

A War if We Want It:
The South China Sea, Nationalism,
and Great Power War in the 21st Century

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A clash between China and the United States over the South China Sea is neither inevitable nor advisable. Review and consideration of past and current territorial disputes involving China demonstrate significant strategic patience and restraint on the part of planner in Beijing, both when tensions are high and when China has a significant military advantage. Though actively strengthening their military capabilities, China's primary state focus is on economic development and securing potential alternatives for resources outside of the heavily used South China Sea. The South China Sea itself is a strategic vulnerability to China, and will remain should the military balance remain as it is. In effect, the decision on

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Abstract

A War if We Want it: The South China Sea, Nationalism, and Great Power War in the 21st Century

A clash between China and the United States over the South China Sea is neither inevitable nor advisable. Review and consideration of past and current territorial disputes involving China demonstrate significant strategic patience and restraint on the part of planner in Beijing, both when tensions are high and when China has a significant military advantage. Though actively strengthening their military capabilities, China's primary state focus is on economic development and securing potential alternatives for resources outside of the heavily used South China Sea. The South China Sea itself is a strategic vulnerability to China, and will remain should the military balance remain as it is. In effect, the decision on whether to view China as a cooperative partner or an adversary is for the United States, as China remains strategically exposed.

“Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”¹ Sun Tzu's classic maxim guides policy makers on both sides of the Pacific Ocean, as many in the United States and China eye a possible great power conflict. The U.S. National Security Strategy of 2017 suggests an adversarial relationship already exists, stating “China . . . challenge[s] American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.”² Recent enactments of tariffs, colloquially called a trade war, have heightened suspicions while China rapidly modernizes its military forces. Finally, many posit the return of a Cold War, primarily between Russia and the United States but also including China, as a reality in the present or very near future.³

The discussion and analysis below will demonstrate a clash between China and the United States over the South China Sea is neither inevitable nor advisable. The first section addresses China's historical approach to dealing with territorial disputes with its neighbors, usually through “win-win” solutions and a general desire to de-escalate conflict. The second section analyzes China's domestic and international propaganda, which focuses on peaceful development and stability. Finally, the third section will review the current situation in the South China Sea in context, demonstrating the region is more a strategic weakness rather than a potential strength for China. These contextual factors show that great power conflict is not in China's interests and that a “win-win” solution is available for peaceful competition between the United States and China.

China's Approach to Territorial Disputes

Many senior officials in the United States view China as a significant, if not existential, threat to the United States.⁴ With a rapidly expanding industrial and economic base, technologically advanced military, and a near endless supply of manpower, China could be a formidable opponent. Furthermore, China's extensive territorial claims place it at loggerheads with the hegemonic power of the United States. Many presume these claims will be

1 Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, (London, Oxford University Press, 1963), 84.

2 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December, 2017, 2.

3 Robert D. Kaplan, “A New Cold War has Begun,” *Foreign Policy*, January 7, 2019. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/07/a-new-cold-war-has-begun/>

4 Ward, Steven, “Because China isn't 'Caucasian,' the U.S. is planning for a 'clash of civilizations.' That could be dangerous.” *The Washington Post*, May 4, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/04/because-china-isnt-caucasian-us-is-planning-clash-civilizations-that-could-be-dangerous/?utm_term=.41866e432ade

the flashpoint for a great power war between China and the United States. However, a review of the history of China's thorny territorial disputes suggests China takes a non-aggressive approach to resolving border and territorial claims, in search of agreements acceptable to all parties and a desire to de-escalate conflict. This approach in the past demonstrates that war over the South China Sea may not be inevitable.

Historically, China's limited approach to difficult territorial issues with neighbors showed restraint, even during periods of political instability at home and ideological conflict abroad. During the height of the Cultural Revolution, China fought a small battle with the Soviet Union along the Amur River resulting in about 100 total casualties. At the time, leadership on both sides of the conflict considered massive escalation into a generalized war, though cooler heads prevailed resulting in a *de facto* recognition of Chinese supremacy in the area.⁵ Both sides completed formal demarcation and recognition of all border disputes in 2008.⁶ This resolution of a bloody border conflict illustrates how China dealt with territorial concerns when a more generalized conflict may have provided a short-term, unifying boost politically. Despite the decade-long war of words with the Soviet Union during the "Sino-Soviet Split," China demonstrated restraint with its adversary, recognizing that such a war would be destructive to its interests while achieving very little except a change in boundaries. Today, though there may be differences in ideology and tension between China and the United States, this example of de-escalation and conflict resolution provides a blueprint for potential future agreements, even if blood is spilled on the battlefield between the two great powers.

