


Fighting for Intelligence:  
Preparing Division Intelligence Operations for Large Scale  
Combat

A Monograph

by

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## Abstract

Fighting for Intelligence: Preparing Division Intelligence Operations for Large Scale Combat, by MAJ Brian D. Chavis, US Army, 59 pages.

The last seventeen years of counterinsurgency operations saw many of the Army's division-level intelligence analysts and equipment remain in static, centralized tactical operations centers to facilitate intelligence support to ground operations. The recently published Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (October 2017), shifts the Army's focus from counterinsurgency to large scale ground combat operations. These operations bring with them the requirement for divisions to be able to establish multiple forward command posts (CPs) that are survivable and able to facilitate mission command in degraded and contested domains. To support large scale combat, intelligence sections must rebalance personnel, capabilities, and equipment across all CPs a division is capable of establishing to enable the survivability of the division's Intelligence Warfighting Function. This requires moving personnel and intelligence specific equipment out of the Main Command Post and the Tactical Command Post to support the Support Area/Early Entry Command Post and the Mobile Command Group if desired by the commander. To account for US peer threat adversaries' ability to contest the US Army's access to the space domain through electronic and cyber-attack, this reorganization also requires adjustments in the division's communication plan to account for analog communication.

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## Acronyms

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ATO	Air Tasking Order
ATP	Army Training Pamphlet
C2	Command and Control
CP	Command Post
EECP	Early Entry Command Post
FM	Field Manual
G-2	Intelligence Officer in Charge
G-2	Intelligence Section
ISIS	Islamic State in Syria
ISIL	Islamic State in Libya
LSCO	Large Scale Combat Operations
MCG	Mobile Command Group
MCP	Main Command Post
MCPOD	Main Command Post Operational Detachment
MDO	Multi-Domain Operations
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo

PLA	Peoples Liberation Army
SACP	Support Area Command Post
TAC	Tactical Command Post
TOC	Tactical Operations Center



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## Introduction

The fluid and chaotic nature of large-scale combat operations will cause the greatest degree of fog, friction, and stress on the intelligence warfighting function.

- Army Doctrine Publication 2-0, *Intelligence*

Over the last seventeen years, the Army's intelligence apparatus largely operated in support of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Collectively, Army divisions have deployed over twenty times in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). That number is also the number of division intelligence sections that answered the Nation's call to arms in support of defeating Al Qaida, Islamic State in Syria (ISIS), Islamic State in Libya (ISIL) and other terrorist groups operating throughout the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Each deployment is defined by different operating environments, unique missions, and varying levels of operational successes and failures, but one commonality exists: division intelligence operations were largely conducted by analysts using equipment in static, centralized tactical operations centers (TOC). As the Army prepares for the future of combat operations, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (October 2017), shifts the focus from counterinsurgency to preparing to fight a peer competitor in large scale combat operations (LSCO). FM 3-0 makes it clear that a divisions primary role is to "serve as tactical headquarters commanding brigades in decisive action."<sup>1</sup> These operations bring with them the requirement for divisions to be able to establish multiple forward command posts (CPs) that are mobile, survivable, and able to facilitate mission command in degraded and contested domains.

A critical capability enabling division intelligence operations during OIF and OEF was an uncontested space domain. Commanders and subordinate units received near real-time intelligence collected, processed, exploited, and disseminated through an intelligence architecture using satellites in a space domain insurgent groups did not have the capability to affect.

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<sup>1</sup> US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017).

In addition to an uncontested communication network, the insurgent's guerilla tactics, largely focused on host nation government facilities and population centers, allowed division intelligence sections to operate on large forward operating bases (FOB) without a significant need to plan for section survivability and mobility. Division CPs were not under threat of consistent and direct targeting by an enemy requiring constant relocation on the battlefield. Large scale combat will not afford intelligence sections the luxury of domain supremacy or assumed survivability. Peer adversaries will contest US forces in all domains and may even reach supremacy in certain domains for periods of time. *FM 2-0, Intelligence*, states "units must be prepared to fight for intelligence against a range of threats, enemy formations, and unknowns."<sup>2</sup> The change in threat does not change the role of intelligence to provide "timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence to understand threat characteristics, goals and objectives, and courses of action to successfully execute offensive and defensive tasks."<sup>3</sup> The change in threat does, however, raise the expectations of intelligence. Large scale combat represents a paradigm shift in how intelligence operations are executed. Divisions will likely establish multiple and constantly mobile CPs across large geographic areas to provide execute its mission command responsibilities and intelligence must be prepared to support them.

Army doctrine discusses five types of CPs a division is capable of establishing a Main Command Post (MCP), a Tactical Command Post (TAC), a Mobile Command Group, a Support Area Command Post (SACP) and an Early Entry Command Post (EECP). Each CP performs a different function which enables more effective mission command. As presently established in Army Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), division intelligence sections are only authorized personnel and equipment to operate in the MCP and the TAC. It cannot be assumed that the other CPs would not be used in LSCO environments. Army divisions must

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<sup>2</sup> US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 2-0, *Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), Foreword.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-8.

ensure its intelligence sections are structured to effectively operate in multiple CPs that are under constant threat of attack, requiring the ability to relocate quickly to survive.

There is an increased likelihood the ability to communicate will be limited due a contested space domain, affecting satellite-based communications. Current intelligence architecture relies on satellites to transmit critical intelligence between the information collectors in the subordinate units and analytical cells in the division CPs. A loss in satellite availability significantly impacts the division intelligence section's ability to support the commander in understanding, visualizing, and describing the enemy threat. Equipment authorizations used to establish the intelligence architecture for the division lack the flexibility and redundancy to support intelligence operations executed in an environment where satellite-based communication is denied.

This monograph explores the best way for division intelligence sections to organize its personnel and intelligence architecture to operate in multiple command posts in environments of enhanced mobility, survivability, and in a contested space domain during Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). To support multiple command posts beyond Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment authorizations, division intelligence sections must ensure that across the various command posts, redundancy exists for all division intelligence section tasks. Select Soldiers from the G-2 Headquarters, G-2X, and the Analysis and Control Element must execute their tasks in a mobile configuration. To operate in a denied or contested space environment, division intelligence sections should establish Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency communications plans that include an analog messenger system to disseminate intelligence to the other division CPs and subordinate units. In LSCO environments, intelligence functions may be significantly reduced due to the increased tempo of operations, especially in the offense.

Division intelligence sections must be properly postured to support LSCO at the operational level. Regardless of the operating environment, division intelligence must provide the commander, staff, and subordinate units with the most timely and accurate information possible.

In addition, the relationship between intelligence and operations is reciprocal, “intelligence drives operations and operations enable intelligence.”<sup>4</sup> Not having the right intelligence personnel and equipment in the right places reduces the operational effectiveness of the organization. Further analysis can determine 1) if the intelligence personnel and equipment currently authorized to the division are adequate to support multiple command posts and 2) provide recommendations regarding how a G-2 should organize those assets to support mission command operations during large scale combat operations.

In order to find supporting evidence to test the hypothesis, this study relies on four research questions. First, what are the operational environments that division intelligence sections are expected to operate in during large-scale combat operations? Second, how are current division intelligence sections designed to operate? What gaps in capability exist in its ability to support the requirements of LSCO operations? Third, how did intelligence sections operate in LSCO environments in the past in which units were constantly moving and communication networks were not as assessable as they have been in recent counterinsurgency operations? Finally, based on best practices in the current force, what can G-2s do internal to their sections to better support division level LSCO?

Several key terms need to be defined to provide better clarity of the issues being discussed and the thesis of the monograph. Mobility is defined as “a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission.”<sup>5</sup> As it pertains to mobility, this monograph discusses the

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<sup>4</sup> US Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 2-0, Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), 2-1.

<sup>5</sup> US Department of the Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), 156.

intelligence section's ability to execute its primary tasks while conducting survivability moves.<sup>6</sup> Discussions about survivability pertain to "all aspects of protecting personnel, weapons, and supplies while simultaneously deceiving the enemy."<sup>7</sup>

Section I describes the environments that intelligence sections are expected to operate in and the problems that division intelligence sections must address to best support LSCO. Section II studies intelligence operations at the division level. This section reviews a division intelligence operation during World War II (WWII), the last time LSCO was conducted by US Army forces without the use of satellites to facilitate communications and intelligence collection. In particular, the 80th Infantry Division's use of intelligence as it operated across Northern France in 1944 and 1945 in General George Patton's Third US Army. This study identifies lessons learned and best practices with respect to intelligence section organization and information dissemination. In addition, this monograph discusses the recent MTOE history of a division intelligence section how those changes impact the sections ability to support LSCO. Section III studies how division G-2s are currently training for LSCO in order to identify capability gaps ahead of large-scale combat not addressed by current training trends. Section III also recommends an organizational structure allowing division intelligence sections to better support large scale ground combat operations and evaluates this recommendation using screening criteria based on doctrinal requirements for ensuring CP survivability and accomplishing the requirements of division-level intelligence operations. Section IV concludes the monograph with key insights critical to the execution of intelligence operations in large-scale combat.

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<sup>6</sup> Survivability is the overarching concept discussed throughout the monograph, but the focus of evaluation is on survivability moves defined by ADRP 3-90 as "a move that involves rapidly displacing unit, command post, or facility in response to direct and indirect fires, the approach of an enemy unit, a natural phenomenon or as a proactive measure based on intelligence, meteorological data and risk analysis of enemy capabilities and intentions (including weapons of mass destruction)."

