

# The Evolution of Restricted Provisioning of Foreign Development Assistance

A Monograph

by

Mr. Douglas W. Balko  
US Agency for International Development



School of Advanced Military Studies  
US Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, KS

2018

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 24-05-2018	<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> SAMS Monograph	<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b> June 2017 – May 2018
--	---	---

<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> The Evolution of Restricted Provisioning of Foreign	<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b>
	<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b>
	<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b>

<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Mr. Douglas W. Balko, US Agency for International Development	<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b>
	<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b>
	<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>

<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) 201 Reynolds Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2134	<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>
---	---

<b>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Command and General Staff College 731 McClellan Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350	<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b> CGSC
	<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b>

<b>12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited
---

<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>
--------------------------------

<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> The delivery of foreign development assistance is a component of the US government's diplomatic instrument of national power. As such, it would seem prudent to enable flexibility in the provision of foreign assistance to accommodate political changes in the domestic, international, and beneficiary country environments. However, as this paper demonstrates, the implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, and the terrorist attacks in September 2001 culminated in greatly restricting flexibility in the delivery of foreign development assistance.
---

<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b>
--------------------------

<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b> Unclassified			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b> 37	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b>
<b>a. REPORT</b> Unclassified	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b> Unclassified	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b> Unclassified			<b>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)</b> 913-758-3302

## Monograph Approval Page

Name of Candidate: Mr. Douglas W. Balko

Monograph Title: The Evolution of Restricted Provisioning of Foreign Development Assistance

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Monograph Director  
Barry M. Stentiford, PhD

\_\_\_\_\_, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies  
James C. Markert, COL

Accepted this 24th day of May 2018 by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Director, Graduate Degree Programs  
Robert F. Baumann, PhD

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

Fair use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the inclusion of pictures, maps, graphics, and any other works incorporated into this manuscript. A work of the United States Government is not subject to copyright, however further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible.

## Abstract

The Evolution of Restricted Provisioning of Foreign Development Assistance by Mr. Douglas W. Balko, US Agency for International Development, 37 pages.

The delivery of foreign development assistance is a component of the US government's diplomatic instrument of national power. As such, it would seem prudent to enable flexibility in the provision of foreign assistance to accommodate political changes in the domestic, international, and beneficiary country environments. However, as this paper demonstrates, the implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, and the terrorist attacks in September 2001 culminated in greatly restricting flexibility in the delivery of foreign development assistance.

## Contents

Acknowledgement .....	v
Acronyms .....	vi
Introduction.....	1
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 .....	6
The Legislative History.....	8
The General Accounting Office Guidance.....	11
Applying the Results Act to Foreign Assistance .....	13
Operationalizing GPRA in Foreign Assistance .....	17
Conclusion .....	30
Bibliography .....	34

## Acknowledgement

I would like to recognize the support of my children, Mae and Forrest, who provided continuous support, inspiration, and humor to me. I would also like to recognize the professionals at the Combined Arms Research Library for their assistance with my research, and more importantly for their encouragement and hospitality while I resided in their library and made it my home away from home. Lastly, I would like to recognize Dr. Stentiford who always made himself available to hear my thoughts, then nudge me in purposeful directions. To my fellow students, and the faculty and staff of the Advanced Strategic Leadership Studies Program, you shared decades of professional experience for which I will always be grateful and indebted.

## Acronyms

CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CFAS	Country Foreign Assistance Strategy
COM	Chief of Mission
DFA	Director of Foreign Assistance
DoD	Department of Defense
FACTS	Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System
FPPSGA	Federal Program Performance Standards and Goals Act of 1990
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GPRA	The Government Performance and Results Act
ICS	Integrated Country Strategy
IR	Intermediate Result
JRS	Joint Regional Strategies
JSP	Joint Strategic Plan
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MIL	Master Indicator List
NSS	National Security Strategy
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OP	Operating Plan
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
QDDR	Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
State	Department of State
State/F	Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance
SPSDs	Standardized Program Structure and Definitions
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

## Introduction

Reality, however, seems to bring organizations closer to a compromise position between determinism and free choice. Environments seldom pre-empt all choice, just as they seldom offer unlimited choice.

—Henry Mintzberg and James A. Waters, *Of Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent*

*The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993* (GPRA or the Results Act) passed into law with bipartisan support. The intended impacts of the Results Act were to reduce government expenditures and focus Executive agencies on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of government operations, and customer service.<sup>1</sup> To demonstrate such improvements, nearly every Executive agency had to describe its purpose, establish performance goals, and self-report on results delivered to American taxpayers. To capsule their purpose, agencies subject to GPRA were required to develop a multi-year strategic plan comprised of a mission statement, goals necessary to achieve the mission statement, and underlying objectives which would encompass the programs of each agency. Additionally, agencies were required to develop performance monitoring and management systems to collect data and enable reporting of results against their goals and objectives. The requirements and intent of the GPRA was a radical shift in focus for most Executive agencies, including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID or the Agency) and the Department of State (State). Jointly, State and USAID developed a hierarchical structure of strategies extending from their joint strategic plan to country specific development assistance strategies. These country-level strategies inhibited the ability of State and USAID to shift development assistance programs and resources to address near- and medium-term challenges or opportunities owing to development programs and funding being strictly planned for five-year increments.

Four years after signing the Results Act into law the Government Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a survey of a random sample of managers and supervisors in twenty-four executive agencies

---

<sup>1</sup> “Executive agency” means an Executive department, a Government corporation, and an independent establishment. (Pub. L. 89–554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat.), 379, accessed March 23, 2018, <http://uscode.house.gov/codification/t5/PubL89-554.pdf>.



and found that only thirty-two percent reported having performance measures that demonstrated if their programs were achieving intended results. It was evident that numerous Executive agencies were challenged by the requirement to develop performance measures or indicators that would inform the Executive Office, the Congress, and the American citizens whether they were achieving the goals and objectives of their mission. It was not clear whether USAID was included in the survey, but other GAO and internal reports highlighted difficulties the Agency was experiencing with collecting and aggregating disparate performance results from its missions around the globe. The primary cause of USAID's difficulties was that prior to the enactment of the Results Act individual overseas missions had developed unique and dissimilar performance measures to monitor the performance of their individual programs, which did not lend themselves to aggregation at the agency reporting level.

Unrelated to the implementation of the GPRA, the *Foreign Assistance Act* was amended in 1998 and the USAID Administrator was made a direct report to the Secretary of State for foreign policy guidance and direction. As a subordinate agency to the Department of State the two organizations set on a path to align foreign policy and foreign assistance, and implement the requirements of the GPRA. The attacks of September 11, 2001, accelerated this process when President George W. Bush elevated development to be alongside diplomacy and defense in his *2002 National Security Strategy*. President Bush described the delivery of development assistance as a mean to limit potential safe havens for terrorist organizations through the promotion of economic opportunities, spreading democratic principles, and improving the living standards of people in developing countries.

Progress implementing the Results Act in USAID stretched over several years and three Secretaries of State. The final solution resulted in cascading levels of strategic plans that descended from the joint State and USAID strategic plan, to regional and functional strategic plans, to US Embassy Integrated Country Strategies, to USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCS), then into the contracts or grants awarded to implement foreign assistance programs. Each layer of strategic planning was based on the structure and requirements of the Results Act, spanned from three to five years, provided direction on what and how objectives were to be achieved, and accounted for future

funding resources. This structure and a parallel performance monitoring and management system was installed to demonstrate alignment of foreign policy and assistance through the implementation of standardized performance indicators to enable the aggregation of results at the agency reporting level. State and USAID had developed a system to satisfy the requirements of GPRA and demonstrate alignment of foreign policy and assistance. However, the hierarchical structure did not provide flexibility at the operational level of overseas missions owing to rigidity and five-year time spans of country-level CDCSs. The system of strategic planning set each overseas mission on a determined course by accounting for all development assistance programs and funding to be implemented through contracted services or grants to non-governmental organizations over the life of each CDCS.

In the context of national security, the Department of Defense defines strategy as “[a] prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”<sup>2</sup> The instruments of national power are commonly referred to as diplomatic, military, economic, and psychological means to exercise influence in the global political order. The President of the United States frames the government’s international engagement by defining the national interests and goals in documents and policy declarations, such as in the National Security Strategy, Presidential policy directives, speeches, and public declarations. Executive agencies that are statutorily enabled to contribute to the exertion of national power develop subordinate strategic plans to align their goals and objectives with those of the President. This alignment ensures that the projection of the national instruments of power align and support the attainment of the end states expressed by the President, who is principally responsible for foreign engagement and relations. However, owing to the dynamics of constantly changing elected officials, including the President, policies guiding the engagement of the US government with foreign governments

---

<sup>2</sup> US Department of Defense, *Terms and Definitions* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), 220, accessed March 28, 2018, <http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf?ver=2017-12-23-160155-320>.

and institutions change based on different perspectives of national interests and goals, and desired end states. Similarly, the global political environment is subject to foreign nation states and multilateral actors changing their policy orientations. Accordingly, those Executive agencies responsible for projecting national power should be afforded flexibility in the operationalization of their strategic plans and programs to accommodate changes in policies resulting from internal and external environmental dynamics.