The border disputes with Russia and the Central Asian Republics provide two central facets of the Chinese approach to dispute resolution in the modern age. The first is a desire to limit the scope and processes used in addressing the incident at large. In the Russia example, though China had significantly massed the People's Liberation Army (PLA) along the disputed border, leadership limited the confrontation to a few units and localities, despite the frosty relations between the two powers. Secondly, China utilized peaceful resolution of border conflicts to enhance bilateral cooperation in the Central Asian Republics, creating a joint demarcation committee and the establishment of a free trade zone in the formerly contested area.⁷ In this way, China negotiated deals not to leverage power over its neighbors, but to create enhanced bonds and mutual prosperity; a "win-win" scenario for both parties. These lessons can be applied to today, particularly with the ASEAN nations surrounding the South

5 Gerson, Michael, "The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict: Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969," Center for Naval Analyses, November, 2010.

6 No byline, "Putin and Hu Resolve Border Dispute," *The New York Times*, October 15, 2014.

7 Simon Denyer, "In Central Asia, Chinese Inroads in Russias Backyard," *The Washington Post*, December 17, 2015.

China Sea. Development of a free trade and development area in the South China Sea between all of the neighboring nations along the lines of the bilateral treaties discussed above may be an option in resolving the competing claims.

The thorniest on-going land dispute China currently faces is with India near Kashmir and on the Doklam Plateau high in the Himalayas, and again demonstrates Chinese restraint in territorial issues. This dispute also illustrates China's reaction and preparations in an on-going dispute that has an uncertain conclusion, similar to actions taken in the South China Sea. Having fought a short, localized war in 1962, the resultant Chinese victory did not resolve the overall dispute, as India continues to press its original claims.⁸ The current focal point is on Doklam, resulting in a military standoff in late summer 2017 between the two which enflamed nationalist sentiments in both countries.⁹ Though the military standoff did not result in significant bloodshed, China fortified its side of the boundary and upgraded readiness by patrolling along the frontier. Recent Chinese fortifications have alarmed Indian officials, many of whom suggest this could be a build-up to another war.¹⁰ Despite provocative actions on both sides of the border, no significant military actions have occurred since. In effect, the situation in Doklam is quite similar to that in the South China Sea, where China fortifies areas that it claims with defensive weaponry and logistics facilities, but takes no further provocative offensive military action while the dispute remains unresolved.

This dispute also demonstrates Beijing's strategic restraint when dealing with thorny border disputes. In the 2017 incident, China attempted to improve a road to the region in order to expand local infrastructure and accessibility. They stopped the construction after the altercation broke out.¹¹ The 1962 war also demonstrated the front was far easier for China to support and reinforce than for India.¹² Considering that Chinese military forces are likely to outmatch anything India can bring, China's actions on the ground show a level of restraint when facing an adversary, even an adversary they can locally dominate. Furthermore, when incidents occur in order regions, China takes pains to localize and limit conflicts. As will be discussed below, such restraint despite local military superiority seems the most logical course of action for China in the South China Sea, as it blends with its published propaganda, military strategy, and the strategic reality that the South China Sea is a strategic vulnerability for China's continued development.

8 Neville Maxwell, "Forty Years of Folly: What Caused the Sino-Indian Border War and Why the Dispute is Unresolved," *Central Asian Studies*, 35:1 (2003), 99-112.

9 Kristin Huang, "China Builds up Troop Numbers Close to Indian Border Flashpoint as Soldiers Prepare for First Winter near Doklam," *South China Morning Post*, December 14, 2017.

10 *Supra* note 10.

11 *Ibid.*

12 *Supra* note 9.

