AFRL-RI-RS-TR-2020-118



CONTINUOUS VALIDATION AND THREAT PROTECTION FOR MOBILE APPLICATIONS

LOOKOUT, INC.

JULY 2020

FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

STINFO COPY

AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORY INFORMATION DIRECTORATE

AIR FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

ROME, NY 13441

NOTICE AND SIGNATURE PAGE

Using Government drawings, specifications, or other data included in this document for any purpose other than Government procurement does not in any way obligate the U.S. Government. The fact that the Government formulated or supplied the drawings, specifications, or other data does not license the holder or any other person or corporation; or convey any rights or permission to manufacture, use, or sell any patented invention that may relate to them.

This report is the result of contracted fundamental research deemed exempt from public affairs security and policy review in accordance with SAF/AQR memorandum dated 10 Dec 08 and AFRL/CA policy clarification memorandum dated 16 Jan 09. This report is available to the general public, including foreign nations. Copies may be obtained from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) (http://www.dtic.mil).

AFRL-RI-RS-TR-2020-118 HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND IS APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT.

FOR THE CHIEF ENGINEER:

/ **S** / JAMES L. SIDORAN Work Unit Manager / S / JAMES S. PERRETTA Deputy Chief, Information Exploitation & Operations Division Information Directorate

This report is published in the interest of scientific and technical information exchange, and its publication does not constitute the Government's approval or disapproval of its ideas or findings.

REPORT DO		Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188				
maintaining the data needed, and completing and suggestions for reducing this burden, to Departmer 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents she if it does not display a currently valid OMB control PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO TH	reviewing the c t of Defense, W ould be aware th number. E ABOVE ADD	ollection of information. Se ashington Headquarters Se at notwithstanding any othe RESS.	end comments regarding rvices, Directorate for Info	this burden ormation Op	reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including verations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information	
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)	2. REF				3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
JULY 2020		FINAL TECH	NICAL REPO			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE CONTINUOUS VALIDATION /	AND THR	FAT PROTECTI	ON FOR	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER FA8750-17-2-0236		
MOBILE APPLICATIONS				5b. Gl	RANT NUMBER N/A	
				5c. PR	OGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 69220K	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PR	OJECT NUMBER DHS7	
DAEMON MORRELL				5e. TA	SK NUMBER LO	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER OK		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 1 LOOKOUT, INC. 275 BATTERY STREET, SUIT SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111		ND ADDRESS(ES)			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AG	ENCY NAM	E(S) AND ADDRESS	S(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
Air Force Research Laboratory	//RIGA				AFRL/RI	
525 Brooks Road				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER		
Rome NY 13441-4505					AFRL-RI-RS-TR-2020-118	
	Distributio	n Unlimited. Thi rity and policy re	view in accord		f contracted fundamental research ith SAF/AQR memorandum dated 10 Dec	
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES						
14. ABSTRACT						
research using advanced mach and before threats exhibit mali infrastructures from Web and 0	nine learn cious beh Content ba so enables	ing, that enables avior. Mobile End ased-threats (e.g s deep threat inve	threat detection dpoint Security phishing attac estigation provi	n even (MES) ks), Ap	ars of mobile threat data collection and in cases where no prior signatures exist protects mobile endpoints and plication-based threats and device risks, iministrators unparalleled visibility into the	
15. SUBJECT TERMS						
Mobile Threat Protection, Mob	le Endpoi	int Security				
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION O	? :	17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES		E OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON MES S. SIDORAN	
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THU	IIS PAGE U	UU	42	19b. TELI N/A	EPHONE NUMBER (<i>Include area code)</i>	
					Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 739 18	

эy

Table of Contents

List of	Figures	ii
List of	Tables	iv
1.0	SUMMARY	1
2.0	Introduction	2
Dep	LOYMENTS AND PROOF OF CONCEPT TESTING	3
3.0	Methods, Assumptions & Procedures	4
4.0	Results and Discussion	5
4 4	4.1.1.1.a - Insecure use of Data 4.1.1.1.b.1 - Use of SDKs from social networking clouds such as Twitter and Facebook 4.1.1.1.c.1 - Actual sending of data to cloud services	6 7
	4.1.1.d.1 - Understand what URLs are being accessed by the app and whether these are of low eputation.	Q
4	.1.1.1.f - Geoview of URLs	10
	4.1.1.1.g – Use of private APIs (iOS) A.1.1.2.a - Custom Policies Allowing Admins to Set Rules Based on App Behaviors	
4	.1.1.2b - Blacklisting of Unwanted Applications	12
	1.1.2c – End-User notification for non-compliant/risky apps	
	Additional Delivered Features	
	2 - Advanced Third Party Application Investigation and "Old Age" App Detection	
	.1.2.1.a - Detection of Apps Removed from App Store	
	.1.2.1.b Policy to notify end-users and admins of removed apps	
	.1.2.2 – Third Party App Store Deliverables	
4.1.		
-	A.1.3.3 Content Modification Detection and Alerting	
4.1.	4 MOBILE VULNERABILITY DETECTION AND MANAGEMENT A.1.4.1- Detection of OS vulnerabilities matching databases such as NVD and CVE	
	4.1.4.2 - Detection of application vulnerabilities	
	4.1.4.3.a Actionable options when vulnerabilities are detected	
	4.1.4.3.b Actionable options when vulnerabilities are detected	
4.1.	1	
Upd	ATED STATEMENT OF WORK – SECTION 4.1.5 (REPLACE CARS WITH CCA)	
	.1.5.1 – Device Identification and Lookout Enforcement	
4	.1.5.2 – Conditional Access Support for Office 365 using AAD for IDP	33
	A.1.5.3 - Real Time Access – Enforce conditional access based on Device Health Check before log	
5.0	CONCLUSION	
6.0	LIST OF ACRONYMS	35

