

# A Question of Convergence: US and EU Security Strategies between 2002 and 2016

A Monograph

by

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## Abstract

A Question of Convergence: US and EU Security Strategies between 2002 and 2016, by Colonel (GS) Daniel Hugo Ahaus, German Army, 45 pages.

This monograph examines the evolution of US and EU security strategies between 2002 and 2016. The United States and the European Union moved towards similar policies expressed in their respective security strategy documents. The US Security Strategy (USNSS) 2002 published under President George W. Bush preferred preemption, emphasized a unilateral approach, and relied on the use of military force. In contrast the European Security Strategy (ESS) favored multilateral approaches, proliferation prevention, and the use of diplomatic and economic power. With the inauguration of President Barack H. Obama, the direction of US strategic policy changed. The USNSS 2015 expressed a more balanced approach and focused less on military strength to cope with the given security challenges. Simultaneously the new European Union Global Strategy 2016, which replaced the ESS, showed a slightly greater willingness to enlarge its security and defense efforts instead of mainly relying on the EU's diplomatic and economic capabilities.

The monograph looks more deeply at these changes to determine whether, under President Obama, the strategies of the European Union and the United States did indeed converge. The analysis is based on three criteria. The first criterion concerns the different understanding of the appropriate actions, whether preventive military operations or preventive political engagement. The second is the role of US national interests versus the EU's desire for international cooperation. The third criterion describes the significance of international law and, strongly related, the relevance of the United Nations.

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## Acronyms

AIIB	Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CFSP	European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy
CRA	Continent Reserve Arrangement
ESDP	European Union's Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUGS	European Union's Global Strategy
GWOT	Global War on Terror
ICC	International Criminal Court
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IWF	International World Fund
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDB	New Development Bank
NSC	National Security Council
UN	United Nations

UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
USNSS	United States National Security Strategy
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization
WW2	World War 2

## Introduction

European security and defense efforts should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO. A more credible European defence is essential also for the sake of a healthy transatlantic partnership with the United States.

— *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*

The United States and the EU are the most representative pillars of the transatlantic partnership with a population of more than 850 million people, representing over 50% of the world economy.<sup>1</sup> The strategic guidance of the United States is found in its National Security Strategy (USNSS), which expresses its strategic thinking and engagements to the rest of the world. The European Union (EU) is an alliance of states. From its foundation on the EU contains the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), which encapsulates European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Within ESDP this alliance developed in 2003, for the first time in its history, the European Security Strategy (ESS), following Asle Toje's thoughts that, in general "[A] security strategy determines an entity's objectives, priorities and means by referring to the broader domestic, regional and global context in the political, economic and military spheres."<sup>2</sup> Although strategic

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<sup>1</sup> "Gross Domestic Product 2016," World Development Indicators, World Bank, December 15, 2017, accessed January 15, 2018, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> Asle Toje, "The EU Security Strategy Revised: Europe Hedging Its Bets," *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 15-2, 2010, 176-177. A good way to explain the EU structures is to use the "three pillar model." The most important pillar is the first one, which covers common economic, social and environmental policies, and also encapsulates supranational treaties. The second pillar is the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), which encapsulates European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and as a subordinate element, amongst others, the European Security Strategy (ESS). The third pillar is Justice and Home Affairs.



documents do not have the status of a legally or politically binding contract, they are the guiding framework for all external actions of these two actors.<sup>3</sup>

The transatlantic dialogue reflects the degree of convergence of these two strategies. The convergence also can be seen as an indicator of the level of cooperation or partnership between the United States and the EU. These two partners see the world and its security challenges in the same way, but more importantly, the ways and means that they propose to answer these challenges are significantly different. When the Bush administration published its first NSS in 2002, it described the major threat to the world's security as stemming from terrorism combined with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). During that time, the EU had almost the same understanding of the given situation. However, even when there was unified understanding of the perceived security environment, the paths to face these challenges were heterogeneous. The United States under President George W. Bush preferred preemption, unilateralism, and the use of military force. In contrast, the EU favored proliferation prevention, multilateral approaches, and the use of diplomacy and economic power.<sup>4</sup>