With this notion in mind it appeared that State and USAID had developed and implemented a system of strategic planning that enforced rigidity at the overseas mission-level through the CDCS, which fixed development assistance programs and funds over five-year increments. This rigidity was seemingly at odds with the idea of elevating development alongside diplomacy and defense. Unlike USAID, the Departments of State and Defense benefitted from greater flexibility to respond to changing internal and external dynamics because the exertion of their powers was not delivered through contracted mechanisms or grants. Owing to implementing the requirements of the Results Act and wanting to demonstrate alignment between foreign policy and assistance, USAID was afforded limited to no capacity to address near- or medium-term security opportunities or challenges at an individual country level. Short of a USAID mission being provided discretionary or supplemental funds, what had been planned and contracted or awarded was what was to be implemented.

The enactment of the GPRA and subsequent implementation of its requirements was followed by a few scholars of public administration. Generally, their published papers discussed and argued the pros and cons of implementing performance management and monitoring systems across the entirety of the federal government, and the related challenges. Within the US government, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Congressional Research Service, and the GAO published a variety of internally-focused reports. They ranged from comparing the Results Act relative with other past performance monitoring and management initiatives, to explaining the requirements to successfully implement the GPRA, to assessing the efforts and status of various Executive agencies on their implementation of the GPRA. Separately, a few trade articles were published by professional services enterprises to effectively

position their organizations as knowledgeable service providers available for hire to assist with implementing the requirements of the Results Act. No specific articles or research was obtained that assessed potential or actual impacts of implementing the Results Act and using it to demonstrate alignment between one or more Executive agencies' policies and program activities.

Outside scholarly and US government research, or trade articles focused on the GPRA, an insight on the form of strategic planning implemented by State and USAID can be considered from a paper written by Henry Mintzberg and James A. Waters. In their 1985 article, *Of Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent*, the authors explained that their research focused on the strategy formulation process based on the definition of strategy as a pattern discernable in a stream of decisions. In this context they explored the interplay between strategies as defined and intended by leaders of organizations and the what organizations did. This consideration gave rise to their terming deliberate strategies as those realized as intended, and emergent strategies as those realized through patterns or consistencies among action regardless or without respect to intentions. Between these two extremes the authors developed a typology of eight forms of strategies that spanned the continuum from fully deliberate to fully emergent. Each of the eight forms are analyzed and described in the context of leadership intentions, control over organization actions, and environmental influence. Of the eight, two are pertinent to assessing the operationalization of the DOD's definition of strategy in the context of national security, and USAID's implementation of strategic planning based on the Results Act.

The first is a planned strategy where a leader(s), as the central authority of an organization, sets and communicates the intentions of the organization. Management and decision controls are instituted to monitor the adherence to an established plan and programs. Critical to this form of strategy, the operating environment must be benign and have no direct impact on an organization, controllable, or highly predictable. These aspects are critical in that a planned strategy is intended to be implemented and achieved as designed and allow little to no alteration to accommodate environmental influences. USAID and State, in their effort to satisfy the requirements of the GPRA and demonstrate alignment between

foreign policy and assistance, pushed this form of strategy formulation down to the overseas mission level through the adoption of the CDCS.

The second is an umbrella strategy where a leader(s) sets and communicates the vision of an organization, providing overall direction to subordinate plans and decisions. In lieu of a strict control structure, guidelines are provided to establish left and right boundaries for subordinate decision makers to operate within. Organizations that employ this form of strategy possess the capacity and willingness to respond to environmental dynamics, within defined limits, as strategic direction is cast as a vision as opposed to a strict plan for implementation. Arguably, umbrella strategies complement the needs of Executive agencies projecting national power owing to the inherent flexibility to operate within parameters defined by national policies, which have a high likelihood of being altered by domestic and foreign influences.

### The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993

The overarching theme of GPRA was “[t]o provide for the establishment of strategic planning and performance measurement in the Federal Government.” Section 2 of the Results Act lists the following specific findings of Congress:

waste and inefficiency in Federal programs undermine the confidence of the American people in the Government and reduces the Federal Government's ability to address adequately vital public needs;

Federal managers are seriously disadvantaged in their efforts to improve program efficiency and effectiveness, because of insufficient articulation of program goals and inadequate information on program performance; and

congressional policymaking, spending decisions and program oversight are seriously handicapped by insufficient attention to program performance and results.<sup>3</sup>

The purpose of the Results Act was to address these findings to improve the confidence of the American people. As recorded during a meeting of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, held on June 15, 1993, to discuss and recommend the passage of GPRA, the Committee noted that public confidence in the

---

<sup>3</sup> Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Public Law 103-62, 103d Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess. (August 3, 1993), 1-2, accessed March 29, 2018, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/senate-bill/20/text/es?>.

American government was suffering and that the Federal Government was held in low esteem. The Committee report cited a then recent public perception poll indicating that American citizens believed at least 48 cents were wasted out of every tax dollar spent by the Federal Government. Overall the Committee raised concerns about waste, inefficiency, and ineffectiveness in Federal programs. To address their concerns the Committee signaled their belief “that regular and systematic measurement and reporting of program performance, compared to preestablished goals, would be a major addition, providing a valuable supplement to the Committee’s previous work in the area of management improvement.”<sup>4</sup>

To address the perceived public’s dissatisfaction with the Federal Government, the Results Act was drafted and proposed to institute systematic performance monitoring and management to hold Federal agencies accountable for achieving intended program results. The intent was to focus on results, service quality, and customer service of Federal agencies as means to improve the effectiveness and public accountability of the Federal Government, and thereby the confidence of the American people. To accomplish this, agencies would need to develop annual performance targets, monitor performance, and report publicly on progress toward achieving those goals. Secondly, the Committee held that such focus and monitoring would assist Federal managers with improving service delivery, and improve congressional oversight of the Federal Government by being able to better monitor agencies’ achievement of statutory objectives, and the effectiveness and efficiency of Federal programs and spending.<sup>5</sup>

To bring about a legislated focus on delivering results, and improving service quality and customer service, the Results Act required that the head of each Executive agency regularly submit to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and to Congress five-year strategic plans. These strategic plans were mandated to contain a comprehensive mission statement encompassing each

---

<sup>4</sup> *Hearing before the committee on Governmental Affairs. Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. 103d Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 1993, 2, accessed March 28, 2018, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/mgmt-gpra/gprptm#h4>.*

<sup>5</sup> Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Public Law 103-62, 2-3.

agencies' major functions and operations, the general goals and objectives of the respective functions and operations, and measurable outcome-related goals for those functions and operations addressed in the mission statement. The strategic plans were also to include a discussion of how the general goals and objectives were to be achieved, including a description of the operational processes, and the human, capital, information and other resources required to meet those goals and objectives. An additional discussion was required to describe how outcome-related performance goals related to the general goals and objectives in each strategic plan. Further discussion was required to elaborate on factors external and beyond the control of each agency that could significantly affect the achievement of their respective general goals and objectives. Lastly, to reinforce the essence of legislated performance management, the Results Act required a description of the program evaluations to be used to establish or revise general goals and objectives, including a schedule for future program evaluations.

All Executive agencies of the Federal Government, except the Central Intelligence Agency, the General Accounting Office, the Panama Canal Commission, the United States Postal Service, and the Postal Rate Commission, were subject to the new law. The first submission of each agencies' strategy was deferred until September 30, 1997, for all Executive agencies not participating in a pilot project. For those agencies selected to pilot performance management for the fiscal years 1994, 1995, and 1996, they were required to begin immediate development of their legislated strategic plans.