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Screenshot showing insecure data in motion for an application on an Android device.
(Deliverable 4.1.1.1.a.2)
Figure 2. Screenshot showing insecure data in motion and at rest for an iOS device, based on Apple ATS (Deliverable 4.1.1.1.a.1 & 4.1.1.1.a.2)
Figure 3. Screenshot showing configuration of policy to match use of Social networks
(Deliverable 4.1.1.1.b.1)
Figure 4. Screenshot showing data from an app that shows access to Cloud services (deliverable
4.1.1.1.b.1)
Figure 5. Screenshot of sensitive data (IMEI) being sent to a third-party
Figure 6. Dashboard control to enable Phishing and Content Protection (PCP)
Figure 7. Device showing that Safe Browsing (Client PCP) is active on the device
Figures 8 & 9. Screenshot warnings to end user about malicious URLs that they attempted to access
9 Figure 10. Screenshot of low reputation and malicious URLs being identified and blocked 9
•
Figure 11. Screenshot showing the Geo-location of IPs/URLs within an application
Figure 12. Screenshot showing an application that accesses Private APIs
Figure 13. Screenshot showing the ability for administrators to configure policy violations for
application based behaviors. (Deliverable 4.1.1.2.a)
Figure 14. – Screenshot showing the ability for administrators to configure policy violations for
application based behaviors. (Deliverable 4.1.1.2.a)
Figure 15. Screenshot showing numerous configuration policies for application based behaviors.
(Deliverable 4.1.1.2.a)
Figure 16. Screenshot showing an application that violates the custom policy for applications
that access the camera. (Deliverable 4.1.1.2.a). Note that the application is available for
Blacklisting because of the violation (Deliverable 4.1.1.2.b)
Figure 17. Screenshot showing that the application violating policy has been blacklisted.
(Deliverable 4.1.1.2.b)
Figure 18. Screenshot showing the ability to Blacklist an Android application. (Deliverable
4.1.1.2.b)
Figure 19. Screenshots showing the end user notification that the app they have installed is
violating policy and has been blacklisted. (Deliverable 4.1.1.2.c)
Figure 20. Screenshot showing applications that have been Blacklisted can be configured to
notify an MDM at a certain threat level. (Deliverable 4.1.1.2.d)
Figure 21. Screenshot from MDM showing that a mobile device has a Blacklisted application
(Deliverable 4.1.1.2.d)
Figure 22. Dashboard view of applications that Access Bluetooth, NFC and Accept incoming
traffic
Figure 23. Application details that show connectivity for NFC/Bluetooth and accept incoming
traffic
Figure 24. Screenshot showing filter for App Store Apps
Figure 25. Screenshot showing an App that came from the Apple App Store
Figure 26. Screenshot showing an App that did NOT come from the Apple App Store
Figure 27. Screenshot showing the configuration options to flag Android Sideloaded
Applications and Whitelist/Blacklist specific sources and App stores
11 I II

Figure 28. Screenshot showing an Administrators notice of an Android Sideloaded Application on a user device
Figure 29. Screenshots showing an end user notice of an Android Sideloaded Application detected on their device
Figure 30. Screenshot showing the configuration option to Whitelist Android applications. Blacklisting of Android applications was also covered under deliverable 4.1.1.2.b and 4.1.1.2.c
Figure 31. Screenshot showing an administrators ability to block a device connected to a Rogue Wifi or a detected MITM attack (Deliverable 4.1.3.1)
Figure 32. Admin notification of a MITM threat on a user's device (Deliverable 4.1.3.1)
Figures 35 & 36. Screenshots showing the option to whitelist certificates for legitimate proxy of traffic (deliverable 4.1.3.2)
Figure 37. Certificate details of a MITM threat (Deliverable 4.1.3.2)
Figure 40. Screenshot showing an iOS release and the details of the associated unpatched CVEs (Deliverable 4.1.4.1)
Figure 41. Screenshot showing an Android device with out of date ASPL and the number of unpatched CVEs associated with that release. (Deliverable 4.1.4.1)
Figure 42. Screenshot showing number of unpatched CVEs associated with a specific ASPL. (Deliverable 4.1.4.1)
Figure 43. Screenshot showing Data Handling vulnerabilities for an application (Deliverable 4.1.4.2)
Figure 44. Screenshot showing OWASP violations (Deliverable 4.1.4.2)
Figure 46. Screenshot showing device software distributions and associated vulnerabilities 27 Figure 47. Device configuration information for Android devices (Deliverables 4.1.4.1, 4.1.4.3)
Figure 48. Device configuration information for iOS devices (Deliverables 4.1.4.1, 4.1.4.3) 28 Figure 49. Screenshot showing the option to Blacklist an application if the identified vulnerabilities are too risky to ignore
Figure 50. Overview of how Continuous Conditional Access work
Lookout needs to be installed on the device before they can access Outlook

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Federal Agencies that have deployed Lookout or testing proof of concepts	
Table 2. Risky Application Visibility deliverables and completion date	5
Table 3. Advanced Third Party Application deliverables and completion dates	
Table 4. Main in the Middle Detection deliverables and completion dates	
Table 5. Mobile Vulnerability Detection deliverables and completion dates	
Table 6. Continuous Conditional Access deliverables and completion dates.	

1.0 SUMMARY

Lookout is pleased to provide our Final report for the DHS BAA Agreement No. FA8750-17-2-0236. The deliverables in this proposal were developed for the Lookout Mobile Endpoint Security (MES) product, which is already deployed in numerous Federal agencies and is being tested with multiple others. All of the completed deliverables in this report have been enabled for Federal customer tenants for testing or production deployment to begin taking advantage of the enhanced mobile security provided by DHS and Lookout.

2.0 INTRODUCTION

Lookout has been providing mobile security since 2007 and the Lookout Mobile Endpoint Security (MES) solution is the most comprehensive solution available to mobile device administrators. MES is a cloud-based platform that detects and stops both mainstream and advanced mobile threats. The platform uses a predictive security model, based on over 12 years of mobile threat data collection and research using our advanced machine learning, that enables threat detection even in cases where no prior signatures exist and before threats exhibit malicious behavior. MES protects mobile endpoints and infrastructures from Web and Content basedthreats (e.g. phishing attacks), Application-based threats and device risks, network-based threats, and also enables deep threat investigation providing administrators unparalleled visibility into the multitude of potential threats and risks within their mobile environment.

Deployments and Proof of Concept Testing

Production Deployments	Testing/Engagement
House of Representatives	
US Marshals	FEMA
Customs and Border Protection	DoJ
Department of Veterans Affairs	USCIS
Peace Corps	HUD
Northcom	Treasury (OCC)
DISA	Dept of Transportation
Depart of Commerce NTIS	State Department
Dept of Commerce OIG	USDA
Dept of Commerce BEA	HHS
CTTSO	CDC
US Senate	US Courts
Federal Judicial Center	
US Marshals TOG	
FirstNet	
Transportation Security Administration	
Department of Homeland Security	

Table 1. Federal Agencies that have deployed Lookout or testing proof of concepts

3.0 METHODS, ASSUMPTIONS & PROCEDURES

Lookout practices the Agile software development methodology. In order to ensure integrity of its systems and software during the development and production deployment processes, Lookout utilizes a software development lifecycle with embedded review and security controls. All software changes are peer reviewed before testing. All code is tested by appropriate parties and signed off before release. Security testing includes the use of both static and dynamic analysis tools. Lookout adheres to a policy with separation of duties to ensure that developers do not push their own code into production systems. Test accounts, credentials, and data are not promoted to production systems. Lookout systems are regularly scanned and verified with an industry-leading vulnerability scanner. Lookout corporate and production networks have in-line intrusion detection systems monitored by the infrastructure security team. Lookout maintains a robust change management system for all changes and software releases. Changes are made at the same time across regions in AWS, so production and contingency environments remain synchronized.

