

The Lens of Operational Art:
A Case Study of 1965 Pakistan – India War

A Monograph
by
MAJ Muhammad Abu Bakar
Pakistan Army



School of Advanced Military Studies
US Army Command and General Staff College
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Name of Candidate: MAJ Muhammad Abu Bakar

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Approved by:

_____, Monograph Director
Bruce Stanley, PhD

_____, Seminar Leader
Robert L. Smith, COL

_____, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
James C. Markert, COL

Accepted this 25th day of May 2017 by:
_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Prisco R. Hernandez, PhD

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Abstract

The Lens of Operational Art: A Case Study of 1965 Pakistan – India War by Major Muhammad Abu Bakar, Pakistan Army, 58 pages.

Pakistan and India gained independence in 1947 from Great Britain but arbitrary drawn borders set the stage for prolonged conflict between the two new states. While there have been numerous territorial disputes between both countries, the major disputed area is the state of Kashmir. Pakistan and India have fought three major wars and many small skirmishes but failed to resolve their differences. Major wars include the wars of 1948, 1965, and 1971. The Pakistan – India War of 1965 began as a localized conflict in Kashmir but evolved into an all-out war between both countries. In this war, the Pakistan Army successfully faced the challenge of numerically superior Indian forces and denied them their political and military ends. Numerous studies have looked at this war from multiple angles, but none analyzed it exclusively through the lens of operational art. This study attempts to fill this void in the literature. This research asserts that the Pakistan Army partially employed effective operational art during the 1965 War. The evidence in the study supports that the Pakistan Army used the element of decisive point and risk; however, it only partially supports the use of balance and Center of gravity by them. This research is useful for all military professional, as it aims at linking the subjective knowledge of operational art with the practical setting of the 1965 War.

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Acronyms

RBC	Ravi Bias Corridor
RCC	Ravi Chenab Corridor
CFL	Cease Fire Line
C-in-C	Commander in Chief
COG	Center of Gravity
FM	Field Marshall
GHQ	General Headquarters
IOK	Indian Occupied Kashmir
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

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Introduction

Pakistan and India became independent states in 1947 with the end of British rule in the sub-continent. The British withdrew from India in haste leaving a dangerous legacy of arbitrarily drawn borders. While there have been numerous territorial disputes between both countries, the major disputed area is the state of Kashmir. The Kashmir dispute is the deadliest and most intractable Asian conflict.¹ Pakistan and India have fought three major wars and many small skirmishes but failed to resolve their differences. Major wars include the wars of 1948, 1965, and 1971. The Pakistan – India War of 1965 began as a localized conflict in Kashmir but evolved into an all-out war between both countries. In this war, the Pakistan Army successfully faced the challenge of numerically superior Indian forces and denied them their political and military ends.

Due to the hostile nature of relations with India, Pakistan always has to remain on guard from likely Indian military aggression. Despite a dwindling economy and a weak industrial base, Pakistan spends a substantial part of its budget on its military to protect its territorial integrity. In the 1965 War, the Pakistan Army met the Indian aggression and successfully denied them the achievement of military ends.² Due to the enormous disparity in national resources and disparate military force ratio, there has been a debate on how the Pakistan Army prevailed in the 1965 War. One explanation is that it was superior operational art employed by the Pakistan Army, which led to its success.³ The counter idea is that it was the lack of strategic thought and inadequate operational

¹ Stanley Wolpert, *India and Pakistan: Continued Conflict or Cooperation* (Oakland, CA: University of California, 2010), xi.

² Maj Gen (Retd) Shaukat Raza, *The Pakistan Army War 1965* (Lahore: M/S Wajidalis Limited, 1984), 280.

³ General (Retd) Mohammad Musa, *My Version: India – Pakistan War, 1965* (Lahore: Wajidalis, 1983), 100-103.

art by the Indian military, which inhibited their ability to attain the military ends..⁴ This uncertainty warrants a study to clarify the role of operational art employed by the Pakistan Army in the 1965 War.

Thesis Statement:

This study asserts that the Pakistan Army indeed employed effective operational art during the 1965 War.

The purpose of this study is to examine the operational art employed by the Pakistan Army in the 1965 War. It will focus on analyzing Pakistan's political and military ends and the operational approach employed by the Pakistan Army to pursue these ends. Moreover, this study will identify the skill set of senior Pakistani military leadership in understanding the higher direction of war and operational art at the onset of the 1965 War. This study will also examine the elements of operational art employed by the Pakistan Army.

Numerous books are available on the 1965 War, however, these books have not analyzed this war through the lens of operational art exclusively. This study contributes to the body of knowledge by examining this war primarily from the perspective of operational art. It highlights the significance of employing effective operational art in wars and brings out the implication of flaws in policy and weak understanding of the higher direction of the war. This study is a useful read for operational artists, as it aims at linking the subjective knowledge of operational art with the practical setting of the 1965 War.

National Policy is a broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives..⁵ **Strategy** is a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion

⁴ Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh, *War Despatches: The Indo-Pak Conflict 1965* (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 1991), 7.

⁵ Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), GL9.

to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.⁶ **Military strategy** is the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force.⁷ **Strategic level of war** is at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives.⁸ **Operational level of war** links the tactical employment of forces to national and military strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on the design, planning, and execution of operations using operational art.⁹ **Tactical level of war** is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other.¹⁰

This study will use the theoretical framework of operational art to analyze the 1965 War. This model will be used to assess policy, national strategy, military strategy, operational art, and operational approach employed by both countries during the 1965 War. Operational art is an area linking strategy and tactics, and spans the theory and practice of planning and conducting campaigns and major operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives in a given theater of operations.¹¹

Driving this study are three hypotheses. The first is that new doctrine, organizations, and equipment enabled the Pakistan Army to employ effective operational art in the 1965 war. The

⁶ Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), GL16.

⁷ Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991), 9.

⁸ JP 3-0, GL 16.

⁹ JP 3-0, GL 14.

¹⁰ JP 3-0, GL 17.

¹¹ Antulio J. Echevarria II, "American Operational Art, 1917-2008," in *The Evolution of Operational Art: From Napoleon to the Present*, eds. John Andreas Olsen and Martin van Creveld (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

second is, the lack of understanding of the higher direction of war by the politicians and military leadership of Pakistan affected the policy and military strategy. The third hypothesis is that the Pakistan Army successfully employed selective elements of operational art during the 1965 War.

This monograph will use eight secondary research questions to find evidence to evaluate the hypotheses. The first is, did the changes in doctrine, organization, and equipment enable the Pakistan Army to improve its operational art? The second, how did the internal politics effect formulation of policy and grand strategy in Pakistan before the 1965 War? The third is, did the Pakistan Army leadership lack education and training in the higher the direction of war? The fourth is, did the Pakistan Army's operational approach align with the policy objectives and military strategy during the 1965 War? The fifth is, did the Pakistan Army correctly identify and exploit decisive points during the 1965 War? The sixth is, did the Pakistan Army employ the element of risk during the 1965 War? The seventh is, did the Pakistan Army employ the element of balance during the 1965 War? Lastly, did the Pakistan Army employ the element of center of gravity (COG) during the 1965 War?

This study has a few limitations. First, this study will be strictly limited to unclassified sources as the official battle accounts of the 1965 War are classified. Secondly, military publications of both Pakistan and India are classified documents inhibiting the researcher's ability to site doctrinal aspects related to operational art practiced by both the countries. Finally, as the researcher is residing in the United States, this study is limited to the data accessible from the United States. The delimitation to this research is the scope of the study, as it will only focus on the 1965 War. Despite the non-availability of classified data on the 1965 War, a thorough study can be conducted adding to the existing body of knowledge.

There are six sections to this study. After the introduction, the second section reviews the literature related to the hypotheses and research questions of this study. Moreover, the literature review highlights the limited research conducted on the Pakistan – India War of 1965 from the

perspective of operational art. Section Three discusses the methodology used for this study and a broad overview of the case study i.e. 1965 War. Section Four examines the case study in view of the research questions and brings out relevant findings. Section Five presents the analysis from the case study using the framework and methodology from section three. Section Six presents conclusions and offers suggestions for future research on this topic.

Literature Review

The literature review will frame the broad strategic context, constructs, and theories relevant to the purpose of this study. This review will focus on establishing a baseline for operational art as a framework and analyzing relevant literature on the Pakistan – India War of 1965 to identify the missing links and requirement of research through the lens of operational art. Numerous war veterans and academics from both countries have written about this war from multiple angles. However, few authors have touched upon operational art in the 1965 War, but no research has viewed this war exclusively through the lens of operational art. Apropos, this study will analyze the operational art employed by the Pakistan Army in the 1965 War.

This section will answer the question what is operational art by finding its origin in history and theory. The idea that war is a function of state is not new. Sun Tzu wrote, "Warfare is the greatest affair of the state, the basis of life and death, the way to survival or extinction. It must be thoroughly pondered and analyzed."¹² During pre-industrial warfare, generals and kings raised professional armies to fight limited wars for the limited objectives of the dynastic states. Within limited war's framework, the conduct of operations formed an integral part of the strategy, and strategy was as simply "the tactics of theater-level operations."¹³ In the nineteenth century, prominent changes occurred in Europe in different domains, which includes the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, and forming of nation states. These changes had an enormous impact on warfare as well resultantly modern warfare evolved during this period.