## The Legislative History

John E. Mercer, who was working for Senator William V. Roth, Jr. (R-DE) as the Republican Counsel to the US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, credited himself for having proposed the idea of developing legislation to mandate performance-based management across the entire Federal Government. He presented his idea to Senator Roth in January, 1990, and received authorization to move forward and develop an early version of GPRA, which was introduced by the Senator on October 3, 1990,

as S. 3154 the *Federal Program Performance Standards and Goals Act of 1990* (FPPSGA).<sup>6</sup> The inspiration for FPPSGA, according to Mr. Mercer’s June 19, 2001, testimony before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, was the performance-based management system of the City of Sunnyvale, California. Between 1979 and 1987 Mr. Mercer had served on the City Council and as mayor for part of his tenure.<sup>7</sup> In these capacities, Mr. Mercer observed and interacted with the city of Sunnyvale’s performance monitoring and management system that was directly integrated with the city’s budget system, enabling program managers to “plan, manage, and assess progress on a day-to-day basis.” The sophisticated system was a partial result of a 1973 pilot development project between city personnel and the US General Accounting Office to improve government effectiveness and efficiencies.<sup>8</sup>

The purpose of FPPSGA was to “provide for establishment and evaluation of performance standards and goals for expenditure in the Federal budget”. To ensure the taxpayer was receiving “full value for their tax dollar,” the proposed bill mandated that OMB establish performance indicators, quantified for each major expenditure category in the Federal budget. However, the bill also required Congress to establish specific outcome measures as part of its legislative process, requiring annual performance standards and goals in all authorizing and appropriating legislation. The bill did not leave committee, presumably because of the obligation it would have placed on Congress to monitor and report on performance of proposed legislation. Senator Roth was not deterred and on January 4, 1991, he reintroduced the bill as S. 20 FPPSGA of 1993, which excluded application to the legislature. Again, the bill did not pass through committee, namely because it did not include lessons observed and learned by OMB, the GAO, the Congressional Budget Office, the Department of Treasury, and congressional staff

---

<sup>6</sup> “The Government Performance and Results Act,” *Strategisys*, last modified 2016, accessed March 28, 2018, <http://strategisys.com/gpra>.

<sup>7</sup> “Congressional Testimony,” *Strategisys*, last modified 2016, accessed March 28, 2018, [http://strategisys.com/jm\\_testimony](http://strategisys.com/jm_testimony).

<sup>8</sup> *Hearing before the committee on Governmental Affairs. Government Performance and Results Act of 1993*, 103d Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 1993, 9-10.



that visited other countries, states and local governments to study performance management systems. Those lessons included the need for Executive agencies to develop strategic plans to explain their statutory responsibilities, goals and objectives; to assign to them the responsibility to develop performance monitoring and management goals, and accountability; and to provide greater managerial flexibility to sustain a successful performance measurement system.<sup>9</sup>

At this juncture, and sensing the possibility of legislative reform to improve Federal government operations and management, OMB policy officials actively engaged with Senate Governmental Affairs Committee staff members to strengthen the draft bill. Of significance, Executive agencies were required to develop five-year strategic plans in consultation with Congress. Those plans would include a comprehensive mission statement and long-term goals and supporting objectives for each of an agency's major functions. Secondly, agencies were required to establish performance goals, prepare annual performance monitoring and management plans, describe how they intended to achieve their performance goals, and describe how they would assess and validate their performance. Thirdly, agencies were required to produce annual reports discussing where and why they had and had not been successful achieving their goals. These three components became integral components of GPRA and helped carry the bill through committee testimony and deliberations with one voice amendment retitling the bill as the "Government Performance and Results Act."<sup>10</sup>

The significantly revised bill garnered the support of an additional nineteen other Senators who joined Senator Roth as sponsors of the law, achieving broad and near balanced bipartisan support. Late in 1991 the legislation was approved by the Senate but the House of Representatives took no action until Presidential-elect William Jefferson Clinton gave early and strong support for the bill. Subsequently the

---

<sup>9</sup> Jonathan D. Breul "GPRA – A Foundation for Performance Budgeting" *Public Performance & Management Review*, 30, no. 3 (March 2007): 314-316, accessed November 29, 2017. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20447635>.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 314-316.

bill was passed by the Congress with balanced support from both parties and assurance that the bill would be signed into law, as it was by President William Jefferson Clinton on August 3, 1993.<sup>11</sup>

The Republican initiated effort to instill performance monitoring and management, improve efficiency and effectiveness across the Federal Government, and enable federal workers to better manage their statutory mandates resonated with the new Clinton Administration and its intent to “reinvent government.” Elaine Kamarck, who managed President Clinton’s National Performance Review from 1993 to 1997, characterized the GPRA as one of three revolutions within the Administration’s reinventing government movement. Collectively the tripartite grouping of government performance, customer focus, and innovation revolutions that took shape under President Clinton’s leadership were built upon by succeeding administrations.<sup>12</sup> By signing into law the Results Act, the Government of the United States had taken a large step forward by legislating the implementation of a performance management framework that relied on Executive agencies to develop strategic plans, annual performance plans, and annual performance reports.

## The General Accounting Office Guidance

In response to the enactment, almost three years prior, of the Results Act the General Accounting Office published the “Executive Guide, Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act” in June 1996. The intent of the guide was to assist federal managers and the Congress with putting GPRA into effect by identifying and providing guidance on key steps that were deemed necessary for successful implementation at the individual agency level. As noted in the GAO guidance, the Results Act was implemented to force agencies to focus on results, instead of traditional concerns such as staffing levels and securing resources. In the preface to the guide, the GAO noted that implementing the

---

<sup>11</sup> Walter Groszyk, “Implementation of the GPRA of 1993” (paper presented at the November 1995 meeting convened by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development of national experts on performance measurement), 4, accessed October 26, 2017, <https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/omb/gpra.html>.

<sup>12</sup> Elaine Kamarck, “Lessons for the Future of Government Reform,” (testimony prepared for the House Committee on Oversight of Government Reform, Washington, DC, June 18, 2013), 1-3, accessed March 28, 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/lessons-for-the-future-of-government-reform>.

requirements of the Results Act would not be easy, nor would it be a quick transition to develop and deploy system to assess and measure improvements in government performance. The report noted that many of the largest government agencies operated systems that predated the significant reform to focus on delivering results. The GAO noted that existing structures and processes supported operations and reporting demands that were designed before new technologies and means of electronic communication had come into being. Regardless, the GAO stated that the environment had changed, and that the Congress, the executive branch and the public wanted agencies to be less accountable for inputs and outputs, and more accountable for outcomes and the results government programs provided to beneficiaries.

The first step recommended by the GAO was to define an agency's mission and its desired outcomes. In this vein the GAO argued that developing an agency's mission statement should bring an agency into focus with a clear understanding of why it exists, what it does, and how it operates. Building on this understanding, strategic goals were to reflect the why and what an agency does to communicate and justify the purpose of its programmatic activities. The GAO described the strategic planning efforts as the starting point to clearly explain what an agency intends to accomplish and the means it intends to deploy to accomplish its goals and objectives. A core component of the first step was for an agency to assess the alignment of its core processes and resources to meeting its mission and desired outcomes. It was explained that by aligning activities agencies would make clearer linkages between levels of funding and anticipated results. Looking forward the GAO noted that the OMB was in the process of modifying its budget decision making process by adopting a greater focus on the alignment of agency goals and objectives with Presidential policies, and an agency's performance achieving its goals and objectives.

The second step listed by the GAO for successful implementation of GPRA was to incorporate performance monitoring and management into Executive agencies. The GAO noted that this requirement was one of the most important features of the Results Act as performance measurement would enable agencies to track and communicate the results they have or have not achieved. To meet this requirement the GAO expounded on four characteristics to guide the development of effective performance goals.

First the GAO advised that performance goals should demonstrate results. Simple as this sounded, the GAO acknowledged that this task would be especially challenging for managers implementing programs that would not realize desired outcomes for multiple years, such as long-term research and development programs. Equally difficult would be establishing goals that could not be reasonably quantified or directly attributable to the programs of an agency, such as foreign policy or assistance programs. The GAO also advised that the number of agency performance goals be limited to a vital few, which would inform stakeholders and decision makers as to whether an agency was accomplishing its mission, guide possible realignment of processes or programs, or question the value of some programs. The GAO noted that managing an excessive amount of performance goals indicators risked creating excess information that could obscure rather than clarify an agency's performance and mission. The guidance also suggested that when agencies are selecting key performance goals to incorporate consideration of multiple competing priorities among stakeholders and to balance competing demands. Lastly, it was advised that performance goals should provide an inherent link to an agency's program offices to guide day-to-day activities and establish accountability for achieving results.

The last significant step that the GAO discussed, as it related to initial implementation of the Results Act was for agencies to anticipate and plan for new systems to replace existing accounting and information systems across the federal government. The GAO opined that most existing systems were largely incapable of collecting and organizing data on a timely, reliable, and accurate basis, giving rise to their guidance that agencies would need to simultaneously develop new information systems to fully implement the requirements of the Results Act.