4.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Lookout has completed the development of all the deliverables detailed in DHS BAA Agreement No. FA8750-17-2-0236. Each deliverable is either already deployed in Federal Agencies or available for Proof of Concepts. Details of the deliverables and examples of how they function are described in the following sections.

4.1.1 Risky Application Visibility

Insecure use of data at rest	Complete Nov 2017
Insecure use of data in motion	Complete Nov 2017
Use of SDKs from social networking clouds such as Twitter	
and Facebook	Complete Aug 2017
Actual sending of data to cloud services	Complete Dec 2019
Understand what URLs are being accessed by the app and	
whether these are of low reputation.	Complete Feb 2019
Dynamic code loading - These are indications of apps that can	
dynamically load code and hence might evade traditional	
vetting strategies	Complete Dec 2019
Geoview of URLs	Complete Sep 2018
Uses private APIs (iOS)	Complete Dec 2019
Custom policies allowing admins to sets rules based on app	
behaviors	Complete Nov 2017
Blacklisting of unwanted applications	Complete Nov 2017
	Complete for iOS Aug
End-user notification for non-compliant/risky apps	2017. Complete for
	Android Oct 2018
MDM notification for non-compliant/risky apps	Complete Nov 2017
Identify applications that listen on sockets to receive data	Complete Jan 2018
Identify applications that make use of Bluetooth and/or NFC	Complete Jan 2018
	Insecure use of data in motionUse of SDKs from social networking clouds such as Twitter and FacebookActual sending of data to cloud servicesUnderstand what URLs are being accessed by the app and whether these are of low reputation.Dynamic code loading - These are indications of apps that can dynamically load code and hence might evade traditional vetting strategiesGeoview of URLsUses private APIs (iOS)Custom policies allowing admins to sets rules based on app behaviorsBlacklisting of unwanted applicationsEnd-user notification for non-compliant/risky appsMDM notification for non-compliant/risky appsIdentify applications that listen on sockets to receive data

Table 2. Risky Application Visibility deliverables and completion date

4.1.1.1.a - Insecure use of Data

4.1.1.1.a.1 - Insecure use of Data at Rest 4.1.1.1.a.2 - Insecure use of Data in Motion

Applications can store data locally on a mobile device or transmit it to numerous domains and the end user does not always have visibility into how their data is protected. Lookout has now added the capability for administrators to review whether or not an application is following best practices for securing and transmitting data.

Network Traffic	
HOSTNAME	ENCRYPTED
2.android.pool.ntp.org	No
cc-fb-php- p1.playtika.com	No
clients.l.google.com	No
dns.local	No
eth0.local	-
stadiumvpc- 265910089.us-east- 1.elb.amazonaws.com	Yes

Figure 1. Screenshot showing insecure data in motion for an application on an Android device. (Deliverable 4.1.1.1.a.2)

RANSPORT SECURITY			
This app can communicate without perfect forwar	d secrecy with 4 domains. 7		Hide domain list 🖍
DOMAINS	SUBDOMAINS INCLUDED	MINIMUM TLS VERSION	
bcdn.net	~	TLSv1.2	
ipi.twitter.com	(#3)	TLSv1.2	
ikamaihd.net	~	TLSv1.2	
graph.facebook.com	15.1	TLSv1.2	
This app requires HTTPS when communicating wit	th 4 domains. 🔭		Hide domain list 🦯
DOMAINS	SUBDOMAINS INCLUDED	MINIMUM TLS VERSION	
ikamaihd.net	u de la constante de la consta	TLSv1.2	
raph.facebook.com	124	TLSv1.2	
ipi.twitter.com	-T.	TLSv1.2	
bcdn.net	*	TLSv1.2	
The app does not require certificate transparency	on any communications. 🍸		
his app can communicate insecurely for all netwo	ork traffic, unless exceptions are listed below. 🕧		
TORAGE SECURITY			

Figure 2. Screenshot showing insecure data in motion and at rest for an iOS device, based on Apple ATS (Deliverable 4.1.1.1.a.1 & 4.1.1.1.a.2)

4.1.1.1.b.1 - Use of SDKs from social networking clouds such as Twitter and Facebook




Figure 3. Screenshot showing configuration of policy to match use of Social networks (Deliverable 4.1.1.1.b.1)

Cloud Services in Use	
Social Network Instagram	
Social Network Facebook	
Social Network Facebook	

Figure 4. Screenshot showing data from an app that shows access to Cloud services (deliverable 4.1.1.1.b.1)

4.1.1.1.c.1 - Actual sending of data to cloud services

Network Activity						
HOSTNAME	IPS	COUNTRY	PORTS	ENCRYPTED	SENSITIVE DATA	
analytics-alb-1196278410.us-e ast-1.elb.amazonaws.com	34.194.133.57	21	443	Full	IMEI	
	54.84.49.138	-	443	Full		

Figure 5. Screenshot of sensitive data (IMEI) being sent to a third-party

4.1.1.d.1 - Understand what URLs are being accessed by the app and whether these are of low reputation.

4.1.1.1.d.1 - Released as Phishing & Content Protection and updated in SOW - Lookout Mobile Security Proposed Statement of Work for FA8750-17-2-0236, dated April 2, 2018.

Functionality to detect and mitigate phishing both during its occurrence and device susceptibility will be developed. The functions to be developed will analyze all mobile traffic including browsing and app traffic from any source (e.g., email, SMS, Facebook, messaging apps) and of any protocol type (e.g., HTTP and HTTPS). It will detect phishing and malicious content and alert end-users before the URL is accessed, for example, to prevent risky content from being loaded. For admins, the capability to set configurations in Lookout's MES to either Block or Warn users of risky content. This will give admins visibility into whether or not devices in their fleet have enabled Phishing & Content Protection, and device details such as a count of URLs blocked.





Figure 6. Dashboard control to enable Phishing and Content Protection (PCP)



Figure 7. Device showing that Safe Browsing (Client PCP) is active on the device



Figures 8 & 9. Screenshot warnings to end user about malicious URLs that they attempted to access



Figure 10. Screenshot of low reputation and malicious URLs being identified and blocked

4.1.1.1.f - Geoview of URLs



Figure 11. Screenshot showing the Geo-location of IPs/URLs within an application

4.1.1.1.g – Use of private APIs (iOS)

	NAME	DESCRIPTION			
🗟 Lookout	Private1	Apps that are user submitted			
O LOOKOUT	TestNotFromAppStore	Apps that are not from apple	app store and are los.		
Dashboard					
▲ Issues	Data Handling Securit	У			
E Devices	TRANSPORT SECURITY				
# Apps	This app can communica	te insecurely for all network traffic,	unless exceptions are listed below. 🔋		
a Vulnerabilities	STORAGE SECURITY				
uinerabilities					
Protections	Encrypted files may be a	ccessed after the device has been u	nlocked for the first time.		
Integrations					
System	Capabilities				
	TYPE NAM	DETAILS	RISK EXPOSURE		
Support	App Lifecycle Acco	esses Private API –	= Elevated		
	OWASP Mobile Top 10				
	OWASP MODIle TOP TO				
	CATEGORY	VIOLATION			
	OWASP M3 Insecure Con	nmunication The application the network.	does not follow best practices in secure	transmission of information over	

Figure 12. Screenshot showing an application that accesses Private APIs

4.1.1.2.a - Custom Policies Allowing Admins to Set Rules Based on App Behaviors

A typical customer environment can have thousands of applications across their mobile device fleet. Many of these applications have permissions and capabilities that, while not intentionally malicious, may be considered risky based on IT policies. Lookout now allows customers to sort Android and iOS applications in their environment based on a wide variety of parameters to identify applications that may require a more detailed review.