President Obama changed the general direction of US strategic thinking in 2010 and commenced the process of convergence, reshaping the foreign policy of the United States. The second NSS of his administration in 2015 expressed a balanced approach and was less focused on military strength to cope with given security challenges. Simultaneously, the European Union's Global Strategy (EUGS), "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe," was published in 2016 by replacing the ESS, seems to show a slightly greater willingness to enlarge its security and

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<sup>3</sup> Alexander Skibba, "Die Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der USA und die Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie im Vergleich," *Wissenschaft u. Sicherheit*, Texte des Bundesverbands Sicherheitspolitik an Hochschulen, Sonderband Nr. 03/2004, 2004, 3.

<sup>4</sup> Torsten Gersdorf, *Comparison of the Security Strategies of the United States and the European Union. Is There a Common Approach in Combating Terrorism?*, Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2005, 25.

defense efforts instead of mainly relying on its diplomatic and economic capabilities.<sup>5</sup> Both documents contained a comprehensive description of the term “security” in proposing how they handle the upcoming security threats.

The monograph looks more deeply at these changes to determine whether, under Obama, the strategies of the EU and the United States did indeed converge. It starts with the examination of the last fifteen years, beginning with the publication of the first NSS under the Bush administration and the ESS drawn up in 2003. The analysis considers three criteria. The first criterion is about the different understanding of appropriate actions, whether they should be preventive military operations or preventive political engagement. The second is the role of national interests versus international cooperation. The third criterion describes the significance of international law and, strongly related, the relevance of the United Nations.

Amongst others, Julia Klohs and Arne Niemann analyzed the respective security strategies of the United States and the EU.<sup>6</sup> These authors came to the same conclusion that the respective strategic documents were converging. However, this analysis was conducted using previous versions of these strategy documents and did not use defined criteria. Hence, the point of main effort lies in analyzing the two last versions, the USNSS 2015 and the EUGS 2016, with those criteria.

This monograph demonstrates that US and EU security strategies converged in 2015-2016, as indicated by the language in the USNSS 2015 and the EUGS 2016. It starts with an overview of the developments that affected both foreign policies and set the conditions for the respective

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<sup>5</sup> Federica Mogherini, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy* (Brussels: European External Action Service, June 2016).

<sup>6</sup> Julia Klohs and Arne Niemann, “Comparing the US National Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy in the First Decade of the 21st Century: Converging but Still Different,” *Mainz Papers on International and European Politics*, no. 8 (December 2014).

strategic approaches with regard to the given security environment. Subsequently, it provides a comparison of US and European security policy to determine the main policy disagreements and divergence. The comparison methodology analyzes documents, speeches, and academic commentary. Next, the monograph analyzes the differences and similarities in the pronouncements of the Obama era to illustrate the convergence in security policy between the United States and the EU. The final chapter gives a summary. To commence, the monograph begins with the delineation of some of the characteristics that shaped their respective foreign policy over the last 15 years.

## Fundamental Elements of US Foreign Policy

The foreign policy of the United States of America has been influenced by its geography and its flexibility. Especially after World War 2 (WW2), the Goldwater-Nichols Act, signed into law on October 1, 1986, required the development of a National Security Strategy. The 2002 USNSS and particularly the 2006 version were focused on terrorists equipped with WMDs. Obama broadened the focus of the NSS beyond terrorism, and took a more balanced approach, depending less on America's military strength. The USNSS 2015 can be seen as a continuation of his first one, with certain adaptations, e.g. to the Russian expansion into Ukrainian territory. This section describes the evolution of the NSS under Presidents Bush and Obama.