The factor of nationalism gave way to national armies having huge numbers too difficult to control as a single mass. This necessitated organizational changes allowing the armies to be dispersed in space yet concentrated in time. Proportionally, the size of the battlefield also grew

¹² Sun Tzu, *Art of War*, translated by Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 167.

¹³ Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Cultural Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), 90–97.

from a few kilometers in Frederick the Great's time to a several hundred kilometers in France in 1871.¹⁴ The increased frontages and dispersion of action reduced the ability of commanders to maintain a tight control ensuring decentralized control. With this division of responsibilities, operational art originated, as both the Germans and the French started using the term "operations" to describe the employment of armies, corps, and divisions in the field. The dispersion of forces and the delegation of command made it impracticable to engage in a single decisive battle to destroy the opposing forces, as had hitherto been the norm.¹⁵

Warfare had outgrown the strategy of the "single point" and became distributed into a number of subordinate battles across an ever-expanding front.¹⁶ These conditions led to the need to group tactical actions and battles into operations and group operations into campaigns, which sought to arrange battles and engagements simultaneously and sequentially to destroy enemy forces in a more coordinated and efficient manner.¹⁷ The summation of the objectives of the campaigns represented the objectives of the war. Because single decisive battles were no longer expected, the objective of war to destroy the enemy was broken down into a series of operations. The arrangement of tactical actions of dispersed and distributed forces in time and space in coherent operations with focus on campaign intent to pursue the strategic objectives of war led to the emergence of operational art.¹⁸ Epstein states modern war has the following characteristics: a strategic war plan that effectively integrates the various theaters of operations, the fullest

¹⁴ R. Cody Phillips, Michael D. Krause, *Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History United States Army, 2007), 4.

¹⁵ Khalid M. Zaki, "Through the Lens of Operational Art: 1971 Bangladesh Campaign" SAMS Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2012, 6.

¹⁶ Phillips and Krause, 5.

¹⁷ Thomas Bruscino, "The Theory of Operational Art and Unified Land Operations" (Essay, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2011), 10.

¹⁸ Justin Kelly and Michael J. Brennan, "The Leavenworth Heresy and the Perversion of Operational Art," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 56 (1st Quarter 2010), 112.

mobilization of the resources of the state, and the use of operational campaigns by opposing sides to achieve strategic objectives in the various theaters of operations.⁻¹⁹ Epstein argues that by using his criteria then perhaps modern warfare began with Napoleonic France and Hapsburg Austria in 1809.²⁰ Napoleon's corps structure and maneuver tactics afforded him the opportunity of piecemeal destruction of the enemy through multiple battles. The need to synchronize multiple battles and maneuvers as part of a single campaign gave birth to the operational level of war.

In theoretical terms, Soviet theorists developed the term operational art. Georgii Samoilovich Isserson's 1937 paper "The Evolution of Operational Art" is amongst pioneers to explain this phenomenon.²¹ Isserson defined operational art as a "series of uninterrupted operational efforts that merge into a single whole."²² Operational art is not a checklist, but "presupposes freedom of methods and form carefully chosen to fit a concrete situation."²³ Isserson argued that military leaders require operational art to achieve any strategic objective with large troop formations. Aforementioned in view, operational art emerged as a necessity, when the size of the armies grew; battlefields became dispersed; communication infrastructure developed, and resultantly numerous battles ensued instead of one major battle to attain the ends of policy.

The key concepts for this research are four elements of operational art: decisive points, risk, balance, and center of gravity (COG). The first key concept is **decisive point**, which is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to

¹⁹ Robert M. Epstein, *Napoleon's Last Victory: 1809 and the Emergence of Modern War* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1992), 14.

²⁰ Ibid., 11.

²¹ James J Schneider, *Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Foundations of Operational Art* (Fort Leavenworth: Presidio Press, 1994), 20.

²² G S. Isserson, *The Evolution of Operational Art*, 2nd ed., trans. Bruce Menning (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, 2013), 48.

²³ Ibid., vii.

gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success.²⁴ Jomini in his book *Art of War* describes decisive points as geographical in nature. He writes, the name of decisive strategic point should be given to all those which are capable of exercising a marked influence either upon the result of the campaign or upon a single enterprise.²⁵ The second key concept is **risk**. Commanders accept risk and seek opportunity to create and maintain the conditions necessary to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results. During execution, opportunity is fleeting. The surest means to create opportunity is to accept risk while minimizing hazards to friendly forces. A good operational approach considers risk and uncertainty equally with friction and chance.²⁶ The fourth element has been derived from the Pakistan Army's elements of operational art, which is **balance**, it means that components of a force are so disposed geographically that they can support each other in time and space before any component succumbs to enemy pressure. Last element is COG, which is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.²⁷

The available literature on the 1965 War mainly covers the environment leading up to the war, the causes of war, the conduct of war, and lessons learned. Few authors have touched upon operational art, but no exclusive research is available concerning operational art during the 1965 War. This section will discuss the available literature, which has partially analyzed pieces of operational art and hypotheses of this study.

²⁴ Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 4-4.

²⁵ Antoine-Henri Jomini, *Summary of the Art of War*, ed. Brig. Gen. J. D. Hittle (Harrisburg, Pa: Stackpole Books, 1987), 467.

²⁶ ADRP 3-0, 4-9.

²⁷ Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), GL6.

Few books on this war have touched upon the first hypothesis of this study that new doctrine, organizations, and equipment enabled the Pakistani military to employ effective operational art in the 1965 War. In his book *The Pakistan Army War 1965*, Shaukat Raza, a retired Pakistani Major General writes that in 1954 Pakistan signed Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the United States, also known as the 5 ½ Division Plan which infused new military equipment into the Pakistan Army. Moreover, the Pakistan Army brought major changes in its organization, doctrine, and training methodology, which enhanced its operational potential.²⁸

Harbakhsh Singh, a retired India Lieutenant General refers to this development in his book *War Despatchers* that the US military assistance enabled the Pakistan Army to reduce the armament gap with India before the 1965 War.²⁹ Musa Khan, Pakistan Army's Commander in Chief (C-in-C) during the 1965 War, writes that military hardware from the United States before 1965, did enhance Pakistani operational potential, but that assistance was limited in nature.³⁰ The above-mentioned accounts related to the first hypothesis will help in describing the impact of changes in organization, doctrine, and military hardware on the operational art by the Pakistan Army during the 1965 War.

Some researchers have touched upon the second hypothesis, which states that the lack of understanding of the higher direction of war by the politician and military leadership of the Pakistan Army affected the policy and military strategy. Pakistan wanted to keep the Kashmir cause alive but not get involved in an all-out war with India.³¹ Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, was not a

²⁸ Shaukat Raza, *The Pakistan Army War 1965* (Lahore: M/S Wajidalis Limited, 1984), 20.

²⁹ Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh, *War Despatches: The Indo-Pak Conflict 1965* (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 1991), 5.

³⁰ General (Retd) Mohammad Musa, *My Version: India – Pakistan War, 1965* (Lahore: Wajidalis, 1983), 15.

³¹ Shaukat, 20.

devious man, and he believed that an aggressive approach towards Kashmir would aggravate the situation.³² However, numerous developments forced Ayub to reconsider his policy towards India, which include, Indian measures to bring the constitutional reforms to absorb Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) in 1963-64, failed negotiations with India on Kashmir, and recommendations of close political aides to adopt a hard stance.³³

Lachhman Singh Lehl, a retired Indian Major General in his book *Missed opportunities: Indo – Pak War 1965*, notes that the parleys in 1963 failed to resolve the Kashmir issue, and dashed Pakistani hopes of settling the Kashmir issue through peaceful means.³⁴ Ayub and his government finally decided to support the freedom movement in the IOK aimed at a popular uprising in the valley. They believed this would force India to soften its stance and settle the dispute through negotiations with Pakistan. Pakistani foreign office proposed to the President that multiple raids in IOK would initiate an uprising against India.³⁵ This strategy assumed that India was not in a position to go to an all-out war, and the conflict would remain restricted to the disputed region of Kashmir.³⁶ Musa Khan, Pakistan Army's C-in-C in 1965, advised President Ayub against the raids because the freedom movement in the IOK was still not ripe and the Pakistan Army was still in the process of reorganization.³⁷ The structure of the Pakistani government and internal politics also inhibited its ability to form a cogent policy. Ayub was surrounded by those individuals, who would

³² Ibid., 14.

³³ Ibid., 19-20.

³⁴ Major General Lachhman Singh Lehl, *Missed Opportunities: Indo-Pak War 1965* (Dehradun: Natraj Publishers, 1997), 69.

³⁵ Musa, 4.

³⁶ Farooq Bajwa, *From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965* (London: Hurst & Company, 2013), 382.

³⁷ Ibid., 382.

rarely provide him candid advice.³⁸ On the military front, the Pakistan Army officers lacked education and training on the higher direction of war. There was no national defense college until 1965, and the war course only started in 1963 in the building of the Staff College in Quetta.³⁹

Few writers have touched on the third hypothesis of this study, that the Indian military failed to employ effective operational art during the 1965 War. Indian concept of operations seemed foredoomed to failure because it lacked offensive dash and it failed to balance ends with means.⁴⁰ B.M Kaul, ex Chief of General Staff (CGS) of the Indian Army, writes that India failed to defeat the Pakistani military, a small power and India survived certain situations through the grace of God.⁴¹ Indian's faulty strategic concept resulted in a number of ineffective jabs instead of a few selected thrusts in force.⁴² This research will facilitate deeper analysis into the validity of these hypotheses.