Figure 13. Screenshot showing the ability for administrators to configure policy violations for application based behaviors. (Deliverable 4.1.1.2.a)

Add a custom policy	/		×
DHS			
Q DATA ACCESS	: Filter apps by]
	Address Book		
	Calendar		
	Camera	Add policy	
	Clipboard		
	Device Identifiers		
	Local Storage		
	Location		
	Media		
	Microphone		
	Reminders		
	SMS Archive		

Figure 14. – Screenshot showing the ability for administrators to configure policy violations for application based behaviors. (Deliverable 4.1.1.2.a)

Issues Custom			ADD POLIC
NAME	os	SOURCE	DESCRIPTION
Android Blacklisted Apps		All	3 - 0
Apps that access address book or camera can't talk to dropbox		All	Apps that connect to dropbox and access camera or address book.
Apps that access calendar and connect to amazon s3 should be marked as policy violations.	0.6	Public apps	Apps that access calendar and connect to amazon s3.
Apps that access calendar and connect to dropbox should be marked as policy violations.		All	Apps that connect to dropbox and access calendar.
Aslo test policy	÷ 6	All	Apps that transfer camera.
Bea - Data Transfer Identifiers	÷ 6	All	Apps that transfer device identifiers.
Bea last		All	Apps that connect to twitter.
Blacklist Policy	÷ 6	All	Apps that contain virus.
cloud	÷ 6	All	Apps that connect to amazon cloud services or google drive.
demo		All	Apps that transfer address book and connect to box.
DHS		All	Apps that access microphone and transfer location.
GM test		Submissions	Apps that access camera and connect to google drive.



4.1.1.2b - Blacklisting of Unwanted Applications

After identifying applications that are considered too risky for a mobile environment, administrators can take an action to Blacklist that application. Users are notified that their device has the risky application installed and require its removal.

	-A					BLACKLIST Save 1
DEVELOPER	OS	VERSION	FILE SIZE	PREVALENCE IN FLEET	FIRST DETECTED	
Chick-fil-A	Inc. 💼	5.13.2	109.70MB	33%	Oct 3, 2017 1:33 PM	
Identificat	tion					
34	Bundle ID	com.engauge.Chick-fil-A				
\mathcal{O}^{*}	Signing ID	C=US,O=Apple Inc.,OU=C	Certification Authority, CN	Apple iPhone Certification Authority		
one	Object ID	77605e069ae4f1c28fe283	12b7/5b41704/18aab9c0d	9b3361d559163/0e7b2a4		
	Categories	Lifestyle, Food & Drink				
	App Store ID	488818252				
	Seler	Chick-fil-A. Inc.				
Descriptio	'n					
		rder ahead and much	more. A restauran	t experience personalized t	o you.	
Earn fr FEATURE 1. Mob	ree treats, o S bile order abo		order through your	t experience personalized t		
Earn fr FEATURE 1. Mob receive 2. Ear	ree treats, o Soile order abo it and let o free treat	ead 777 Place your o us know when you ar s 777 Earn progress	order through your rive. towards free food		like to	
FEATURE 1. Mob receive 2. Ear choose you.	ree treats, o S ile order ah it and let o n free treat to scan your	ead 777 Place your o us know when you ar s 777 Earn progress Chick-fil-A One777	order through your rive. towards free food card in the app w	phone, choose how you?77d treats with each mobile or	like to der ar surprise	
Earn fr FEATURE 1. Mob receive 2. Ear choose you. 3. Cus	ree treats, o S Sile order ah i it and let i on free treat to scan your stomized menu	ead 777 Place your o us know when you ar s 777 Earn progress Chick-fil-A One777	order through your rive. towards free food card in the app w	phone, choose how you???d treats with each mobile or ith each visit. We may even	like to der ar surprise	
Earn fr FEATURE 1. Mob receive 2. Ear choose you. 3. Cus 11.	ree treats, o S Sile order ah i it and let i on free treat to scan your stomized menu	ead 777 Place your o us know when you ar s 777 Earn progress Chick-fil-A One777	order through your rive. towards free food card in the app w	phone, choose how you???d treats with each mobile or ith each visit. We may even	like to der ar surprise	

Figure 16. Screenshot showing an application that violates the custom policy for applications that access the camera. (Deliverable 4.1.1.2.a). Note that the application is available for Blacklisting because of the violation (Deliverable 4.1.1.2.b)

				Chi	ck-fil-A has been blacklisted.		
Chick-fil-	A					BLACKLISTED	UNBLACKLIST Save to PDF
OEVELOPER	05	VERSION	FILE SIZE	PREVALENCE IN FLEET	FIRST DETECTED		
Chick-fil-A, I	nc. 🤹	5.13.2	109.70MB	33%	Oct 3, 2017 1:33 PM		
Identificati	on						
ELC.	Bundle ID	com.engauge.Chick-fil-J					
one	Signing ID	CHUS, OHApple Inc., OUH	Certification Authority, CN	Apple Phone Certification Authority			
one	Object ID	77605e069ae4f1c28fe28	326715641704118aab9c0d	9b3361d55916310e7b2a4			
	Categories	Liferbile Food & Drink					

Figure 17. Screenshot showing that the application violating policy has been blacklisted. (Deliverable 4.1.1.2.b)

Excel							BLACKLIST	Save to PDI
DEVELOPER	OS	VERSION	FILE SIZE	PREVALENCE IN FLEET	FIRST DETECTED			
Microsoft Corporation		16.0.8625.2046	64.73MB	33%	Nov 2, 2017			
					2:21 PM			
dentification					2:21 PM			
Package Name	com.microsoft	t.office.excel			2:21 PM			
			etplace (Do Not Trust)	, OU=Android Marketplace Signing fo	2:21 PM r Microsoft Office, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S	sT=Washington, C=US		

Figure 18. Screenshot showing the ability to Blacklist an Android application. (Deliverable 4.1.1.2.b)

4.1.1.2c – End-User notification for non-compliant/risky apps




Figure 19. Screenshots showing the end user notification that the app they have installed is violating policy and has been blacklisted. (Deliverable 4.1.1.2.c)

4.1.1.2d - MDM Notification for Non-compliant/Risky Apps

For applications that have been Blacklisted, an action can be taken to set the risk level and notify an MDM which devices are out of compliance because they contain Blacklisted applications. If desired, the MDM can take a remediation action (e.g. block email) on those devices until the Blacklisted applications are removed.