Rising Nationalism - China's Propaganda, Initiatives, and Military Strategy

China's pronouncements demonstrate an official desire for peaceful development and stability in order to achieve national rejuvenation. China has focused for both internal and external consumption three critical benchmark strategies to raise the country amongst the world's great powers: the China Dream, One Belt One Road, and China's 2015 Military Strategy. Though meant primarily for public consumption¹³, these policies burnish China's reputation at home and abroad. Furthermore, they emphasize the peaceful development of China and its relationships with others, suggesting China does not seek a great power war over the South China Sea, despite its territorial claims.

Since the “100 years of humiliation” occurred primarily at the hands of western powers, a strong nationalistic focus by Chinese leaders through the China Dream suggests that Western powers cannot expect China to back down from displays of force near what it has labelled parts of its territory, like the South China Sea. Though primarily an idea focused on domestic economic development, the China Dream espoused by President Xi Jinping represents an attempt to awaken the strength of China through its goal to be a “moderately well-off society” by 2021 and a “fully developed nation” by 2049.¹⁴ The concept has permeated Chinese society for mass consumption and through scholarly articles, where the words “China Dream” occurred in over 8,000 articles by mid-2014.¹⁵ Put simply, the idea of the China Dream focuses the energy of the people towards rejuvenating the country, while also providing the regime with a justification for hardship occurring during economic or political reform. State Counselor Yang Jiechi, regarded as the regime's senior diplomat, linked the China Dream to China's foreign policy by emphasizing achievement of the dream requires a “peaceful and stable international environment” to meet China's domestic economic goals.¹⁶ Other Chinese officials have likewise pushed back on the notion of a new cold war between China and the United States by emphasizing Yang's words, while seeking to resolve international issues through shared interests. Similar to the border disputes above, one can easily envision the exercise of Chinese power in the resolution of these issues as a velvet gloved mail fist—an offering of peace backed by force if tested too strongly. As such, in order to follow its own propaganda and seek peace and stability abroad for its own

13 Huang, Zheping, “China's most popular app is a propaganda tool teaching Xi Jinping Thought,” *South China Morning Post*, February 14, 2019. <https://www.scmp.com/tech/apps-social/article/2186037/chinas-most-popular-app-propaganda-tool-teaching-xi-jinping-thought>

14 Camilla T.N. Sorenson, “The Significant of Xi Jinping's 'Chinese Dream' for Chinese Foreign Policy: From 'Tao Guang Yang Hui to 'Fen Fa You Wei,’” *Journal of China and International Relations*, 3:1, 2015, 53-73.

15 *Ibid.*

16 *Ibid.*

domestic development, China prefers the status quo or a peaceful resolution in the South China Sea to continue meeting its domestic goals.

Though the One Belt One Road Initiative (or Belt and Road Initiative, BRI) may result in national security-related advantages for China down the road, in the meantime the generally “no strings attached” nature of Chinese investment very neatly meshes in the announced China desire to improve international stability. Based originally on the the Silk Road traversing Central Asia, BRI promotes funding mechanisms to develop land and sea infrastructure connecting China to other countries around the world.¹⁷ President Xi promotes the idea at home and abroad as an attempt to build a “community of common destiny” amongst neighbors, which dovetails with the China Dream by building a stable and peaceful international environment.¹⁸ Many believe China has invested more than \$1 trillion in improving infrastructure abroad to tie foreign markets closer.¹⁹ The United States, amongst other powers, has viewed such measures as parallel efforts to existing mechanisms and characterized BRI as a threat to the existing order.²⁰ Despite these concerns, BRI may just be what the Chinese say it is, an initiative to improve infrastructure in order to assist development. Having only one ally of its own, China is building relationships with countries that have generally been left out of the development game over the last 100 years, while also securing alternative trade routes outside of the South China Sea. Furthermore, it is the West that generally views BRI as a threat internationally, by attempting to counter-program or message the initiative through its own diplomatic initiatives. Most recipient nations accept the overtures, resulting in improved facilities and infrastructure as well as improved diplomatic ties.