This section presents the rationale for conducting research on the effectiveness of operational art employed by the Pakistan Army in the 1965 War through the prism of operational art. The section outlines the broad underpinning of the evolution of operational art from its genesis to theory. This section also defines those elements of operational art, which will be used in subsequent sections to analyze the 1965 War. In view of available studies on the 1965 War, this section has verified the requirement of examining this war through the lens of operational art. The next section will discuss the methodology for this research.

³⁸ Shaukat, 20.

³⁹ Ibid., 25-43.

⁴⁰ Singh, 7.

⁴¹ Lt. General, B.M Kaul, *Untold Story* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1967), 474.

⁴² Singh, 193.

Methodology

The primary research question of this study is to test the effectiveness of operational art employed by the Pakistan Army in the 1965 War. This section presents the methodology employed to test the primary research question. This section consists of five parts: case study methodology, selection to the case study, research questions and expected findings, data collection, and method of analysis.

This monograph will use the case study methodology, which serves as one of the three basic observational testing methods for analysis.⁴³ This methodology suits answering the primary research question that did the Pakistan Army employ effective operational art in the 1965 War. To answer this research question, this study uses a structured focused approach of the single case study framework.⁴⁴ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett describe this method in two parts. First, the structured component involves developing questions that reflect the research objective to standardize data collection. The focused component deals specifically with certain aspects of the case study.⁴⁵ The 1965 War was a complete campaign and the Pakistan Army employed all available means as compared to others war with India. Therefore, single case study of the 1965 War best suits answering the research questions as opposed to conducting a comparative analysis of two or more case studies. This application involves answering specific research questions to collect relevant data to test the hypotheses. The overall framework for this study is operational art. This study will examine five elements of operational art, which are part of the US Army doctrine and the

⁴³ Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 50-51.

⁴⁴ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2005), 66-69.

⁴⁵ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 69.

Pakistan Army doctrine to ascertain the effectiveness of operational art employed by the Pakistan Army in the 1965 War.

This section describes the selection of the Pakistan – India War of 1965 as the case study most relevant to examine the use of operational art by the Pakistan Army. The selection of the 1965 War is important as it provides significant lessons about operational art. Following factors highlight the significance of this war. First, the Pakistan – India War of 1965 is a complete campaign conducted in diversified terrain. Second, both Pakistan and India employed full combat potential in this war including all elements of national power. Third, this campaign involved large-scale maneuvers of large size formations including corps bringing useful lessons for operational artists. Fourth, both Pakistan and India are still at loggerhead with each other with the possibility of future war between them in the same area of operations. Fifth, both Pakistan and India have come a long way in developing their militaries and operational art since the 1965 War; this study renders the doors open for research on their current operational art as compared to 1965. In this backdrop, this case study is not only vital to understand the operational art employed in the 1965 War, but it is also relevance to understand the future scenarios.

Eight structured focused questions guide the data collection to test the three hypotheses. The structured focused questions assist in ensuring the study remains focused on answering the primary research question. Moreover, the following questions guide the collection of data and subsequent synthesis to determine the supportability of the hypotheses through the lens of operational art:

This monograph will use eight secondary research questions to find evidence to evaluate the hypotheses. The first is, did the changes in doctrine, organization, and equipment enable the Pakistan Army to improve its operational art? The second, how did the internal politics effect formulation of policy and grand strategy in Pakistan before the 1965 War? The third is, did the Pakistan Army leadership lacked education and training in the higher the direction of war? The

fourth is, did the Pakistan Army's operational approach align with the policy objectives and military strategy during the 1965 War? The fifth is, did the Pakistan Army correctly identify and exploit decisive points during the 1965 War? The sixth is, did the Pakistan Army employ the element of risk during the 1965 War? The seventh is, did the Pakistan Army employ the element of balance during the 1965 War? Lastly, did the Pakistan Army employ the element of COG during the 1965 War?

The first research question relate to the changes occurred in the Pakistan Army in the realm of doctrine, organization, and equipment before the 1965 War. The empirical evidence suggests that the Pakistan Army underwent a substantial transformation in doctrinal, organization, and military hardware in the decade preceding the 1965 War. The answer to this question will enable understanding on the impact of these changes on the operational art in the 1965 War.

The second question analyze the government structure in Pakistan, impediments in policy making and strategy formulation due to internal politics before the 1965 War. The third question aims at identifying the weaknesses in the education and training of the senior leadership of the Pakistan Army in the higher direction of war. The answers to these questions will enable understanding on the process of policy and strategy formulation on Kashmir in the years leading to 1965 War. Moreover, it will identify the skill set of the senior Pakistan Army officer in handling the higher direction of war.

The fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eight question the operational approach and the elements of operational art employed by the Pakistan Army. Four elements of operational art will be assessed in this case study, these include decisive points, risks, balance, and COG. By answering these questions, the study will attain requisite insight, evidence, and logic to support or negate the hypotheses.

The official war accounts of the 1965 War and the military publications of both Pakistan and India are classified documents. Thus, the research work primarily relies on open source

material i.e. books, articles of journals, and newspapers. The research will also use the memoirs of a few high-ranking officers of both Pakistan and India who fought in the 1965 war. To ensure veracity in research, the majority of empirical material will be comprised of works of Pakistani, India, and international writers.

The data will be evaluated through the selective elements of operational art, which include decisive points, risks, balance, and COG. Different operations conducted during the 1965 War will be scrutinized in view of these elements to identify the effectiveness of operational art employed by the Pakistan Army in the 1965 War.

This section describes the purpose of this study and outlines the specific methodology, which will direct analysis and findings. Eight focused questions will enable a structured focused research to find answers to the hypotheses. Data collection for the study includes primary and secondary sources primarily from the writers of both Pakistan and India. This section also describes that salient elements of operational art will be used to analyze the data.

Case Study

The British sowed the seeds of the Pakistan and India confrontation in the torturous birth of both countries in 1947.⁴⁶ Lord Mountbatten, the last British Governor-General in India rushed through the partition plan of June 1948, to August 1947.⁴⁷ Mass killings and arbitrarily drawn borders set the stage for a treacherous and confrontational course between Pakistan and India. Approximately 6,500,000 Muslims refugees came to Pakistan from India territories and roughly 5,500,000 Hindus and Sikhs went to India from Pakistani areas. Nearly 500,000 Muslims lost their lives attempting to reach their new country as they were raped and murdered in riots.⁴⁸

Under the terms of the partition, contiguous areas were to join either Pakistan or India based on the religious makeup of their population or contiguity.⁴⁹ The states of Junagadh and Hyderabad had a majority Hindu population but Muslim rulers. The ruler of Junagadh acceded to Pakistan, but part of his subjects rebelled. The Indian Army went into the state and annexed it to India.⁵⁰ Likewise, India forces entered in the Hyderabad State in August 1948 and obtained accession after defeating the forces of the local ruler.⁵¹ In the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the situation was exactly opposite as 77 percent of the population was Muslim out of the total population of 4,000,000, but the ruler was a Hindu.⁵² India resorted to playing bad politics, putting

⁴⁶ Shaukat, 1.

⁴⁷ Nawaz, 27.

⁴⁸ Richard Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1950), 83.

⁴⁹ Nawaz, 39.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 45

⁵¹ Symonds, 87.

⁵² Ibid., 87.

the entire region in jeopardy.⁵³ The Hindu ruler decided to accede to India, resulting in a popular uprising and subsequently the first war between India and Pakistan in 1948. The Pakistan Army supported by Kashmiris, liberated part of Kashmir. India went to the United Nations to end the war and pledged to hold a plebiscite in the State, which India was not seriously committed to.⁵⁴ The United Nations Security Council passed a resolution asking to hold a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Continued denial by India to implement the UNSC resolutions on Kashmir coupled with the failed dialogue between Pakistan and India created a deadlock.⁵⁵ Moreover, Indian efforts to change the special status of Kashmir through extending the jurisdiction of the Indian constitution left little hope in diplomacy.⁵⁶

Throughout the 1950s, Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, refused to enter into any meaningful negotiations with the UN mediators or Pakistan, thereby not only losing the moral high ground but also leaving Pakistan to feel the need to use others means to force India to change her stance on Kashmir.⁵⁷ Defeat in the Indo-China War of 1962 and the military-diplomatic victory of Pakistan in Rann of Kutch affected the national morale in India.⁵⁸ Pakistan, although allied with the United States, failed to secure super power guarantees in the resolution of the Kashmir issue despite

⁵³ Major General (Retd) Lachhman Singh Lehl, an Indian Army officer, writes in his book “ Missed Opportunities: Indo-Pakistan war 1965 that in Junagadh, if India admitted the right of the ruler to decide the fate of his state then State of Hyderabad could use the same precedence. If India intervened with force that would set up a contrary precedence, which Pakistan could apply in Kashmir. If India demanded a plebiscite in Junagadh , this could be quoted as a guiding principle by Pakistan in Kashmir, 17.

⁵⁴ The first Prime minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru was a descendent from a Kashmiri Hindu family. In Sep 1947, he wrote to Interior minister Vallabhbai Pate: Something must be done before the winter sets in.. We definitely have a great asset... and things must be done in a way so as to bring about the accession of Kashmir into the Indian Union as rapidly as possible (Wolpert, Nehru, 413).

