  
CAC 022219

17 June 1947.

The operation of the logistics division,  
by Lt Col O, K. Marshall. CGSC. 1946-47.

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1st Ind, WD GOT 322 (13 Sept 46), fr Hq, C&S College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, d 30 October 1946, To: Director of O & T, WD, Wash, D.C., including final recommendations of C&GS College on disposition of concept of Logistical Division.

Report of The General Board, USFET, TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT FOR A BASE SECTION IN A THEATER OF OPERATIONS, October 1945.

Analytical Study THE LOGISTICAL DIVISION, 21 November 1945, Committee No. 4, First Command Class, Command and General Staff School, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

Logistics School,  
Command & General Staff College,  
Ft. Leavenworth,  
Kansas.

17 June 1947.

Subject: THE OPERATION OF THE LOGISTICAL DIVISION.

To: THE DIRECTOR, School of Logistics, Command and General Staff  
College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

PURPOSE:

To present, in analytical form, a study of the proposed Logistical Division to include its conception, organization, mission, and operations, and to present constructive criticism of the organization.

DISCUSSION:

1. The apparent need of some sort of regularized organization to exist as a standard command structure for the control and operation of service units in any theater, or major division thereof, was felt by many during World War II. Base, section, and area commands in all theaters were devoid of any organization based on War Department tables of organization and equipment, and depended on bulk allotments from each theater concerned with their formation. These authorizations varied considerably, were largely "improvised", to a great extent precluded prior planning, and offered no basis for the development of common doctrine and training methods throughout the services of the Army.

2. On 15 March, 1945, the War Department G-4 directed that the Command and General Staff College (then School) prepare and submit a study of " - - the organization of an integrated force trained and equipped as a logistical division". This directive contemplated an

organization capable of providing the logistical support of a type field army of three corps, each corps with three divisions, including Air Force supporting troops. The completed study on the new Logistical Division was forwarded to the War Department, and, after study and comment by general staff sections, major commands, and theaters, was revised in minor detail and resubmitted as The Logistical Division, Mark II. Based on this latter study, the War Department has approved and published tentative T/O&E's for the Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion of the division, and a tentative operational Field Manual has been published at the Command and General Staff College.

(See Tab A, Chronology of Development)

3. a. The Logistical Division, Mark II, consists of the Commander and General and Special Staffs, a Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion, and the operational and overhead troops of the various services. (See Tab B, Organizational Chart.) To this ~~basic~~ organization there are appended such subordinate commands, boards, and commissions as might exist in a given area. As is evident from the organizational chart, the administrative and technical service chiefs function in the dual capacity of special staff officers and commanders of their service troops, where such exist. To emphasize the command functions from Division Commander to service troops, a special command line is shown which by-passes the general staff. If abused, this structure permits nineteen separate individuals to report direct to the commander, and relegates the general staff to a position of minor importance.

b. The Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion of the Logistical Division exist as a nucleus around which the complete division can be tailored to meet <sup>y</sup> and service support situation thought likely to arise. The basic troop list of the division, totaling 15,835 personnel, comprises only those troop units considered essential to any given area command. Such operations as port and railway are not provided for in the basic



organization, and provision for such operations, together with provision for larger supported commands, is in the expansion tables of the division. These expansion tables provide a listing of service units which would be required in type situations and afford an accurate guide to the number and type of service elements necessary for other situations. Situation A, as shown in the expansion tables, contemplates the support of a reinforced corps, while Situation B is the support of a type field army. In both situations the conditions of operation are assumed<sup>m</sup> to be the same and do not contemplate either unusually favorable or unfavorable circumstances. (See Tab C, Expansion Tables for Type Situations)

c. The present concept of the operation of the Logistical Division varies little from that first set forth in the initial study. Minor changes were effected in the organizational structure as a result of comments from the reviewing agencies, and the concept of a Logisitcal Corps to be a larger headquarters of the same type has been dropped. The division is designed primarily to function as an advance section such as was used in the ETO. It is designed also to function as a base or intermediate section, or a major subdivision of either one, such as a district or area command. It can also be used to form the small communications zone, or SOS, which might exist in a limited theater of operations where there <sup>was</sup> ~~were~~ no possibility of area expansion. It has been proposed that the division act as an army service command, relieving the army commander of dealing with separate service elements. This latter type operation would, in effect, consist of a more or less permanent ASCOM organization such as was used in the Pacific. Peacetime operation of the division would include Occupation Zone area headquarters and service commands in overseas bases. Just how the division might function in peacetime in the zone of the interior is not yet firm, except that it would go into the field on maneuvers in support of large tactical forces.

