



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

**Survey and Analysis of Existing Security  
Cooperation Assessment, Monitoring, and  
Evaluation Roles and Responsibilities**

Aaron C. Taliaferro  
Christophe L. McCray  
Margaret D.M. Barber  
Clark A. Frye  
Russell A. Keller  
Allison L. King  
Terri J. Walsh

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#### For More Information:

Dr. Wade Hinkle, Project Leader

[whinkle@ida.org](mailto:whinkle@ida.org), 703-578-2895

ADM John C. Harvey, Jr., USN (Ret), Director, SFRD, IDA

[jharvey@ida.org](mailto:jharvey@ida.org), 703-575-4530

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# Executive Summary

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In Fiscal Year 2019, the Director of the Office of Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation asked the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to assist in the identification of that office's responsibilities, as assigned in Department of Defense (DoD) policy and guidance, and in the construction of an organizational structure capable of implementing new legal requirements for security cooperation programs. To this end, IDA was asked to analyze the roles and responsibilities formally assigned across the DoD that pertain to the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) of security cooperation programs and activities. This report contains the findings of our effort.

DoD issuances formally assign Departmental roles and responsibilities, so this analysis focuses on these documents and the law, though other sources were consulted throughout the project. The IDA research team leveraged an existing in-house methodology<sup>1</sup> to collect, input, and organize unstructured data from DoD issuances in a database. This is a multi-step process to identify where data resides (collect), extract and code the data (input), and then organize it so it can be analyzed. Our analysis is what ultimately determined where gaps and overlapping roles and responsibilities are assigned in the Department. Outputs of this methodology are some select maps of how roles and responsibilities pertaining to the AM&E of security cooperation are formally assigned throughout the DoD. These maps were created using commercial-off-the-shelf software.

Finally, several observations and suggested courses of action that can resolve existing challenges were identified during our research. Our analysis yielded four findings:

1. DoD has not met the full requirements codified in Title 10 United States Code (USC) § 383 to maintain a program of AM&E for its security-cooperation activities.
2. Critical AM&E activities remain assigned only to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), rather than being delegated to the offices that are now informally tasked to conduct these activities.

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<sup>1</sup> The methodology used was leveraged from the following reports: McCray et al, "*Mapping Models and Simulations Throughout the US Department of Defense*", 5. and Barber et al., "*Planning for Biological Incidents: Characterizing Variations in Local-Level Public Health Plans across Jurisdictions and Incident Types*", 3.

3. No AM&E responsibilities are formally assigned below the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (ASD(SPC)).
4. The Department's AM&E Instruction<sup>2</sup> is focused on the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of partner nation progress toward a Security Cooperation (SC) objective or on the actions taken by SC implementers to build capacity in a partner nation. There is little to no AM&E required for the DoD's effectiveness at managing its security cooperation programs, or for how training, funding, or staffing of its SC programs impact program effectiveness.

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<sup>2</sup> DoD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "*DOD Instruction 5132.14, Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise*", (Washington, DC: DoD, 2017), 5, accessed November 12, 2018, <https://www.esd.whs.mil/Directives/issuances/dodd/>.

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# 1. Introduction

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In Fiscal Year 2019, the Director of the Office of Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation (AM&E) in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation (DASD-SC) asked the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to assist in the identification and performance of that office's responsibilities, as assigned in Department of Defense (DoD) policy and guidance, and in the construction of an organizational structure capable of implementing new legal requirements for security cooperation programs. Initially, to achieve this end, the sponsoring organization and IDA agreed upon three lines of effort. The first was to analyze the roles and responsibilities formally assigned across DoD that pertain to the AM&E of security cooperation programs and activities. This report contains the findings of that analysis.

## A. Background

### **IDA | Background**

- Reforms, codified in 10 United States Code (USC) § 382 and 383, levy specific requirements on the Secretary of Defense
  - Provide strategic policy and guidance for security cooperation (SC) tasks, programs, and activities of the Department of Defense (DoD)
  - Be responsible for overall resource allocation for DoD's SC tasks, programs, and activities.
  - Maintain a program of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) in support of DoD's SC programs
- IDA was asked to survey and analyze existing DoD issuances so the Department could know what policies and programs relevant to the law already exist and who is responsible for them
- Based on Sponsor guidance, the team focused on identifying roles and responsibilities related to AM&E of security cooperation tasks, programs, and activities
- The analyses and findings of this report are based on what is documented in DoD issuances; not on what actual practices may or may not be occurring

Title 10 United States Code (USC) § 383 codified new legal requirements<sup>3</sup> that require the Secretary of Defense to develop and manage a program of AM&E in support of DoD's security cooperation programs and activities. Per Section 383, this program must provide for the following:

1. Initial assessments
2. Monitoring implementation of DoD's security cooperation programs and activities
3. Evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of DoD's security cooperation program and activities
4. Identification of lessons learned in carrying out DoD's security cooperation programs and activities

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<sup>3</sup> *Title 10 – Armed Forces*, U.S. Code 10 (1956), §§ 383.

5. Incorporation of lessons learned from implementation of prior security cooperation programs and activities carried out any time after 11 Sept 2001
6. Recommendations to improve future implementation of DoD security cooperation programs and activities<sup>4</sup>

## **B. Overview of Methods**

Formal issuances—directives, instructions and directive type memorandums—are a primary means by which DoD describes how it implements the law. This effort surveys existing DoD issuances to ascertain how the Department has chosen to interpret and act upon legal responsibilities regarding security cooperation, including program execution, training of personnel assigned to perform Security Cooperation (SC) functions, the staffing of billets that perform SC functions, resource allocation for SC, and AM&E.

DoD issuances contain data on roles and responsibilities that is unstructured—that is, this data resides in text. Therefore, these issuances have to be read so relevant information can be extracted, processed, and analyzed. The IDA team leveraged an existing methodology developed in-house to read, extract, process and analyze the data in DoD issuances. Our analysis is what ultimately determined where gaps and overlapping roles and responsibilities are assigned in the Department. An output of this methodology are some select maps of how roles and responsibilities pertaining to the AM&E of security cooperation are formally assigned throughout the DoD. The maps were created using commercial-off-the-shelf software. Further, several observations and suggested courses of action that can resolve existing challenges were identified during the analysis.

## **C. Summary of Findings**

This analysis yielded four principal findings:


1. DoD has not met the full requirements codified in 10 USC § 383 to maintain a program of AM&E for its security-cooperation activities.
2. Critical AM&E activities remain assigned only to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), and are not formally delegated to the offices that are now informally tasked to conduct these activities.
3. No AM&E responsibilities are assigned below Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (ASD(SPC)).

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

4. The Department's AM&E Instruction<sup>5</sup> is focused on the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of partner nation progress toward an SC objective or on the actions taken by SC implementers to build capacity in a partner nation. There is little to no AM&E required for the DoD's effectiveness at managing its security cooperation programs or how training, resourcing, or staffing of its SC programs impact program effectiveness.