⁵⁵ Shaukat, 18.

⁵⁶ Russel Brines, *The Indo-Pakistan Conflict* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), 285.

⁵⁷ Bajwa, 24.

⁵⁸ Nawaz, 130.

her gesture of assurance at the behest of the United States during Sino-India war of 1962. In May 1965, Indian forces captured three posts in the Kargil Sector of Kashmir.⁵⁹ India refused to vacate those posts, sparking a reactive urgency in Pakistan.⁶⁰

In this backdrop, President Ayub of Pakistan asked the foreign minister and the Army Chief to take actions to resuscitate the Kashmir problem, weaken Indian resolve, and bring her to the table to negotiate without provoking a general war.⁶¹ Pakistan's underlying assumption was that the military actions in Kashmir would remain limited to it and an all-out war was unlikely.⁶² As per the assessment of Pakistani foreign minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, India was not in a position to risk a general war, thus any provocation in Kashmir would remain limited to Kashmir.⁶³ The Pakistani government tasked the military to initiate an uprising in the IOK by infiltrating trained "Freedom Fighters" and launch the war of liberation.⁶⁴ The Pakistan Army received orders to prepare two sets of plans: one being full – fledged guerrilla operations and the other for low-key raids.⁶⁵ President Ayub believed that military action was the only way Pakistan could solve the Kashmir issue once for all, and the stage was set to test his convictions and conclusions.⁶⁶

⁵⁹ Gosh, Sri Kanta, *Pakistan's ISI: Network of Terror in India* (New Delhi: APH Publishing Corporation India, 2000), 188.

⁶⁰ Lt Gen (retired) Mahmud Ahmed, *History of Indo-Pak War - 1965* (Rawalpindi: Oxford University Press for Services Book Club, 2006), 29.

⁶¹ Gauhar, 328

⁶² Nawaz, 130.

⁶³ Musa, 4.

⁶⁴ Qadir Shaukat, "Operation Gibraltar: The Battle that Never Was." *Rediff India Abroad* (2005), accessed November 10, 2016, <http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/sep/08war1.htm>.

⁶⁵ Ahmed, 23.

⁶⁶ Bajwa, 106.

The operation was code-named “Gibraltar.” It was a daring plan to send thousands of local Kashmiris, soldiers, and paramilitary persons from Azad Kashmir into the IOK to engage the Indian Forces and lead a popular revolt against Indian rule.⁶⁷




Figure 1. Operation Gibraltar

Approximately 7,000 people from Azad Kashmir infiltrated across the cease-fire line (CFL) starting on 29 – 30 July 1965 over 700 kilometers from Kargil to Chhamb, see figure 1. Most of them underwent some guerilla training within the short time available before the operation, and they carried small arms.⁶⁸ Having created a shock wave by attacks on the initial targets, the Gibraltar forces were to establish areas of influence in IOK and expand the operational activity by recruiting, training, and arming local volunteers and fostering local uprising.⁶⁹

The task to eliminate the guerrillas in the Indian occupied Kashmir went to western command's 15 Corps.⁷⁰ Operation Gibraltar failed to achieve its objectives but it did succeed in

⁶⁷ Bajwa, 104.

⁶⁸ Musa, 36.

⁶⁹ Mahmud, 82.

⁷⁰ Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh, *War Despatches: Indo-Pak Conflict 1965* (Atlanta: Lancers Publishers LCC, 2013), 49.

achieving partial gains. The primary reason for failure was a lack of prior coordination with the local Kashmiri leadership before the operation. Thus, the population of IOK was not prepared for the operation..⁷¹

Indian General B.M. Kaul believed that infiltrators committed many acts of sabotage, but their successes did not meet expectations. Gibraltar forces could not cause rebellion amongst the Kashmiris. Nevertheless, it was not true that they were a complete failure..⁷²

After initial confining, chasing, and destroying activities, the Indians decided to go up the first rung of escalation..⁷³ India launched simultaneous attacks to sever the infiltrating forces' entry routes and to destroy their bases, see figure 2.




Figure 2. Indian Response to Operation Gibraltar

They made desperate attempts to break through to Muzaffarabad on the Tithwal front and to link up Uri with Poonch..⁷⁴ Indians code-named it operation “Bakshi,” which failed to achieve

⁷¹ Musa, 36.

⁷² Ibid., 36.

⁷³ Singh, 53.

⁷⁴ Musa, 38.

the desired military ends but captured Haji Pir Pass, which could have helped Indians to link Uri with Poonch and cut off Bedori bulge.⁷⁵

Indian offensive operations in the Pakistani held Kashmir provoked Pakistan to move into Chhamb and Jaurian.⁷⁶ According to General Musa and General Sher Bahadur, Pakistan launched operation “Grand Slam,” when India captured some territory in Kashmir, and there was a danger of Indians capturing Muzaffarabad, see figure 3.



Figure 3. Operation Grand Slam

The main aim of this operation was limited to relieve the pressure against the Pakistani 12 Division deployed in Kashmir. The plan was an armored thrust by 12 Division against Indian forces across the CFL at Akhnur, which was a critical supply line for Indian forces from India to Srinagar.⁷⁷ The 12 Division launched Operation “Grand Slam” on September 1, 1965 achieving complete surprise.⁷⁸ By 2 September, they captured Chhamb but they could not establish a bridgehead across River Tawi. On 6 September, Pakistani forces were still six miles short of

⁷⁵ Ibid, 38.

⁷⁶ Nawaz, 218.

⁷⁷ Bajwa, 103.

⁷⁸ Asghar Khan, *The First Round, Indo-Pakistan War 1965* (Karachi: Islamic Information Services, 1979), 67.

Akhnur, when India launched an offensive across the international border. The Pakistani offensive recoiled, and forces moved to Sialkot Sector without achieving its objective.⁷⁹

The Pakistani offensive in Chhamb Jaurian took the Indians by surprise. Thus, they decided to conduct an offensive across the international border against Lahore and Sialkot to relieve the pressure from Chhamb Jaurian and secure territorial gains, see figure 4.⁸⁰




Figure 4. Indian Offensive across the International Border

The Indian plan was to launch 1 and 11 Corps in a simultaneous offensive in Sialkot and Lahore Sectors respectively.⁸¹ The operation against Lahore was code named Operation “Riddle” conducted by Indian 11 Corps.⁸² Pakistani 10 and 11 Divisions were responsible for the defense of Lahore.⁸³ The offensive commenced in the early hours of 6 September, and Indian formations

⁷⁹ Musa, 42.

⁸⁰ Bajwa, 162.

⁸¹ Lehl, 182.

⁸² Singh, 14.

⁸³ Bajwa, 162.

secured initial objectives. However, the defenders recovered from the initial shock and successfully fought a defensive battle. While the multi-pronged attack of 11 Corps in Lahore achieved tactical surprise, the attack lacked finesse and boldness in execution.⁸⁴ Pakistani 10 Infantry Division conducted a remarkably good defense considering it occupied its positions so belatedly.⁸⁵

By 7 September, the shock of the Indian invasion had worn off, and the Pakistan Army had recovered its balance, pushing Indian troops back. Now Pakistan had the opportunity to launch its main counteroffensive in Kasur Sector.⁸⁶ Pakistan planned to launch a right hook into the Indian territory towards the Sutlej-Bias corridor, which would have allowed Pakistan to threaten Amritsar.⁸⁷ 11 Infantry Division was to establish the bridgehead, while the 1 Armored Division was to breakout and advance towards deeper objectives, see figure 4. Indian 4 Mountain Division was defending the sector. The timings of the attack surprised the Indians. The Pakistani forces occupied Khem Karan on 7 September. 1 Armored Division advanced in two prongs up to milestone 32, short of Bhikkiwind, but it lacked infantry support. After recovering from initial setbacks, Indians reorganized and strengthened their defenses. Indians launched two failed counterattacks to regain Khem Karan. In view of Indian General Kaul “...it had been a matter of touch and go, we should thank God for his mercies and the enemy for his mistakes from saving us from the grim mistakes.”⁸⁸ Overall, the operation failed to achieve its intended objectives. With no further progress and identification of the main enemy offensive in the Sialkot Sector, 1 Armored Division was redeployed to Pasrur to create a reserve in the area for the operations in the Sialkot Sector.⁸⁹

⁸⁴ Ahmed, 221.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 221.

⁸⁶ Bajwa, 162.

⁸⁷ Nawaz, 232.

⁸⁸ B.M.Kaul, *Confrontation with Pakistan* (Delhi: Vikas Publication, 1971), 41.

⁸⁹ Musa, 59.

Indian 1 Corps launched Operation “Nepal” in Sialkot Sector on the night of 7/8 September as the second pincer of the overall Indian offensive in the Pakistani province of Punjab.⁹⁰ The Indian Army planned to launch operations “Nepal” and “Riddle” simultaneously to stretch the Pakistani defenses to their breaking points and achieve paralysis, but the former operation commenced two days later.⁹¹ Writers from both countries do not agree on the ultimate territorial objective of Indian offensive in Sialkot. Some Pakistani writers believe the Indian objective was to sever the Grand Trunk Road between Wazirabad and Gujranwala, while Indian writers claim Operation “Nepal’s” objectives were simply to relieve pressure on Chhamb and to draw in Pakistani armor.⁹²

1 Corps of the Pakistan Army, comprising 15 Infantry Division and 6 Armored Division defended Sialkot Sector. 15 Division held a defensive role, while 6 Armored Division concentrated around Daska for a counter-offensive in a later time frame. The offensive made some headway but failed to achieve a decisive breakthrough. Once the Indian 1 Armored Division neared culmination, the Pakistan Army planned to launch a counter-offensive by its 1 Armored Division, which came to Sialkot Sector after its de-induction from Khem Karan.⁹³


However, both countries agreed to a ceasefire on 22 September before the commencement of the operation. In the Suleimanki-Fazilka Sector, Pakistani 105 Infantry Brigade launched a pre-emptive attack on Indian positions capturing four villages and sufficient area to eliminate any threat to the head works, see figure 5.