### Applying the Results Act to Foreign Assistance

In June 1997, the GAO was requested to review USAID's 1996 draft strategic plan, and others submitted by cabinet departments and selected major agencies. The GAO conducted their review based on the requirement that each strategic plan include the following six elements (1) a comprehensive mission statement covering the major functions and operations of the agency, (2) the agency's general goals and objectives, (3) a description of how the goals and objectives are to be achieved, (4) a

description of how the performance goals included in the plan will be related to the agency's general goals and objectives, (5) identification of key factors external to the agency and beyond its control that could affect achievement of general goals and objectives, and (6) a description of the program evaluations used to establish/revise strategic goals with a schedule for future program evaluations. These six elements formed the basis of a series of reviews conducted by the GAO to assess progress the various Executive agencies were making with implementing the Results Act. The GAO's report explained that USAID was having difficulty establishing clear objectives and priorities owing to the statutory dictates of the *Foreign Assistance Act of 1961* (P.L. 87-195) and several amendments to the law, which authorized the majority of USAID's program activities and incorporated more than thirty separate wide-ranging objectives. Further complicating the difficulty of establishing clear objectives and priorities, USAID was also subject to implementing numerous congressional directives and other activities that had been established by former USAID Administrators. Regardless, the GOA noted that USAID had made good progress developing a strategic framework by gathering various foreign assistance activities under six broad goals. However, the GAO raised concern about noted deficiencies in relating performance goals to general goals and objectives, and program evaluations.<sup>13</sup>

With respect to relating performance goals to general goals and objectives, the GAO commented that USAID had not finished developing performance measurement indicators, and consequently the agency had not explained how day-to-day activities linked to the broad nineteen long-term objectives included in its 1996 draft strategic plan. Regarding the section on program evaluations, the GAO found that USAID did not mention any findings from program evaluations, consequently USAID did not explain how findings influenced the establishment of its strategic goals. The strategic plan also failed to include a discussion of scope and methodology of future evaluations, nor indicate where and when they

---

<sup>13</sup> US General Accounting Office, *The Results Act: Observations on UISAD's November 1996 Draft Strategic Plan*, GAO/NSIAD-97-197R, 3-4, accessed on March 28, 2018, <https://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-97-197R>.

would be conducted.<sup>14</sup> Regardless of the reasons behind the deficiencies, it was apparent that USAID was struggling to implement adequate performance monitoring and management systems to address the intent of the Results Act to focus Executive agencies on demonstrating achievement of results.

Following the submission of USAID's first strategic plan by September 30, 1997, the GAO conducted a review of the submitted plan. In its report, the GAO concluded that USAID had demonstrated progress addressing its findings in the 1996 draft strategic plan. However, the GAO noted that USAID's strategic plan was a work in process and that continued improvements would need to be made to fully address the requirements of the GPRA. Specifically, the GAO focused on the challenge the Agency faced with aggregating performance data across all USAID missions because of the lack of consistency in performance monitoring indicators that had been developed independently by each USAID mission. The disparity in indicator data exacerbated the difficulty of USAID being able to make clear links to the high-level performance goals that were included in the 1997 strategic plan.<sup>15</sup>

In its fiscal year 1997 Agency Performance Report, USAID reported that during 1995 and 1996 USAID missions had developed country-specific strategic plans, including goals and objectives to frame their assistance activities, and related performance monitoring indicators. Yet, as of September 1997 the report noted that "[a]bout 80 percent of all operating units had performance monitoring systems in place with baseline data established for at least one strategic objective."<sup>16</sup> Assuming each USAID mission had at least two strategic objectives, the Agency had significant progress to make to demonstrate progress addressing the requirements of GPRA. In its 2001 Agency Performance Report, USAID's Office of Inspector General noted in its comments on USAID's most serious performance challenges that "USAID continues to have problems developing performance measurement and reporting systems that meet

---

<sup>14</sup> US General Accounting Office, *The Results Act: Observations on UISAD's November 1996 Draft Strategic Plan*, GAO/NSIAD-97-197R, 9-11.

<sup>15</sup> US General Accounting Office, *Agencies' Annual Performance Plans Can Help Address Strategic Planning Challenges*, GAO/GGD-98-44, 138-141, accessed March 28, 2018, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/225214.pdf>.

<sup>16</sup> US Agency for International Development, *1997 Agency Performance Report*, 163, accessed March 28, 2018, [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNACB775.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACB775.pdf).

internal and external reporting requirements, including the requirements of the Results Act.”<sup>17</sup> USAID never developed an integrated system to link foreign assistance programs directly to its agency-level strategic plan and framework. Consequently, USAID remained unable to explain how well it was doing in fulfilling its agency mission, and Congress and the Clinton Administration were not provided sufficient information to judge whether US taxpayer funds were being efficiently and effectively deployed to achieve USAID’s mission and support Presidential policies.

Compounding the Agency’s challenges, it was also caught in a political struggle that sought to abolish its existence. Senator Jesse Helms, who served as the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations from 1995 through 2000,<sup>18</sup> was a frequent and powerful critic of USAID and questioned the rationale of foreign assistance following the end of the Cold War. In March 1995, Senator Helms proposed a significant restructuring of the foreign policy apparatus by eliminating USAID, the Arms Control and Development Agency, the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and other agencies. His argument was that during the Cold War numerous foreign policy initiatives and functions had been parceled out to newly established agencies that operated independent of a unified policy making directorate.<sup>19</sup> His proposal kicked off a debate between the Republican Controlled Congress and the Clinton Administration. By early 1998 a compromise had been reached and *Foreign Affairs Agencies Consolidation Act of 1998* (Division G of PL 105-277) was signed into law. The law abolished the International Development Cooperation Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the United States Information Agency, and transferred their functions and resources to the Department of State. USAID was not abolished, but the new law included the provision that the USAID Administrator “shall report to and be under the direct authority and foreign policy guidance of the

---

<sup>17</sup> US Agency for International Development, *Fiscal Year 2001 Accountability Report*, 139, accessed March 28, 2018, [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PDABW111.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABW111.pdf).

<sup>18</sup> *Encyclopedia Britannica*, s.v. “Jesse Helms,” accessed March 28, 2018, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jesse-Helms>.

<sup>19</sup> Steven Greenhouse, “Helms Seeks to Merge Foreign Policy Agencies,” *New York Times*, March 16, 1995, accessed March 28, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/16/world/helms-seeks-to-merge-foreign-policy-agencies.html>.

Secretary of State.”<sup>20</sup> The requirements of GPRA had highlighted and illustrated the concerns in Congress that USAID was unable to demonstrate meaningful purpose by not being able to report on its results. Simultaneously, the legislation resulting from Senator Helm’s attempt to abolish USAID resulted in a compromise between the Republican Controlled Congress and President Clinton that USAID would receive foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State.

## Operationalizing GPRA in Foreign Assistance

The attacks of September 11, 2001 had many profound effects on America and its government. In his opening letter to the American people and all readers of the *2002 National Security Strategy* (NSS), President George Walker Bush made the case that “only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic human rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be able to unleash the potential of their people and assure their future prosperity.” Specifically, he listed the freedoms of speech, to choose one’s government, to worship as one chooses, to educate one’s children, to own property, and to enjoy the rewards of one’s labor.<sup>21</sup> In the context of the 2002 NSS, President Bush emphasized the need for the US to assist other nations to realize their potential for the benefit of their citizens, and for the security of the United States. The basis for his case stemmed from the acknowledged lesson of the attacks on September 11, 2001 that weak states, such as Afghanistan, posed a threat to the security of the United States. The threat emanated not from impoverished citizens themselves, but from the vulnerability of terrorist networks being able to operate freely in states comprised of weak institutions, corrupt practices, and vast poverty. To address this vulnerability President Bush stated that the United States intended to “create a balance of power that favors human freedom.”<sup>22</sup> To accomplish this objective while protecting the United States from aggressors, President Bush stated:

---

<sup>20</sup> Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Ch. 74: Foreign Affairs Agencies Consolidation, §6592 Administrator of AID reporting to Secretary of State, accessed February 1, 2018, <http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title22/chapter74&edition=prelim>.

<sup>21</sup> US President, Executive Office of the President, “The 2002 National Security Strategy” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), iv, accessed March 28, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., iv.



We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.<sup>23</sup>

In the 2002 NSS, President Bush laid out the course the United States would pursue in international engagement to protect its national security and interests through the three interdependent components of defense, diplomacy, and development.

Roughly a decade after the end of the Cold War, USAID was again being considered an integral component to advancing the national security of the United States. With the elevation of development assistance as a pillar of national security, and in line with existing authorities, Secretary of State, Colin L. Powell led a process to align foreign policy and assistance, resulting in the preparation of the first Joint Strategic Plan (JSP) between State and USAID. The new JSP for fiscal years 2004-2009 opened with introductory letters from Secretary Powell and USAID Administrator Andrew S. Natsios affirming their shared intent to align foreign policies and assistance, and was appropriately subtitled *Aligning Diplomacy and Development Assistance*.