<sup>7</sup> US Department of the Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), 2-1.

## Section I – Denied Domains: The Nature of Large-Scale Combat

### Large Scale Combat

To better understand the role of intelligence in LSCO, it is important to describe a LSCO environment. While Army doctrine does not explicitly define large scale combat by the number of forces involved at any specific echelon, Figure 1 from FM 3-0 places operations associated with large scale combat at the far right of the Conflict Continuum as a response to war with a full complement of military operations at the disposal of the nation’s strategic leaders. LSCO operations “occur in the form of major operations and campaigns aimed a defeating an enemy’s armed forces and military capabilities in support of national objectives.”<sup>8</sup>




Figure 1. The conflict continuum and the range of military operations. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (2017), 1-1.

The operational environment in which LSCO occurs is extremely complex and wrought with friction and an evolving threat. FM 3-0 states “historically, large-scale combat operations have been more chaotic, intense, and highly destructive.”<sup>9</sup> WWII is an example of LSCO. The United States mobilized twenty corps and ninety divisions during the United States’ direct involvement in the war from 1942-1945. US casualties for the war exceed over 400,000 Soldiers

<sup>8</sup> US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 1-2.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 1-2.

and civilians. Collectively for all countries involved in the war battle deaths and injuries for soldiers and civilians totaled over 80 million people.<sup>10</sup>

### The Current/Emerging Operating Environment

According the *2017 National Security Strategy of the United States*, China is “building the most capable and well-funded military in the world, after the US and Russia poses an existential threats to the nation.”<sup>11</sup> The emerging environment in which the US military will operate is characterized by our peer competitor’s ability to contest all domains (land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace) in LSCO and at levels below armed conflict. China and Russia have each spent millions of dollars in modernizing their militaries. These efforts range from China reorganizing the Army to execute combined arms combat to Russian developing long range intercontinental ballistic missiles. The latest improvements center around the development of technologies that allow them to compete with the US in the space domain. Figure 2 depicts the various ways a peer competitor can conduct counterspace activities. While China’s intentions for counterspace capabilities remain largely theoretical, Russia is testing theories associated with denial and deception, cyber-attacks and what is most attributable to them, electronic warfare. Contesting the United States along the electromagnetic spectrum, directly challenges the military’s ability to execute large scale combat operations and conduct proper command and control.

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<sup>10</sup> The National World War II Museum, “Worldwide Deaths in World War II,” accessed December 8, 2018, <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/research-starters/research-starters-worldwide-deaths-world-war>.

<sup>11</sup> President of the United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017).






Figure 2. The Counterspace Continuum. Defense Intelligence Agency, *Challenges to Security in Space*, 2019, 36.

### The Chinese Threat

A 2016 report published by the Congressional Research Services Office estimates the Chinese military has a troop strength of 2.3 million Soldiers with approximately 1.4 million of those Soldiers belonging to the Peoples Liberation Army (PLAA).<sup>12</sup> In April 2017, China began a significant restructure as “the PLAA dissolved 5 of its 18 group army headquarters and is changing core operational units from divisions and regiments to brigades and battalions.”<sup>13</sup> Despite this reorganization, China’s seventy-eight combined arms brigades marginally outnumber the amount of US Army combat brigades, which sits at seventy-one.

In addition to its ground capabilities, China has made significant strides in the cyber and land domain to contest the United States’ dominance in these realms over the last few decades. At the strategic level, “China is developing anti-satellite capabilities, including research and possible

<sup>12</sup> Ian E. Rinehart, *The Chinese Military: Overview and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Office, 2016), 2.

<sup>13</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), 24.

development of directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers, and probably has made progress on the antisatellite missile system that it tested in July 2014.”<sup>14</sup> These capabilities are finding their way onto the battlefield at the tactical level. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), “electronic countermeasure (ECM) units are equipped with a range of modern ground-based electronic warfare systems capable of targeting large portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. PLAA ECM units use HF/VHF/UHF, radar, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-borne jamming systems to support maneuver forces.”<sup>15</sup>

### The Russian Threat

Russia’s recent military conflicts demonstrate a steady evolution in their ability to contest the space domain. The space domain is home to countless US satellites which enable military ground communications, GPS synchronization, and UAS operations. Russia, like the United States views space as a warfighting domain and achieving supremacy in the domain is integral to winning future conflicts. Russia views American reliance on the space domain as the Achilles heel of the military. This belief drives Russia’s policy not to rely on space for its own defense mission, and to also find ways to exploit the relationship the United States has with the domain to further Russia’s objectives on the battlefield. The DIA states Russia “is developing an array of weapons designed to interfere with or destroy an adversary’s satellites.”<sup>16</sup> Russia uses a variety of methods to target the domain such as cyber-warfare, directed energy weapons, ground based kinetic missiles, and other orbital satellites. Each method is designed to disable US satellites and sensors in space. These capabilities will only expand over the next decade. The DIA believes “Russia believes its counterspace forces will offer its military leaders the ability to control

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<sup>14</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency, *China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019), 43.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 58.

<sup>16</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency, *Challenge to Security in Space* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019), 24.

escalation of a conflict through selective targeting of adversary space systems.”<sup>17</sup> However, the biggest threat to the space domain at the operational level comes from Russia’s ability to conduct electronic warfare.

At the operational and tactical levels of war, Russia intends to directly challenge the United States’ ability to use satellites to conduct command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations (C4ISR). John Grady states by 2020, Russia expects to field a “a full spectrum of EW capabilities to counter western C4ISR and weapons guidance systems with new technology, data transfer, and capabilities for peacetime and wartime.”<sup>18</sup> The evolution of their EW capabilities is evident in its recent activity in Georgia, Crimea, the Ukraine, and Syria. Although EW has been a Russian capability dating back to the 1980s, the Russo-Georgia War of 2008 demonstrated a revived capability that drew the attention of outside analysts and marked the beginning of Russia’s modern EW capabilities development. During this conflict Russia’s use of EW was limited; largely used in a force protection capacity at the operational and strategic levels. The successful employment of EW in Georgia drove Russia’s desire to expand its use in future operations. In 2014, EW was integrated into tactical units during Russian operations in Crimea. John Grady’s research revealed that according to some reports, “in each motorized rifle brigade was an EW unit of 150 to 180 non-conscript soldiers engaged in planning and executing missions.”<sup>19</sup> As the Crimean conflict continued, Russia integrated EW so well, no Russian operation was conducted without EW support. While Crimea established the employment of EW at the tactical and operational level, Russia’s actions in the Donbas region of the Ukraine provide the greatest insight into how Russia uses EW at the operational level.

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>18</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency, *Challenges to Security in Space* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019), 28.

<sup>19</sup> John Grady, “Russian Operations, Exercises Have Better Integrated Electronic Warfare,” *US Naval Institute News*, January 30, 2018, accessed April 12, 2019, <https://news.usni.org/2018/01/30/russian-operations-exercises-have-integrated-electronic-warfare>.

It is estimated over forty-three pieces of Russian electronic warfare equipment was used in the Donbas region during their conflict in the Ukraine. The conflict revealed Russia's modern use of EW. Studying Russia's EW employment practices reveal four distinct ways in which they use their EW capabilities to increase the likelihood of success on the battlefield:

1. Target Ukrainian UAS by jamming controller or GPS signals
2. Disrupt electronically fused munitions ranging from artillery to mortars
3. Disrupt enemy communications: in some parts of the region, no communications systems function
4. Target enemy C2 by detecting electromagnetic emissions, which can be located and targeted<sup>20</sup>

It is believed that Russia began jamming drones in the Ukraine. Perhaps its most complex EW system is believed to have played a significant role in the defeat of Ukrainian forces in the Battle of Debaltseve in 2015. Sergey Sukhankin explains the RB-301B is an EW platform “designed for radio intelligence and jamming of HF/UHF...at the tactical and operational-tactical command levels.”<sup>21</sup> NBC News notes that in addition to targeting C2 nodes, Russia targeted “United Nations surveillance drones that were attempting to monitor the area, grounding the fleet for days and halting intelligence gathering from the air.”<sup>22</sup> Ukrainian drones were not immune from targeting either. Russia employed not only ground systems but UASs as well to target Ukrainian drones by “jamming against satellite, cellular and radio communication systems along with GPS

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<sup>20</sup> Roger N. McDermont, *Russia's Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025: Challenging NATO in the Electromagnetic Spectrum*, (International Centre for Defense and Security, September 2017), 25.

<sup>21</sup> Sergey Sukhankin, “Russian Electronic Warfare in Ukraine: Between Real and Imaginable,” *The Jamestown Foundation*, May, 26, 2017, accessed April 15, 2019, [https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/05/26/russian\\_electronic\\_warfare\\_in\\_ukraine\\_111460.html](https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/05/26/russian_electronic_warfare_in_ukraine_111460.html)

<sup>22</sup> Courtney Kube, “Russia has figured out how to jam U.S. drones in Syria, officials say,” (NBC News, April 10, 2018, accessed April 1, 2019, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/russia-has-figured-out-how-jam-u-s-drones-syria-n863931>).

spoofing.”<sup>23</sup> Despite the advances in EW demonstrated in the Ukraine, Russia is constantly testing new capabilities in other theaters of conflict.