⁹⁰ Bajwa, 259.

⁹¹ Ibid, 252.

⁹² Ibid, 252.

⁹³ Musa, 70.



The 105 Brigade kept up pressure on Indian forces, and by 23 September, it had captured 30 Indian villages and about 130 square miles of area in the Suleimanki-Fazilka Sector. Desert Sector saw limited operations, and these were a relative sideshow compared to the large-scale clashes in Kashmir and Punjab.

Overall, the war remained inconclusive for both sides, and neither side succeeded in producing decisive results.⁹⁴ The Indian Army in 1965 enjoyed an overwhelming numerical superiority over the Pakistan Army, 825,000 versus 230,000.⁹⁵ In this backdrop, the Pakistan Army successfully faced the challenge of a three times numerically superior enemy. It not only denied the Indian Army attainment of its strategic objectives but also kept it constantly under pressure by capturing and threatening sensitive territories.

First research question:

Did the changes in organization, equipment, and doctrine enable the Pakistan Army to improve its capacity to conduct operational art? In 1953, Field Marshal Ayub went to the United

⁹⁴ Lehl, 363.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 67.

States to obtain much-needed equipment and training to overhaul the army.⁹⁶ On February 25, 1954, President Eisenhower announced the United States had decided to provide the Pakistan military assistance to strengthen the defensive capabilities of the Middle East.⁹⁷ US aid to Pakistan was limited to making up deficiencies in five and a half division called the 5 ½ Division Plan.⁹⁸ The process lasted three years and reformed field formations, training centers, schools of instructions, static installations, and even the General Headquarters (GHQ). Training centers doubled their strength, revised their training schedules, and increased their tempo.⁹⁹

In early 1959, the army leadership established a cell to study and evolve doctrine suited to the country's peculiar operational environment.¹⁰⁰ The new doctrine called for holding ground with firepower instead of manpower. It stressed keeping the minimum essential forces to hold ground while maintaining the bulk as a strike force.¹⁰¹ New US military equipment along with changes in doctrine gave the Pakistan Army increased firepower and mobility.¹⁰² Based on the US model, the Pakistani infantry divisions shrank from 24,965 to 19,856 yet fielded more firepower than the earlier British model.¹⁰³ The Armored divisions were equipped with the redoubtable Patton tanks

⁹⁶ Ibid., 35.

⁹⁷ "Military Assistance for Pakistan," *American Political Science Review*, Volume 48 (September 1954), accessed November 9, 2011, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/military-assistance-for-pakistan/E95543A6A791B16E0023DF611EAA2EA0>.

⁹⁸ Shaukat, 35.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 38

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 46.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 38.

¹⁰² Lehl, 65.

¹⁰³ Shaukat, 36.

and armored personnel carriers (APCs) for the infantry to keep pace with armor.¹⁰⁴ Pakistan also received modern guns for an independent artillery brigade, providing longer ranges, heavier shells, locating devices, and increased mobility.¹⁰⁵ Other significant changes included setting up an army tactical headquarters in 1962 and the establishment of research and development directorate.¹⁰⁶ Pakistan's Airforce got F-86 and F-104 fighter aircrafts along with radar systems.

With these modern weapons, the Pakistani military acquired a limited qualitative edge over the numerically larger Indian Army.¹⁰⁷ From 1954 to 1965, Pakistan received around \$630 million in direct American grant assistance and over \$670 million in concessional sales and defense support assistance.¹⁰⁸ Militaries require time to absorb changes at such massive level, and at the onset of the 1965 War, the Pakistan Army was far from being ready for the major encounter. Nevertheless, the effect of US military assistance, a new doctrine, and the reorganization in training enabled the Pakistan Army to improve operational art. These changes proved fundamental to the outcome of the 1965 War.¹⁰⁹

Second research question:

Did the political system and internal politics in Pakistan negatively affect the formulation of policy and grand strategy before the 1965 War? In 1958, General Ayub Khan declared martial law and assumed control of the country.¹¹⁰ Although it was a military regime, the President

¹⁰⁴ Lehl, 65.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 65.

¹⁰⁶ Shaukat, 61-62.

¹⁰⁷ Lehl, 65.

¹⁰⁸ Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 138.

¹⁰⁹ Shaukat, 76.

¹¹⁰ Bajwa, 28.

constantly searched for a bright political leader to support the regime without posing a threat to it.¹¹¹ Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, an Oxford graduate with substantial land holdings, was the man to fill this slot. Ayub made him foreign minister at the age of thirty-four. The President was highly impressed with him and gave him a large degree of latitude in his dealings.¹¹² Bhutto disarmed Ayub by calling him ‘daddy’ and behaving like an overzealous son. The president gave him more than affection; he gave him his trust.¹¹³

Bhutto believed that due to the stiffening Indian stance on Kashmir, Pakistan should formulate an option to provoke a freedom struggle in the IOK.¹¹⁴ He advised the president to take a hard line on Kashmir.¹¹⁵ He informed the president that in the aftermath of India’s humiliation at the hands of the Chinese, she was not in a position to risk a general war with Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan can intervene in IOK.¹¹⁶ In January 1965, Ayub retained his presidency due to manipulation in the elections.¹¹⁷ The election damaged his credibility, and he required substantial measures to regain some popular support.¹¹⁸ In this backdrop, the suggestions by the foreign minister on aggressive options for Kashmir found space in Ayub’s mind. In the system of government Ayub had established, he became increasingly isolated from criticism. He was

¹¹¹ Ibid., 28

¹¹² Ibid., 29.

¹¹³ Shaukat, 20.

¹¹⁴ Musa, 4.

¹¹⁵ Shaukat, 18.

¹¹⁶ Musa, 4.

¹¹⁷ Bajwa, 30.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 30.

increasingly sure of his opinion and became vulnerable to honeyed words.¹¹⁹ The military also could not influence Ayub's decision-making.

When negotiations with India led nowhere, mutual suspicion burgeoned. In 1958, Ayub appointed General Musa Khan to be C-in-C of the Pakistan Army. According to Lieutenant General Gul Hassan, Director General Military Operations to Musa for four years, Musa was humane, approachable, and considerate, but Ayub selected him for dependability rather than merit.¹²⁰ In his book *My Version*, Musa states that he informed the President that conditions necessary for an uprising in IOK were not ready thus Pakistan should not stick its neck too far as it could lead to a general war with India.¹²¹ Moreover, Pakistan did not have even half of what India had in military strength.¹²² Despite the Army's advice, the foreign office, led by Bhutto, was adamant on the feasibility of an offensive approach on Kashmir. Musa, in his book, states that the policy makers thwarted the military assessment and advice on a matter having great military implications because of their miscalculation of the politico-strategic situation and overambitious of few individuals.¹²³ Grand strategy drives military strategy, and national leadership has a predominant role in developing the former. In the case of Pakistan, the grand strategy and the strategic guidance for the military was either non-existent or oriented towards debilitating objectives.¹²⁴

¹¹⁹ Shaukat, 20.

¹²⁰ Brain Cloughley, *A History of the Pakistan Army* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 48.

¹²¹ Musa, 5.

¹²² Ibid., 3.

¹²³ Ibid., 4.

¹²⁴ Shaukat, 25.

Third research question:

Did the Pakistan Army leadership lacked education and training in the higher direction of war? The answer is yes, the Pakistani military leadership lacked grooming to handle higher direction of war. At the time of the partition of the Indian Sub-continent in 1947, new armies had to grapple with the problems of creating balanced fighting force in the midst of the chaos.¹²⁵ India deprived Pakistan of its agreed share of military equipment and stores. Out of 170,000 tons of equipment and stores for Pakistan planned to move on 300 trainloads from India only three railway wagons arrived.¹²⁶

In 1946-47, the Indian component of the officer corps in the British military was almost 80 percent Hindu. There were no all-Muslim units as there were pure Hindu and Sikh units, a legacy of British distrust of Muslims' loyalty dating back to the war of independence against British rule.¹²⁷ Most of the defense production facilities and the bulk of the military stores were situated in India. Of the fixed installations, Pakistan received the Staff College, situated at Quetta, the Royal Indian Army Service Corps School at Kakul, and several regimental centers.¹²⁸ The officers' shortage was huge, for there were only one Pakistani major general, two brigadiers, and fifty-three colonels.¹²⁹ At the onset of 1965 War, the Pakistan Army had an officer corps with potential good raw material, but the senior leadership was inadequate.¹³⁰ Winston Churchill said, "...it takes three generations

¹²⁵ Brian, 3.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 3.

¹²⁷ Cohen, 6.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 7.

¹²⁹ Cohen, 8.