The structure of the 2004-2009 JSP focused on four overarching goals: achieve peace and security, advance sustainable development and global interests, promote international understanding, and strengthen diplomatic and program capabilities. Below these goals were listed the shared objectives of State and USAID, which effectively merged the objectives listed in their respective prior strategic plans and presented them in broader and more general terms. For example, State's 2000-2004 strategic plan included the objectives to minimize the impact of international crime on the United States and its citizens, and reduce the entry of illegal drugs into the United States. In the 2004-2009 JSP, these objectives were combined into one objective to minimize the impact of international crime and illegal drugs on the United States and its citizens. The supporting text explained that State and USAID would "strengthen foreign law enforcement capabilities, establish transparent public and private institutions, and encourage alternative

---

<sup>23</sup> US President, Executive Office of the President, "The 2002 National Security Strategy," 1.

livelihoods through education and development.”<sup>24</sup> Each organization had long established foreign policy and development assistance activities to address the challenge of drug eradication in the Andean Region and for the first time spoke of what they were doing collectively as opposed to independently.

Similarly, three of USAID’s prior goals to develop human capacity through education and training, to stabilize the world population and protect human health, and to protect the world’s environment for long-term sustainability were grouped into a single goal to improve health, education, environment, and other conditions for the global population. Again, the supporting text demonstrated the programs of State and USAID but their work was encompassed under a broader and more general goal. Where State would work “with the Department of Homeland Security to promote orderly and humane migration flows,”<sup>25</sup> USAID would “devote special efforts to reducing barriers to education for girls.”<sup>26</sup> The intent of the 2004-2009 JSP was to align foreign policy and assistance, but the document did not include a discussion of policies or assistance activities that resulted from or were altered owing to aligning foreign policy and assistance. Instead, the document was a well-crafted merger of on-going the programs of both organizations, with goals written more broadly and generally to accommodate multiple existing efforts that predated the 2004-2009 JSP.

One and a half years after the release of the 2004-2009 JSP, Secretary Powell resigned and was succeeded by Condoleezza Rice as the Secretary of State. Just one year shy of having assumed the mantle, Secretary Rice announced her transformational diplomacy initiative on January 18, 2006, to a gathering at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. In her remarks, Secretary Rice cited President Bush’s second Inaugural Address, and his declared policy that the United States would “seek to support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” Secretary Rice explained to the attendees that the objective

---

<sup>24</sup> US Department of State and USAID, *Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2004-2009*, accessed March 28, 2018. <https://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/>, 15.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

of the transformational diplomacy initiative was to engage globally with partners to build and sustain well-governed democratic states that sought to meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.<sup>27</sup>

On the following day Secretary Rice held another gathering with senior leaders of the US government and expounded further on how transformational diplomacy would impact foreign assistance. In her comments, Secretary Rice reiterated the objective of the initiative and stressed the importance of foreign assistance's contribution to America's security by developing the capacity of other nations to govern justly and effectively. Of note she stressed that foreign assistance "must empower developing countries to strengthen security, to consolidate security, to increase trade and investment, and to improve the lives of their people." These four areas would subsequently become four key objectives of foreign assistance for the US government. The Secretary also explained that she had conducted a thorough review of foreign assistance provided by both State and USAID and concluded that there was a pressing need to better organize the multiple authorities that allocate assistance between the two organizations, to reduce conflicting or redundant efforts, and to integrate foreign assistance with broader US foreign policy goals and objectives. Secretary Rice continued by emphasizing that the existing approach to providing foreign assistance risks being misaligned with national policy objectives, and consequently the possibility of resources not being used to support Presidential policies. Her solution, and crux of the gathering, was to announce the establishment of a new position, the Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA), who would report directly to the Secretary and serve as the Administrator of USAID. Under the Secretary's direction, the DFA would have authority over all foreign assistance programmed and managed by both State and USAID. To organize this effort, the DFA was charged with developing a US government foreign assistance strategy, including five-year country-specific assistance strategies, and annual country-specific

---

<sup>27</sup> Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, "Transformational Diplomacy" (Georgetown University, Washington, DC, January 18, 2006), accessed March 28, 2018, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm>.

operational plans. This effort would drive the alignment of policies and assistance resources from the high-level previously organized by Secretary Powell to each individual US mission operating overseas.<sup>28</sup>

Later the same day Secretary Rice met with personnel at USAID where she reiterated the objectives of her initiative, explained the new DFA position and its dual-hatted responsibilities, and spoke of the need to secure financial resources to fund long-term development programs. In the middle of her remarks, the Secretary shared her thought that “we will have an opportunity to have strategic country plans that will guarantee that resources will be available for long-term development.” Later she seemed to have had in mind the findings of Congress as included in the GPRA of 1993 when she explained that three key principles would lead State and USAID to doing their job well. aligning priorities between the two organizations, being more effective in consolidating efforts and resources, and being good stewards of the taxpayers’ money. She then offered her expectation that other competing demands for resources of the federal government would make securing foreign assistance resources more difficult, and that aligning foreign policy and assistance would demonstrate good stewardship of resources and satisfy the dual objectives of assisting people around the world and make the United States securer. During the following question and answer session, Secretary Rice obliquely referred to the need for leadership to develop guidelines and strategic direction of what the US government intends to pursue in individual countries and regions.

Just days prior to the Secretary announcing her new initiative Andrew Natsios resigned as the Administrator of USAID. He was replaced by Ambassador Randall L. Tobias as the Administrator of USAID and the first Director of Foreign Affairs. Previously, Ambassador Tobias served as the United States Global AIDS Coordinator from 1993-1996. Coming into the DFA position, Ambassador Tobias brought with him an appreciation for online systems to track performance against standardized indicators, based on what had been had been developed under his leadership as the Global AIDS Coordinator to track

---

<sup>28</sup> Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks on Foreign Assistance” (Department of State, Washington, DC, January 19, 2006), accessed March 28, 2018, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59408.htm>.

and report on performance. Following his swearing in ceremony on March 31, 2006, Ambassador Tobias conducted an analysis of foreign assistance based on where State and USAID were currently investing the largest amounts of resources.

To support the DFA, the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance (State/F) was established to implement the DFA's responsibilities and focus the delivery of foreign assistance to achieve the Secretary's transformational diplomacy goal. To achieve this, State/F was tasked with developing:

- A coherent, coordinated US government foreign assistance strategy;

- Consolidated policy, planning, budget, and implementation mechanisms and staff functions required to provide leadership to State and USAID foreign assistance;

- Multiyear country-specific assistance strategies and annual country-specific operational plans; and

- Guidance for foreign assistance delivered through other US government agencies.<sup>29</sup>

To coordinate US foreign assistance and align policy objectives, Ambassador Tobias oversaw the development of "a new strategic framework to focus foreign assistance policy, planning, and oversight at the State Department and USAID on the Secretary's overarching transformational diplomacy goal." The goal of the framework was to help "build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system." Below this goal were the five assistance objectives of achieving peace and security, governing justly and democratically, investing in people, promoting economic growth, and providing humanitarian assistance. Below the goals were broad foreign assistance program areas, under which specific programs would be linked or aligned to an objective and the goal of foreign assistance. For example, under the objective of governing justly and democratically were four program areas including, rule of law and human rights, good governance, political competition and consensus-building, and civil society.<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>29</sup> US General Accounting Office, *Foreign Aid Reform*, GAO-09-192, 2, accessed March 28, 2018, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/290/288434.pdf>.