Spyware	Engages in broad-based data collection ?	Medium Alert device
Adware	Serves intrusive ads or sends excessive PII to ad networks (2)	Low Alert device -
Blacklisted App	🌲 🧉 App blacklisted as it violates policies or is unsafe 👔	Low Alert device
Chargeware	Misleadingly charges the device user (2)	Low Alert device ~
Click Fraud	Defrauds ad networks by faking clicks or downloads	1 High Alert device -
Riskware	🌲 🧉 Engages in risky behavior 👔	Low Alert device

Figure 20. Screenshot showing applications that have been Blacklisted can be configured to notify an MDM at a certain threat level. (Deliverable 4.1.1.2.d)




Figure 21. Screenshot from MDM showing that a mobile device has a Blacklisted application (Deliverable 4.1.1.2.d)

Additional Delivered Features

- 1) Identify applications that listen on sockets to receive data
- 2) Additional Delivered Feature Identify applications that make use of Bluetooth and/or NFC

App Analysis (670 Apps Analyzed)				
91% APPS	51% APPS	54% APPS	0% APPS	10% APPS
Data Access	Connectivity	Cloud Service	Malware	Data Transfer
22% Access Bluetooth	41% Accept incoming t	raffic 0% Access NFG	c	

Figure 22. Dashboard view of applications that Access Bluetooth, NFC and Accept incoming traffic

Connectivity	
Accesses NFC ?	-
Accesses Bluetooth ? Accepts incoming traffic ?	×
This app uses sockets to listen fo sockets can be used by the app to network (local or remote) or from communications (local).	to receive data from the

Figure 23. Application details that show connectivity for NFC/Bluetooth and accept incoming traffic

4.1.2 - Advanced Third Party Application Investigation and "Old Age" App Detection

	Detection of Apps Removed from App Store	Complete April 2019
4.1.2.1	Policy to notify end-users and admins of removed	
	apps	Complete April 2019
	Android Side Loaded App Detection (Flag apps not	Complete Jan 2020
	from Google Play)	
	Notify end-users and admins of non-Google Play	
4.1.2.2	apps	Complete Jan 2020
	Blacklist and Whitelist for Android apps	Complete Jan 2020
	Whitelist specific Third Party app stores (e.g.	
	Amazon)	Complete Jan 2020
	Blacklist a third party app store	Complete Jan 2020

Table 3. Advanced Third Party Application deliverables and completion dates.

4.1.2.1.a. - Detection of Apps Removed from App Store

Filters have been added that will now allow admins to identify apps that are not in Apple App Store. Any apps that did not come from the App store and are NOT approved can be blacklisted and end-users will be notified that the app is no longer approved for use on their device.




Figure 24. Screenshot showing filter for App Store Apps

4.1.2.1.b. - Policy to notify end-users and admins of removed apps

Messeng	er					
DEVELOPER	os	VERSION	FILE SIZE	PREVALENCE IN FLEET	FIRST DETECTED	OFFICIAL STORE
Facebook Ind		1.3.5	128MB	3%	Jun 21, 2017	Apple App Store 😨
	Bundle ID	com.facebook	.Messenger			
	Bundle ID	com.facebook	.Messenger			
	Signing ID	CN=Apple Coo	le Signing Certific	ation Authority,OU=Apple Ce	rtification Authority,O=A	pple Inc.,C=US
	Object ID	0fe2bcf45ae2	9ba8683e7948a5	dcb5dc771f6c5089717dca40b	d9a1cb2560aa7	
	Categories	Social Networ	king, Productivity			
	App Store ID	454638411				
	Seller	Facebook, Inc				

Figure 25. Screenshot showing an App that came from the Apple App Store




Figure 26. Screenshot showing an App that did NOT come from the Apple App Store

4.1.2.2 – Third Party App Store Deliverables

- 4.1.2.2 Android Side Loaded App Detection (Flag Apps not from Google Play)
- 4.1.2.2 Whitelist specific Third Party App stores
- 4.1.2.2 Blacklist a third party App store

Installers Apps			
Manage which installation so	urces are allowed for your fleet		
INSTALLER DESCRIPTION	PACKAGE	ALLOW/DISALLOW	
Android Device Bridge (ADB)		✓ Allow	
Android Package Installer	com.google.android.packageinstaller	× Disallow	
CUSTOM INSTALLER SOURCE	5		
INSTALLER DESCRIPTION	PACKAGE 7	ALLOWED/DISALLOWED	
Wechat App Store	com.wechatstoreapp	× Disallowed	1 I
Add an Installer			



4.1.2.2 - Notify end-users and admins of non-Google Play apps

Cookout	High Risk Appl	ication Issue			IUNORE THREAT
Dishbourd					
	Active. High risk	TT Application	usen nina simone@spacex.com	OWELL TIME OD DH 01M	
kees Contors Contors Apps Policies Sonnas Support Support	Active, High risk Ape_LICATION DETAILS apace_comboy comapse_isomboy DEVICE DETAILS nhs.simone @spaces Ness1 View device		The app may have circum	the device using the Android Dobug Bridge (ADB) or through a web browser, writed the vetting and approval process and may be harmful. Alternatively, elegment and could be a test build. If you believe this app deesn't pose any	
	Issue history DATE 12/16/2015	TINS Exa PM	ACTION Security event delected	ACTOR MTP Cause	

Figure 28. Screenshot showing an Administrators notice of an Android Sideloaded Application on a user device




Figure 29. Screenshots showing an end user notice of an Android Sideloaded Application detected on their device

4.1.2.2 – Blacklist and Whitelist for Android Apps

e en ingure r in a foie en	deloaded Apps policy	×
Installers Apps		
From this screen you ca	n manage your list of trusted packages. You can whitelist a package and s	gnature hash from the
issue detection detail sci		
Sideloaded apps with th	sted package names won't generate issues or alert end users.	
TRUSTED SIDELOADED A		
PACKAGE 7	SIGNATURE HASH (7	
	and the bran t	
There are no whitelist items.		
Add an Entry		
	Save changes	

Figure 30. Screenshot showing the configuration option to Whitelist Android applications. Blacklisting of Android applications was also covered under deliverable 4.1.1.2.b and 4.1.1.2.c

4.1.3 Man in The Middle Detection

	Real-time on-device detection of network based	
	threats	Complete Aug 2017
	Automatic disconnect option from malicious	
4.1.3.1	networks (configurable by admin)	Complete Feb 2019
	Notify admins, end-users and MDMs of the	
	detected threat	Complete Aug 2017
	Certificate whitelisting for legitimate proxy of	
4.1.3.2	traffic	Complete April 2019
	View certificate details of a detected attack	Complete Aug 2017
4.1.3.3	Content Modification Detection and Alerting	Complete Nov 2019
Additional	Rogue-Wifi detection	Complete Dec 2018

Table 4. Main in the Middle Detection deliverables and completion dates

4.1.3.1 - Real-time on-device detection of network based threats

4.1.3.1 - Automatic disconnect option from malicious networks (configurable by admin)

4.1.3.1 - Notify admins, end-users and MDMs of the detected threat

In the event that a Man-In-The-Middle attack is detected or the user connects to a Rogue Access Point, the admins have the ability to enforce a quarantine on the device and alert the user.