4. Advantages:

a. The Logistical Division provides a standard T/O&E organization which can be organized and trained for operations during peacetime and during the early stages of mobilization in a future war. It can exist as a "known quantity" for logistical planning and, as such, can be accurately computed in troop bases as the service support element for current and future needs.

b. As a permanent peacetime component of the army, the Logistical Division Headquarters is capable of initiating and keeping current the doctrine of the support of field armies. It can exist as the planning agency for the communications zone operations.

c. With the standards of organization fixed by the T/O&E, and the concept of the division firmly drawn in operational field manuals, the methods of functioning and doctrine of support will become uniform throughout the army. This uniformity of operation would be invaluable in future operations where combat elements are shifted back and forth between various sections and bases. Service units, too, will be capable of ready transfer to new commands as the situation may dictate, being of a uniform origin.

d. The morale and efficiency of small service elements would be increased by the existence of a parent headquarters and organization which could "own" them and control them more effectively. Although this same morale and control may have been present in some administrative headquarters during the last war, it was a result of gradual build-up and could not have existed from the start since there was no pre-organization of the parent unit.

e. The division in existence as a peacetime force would reduce the operational readiness time of our field forces by a marked degree. Future operations may demand a suddenness of organization which will preclude the gradual evolution of large service headquarters during a defensive period of operations.

5. Disadvantages:

a. The entire T/O&E organization of the logistical division, as differentiated from the headquarters alone, inherits the inflexibility of any large T/O&E organization. It is based upon sound and reasonable assumptions, but is naturally subject to change based on the changed conditions of warfare. It is felt there is a recognizable limit to the size of organizations which can be flexibly designed for operations. There exists no T/O&E army or corps, except for planning and instructional purposes. This inherent inflexibility of T/O&E organizations, would impose serious handicaps on theater commanders who would be obliged to use organizations which might not accurately meet their needs. Revision of tables of organization and regrouping time might very well become a more serious and time consuming factor than initial survey and organization.

b. The existence of a complete logistical division, or the early wartime organization thereof, for purely training purposes would be, to some extent, a waste of service troops. Such training would be of unquestioned value, but when weighed against the cost and manpower effort, and with emphasis on our experience in the past with these two factors, it is not believed to be feasible. It cannot be foreseen where the retention of service units in the zone of the interior during a war for the purpose of large unit training alone could ever be justified as against the value (and operational training received) of those units within the theater as augmentation units. During peacetime, the value-per-dollar received from large unit training of service elements would not justify the corresponding reduction in large scale tactical training of combat units. ✓

c. The concept of the division operating as an army service command is believed to be unsound. No specific criticism of the ASCOM, as it was used in the Pacific, can be found, however, no outstanding advantages appear to have been gained by this type organization. The Army doctrine is that of the largest administrative and tactical unit

and, as such, the army commander must be directly responsible for his service support. To place the service elements under a separate command in the army would be, in effect, interposing an unnecessary echelon in the command structure, and would render the army special staff chiefs powerless. If all services in our army were combined into one service branch embracing all service support functions, then this type organization (ASCOM) would be meaningful, however, the present organization of the services makes this impossible.

d. The name: Logistical Division, is not truly descriptive of its functions as a service support section and implies a rigid combat type organization. This is not believed to be a great disadvantage, however, as will be seen from the recommendations, if this organization is to exist as a headquarters alone, then some more appropriate name should be adopted.

#### CONCLUSIONS:

1. That the Logistical Division, Mark II, is soundly conceived and developed, insofar as the headquarters and headquarters battalion are concerned, but that the remaining structure of the complete division is too rigid to be practicable considering its size and varied missions.

2. That the Logistical Division, Mark II (Headquarters and headquarters battalion), fulfills a major requirement for a large service support headquarters for both peacetime operation and planning and for wartime mobilization and operation.

3. That operational field manuals, T/O&E's, and all attendant research and study should exist and be kept up to date as planning and instructional guides for future mobilization of service elements.

4. That it is unsound to contemplate organizing army service units under a separate commander into an army service command. No change, in this respect, to the present responsibilities of the army commander and his staff should arise from the concept of the logistical division.

5. That more conventional staff-command relationship should be indicated on the organizational chart of the division in order to give

proper emphasis to the functioning of the general staff.

6. That the name - Logistical Division - is not properly descriptive of the service support headquarters as recommended in this study.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Logistical Division Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion be accepted as a regular T/O&E organization of the army, and that one such Headquarters be established on the regular army troop basis with station adjacent to the Army Ground Forces. This Headquarters to function primarily as the planning agency for all communications zone matters.

2. That other Logistical Division Headquarters and Headquarters Battalions exist on the mobilization troop lists of the National Guard, and Organized Reserves, in such number as may be determined by the War Department.

3. That the complete Logistical Division not be accepted as a T/O&E organization of the army, but that the tables, data, and all attendant matter be kept current and be used as the basis for planning and instruction throughout the army.

4. That the concept of an army service command be dropped.

5. That the organizational chart of the division be revised to indicate more conventional general staff functioning.

6. That the name - Logistical Division - be changed to some more descriptive title such as; \_\_\_\_\_ Service Support Headquarters, or; \_\_\_\_\_ Service Support Command.

A

Tab A, to accompany analytical study: THE OPERATION OF THE LOGISTICAL DIVISION.

CHRONOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT OF  
THE LOGISTICAL DIVISION

15 March 1945            Letter directive from G-4, War Department, directing Command and General Staff School study and submit to War Department its recommendations with regard to:

1. Organizational structure.
2. Functional operations.
3. Desirability as compared with existing procedure.

of an organization trained and equipped as a logistical division.