The distances at which the Ukrainian military encountered different forms of EW informs how Russia may use EW against a US Army division to contest the formations access to the space domain, a critical component in the divisions ability to effectively conduct operations. Figure 3 is depiction of the ranges at which Russia employs its EW systems using US Army battlefield geometry as a reference point. Russia begins its EW operations 240 kilometers from the line of contact. Any activities operating within this range is likely to be a target of EW effects to include GPS spoofing, degrading the connection between electronic line of site systems, or jamming of specific radio frequencies all of which have an intended effect to disrupt enemy C4ISR systems.




Figure 3. Russia’s Operational Electromagnetic Range Fan. *Source:* Created by author

Russia uses Syria as a test bed for its military technologies. During the 2018 GEOINT Summit, General Raymond Thomas, a former commander of US Special Operations Command

<sup>23</sup> Liam Collins, “Russia Gives Lessons in Electronic Warfare,” *AUSA*, July 26, 2018, accessed April 9, 2019, <https://www.ausa.org/articles/russia-gives-lessons-electronic-warfare>.



noted that “Syria has become “the most aggressive EW environment on the planet.”<sup>24</sup> General Thomas went on to say adversaries were “knocking our communications down and disabling our AC-130s.”<sup>25</sup> Russia demonstrated an advancement in its EW capabilities by successfully jamming US Unmanned Aerial Systems in the region. Russia targeted smaller US drones by preventing them from receiving GPS satellite signals. It is also believed more sophisticated systems have been fielded in the region by Russia with the intent to target larger UAS systems and C4ISR nodes in accordance with their strategic intent for counterspace operations.

A peer adversary’s ability to disrupt army division operations is significant when taking into consideration the level of space-based systems the army relies on to execute many functions such as mission command and intelligence collection and dissemination. Our peer adversaries will use our electronic signatures to find us and target our C4ISR nodes with a combination of lethal and non-lethal effects. Figure 3 demonstrates that division formations are in range of Russian EW as far back as the consolidation area. Russia can force divisions to fight with “digital blindness” characterized by zero to minimal communication between echelons and with intelligence only based on ground reconnaissance forces. Even with that information, no matter how good, it is not guaranteed those reports will reach the appropriate audiences in time to influence decisions. Divisions must get comfortable with increased ambiguity and truly operating according to mission command principles such as building teams through mutual trust, exercising disciplined initiative, and accepting prudent risk.

#### Multi-Domain Operations: A Response to Peer Threats

While Unified Land Operations (ULO) remains the Army’s operating concept for conducting warfare, the US Army is exploring its role in a joint concept known as Multi-Domain

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<sup>24</sup> Raymond Chandler, “2018 GEOINT Summit Keynote Address” (video) April 25, 2018, accessed April 19, 2019, <https://www10.gisafe.com/video/USGIF-Keynote-Gen.-Raymond-A.-Thomas-III-Commander-U.S.-Special-Operations-Command/577952/media.html>.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

Operations (MDO). It is not doctrine, but provides a broad approach to defeating peer adversaries in competition and in armed combat, if required. While aimed toward China and Russia, the concepts it espouses can apply to any adversary. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028* helps to answer the question “How does the Army enable the Joint Force to compete with China and Russia below armed conflict, penetrate and dis-integrate their anti-access and area denial systems and ultimately defeat them in armed conflict and consolidate gains, and then return to competition?”<sup>26</sup> MDO is designed to present the enemy with multiple dilemmas simultaneously. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 explains MDO as “the ability of Army formations at echelon to converge capabilities in multiple ways and sequences provide the Joint Force Commander with options to impose additional complexity on the enemy.”<sup>27</sup> MDO has three tenets which, when applied, serve as a baseline method of countering threats posed by peer adversaries:

- 1) Calibrated Force Posture – This tenet speaks to the Army’s ability to rapidly project the appropriate mix of force and capabilities (dictated by the situation) to any location worldwide to prevent adversaries from succeeding in large-scale combat operations. This force projection is conducted through the use of forward forces already in the theater of conflict to make initial contact before expeditionary forces arrive. These forces are supported by national-level intelligence and strike capabilities as well tailored and delegated authorities granting the force the ability to conduct “electronic attack, offensive cyberspace and space measures, and lethal strikes, especially to support a rapid transition from competition to conflict.”<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> US Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), 15

<sup>27</sup> US Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), 11.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.

- 2) Multi-domain formations – The second tenet ensures Army formations can “conduct independent maneuver, employ cross-domain fires, and maximize human potential.”<sup>29</sup> This means there must be internal organic redundancy across all warfighting functions to survive in contested environments. The second tenant also requires units to project fires not just through conventional ground-based platforms but also through aviation, EW, space, cyberspace, and information systems as well.
- 3) Convergence - The last tenet centers around the concept of bringing multiple capabilities across the various domains to bear at a decisive point on the battlefield. The convergence is designed to “complicate the enemy’s attempts to conceal and defend its center of gravity.”<sup>30</sup> Convergence allows a division to incorporate joint or Army fires when acting as a supporting effort or incorporate air sorties, naval strikes, or several brigades of reinforcing ground fire when the division is action as the main effort.<sup>31</sup>

#### Division Intelligence Considerations for LSCO and MDO

LSCO and MDO bring with them different, but not new, challenges to intelligence operations. LSCO environments are not new to the Army, but the last seventeen years of operating in static, COIN environment have allowed some of that LSCO knowledge to atrophy. From an intelligence support perspective, MDO asks intelligence teams to provide a wider scope of information about the environment and threat capabilities. LSCO and MDO do not necessarily change *what* intelligence does, but instead, *how* intelligence operations are conducted. No matter the operation, the division intelligence section’s mission does not change. FM 2-0, *Intelligence*,

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>30</sup> US Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), 20.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 23.



outlines the function of the division intelligence cell is to “coordinate activities and systems that assist commanders to understand the enemy and other threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations.”<sup>32</sup> LSCO re-introduces intelligence sections to aspects of command and control and command posts operations such as requirements for survivability and mobility. Future LSCO environments of a contested or denied space domain also brings a challenge based on expected reductions in information collection resource capability. A loss of access to satellite-based communications impacts the use of the division’s organic ISR platform, the MQ-1C Grey Eagle. It also reduces the G-2’s communication options regarding the dissemination of intelligence to other division CPs and subordinate unit CPs via intelligence specific platforms such as the Trojan Spirit. LSCO challenges presented by peer adversaries also creates a greater reliance on the division’s ground-based reconnaissance capabilities and reporting from subordinate units to conduct information collections.

From an intelligence perspective, MDO is not a seismic shift in requirements for division intelligence sections or the Army intelligence enterprise as a whole. No matter the environment, the role of intelligence is to “provide commanders and staffs with timely, accurate, relevant, predictive, and tailored intelligence about the enemy and other aspects of the operational environment.”<sup>33</sup> MDO marks a return to describing the more robust capabilities a peer adversary has at their disposal compared to violent extremist groups or to what terrorist groups had access to during recent counterinsurgency operations. MDO requires intelligence sections to describe the “interrelationship of the air, land, maritime, space, cyberspace, the information environment, and the EMS.”<sup>34</sup> This includes describing the various strengths and weaknesses of each domain as it

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<sup>32</sup> US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 2-0, *Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), 4-11.

<sup>33</sup> US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 2-0, *Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), 1-1.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-16.

pertains to peer adversaries. The authorities for employment of cross domain effects have been lowered to a level in which a tactical or operational-level enemy commander can leverage capabilities from any domain without a delay caused by seeking approval from a higher headquarters. Commanders with multi-domain capabilities can execute operations and respond to threat quicker than a commander who must seek approval from a higher command authority. Peer adversary commanders now have greater means, and through arrangements of capabilities in time, space and purpose, greater ways to achieve operational or strategic goals. Division intelligence sections must be able to describe these ways and means to the staff and commanders to enable friendly success on the battlefield.

LSCO environments are not new to the Army and MDO is a return to a more holistic approach to conducting warfare. LSCO requires division intelligence sections to operate with more mobility and with a more varied communications plan that accounts for lack of continuous access to satellite communications. MDO expands the information requirements needed to support the division in the planning, preparation, executing and assessing operations. However, to do that, a resilient intelligence network architecture is required. At the division level, the current intelligence network architecture is extremely vulnerable due to its reliance on space-based satellites, rendering many of nodes useless in the event a peer competitor contests and perhaps gains supremacy in the space domain for periods of time in a LSCO or multi-domain environment. A lack of access to a reliable satellite-based communications structure threatens the divisions ability to conduct intelligence operations in LSCO against a multi-domain enabled peer adversary. With this understanding of LSCO and MDO along with the possible implications for the future of division intelligence operations, the current structure and expectations of division intelligence sections can be analyzed to determine the major challenges to a division G-2's ability to support LSCO and MDO.

## Section II – Gaps in Functionality: Intelligence Operations at the Division Level

Let there be no mistake, aggregate reductions WILL TAKE PLACE. The money is gone; out mission now is to determine how to best allocate these cuts while maintaining readiness.