Man-in-the-Middle Attack	• •	Allows a malicious actor to intercept data sent between two parties 🕐	0	High	v	\$	Block internet and 👻
	×	reless access point that imitates a known Wifi to intercept and modify users				Alert device	
Rogue Wifi		private data by executing Man-in-the-Middle attacks ?	U	High	*		Block internet and alert
						1	

Figure 31. Screenshot showing an administrators ability to block a device connected to a Rogue Wifi or a detected MITM attack (Deliverable 4.1.3.1)





Figure 32. Admin notification of a MITM threat on a user's device (Deliverable 4.1.3.1)



Figures 33 & 34. End user notification and remediation actions for MITM threat on mobile device. (Deliverable 4.1.3.1)

4.1.3.2 - Certificate whitelisting for legitimate proxy of traffic 4.1.3.2 - View certificate details of a detected attack

	new issues whenever these networks that decrypt traf	solve active issues and will prevent the creat e certificates are found in your fleet. Connec fic using trusted certificates won't generate act that certificates in this certificate chain sh	ting to issues or	
	CERTIFICATE NAME	ISSUER NAME		
	 *.protect.prod.lkt.it 	S Charles Proxy CA (11 Sep bos-m-dmorr02)	2017,	
	Charles Proxy CA (1 bos-m-dmorr02)	11 Sep 2017, Charles Proxy CA (11 Sep bos-m-dmorr02)	2017,	
	Once you trust certificates	nage trusted certificates through the policy s in this issue, the issue will be marked resolv ly active issues may be marked resolved as Trust these certificates	red after	
TRUSTED CERTIFICATES				
CERTIFICATE NAME		ISSUER NAME		CUSTOM LABEL ?
*.protect.prod.lkt.is		Charles Proxy CA (11 Sep 201	17, bos-m-dmorr02)	-
Charles Proxy CA (11 Sep	2017, bos-m-dmorr02)	Charles Proxy CA (11 Sep 201	17, bos-m-dmorr02)	-

Figures 35 & 36. Screenshots showing the option to whitelist certificates for legitimate proxy of traffic (deliverable 4.1.3.2)

Issue Analysis						
ANOMALIES DETECTED	DESCRIPTION					
Anomalous Host Certificate	The user has connected to a site, but the c	ertificate presented by the site doe	s not match the certificate authority that guarantees the integr	ity of the connection.		
Anomalous Protocol Paramete	The user has connected to a site using a se	The user has connected to a site using a secure session, but after a trusted connection was established, the level of security for the connection was renegotiated.				
Anomalous Root of Trust	The user has connected to a site, but the c	ertificate presented by the site doe	s not match the certificate authority that guarantees the integr	ity of the connection.		
Connection Details			CONNECTION			
SSID	McDonalds Free WiFi		TLS Protocol Version	TLSv1.2		
Network Type	wifi		IP Proxy	-		
MAC Address	0:15:62:bb:4b:0		VPN Present	No		
			VPN IP Address	-		
Certificate Details		ISSUER NAME				
Country	US	Country	US			
State/Province	Texas	Organization	ATT Services Inc			
Locality	-	Organizational Unit	ATT Wi-Fi Services			
Organization	ATT Services Inc	Common Name	ATT Wi-Fi Services Managed Device Certificate Authority G3	1		
Common Name	nmd.mcd34961.atl.wayport.net					

Figure 37. Certificate details of a MITM threat (Deliverable 4.1.3.2)

4.1.3.3 Content Modification Detection and Alerting

Low Risk Netv	vork Issue				
ISSUE STATUS √∱ Resolved	risk 1 Low	ISSUE TYPE	user alitsiyayu@gmail.com	DWELL TIME Days H M S 000 00:11:59	
 NETWORK DETAIL qa-ssistrip DEVICE DETAILS alitsiyayu@gmail HTC One View device > 		device and the netw	CRIPTION e Attack occurs when a malicious a	actor inserts itself between the mobile ng to access. This makes it possible to ser believes to be private.	
Network Anomali		RIPTION			
Link Modification	Link	s to content in pages have	been modified. This is most likely a	an ssl strip attack where an attacker changes HTTPS links to H	ITTP instead.

Figure 38. Screenshot showing a content modification detection (Deliverable 4.1.3.3)

4.1.4 Mobile Vulnerability Detection and Management

	Operating System Analysis Stack	
4.1.4.1	Out of date OS notification	Complete Aug 2017
	Detection of OS vulnerabilities matching databases	
	such as NVD and CVE	Complete Nov 2017
4.1.4.2	Application Analysis Stack	
	Detection of application vulnerabilities	Complete Jan 2019
4.1.4.3	Lookout Management Console Enhancements	
	MES Console reporting on device vulnerabilities	Complete Aug 2017
	Actionable options when vulnerabilities are detected	Complete Jan 2019

Table 5. Mobile Vulnerability Detection deliverables and completion dates

4.1.4.1 - Detection of OS vulnerabilities matching databases such as NVD and CVE

Mobile device OS and firmware need to be regularly updated to protect against vulnerabilities that are identified and patched. With this new feature, Lookout can provide visibility into what software a mobile device is currently running and what vulnerabilities are associated that particular release.