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23 April 1945            1st Interim Report on the Logistical Division, including a Logistical Corps, submitted to War Department by the Command and General Staff School.

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27 August 1945           War Department forwarded to Command and General Staff School the comments of the WD staff divisions, major commands, and theaters on the 1st Interim Report. WD directed that final report be expedited at earliest possible date since cessation of hostilities appeared imminent.

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October 1945             Final Report on the Logistical Division, Mark II, submitted to WD.

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22 October 1945           Concurrent with, but separate from, the logistical division planning, ETO General Board directed by WD to study and submit recommendations on the Headquarters of a type Base Section. (No

20 March 1946

WD directed Continental Base Section, ETO, to field test the Logistical Division, Mark II, in its role as an occupation area command.

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10 October 1946

WD forwarded to Command and Staff College the "Report on Field Test of Logistical Division" which USFET forwarded to WD from Continental Base Section. This report of test of the First Logistical Division (Provisional) was very favorable, USFET Commander stating that: "The First Logistical Division (Provisional) has accomplished its mission in a highly successful manner and has proven the effectiveness of this type organization." WD directed that study and comments be made on this report.

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30 October 1946

Command and Staff College returned, by indorsement, the WD letter, above, with following recommendations for future disposal of the concept of the logistical division:

(1) That the WD publish T/O&Es for the Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion, for the complete division, and proposed operational field manual for the division, all in properly revised form as indicated in body of indorsement.

(2) That complete organic logistical divisions be included in the mobilization plan at the overall rate of approximately two logistical divisions per field army. ✓

(3) That active logistical divisions be organized in occupied areas in both theaters.


(4) That overseas departments and commands



give study to the logistical division with a view to organizing their service elements along similar lines.


(5) That one Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion, Logistical Division (on a reduced basis) be created under the War Department Director of Service, Supply, and Procurement, with permanent station near Headquarters Army Ground Forces and also Washington, D.C. Purpose of this organization would be plan for the organization of communication zones (wartime) and to field test doctrine and procedure in the employment of the combined services. Among other functions, it would participate in all maneuvers of a corps or more and would be charged with the preparation of the logistical portions of specific theater war plans.

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
LOGISTICAL DIVISION, Mark 3

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\* Issue with advance sheet.





EXPANSION TABLES FOR TYPE SITUATIONS

(1.) Expansion tables exist as a part of the logistical division to facilitate organization of the division into the proper sized force necessary to effectively support type field forces. Two type situations have been contemplated in building these expansion tables, both utilizing the same assumptions except for the area (size) and force supported. In both situations, the division (assumed to be an advance section of a communications zone) is charged with the general service support of a ground force in the combat zone, and an air element partly in the combat zone and partly in the advanced section. Both ground and air include normal combat service troops. In addition the division supports all elements located in its area.

a. In Situation A the area of the division is assumed to be 50 miles deep by 20 miles wide, and the force supported to be a reinforced Corps. Full support will be given to 135,000 troops, and partial support to 117,083, totaling 252,083 troop strength supported.

b. In Situation B the area of the division is assumed to be 50 miles deep by 50 miles wide, and the force supported to be a type Army. Full support will be given to 377,500 troops, and partial support to 246,000, totaling 623,500 troop strength supported.

(2) General assumptions as to conditions in both areas are made as follows:

(a) Local conditions: hostile population, temperate climate, foreign language, rolling rural and urban topography, partially developed, one city of 80,000, one main railroad, a few hard-surfaced roads and several large streams.

(b) Damage: considerable to city and transportation systems by bombing and subsequent ground and naval action.

- (c) Enemy situation - bombing, strafing, airborne attack, sabotage and coastal raids may be expected.
- (d) Gas warfare - remote possibility.
- (e) Lines of communication to rear - all by ocean shipping.
- (f) Amphibious phase is over. Port is adequate for normal maintenance and build-up with extensive repair.
- (g) Airfields - to be constructed by air.
- (h) No standing timber available.
- (i) Casualty rate - ETO experience.
- (j) No malaria.
- (k) Vehicles being received boxed.
- (l) POL 90% bulk.
- (m) Air will take care of signal construction for TAC and ADC.
- (n) No V-mail service.
- (o) Advance section (division) will operate own MRS.
- (p) No coastwise or inland waterway.
- (q) One general depot.
- (r) No subordinate bases, districts or areas, training commands, or regulating stations.
- (s) Rest camp for 7,000 for Situation B.
- (t) AAA under air defense command.
- (u) One reinforcement depot of 4 battalions under division control of Situation B.

(3) In organizing the division to meet either of the situations under the assumptions and conditions as outlined above, the basic division consisting of 15,802 is augmented by selecting from the expansion tables those service units necessary to operate the services indicated and in numbers sufficient to support the strength indicated. Expanded to meet Situation A, the division grows to a strength of 37,565; to meet situation B, it expands to 84,465. Expansion of all type service units is understandably not uniform, depending upon their individual functions. The Headquarters Battalion, housekeeping for the Headquarters, expands not at all.