¹³⁰ Brian, 51.

to make a general staff.” The Pakistan Army came into being on paper on August 14, 1947 but there was no general staff with a century-long tradition of thinking in terms of national defense.¹³¹

In 1949, the Army setup C-in-C Training Advisory Staff (TASS) to train division and brigade commanders in functions of command. The Army obtained services of about half a dozen British officers.¹³² This experience was not particularly useful because the training exercises invariably started with advance to contact, an imitation of operations in North Africa or Burma during the World War II; something quite irrelevant to the Pakistan – India environment.¹³³ By 1956, the head of TASS stated interfering too much in the military functioning, including the ongoing reorganization. Thus, this program ended.¹³⁴

There was no system to plan the military education of the officers’ from basic military training for the next twenty years as a continuous, progressive, and coherent process.¹³⁵ From 1947 to 1956, the training institutions lacked high-level coordination to ensure smooth progression and transition in training different aspects of warfare. The course work was quite exhausting and the content was restrictive rather than expansive. From the military academy to the staff college, there was a ready preference for repeated doses of minor staff duties and minor tactics.¹³⁶ There was a corresponding vacuum in respect to higher direction of war, operational art, and scientific evaluation of equipment, organization, and tactics.¹³⁷ The planning board accepted the need for a national defense college for education in higher direction of war however; the Army leadership

¹³¹ Shaukat, 24.

¹³² Ibid., 27.

¹³³ Ibid., 28.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 28.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 42.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 42.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 42.

made the mistake of deferring its establishment.¹³⁸ In the absence of a war college, the senior commanders lacked training at the operational and strategic level to understand the higher direction of war.

Fourth research question:

Did the Pakistan Army's operational approach align with the policy objectives and military strategy during the 1965 War? The answer is yes the operational approach of the Pakistan Army aligned with the policy objectives and military strategy during the 1965 War. Pakistan's strategic objective in the 1965 War, as enunciated by President Ayub, was to resuscitate the Kashmir problem by starting an uprising in the IOK aimed at weakening Indian resolve, and bringing her to the negotiating table without provoking a general war.¹³⁹ Pakistan's underlying assumption was that the military actions in Kashmir could remain limited and that an all-out war was unlikely.¹⁴⁰ The Pakistani government tasked the Pakistani military to initiate an uprising in the IOK by infiltrating trained "Freedom Fighters" and launching the war of liberation.¹⁴¹ In case of a general war, the military strategy was to absorb the initial Indian offensives and subsequently transition to the offensive when the situation permitted.¹⁴² The military strategy of the Pakistan Army was defensive-offensive in nature.¹⁴³

In order to implement this strategy, the broad thrust lines of the Pakistan Army's operational approach included infiltrating around 7,000 freedom fighters into IOK to initiate a local

¹³⁸ Ibid., 44.

¹³⁹ Gauhar, 328.

¹⁴⁰ Nawaz, 130.

¹⁴¹ Qadir Shaukat, "Operation Gibraltar: The Battle that Never Was," *Rediff India Abroad* (2005), accessed November 10, 2016, <http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/sep/08war1.htm>.

¹⁴² Musa, 14.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 14.

uprising. In case of a general war, deploying the bulk of Army, two armored divisions, three infantry divisions and three independent infantry brigades in Punjab, the main theater of operations. Holding both armored divisions in their strategic concentration areas one north of the Ravi River and one south of it poised for counteroffensive...¹⁴⁴ Defending the areas of psychological-social importance in strength, which included Sialkot and Lahore. In Azad Kashmir executing a defensive posture and conducting tactical offensives when opportunity arises. Likewise, the Pakistan Army planned a defensive posture in East Pakistan employing minimum forces due to minimal perceived threat.

Overall, the operational approach was in line with the policy of thawing the Kashmir dispute through guerilla operations and with the military strategy premised on a defensive-offensive posture. However, the government did not provide enough flexibility to the Pakistan Army to plan operations in Kashmir at the time of its choosing.

Fifth research question:

Did the Pakistan Army correctly identify and exploit decisive points during the 1965 War? The answer is yes they correctly identified and exploited decisive points. Once infiltration of guerillas into the IOK did not yield enough results, and the Indian Army captured Haji Pir pass in Azad Kashmir, the Pakistan Army launched a counteroffensive to capture Akhnur, codenamed Operation Grand Slam...¹⁴⁵ It was not only a decisive point in view of the operational situation in Kashmir but also a geographic decisive point. Akhnur was a critical supply line for the Indian forces from India to Srinagar...¹⁴⁶ Indian General Lachhman Singh, in his book *Missed Opportunities* writes, "...Akhnur Bridge was like the Adam's apple as all communication between

¹⁴⁴ Musa, 22.

¹⁴⁵ Raza, 113.

¹⁴⁶ Bajwa, 105.

India and its garrisons in Chhamb, Naushahra, Rajauri, and Poonch passed over this bridge.”¹⁴⁷ In 1965, a single one-way bridge was the only link between India and her forces west of Chenab. If the Pakistani forces could have captured the Akhnur Bridge, they could have starved the large Indian forces west of the Chenab and destroy infantry formations using armor and artillery superiority.¹⁴⁸ The selection and exploitation of Akhnur as a decisive point served its main purpose by releasing the Indian pressure in the north, the Tithwal and Hajipir area of Azad Kashmir.¹⁴⁹ Moreover, Operation Grand Slam enabled the Pakistan Army to regain the initiative and gain a position of relative advantage.

The Pakistan Army launched a second counteroffensive to threaten Amritsar, a city of social and psychological importance. It was a decisive point in terms of the operational situation and a vital geographic location. India launched an offensive against Lahore threatening the capture of sensitive territory. To reduce pressure on the Lahore Sector, the Pakistan Army launched a counter offensive against Amritsar. The Pakistan Army’s C-in-C during the 1965 War states, “...it would have given us a great strategic advantage, and would have devastatingly demoralizing for the enemy.”¹⁵⁰ If the counteroffensive against Amritsar had been successful in investing it, or at least a division had lodged itself between Amritsar and road Harike – Lahore, this would have outflanked the Indian troops on the Lahore front.¹⁵¹ Indian General Lachhman Singh states, “...a swift and strong Pakistani thrust along Kasur – Khem Karan axis [towards Amritsar] offered promise of decisive results.”¹⁵² It would take the Indian 11 Corps from a flanking position and open a way to

¹⁴⁷ Lehl, 149.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 149.

¹⁴⁹ Musa, 100.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 60.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 61.

¹⁵² Lehl, 205.

reach the Indian rear and soft areas with dire consequences for the 11 Corps, especially as India had no reserve readily available against this threat. These accounts show that the Pakistan Army correctly identified various decisive points during the 1965 War, which enabled it to conduct effective operational art.

Sixth research question:

Did the Pakistan Army employ the element of risk during the 1965 War? The answer is yes the Pakistan Army took risks at numerous stages of the campaign. The Pakistan Army took a major strategic risk by launching Operation Gibraltar. The Indian Army in 1965 enjoyed an overwhelming numerical superiority over the Pakistan Army, 825,000 versus 230,000.¹⁵³ With this huge difference in military capability, launching of Operation Gibraltar in IOK involved a huge risk of starting an all-out war with India. On the other hand, this risk afforded the opportunity of initiating a popular uprising in IOK, forcing the Indian government to solve the Kashmir issue through dialogue. A major assumption that any conflict in Kashmir would remain restricted to it also emboldened the Pakistani government to launch Operation Gibraltar in IOK. Moreover, poor performance of the Indian Army during the Indo-China War 1962 and superb performance of the Pakistan Army in its encounter with the Indian army in the Run of Kutch on April 1965 encouraged policy makers to believe Pakistan could handle the Indian threat in the case of war.

The second risk taken by the Pakistan Army was to launch a riposte in Kashmir codenamed Operation Grand Slam. In this operation, the Pakistan Army employed 7 Infantry Division, which was part of its main strike force. This implied that this formation would not be available for main counteroffensive along with 1 Armored Division. However, Indian gains in Azad Kashmir forced

¹⁵³ Lehl, 67.

the Pakistan Army to launch this operation to cause a pull on the Indian forces operating in Kashmir.¹⁵⁴

This redistribution of forces contributed towards taking yet another risk. Once all-out war broke out on September 6, 1965, Indian 11 Corps attacked Lahore. When the Pakistan Army decided to launch her main counteroffensive in Kasur Sector, 7 Infantry Division was not available to accompany 1 Armored Division. The offensive capability of the counteroffensive force was greatly diminished by the absence of 7 Infantry Division.¹⁵⁵ However, the army employed part of 11 Infantry Division with 1 Armored Division. 11 Infantry Division's main task was to defend the Kasur Sector, which it successfully accomplished by repulsing the attack from the Indian 4 Mountain Division. The Pakistan Army took the risk of employing part of 11 Infantry Division, a defensive formation into an offensive role by thinning out the defenses of Kasur Sector. The opportunity offered by this risk was substantial because had this counteroffensive succeeded in cutting off Amritsar and road Harike - Lahore, Indian troops on the Lahore front would have been outflanked.¹⁵⁶ In 1965 campaign, the Pakistan Army took numerous risks, a few were necessitated by the operational situation, and the others provided opportunities of gaining position of relative advantage.

Seventh research question:

Did the Pakistan Army employ the element of balance during the 1965 War? The answer is that the Pakistan Army partially employed the element of balance. Initial disposition of forces ensured balance and correct disposition in view of defensive – offensive posture. Both armor divisions were correctly disposed to thwart any threat in Ravi Chenab Corridor (RCC) and Ravi

¹⁵⁴ Musa, 39.