Phone 5s 🖌							DEACTIVATE	DELETE
ITATUS	USER	DEVICE TYPE	MDM	CONNECTION				
Secured 2	veigar3071@gmail.com 🖌	🔹 IPhone 5s	5	Connected 6 days ago				
ssues								1-1 0
ITATUS ‡		ISSUE				DETECTED 🛊		
Resolved		🗊 Blac	klisted App			Nov 13, 2017 2:50 PM		
								1-1 0
Configuration								
Lock Screen								
Device Encryption								
Software								
05	iOS			OS Version	10.0.2			
05 Status	Update available			OS Version Availat	le 11.1.1			
locale	en_US			Firmware Version	-			
Unpatched CVEs	424 View list							

Figure 39. Screenshot showing an iOS with out of date OS and the number of unpatched CVEs associated with that release. (Deliverable 4.1.4.1)

iOS 10.0.2.0		
RELEASE DATE		
Sep 22, 2016		
Vulnerability summary		
VULNERABILITY CVE SEVERITY		
Critical severity vulnerabilities	33	
High severity vulnerabilities	213	
Medium severity vulnerabilities	97	
Low severity vulnerabilities	16	
Unknown severity vulnerabilitie:	65	
Vulnerability details		
vullerability details		
CVE ID 👙	DESCRIPTION	CVE SEVERITY 🔶
CVE-2017-2428	A malicious HTTP/2 server may be able to cause undefined behavior in HTTPProtocol	Critical
CVE-2017-2434	Home Control may unexpectedly appear on Control Center in HomeKit	Critical
CVE-2017-2423	Validating empty signatures with SecKeyRawVerify() may unexpectedly succeed in Security	Critical
CVE-2017-2523	Parsing maliciously crafted data may lead to arbitrary code execution in Foundation	Critical
CVE-2017-11120	Farsing maliciously crated data may lead to arbitrary code execution in Poundation	
	rai sing miniculusiy diared data may read to an bit any code execution in Polinadion An attacker within range may be able to execute arbitrary code on the Wi-Fi chip in Wi-Fi	Critical
CVE-2017-2513		Critical Critical
CVE-2017-2513 CVE-2017-10989	An attacker within range may be able to execute arbitrary code on the Wi-Fi chip in Wi-Fi	
	An attacker within range may be able to execute arbitrary code on the WI-FI chip in WI-FI A maliclously crafted SQL query may lead to arbitrary code execution in SQLIte	Critical
CVE-2017-10989	An attacker within range may be able to execute arbitrary code on the WI-FI chip in WI-FI A maliclously crafted SQL query may lead to arbitrary code execution in SQLite Multiple issues in SQLite in SQLite	Critical Critical

Figure 40. Screenshot showing an iOS release and the details of the associated unpatched CVEs (Deliverable

4.1.4.1)

DEVICE ADMIN (2) Google Play servin com.google.android Software			
OS	Android	OS Version	7.1.1
Locale	en_US	Firmware Version	samsung/gtesqltespr/gtesqltespr:7.1.1/NMF26X/T377PVPU3CQl4:user/release-k eys
Security patch level ?	2017-08-01	Unpatched CVEs	155 View list

Figure 41. Screenshot showing an Android device with out of date ASPL and the number of unpatched CVEs associated with that release. (Deliverable 4.1.4.1)

	ch Level 2017-08-01	
RELEASE DATE		
Aug 6, 2017		
Vulnerability summary		
VULNERABILITY CYE SEVERITY		
Critical severity vulnerabilities	4	
High severity vulnerabilities	89	
Medium severity vuinerabilities	33	
ow severity vulnerabilities	0	
Unknown severity vulnerabilities		
Vulnerability details		
CAE ID #	DESCRIPTION	CVE SEVERITY &
CVE-2017-11121	An attacker within range may be able to execute arbitrary code on the Wi-Fl chip in Wi-Fl	Critical
CVE-2017-8890	Remote code execution in Networking subsystem	Critical
	Remote code execution in Networking subsystem Information disclosure in Networking subsystem	Critical Critical
CVE-2017-5897		
CVE-2017-5897 CVE-2017-11120	Information disclosure in Networking subsystem	Critical
CVE-2017-5897 CVE-2017-11120 CVE-2017-6983	Information disclosure in Networking subsystem An attacker within range may be able to execute arbitrary code on the W-FI chip in Wi-FI	Critical Critical
CVE-2017-8890 CVE-2017-5897 CVE-2017-11120 CVE-2017-6988 CVE-2017-0787 CVE-2017-0782	Information disclosure in Networking subsystem An attacker within range may be able to execute arbitrary code on the MFR chip in WFR Processing maliciously costited web content may lead to arbitrary code execution in SQLite	Critical Critical High
CVE-2017-5897 CVE-2017-11120 CVE-2017-6983 CVE-2017-0787	Information disclosure in Networking subsystem An attacker within range may be able to execute arbitrary code on the Wi-IF chip in Wi-IT Processing maliciously contrast web content may laad to arbitrary code execution in SQUte Elevation of privilege in Wi-Fi driver	Critical Critical High High
CVE-2017-5897 CVE-2017-11120 CVE-2017-6983 CVE-2017-0787 CVE-2017-0782	Information disclosure in Networking subsystem An attackor within range may be able to execute arbitrary code on the W-PL chip in W-PL Processing mail:closury crafted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution in 5QUte Execution of privilege in W-PL driver Bemote code execution in System	Critical Critical High High High
CVE-2017-5897 CVE-2017-11120 CVE-2017-6983 CVE-2017-0787 CVE-2017-0782 CVE-2017-0786 CVE-2017-13082	Information disclosure in Networking sublystem An attacker within range may be able to execute arbitrary code on the W-IF chip in W-IF Processing maliciously cratted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution in 5QUae Elevation of privilege in W-IFI driver Remote code execution in System Elevation of privilege in W-IFI driver	Critical Critical High High High High
CVE-2017-5897 CVE-2017-11120 CVE-2017-6983 CVE-2017-0787 CVE-2017-0782 CVE-2017-0786	Information disclosure in Networking sublystem An attacker within range may be able to encoute arbitrary code on the W-FI chip in W-FI Processing maliciously cratted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution in SQU as Elevation of privilege in W-FI driver Remote code execution in System Elevation of privilege in W-FI driver Elevation of privilege in W-FI driver Elevation of privilege in W-FI driver	Critical Critical High High High High High

Figure 42. Screenshot showing number of unpatched CVEs associated with a specific ASPL. (Deliverable 4.1.4.1)

4.1.4.2 - Detection of application vulnerabilities

Data Handling Security
TRANSPORT SECURITY
The app does not require certificate transparency on any communications. 🧃
This app can communicate insecurely for all network traffic, unless exceptions are listed below. _?
STORAGE SECURITY
Encrypted files may be accessed after the device has been unlocked for the first time.

Figure 43. Screenshot showing Data Handling vulnerabilities for an application (Deliverable 4.1.4.2)

OWASP Mobile Top 10	
CATEGORY	VIOLATION
OWASP M3 Insecure Communication	The application does not follow best practices in secure transmission of information over the network.