For more than two hundred years the United States' geography provided the basis of foreign policy and the American way of approaching the rest of the world. This included the tendency toward a strain of isolationism. The separation by the Atlantic on the one side and the Pacific on the other protected the United States from any attack, with the exceptions of the War of 1812 against the British Empire, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The protection offered by the oceans still matters. The fact that Pearl Harbor remains in the American consciousness is the reason that the United States reacts so strongly to attacks on its

homeland. The '9/11 attacks' provide a good example of this response as this was only the third time in the Republic's history that its own soil was attacked.<sup>7</sup>

The American experience in two world wars and the Cold War, the growth of the United States as an economic power, technological enhancements, and the foundation of the United Nations have altered the approach to foreign policy. From its inception the United States has used all its instruments of foreign policy, including those usually considered incompatible. This attitude is perfectly mirrored in a statement by Eugene V. Rostow, the former under secretary for political affairs in the Lyndon B. Johnson administration: "Should our foreign policy be based on power or morality? Realism or idealism? Pragmatism or principle? Should its goal be the protection of interests or the promotion of values? Should we be nationalist or internationalists? Liberals or conservatives? We blithely answer, 'All of the above.'"<sup>8</sup>

In the United States, it is the president's role to shape foreign policy. Since the foundation of the country there have been, at irregular periods, declarations, speeches, or written documents with strategic intent. Presidential doctrines from over two centuries provide a wide range of guiding principles for strategic thinking, which Cecil Crabb defined as: "the power of America's example, the concept of America's mission, the utopian quality of American ideals, the universalization of doctrines beyond American shores, and unilateralism."<sup>9</sup>

After WW2 the United States passed the National Security Act, published in 1947, which was eventually enforced by the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The

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<sup>7</sup> Andrea K. Reimer und Gunther Hauser, "Die Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der USA und die Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie: Ein Vergleich der Unvergleichbaren," *Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und Aussenpolitik*, AIPA 2/2004, 2004, 10.

<sup>8</sup> Eugene V. Rostow, *A Breakfirst for Bonaparte: U.S. National Security Interests from the Heights of Abraham to the Nuclear Age* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1993), 22.

<sup>9</sup> Cecil V. Crabb Jr., *The Doctrines Of American Foreign Policy: Their Meaning, Role, and Future* (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 382.

president and his staff must provide, annually, a comprehensive national security report. The National Security Strategy is submitted to Congress in order to demonstrate how the administration intends to tackle security challenges and get reasonable funding for that approach.

## USNSS 2002

The USNSS 2002 was not drafted as one coherent document, as were former security strategies. Instead, it encapsulates a set of speeches given by US President George W. Bush from September 2001 to September 2002. However, the security strategy “declared that the United States would use its power to promote its democratic values worldwide. Not since Woodrow Wilson had an American president or his administration committed itself to the mission of remaking the world – and Wilson never imagined that the United States would use its military forces unilaterally.”<sup>10</sup>

The content is mainly focused on the United States’s answer to terrorism, demonstrated by the 11 September 2001 attacks conducted in Washington DC, New York, and Pennsylvania. The documents mentioned global terrorism as the most dangerous and concrete threat to US society: “Yet terrorism is far from being a solitary danger. To the contrary, it comes in a triad with rogue regimes and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”<sup>11</sup> The US president stated in his foreword: “The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination.”<sup>12</sup> According to Jervis, the other main elements of this strategy are:

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<sup>10</sup> Warren I. Cohen, *Americas Failing Empire. U.S. Foreign Relations Since the Cold War* (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 136.

<sup>11</sup> Paul M. Bisca, “Democracy, Security, Peace: American and European Approaches towards Democratization,” *Macalester International*, Volume 20, Article 8 (2008): 25.

<sup>12</sup> George W. Bush, “National Security Strategy 2002” (Washington, DC: The White House, 2002), ii.

... a strong belief in the importance of a state's domestic regime in determining its foreign policy and the related judgement that this is a time of great opportunity to transform international politics; the perception of great threats that can be defeated only by new and vigorous policies (most notably preventive war); a willingness to act unilaterally when necessary; and, as both a cause and a summary of these beliefs, an overriding sense that peace and stability requires the United States to assert its primacy in world politics.<sup>13</sup>

Thus this national strategy can be considered as one of the most notable security documents in modern US history. President Bush stressed in a National Security Council (NSC) meeting right after the 9/11 attacks "that the United States was at war with a new kind of enemy, and he ordered the participants to go beyond the pre-9/11 mentality and develop strategies that could destroy terrorists and those that were behind them."<sup>14</sup>

## USNSS 2006

The USNSS 2006 was a continuation of the USNSS 2002, with the same focus but extending national security to include the Global War on Terror (GWOT). "The 2006 NSS was released nearly four and half years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, but the impact of the tragic events of that day continue to reverberate poignantly through the core of the document."<sup>15</sup> However, there were certain aspects worth adding here.