- Secretary of Army John McHugh and  
Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno

### A Recent History of Infantry Division Intelligence MTOEs

In 2011, the US Congress passed a Budget Control Act cutting \$500 billion over a 10-year period from the DoD. This prompted service secretaries and chiefs of staff to determine where to make cuts to allow the services to continue to meet its obligations as an element of national power despite the financial constraints. For the Secretary of the Army, John McHugh and Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ray Odierno, it meant “reducing headquarters elements at the 2-star general officer and above levels in the aggregate by 25 percent.”<sup>35</sup> This included the Army division headquarters, commanded by a Major General. On 14 August 2013, Secretary McHugh and General Odierno directed the establishment of a Focus Area Review Group (FARG) to “provide recommendations to reduce and consolidate organizations, programs and functions in expectation of dramatically reduced funding levels.”<sup>36</sup>

Prior to FARG, the Division G-2 section was authorized 142 personnel.<sup>37</sup> The impact of FARG reorganizations resulted in a 53% reduction in intelligence professionals, bringing the total authorized for the section to eighty-six. Army MTOE task organizes the division intelligence section into two major sections, the Main Command Post (MCP) and the Tactical Command Post (TAC). This task organization is depicted in Figure 4. Despite the personnel reduction, there was

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<sup>35</sup> Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army Memorandum for Distribution, “Focus Area Review Group Decision Implementation,” 23 July 2014, accessed 25 December 2018, <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/44288646>.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> For easy of understanding division headquarters organizational changes over time, this monograph uses the 3rd Infantry Division as the default for all topics pertaining to personnel and equipment except for Section 2 which looks at 80th Infantry Division operations in World War II.

no reduction in intelligence related equipment. The only equipment to leave the section were basic issue items such as weapons, night vision devices, NBC masks, etc.




Figure 4. Division G-2 MTOE, Effective 15 February 2019. *Source:* Created by author

To lessen the impact the reductions would have on a deployed division headquarters, the Army established the Main Command Post – Operational Detachment (MCP-OD). The MCP-OD is a Army National Guard element of approximately 100 Soldiers who deploy with a division headquarters to augment them in areas such as intelligence, signal, engineering, civil affairs, operations, or logistics. There is no specific/required Army directed force structure for a division’s MCP-OD. The MCP-OD is designed to be tailorable to the needs of a division based on the mission. A commander “can ask for the entire unit, or he can pretty much go in and plug and play what sections of the MCP-OD that he wants to take with him to a deployment.”<sup>38</sup> While there is no definitive force structure for the MCP-OD, its potential ability to support division

<sup>38</sup> Meghann Myers, “These new Guard and Reserve units will deploy with active Army Divisions and Corps,” *Army Times*, January 29 2017, accessed 20 March 2019, <https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2017/01/29/these-new-guard-and-reserve-units-will-deploy-with-active-army-divisions-and-corps/>.

intelligence operations should be factored into any plan to shape division intelligence force structures in future LSCO.

### The Role of Army Intelligence

The history of Army intelligence as a formal organization date back to the inception of the Division of Military Information (MID) in 1885. Its purpose was to centralize Army intelligence collection to support the development of war plans. Prior to this reorganization, John Finnegan argued “each US commander served as his own intelligence officer, and the intelligence function was limited to simple reconnaissance in times of war.”<sup>39</sup> An example of this was demonstrated by General Winfield Scott in the 1847 Mexican American War. General Scott conducted reconnaissance mission by using his organic scouts and augmented them with civilians. Historians note that Scott “employed a group of locally hired Mexican bandits and deserters, the “Mexican Spy Company,” to gather specific tactical intelligence.”<sup>40</sup> The inception of the MID thirty-eight years later expanded the role of Army intelligence to collect information on foreign countries, liaise with attachés, disseminate intelligence, and produce maps for the Army. When the Army reorganized the War Department in 1903 creating the General Staff, the MID was placed in under the Second Division and tasked with similar responsibilities of the original MID.

At the operational level, World War I saw Army intelligence begin to organize itself into departments that would affect the structure of division intelligence sections. The commander of American Expeditionary Forces, General John J. Pershing organized field army intelligence to meet tactical needs, but did not push the capability to produce intelligence to theater and division commanders. Despite the strides in intelligence organization, the end of World War I still found

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<sup>39</sup> John Finnegan and Romana Danysh, *Military Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), 7.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

Army intelligence as a less-important function. John Finnegan argues “intelligence was still considered especially a staff-level activity within the Army.”<sup>41</sup> Army divisions did not have the personnel to produce meaningful intelligence from disciplines developed during the war such as counterintelligence, signals intelligence, and aerial photography. However, division-level staff structures were conceived on paper to include these disciplines, but would not be formally implemented until World War II. The division G-2 structures developed in World War II continue to inform current division intelligence force structures by providing divisions with multiple single-source collection capability and analysts to turn this information into intelligence.

Current doctrine states intelligence supports commanders and staffs by “providing situational understanding of the threat, terrain and weather, civil considerations, and other aspects of the operational environment.”<sup>42</sup> The expectations of commanders for their intelligence staffs have increased over time as advances in technology spurred the creation of other intelligence disciplines such as Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), and Measures and Sciences Intelligence (MASINT). These disciplines provide more precise and detailed information enabling staff planning and facilitating commander decisions. Technology also enables the Army intelligence apparatus to collect, process, exploit, and disseminate intelligence in near real time over a network comprised of intelligence specific satellites, servers, sensors, and computers. To manage the intelligence effort in supporting Army operations, the Army uses the Intelligence Warfighting Function to organize the tasks and systems that provide the situational understanding mentioned above. Table 1 lists the variety of intelligence tasks that are expected to be provided by the Intelligence Warfighting Function.

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<sup>41</sup> John Finnegan and Romana Danysh, *Military Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), 13.

<sup>42</sup> US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 2-0, *Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), 2-1.

<b>Intelligence tasks ►</b>	<b>Commander's focus ►</b>	<b>Commander's decisions</b>
<b>Provide intelligence support to force generation:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide intelligence readiness.</li> <li>• Establish an intelligence architecture.</li> <li>• Provide intelligence overwatch.</li> <li>• Generate intelligence knowledge.</li> <li>• Tailor the intelligence force.</li> </ul>	Orient on contingencies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Should the unit's level of readiness be increased?</li> <li>• Should the operation plan be implemented?</li> </ul>
<b>Provide support to situational understanding:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Perform IPB.</li> <li>• Perform situation development.</li> <li>• Provide intelligence support to protection.</li> <li>• Provide tactical intelligence overwatch.</li> <li>• Conduct police intelligence operations.</li> <li>• Provide intelligence support to civil affairs operations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Plan an operation.</li> <li>• Prepare.</li> <li>• Execute.</li> <li>• Assess.</li> <li>• Secure the force.</li> <li>• Determine 2d and 3d order effects on operations and the populace.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Which COA will be implemented?</li> <li>• Which enemy actions are expected?</li> <li>• What mitigation strategies should be developed and implemented to reduce the potential impact of operations on the population?</li> </ul>
<b>Conduct information collection:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Collection management.</li> <li>• Direct information collection.</li> <li>• Execute collection.</li> <li>• Conduct intelligence-related missions and operations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Plan information collection for an operation, including PED requirements.</li> <li>• Prepare.</li> <li>• Execute.</li> <li>• Assess.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Which DPs, HPTs, and HVTs are linked to the threat's actions?</li> <li>• Are the assets available and in position to collect on the DPs, HPTs, and HVTs?</li> <li>• Have the assets been repositioned for branches or sequels?</li> </ul>
<b>Provide intelligence support to targeting and information operations:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide intelligence support to targeting.</li> <li>• Provide intelligence support to information operations.</li> <li>• Provide intelligence support to combat assessment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Create lethal or nonlethal effects against targets.</li> <li>• Destroy, suppress, disrupt, or neutralize targets.</li> <li>• Reposition intelligence or attack assets.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Are the unit's lethal and nonlethal actions and maneuver effective?</li> <li>• Which targets should be re-engaged?</li> <li>• Are the unit's information operations effective?</li> </ul>
COA    course of action	HVT    high-value target	
DP     decision point	IPB    intelligence preparation of the battlefield	
HPT    high-payoff target	PED    processing, exploitation, and dissemination	

Table 1. Overview of Intelligence Warfighting Function Tasks. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 2-0, *Intelligence*, 2019, 2-3.

### Army Division G-2 Operations

A division G-2 is responsible for activities that assists the commander in understanding, visualizing, and describing the threat and a variety of other variables in the operating environment. To execute these activities, division G-2s are doctrinally divided into three intelligence cells depicted in Figure 5. Each cell has its own unique function. The operations cell is responsible for the coordination of intelligence support to the various command posts and subordinate units. The G-2X section provides the technical oversight of the division's Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence operations. Lastly, the ACE functions as the analytical backbone of the division G-2. The ACE is the largest section in the G-2 as it “produces



and disseminates intelligence and focuses collection resources to provide information the commander needs to make decisions.”<sup>43</sup> Table 2 details the specific capabilities of the ACE.




Figure 5. Division G-2 Section Organizational Structure. Source: Created by author

In combat, a division’s intelligence sections tasks are largely conducted out of two types of CPs, the Main Command Post (MCP) and the Tactical Command Post (TAC). Army doctrine’s discussion of intelligence operations inside of these two command posts is extensive and based on decades of operations utilizing these CPs in combat, primarily in static roles. Figure 2 also depicts how intelligence operations and personnel are split between the MCP and TAC along with the MTOE authorization of personnel for each section. Army Training Publication 2-19.3, *Corps and Division Intelligence Operations* (26 March 2015), delineates the role of intelligence based on what type of command post being used.