## D. Roadmap



The IDA team reviewed and analyzed existing laws and DoD issuances that already speak to roles and responsibilities related to security cooperation, including those codified in 10 USC § 382, 383 and 384. The objective was two-fold: to make recommendations on actions that can be taken to improve the Department's ability to implement the law, and to identify areas in which the policy that implements this law may be improved or clarified.

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<sup>5</sup> DoD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "*DOD Instruction 5132.14, Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise*", (Washington, DC: DoD, 2017), 5, accessed November 12, 2018, <https://www.esd.whs.mil/Directives/issuances/dodd/>.

This brief describes our approach to capture and process data required to understand the roles and responsibilities that govern the AM&E of security cooperation tasks, programs and activities<sup>6</sup> within the Department. It will then map these roles and responsibilities using data visualization to identify gaps, overlaps, and ambiguity. Finally, it will offer a series of observations and suggested courses of action. These will inform next steps for efforts this project may undertake for the sponsor.

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<sup>6</sup> For this paper, a task refers to managing the security cooperation enterprise. Is it resourced appropriately, does it have the right people in the right positions, are the people managing SC programs or conducting SC activities appropriately trained? An SC program is just that, a program (e.g. The Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program, the 333 Program, or the Ministry of Defense Advisor Program). An activity is something that takes place under a program.


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## 2. Methods and Data

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IDA's methodology to review formal issuances and characterize the roles and responsibilities related to security cooperation and the AM&E of security cooperation surpassed simple summary and categorization of roles and responsibilities, as phrased in the documents themselves. The team used a method, vetted across other IDA projects<sup>7</sup>, to unpack the density of these roles and responsibilities, identify key actors in the space, and identify those actors' points of coordination, gaps, and overlap.

### A. Process



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<sup>7</sup> The methodology used was leveraged from the following reports: McCray et al, "Mapping Models and Simulations Throughout the US Department of Defense", 5. and Barber et al., "Planning for Biological Incidents: Characterizing Variations in Local-Level Public Health Plans across Jurisdictions and Incident Types", 3.

Our method is a six-step process (pictured above) designed to untangle and de-conflict existing roles and responsibilities described in formal issuances. The first step in the process was to define the sources to be used in the survey. The main criterion was that the sources be authoritative in the assignment of roles and responsibilities within the Department.

Step two was to collect the sources needed for analysis. A set of keywords was developed to cull relevant sources pertaining to security cooperation roles and responsibilities. By casting a broad net across all security cooperation roles and responsibilities, the team was confident that it would find all of those that specifically addressed AM&E of security cooperation tasks, programs, and activities.<sup>8</sup> Finally, the team only used sources that had not been canceled or superseded by other documents. This ensured that roles and responsibilities identified were as up to date as possible.

Third, these sources were reviewed for relevance based on several factors:

- Whether they were the most current authority
- Whether they assigned roles and responsibilities related to security cooperation
- Whether they alluded to security cooperation roles and responsibilities while discussing lessons learned

Step four was to code relevant documents. Coding requires the use of a pre-defined data model and rules. These rules become even more critical when extracting unstructured data and placing it into a more structured form for analyses, like a database. The data model and coding instructions were built based on what roles and responsibilities needed to be visualized. This was based on the need to display individual roles and responsibilities, as well as key relationships. The coding was performed by individual research analysts, who read the source documents and extracted pertinent information (the unstructured data) and entered the data into the data model according to the rules<sup>9</sup>.

To map the roles, responsibilities and relationships (step 5), the IDA team used commercial-off-the-shelf software, *Analyst Notebook*. The maps allowed the team to identify overlapping authorities and gaps in roles and responsibilities and to depict hierarchical and horizontal relationships between organizations in this space.

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<sup>8</sup> From here forward, we only refer to the AM&E of security cooperation. Unless noted, we always mean the AM&E of security cooperation tasks, programs, and activities, as explained in footnote 6.


<sup>9</sup> See Appendix A.



The final step in this process was to analyze the data and the maps to derive key findings and make recommendations where roles and responsibilities within DOD issuances need to be clarified, de-conflicted, and/or reassigned.

To refine and validate our analysis, we repeated steps 3-6 several times. The first iteration yielded a coded dataset of roles and responsibilities as written in DoD issuances. During the second iteration, we broadened our keywords to include synonyms for AM&E, to make sure we did not miss relevant roles and responsibilities described in the documents collected. Because these documents often lump several roles and responsibilities together, additional iterations of the process were run to deconstruct responsibilities that are comprised of more than one actor and/or task, so that each entry in the data model represented a unique actor-task pair. Further, each pair was categorized by the type of responsibility assigned. Once each task was assigned to an actor and associated with a responsibility, this final dataset was mapped and analyzed.

## B. Data Source Identification and Collection




Our analysis focused on formally assigned roles and responsibilities within DoD; therefore, our selection of documents focused on those that contain this information. Roles and responsibilities in DoD are formally assigned through two types of sources – (1) the law, and (2) DoD issuances. DoD issuances include directives, instructions, and directive-type memos. The law and issuances assign who conducts tasks in the Department, either from a functional perspective or from an organizational perspective. In other words, some DoD issuances pertain to a category of tasks, such as education or security cooperation, while others pertain to a specific position within the DoD organization, such as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. It is necessary to review both types of issuances to understand how tasks are dispersed across the organization.

Other sources on security cooperation and AM&E responsibilities exist but were rejected for a variety of reasons. Prior to the review phase (step 3 in the six-step process), sources like field manuals and joint publications were omitted because they provide information on best practices and process, but do not assign roles and responsibilities. Instead, many of these sources focus on *how* tasks should be executed, rather than *who* is assigned to do the work. Other sources that did not formally delegate roles and responsibilities or focused on what roles and responsibilities ought to be, rather than how they have been assigned, were also omitted. This left two types of data sources to analyze – the law and DoD issuances.

To cull relevant law and issuances, the IDA team used a keyword search to ensure all relevant information from all relevant documents was captured

## C. Data Organization



The selection process yielded 80+ documents for review and coding. Each document was reviewed for security cooperation-related roles and responsibilities. These roles and responsibilities were extracted verbatim from the documents and cross-walked to the actor responsible. Special attention was paid to the responsibilities section of each issuance, though data was extracted across all sections of each issuance reviewed. This formed the foundation of the data for this effort.

From this data set, responsibilities related specifically to AM&E were culled and pulled into a separate, revised data model. Next, these AM&E-related security cooperation roles and responsibilities were parsed in two ways. The first was to break them into unique pairs of actors and tasks. The second was to characterize the type of security cooperation responsibility. Types included oversight of security cooperation tasks, programs, and/or activities, the oversight of AM&E of security cooperation, the actual AM&E of security cooperation programs, and the AM&E of security cooperation tasks. These parsing exercises yielded more than 1,000 unique records of actor-task pairs related to AM&E of security cooperation.

This data was entered into a model that cross-walked actor-task pairs to various other observations. These included the assignment of a type, as described above, as well as whether coordination was required and with whom, the type of issuance that assigned the responsibility, and the law associated with the responsibility. The model helped the team track delegation of responsibilities within the DoD and characterize the levels at which certain types of AM&E responsibilities were being assigned.

## D. Descriptive Statistics

### IDA | Descriptive Statistics

- Over 2,000 unique pairings of actors and responsibilities **related to Security Cooperation**
- For AM&E:
  - 1,078 pairings **related to AM&E within the SC universe**
  - 421 are **related to oversight or conduct of AM&E**
  - 111 of the 421 AM&E responsibilities **require coordination** with another actor
- 125+ actors are assigned responsibilities related to AM&E in the SC universe

Responsible Type	OID	Office	Policy Area	Responsibility (ORNT)	Rating	Action Category	Function	To Whom	With Whom	Applicable Law
Supp	66	USOCS/C	FD	OP&A persons accounting billing, debiting, and crediting resources for SC programs. OP&A also issues accounting procedures.	AM&E of SC Funds	Function	accounting billing, debiting, and crediting resources for SC programs.			2011 Foreign Operations Act (FOA) of 2011, as amended. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, as amended. Title 22, USC.
Supp	66	USOCS/C	FD	OP&A persons accounting billing, debiting, and crediting resources for SC programs. OP&A also issues accounting procedures.	AM&E of SC Funds	None	accounting procedures.			2011 Foreign Operations Act (FOA) of 2011, as amended. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, as amended. Title 22, USC.
Director	5	USOCS/D	AS/COM/ISA	For assigned areas of responsibility, identify, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of Policy plans and priorities, as well as cases of SC. Personnel engaged in encouraging, facilitating, and supporting the implementation of policy plans and priorities.	SC Change	Director	the implementation of Policy plans and priorities, as well as cases of SC. Personnel engaged in encouraging, facilitating, and supporting the implementation of policy plans and priorities.			Section 103 and 108 of title 10, United States Code.
Director	2	SECDEF	USDP/PA	Identify, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of Policy plans and priorities, as well as cases of SC. Personnel engaged in encouraging, facilitating, and supporting the implementation of policy plans and priorities.	AM&E of SC Staff	Coordination	Identify, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of Policy plans and priorities, as well as cases of SC. Personnel engaged in encouraging, facilitating, and supporting the implementation of policy plans and priorities.			Section 103 of title 10, United States Code.
Director	2	SECDEF	USDP/PA	Identify, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of Policy plans and priorities, as well as cases of SC. Personnel engaged in encouraging, facilitating, and supporting the implementation of policy plans and priorities.	AM&E of SC Staff	Coordination	Identify, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of Policy plans and priorities, as well as cases of SC. Personnel engaged in encouraging, facilitating, and supporting the implementation of policy plans and priorities.			Section 103 of title 10, United States Code.
Director	2	SECDEF	USDP/PA	Identify, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of Policy plans and priorities, as well as cases of SC. Personnel engaged in encouraging, facilitating, and supporting the implementation of policy plans and priorities.	AM&E of SC Funds	None	Identify, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of Policy plans and priorities, as well as cases of SC. Personnel engaged in encouraging, facilitating, and supporting the implementation of policy plans and priorities.			Section 103 of title 10, United States Code.
Director	2	SECDEF	USDP/PA	Identify, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of Policy plans and priorities, as well as cases of SC. Personnel engaged in encouraging, facilitating, and supporting the implementation of policy plans and priorities.	AM&E of SC Funds	None	Identify, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of Policy plans and priorities, as well as cases of SC. Personnel engaged in encouraging, facilitating, and supporting the implementation of policy plans and priorities.	Coordinates on		Section 103 of title 10, United States Code.
Director	2	SECDEF	USDP/PA	Identify, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of Policy plans and priorities, as well as cases of SC. Personnel engaged in encouraging, facilitating, and supporting the implementation of policy plans and priorities.	AM&E of SC Funds	None	Identify, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of Policy plans and priorities, as well as cases of SC. Personnel engaged in encouraging, facilitating, and supporting the implementation of policy plans and priorities.	Coordinates on		Section 103 of title 10, United States Code.
Director	2	SECDEF	GCS	Identify, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of Policy plans and priorities, as well as cases of SC. Personnel engaged in encouraging, facilitating, and supporting the implementation of policy plans and priorities.	AM&E of SC Funds	None	Identify, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of Policy plans and priorities, as well as cases of SC. Personnel engaged in encouraging, facilitating, and supporting the implementation of policy plans and priorities.	Coordinates on		Section 103 of title 10, United States Code.

Type of SC AM&E Roles	Count of Responsibilities
SC Oversight	189
AM&E Oversight	66
AM&E of SC Programs	179
AM&E of SC Personnel	80
AM&E of SC Resourcing	63
AM&E of SC Training	33
Data and Reporting	97
Related Activities	371

Of the 2,000+ unique responsibilities related to security cooperation assigned within the Department, the IDA team identified 1,078 unique pairings of actors and tasks related to AM&E. Of these, 421 were related to AM&E oversight or execution, and of these, 111 required coordination with at least one other actor. An estimated 125 actors in DoD have at least one responsibility assigned to them that is related to the AM&E of security cooperation. These descriptive statistics form the foundation of the maps that are shown in the next section of this report.

### 3. Maps of Security Cooperation AM&E Roles and Responsibilities

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Using the database of security cooperation-related AM&E roles and responsibilities we created maps that illustrate where these responsibilities are distributed across the Department. The purpose of the maps is to depict two types of relationships:

1. Relationships that show how responsibilities are delegated from top to bottom across DoD, and
2. Hub-and-spoke relationships that show how responsibilities are concentrated within specific DoD organizations.

This section consists of five maps:<sup>10</sup>

1. All DoD actors with responsibilities related to the AM&E of security cooperation
2. DoD actors assigned oversight roles for security cooperation programs, activities, and/or tasks *or* oversight of the AM&E of security cooperation
3. DoD actors tasked to conduct AM&E of security cooperation training
4. DoD actors tasked to conduct AM&E of security cooperation resourcing and personnel
5. Responsibilities assigned to USD(P) and its component organizations

The maps come with several caveats. First, they depict relationships and authorities between actors. They are not organization charts and they are not hierarchical. For example, the size or location of each quadrant does not reflect the importance of the responsibilities depicted within it. Also, while the Secretary of Defense resides above all entities in the maps, that position does not appear on the graphics.


Second, the maps are derived from official issuances and guidance spanning a 20-year period. Some of the mapped organizations no longer exist or have been renamed. These organizations appear in red.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Only five are depicted, but there are many different ways to map the data

<sup>11</sup> These organizations appear on the map because the issuance or issuances that refer to them have neither been rescinded nor updated.

**A. Map 1: Actors with Responsibilities Related to AM&E of Security Cooperation Tasks, Programs, and/or Activities**



Reflective only of documents as written and formally issued.

Map 1 shows all of the DoD actors who have been assigned responsibilities that are related to *both* security cooperation and AM&E. The graphic is divided into four quadrants. On the top left are Office of the Secretary of Defense actors. The top right shows Joint Staff actors under the Chairman. The lower left shows the Services, and the lower right depicts the Combatant Commands. While these organizations are portrayed in quadrants, these quadrants do not signify importance. However, the hierarchy displayed within each quadrant is current as of the date of this report. Organizations in red no longer exist, but are still assigned relevant responsibilities in current issuances. Though not pictured in any map, the Secretary of Defense sits atop each of the four quadrants. A legend and caveats are on the bottom far left of the map. Any actor not depicted does not have responsibilities in the AM&E of security cooperation tasks, programs, or activities.<sup>12</sup>


## **B. Maps 2, 3 and 4: “Responsibility Type” Data Layers over Map 1**

Maps 2, 3, and 4 show data layers superimposed on top of Map 1. Each layer represents a responsibility type. The purpose of superimposing these layers is to show where responsibilities are concentrated within the Department and to understand how this distribution may impact the ability of DoD organizations to carry out these responsibilities in a thorough, meaningful way. What follows is a discussion of each set of overlays in Maps 2 through 4. Observations from these maps will be addressed in their own sections later in this report.

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<sup>12</sup> Along with this annotated briefing, the IDA team will deliver an Excel file containing the SC AM&E Roles and Responsibilities database and a bibliography of documents reviewed. Additionally, the files for each of the maps presented in Section 3 will also be provided.

# IDA | Map 2: Oversight Roles and AM&E of SC Programs



Reflective only of documents as written and formally issued.

Map 2 illustrates the DoD actors responsible for the oversight of security cooperation, the oversight of the AM&E of security cooperation, and the AM&E of security cooperation programs. Security cooperation oversight refers to those actors with responsibilities to manage security cooperation programs or portfolios of programs. This implies some sort of AM&E must be conducted, however informal, as part of the stewardship of these programs. AM&E oversight refers to responsibilities related to the management of the




conduct of AM&E of security cooperation tasks, programs, and/or activities. This might include activities like setting standards for the execution of AM&E and specifying how AM&E will inform resourcing processes (e.g., developing the security cooperation program objective memorandum or the budget). Responsibilities related to AM&E of security cooperation programs refer to those activities required to conduct AM&E of security cooperation programs. Examples of these activities might include data collection for AM&E products, authorship of these products, and communication of findings to decision makers. These roles and responsibilities are grouped together to show to whom and at what level these types of responsibilities are being assigned.

Responsibility types in Map 2 are color coded as follows:

- Green: Oversight of security cooperation programs
- Orange: Oversight of the AM&E of security cooperation
- Purple: AM&E of security cooperation programs

Map 2 shows that the majority of actors in this space are assigned at least one (though often more than one) type of the responsibilities depicted. Very few actors are assigned none of these responsibility types. Offices that are no longer in existence are also assigned at least one of these responsibilities, indicating those responsibilities have not yet been formally delegated to a new organization.


# IDA | Map 3: AM&E of SC Training



Reflective only of documents as written and formally issued.

Map 3 shows who in DoD conducts AM&E of security cooperation training. These actors are highlighted in yellow. The activities these actors might undertake include discerning whether training is sufficient for specific security cooperation personnel assigned to manage or implement programs. We see these types of responsibilities concentrated within the Military Departments and the Combatant Commands.

# IDA | Map 4: AM&E of SC Resourcing and Personnel



Map 4 shows who in DoD conducts AM&E of security cooperation resourcing and personnel. Generally, these responsibilities entail assessments of quality of personnel and compliance with contractual obligations and legal constraints. Red highlighted actors conduct AM&E of security cooperation resourcing, and green highlighted actors conduct AM&E of security cooperation personnel. These responsibilities are dispersed across DoD.


### **C. Map 5: USD(P) Security Cooperation and AM&E Responsibilities**

Map 5 displays the responsibilities to conduct AM&E of security cooperation programs that are assigned to the USD(P). Critical security cooperation AM&E actors, including DASD(SC)'s AM&E Office and DSCA, report to USD(P). This map identifies which USD(P) responsibilities have been delegated and which have not. Those that have not been delegated are depicted in red. An overlay in the bottom right depicts additional responsibilities for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (ASD(SPC)), as assigned in the current draft version of Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5111.SU.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> The draft version of DoDD 5111.SU was provided to IDA by the DASD-SC office.

# Map 5: USD(P) Responsibilities for AM&E of Security Cooperation Programs



Reflective only of documents as written and formally issued.

This map represents USD(P) as a hub and its component organizations as spokes. Other related organizations may be linked through shared responsibilities to these spokes. Nodes with no highlighting indicate responsibilities that are clearly assigned; nodes with red highlighting indicate the responsibility has not yet been formally assigned below the level of USD(P).

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## **4. Observations, Findings, and Courses of Action**

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The data collection, mapping, and analysis yielded several observations and findings. First, this section will present general observations about how relevant roles and responsibilities are distributed. Second, it will offer four key findings about ambiguity and gaps in these responsibilities that will be paired with suggested courses of action (COAs). These COAs represent what the IDA team believes to be the most opportune, expedient solutions to the findings presented; they do not necessarily represent the best possible solutions.

## A. Observations of Responsibilities related to AM&E of Security Cooperation Tasks, Programs, and Activities

### IDA | Observations

- Responsibilities related to AM&E:
  - Actors with responsibilities related to **AM&E of Security Cooperation tasks, programs, and activities**: Dispersed across DoD
  - Actors that **oversee SC-related AM&E**: Concentrated in USD(P)
  - Actors that **conduct SC-related AM&E**: Concentrated in five DoD entities:
    - OSD: USD(P), ASD(SO/LIC), and Director DSCA
    - Joint Staff: CJCS and Geographic Combatant Commands
  - Actors that **conduct AM&E of SC programs**: Mostly within the same five organizations
- Where SC oversight actors are concentrated, so too are security cooperation-related AM&E oversight roles
  - Potential conflict of interest issue as USD(P) gets to grade its own work

Five observations from this analysis do not necessarily require action, but are helpful to understanding how responsibilities are assigned across DoD for the conduct of AM&E in security cooperation. First, AM&E responsibilities are dispersed across the Department. Despite this dispersion, these organizations serve as critical hubs of AM&E responsibilities:

1. USD(P)
2. ASD(SO/LIC)
3. Director, DSCA
4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
5. Geographic Combatant Commands

These same organizations are also hubs of responsibilities related specifically to AM&E of security cooperation programs. Oversight responsibilities for both security cooperation and related AM&E activities are concentrated in USD(P). This presents a



potential conflict of interest and could bring about inefficiencies or a lack of accountability, as organizations are formally assigned responsibility (through DoD issuances) for the evaluation of their own work.

## B. Key Findings and Suggested COAs

### **IDA | Findings and COAs (1 of 4)**

Finding 1: **The requirement in Title 10 § 383** that SECDEF “maintain a program of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation in support of the security cooperation programs and activities of the Department of Defense” **has not been met.**

#### **Recommended COA(s):**

- Formally assign the central evaluation office to an OSD organization that is “resourced and appropriately placed within the Department of Defense to enable the rigorous examination and measurement of security cooperation efforts towards meeting stated objectives and outcomes”
- Tailor the organization of the office towards managing an AM&E program, in addition to performing more general oversight functions
  - Ensure this program is tied to the PPBE process
  - Articulate how this program will add value to Combatant Command (CCMD) planning processes and global force management

10 USC § 383 states that the Secretary of Defense shall “maintain a program of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation in support of the security cooperation programs and activities of the Department of Defense.”<sup>14</sup> Based on the map of formal roles and responsibilities across the Department, we can identify where AM&E oversight responsibilities reside, but no office has been formally assigned responsibility for overseeing or managing a program of AM&E. DOD Instruction 5132.14 describes an AM&E framework for Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives, but is silent on the programmatic aspect of AM&E. Further, DoDD 5132.03 (Security Cooperation) does not assign responsibility to manage a program of AM&E to any specific organization. It only says that it is DoD policy to maintain a program of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation

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<sup>14</sup> *Title 10 – Armed Forces*, U.S. Code 10 (1956), §§ 383.

of security cooperation<sup>15</sup>. Assigning the central evaluation office (referred to in DOD Instruction 5132.14) to a specific organization within OSD Policy could be a first step to establishing and then managing such a program. It would provide a place for the program manager to reside. This would only be useful, however, if the office is given the mandate to manage an AM&E program, as opposed to merely conducting oversight of existing AM&E providers. Finally, this program would need to engage fully in the Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) process to fulfill the programmatic requirements of existing law. It should not be limited to independent evaluations, which appear to be the current, limited remit of the Director, AME, within the office of the DASD for Security Cooperation.

## **IDA | Findings and COAs (2 of 4)**

Finding 2a: **Critical USD(P) responsibilities for AM&E have not been delegated.** These include:

- Manage SC-related AM&E
- Maintain and oversee a centralized evaluation office
- Review Combatant Command (CCMD) integrated security cooperation plans
- Assess security cooperation programs
- Disseminate lessons learned from evaluations

Finding 2b: **DoDD 5111.SU does not assign any of these responsibilities to ASD(SPC).**

**Recommended COA(s) for 2a and 2b:** Use DoDD 5111.SU to clarify responsibilities

- Ensure all critical SC-related AM&E responsibilities are delegated to the office expected to oversee them
- Specify, who at the ASD level, should assess security cooperation programs and disseminate lessons learned

The second finding that resulted from this work is that there are critical AM&E responsibilities assigned to USD(P) that have not been further delegated in any DoD issuance. While some organizations under USD(P) may perform these functions, they are not formally assigned to those offices. This puts such organizations in a precarious position,

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<sup>15</sup> DOD Directive 5132.03, DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation. <https://www.esd.whs.mil/Directives/issuances/dodd/>.

as these responsibilities may be reassigned at any moment and the authority to perform them is subject to debate.

USD(P) retains five AM&E responsibilities that have not been officially assigned to one of its sub-organizations. These are:

- Manage the Security Cooperation AM&E Enterprise
- Maintain and oversee a central evaluation office
- Review Combatant Command (CCMD) integrated security cooperation plans
- Assess security cooperation programs
- Disseminate lessons learned from evaluations

In practice, we understand that, through DASD(SC), ASD(SPC) manages AM&E of significant security cooperation initiatives. While the Office of AM&E under DASD(SC) currently functions as a central evaluation office, it does not manage a program of AM&E, which the law requires. It is also unclear at present who reviews CCMD security cooperation plans. DSCA has undertaken the responsibility to assess some, though not all, security cooperation programs. The dissemination of lessons learned appears to be a pan-organizational responsibility and entirely voluntary.

The draft DoDD 5111.SU, a directive establishing the roles and responsibilities of ASD(SPC), is silent on the subject of the role the ASD has for the management of a program of AM&E. For example, the document assigns ASD(SPC) the role of developing policy and guidance for the conduct of AM&E of DoD security cooperation programs, but it does not assign the ASD a role for an office that maintains a program of AM&E for security cooperation. This misses a critical opportunity to shore up the ASD's equities and justify the structure of the ASD's portfolio. If possible, DoDD 5111.SU should be modified to assign the central evaluation office to ASD(SPC) and clarify responsibilities of that office in accordance with the law, so it is more than just an evaluation office. It should also more clearly delineate who is in charge of assessing and monitoring all security cooperation programs and disseminating lessons learned.

## **IDA | Findings and COAs (3 of 4)**

### **Finding 3: No responsibilities to conduct AM&E of SC programs are formally assigned below ASD(SPC)**

- This is not the case with ASD(SO/LIC) or ASD(NCB)
- DASD(SC) has no assigned responsibilities in this space

#### **Recommended COA(s):**

- Leverage DoDD 5111.SU to clarify roles and responsibilities of DASD(SC), if applicable, and de-conflict these from DSCA
- If DASD(SC) and/or related responsibilities are moved/redistributed, then specify exactly where these responsibilities are assigned

Related to the second observation is the third—that no AM&E responsibilities are assigned to any organizations within ASD(SPC). This is not surprising, given that most DoD issuances do not assign roles to DASDs. However, some exceptions have been made, such as security cooperation responsibilities assigned to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combatting Terrorism (DASD(SO/CT)) under Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)). These assigned responsibilities clarify a complex authority space. The same ought to be considered for ASD(SPC)'s diverse portfolio. Given the ASD's breadth of equities, it would be useful to be specific about what DASD(SC) is empowered to do in order to fulfill the requirements codified in 10 USC § 383 that requires the Office of the Secretary of Defense manage a program of AM&E.

## **IDA Findings and COAs (4 of 4)**

Finding 4: AM&E of SC training, SC resourcing, and SC personnel appears to occur separately from AM&E of SC programs. This means that **questions about how SC training, resourcing, and personnel impact the program effectiveness may go unanswered.**

### **Recommended COA(s):**

- Leverage the central evaluation office to ensure data sharing occurs between organizations responsible for SC-related AM&E
- Formalize a process to include training, resourcing, and personnel considerations in the AM&E process for SC programs, particularly in monitoring reports

DoD organizations responsible for conducting some form of security cooperation-related AM&E are assigned a portion of this space, such as assessing training, the adequacy of the workforce, or the resourcing of security cooperation programs. This tendency creates an unnatural division between key aspects of security cooperation that work in tandem to achieve results. For example, AM&E of security cooperation programs should account not only for the sufficiency of resources to do the work, but also the adaptability and utility of how programs are resourced. Likewise, the sufficiency of security cooperation training impacts security cooperation program results. Even if those who receive DoD security cooperation training are not directly responsible for implementation, their ability to oversee and design security cooperation programs impacts whether or not those programs are successful. As it is now, AM&E of programs, training, resourcing, and personnel for security cooperation are not required to be assessed holistically.