<sup>30</sup> Ambassador Randall Tobias, "The New Approach to U.S. Foreign Assistance" (George Washington University, Washington, DC, June 7, 2006), accessed March 28, 2016, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/f/releases/remarks2006/67973.htm>; US Agency for International Development, *Foreign Assistance*

To further align foreign policy and assistance, State/F developed a structure to target State and USAID assistance to a country based on one of five classifications of nation states (rebuilding, developing, transforming, partner, and restrictive countries). In a matrix format, guidance was provided to direct the course of foreign assistance relative to an objective and classification of a nation. For example, in a rebuilding country, defined as a state in or emerging from and rebuilding after internal or external conflict, under the peace and security goal, assistance would focus on “assist in creating and/or stabilizing a legitimate and democratic government and a supportive environment for civil society and media.” While in a transforming country, including countries with low or lower-middle income, assistance would “provide limited resources and technical assistance to reinforce democratic institutions.” In this manner, the framework provided a matrix of twenty-five directives to guide assistance planning depending on the corresponding assistance objectives and classification of nation, as established by State and USAID.<sup>31</sup>

To consolidate planning, budgeting, and implementing mechanisms, State/F developed Standardized Program Structure and Definitions (SPSDs), which provided a consistent way to categorize and account for all State and USAID foreign assistance. The basis of the SPSPD structure were the foreign assistance program areas listed in the foreign assistance framework. Continuing with the examples under the program objective governing justly and democratically, there were four program areas, strengthening civil society. Below this program area there were two program elements, including civil participation, and below this program element were listed five sub-elements, including strengthen civil society capacity for democratic processes, and citizen participation and oversight. The effect of narrowing from objectives to program areas to elements then to sub-elements was to provide guidance on the types of foreign assistance that the United States would provide based on the categorization of a nation state, effectively

---

*Framework*, October 12, 2006, accessed March 28, 2018, [https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/framework\\_102506.pdf](https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/framework_102506.pdf).

<sup>31</sup> US Agency for International Development, *Foreign Assistance Framework*, October 12, 2006, accessed March 28, 2018, [https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/framework\\_102506.pdf](https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/framework_102506.pdf).

providing parameters to the design of new assistance activities by requiring that they align with the foreign assistance framework and SPSD structure.

To coordinate the monitoring of results, State/F developed and issued the Standardized Foreign Assistance Master Indicator List (MIL). The standardized indicators were issued globally to overcome the challenge of aggregating data at the highest reporting levels, where previously two or more assistance activities that were providing similar types of assistance could have been reporting against different indicators. The indicators were organized in accordance with SPDSs to measure performance at the program area and program element levels to provide data for reporting at the objective level. To united the foreign assistance framework, the SPSD and the MIL, to collectively address the first three task of State/F, the office developed and implemented the Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System (FACTS) and subsequently FACTS Info. The FACTS system was developed to collect plans for implementing yearly appropriated funds, performance goals, and actual results achieved. FACTS Info was developed to aggregate, analyze, and report data on foreign assistance programs under the DFA's authority. To satisfy the new reporting requirements, overseas US missions needed to submit an annual Operating Plan (OP) that accounted for all foreign assistance programs. For each program US missions needed to provide the name of the implementing partner (i.e., contractor, non-governmental organization), the relevant contract or grant award number, detailed funding request by sub-element, and the intended results to be achieved based on the funding request. The effect of the framework, structures and standardized indicators established and implemented by State/F linked budget requests, funds spent, planned goals, and results from each assistance program from each US mission to the five objectives of the foreign assistance framework.

After more than seven months of socializing the foreign assistance framework with Congress, leaders of other Executive Agencies, nongovernmental organizations and entities, Ambassador Tobias issued a revised framework on January 31, 2007. The only change made to the framework was to include the words "reduce widespread poverty" in the framework's goal to clearly state the commitment of the United States to assist the poor. The framework was effectively uncontested, and its five objectives to

achieve peace and security, govern justly and democratically, invest in people, promote economic growth, and provide humanitarian assistance were elevated to be five of the seven strategic goals that formed the 2007-2012 State and USAID JSP that was being prepared under the direction of Secretary Rice.

Following the work link foreign assistance programs to the five objectives of the framework, State/F turned its attention to developing a template to replace USAID country-specific development assistance strategies with a new country assistance strategies (CAS) that included all foreign assistance being implemented by the US government. US missions that were providing foreign assistance were tasked with developing five-year CASs that included a description of current challenges, opportunities where assistance could help countries progress from one characterization in the framework to the next. Preparation of each CAS required participation of representatives of each agency that was implementing and overseeing foreign assistance in a host-country. As an example, the 2009-2014 CAS for Mozambique was built around the five goals of strengthening democratic governance, improving competitiveness of key economic sectors, improving health services, expanding opportunities for education and training, and enhancing capabilities of security forces. Collectively, USAID, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), State, the Office of the US Trade Representative, the Department of the Interior, the US Department of Agriculture, and the Department of the Treasury were to contribute to improving the competitiveness of targeted economic sectors. Apart from MCC's \$507 million investment in transportation infrastructure, the other Executive Agencies focused on a variety of assistance to develop the capacity of government officials, businesses and individuals to improve agriculture production through market linkages, and develop the tourism sector. The 2009-2014 CAS provided a description of how the assistance of each agency complemented efforts of other agencies and ultimately contributed to strengthening the economy and continuing the political stability of Mozambique, and its integration into the regional economy.<sup>32</sup>

---

<sup>32</sup> US Agency for International Development, *2009-2014 Country Assistance Strategy to Mozambique*, accessed March 28, 2018, <https://www.usaid.gov/documents/1860/us-government-country-assistance-strategy-mozambique-2009-2014>.



The second State and USAID JSP was released less than four years after the previous one had been published to incorporate the foreign assistance framework and further demonstrate the alignment of foreign policy and assistance. The structure of the 2007-2012 JSP was based on the SPSD and the cascading goals, program areas, elements and sub-elements. At the highest level the five objectives of the foreign assistance framework were included as individual goals of the JSP. Sections dedicated to each goal included a direct link to a policy or policies of President Bush then spelled out the strategic priorities of each goal, which equated to program areas listed in the SPSD. Discussions of each strategic priority explained the reasons for foreign assistance, described the expectations of assistance, and included general descriptions of types of activities that would be implemented. Collectively, the discussions of each goal linked from Presidential policy down to programs, justifying and explain the why, what and how of each level of the SPSD. As the 2007-2012 JSP incorporated the foreign assistance framework, and its linkages to country specific programs, the Secretary of State and USAID Administrator could for the first time demonstrate clear alignment of foreign policies and assistance with Presidential policies, and report on their performance.

The foreign assistance reforms during the terms of President Bush, particularly under the leadership and direction of Secretary Rice, were far reaching and revolutionary to USAID. During the Cold War, when USAID was formed by President John F. Kennedy, the focus of foreign assistance was to support global economic development and prosperity to offset the appeal of communist influence and threats of revolutions in countries aligned with US policies and interests. Following the end of the Cold War, USAID was left to promote American values along purely humanitarian lines. With the attacks on September 11, 2001, foreign assistance was considered a key component to shaping the international environment by strengthening nations to limit safe havens for terrorist organizations. In the opening letter to the 2006 National Security Strategy, President Bush stated that his strategy was based on two pillars. The first was “promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity – working to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development

policies.”<sup>33</sup> Concluding President Bush’s second term, State and USAID could speak to the alignment of foreign policies and assistance based on the purpose of enhancing national security, and demonstrate impact through performance monitoring. Through the development of SPSP, OPs, a standardized data rich performance monitoring system, and the CASs future Secretaries of State and USAID Administrators could explain how US taxpayer funds were being planned and used to mitigate the risks evolving in failed of failing states. More importantly the reporting system captured results of those efforts and the benefits derived to shape the global environment in line with US security interests. However, as demonstrated, the goals of State and USAID were rewritten to be broader and more general to subsume the programmatic activities of an agency, raising the question of whether the delivery and focus of foreign assistance had been significantly altered or repackaged to facilitate better communication.

Hillary Diane Rodman Clinton was sworn in at the 67<sup>th</sup> Secretary of State on January 21, 2009, and entered office wanting to know “[h]ow can we do better?” As a member of the Senate’s Armed Service Committee she had observed the Department of Defense (DoD) undergo its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and put in motion a similar review of State and USAID, culminating in the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). She made the QDDR process one of her highest priorities with a focus on achieving the most impactful results for every American tax dollar spent while looking forward in time to plan for a changing world. Her focus was on delivering results by focusing on priorities and ensuring that such priorities were properly reflected in budget requests.<sup>34</sup>

The 242-page QDDR was expansive in scope and recommended additional measures to further align strategic planning, budgeting, and performance monitoring and management implemented under Secretaries Powell and Rice. The QDDR segmented planning by State and USAID into three steps: (1)

---

<sup>33</sup> US President, Executive Office of the President, “The 2006 National Security Strategy” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), ii, accessed March 28, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/64884.pdf>.

<sup>34</sup> US Department of State, “The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 2010), iii-iv, accessed March 29, 2018, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/2010/index.htm>.

agency planning, (2) bureau planning, and (3) mission planning. In the report it was recommended that “[b]ureaus and technical disciplines at State and USAID will establish strategies drawn on the joint State and USAID strategic plan that articulate priorities within a region or sector and lay out specific tradeoffs necessary to bring resources in alignment with highest potential for impact.”<sup>35</sup> Joint regional strategies (JRS) were to be prepared every three years by the respective regional bureaus within State and USAID, and mirror the requirements and format laid out in the Results Act for agency strategic plans. The policy guidance was to be drawn from joint State and USAID strategic plans, the NSS and Presidential directives, as appropriate. The planning purposes of the JRS were to establish goals and objectives addressing challenges or opportunities at regional levels, set criteria for determining success, establish bureau level resource requests, and provide input to individual US missions for the development of their assistance plans.