The Main and Tactical Command Posts and the Mobile Command Group

The responsibilities of the intelligence cell in the Main CP are:

<sup>43</sup> US Department of the Army, Army Training Publication (ATP) 2-19.3, *Corps and Division Intelligence Techniques* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 2-5.



1. Receive, process, and analyze information from all sources and disseminates intelligence.
2. Provide intelligence to support current and future operation activities.
3. Develop information collection requirements and synchronizes intelligence operations.
4. Participate in the targeting process.
5. Through the G-3, support, task, and direct intelligence operations.
6. Assess information collection, including intelligence operations, and resynchronize the information collection plan throughout operations.
7. Plan, monitor, and analyze human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence (CI) activities.

Doctrinally, the function of intelligence personnel in the TAC is to support current operations. The TAC's intelligence cell must maintain situational awareness and ensure "the tactical CP remains informed of the current enemy situation and makes recommendations related to the operation."<sup>44</sup> While not supported by MTOE, intelligence doctrine discusses the Mobile Command Group (MCG) which serves as the commander's mobile CP. The commander has the discretion to select who he/she wants in to staff it, but "personnel often represent those staff sections that can immediately affect current operations; these sections normally include maneuver, fires, and intelligence."<sup>45</sup> The possibility of employment means the division G-2 must plan to support a MCG if required.

#### The Support Area and Early Entry Command Posts

As the Army shifts its focus from counterinsurgency, the Main CP and TAC alone cannot solely be relied on to execute mission command in large scale combat. FM 3-0, *Operations* emphasizes this point and reiterates the need for divisions to have the ability to establish and operate additional types of command post: the SACP and the EECF. An Early Entry Command

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<sup>44</sup> US Department of the Army, Army Training Publication (ATP) 2-19.3, *Corps and Division Intelligence Techniques* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 2-9.

<sup>45</sup> US Department of the Army, Army Training Publication (ATP) 2-19.3, *Corps and Division Intelligence Techniques* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 4-8.

Post (EECP) is typically employed during a deployment phase of an operation. Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organizations and Operations* explains “the early-entry command post performs the functions of the main and tactical CPs until those CPs are deployed and fully operational.”<sup>46</sup> As division maneuvers on the battlefield, the commander has the option of establishing a consolidation area to facilitate stability and security tasks which enable greater freedom of maneuver in the close and deep areas. If a commander chooses to establish a consolidation area, the division establishes a Support Area Command Post (SACP) to provide command and control of operations in the consolidation area. FM 3-0, *Operations*, explains “SACPs assist in shaping the support and consolidation areas that complement the division’s scheme of maneuver, allowing the Main CP to focus on close and deep operations.”<sup>47</sup> The SACP is typically co-located with the division’s Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB), who is typically assigned the responsibility of managing the division’s consolidation area. In recent training exercises, Army divisions are determining the best ways to establish and man the SACP. A recent Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report details how 3d Infantry Division (3ID) and 1st Infantry Division (1ID) approached SACP integration into division operations. In both cases, the divisions established the SACP and co-located it within the MEB’s Main CP footprint. This allowed the SACP to lean on the MEB for support. “This included network connections, intelligence, operations, and life support.”<sup>48</sup> This is where the similarities stop.

1ID established its SACP and internally sourced it with staff personnel to provide command and control of support area operations. Figure 6 list the tasks assigned to the 1ID

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<sup>46</sup> US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organizations and Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 1-3.

<sup>47</sup> US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 2-178.

<sup>48</sup> US Department of the Army. *Mission Command in The Division and Corps Support Area* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2017), 23.

SACP. The SACP intelligence section was manned by an intelligence representative to facilitate shared understanding across the staff. However, none of the tasks listed are the direct responsibility of the division intelligence section according to doctrine. While the SACP effectively executed its given tasks, an opportunity was missed to increase the flexibility of division by providing the SACP a robust ability to coordinate intelligence efforts in the consolidation area beyond the capabilities of the MEB. The lack of intelligence personnel in the SACP only gave the CP the ability to maintain situational awareness. Adding more intelligence personnel would have allowed the SACP to accomplish a greater amount of IPB on the consolidation area, enhancing the organization's understanding of the OE. This greater shared understanding could potentially leading to the staff making better recommendations and the commander making more informed decisions. From a CP survivability perspective, 1ID's use of the intelligence section in the SACP did not allow the division G-2 to incorporate redundancy into its survivability requirements during LSCO. While 1ID provided minimal intelligence staffing to their SACP, 3ID increased the amount of SACP intelligence personnel, but ultimately made a similar decision while outlining SACP functions on behalf of the division intelligence enterprise.

<b>SACP Functions</b>	
• Support-area security	◆ <i>Plan and synchronize division Army Health Services support with the supporting medical organizations</i>
• Movement control/ LOC management	◆ <i>Plan and synchronize division sustainment operations with supporting sustainment organization</i>
• RSOI/force flow	• Support-area interagency integration
• Coordinate and manage force structure to include requests for forces and equipment	• Mission command for TCF
• Manage initial stability tasks	• Support-area Air Traffic Services
• Support-area terrain management	• Route classification
• Host nation engagements	
• Support-area civil affairs operations	
◆ <i>Functions which are currently listed under the DMAIN in Army Techniques Publication 3-91, Division Operations</i>	

Figure 6. 1st Infantry Division SACP Functions. Center for Army Lessons Learned Publication, *Mission Command in The Division and Corps Support Area*, 34.

3ID used the MEB staff as the foundation for the SACP and then augmented it internally with nine intelligence analysts from the division MCP-OD. Using the MEB S-2 section as a base, the G-2 augmentation enhanced the MEB's ability to support its own operations (the MEB S-2 went from eleven to twenty personnel). However, the SACP was not asked to serve as an alternate conduit which could produce all-source intelligence. Table 3 details the tasks of the various 3ID command nodes. The inclusion of the SACP provided either a second or third level of redundancy in twelve of the fifteen functions listed; responsibilities are shared so there is no single point of failure. Producing intelligence is one of two that was given no redundancy when the SACP was established. In both cases, the divisions were not training in a LSCO environment, thus no significant consequence to the techniques implemented, but there is still a lesson to learn: ensure each division command post can perform an array of intelligence functions. No one CP can be the only command node able to execute specific intelligence tasks.

Table 2. 3rd Infantry Division MC Node Functions and Responsibility

<b>FUNCTIONS</b>	<b>3ID FCP</b>	<b>MEB</b>	<b>SB</b>	<b>SACP</b>
<b>Area security</b>		X		X
<b>Terrain management</b>	X	X		X
<b>Manage initial stability tasks</b>	X	X		X
<b>Mission command for TCF</b>		X		X
<b>Clearance of fires /targeting</b>	X	X		X
<b>Route classification</b>	X	X		X
<b>Host nation engagement</b>	X			X
<b>Interagency integration</b>	X			X
<b>Civil affairs operations</b>	X			X
<b>Movement control/LOC management</b>	X	X		X
<b>RSOI/force flow</b>			X	
<b>Coordinate and manage force structure, to include requests for forces (RFFs)</b>	X			
<b>Plan and synchronize DIV sustainment operations with corps/ESC</b>	X		X	
<b>Air traffic services</b>	X			X
<b>Produce single-source and all-source Intel</b>	X			

Source: Center for Army Lessons Learned Publication, *Mission Command in The Division and Corps Support Area*, 26.

The purpose of the SACP is to establish a division-level command and control element to oversee consolidation area operations. This should remain the primary focus of the SACP, but by augmenting it with increased intelligence personnel, it can provide division intelligence operations the ability to continue performing its doctrinal tasks in the event the Main CP or TAC become compromised. In both examples, the divisions missed an opportunity to increase its ability to create redundancy in division intelligence operations. This missed opportunity is likely the result of how Army intelligence doctrine approaches discussions about CPs

Intelligence doctrine is scant on discussions about the SACP and EECF and how intelligence processes should occur within them. In fact, the CP conversation at large is not uniform across intelligence doctrine. Army intelligence doctrine does not consistently account for all the CPs mentioned in other parts of doctrine. Typically, these types of discrepancies occur due

to updates to newer parts of doctrine that have yet to be updated in older doctrinal spaces. However, an analysis of what CPs are addressed in intelligence doctrine based on publication date reveal significant inconsistencies across ADPs, ADRPs, and FMs related to intelligence. Table 3 shows that despite the publication of FM 2-0 and ADP 2-0 occurring after FM 3-0, neither of them addresses the EECP, SACP, or MCG.<sup>49</sup> Although Army MTOEs are built and approved several years before implementation, a consequence of this discrepancy is manifested in what the Army authorizes a division to man and equip the various CPs. Army infantry division headquarters MTOE, effective 15 February 2019 only authorizes intelligence personnel and equipment to operate a MCP and TAC. The current MTOE hinders the division intelligence section's ability to support a SACP, EECP, or MCG without internally resourcing it from the MCP or TAC. Supporting the additional CPs removes critical intelligence capability from the more frequently established MCP and TAC, diminishing the overall effectiveness of intelligence operations.