China 's Military Strategy of 2015 focus on ”military cooperation” and “all-win cooperation”²¹ suggests an opportunity for status quo powers to engage with, rather than confront, the reality of China's power. The Strategy illustrates China's national security policy, based on the concept of “active defense,” which has been advocated by most of the paramount leaders of China. Traditionally following a policy of non-interference on the world stage, the new military strategy focuses on the maritime domain, emphasizing the need to secure international sea lines of communication and signaling an intent to develop a blue water navy.²² The second has already occurred, with the

17 Peter Ferdinand, “Westward Ho – The China Dream and 'One Belt, One Road:' Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping,” *International Affairs*, 92:4, July 2016, 941-957.

18 Tanner Greer, “One Belt, One Road, One Big Mistake,” *Foreign Policy*, December 6, 2018. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/06/bri-china-belt-road-initiative-blunder/>

19 *Supra* note 18.

20 *Supra* note 19.

21 State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. “Document: China’s Military Strategy.” May 2015. <https://news.usni.org/2015/05/26/document-chinas-military-strategy>

22 *Ibid.*

laying down of two different, indigenously produced aircraft carriers.²³ Though seen as a threat by the United States, another option views the expansion of the Chinese Navy as a possible new partner in international security. In its Military Strategy describing the National Security Situation, China reiterated that “[c]ountries are increasingly bound together in a community of shared destiny.” After noting “the forces for world peace are on the rise, so are the factors against war,” the Strategy takes specific aim at the role of the United States and “offshore neighbors” who take “provocative actions” against China in what is described as “illegally occupied” reefs and islands in the South China Sea.²⁴ Finally, the Strategy specifically incorporates the language of the China Dream, and the aim of national rejuvenation.²⁵ Overall, the Strategy represents an expansion of China's view of the uses of its military forces, seeking to expand the domains where both land and sea forces are proficient and the need to be able to project power to other regions. As with any rising power, such an expression of an outward focus of military power should not surprise military planners. However, the reality of China's rise requires Western policy makers to re-assess its approach to China from a military perspective. Despite the Strategy's callout of the United States and its allies, fundamentally the approach is still defensive in nature for the time being. Ultimately, the Military Strategy is consistent with other Chinese propaganda and initiatives, by seeking to peacefully interact with the world without directly confronting neighbors or great powers.

These three broad policies demonstrate a fundamentally peaceful, even cautious, approach to modern international relations. According to these policies, China maintains focus on its internal development and a slow emergence onto the international scene.²⁶ China still has not conducted any international military operation aside from peacekeeping, humanitarian, or anti-piracy actions. Its most recent large-scale military action remains the Korean War, two generations in the past and a type of combat far out-distanced by modern technology. Though China has significantly increased military spending and fortifications in the South China Sea, China still has not taken any significant military action at or outside of its borders or claims. Without some significant military action or offensive build-up on China's part, all of China's words and past actions on its borders suggests a strong desire by Beijing to avoid conflict and resolve disputes in a peaceful manner, including in the South China Sea.

23 Minnie Chan, “China Will Build Four Nuclear Aircraft Carriers in Drive to Catch U.S. Navy, Experts Say,” *South China Morning Post*, February 6, 2019.

24 *Supra* note 22.

25 *Ibid.*

26 Shaheli Das, “The Awakening of Xi's Chinese Dream,” *East Asia Forum*, April 7, 2016. <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/04/07/the-awakening-of-xis-chinese-dream/>

The Prime Flashpoint – The South China Sea

Surrounded by seven countries, the South China Sea represents one of the most dangerous flashpoints in a potential great power war between the United States and China. China has militarized islets and reefs in the South China Sea for up to the last 10 years. Dredgers are building up places such as Subi and Mischief Reefs in order to install airbases, barracks, and naval installations to support a power projection capability in the region.²⁷ China also claims almost the entirety of the sea as its own sovereign territory. Contested by all of the countries in the region, the South China Sea is home to significant energy and food reserves, and sees roughly 70% of global trade by value transit the region.²⁸ Though the United States does not have a specific territorial interest at play in the region, it frequently operates naval vessels and aircraft in the region in order to maintain internationally recognized freedom of navigation through the Sea, as outlined in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.²⁹ In fact, the U.S. National Security Strategy specifically identifies China's actions in the South China Sea in this regard as a direct threat to the flow of trade, sovereignty of neighboring countries, and region stability.³⁰ The intensity of the military developments by China, the importance of the waterway to international trade, and frequent movements of U.S. military vessels through the region all combine to create significant tension between both countries. Just one mistake by anyone in the region could trigger devastation.