At the overseas mission level, the QDDR elevated Chiefs of Missions (COM) to being responsible for the overall management of foreign assistance at the country level, and charged them with the responsibility for producing an Integrated Country Strategy (ICS). These three-year strategies were to involve all US government agencies operating in a country and capsule US foreign policy priorities and objectives, and articulate how diplomatic, foreign assistance, and other interventions would be used to achieve priority policies. The intent of implementing the ICS process and resulting plan was to reach consensus and articulate a common set of US mission goals and objectives in line with an overarching JRS, strengthen coordination throughout missions, and link mission strategies to monitoring programs, designs and resources requests for all assistance programs. As the ICS needed to align with the higher-level JRS, the structure, requirements and format also needed to be consistent with those of the Results Act.

---

<sup>35</sup> US Department of State, “The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 2010), 193.

Below the ICS, the QDDR recommended two additional strategies, the Country Diplomatic Strategy and the Country Foreign Assistance Strategy (CFAS). The former was to reiterate US foreign policy objectives in a country and articulate how policy advocacy, diplomatic and consular engagement, public diplomacy, and donor coordination would achieve policy objectives. The purpose of the CFAS was to relate foreign assistance and policy objectives in a country, however the type and resource level of foreign assistance being provided would guide the development of the strategy. For example, in a country where an assistance portfolio was primarily focused on development assistance, the USAID Mission Director would be made responsible for developing a Country Development Cooperation Strategy under the direction of the COM. In other countries where assistance was largely focused on the security sector, the COM could designate another US government official to prepare a Security and Justice Sector Strategy.<sup>36</sup> Again, as foreign assistance strategies needed to align with the higher-level ICS, the structure, requirements and formant needed to be consistent with those of the Results Act.

The recommendation to prepare a CDCS was in fact a requirement of President Barak Obama's Presidential Policy Directive 6 on US Global Development Policy. The policy directive listed six areas that the US government would implement to reestablish the United States as the global leader in international development. One of those areas required that USAID "will work in collaboration with other agencies to formulate country development and cooperation strategies that are results oriented and will partner with host-countries to focus investment in key areas that shape countries' overall stability and prosperity."<sup>37</sup>

The structure and requirements of a CDCS differed from those of the preceding strategies. Where goals and objectives were aligned between an ICS and a CDCS, the components of the former strategy could have been written broader to account for assistance other than development assistance that might

---

<sup>36</sup> US Department of State, "The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review" (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 2010), 192.

<sup>37</sup> US President. Executive Office of the President, "Presidential Policy Directive, U.S. Global Development Policy," (September 22, 2010), 14, accessed March 29, 2018, <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-6.pdf>.

have been provided to a host-country. And where sub-objectives might have followed objectives in an ICS, the structure of a CDCS used different terminology to orient its framework on results. For example, the CDCS prepared for the Republic of Georgia included the development objective to enhance democratic checks and balances and accountable governance. Below this development objective were listed four intermediate results (IR), including one for “a more informed engaged citizenry”, and below this IR were listed four sub-intermediate results, including “advocacy and civic oversight increased”<sup>38</sup>. The purpose for a CDCS to include a results framework was to focus USAID’s work on the attainment of results, as measured by the standardized list of foreign assistance indicators developed by State/F or by the US mission for management purposes. For example, under the sub-intermediate result listed above, the Good Governance Initiative in Georgia development assistance program was required to collect data and report on standardized State/F indicators including the number of people participating in new or improved government mechanisms for citizen consultation to address management and management purposes. The implementing partner was also required to collect and report data related to the number of public forums resulting from US government assistance in which national legislators and the public interact<sup>39</sup>. Through USAID contracts and grant agreements the foreign assistance framework structure and performance monitoring and management system transcended the entirety of State and USAID foreign assistance programs and reached through to their implementing partners.

## Conclusion

The end of the Cold War presented numerous opportunities to reduce the size of the US government through the elimination of foreign policy and assistance programs that had been created to counter the spread of communism and to sustain relationships with allies and partners across the globe. At

---

<sup>38</sup> US Agency for International Development “Country Development Cooperation Strategy for Georgia,” (July 2012), 22, accessed March 29, 2018, <https://www.usaid.gov/georgia/cdcs>.

<sup>39</sup> USAID/Georgia, “The Good Governance Initiative in Georgia, Request for Proposals SOL-114-14-000008,” (May 21, 2014), 44, accessed March 29, 2018, [https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=5dabb5dbe1825b84598ef78437e4056d&tab=core&\\_cview=1](https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=5dabb5dbe1825b84598ef78437e4056d&tab=core&_cview=1).

the same time, the Clinton Administration brought with it a zeal to reinvent government, focusing on initiatives to improve the efficiency of its operations and the delivery of services to citizens. The Administration's vision blended with that of John Mercer, who had brought to the US Congress his experience of local-level performance-based management from Sunnyvale, California. He believed and advised the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs that the system in Sunnyvale was a model example of how a performance monitoring and management system would link funds spent to results achieved. Such a system in turn provided a means to assess budget requests based on projected results to be achieved with requested funds. His premise served as the core in the bipartisan drafting of the final Results Act, which President Clinton signed into law.

Subsequently, the early years of the Bush Administration were complicated by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and President Bush responded with enthusiasm to elevate development assistance in his NSS as a mean to limit potential safe havens for terrorist organizations. Arguably, USAID's weak performance aggregating and communicating the results of its foreign assistance programs, coupled with the Secretary of State's relatively new authority over the Agency, made alignment of foreign policy and assistance inevitable to ensure President Bush's security strategy was optimally implemented. As a first step, Secretary Powell oversaw the development of the first joint strategic plan by State and USAID. Following the end of his tenure, Secretary Rice established the Director of Foreign Assistance position and the State/F to operationalize the mandate of the Director. Systems, processes, and standardized definitions and performance indicators were developed and implemented throughout State and USAID to synchronize terminology and to enable aggregation of results being achieved with foreign assistance funds. These reforms were further tightened by Secretary Clinton who set in motion the first ever quadrennial review of diplomacy and development programs during the first term of President Obama.

The output of the efforts of the three Secretaries was layers of cascading strategic plans, each of which was based on the requirements and structure of the Results Act to manage the alignment and implementation of foreign policy and assistance. This hierarchy of multi-year, results-based strategic

plans linked the State and USAID joint strategic plans to geographic regional bureaus to overseas missions to foreign assistance programs and then to individual programs that were being implemented by contractors or grantees. Everything that was being implemented anywhere on the globe could be clearly linked to a foreign policy or assistance directive, and the results of those programs could be aggregated.

However, the outcome of cascading layers of strategic plans was to significantly limit State and USAID's ability to respond to near- and medium-term challenges or opportunities. Drawing on the article, *Of Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent*, planned strategies inherently discourage adaptation by the mere articulation of leadership intentions. The inherent rigidity of planned strategies is further exacerbated by separating formulation from implementation, where the former occurs before and to guide eventual implementation. This in turn generates systems of commitments, or intended results, and procedures in the form of set plans, programs, and performance monitoring and management systems to ensure adherence to commitments.

Whether intentional or not, the five-year CDCSs modeled the formulation of a planned strategy, in which design, implementation, and funding of all development assistance programs in a country were determined before operations began. The notion of establishing a five-year plan that accounted for how the majority of, if not all, anticipated development assistance would be provided assumed a high degree of confidence that the environment would remain largely static during the implementation of each CDCS. These plans also conveyed the notion that US mission leadership had clear intentions of what was to be accomplished with little tolerance for deviation or adaptation from learning or environmental influences. The creation of such plans also suggested that the results of implementing a CDCS could be projected in terms of measurement goals.

At higher levels above CDCSs, it could have been argued that the JSPs and regional bureau strategies were consistent with the form of an umbrella strategy, where guidance was provided and subordinate organizations were allowed to develop individual strategies within parameters established by policy. While no evidence was obtained to suggest that the intent of developing and employing CDCSs was to establish planned strategies that did not tolerate deviation or adaptation to environmental changes,

it could have been reasonably argued from the evidence that this was the result, either intended or realized. Granted, the requirements of the Results Act, and the needs to address the interests of Congressional appropriators and to demonstrate purpose and alignment of foreign policies and assistance drove the construct of layers of strategic plans, and eventually gave rise to the CDCS. In its final form, foreign assistance, as an instrument of national power, largely operated without regard to environmental influences because what was intended and planned was to be achieved as designed. Consequently, in the absence of additional unplanned funds being allocated to an overseas mission from State/F and lengthy modifications to existing contracts or grant agreements the capacity to address near- and medium-term challenges and opportunities was not afforded to State or USAID.