Table 3. Comparison of CP Inclusion Across Doctrine

	Main Command Post	Tactical Command Post	Mobile Command Group	Support Area Command Group	Early Entry Command Post
ADRP 2-0 (2014)	X	X	X		
ATP 2.19.3 (Mar 2015)	X	X	X		
FM 3-0 (Oct 2017)	X	X	X	X	X
FM 2-0 (Jul 2018)	X	X			
ADP 2-0 (Sep 2018)					
MTOE (2019)	X	X			

Source: Created by author

As divisions begin to train more with the inclusion of SACP, EECPs and MCGs, division intelligence section leaders are determining the role intelligence plays in supporting them. LSCO brings with it an increased threat for C2 node targeting, therefore, division G-2

<sup>49</sup> ADP 2-0 acknowledges intelligence operations should support the command post structure, but does not discuss intelligence specific considerations for supporting them.

leaders must view these CPs not as a mere secondary task to support, but instead as a key to an intelligence operations survivability. Recent training trends indicate division intelligence leaders are taking into account the establishment of the SACP, however, the EECP and MCG are either not in use during training exercises or have not yet taken into account how intelligence operations can function inside of them.

#### Survivability of Division Intelligence Command Post Operations

Command post survivability is discussed at length in FM 6-0, *Command Post Organization and Operations* and FM 3-0, *Operations*. Survivability is not new concepts in doctrine, but the last seventeen years of counterinsurgency have reduced its importance as the US' enemies in counterinsurgency operations possessed little to no capacity to effectively find and target C2 nodes with precision fires, unlike a peer adversary. Survivability topics provide general guidance across the formation, but do not account for specific idiosyncrasies associated primarily with the G-2 section and the intelligence warfighting function at large. As divisions G-2 leaders find ways to increase survivability, doctrine discusses four factors affecting the CP survivability: dispersion, size, redundancy, and mobility.

The organic nature of small, tailored TACs working closer to an operation in division close area and larger Main CPs generally operating at the forward edge of the division deep area creates a dispersion effect that only improves as G-2s reposition resources in the consolidation areas to support SACP operations. For the G-2, the size of the section in each CP is critical, especially as it pertains to the TAC and MCG. To assist in reducing the TAC's footprint, division G-2 leaders use significant discretion on whether or not an entire section is needed to control an ongoing operation or if some of the support can be repositioned to the Main CP. The MCG configuration is at the commander's discretion. If intelligence support is requested, G-2 leaders

should heed the words of FM 6-0, which says “commanders require information for decisions; they do not need every subject matter expert located with them.”<sup>50</sup>

Redundancy is critical for division intelligence operations during LSCO. The threat of a loss of CP functionality is high. As divisions expand its ability of command and control through multiple CPs, intelligence leaders must balance leadership, capability, and equipment across all CPs in use to ensure continuous operations during CP jumps or loss of a CP to enemy actions. The increased distribution of these items not only allows the division G-2 to support more CPs with analytical capability, it also assists in reducing the size of these nodes from a physical terrain and an electromagnetic signature perspective. Lastly, intelligence doctrine spends little time addressing the role of G-2 section mobility. While Army intelligence doctrine is fraught with references to mobility, those references are geared toward tactical considerations on mobility corridors as intelligence sections build Modified Combined Obstacle Overlays. Current MTOEs were designed to ensure division G-2s have everything they needed to support static operations such as counterinsurgency, but authorize very little to survive and operate in more dynamic and lethal environments such as large-scale combat. Doctrine and Army force management has left the bulk of these issues up to the Operating Force to solve without much assistance from the Generating Force. For example, the G-2 is does not have the vehicles to relocate itself in the event the Main CP executes a hasty jump to evade enemy fires. Current MTOE authorizations for vehicles assigned to a G-2 section in the Main CP is a two M1113 HMMWVs with a total seating capacity of four Soldiers. Dismounted movement is the likely method of relocation which extends the amount of time the Main CP is in operable. Redundancy of intelligence tasks between command posts mitigates this issue, but prior planning is required to ensure all tasks can be executed in each CP established.

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<sup>50</sup> US Department of the Army. Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organizations and Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 1-4.



## Intelligence Architecture in Large Scale Combat

To enable the execution of intelligence tasks within a division, the G-2, in conjunction with the G-6, establishes an intelligence architecture which serves as the communications backbone connecting all the intelligence systems within the organization. Army Training Publication (ATP) 2-19.3, *Corps and Division Intelligence Techniques*, states adequate communications and access to the intelligence enterprise are often the most critical enablers for the intelligence warfighting function.<sup>51</sup> Doctrine does not prescribe a specific configuration for the architecture as operational environments, new divisional capabilities, and new technologies affect the layout of the architecture. Based on the current division MTOE, Figure 7 is an example of a typical architecture layout of the Main CP and the TAC. While each division may have a unique design for their architecture, they all share a universal truth: the architecture requires satellite connectivity. Satellites allow the division to access the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), the National Security Agency Network (NSANet), and the Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR). These networks allow the intelligence warfighting function to plan, execute, and provide command and control of single-source intelligence disciplines resident in the formation. ATP 2-19.3 states “the uninterrupted flow of information within the intelligence warfighting function is critical to mission command.”<sup>52</sup> Satellite connections also allow the ACE to produce and disseminate intelligence to the division staff, commander, and in all directions outside the headquarters. One of the biggest challenges division intelligence sections will face in LSCO is operating in an environment with an extremely complex intelligence communications system made fragile by a vulnerability a peer adversary is likely to exploit. Without out the satellite, the system fails.

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<sup>51</sup> US Department of the Army, Army Training Publication (ATP) 2-19.3, *Corps and Division Intelligence Techniques* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), C-1.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-2.




Figure 7. Generic Division Intelligence Architecture. *Source:* Created by author

Large scale combat against a peer adversary presents a unique challenge for division intelligence sections. As discussed earlier, the inability to have continuous access to the space domain and to have reliable radio connectivity due to peer adversary interference reduces the overall effectiveness of the architecture and the G-2s ability to provide accurate, timely, and relevant information about a complex enemy operating in dynamic OE. If peer adversaries successfully deny or degrade a division intelligence section’s ability to leverage the space and/or domain in the next war, it results in a significant paradigm shift in how a division conducts intel operations. To better understand the acceleration in operational tempo with limited means of collecting and disseminating intelligence throughout the organization, studying history can provide some insights on what to expect and possibly how to mitigate some the challenges intelligence sections must manage during large-scale combat. For an analysis of an environment similar to what was just described, WWII serves as an appropriate historical example.

### Division Intelligence Doctrine in 1944

The division G-2 section is responsible for all aspects of combat intelligence that affects the organization. The endstate of the G-2 is to provide critical information on the enemy and environment to the commander and subordinate units. Basic Field Manual 30-5, *Military Intelligence – Combat Intelligence*, explains “the primary functions of the intelligence section are the collection, collation, evaluation, and interpretation of information, and dissemination of combat intelligence.”<sup>53</sup> While doctrine is clear on the primary functions of an intelligence section, prior to WWII, doctrine did not provide a baseline organizational structure to support intelligence operations. In WWII, units simply organized themselves based on what allowed them to best manage the collection, analyzing and dissemination of processed intelligence to the division commander and his subordinate units. It was not until 1946 when doctrine would provide an organizational structure based on lessons learned in WWII.

Historical doctrine recognizes the urgency of disseminating intelligence in a timely manner. Basic Field Manual 30-5 argues “military intelligence is of no use unless it reaches the individuals or units concerned in time to serve their purposes.”<sup>54</sup> The means to disseminate sat on a spectrum based on the urgency of the message to be sent. For the most time sensitive messages, the primary means of intelligence transfer was through personal contact either face to face or through telephone messages. For both cases, historical doctrine states “in no other way can a community of thought and adjustment of viewpoints be so quickly and effectively realized.”<sup>55</sup> If this was not possible “special messages may be transmitted by airplane, motorcycle messenger, or other rapid means of communication.”<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> US Department of the Army, Basic Field Manual 30-5, *Military Intelligence – Combat Intelligence* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1940), 6.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 27.

The ways of dissemination include special messages, G-2 special reports, and G-2 periodic reports. The means of dissemination include face to face, telephone, and radio. The frequency of transmittal is important as well. This is largely dictated by operational tempo (OPTEMPO). War Department Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, recommended taking advantage of lulls in combat to transfer information: “During pauses in combat, or whenever the situation demands, subordinate commanders make brief intelligence reports to the next higher headquarters.”<sup>57</sup>

#### Intelligence Communications in 1944

Understanding intelligence dissemination in WWII requires it be analyzed through the lens of signal doctrine in 1944. War Department Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, explains the dissemination of intelligence could occur through any of six means: “wire, radio, visual and sound communication, pigeons, and messengers.”<sup>58</sup> Each means has advantages, but also operational risk. Wire was the most reliable, however, it is not practical in an environment of constant movement due to the time needed to install it. It is also, like other methods, susceptible to enemy intercept if the line is not guarded. Historical doctrine also warned that wire “should seldom be used to transmit clear-text classified messages.”<sup>59</sup> Radio messages get intelligence out quicker than any other method. However, “enemy interception of all radio messages must be assumed.”<sup>60</sup> Commanders must weigh whether the benefit of sending the message outweighs the repercussion of the information contained therein falling into enemy hands. Visual communication (i.e. flags, pyrotechnics and airplane maneuvers) and sound communication (i.e. horns, sirens, and whistles)

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<sup>57</sup> US Department of the Army. War Department Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1944), 58.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

are effective for short messages over short distances and not for complete dissemination of intelligence to the commander and subordinate units. Doctrine recognized the potential use of homing pigeons for front to rear communication in a formation but gives them little credence. Despite the multiple means of message dissemination, doctrine specified “the messenger system is still the backbone of army signal communications.”<sup>61</sup> Since intelligence sections produce maps and are constantly updating enemy overlays, messengers were the best way to communication intelligence. Doctrine recognizes special messengers who are dispatched on special missions and local messengers who serve the units dispersed around the division command post.<sup>62</sup> In both cases, messengers are highly susceptible to enemy actions and typically require armed escort to accomplish their missions.