First, the USNSS 2006 differs from the previous security strategy in that each section includes a brief report of the progress that had been achieved since 2002 and the actual security situation including details about the fight against Al-Qaeda, and overall operations in Afghanistan

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<sup>13</sup> Robert Jervis, "The Prospectus for American Hegemony," in *Striking First. The Preventive War Doctrine and the Reshaping of U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. by Betty Glad and Chris J. Dolan (New York: Palgrave MacMillan), 193.

<sup>14</sup> Lamont Colucci, *The National Security Doctrines of the American Presidency: How They Shape Our Present and Future* (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger Security International, 2012), 422.

<sup>15</sup> Christian M. Henderson, "The 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States: The Pre-emptive Use of Force and the Persistent Advocate," *Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law* 15, no. 1 (September 1, 2007): 4.

and Iraq. Additionally, in contrast to the 2002 version, it outlined four rationales, to explain the rise of global terrorism. Two of them are ideological and pertain to historical injustice and the other two refer to the lack of democracy in the societies from which the terrorists came.<sup>16</sup> The third obvious difference is that the USNSS 2006 contained a section describing new challenges to the security environment caused by the ongoing globalization process.<sup>17</sup> The significance of these changes is that the USNSS 2006 sought to achieve a broader understanding of the phenomenon of global terrorism.

## USNSS 2010

The first NSS under Democratic President Barack Obama was remarkably different from its predecessors; it was less focused on terrorism than the NSSs under the Bush administration and was written in a more moderate and sometimes appeasing style. As Lamont Colucci pointed out in his comparison of the former security documents: “If the Bush national security strategies were seen as aggressive and overly dictatorial, the Obama one has been interpreted as lacking a compass.”<sup>18</sup>

Three weeks after he took office, Obama’s Vice President, Joe Biden, attended the Munich Security Conference in February and gave a speech in which he stated: “America and Europe still look to one another before they look to anyone else. Our partnership has benefitted us all.”<sup>19</sup> In his speech he outlined America’s repositioning in the transatlantic partnership from the remaining

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<sup>16</sup> Bisca, “Democracy, Security, Peace,” 27.

<sup>17</sup> George W. Bush, “National Security Strategy 2006” (Washington, DC: The White House, 2006), iii.

<sup>18</sup> Colucci, *The National Security Doctrines of the American Presidency*, 488.

<sup>19</sup> Joseph R. Biden, “America Needs the World Just as the World Needs America,” Speech, 45th Munich Security Conference, February 2009, accessed January 15, 2018, <https://www.securityconference.de/aktivitaeten/munich-security-conference/msc-2009/reden/joseph-r-biden/>.

superpower to first among equals. “Consequently, the sort of dialogue between equals that the Europeans so eagerly desire with the United States will not be based solely on interdependence — that is to say, on mutual dependence — and instead presuppose to a degree a symmetric distribution of power.”<sup>20</sup>

## USNSS 2015

The USNSS 2015 was a continuation of the first one.<sup>21</sup> It had almost the same structure and wording, and there was no fundamental shift in the United States’ view of the world or its place in it. Having said that, this NSS took account of the most recent security developments, such as Russian aggression in the Crimea and the rise of terrorists who want an Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and how these considerations impacted the United States.

As National Security Advisor Susan Rice pointed out during her speech at the Brookings Institute on 6 February 2015 while presenting the new NSS, “Yes, there is a lot going on. Still, while the dangers we face may be more numerous and varied, they are not of the existential nature we confronted during WW2 or during the Cold War. We cannot afford to be buffeted by alarmism in a nearly instantaneous news cycle.”<sup>22</sup> Therefore, the USNSS 2015 is guided by the US’s four enduring national interests, the same ones that drove the USNSS 2010: security, prosperity, values, and a rules-based international order.

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<sup>20</sup> Beate Neuss, “Asymmetric Interdependence. Do America and Europe Need Each Other?,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* (Winter 2009): 110.

<sup>21</sup> The second NSS of the Obama administration was, with twenty-nine pages, remarkably shorter than his previous NSS with fifty-two pages. Within these twenty-nine pages, the terms “lead”, “leader”, or “leadership” are used 94 times, in the context of the United States’s role in the world.

<sup>22</sup> Peter Baker, “Top Aide Leaps to Defense of Obama Security Stance,” *The New York Times*, February 7, 2015, accessed January 15, 2018, [http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/07/world/top-aide-leaps-to-defense-of-obama-security-stance.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/07/world/top-aide-leaps-to-defense-of-obama-security-stance.html?_r=0).



First, there is a shift addressing Russia as one of the main aggressors interfering in the existing European order. The 2015 version states that: "... aggression by Russia [gives] rise to anxieties about global security."<sup>23</sup> This is in contrast to the preamble of the USNSS 2010, which considered Russia along with other countries as "key centers of influence" with which the United States should "build deeper and more effective partnerships."<sup>24</sup> Secondly, for the first time in recent history, the NSS explicitly stated that US capabilities were not unlimited: "As powerful as we are and will remain, our resources and influence are not infinite."<sup>25</sup> The logical consequence is that the USNSS 2015 describes a more comprehensive view of security including utilizing preventive means as a more general approach to counter security threats. It states that multilateralism combined with international law and a rules-based order is vital, but also stressed the United State's willingness to use power unilaterally if necessary to protect core interests.<sup>26</sup>

## Fundamental Elements of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy

The EU began as a commercial project and therefore it had neither experience in forming strategy nor the processes for formulating a coherent strategy for its foreign policy.<sup>27</sup> Even today the EU is mainly known for its economic power. However, it warrants recognizing that the

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<sup>23</sup> Barack Obama, "National Security Strategy 2015" (Washington, DC: The White House, 2015), 1.

<sup>24</sup> Barack Obama, "National Security Strategy 2010" (Washington, DC: The White House, 2010), 3.

<sup>25</sup> USNSS 2015, 2.

<sup>26</sup> USNSS 2015, 1.

<sup>27</sup> During the Cold War, the primary focus of European integration was indeed on economic cooperation. The three European Communities: the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), merged into the European Union in 1992 through the Treaty of Maastricht. With the establishment of the EU, there was also the requirement for a Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP). Treaty on European Union, Belgium-Denmark-Germany-Greece-Spain-France-Ireland-Italy-Luxembourg-Netherlands-Portugal-United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, February, 7, 1992, UNTS 1757, no. 30615, 3.

European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is an integral instrument of the EU's broad area of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

Two aspects have direct implications for shaping the ESDP. First, the comprehensive character of crisis management calls for a combination of civilian and military assets, the "Comprehensive Approach" (CA). This requires a prioritization of tasks and implies an expanded view of security challenges. Second, the ESDP is subordinated to the guiding rules and principles of the United Nations. All operations under the umbrella of the ESDP should seek UN Security Council approval in order to provide a certain degree of international legitimacy. This also applies to cooperation with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in regard to the solidarity and mutual assistance rule, which was expressed in the Treaty of Lisbon.<sup>28</sup> Independently operating in parallel to the United Nations (UN) and NATO, the EU's ESDP includes a caveat that emphasizes the subordination of its rules and mechanism to the UN and NATO.<sup>29</sup>

## European Security Strategy

The controversial debate within the EU over the US-led Iraq attack in 2003 showed clearly to the world, once more, the EU's inability to react to such a crisis within the existing framework of the CFSP as a unified body. There was indeed a discrepancy within the EU as compared to other policy fields: "While the EU speaks with one voice in international organizations and acts according to commonly held regulations and legal codes, in matters of foreign and security policy it

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<sup>28</sup> Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Austria-Belgium-Bulgaria-Cyprus-Czech Republic-Denmark-Estonia-Finland-France-Germany-Greece-Hungary-Ireland Italy-Latvia-Lithuania-Luxembourg-Malta-Netherlands-Poland-Portugal-Romania-Slovakia-Slovenia-Spain-Sweden-United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, December 13, 2007, UNTS 2702, no. 47938, 3.

<sup>29</sup> European External Action Service, "Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy," July 8, 2016, accessed February 10, 2018, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5388/shaping-common-security-and-defence-policy\\_en#The+Treaty+of+Lisbon](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5388/shaping-common-security-and-defence-policy_en#The+Treaty+of+Lisbon).

still operates on an intergovernmental basis, which means all essential decisions must be reached through unanimous consent among all 27 member states.”<sup>30</sup> This one voice is difficult to attain because every single EU member state has a different understanding of security and defense policies and has also engaged in bilateral agreements.<sup>31</sup>

In December 2003, the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, presented the draft of the ESS, “A More Secure Europe in a Better World,” to the European Council. The ESS “was hailed by some diplomats as Europe’s response to the hawkish US foreign policy unveiled in the autumn of 2002 by Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush’s national security adviser.”<sup>32</sup> The document mainly addressed the United States and also provided the necessary space for European countries to shape their conceptual document for ESDP, the ESS. It attempted to set the future basis for the EU’s self-perception as a strategic actor in international relations. “The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO. The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor.”<sup>33</sup>

In response to the paradigm shifts in the international security environment caused by the events of September 11, 2001, the new document outlines a comprehensive strategic vision and is the first official EU document to formulate a common security strategy among all EU member states.<sup>34</sup> Remarkable as it is, one has to stress that the document requires consensus at the national

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<sup>30</sup> Neuss, 115.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Judy Dempsey, “Words of War: Europas First Security Doctrine Backs Away from Commitment to US-Style Pre-Emption,” *Financial Times*, December 5, 2003, accessed February 14, 2018, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/pressreview/78247.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/pressreview/78247.pdf).

<sup>33</sup> Javier Solana, *A Secure Europe in a Better World* (Brussels: European Council, December 12, 2003), 1.

<sup>34</sup> Felix Berenskoetter, “Mapping The Mind Gap: A Comparison of US and EU Security Strategies,” *Security Dialogue* 36, no. 1 (March 2005): 72.

level and within the EU. Every member state and every EU institution still has its own interests with regard to international policy.

The document was not drafted only as a reaction to the US approach. Importantly, it proposed a strategic dialogue between the United States and Europe. The USNSS 2002 did not consider the EU's relevance with regard to security policy and was only focused on its economic power.<sup>35</sup> In contrast, the ESS described the EU as a global actor with responsibilities in the field of security policy: "As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the World's Gross National Product (GNP), the European Union is inevitably a global player ... it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and building a better world."<sup>36</sup>

Against this background of a broad delineation of the international security environment, the ESS listed five security challenges for European security: transnational terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime.<sup>37</sup> The document then followed up with a description of the EU's strategic goals and the most effective and sustainable means to deal with those threats based on a comprehensive definition of the term "security." The EU strategy is heavily in favor of preventive actions, conducted in close cooperation with other actors such as the UN and NATO.<sup>38</sup>

The ESS received remarkable feedback, because it provided the opportunity for other actors to grasp the notion of the EU's self-ascribed role and its international positioning. Another important aspect of the EU's first strategic document was the formulation of the ESDP as a mature

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<sup>35</sup> Skibba, 7.

<sup>36</sup> ESS, 1.

<sup>37</sup> Annegret Berndiek and Markus Kaim, "New European Security Strategy – The Transatlantic Factor," *SWP Comments* 34, (June 2015): 1.

<sup>38</sup> ESS, 9.

security and defense project.<sup>39</sup> There was no doubt about the value of the ESS's provision of a common threat analysis, which constituted an understanding of the given and upcoming challenges. Moreover, it was a starting point and could be used as a basis for the aforementioned strategic dialogue about the future transatlantic partnership.

## Report on the Implementation of the ESS

In December 2008 the Report on the Implementation of the ESS (RI-ESS) was presented and adopted by the European Council. The report offered little new in terms of suggestions for concrete action or recommendations for implementation, but it did introduce some new ideas. The RI-ESS also updated most parts of the 2003 document and “provide[d] a concise overview of implementation and confirm[ed] the holistic and multilateral approach.”<sup>40</sup> Even when Javier Solana was still the EU's High Representative for CFSP, he was never given the mandate from the Council to “review” the ESS. However there were high expectations from outsiders, and some academics, to see a completely new ESS rather than a report about implementation of the existing version of the ESS. That at least provides proof of the importance given to the current ESS.

In conclusion, there is not that much difference between the RI-ESS and the original ESS. Having said this, at least one development must be mentioned here. The EU introduced a new concept extending the traditional understanding of security to other areas of human existence such as the environment, food, and health by directing the focus on the individual security of human

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<sup>39</sup> European External Action Service, *Preparing the December 2013 European Council on Security and Defence – Final Report by the High Representative/Head of the EDA on the Common Security and Defence Policy* (Brussels, 2013), 5, accessed March 10, 2018, <https://de.scribd.com/document/179051979/Final-Report-by-the-High-Representative-Head-of-the-EDA-on-the-Common-Security-and-Defence-Policy>.

<sup>40</sup> Sven Biscop, Jolyon Horworth and Bastian Giegerich, *Europe: a Time for a Strategy*, Egmont-Royal Institute for International Relations, Egmont Paper 27 (Gent: Academic Press, 2009), accessed March 10, 2018, <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2013/09/ep27.pdf?type=pdf/>.

beings. The European report document expressed the need “to continue mainstreaming human rights issues in all activities in this field, including ESDP missions, through a people-based approach coherent with the concept of human security.”<sup>41</sup>

## European Union’s Global Strategy

Four months after US President Obama published his 2015 security strategy, the European Council gave the EU’s new High Representative for CFSP, Federica Mogherini, a former Italian minister of foreign affairs, the assignment to: “... continue the process of strategic reflections with a view to preparing an EU global strategy on foreign affairs and security policy in close cooperation with Member States, to submit to the European Council by June 2016.”<sup>42</sup> One year later Moghereni presented the European Union’s Global Strategy, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe,” to the public. Her intent was to draft a new strategy to replace the old ESS of 2003 due to recent changes in the global security environment; she worked on it relentlessly during the previous year.<sup>43</sup>

Some EU member states were reluctant to draft a new strategic concept. Sven Biscop said: “Let us not waste time therefore on drafting strategic documents, which with 28 Member States

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<sup>41</sup> Javier Solana, *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World* (Brussels: European Council, December 11, 2008), 8.

<sup>42</sup> European Council, *EUCO 22/15, European Council meeting (June 25-26, 2015) – Conclusions*, Brussels, June 26, 2015, accessed February 20, 2018, <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-22-2015-INIT/en/pdf>. The task got little public attention because the Greek financial crisis, migration issues, and United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister David Cameron’s demands to renegotiate the status of the UK’s EU membership had received most of the media coverage.

<sup>43</sup> Hylke Dijkstra, “The EU Global Strategy: Some Initial Reflections,” *Center of European Research in Maastricht*, June 29, 2016, (blog) accessed March 10, 2018, <https://cerim.blogactiv.eu/2016/06/29/the-eu-global-strategy-some-initial-reflections/>.

around the table will be extremely difficult.”<sup>44</sup> These nations took into consideration that since 2008, Europe and the world have substantially changed. The failure of states at the EU’s close periphery resulted in a refugee crisis of significant proportions. However, despite the aversion of some EU members, the spread of Islamic terrorism in Europe, with its recent devastating attacks against the western way of life in the capitals of France, Belgium, and Germany, demanded a new strategic concept.

To use Sinan Uelgens’s words, “The new EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy should therefore be shaped by the changing nature of the security challenges facing the EU.”<sup>45</sup> As an example, the EUGS addressed increasing Russian aggression in Eastern Europe and the subsequent growing apprehension of Poland and the other Baltic states. The rising threat of hybrid warfare<sup>46</sup> raised the necessity for a new approach, especially given Russia’s extensive use of this tactic, with its mixture of conventional and unconventional means. As some examples: cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, and the use of non-state actors, all below the threshold of an attack as understood by NATO or other western states.<sup>47</sup> In recognition of these security challenges, the EUGS, which was welcomed by the European Council in June 2016, opened with the promising

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<sup>44</sup> Sven Biscop, *Peace without Money, War without Americans. Can European Strategy Cope?*, Egmont-Royal Institute for International Relations, Belgium and Ghent University (New York: Ashgate, 2016), 13.

<sup>45</sup> Sinan Uelgen, “EU Global Strategy: A Transformed Security Landscape,” *European Union Institute for Security Studies*, February 1, 2016, accessed March 10, 2018, <http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/02/01/eu-global-strategy-transformed-security-landscape-pub-62711>.

<sup>46</sup> As Biscop mentioned in the EU capital the term “hybrid” is replacing the former expression “comprehensive.” “They might not be so different, in fact. Both a hybrid and a comprehensive approach mean the integrated use of a broad range of instruments of external actions towards the achievement of a foreign policy objective. It is just that the hybrid approach put into practice by Russia today seeks to achieve less friendly aims than the EU’s own comprehensive approach. The hybrid approach is the comprehensive approach gone over to the dark side of force.” Biscop, *Peace without Money, War without Americans*, 57.

<sup>47</sup> Annegret Berndiek, “Die Globale Strategie für die Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU,” *SWP-Aktuell* 44, (July 2016): 4.

statement: “We need a stronger Europe. This is what our citizens deserve, this is what the wider world expects.”<sup>48</sup> The description of how “a stronger Europe” could be achieved is the main content of the document.

The EUGS contained a fundamentally new approach to tackling security challenges given the global security situation and the threats to it, which was no longer satisfied by vague EU positions. In contrast to the ESS, the EUGS started by defining the core interests that all EU member states shared: “The fact that for the first time ever an EU document lists our vital interests (which is a breakthrough in its own right) is a reflection of this new approach.”<sup>49</sup> From this starting position, which is “European-centric” but not present in the former ESS, the next steps are developed within the document. In identifying the core interests and addressing them early, the EU makes a significant step towards the US national security strategy and also conforms to the general criteria of a document that claims to have strategic relevance.

There are five priorities mentioned in the EU’s security policy: (1) enhancing the Union’s security, (2) enabling the CFSP to focus on state and societal resilience of its neighbors, (3) providing an integrated approach to conflict and crisis, (4) developing a cooperative regional order, and (5) taking part in a better global governance for the 21st century. All these priorities are serving four identified core interests of the EU: peace and security, prosperity, democracy, and a rule-based global order, the same priorities that shaped the USNSS 2010 and USNSS 2015.

The EUGS defines the term “resilience” as follows: “A resilient state is a secure state, and security is the key for prosperity and democracy... Echoing the Sustainable Development Goals, resiliency is a broader concept, encompassing all individuals and the whole of society. A resilient

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<sup>48</sup> EUGS, 1.

<sup>49</sup> Sven Biscop, “The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European Characteristics.” *Egmont-Royal Institute for International Relations*, Security Policy Brief, No. 75, June 2016, 2, accessed March 10, 2018, <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2016/06/SPB75.pdf?type=pdf>.



society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development lies in the heart of a resilient state.”<sup>50</sup> This emphasis on resilience as a concept is a move away from the previous ESS’s strongly promoted aim to encourage good governance and democracy. It is one of the most central aspects of the new document and was not used in the previous one.<sup>51</sup> As Sven Biscop stated in his article, “Where the ESS proved to be overoptimistic, the EUGS is more conscious of the limits imposed by our own capabilities and therefore more modest. It charts a course between “dreamy idealism and unprincipled pragmatism ... under the new heading of what the EUGS calls ‘principled pragmatism.’”<sup>52</sup> