

Malicious Insiders by Motive, Collusion, Recruitment, and Disgruntlement

Insights into the CERT National Insider Threat Center Incident Corpus

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A Note about the Cases

The statistics and figures represented in the remaining slides are limited to:

- Domestic incidents with publicly available information that were not dismissed or otherwise settled out of court
 - These incidents primarily took place in federal criminal courts
- Malicious insiders
- Cases identified as Fraud, Sabotage, Theft of IP, or Misuse


The categories of information are not intended to be exhausted of what is documented in the CERT Insider Threat Incident Corpus, but provide a sample of information.

Objectives


The information in the following slides will address the following information:

- Why did the insider commit a hostile act?
 - Motive
- How did the insider commit these hostile acts?
 - Recruitment
 - Collusion

Motive




Collusion



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Aggregated Collusion



- 128 insiders (11.5%) colluded with one or more other insiders
- 238 insiders (21.3%) colluded with one or more outsiders
- 67 insiders (6.0%)
 colluded with both at
 least one other insider
 and one outsider


Other Statistics

Recruitment

- 157 insiders (14.0%) were recruited or induced by outsiders
- 29 insiders (2.4%) were recruited or induced by competitors


Disgruntled

- 51 insiders (4.6%) showed signs of being disgruntled
- 34 of these disgruntled insiders (66.7%) committed IT Sabotage



NITC Publications and References

- Theis, M. C., Trzeciak, R. F., Costa, D. L., Moore, A. P., Miller, S., Cassidy, T., & (2019) Claycomb, W. R. <u>Common Sense</u>
 <u>Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats (6th Ed.)</u>. Pittsburgh:
 Software Engineering Institute.
- Cappelli, D. M., Moore, A. P., & Trzeciak, R. F. (2012).
 <u>The CERT® Guide to Insider Threats: How to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Information Technology Crimes (Theft, Sabotage, Fraud)</u>. Addison-Wesley Professional.
- Moore, Andrew; Savinda, Jeff; Monaco, Elizabeth; Moyes, Jamie; Rousseau, Denise; Perl, Samuel; Cowley, Jennifer; Collins, Matthew; Cassidy, Tracy; VanHoudnos, Nathan; Buttles-Valdez, Palma; Bauer, Daniel; & Parshall, Allison. <u>The Critical Role of Positive Incentives for Reducing Insider</u> <u>Threats</u>. CMU/SEI-2016-TR-014. Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University. 2016.



Blog Posts with Details on Motive or Collusion

- Insiders and their Significant Others: Collusion, Motive, and Concealment
- Handling Threats from Disgruntled Employees
- The Frequency and Impact of Insider Collusion
- Insider Threats in the Federal Government
- Insider Threats in Finance and Insurance
- Insider Threats in State and Local Government
- Insider Threats in Information Technology
- Insider Threats in Healthcare
- Insider Threats in Entertainment

For More Information on Insider Threat

National Insider Threat Center

National Insider Threat Center Email

Insider Threat Blog

SEI Digital Library

http://www.cert.org/insider-threat/

insider-threat-feedback@cert.org

http://insights.sei.cmu.edu/insider-threat/

https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/

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