Figure 44. Screenshot showing OWASP violations (Deliverable 4.1.4.2)

APPLICATION DETAILS	CLASSIFICATION	FAMILY NAME
Fly Delta com.delta.mobile.ipad.flydelta	Vulnerability	ZipperDown
	CLASSIFICATION DESCRIPTION	
DEVICE DETAILS	Vulnerabilities expose flaws in software or	operating system components that may be used

Figure 45. Screenshot showing an application with a detected vulnerability (Deliverable 4.1.4.2)

4.1.4.3a - MES Console reporting on device vulnerabilities

Q Filter p	atches by			
os \$	ратсн Ф 🕐	RELEASE DATE 🗘	DEVICES ©	# OF VULNERABILITIES \$
+	2020-02-01	Feb 3, 2020	11 5%	82
¢.	13.3.1	Jan 28, 2020	7 3%	0
÷	2020-01-01	Jan 6, 2020	1 <1%	128
e .	13.3	Dec 10, 2019	4 2%	32
÷	2019-12-01	Dec 2, 2019	2 <1%	161
÷	2019-12-05	Dec 2, 2019	2 <1%	135
¢.	13.2.3	Nov 18, 2019	1 <1%	47
+	2019-11-01	Nov 4, 2019	1 <1%	196
¢.	12.4.3	Oct 28, 2019	3 1%	139
é.	13.1.3	Oct 15, 2019	1 <1%	78

Figure 46. Screenshot showing device software distributions and associated vulnerabilities

Configuration				
Lock Screen	Enabled		Device Encryption	Enabled
Developer Mode	Disabled		Unknown Sources	Not Allowed
USB Debugging	Disabled			
DEVICE ADMIN Device ADMIN Construction	ng ELM Service	Google Play services com google android goss	Agent com aiswatch	Landrokkagent
.05	Android		OS Version	7.0
Locale	en_US		Firmware Version	samsung/heroqiteuc/heroqiteatt:7.0/NRD90M/G930AUCU4BQG1:use r/release-keys
Security patch level (7)	2017-07-01			
Security patch level displays v Security Patch Level (ASPL) is on this device. Security patch independent of Operating Sy include patches to vulnerabili	currently installed levels are stem version and			

Figure 47. Device configuration information for Android devices (Deliverables 4.1.4.1, 4.1.4.3)

Configuration			
Lock Screen	Enabled		
Device Encryption	Enabled		
Software			
OS	iOS	OS Version	10.1.1
OS Status	Update available	OS Version Available	10.3.3
Locale	en_US	Firmware Version	-

Figure 48. Device configuration information for iOS devices (Deliverables 4.1.4.1, 4.1.4.3)

4.1.4.3b - Actionable options when vulnerabilities are detected

Chick-fi	I-A							BLACKLIST	Save to PDF
DEVELOPER	OS	VERSION	FILE SIZE	VERSION PREVALENCE	APP PREVALENCE	FIRST DETECTED	OFFICIAL STORE		
Chick-fil-A, Inc.	S	6.0.9	52.55MB	33% in your fleet 1 device	33% in your fleet 1 device	Dec 13, 2018 2:52 PM	Apple App Store	3	

Figure 49. Screenshot showing the option to Blacklist an application if the identified vulnerabilities are too risky to ignore

4.1.5 Continuous Conditional Access

RE: DHS BAA Agreement No. FA8750-17-2-0236.

In the existing agreement Lookout had proposed developing a Certificate Authority Reputation System (CARS) as defined in section 4.1.5

"Repository for cataloging and analyzing certificates to find, measure and characterize relationships between CAs, relying parties, the certificates they have issued, known malware, and maliciously configured services on the Internet."

After researching the proposed system and gathering customer feedback, it has been determined that a CARS solution does not currently lend itself to a tangible product that would provide significant improvements in today's mobile security environments. Rather than continue to fund research and development of a solution that has limited deployment prospects, Lookout proposes that we replace the CARS deliverable in Section 4.1.5 with a new capability, Continuous Conditional Access (CCA). CCA is solution that will combine Policy based threats and Identity & Access Management to determine a device's current Health and Risk before resources are accessed. This solution is a more tangible product that can be widely deployed in the Federal space and provide immediate enhancements to securing mobile devices. The solution applies to GFE and BYOD devices and has broad interest among customers.

Updated Statement of Work – Section 4.1.5 (Replace CARS with CCA)

4.1.5 Continuous Conditional Access (CCA) – Access to corporate resources will be protected by granting access to users or devices based on endpoint risk. Lookout will develop functionality that, prior to accessing corporate data, ensures devices have Lookout installed and the health of the device is within accordance to defined polices in the Lookout MES console. Devices that are out of compliance will be prevented from accessing corporate networks and data.





Figure 50. Overview of how Continuous Conditional Access work

4.1.5	Continuous Conditional Access Lookout will develop functionality that, prior to accessing agency data, ensures devices have Lookout installed and the health of the device is within accordance to defined polices in the Lookout MES console. Devices that are out of compliance will be prevented from accessing agency networks and data. This functionality enhances protection for agencies that want to enable a BYOD and/or Container program for protecting mobile devices.	Status
4.1.5.1	Device Identification on iOS & Android - Check if Lookout app is installed on a device & enforce app installation if the Lookout App is not installed.	Complete Nov 2019
4.1.5.2	Conditional Access Support for Office 365 using AAD for IDP Real Time Access – Enforce conditional access based on Device Health Check before logging in.	Complete Nov 2019 Complete Nov 2019

4.1.5.1 – Device Identification and Lookout Enforcement

4.1.5.1 - Device Identification on iOS & Android

4.1.5.1 - Check if Lookout app is installed on a device & enforce app installation if the Lookout App is not installed



Figures 51 & 52. Screenshots showing an end user device (iOS and Android) requiring that Lookout needs to be installed on the device before they can access Outlook

4.1.5.2 - Conditional Access Support for Office 365 using AAD for IDP

When a user launches one of the supported Microsoft Office 365 applications, their device will test to make sure that Lookout is installed and no threats are detected before they can access data.

4.1.5.3 - Real Time Access – Enforce conditional access based on Device Health Check before logging in




Figure 53. Screenshot showing that a mobile device cannot access Outlook because Lookout has detected threats on their device, enforcing Real Time Access

5.0 CONCLUSION

The features developed for DHS BAA Agreement No. FA8750-17-2-0236 expand the capabilities and functionality of Lookout's MES solution to provide more comprehensive protection of mobile devices and visibility into the types of applications capabilities and permissions that are being deployed in customer environments.

6.0 List of Acronyms

AAD	Azure Active Directory
API	Application Programming Interface
ASPL	Android Security Patch Level
ATS	App Transport Security
AWS	Amazon Web Services
CARS	Certificate Authority Reputation System
CCA	Continuous Conditional Access
CVE	Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
IDP	integrated data processing
IMEI	International Mobile Equipment Identity
MDM	Mobile Device Management
MES	Mobile Endpoint Security
MITM	Man in The Middle
NFC	Near Field Communication
NVD	National Vulnerability Database
OS	Operating System
OWASP	Open Web Application Security Project
РСР	Phishing and Content Protection
SDK	Software Developer Kit
SSO	Single Sign On
URL	Uniform Resource Location