#### Division Intelligence Support to Command Post Operations in 1944

FM 100-5 in 1944 describes the use of a what has now been codified as the mobile command group: “A commander frequently places himself forward of the command post, better to observe and direct the action. In such cases, he should be in communication with his command post. He may be accompanied by a small staff.”<sup>63</sup> Then, as it is today, intelligence dissemination to the commander was always of critical importance since commanders in WWII spent little time inside of their command posts. G-2s could not hold the information until the commander returned. One survey suggests that commanders in WWII spent no more than 25% of their time at their command posts.<sup>64</sup> The information must travel great lengths to reach the intended audience. In fact, most commanders employed the mobile command group concept to assist in their mission

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<sup>61</sup> US Department of the Army. War Department Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1944), 47.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.

<sup>64</sup> Bruce C. Clarke, *Art and Requirements of Command*, Volume II: *Generalship Study* (Washington, DC: Office of the Army Chief of Staff, 1967).

command responsibilities. “Commanders went forward with one or two vehicles and sometimes a small armed escort. They relied on subordinate units to provide security and command post facilities.”<sup>65</sup> During combat, some command posts integrated their staff sections, as G-2/G-3 groups, or as war rooms. These War Rooms had a similar function that modern Tactical Operations Centers (TOC) currently serve. “In the War rooms were charts and maps depicting the strengths of friendly units, the current situation, projected plans, the supply situation and transportation net.”<sup>66</sup> War Rooms were nerve centers, constantly taking reports and issuing orders or instructions to subordinate units.

#### 80th Infantry Division Intelligence Operations

From August of 1944 to May of 1945, the 80th Infantry Division (ID), commanded by Major General Horace L. McBride operating in General George Patton’s Third US Army, fought in over forty battles supporting three major campaigns in the European Theater. For the 80th ID, large-scale combat began from the unit’s arrival on Utah Beach in August of 1944 to the completion of their mission in Austria in May of 1945. The division moved (or jumped) its command post sixty times in the ten months they fought in theater. There were periods of significant movement at the front and backend of their deployment. The period of constant movement in August of 1944 is attributed to the division’s pursuit of German forces retreating back toward the Meuse River in Chalons, France. The increased movements in March of 1945 are attributed to 80 ID’s attacks to seize Wiesbaden, Germany and in April to seize the cities of Weimar and Jena, among others. Table 4 is summary of the division’s command post movements for the 10 months they were in the European Theater in WWII. Preceding each jump, the CP was operational for an average of five days before the next movement and each jump was an average distance of five miles. When isolating their four most active periods (the North France Campaign

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<sup>65</sup> Brice Pirne, *Division and Corps Command Posts in World War II* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1986), 23.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 35.



from August and September and the transition from the Rhineland to the Central Europe Campaign) the number of days the CP remained static was just over two and a half days and each jump only moved the CP just under three miles.

Table 4. 80th Infantry Division Command Post Movements – August 1944 to May 1945

	Aug 1944	Sep 1944	Oct 1944	Nov 1944	Dec 1944	Jan 1945	Feb 1945	Mar 1945	Apr 1945	May 1945
Major Campaign	Northern France Campaign (25 July – 14 September 1944)		Rhineland Campaign (15 September 1944 – 21 March 1945)						Central Europe Campaign (22 March – 8 May 1945)	
Command post jumps per month	13	8	1	6	3	3	2	14	11	3
Average distance travelled per jump*	55 miles	12 miles	6 miles	10 miles	16 miles	20 miles	12 miles	26 miles	43 miles	42 miles

Movement rate for the Division CP was approximately 20 mph  
\*Distance rounded to the nearest mile Numbers derived from 80 ID Operational History Aug 44 – May 45

Source: Created by author

To support the division commander’s intelligence needs, the 80th ID G-2 was organized as depicted in Figure 8. All major intelligence disciplines in were represented in the staff section. The 52-man section was responsible for the collection, analysis and dissemination of all intelligence needed to support combat operations. The primary method for dissemination of intelligence was through the use of periodic reports, which, much like modern Intelligence Summaries (INTSUM) contained vital information about enemy strength, composition, and disposition. However, the division operated at an accelerated tempo as they were in pursuit of a rapidly retreating enemy. This changed the collection focus of the G-2 from doctrinal requirements such as enemy disposition, composition and strength to information largely related to counter-mobility. “The location of enemy minefields, booby traps, demolitions, and enemy pockets of resistance was the chief function of the G-2 section.”<sup>67</sup>

<sup>67</sup> Department of the Army, *G-2 After Action Report: August 1944*, 80th Infantry Division. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1944), 5.




Figure 8. 80th Infantry Division G-2 Section MTOE – August 1944. *Source:* Created by author

Initially, the time it took to disseminate information was problematic for the photo interpretation teams. The team’s primary function was to analyze aerial reconnaissance photos of the division’s zone of advance to update the maps that were already produced, but too often the enemy’s movements outpaced the team’s ability to collect, interpret, and disseminate the intelligence to the subordinate units. The speed of operations “made it impossible for photographs of the zone of advance to be received in time to be of value.”<sup>68</sup> This was the case for the first sixty days of combat. “For the first time since becoming operational, the division was able, during the month of October, to secure aerial phot coverage of the division zone of advance.”<sup>69</sup>

A vast majority of the division’s intelligence was collected through the use of HUMINT gained from prisoners. “Information obtained from German prisoners was invaluable and it was rarely found that German Soldiers would hold back and information they had.”<sup>70</sup> As the division

<sup>68</sup> Department of the Army, *G-2 After Action Report: August 1944*, 80th Infantry Division (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1944), 4.

<sup>69</sup> Department of the Army, *G-2 After Action Report: October 1944*, 80th Infantry Division (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1944), 2.

<sup>70</sup> Department of the Army, *G-2 After Action Report: August 1944*, 80th Infantry Division (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1944), 5.



continued its movements throughout the duration of their time in theater. When static, the division's counterintelligence teams established operations in nearby cities to continue to collect information about the enemy. In some instances, the division was able to establish as many as nineteen offices in various towns. The division placed its HUMINT teams with the unit's forward elements to interview civilians for critical information. These HUMINT teams established contacts with civilians in the towns the division was about to seize in order to gain insights on the terrain. Documents captured during these attacks proved invaluable to the division and their higher headquarters. The 80th ID G-2 After Action Report from November 1944 noted "the 80th Division Order of Battle Team obtained much information of strategic as well as tactical value from captured documents."<sup>71</sup>




Figure 9. Guide for Organization for Combat of G-2 Section, Basic Field Manual 30-5, *Military Intelligence – Combat Intelligence*, 1946, 6.

<sup>71</sup> Department of the Army, *G-2 After Action Report: November 1944, 80th Infantry Division* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1944), 6.

Analyzing intelligence operations in WWII reveals characteristics of LSCO that may reemerge in future operations. First, the initial stages of LSCO may see an acclimatization period as intelligence systems are put into operation and adjust to speed of combat. All intelligence disciplines may not be available when conflict begins. Second, dissemination was primarily executed using a messenger system. Although not in “near real time,” intelligence still reached the front lines and subordinate headquarters were able to use in their plans. Third, in the offense, the dynamic and rapidly changing threat may reduce the planning horizons for future operations. 80th ID was only able to plan succinctly in 24-48-hour increments. Anything beyond this time window was less beneficial as the enemy situation changed in ways that did not lend itself to rigid targeting cycles or significant deliberate planning.

#### Framing the Problem

Analyzing the doctrinal requirements of a division G-2 section and how it accomplishes these tasks using the current MTOE against the nature of large-scale combat presents several problems that must be managed by division intelligence leaders.

- 1) G-2 sections use a significant amount of equipment that takes time to establish once the CP location has been determined. Most division intelligence tasks are performed with equipment that is not configured in a way that supports enhanced mobility to facilitate rapid repositioning of DIV CPs.
- 2) The electronic signature of a G-2 contributes to a division signature large enough to be detected by peer adversary technologies. They will use this detection capability to target Division C2 nodes with precision fires.
- 3) Satellites serve as the foundational means of establishing the intelligence architecture for the division. A loss of access to the space domain would significantly impact the Division G-2's ability to support the commander and the staff in understanding, visualizing and describing the operational environment and threat.
- 4) Division G-2s must prepare to support an EECP/SACP, and MCG in addition to the MCP and TAC.

With a better understanding of how division intelligence sections operated in a large-scale combat environment of increased mobility with a communications structure using only line of sight-based

technology, recommendations can be made regarding how contemporary division G-2 sections can best operate in similar environments.