Many commentators generally view the situation as an attempt by China to bully its neighbors and seize the wealth of the South China Sea for itself.³¹ However, this flies in the face of both the strategic reality of the South China Sea, China's reliance on international trade, and its published desire to maintain regional peace in order to further China's internal economic development. Strategically speaking, the South China Sea is ringed by major and minor U.S. naval bases: in Japan, Okinawa, Singapore, and covering the Indian Ocean. Even if China were to completely control the South China Sea through its naval bases and area denial weapons systems, international trade could be diverted around the region and its southern entryway blocked by mining or the sinking of ships in the Straits of Malacca. Similarly, the United States and allied navies control the seas surrounding China's "near seas" region, thus enabling the opportunity to blockade from afar by denying access to the South China Sea through more

27 Hannah Beech, "China's Sea Control is a Done Deal, 'Short of War with the U.S.," *The New York Times*, September 20, 2018.

28 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, "Review of Maritime Transport," New York and Geneva, 2015.

29 Jeffrey Bader, "The U.S. and China's Nine-Dash Line: Ending the Ambiguity," *Brookings Institution*, February 6, 2014. <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-u-s-and-chinas-nine-dash-line-ending-the-ambiguity/>

30 *Supra* note 2.

31 Roncervert Ganan Almond, "Trade, War, and the South China Sea," *The Diplomat*, September 1, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/trade-war-and-the-south-china-sea/>

traditional means. This would be an effective approach in choking off raw materials for China, as the South China Sea accounts for 39% of its foreign trade and over 50% of its crude oil imports.³² Closure of the South China Sea, therefore, would devastate the Chinese economy. Similarly, since such actions would be expected of the United States in the event of conflict elsewhere between the two powers, the region would still be central in a general conflict. As China continues to exploit the resources of the sea, defensive military emplacements would be critical were China cut off from such a significant amount of foreign trade.

As such, China is most likely building up its defensive posture in the South China Sea for exactly that and to start testing the United States and its allies. Development of a blue water navy assists China in projecting power outside of the immediate region, as well as continued development of highly accurate ballistic anti-ship missiles. Instead of a directly offensive threat to the United States and its allies, the immediate benefit of fortifying its position in the South China Sea also provides China with an opportunity to test the United States and attempt to shake loose allies like the Philippines,³³ rather than to seize the area by force. Sun Tzu said that the best thing to attack of an enemy's, after his strategy, is his alliances.³⁴ However, even this strategic concept is not necessarily offensive or adversarial in nature, since China does not appear to be losing any steam or advantage by the status quo in the South China Sea. Instead, the build-up is likely a trump card in the event of unforeseen international instability in the future, for example a strategic retreat by the United States from the Western Pacific because of economic or domestic political concerns. With the United States gone from the region, China would then be able to assert a *fait accompli* by its occupation of the islets.

Ultimately, China's words and deeds of recent vintage suggest the desire for peaceful resolution of disputes or, at worst, extremely low grade military action. Though that has not prevented China from preparing for military action, China's desire for economic expansion, mostly to maintain the Communist Party's grip on power,³⁵ dictates that China will not likely take aggressive action to seize the South China Sea by force. Furthermore, the potential isolation of the South China Sea and the economic damage in the event of its closure further buttresses this desire. Particularly considering that Chinese propaganda generally denotes the United States as a "declining power,"³⁶ it is

32 Ankit Panda, "How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea? Not \$5.3 Trillion a Year," *The Diplomat*, August 8, 2017. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/how-much-trade-transits-the-south-china-sea-not-5-3-trillion-a-year/>

33 Richard Heydarian, "How the Scarborough Shoal came back to Haunt China-Philippines Relations," *South China Morning Post*, June 23, 2018.

34 *Supra* note 1.

35 David Shambaugh, *China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation*, (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, 2008).