¹⁵⁵ Lahl, 210.

¹⁵⁶ Musa, 39.

Bias Corridor (RBC). In Punjab, the Pakistan Army was operating on interior lines, which enabled it to move forces quickly in different sectors.¹⁵⁷ The speed with which the Pakistan Army undertook massive movements of forces during the war was praiseworthy as it ensured balance in the system of forces.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, the speed enabled the Pakistan Army to recover balance when it was lost.

The Indian Army launched her main offensive in Sialkot Sector. In order to achieve balance, the Pakistan Army redeployed its 1 Armored Division minus from Kasur Section and placed it in the Sialkot Sector near Pasrur. At the time of redeployment, 1 Armored Division was employed in a counteroffensive role across Kasur to threaten Amritsar. However, the Pakistan Army moved it to Pasrur once the threat developed in the Sialkot Sector to support the defensive effort and remain poised for a counteroffensive.¹⁵⁹ This quick transition of the armored division from one sector to another enabled the Pakistan Army to achieve balance in the Sialkot Sector.

At the tactical level, there were instances when the Pakistan Army formations lost sight of balance. The Pakistan Army launched Operation Gibraltar by culling troops from the 12 Infantry Division, responsible for the defense of Azad Kashmir. This decision weakened the base of operations, Batori Bulge and created imbalance in the 12 Infantry Division defenses. Indians forces exploited this tactical imbalance and captured Haji Pir Pass.¹⁶⁰

In order to dislocate the Pakistani tactical reserve in Sialkot Sector, the Indian Army launched a shaping operation in Jassar Sub-Sector before the launching of main effort in Charwah

¹⁵⁷ Mahmud, 532.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 532.

¹⁵⁹ Musa, 59.

¹⁶⁰ "In all fairness to 12 Division it must be acknowledged that losses of territory could have been greatly minimized if the four regular infantry battalions were not committed in Operation GIBRALTAR and NUSRAT." Mahmud, 69.

Sector.¹⁶¹ The 15 Infantry Division commander considered it as the main effort and moved the reserve comprised of 24 Infantry Brigade and 25 Cavalry, to Jassar. This resulted in an imbalance in his system of forces as the Indian main effort unfolded from Charwah. However, the Indian main effort failed to exploit this advantage.¹⁶² This explanation of balance in the case study revealed a mixed outcome. In operations, where the Pakistan Army adhered to the element of balance it thwarted the Indian designs, where they failed to balance, it denied them the achievement of desired operational ends.

Eighth research question:

Did the Pakistan Army employ and exploit the element of COG during the 1965 War? The answer is yes the Pakistan Army employed the element of COG but failed to exploit it. At various stages of the campaign, the Pakistan Army correctly identified the enemy's COG. While planning Operation Gibraltar, the Pakistan Army correctly identified "support of local population" as the COG. However, insufficient measures to motivate the local populace to support the guerilla operation contributed to the failure of the operation.

During the all-out war, the Pakistan Army correctly identified the Indian 1 Armored Division as their COG. It was the Indian Army's main strike force, capable of influencing the outcome of the war.¹⁶³ Given the terrain, its employment was more likely in Sialkot than Lahore due to the major water obstacle in Lahore.¹⁶⁴ However, Pakistani intelligence could not locate its employment area. Nonetheless, peacetime operational plans assumed the Indian 1 Armored Division's likely employment areas and placed enough armor to match the threat.

¹⁶¹ Shaukat, 145.

¹⁶² Bajwa, 258.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 251.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 251.

The Pakistan Army carefully carried out the initial strategic assembly of its COG, which was 1 Armored Division. The leadership discreetly kept it in the jungle of Changa Manga near Lahore to avoid detection. Once the Pakistan Army employed it in the counteroffensive in Khem Karan Sector, it achieved complete surprise. In the words of Indian General Lachhman Singh, “...unsuspected by the Indian intelligence, Pakistan assembled a formidable force for their masterly counter-stroke in Khem Karan Sector.”¹⁶⁵ Due to prewar operational preparations and operational understanding during the war, the Pakistan Army correctly identified enemy’s operational COGs, but in most of the operations, could not sufficiently address them, limiting the outcome of those operations.

¹⁶⁵ Lahl, 217.

Findings and Analysis

This section analyzes how well the Pakistan Army used operational art to achieve their strategic objectives in the 1965 War. The Pakistan Army employed the elements of decisive point, risk, balance, and COG to varying success. This section consists of two parts. The first part summarizes the findings of the eight structured focused questions, and the second part analyzes the three hypotheses.

The first research question asked whether the changes in doctrine, organization, and equipment enabled the Pakistan Army to improve its operational art. The Pakistan Army carried out a major restructuring, reorganization, and rearmament program in the late 1950s. The United States provided military hardware to the Pakistan Army to make up deficiencies in five and a half division. The Pakistan Army replaced old British doctrine with a new doctrine specific to its operational environment. The Army by reforming its field formations, training centers, schools of instructions, static installations, and the General Headquarters (GHQ) improved its operational capacity manifold. These changes transformed the Pakistan Army into a better professional outfit, sufficiently equipped, trained, and structured to conduct operational art.

The second research question asked whether the political system and internal politics in Pakistan negatively affected formulation of policy and grand strategy before the 1965 War. Field Marshall Ayub Khan became a martial law administer after imposing martial law in 1958 and. In January 1965, he narrowly retained his presidency after winning a controversial election. Few politicians with vested interests encircled Ayub and he became increasingly isolated from criticism and sincere advice. This affected formulation of policy and grand strategy toward India. The

president left policy formation to a few chosen individuals, and consultation with other stakeholders was not a norm. The policy towards India rested on assumptions by the foreign office, which proved wrong once an all-out war broke out with India. The internal politics in Pakistan negatively affected formulation of a coherent and well thought out grand strategy against India.

The third research question asked whether the Pakistan Army leadership lacked education and training in the higher direction of the war. At independence in 1947, Pakistan had a critical shortage of officers and military training institutions. Over the period of time, strength and training of the officers improved. However, the absence of a war college inhibited training on strategy, handling of bigger formations in the battlefield, and the ability to synchronize operations in time, space, and purpose. This institutional deficiency negatively affected the ability of the senior commanders to conceive the war as one whole and understand the implications of one operation on the overall campaign.

The fourth research question asked whether the Pakistan Army's operational approach aligned with policy objectives and military strategy during the 1965 War. In line with policy, the Pakistan Army developed an operational approach aimed at initiating freedom movement in the IOK and preparing for the eventuality of an all-out war with India. The operational approach called for absorbing the initial Indian offensive and subsequently transitioning to the offensive when the situation permitted. This operational approach aligned with the military strategy, which called for a defensive-offensive posture in West Pakistan and a defensive-defensive posture in East Pakistan. Overall, the operational approach was in concert with policy and strategy. It enabled the Pakistan Army to absorb the blows of an Indian Army three times its own size, yet launch offensive operations to achieve the parity of effects to improve the position for a post-war bargain. An operational approach tied to policy and strategy facilitated the Pakistan Army to employ effective operational art.

The fifth research question asked whether the Pakistan Army correctly identified and exploited decisive points during the 1965 War. Throughout the war, the Pakistan Army correctly identified and exploited decisive points. To stabilize the situation in Kashmir, after the failure of Operation Gibraltar and capture Haji Pir Pass by India, the Pakistan Army correctly identified Akhnur as a decisive point. It launched her counteroffensive against Akhnur to cause a pull on to the Indian forces operating in Kashmir. The Pakistan Army launched a second counteroffensive in Punjab to threaten Amritsar, a city of social-psychological importance. In both cases, the selected places acted as decisive points due to the operational situation as well as due to their geographic significance. Correctly, identifying and exploiting these decisive points enabled the Pakistan Army to employ effective operational art at critical junctures of the campaign and achieve a position of relative advantage.

The sixth research question asked whether the Pakistan Army employed the element of risk during the 1965 War. The Pakistan Army, on numerous occasions took risks at both strategic and operational level. Launching Operational Gibraltar and inciting a three times bigger armed forces for war was a strategic risk. However, this risk provided the opportunity of initiating an uprising in the IOK and forcing India to solve the issue of Kashmir through negotiations. The risk to initiate a freedom struggle in IOK proved costly. The political objective of Pakistan was to resuscitate the Kashmir issue. However, the means employed and the risks taken were grossly disproportionate to the results achieved.¹⁶⁶ At the operational level, employing part of the strategic reserve in Operation Grand Slam was a major operational risk. Likewise, employing 11 Division, a defensive formation in an offensive role in Operation Mail Fist was a significant operational risk. The leadership of the Pakistan Army took these risks due to the opportunities attached to them and the

¹⁶⁶ Mahmud, 533.

dictates of the operational situation. Employing the element of risk with opportunities facilitated the Pakistan Army to employ effective operational art.