We suggest two approaches to this challenge. First, formalize the need for holistic assessments and evaluations of how the quality of training, resourcing, and personnel impacts the quality of security cooperation programs. Without clarification in DoD issuances, the best that can be achieved is to build this type of holistic assessment into the AM&E culture as an informal, best practice. Second, leverage the central evaluation office as a conduit for data-sharing. This would require making the Global-Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (G-TSMIS), or a similar system, fully functional and able to move data quickly between a dispersed AM&E enterprise in the Department.

No matter what approach is taken, AM&E of security cooperation programs should be required to consider the performance of implementation and adequacy of planning, rather than just change in partner nation capacity. This improved understanding would

assist program designers in identifying what may cause a program to fail – lack of proper planning and resourcing or implementation on the part of the U.S., or a deficiency on the partner nation side.

### C. Recommended COA Prioritization

#### **IDA** | COA Prioritization

- Priorities for policy changes
  1. Clearly assign where the central evaluation office sits in OSD and who oversees DoD’s AM&E Program
  2. Update and issue DoDD 5111.SU to assign ASD(SPC) responsibilities appropriately, based on USD(P) reorganization
  3. De-conflict DSCA ESAMM with DoDD 5111.SU
  
- Priorities for organizational changes
  1. Define what a **program** of AM&E is
  2. Structure the central evaluation office around this program
  3. Develop a staffing plan based on the AM&E program requirements
  4. Outline a process for PPBE of the AM&E of security cooperation programs and clarify for stakeholders what decisions are being made and when

Given the weight of the findings of this effort, the IDA team has suggested a prioritization of the COAs it pairs with findings. The COA most likely to resolve some of the most pressing concerns of this report is the modification of DoDD 5111.SU. As this document is still in review, there is an immediate opportunity to make changes necessary to clarify key roles and responsibilities. Changes should focus on the assignment of unassigned USD(P) AM&E responsibilities to ASD(SPC), as well as the identification of the location and purpose of the central evaluation office. Once these changes are approved and the directive is signed, it should then be coordinated and de-conflicted with the current DSCA Electronic Security Assistance Management Manual (ESAMM).<sup>16</sup> Finally, DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5132.14: Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise, should be amended to align with the new responsibilities specified in DoDD 5111.SU.<sup>17</sup> It should reiterate where the central evaluation office sits

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<sup>16</sup> Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Electronic Security Assistance Management Manual (E-SAMM)* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense), accessed June 3, 2019, <https://www.samm.dscam.mil/listing/esamm>.

<sup>17</sup> Since the analyses of issuances was completed, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5025.01 was updated May 22, 2019, and now states: “DoDDs, DoDIs, DoDMs, and AIs – Issuances published before

and who is responsible for managing DoD's program of security cooperation-related AM&E.

Organizational changes ought to accompany these policy changes. First and foremost, ASD(SPC) and DASD(SC) must determine what a program of AM&E should look like and how it should be run. This includes the selection of a program manager, construction of a functioning structure to execute this program, and a clear articulation what sub-programs must exist to support it. If the central evaluation office is to manage this program, then this office ought to be organized accordingly. Finally, the program should be staffed appropriately and initiate a PPBE process. This includes identifying stakeholders and developing a process and timeline for decision making.

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March 25, 2012, should be updated or cancelled within 10 years of their publication date. Issuances published or changed after March 25, 2012, will be processed for cancellation by the Directives Division on the 10-year anniversary of their original publication dates in accordance with the March 25, 2012, Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, unless an extension is approved.”

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## 5. Important Considerations for Additional Lines of Effort

IDA's support to the sponsor consists of additional lines of effort. One is to consider how the OSD Office of AM&E ought to be structured and the other is to survey existing security cooperation training courses for how they are incorporating consideration of AM&E into the training. The organizational charts in both of the slides in this section depict an AM&E office structure provided by the office of the Director, AM&E, within the DASD for Security Cooperation.

### A. Line of Effort: Organizational Structure of the AM&E Office

**IDA**

## Next Steps: Considerations for AM&E Office Structure (1 of 2)

The data and observations inform a possible reorganization in the following ways:

- Outline AM&E Office functions
- Specify the functions that would need to be formally reassigned

AM&E Office Structure, Current State

```

graph TD
    Director[Director, AM&E]
    Team1[Planning, Assessments, and Monitoring Team]
    Team2[Evaluations Team]
    Team3[Accountability and Lessons Learned Team]
    Director --- Team1
    Director --- Team2
    Director --- Team3
    Oversight[Oversight of the AM&E Office] --> Director
        
```

**SECDEF:**

- *...oversee[s] development and management of a professional workforce supporting SC programs and activities...including...assessment, planning, monitoring, execution, evaluation, and administration of such programs and activities...*(10 USC § 384.(a))
- *...shall maintain a program of AM&E in support of the security cooperation programs and activities of the DoD* (10 USC § 383.(b))
- *...shall submit to the congressional defense committees each year a report on the program...*(10 USC § 383.(d)(1))

**Oversight of the AM&E Office:**

- *...applies lessons learned and best practices from monitoring and evaluations to make adjustments, as needed, to policy, program, and resource allocation...*(10 USC § 383.(b)(1)(D)); DoDI 5132.14, 2.1.g)
- *Maintains and oversees a centralized evaluation office to coordinate and facilitate the conduct of independent evaluations of significant security cooperation initiatives and to provide DoD-wide guidance, tools, and templates on all aspects of AM&E...*(DoDI 5132.14, 2.1.b)
- *...sets budget and resource allocations for AM&E functions...*(in consultation with DSCA, DCAPE, USD(Comptroller)/DoD CFO) (DoDI 5132.14, 2.1.c)
- *...represents DoD security cooperation AM&E goals, policies, and priorities to external audiences, including interagency and international partners.* (DoDI 5132.14, 2.1.e)


**Additionally, assign the following to the AM&E Office:**

- Manage program of AM&E
- Execute a PPBE process for AM&E

The data and observations in this report can inform the AM&E Office organizational construct in two ways: 1) outline the functions of a central AM&E office and 2) specify the functions that would need to be formally reassigned. Existing and draft policy delegates these responsibilities to USD(P), but no further.<sup>18</sup>

To the right, these slides map the specified and implied planning, programming, and AM&E responsibilities from 10 USC § 382, 383 and 384 and DoDI 5132.14 to this construct. The objective of the mapping is to identify the resources needed for a central AM&E office.

The text (far right) contains those duties and responsibilities that would logically accrue to the office of the Director, AM&E (shaded blue). The Director, AM&E, would oversee three subordinate teams: 1) Planning, Assessments, and Monitoring (shaded purple); 2) Evaluations (shaded teal); and 3) Accountability and Lessons Learned (shaded gray). These teams are grouped according to related tasks. The following slide further defines what these groups' responsibilities might be, based on existing law and policy.