## Bibliography

- Blackberry, Phillip. "Strategic Planning: An Overview for Complying with GPRA (P.L. 103-62)." *Armed Forces Comptroller*. Vol. 39, No. 1 (Winter 1994). Accessed March 28, 2018.  
<http://web.b.ebscohost.com/lumen.cgscarl.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=5&sid=e8e00532-5952-4504-bd89fcb98ffcaf3e%40sessionmgr102&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=9411170463&db=bth>.
- Breul, Jonathan D., "GPRA-A Foundation for Performance Budgeting." *Public Performance & Management Review*, vol. 30, no. 3, 2007. Accessed November 29, 2017.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/20447635>.
- Builder, Carl H. *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis*. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1989.
- President Clinton, William J. "Remarks on Signing the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and an Exchange with Reporters." White House, Washington DC, August 3, 1993. Accessed March 28, 2018. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=46945>.
- Congressional Research Service. Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. *Restructuring U.S. Foreign Aid: The Role of The Director of Foreign Assistance in Transformational Development*, by Connie Veillette. January 2007.
- Congressional Research Service. Government Organization and Management. *Changes to the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA): Overview of the New Framework of Products and Processes*, by Clinton T. Brass. February 2012.
- Greenhouse, Steven, "Helms Seeks to Merge Foreign Policy Agencies." *New York Times*, March 16, 1995. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/16/world/helms-seeks-to-merge-foreign-policy-agencies.html>.
- Groszyk, Walter. "Implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993." Paper presented at the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Meeting of National Experts on Performance Measurement, Paris, November 1995. Accessed March 28, 2018.  
<https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/omb/gpra.html>.
- Kravchuk, Robert S. and Schack, Ronald W. "Designing Effective Performance Measurement Systems under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993." *Public Administration Review*. Vol. 56. Issue 4, Jul/Aug 96, 348-358. Accessed March 28, 2018.  
<http://web.b.ebscohost.com/lumen.cgscarl.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=13&sid=e8e00532-5952-4504-bd89-fcb98ffcaf3e%40sessionmgr102&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=9608263539&db=bth>.
- Mercer, John. "The Result Act: Has it Met Congressional Expectations?" Statement Before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, June 19, 2001. Accessed March 28, 2018.  
[http://strategisys.com/sites/default/files/library/jm\\_testimony.pdf](http://strategisys.com/sites/default/files/library/jm_testimony.pdf).
- Mintzberg, Henry. *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*. New York, NY: The Free Press, 1994.

- Mintzberg, Henry and Quinn, James Brian, eds. *Readings in the Strategy Process*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1998.
- Mintzber, Henry and Waters, James A. "Of Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent." *Strategic Management Journal*. Vol. 6, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1985), pp. 257-272. Accessed March 29, 2018. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2486186?seq=1#page\\_scan\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2486186?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents).
- Radin, Beryl A. "The Government Performance and Results Act and the Tradition of Federal Management Reform: Square Pegs in Round Holes?" Paper presented at the fifth national Public Management Research Conference, Texas A&M University, December 3-4, 1999. Accessed March 28, 2018. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/3525813?seq=1#page\\_scan\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3525813?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents).
- . "The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA): Hydra-Headed Monster of Flexible Management Tool?" *Public Administration Review*. Vol. 58. Issue 4, Jul/Aug 98, 307-316. Accessed March 28, 2018. <http://web.b.ebscohost.com/lumen.cgscarl.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=9&sid=e8e00532-5952-4504-bd89-fcb98ffcaf3e%40sessionmgr102&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWwhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=952288&db=bth>.
- Secretary Rice, Condoleezza. "Transformational Diplomacy." Remarks at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, Washington DC, January 18, 2006. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm>.
- . "Remarks on Foreign Assistance." Remarks at the Department of State Benjamin Franklin Room, Washington DC, January 19, 2006. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59408.htm>.
- . "Remarks at the U.S. Agency for International Development of Foreign Assistance." Remarks at the U.S. Agency for International Development of Foreign Assistance, Washington DC, January 19, 2006. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59448.htm>.
- Strategisys.com. "Government Performance Management and Budgeting." Last modified 2016. Accessed November 5, 2017. <http://strategisys.com/gpra>.
- Ambassador Tobias, Randall. "Remarks at the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid and the New Approach to U.S. Foreign Assistance." Remarks at the ACVFA Second Public Meeting for 2006, Washington DC, June 7, 2006. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/f/releases/remarks2006/67973.htm>.
- . "Getting a Better Return on America's Investment in People." Remarks at the Initiative for Global Development 2006 National Summit, Washington DC, June 15, 2006. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/f/releases/remarks2006/67944.htm>.
- . "Foreign Assistance: A Vital Investment in Our Nation's Future." Remarks to members of the Indiana Chamber of Commerce attending the 2006 Washington Conference, Washington DC, June 27, 2006. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/f/releases/remarks2006/75076.htm>.

- . “Advancing the Message That Foreign Assistance Works.” Remarks at U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, Washington DC, June 27, 2006. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/f/releases/remarks2006/68392.htm>.
- . “Transformational Diplomacy: Staring the Vision.” Remarks to the Society for International Development, Washington DC, August 14, 2006. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/f/releases/remarks2006/75068.htm>.
- . “The New Approach to U.S. Foreign Assistance.” Remarks at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Gala, Washington DC, November 17, 2006. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/f/releases/remarks2006/78284.htm>.
- . “Telling the Story of America’s New Approach to U.S. Foreign Assistance.” Remarks at Worldwide Public Affairs Officers Conference, Washington DC, January 8, 2007. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/f/releases/remarks2007/80164.htm>.
- US Congress. Senate. Report of the Committee on Governmental Affairs to Accompany the S. 20, Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. 103d Cong., 1st sess., 1993. S. Report 103-58. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/mgmt-gpra/text/gprptm.html>.
- US Department of Defense. “Terms and Definitions.” Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018. Accessed March 28, 2018. <http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf?ver=2017-12-23-160155-320>.
- US Department of State. “The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading Through Civilian Power.” Washington, DC. December 2010. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153108.pdf>.
- . “Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2000-2005.” Washington, DC. October 2000. Accessed March 28, 2018. [https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/general\\_foreign\\_policy/2000\\_dos\\_stratplan\\_index.html](https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/general_foreign_policy/2000_dos_stratplan_index.html).
- US Department of State and USAID. “Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2004-2009.” Washington, DC. August 2003. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/>.
- . “Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2007-2012.” Washington, DC. May 2007. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2007/>.
- . “Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2014-2017.” Washington, DC. April 2014. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2014/>.
- US Government Accountability Office. “Foreign Aid Reform: Comprehensive Strategy, Interagency Coordination, and Operational Improvements Would Bolster Current Efforts.” GAO-09-192. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://www.gao.gov/assets/290/288434.pdf>.
- . General Government Division. “Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act.” GAO/GGD-96-118. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://www.gao.gov/products/GGD-96-118>.

- . General Government Division. “Managing for Results: Prospects for Effective Implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act.” GAO/T-GGD-97-113. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97113t.pdf>.
- . General Government Division. “Managing for Results: Agencies’ Annual Performance Plans Can Help Address Strategic Planning Challenges.” GAO/GGD-98-44. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://www.gao.gov/products/GGD-98-44>.
- . National Security and International Affairs Division. “The Results Act: Observations on USAID’s 1996 Draft Strategic Plan.” GAO/NSIAD-97-197R. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-97-197R>.
- . National Security and International Affairs Division. “The Results Act: Observations on USAID’s Fiscal Year 1999 Annual Performance Plan.” GAO/NSIAD-98-194R. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-98-194R>.
- US President. Executive Office of the President. “The 2002 National Security Strategy.” September 2002. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>.
- . Executive Office of the President. “The 2006 National Security Strategy.” March 2006. Accessed March 28, 2018. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/64884.pdf>.
- . Executive Office of the President. “The 2010 National Security Strategy.” May 2010. Accessed March 28, 2018. <http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf>.
- . Executive Office of the President. “Presidential Policy Directive, U.S. Global Development Policy.” September 2010. Accessed March 29, 2018. <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-6.pdf>.
- Vaisse, Justin. “Transformational Development.” *Chaillot Paper*. Paris, France. 1997. Accessed January 7, 2018. <https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/cp103.pdf>.