### Section III – Adjusting for the Future: Solutions for Change

FM 6-0 explains to be survivable is to utilize dispersion, size, redundancy, and mobility to remain effective. With this in mind, “CPs often gain survivability at the price of effectiveness.”<sup>72</sup> For an intelligence section, this presents a difficult challenge that must be planned for prior to any in type of combat operation. Perhaps it is most important in LSCO environments where dynamic operations are occurring across large distances at a rapid pace. Intelligence sections must have small and mobile footprints capable of conducting analysis, collection management, and intelligence dissemination in multiple locations in the divisions area of operations. FM 2-0 provides intelligence operations guidelines for conducting successful operations. While these guidelines are not a direct response to operating in environments of survivability, by following them, an intelligence section is more prepared to operate in these environments. The elements are:

- 1) Maintain readiness
- 2) Ensure continuous intelligence operations
- 3) Orient on requirements
- 4) Provide mixed and redundant coverage
- 5) Gain and maintain sensor contact
- 6) Report information rapidly and accurately
- 7) Provide early warning
- 8) Retain freedom of movement

By taking select elements from this list and including tenets of survivability (dispersion, size, redundancy, and mobility), a method of evaluating intelligence operational plans in a LSCO

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<sup>72</sup> US Department of the Army. Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organizations and Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 1-4.

environment emerges and can be applied to any organizational structure plan to ensure intelligence can accomplish its duties as a warfighter function and supporting the greater mission command effort. To evaluate the recommendations for improving and expanding division intelligence support during LSCO, the following criteria will be used:

- 1) Dispersion
- 2) Size
- 3) Redundancy
- 4) Report information rapidly and accurately




Figure 10. Division G-2 Configuration Supporting Four Command Posts. *Source:* Create by author

Figure 10 recommends several organizational changes the division G-2 in the event multiple CPs are put into use by the division. To support the additional CPs, both the MCP and the TAC lose personnel and equipment to support the SACP/EECP and the MCG. These changes create some risk to the effectiveness of the MCP and TAC based on losing some capability in key sections. The mitigation for this risk is created by only removing small amounts of personnel and equipment from several sections so that no CP is reduced more than 30% in its personnel and

50% of its equipment based on the original MTOE authorization. This risk should be taken to increase the overall effectiveness of the section and increase its survivability by spreading the capabilities of the section across the various command posts.

- 1) The MCP transfers one of its three geospatial workstations from the GEOINT Cell and two of its four Intelligence Fusion Servers. It also loses two GEOINT Soldiers, two SIGINT Soldiers, two ACE Fusion Soldiers, and one Collection manager, equaling a reduction of seven personnel and three pieces of equipment.
- 2) The TAC loses one of its four Cross Domain Site Servers. It also loses the four-person G-2X section and two GEOINT Soldiers, equaling a reduction of six Soldiers and one piece of equipment.
- 3) The SACP/EECP uses the thirteen Soldiers and four pieces of equipment to create an ACE Fusion Cell, a GEOINT Cell, a SACP Operations Section and a G-2X Headquarters element. In this configuration, the G-2X HQ is also here, allowing them to serve both as the G-2X command and control element and as intel SACP leadership.<sup>73</sup>
- 4) The commander has the ability to tailor the MCG as they deem necessary. If the commander decides to incorporate intelligence capabilities in the MCG, a recommended support package includes a multi-discipline intelligence team that can provide the latest information produced by the ACE. As the commander conducts battlefield circulation and visits subordinate unit CPs, this package can conduct face to face interaction with the BDE S-2s on behalf of the division G-2 OIC.

The sections created for the SACP provide it with the ability to produce all-source intelligence and GEOINT specific products to support planning and operations. It also supports MEB intelligence tasks in the consolidation area. Naturally, each intelligence section is different in terms of assigned personnel and skill set of soldiers in the various organizations. This monograph only provides recommendations for specific ranks for the leadership in MCG deliberately. The intent of the recommendations is to ensure major functions of the MCP and TAC are replicated in the SACP and represented in the MCG. Appropriately levels of leadership can be determined by intelligence section leadership.

Doctrine describes using dispersion to enhance survivability by placing minimum resources in the deep or close areas. This plan creates intelligence dispersion by reducing assets in

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<sup>73</sup> This configuration assumes the division is collocating the SACP with the MEB CP and not establishing a command post in a different location.

the close area (G-2X HQ in the TAC) and moving it back to the consolidation area in the SACP. If they are needed to control a portion of the operation for key period of time, they can move forward, but in the meantime their new location aids in the second evaluation criteria, size. FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, comments that “commanders require information for decisions, they do not need every subject matter expert with them.”<sup>74</sup> This logic provides guidance in where intelligence section can reduce the size of its footprints in each command node. In this case, the requirement for staffing both a SACP/EECP and a MCG naturally reduce the size of the intelligence footprint in the MCP and TAC. This reduction also reduces the electronic footprint of these nodes making it harder for enemy targeting. The logic of ensuring the SACP/EECP, MCP, and TAC have the same capabilities supports the third evaluation criteria, redundancy. The redundant nature of this recommendation allows the division to execute the range of intelligence operations to varying capacities. By having elements of G-2 Operations and G-2 ACE in each CP, jumping CPs without a complete loss of execution is easier, but does not make the task any less complicated when factoring in the role the entire staff plays in managing division operations in LSCO. History suggests the LSCO OPTEMPO is incredibly fast and chaotic. Producing and disseminating intelligence from multiple locations gives the division G-2 the best chance at achieving the fourth criteria, reporting information rapidly and accurately enough to allow the commander to make the best decision at the right time.

The communications plan describes how the Intelligence Warfighting Function (IWfF) receives and transmits data. Army mission command uses a system of digital networks called Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) to communicate between mission command nodes and within different Warfighter Functions. The IWfF uses the ABCS subsystem DCGS-A to facilitate intelligence communication classified up to the secret level. In addition to DSCG-A, the IWfF

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<sup>74</sup> US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organizations and Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 1-4.

uses the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System, National Security Agency Network and the Trojan to communicate information up to the Top Secret//SCI level. A division intelligence section uses both the non-inclusive digital means listed above and analog means such as radio, blue force tracker, tactical satellite and HF radio to communicate. In a communication-denied environment, disruptions are likely to affect both means. *ATP 2-19.3, Corps and Division Intelligence Techniques* notes that while divisions have an intelligence equipment architecture unique to the IWfF, “the majority of information received and distributed by intelligence organizations at theater and below occurs over communications networks shared by all of the warfighting functions.”<sup>75</sup> Hence, the communications plan used by the G-2 is going to be nested within the larger division communications plan. Both ABCS and the Trojan use satellites and radio is affected by terrain and despite the advances in encryption, radio is also susceptible to jamming and interception. Given the threat capabilities of a LSCO adversary, any communication plan warrants the inclusion of a routinized messenger system to relay information. As noted in Section II, radios were subject to intercept by the enemy so ground based messengers we used to relay information. Division intelligence staffs during WWII used messengers to send intelligence reports and products to the subordinate units. The same actions could be used in future large-scale combat. A divisions communications plan will vary by the environment in which the fighting occurs and the equipment available to the division. Taking into account the threat to Army division networks, an example division intelligence communications plan in LSCO may look like the following:

Primary: DCGS-A  
Alternate: Physical Messenger  
Contingency: VHF/UHF radio  
Emergency: HF radio

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<sup>75</sup> US Department of the Army, Army Training Publication (ATP) 2-19.3, *Corps and Division Intelligence Techniques* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 4-6.

These recommendations are not designed to make an ineffective and inefficiently managed section better. These recommendations are generated based on a need for enhanced survivability across a wider geographic area in a degraded/denied communications environment. They are designed to help a division intelligence section maintain effectiveness given additional requirements of a LSCO environment. The section's intelligence warfighter function competence is assumed in these recommendations.<sup>76</sup>

### Conclusion

To win in LSCO environments, first and foremost, intelligence professionals must be proficient in their various intelligence disciplines. With these competencies at its highest level of readiness, division intelligence leaders must then prepare the intelligence staff to manage several problems. First, given the nature of LSCO, division G-2s must be prepared to operate in more than the Main CP and the TAC. Intelligence personnel must be prepared to augment a SACP and an EECF. It must also prepare to provide selected personnel to the MCG should the commander decide to have intelligence personnel on hand. Each augmentation comes with an implied requirement to ensure section redundancy exists in each CP. The CPs with division augmentation must have some capacity to provide division-level intelligence C2 and analysis in the event the other CPs compromised. Second, given the capabilities of our peer adversaries, intelligence leaders must be ready to execute without access to the space domain. This means conducting intelligence operations without the use of satellites, restricting Secret and Top-Secret communications and planning for a possible return to the use of messengers to disseminate intelligence. Lastly, with the possibility of a return to large scale combat, division intelligence sections must be able to operate with greater mobility to survive in large-scale combat

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<sup>76</sup> Evaluation criteria assumes the division intelligence section is already following the intelligence operations guidelines not used in the evaluation criteria. The evaluation is accounting for the possible use of 4-5 command posts simultaneously in an environment where the ability to disseminate information is severely degraded.



environments. This means shifting from working in a static, tent-based setting to operating off of vehicles that can be collapsed and moved to a new location faster than the G-2 tent of a division TOC. These problems can be effectively managed with prior planning of possible personnel shifts and PACE plans along with training with objectives that test the sections ability to operate with these constraints. These efforts will ensure the Division intelligence section is best supporting the division in large-scale combat and “Always Out Front!”

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