<sup>18</sup> Brian P. McKeon, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), Department of Defense Instruction 5132.14 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2017), accessed May 21, 2019, [https://open.defense.gov/portals/23/Documents/foreignasst/DoDI\\_513214\\_on\\_AM&E.pdf](https://open.defense.gov/portals/23/Documents/foreignasst/DoDI_513214_on_AM&E.pdf); and, Department of Defense Instruction 5111.SU (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, DRAFT).

In the AM&E office structure, the director oversees three teams. Responsibilities, issued by DoDI 5132.14, are mapped to the three team leads. Some of these connections were easy to determine, based on the wording of the responsibility. However, others were positioned based on the interpretation of the responsibility and the possible actions required to fulfill it. Mapping helps facilitate the personnel requirements that a central AM&E office would need to execute its mission and associated responsibilities. Some of the responsibilities assigned may not be enough to satisfy the general AM&E Framework articulated in DoDI 5132.14, unless there is a strong management or coordination mechanism to ensure information is shared.

## **B. Line of Effort: Security Cooperation Training**

### **IDA | Next Steps: Considerations for Security Cooperation Training**

- This sub-task identified:
  - Who is responsible for security cooperation training in DoD
  - Who is responsible for workforce development related to security cooperation
  - Who is responsible for monitoring the quality of each
  
- AM&E responsibilities for security cooperation training are not uniform across different SC programs and activities
  
- Other work in support of the overall DASD(SC) AM&E project may leverage this data to locate security cooperation training and workforce standards, as they exist in issuances
  - Assessment criteria of training programs can help point out best practices
  - Assessments and evaluations of training responsibilities may point out gaps or deficiencies

In terms of security cooperation training, this effort's findings identified roles and responsibilities related to training, workforce development, and AM&E of these efforts. These responsibilities are not uniform across all security cooperation programs and activities, and the lack of definition and uniformity should be addressed. Other lines of effort for this project may leverage the data and maps in this report to define what security cooperation training responsibilities and standards currently exist.

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## 6. Conclusion

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IDA found that many responsibilities related to AM&E of security cooperation tasks, programs, and/or activities are not formally assigned and those that are assigned are insufficient to manage a program of AM&E, as mandated in the law. Prompt action on the part of the USD(P) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities offer the most direct and enduring potential solutions to these challenges. Barring such action, however, responsibilities within this space will continue to be dispersed and the authority of who is responsible unclear.

Stakeholders across the Department would benefit from additional work to characterize how business is conducted in this space. A question that was out of scope for this effort, but that would add value to understanding the business of security cooperation-related AM&E, is how formally assigned roles and responsibilities compare to informally assigned tasks in this space. The maps generated for this effort should contain an additional layer of data on “real world.” Analyzing the differences between policy and reality would further illuminate areas where additional clarification is needed and assist the Department in streamlining its responsibilities.

Another useful extension of this effort is to process and analyze data on all security cooperation responsibilities in the same manner as the AM&E-specific data. This would provide the Department with a more robust picture of how these responsibilities are assigned and where possible stovepipes exist. This work would contextualize where AM&E responsibilities are currently assigned and if these assignments allow those responsible to access the data, reporting, and feedback that they need to conduct robust assessments and evaluations. An improved understanding of the distribution of security cooperation responsibilities may also explain differences in program design and implementation, which may further the implementation of best practices and lessons learned across the Department.

Finally, the same data collection and processing methodology used to conduct this survey of formal issuances can be leveraged to investigate where data and reporting relevant to AM&E reside in the Department. Too often, the requirement to develop metrics early in the design process of security cooperation programs can lead to the hurried production of a list of benchmarks that may indicate program success, if and only if that program takes place in a vacuum. Understanding what security cooperation programs are ongoing at a given time, how they intersect, and which metrics may be influenced by more than one program at a time helps to isolate a single program’s effects from those that may

be attributable to a set of programs. To accomplish this level of understanding, the Department requires, at a minimum, a central data system that catalogues security cooperation programs and their associated metrics so that AM&E products can account for the programmatic context in which a security cooperation activity takes place. Ideally, this system would import similar data from other U.S. Government agencies on their related security sector assistance programs. Access to this kind of data will help inform program design, reduce duplication of effort, and promote coordination within the Department and its interagency counterparts. It would also reduce the burden on DoD and Embassy personnel to track each individual security cooperation program in a given country—a goal that is often infeasible, given time and resource constraints.

These additional efforts, if undertaken, would be ideal complements to the policy and guidance work presented in this report. They would offer the Department additional insight on security cooperation data, reporting, and responsibilities. Finally, these additional efforts would inform organizational structures and training pertaining to AM&E of security cooperation tasks, programs, and/or activities.

# Appendix A.

## Security Cooperation AM&E Database and Map Guide

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The purpose of this appendix is to provide information on the database that accompanies this report. This database contains all currently-assigned roles and responsibilities that relate to Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation (AM&E) of security cooperation tasks, programs, and/or activities. The database is organized based on unique pairings of a single actor with a single responsibility. This appendix will provide an overview of how the database organizes data. Then, it will discuss what questions the database can be used to answer. Finally, it will provide a description of the two poster-sized maps delivered to the Sponsor with this report.

### A. Data Model

This section provides an overview of the data model that the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) team used to build its Security Cooperation AM&E Role and Responsibility Database (file name: *SC AME Roles and Responsibilities.xlsx*). A data model refers to the way in which data is organized and relationships between data elements are established so that the data exists in an analyzable structure. Data models are therefore governed by a set of rules specified by the data modeler. To ensure the integrity of the data, if coding is required, data coders must be trained on these rules.<sup>19</sup> What follows is an overview of the dataset, including fields, field definitions, field values, and relationships between data fields and data worksheets. If the data requires updates, this appendix may be used as a quick reference to ensure data quality.

**Table 1. IDA Security Cooperation AM&E Role and Responsibility Data Model**

<i>Field Name</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Values</i>
<i>Record #</i>	Assigns a unique number to each record, from 1- <i>n</i> .	Numeric
<i>Document Type</i>	Contains the type of document coded (e.g., Directive, Instruction, ESAMM, CJCSM)	Text
<i>UID</i>	Contains a Unique Identifier that matches the UID field in Bibliography worksheet for the originating source of the data.	Numeric

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<sup>19</sup> “What is a Data Model?” Princeton University Center for Data & Reporting Website, accessed May 28, 2019, <https://cedar.princeton.edu/understanding-data/what-data-model>.

<b>Field Name</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Values</b>
<i>Office</i>	Contains the office to whom the actor listed in the “Actor” field reports	Alpha-numeric
<i>Actor</i>	Contains the name of the actor to whom a given responsibility is assigned.	Alpha-numeric
<i>Actor Bin</i>	Contains a rough characterization of the level of activity at which an actor conducts a responsibility. Coders choose from a drop-down menu: execution, management, other, or oversight, using pre-defined coding rules about which Roles are assigned to which role types.	Text
<i>Responsibility</i>	Captures the responsibility as written in the original document	Alpha-numeric
<i>Responsibility Bin</i>	For each actor-task pairing assign a category from the pull-down: AM&E of SC Funds, AM&E of SC Programs, AM&E of SC Staff, AM&E of SC Training, AM&E Oversight, Data and Reporting, G-TSCMIS, Other, SC Adjacent, SC Oversight, or Support of SC AM&E	
<i>Action</i>	Assigns a single action (verb) based on the “Responsibility” field	Text
<i>Task</i>	Assigns a task that is an abbreviated phrasing of the responsibility as written in the “Responsibility” field	Alpha-numeric
<i>Task Matchup</i>	Matches the “Task” field with a similar task from an oversight organization, such as USD(P), to track delegation of responsibilities	Alpha-numeric
<i>To Whom</i>	Contains the name of the organization that receives a product or information from the person listed in the “Actor” field	Alpha-numeric
<i>Collaboration Type</i>	Captures whether and how a responsibility must be coordinated. Coders choose from a drop-down menu: Consults on, Collaborates on, Coordination through point, Jointly, or Provides concurrence on	Text
<i>Applicable Law(s)</i>	Lists all applicable laws associated with an actor-task pair, as described in the original document	Alpha-numeric

## **B. Using the Database**

IDA’s Security Cooperation AM&E Role and Responsibility Database is currently in Microsoft Excel (file name: *SC and AME Roles and Responsibilities.xlsx*). It exists in two parts, or worksheets. The first worksheet, titled *AME\_Roles\_Responsibilities*, contains the data model discussed in the preceding section and all data pertaining to assigned security cooperation-related roles and responsibilities. The second worksheet, titled *Bibliography*, contains all of the source information for the data contained in the first worksheet. These worksheets are linked through the Unique Identifier (UID) field they both share. This allows a user to trace a specific actor-task pair to its originating source.

IDA’s Security Cooperation AM&E Role and Responsibility Database has all the functionality that currently comes with Excel. While it is possible to write coding for this file, most questions researchers will have can be answered by using the filter functions for fields of interest. Here are some examples of what questions the dataset might answer and which filtering would be applied to answer them.



**Table 2. Sample Questions and Filter Functions**

<b>Question</b>	<b>Filter</b>	<b>Result</b>
<b>What responsibilities are assigned to a specific certain organization within the Department?</b>	Sort on the “Actor” field and select which office you are interested in.	This will display only the responsibilities assigned to that office.
<b>At what level are these responsibilities assigned?</b>	Sort on the “Actor Bin” field and select the level of organization you want to see.	This will display only the responsibilities assigned to organizations at a given level, such as execution versus oversight.
<b>What responsibilities fall under a specific category?</b>	Sort on the “Responsibility Bin” field and select which bin you wish to see.	This will display the responsibilities that fall under the selected bin.
<b>What types of responsibilities are assigned by which issuances?</b>	Sort on the “Document Type” field and select which document type you wish to see.	This will display all the responsibilities and related information assigned by that type of issuance.

More complex or multi-part questions may require sorting to be applied on multiple fields within the database. Alternately, the user may wish to import one or both worksheets into another database tool, such as Microsoft Access, that permits more complex queries. This can be done using the Excel file as it is, or the file can be converted to a .csv file if required.

### **C. Maps**

IDA chose to use Analyst Notebook as the primary data visualization tool for this project. Analyst Notebook is commercial-off-the-shelf software that can import Excel files and map data in them according to the user’s specifications about relationships and how the user wants data displayed. Its relatively customizable format and intuitive interface made it an ideal product.<sup>20</sup> However, there are many other data visualization capabilities that may be used in combination with this data. They may require additional fields or records to be added to the database to facilitate a given display. Visualization software also tends to come at a price for licensing and unfettered use, which ought to be considered if additional maps are required. Contact the Task Lead for specific instructions on how to map this dataset using Analyst Notebook.

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<sup>20</sup> For more information on this product, see its product page, located here: <https://www.ibm.com/us-en/marketplace/analysts-notebook>.

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## Appendix C. Glossary and Acronyms

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### A. Acronyms

<b>AM&amp;E</b>	Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation
<b>ASD(NCB)</b>	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs
<b>ASD(SO/LIC)</b>	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
<b>ASD(SPC)</b>	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities
<b>CCDR</b>	Combatant Commander
<b>CCMD</b>	Combatant Command
<b>CJCS</b>	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
<b>CJCSM</b>	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
<b>COAs</b>	Courses of Action
<b>DASD(SC)</b>	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation
<b>DASD(SO/CT)</b>	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combatting Terrorism
<b>DoD</b>	Department of Defense
<b>DoDD</b>	Department of Defense Directive
<b>DoDI</b>	Department of Defense Instruction
<b>DoD CFO</b>	Department of Defense Chief Financial Officer
<b>DSCA</b>	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
<b>DTM</b>	Directive-Type Memo
<b>ESAMM</b>	Electronic Security Assistance Management Manual
<b>G-TSMIS</b>	Global – Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System
<b>GCCs</b>	Geographic Combatant Commands
<b>IDA</b>	Institute for Defense Analyses

<b>IOC</b>	Initial Operating Capability
<b>JPs</b>	Joint Publications
<b>ODASD(SC)</b>	Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation
<b>OSD</b>	Office of the Secretary of Defense
<b>PPBE</b>	Programming, Planning, Budgeting, and Execution
<b>SC</b>	Security Cooperation
<b>SECDEF</b>	Secretary of Defense
<b>U.S.</b>	United States
<b>UID</b>	Unique Identifier
<b>USC</b>	United States Code
<b>USD(P)</b>	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
<b>USG</b>	United States Government

## B. Glossary

For the purposes of this task, the team used a set of terms to make reference to specific aspects of security cooperation and related subjects. The majority of these terms do not have official Department of Defense definitions. They are used to signify technical distinctions made across this effort.

<b>Term</b>	<b>Definition</b>
<b>AM&amp;E of security cooperation tasks, programs, and activities</b>	The assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of any action related to security cooperation. This might include (but is not limited to) security cooperation training, use of funds, personnel, programs, or program inputs. Synonymous with security cooperation-related AM&E.
<b>AM&amp;E of security cooperation programs</b>	The assessment, monitoring and evaluation of programs of record in the Department of Defense that are funded through funding streams specifically for security cooperation. These programs are similar to security sector assistance programs run by other U.S. Government agencies.
<b>AM&amp;E of security cooperation training</b>	This refers to the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of training related to security cooperation and related activities.

Term	Definition
<b>AM&amp;E of security cooperation personnel</b>	This refers to the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of personnel assigned to conduct or manage security cooperation tasks, programs, and/or activities. This includes whether or not personnel levels are sufficient and if qualified personnel are assigned to each security cooperation related task.
<b>Oversight</b>	This term refers to the general management of a set of programs, portfolios, or Departmental functions.
<b>DoD Issuance</b>	A Department of Defense (DoD) issuance is an official DoD document that assigns roles and responsibilities to organizations with the Department. These documents include directives, instructions, and directive-type memos.

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