The seventh research question asked whether the Pakistan Army employed the element of balance during the 1965 War. From the case study, a mixed outcome is evident on balance. The initial disposition of the Pakistan Army ensured balance as it provided flexibility to handle threats to core areas of Pakistan. The transition of the 1 Armored Division from Kasur to Pasrur enabled the Pakistan Army to achieve balance in Sialkot Sector against the main Indian effort. However, at the tactical level, culling out troops from 12 Infantry Division for Operation Gibraltar created an imbalance in its defense. Moreover, the wrong employment of 24 Infantry Brigade and 25 Cavalry against the shaping operation in the Sialkot Sector created an imbalance in 15 Division's defense. During the campaign, when the forces were in a state of balance, the Pakistan Army was able to employ effective operational art and achieve operational successes as highlighted in the case study. Meanwhile, the negligence of balance inhibited employment of operational art resulting in few reversals both at the operational and tactical levels.

The eighth research question asked whether the Pakistan Army employed the element of COG the 1965 War. The Pakistan Army correctly identified operational COGs during operations in the 1965 War. However, it could not exploit this advantage to the fullest. In Operation Gibraltar, the Pakistan Army correctly identified the support of the local population of Kashmir as COG, but they did not take enough measures to garner this support. During the Indian invasion of the mainland Pakistan, the Pakistan Army correctly identified the Indian 1 Armored Division as their COG but could not identify its exact employment location. On the other hand, the Pakistan Army successfully deceived the Indians about the initial assembly and area of employment of the Pakistan Army's COG, which was Pakistani 1 Armored Division. However, this strong armor force could not accomplish its operational objective due to the piecemeal employment of the offensive force

once committed. Overall the Pakistan Army could not destroy enemy operational COGs in different operations in the 1965 War, which negatively affected employment of operational art.

The first hypothesis states that new doctrine, organizations, and equipment enabled the Pakistan Army to employ effective operational art in the 1965 War. The evidence from the case study supports this hypothesis. The Pakistan Army undertook a major reorganization and rearmament program in the late 1950s that enhanced its combat potential. As part of the 5 ½ Division plan, the United States provided military hardware to Pakistan, which included tanks, APC, and artillery guns. The reforms took place in all military schools of instructions and regimental centers. The Pakistan Army adopted a new doctrine that focused on holding the area of responsibility with firepower and keeping enough reserve at all tiers.

The second hypothesis states that the lack of understanding of the higher direction of war by the politicians and military leadership of Pakistan affected its policy and military strategy. The evidence from the case study supports this hypothesis. Pakistan was under martial law at the onset of the 1965 War. President Ayub was losing his popularity due to the controversial win in the election in January 1965. The foreign minister, Bhutto won the trust of Ayub and had a strong influence on decision-making. Sycophants surrounded the President and kept him away from reality. On the other hand, the military leadership lacked education and training in higher direction of war and campaign planning due to the absence of a war college. It affected their understanding of operational art, war planning, and commanding larger formations in wars.

The third hypothesis states that the Pakistan Army successfully employed elements of operational art during 1965 War. The evidence from the case study suggests a mixed outcome. The Pakistan Army successfully used the element of decisive point both at the strategic and operational levels. The military leadership also employed the element of risk in numerous operations to exploit opportunities afforded by risks. However, the Pakistan Army partially employed and exploited the element of balance and COG, which inhibited an overwhelming success to the Pakistan Army in the

1965 War. Nonetheless, application of these elements of operational art enabled the Pakistan Army to gain partial success in attaining the strategic ends and denying the three times bigger Indian Army its strategic ends.

Conclusion

This study examined the 1965 War to identify whether the Pakistan Army employed operational art to achieve their strategic ends. Indian stubbornly resisted a peaceful solution in line with the United Nations Security Council's resolution and forced Pakistan to resort to military options. After instilling martial law in 1958, Field Marshal Ayub Khan was still President in 1965. He had a close circle of advisors and policy makers led by an energetic and young foreign minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who believed in taking a hard line with India on Kashmir. In the late 1950s, Pakistan became a close ally of the United States and received substantial military aid from the relationship.

To bring the Kashmir issue to the international limelight and India to the negotiating table, the government of Pakistan decided to infiltrate freedom fighters in the IOK to initiate a freedom movement. India enjoyed numerical superiority in armed forces by more than three to one; therefore, Pakistan did not want an all-out war with India. However, the policy makers in Pakistan assumed that any action by Pakistan in the IOK would remain confined to Kashmir and India would not initiate an all-out war. This assumption proved wrong when India attacked mainland Pakistan in response to the Pakistani intervention in IOK. India, with its numerically superior forces, believed that they could defeat the Pakistani armed forces and capture large swaths of the Pakistani territory. After seventeen days of fighting, Pakistan and India agreed to a cease-fire, but the war ended with

no clear winner. Pakistan successfully highlighted the significance of the Kashmir issue at the international level but had to pay excessive costs. On the other hand, India, with more than three times bigger armed forces, failed to defeat the smaller Pakistani armed forces and attain its strategic objectives.

The study focused on eight research questions to evaluate operations of 1965 War within the theoretical framework of operational art. The first research question asked whether changes in doctrine, organization, and equipment enabled the Pakistan Army to improve its operational art. The second research question asked whether the political system in Pakistan negatively affected the formulation of policy and grand strategy at the onset of the 1965 War. The third research question asked whether the Pakistan Army leadership lacked education and training in the higher direction of the war. The fourth research question asked whether the Pakistan Army's operational approach aligned with the policy objectives and military strategy during the 1965 War. The fifth research question asked whether the Pakistan military correctly identified and exploited decisive points during the 1965 War. The sixth research question asked whether the Pakistan Army employed the element of risk during the 1965 War. The seventh research question asked whether the Pakistan Army employed the element of balance during its operations during the 1965 War. The final research question asked whether the Pakistan Army employed the element of COG during the 1965 War. These questions focused the examination on the specific operational and tactical actions conducted to achieve the strategic objectives.

Three hypotheses drove this study. The evidence supports two hypotheses and leads to a mixed outcome on the third hypothesis. The evidence supports the first hypothesis that new doctrine, organizations, and equipment enabled the Pakistan Army to employ effective operational art in the 1965 War. The evidence also supports the second hypothesis that the lack of understanding of the higher direction of war by the politicians and military leadership of Pakistan affected the policy and military strategy. The evidence from the case study suggests a mixed

outcome for the third hypothesis, that the Pakistan Army successfully employed elements of operational art during 1965 War. In this regard, this study assessed the elements of the decisive point, risk, balance, and COG. The evidence supports the use of decisive point and risk; however, it only partially supports the use of balance and COG.

This case study on the 1965 War provides historical evidence for operational planners to consider when applying the elements of operational art. The case study has been analyzed against four elements of operational art: decisive points, risks, balance, and COG. The application of these elements allowed the Pakistan Army to face the challenge of a three times bigger Indian Army and achieve substantial gains. Employment of these elements enabled the Pakistan Army to act as a coherent force and constantly keep the enemy in a dilemma. Had the Pakistan Army enjoyed the numerical superiority of 3:1 over the Indian Army, it might have succeeded in achieving a decisive victory in the 1965 War. The element of balance is new for US military planners as it is not part of the US Army elements of operational art. However, it provides an additional lens to military planners once analyzing or planning a campaign.

This study is significant to military professionals for numerous reasons. At the strategic level, it shows that how the absence of a democratic government and internal politics affect policy making and formulating strategic objectives. At the onset of 1965 War, Field Marshall Ayub Khan led the government in Pakistan and policymaking was in the hands of a select group, who enjoyed the trust of the President. In 1965 War, the government of Pakistan exceeded its role and dictated, the Pakistan Army on how to achieve policy ends in Kashmir with a specific timeframe. This overstepping constrained the Pakistan Army in developing its options and timeline. This study illustrates that military plans should not rest on enemy intentions alone; rather they should focus on enemy capabilities as the former can change over time. The government of Pakistan decided to venture into the IOK based on the assumption that in the case of a conflict in Kashmir, India will not attack mainland Pakistan. Whereas India with superior force ratio had the capacity to invade

Pakistan. The case study also shows importance of training senior military leadership in the higher direction of the war, so that they can handle operations of larger formations and synchronize them in time, space, and purpose to achieve the strategic ends.

This study reflects that a numerically smaller force with high morale, patriotic spirit, discipline, better doctrine, and the support of the nation can persevere against a numerically superior adversary. The Indian Army had an overwhelming numerical superiority over the Pakistan Army, 825,000 versus 230,000. Nonetheless, the Pakistan Army denied its enemy any substantial gains in the war and achieved parity in effects by capturing and threatening sensitive places in India. This highlights the importance of offensive spirit in war and defensive – offensive posture for even a numerically inferior force with requisite offensive capability. Adaptation of defensive – offensive posture enabled the Pakistan Army to launch a riposte and counteroffensives at the critical juncture of the war to off balance the enemy and threaten sensitive Indian territories.

The research identifies other areas to study including a study on the application of operational art by the entire armed forces of Pakistan in the 1965 War as this study only focuses on the Pakistan Army. A comparative study on the application of operational art by the Pakistan and Indian Armies in the 1965 War is a valuable research topic. Another area for future study is to examine the impact of nuclearization in South Asia on the application of operational art by Pakistan and India in any future conflict.

This case study on the 1965 War provides military professionals with a historical example of the application of operational art in the diverse terrain of Pakistan and India. This study is useful, as it aims at linking the subjective knowledge of operational art with the practical setting of the 1965 War. It signifies the importance of civil-military collaboration in formulating policy and strategy, as well as the importance of training for the higher direction of war, and the importance of four elements of operational art: decisive points, risks, balance, and COG.

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