36 Lu Jingxian, "Is China Catching Up with a Faltering U.S.?", *Global Times*, August 6, 2018. <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1114138.shtml>

likely that China's leadership believes time is on its side with regards to the thorniest seaward trouble spots. Should the United States truly fade and retreat from the Western Pacific Ocean, all bets are off.

Counter-Argument

On the flip side, referring to China as a threat to American prosperity has validity, particularly with regards to issues outside the gamut of typical national security relations. China's rampant theft of intellectual property and trade secrets over the past two decades have also had national security implications, as some speculate the Chinese J-20 Stealth Fighter may have been developed via a leak in classified U.S. information.³⁷ In addition, Chinese PLA units have been accused of major U.S. national security breaches, to include the theft of 21.5 million records from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management in 2014.³⁸ Denoted as acts of “cyber warfare” by many commentators, these actions demonstrate a pervasive ill intent by the Chinese to undermine U.S. readiness and its ability to compete. Furthermore, China's failure to participate in and disregard the results of the South China Sea Arbitration demonstrates that China is a wayward regime, able and willing to flout international law and norms. As such, its actions in and around the South China Sea are exactly what they appear to be—a military build-up intent on seizing the area for its own development and the opportunity to bully lesser powers in the neighborhood.

Most recently, on 18 January 2019, President Xi noted in a public speech, “[w]e must hasten the establishment of a mechanism to protect the legitimate interests of Chinese organisations and nationals abroad.”³⁹ This message means that China will become only more and more involved militarily and diplomatically abroad as its trade interests continue to flourish. Though most in the West fear this message as a signal of China's true expansionist tensions, taken from an objective standpoint it is the same argument any developed country would take with regards to its interests abroad, most particularly evidenced by the actions of the United States since World War II. Finally, China's actions up until today all suggest significant strategic patience and a desire to focus on internal stability and development, rather than direct adversarial engagement with the West. Although China does not fear confronting the United States in the cyber domain or via espionage, there has been no evidence of a strong desire of China to directly confront the United States or its allies militarily.

Conclusion

37 Slobhan Groman, “Computer Spies Breach Fighter-Jet Project,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 21, 2009.

38 David Sanger, “Hacking Linked to China Exposes Millions of U.S. Workers,” *The New York Times*, June 4, 2015.

39 Kristin Huang, “Step Up and Protect Chinese Interests Abroad, Xi Jinping Tells Law Enforcers,” *South China Morning Post*, January 18, 2019. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2182583/step-and-protect-chinese-interests-abroad-xi-jinping-tells-law>

In conclusion, China's overt military actions appear to be non-expansionist, suggesting a country only engaging in actions short of war (i.e. espionage) in order to compete with a superior adversary. Though China has been consistent with regards to its claims in its "near seas" and aggressive in trailing U.S. aircraft and ships transiting the disputed waterway, its recent history with regards to land disputes suggests China will prepare for conflict but not initiate it. Furthermore, throughout its history, China has strained to keep conflict with other large powers limited in scope and duration, preferring peaceable resolution of disputes over full contests of arms. In addition, its published strategies and internal propaganda point to the maintenance of regional peace, while preparing for its national defense at key strategic vulnerabilities. Finally, as China further develops its capabilities, its reliance on maritime shipping and the U.S. market for its goods, point China away from an ultimate showdown over the South China Sea in the near-term. U.S. naval officers will continue to white-knuckle their way through the South China Sea, but because of China's need for markets and raw materials, no attack will come.

China, by any objective standard and by its own admission, is still a developing country with only the modest near-term goal of a "moderately well-off society" by 2021 and another generation to become "fully developed." Though rising in economic and military power, it is a strategic error to view China as "attempting to erode American security and prosperity" now.⁴⁰ This view of international development looks at great power competition as a zero-sum game and creates one's greatest fear where there was nothing to fear to begin with. China views the United States itself as a threat to its own national security, and not without reason. However, by understanding how China deals with foreign competition in other arenas and by attempting to find mutually agreeable solution to thorny problems, China and the United States can avoid Thucydide's Trap. Changing the Sun Tzu quote at the outset, the modern version would be more aptly put as "know thy potential adversary and know thyself; you will prevent a hundred battles."

⁴⁰ *Supra* note 2.

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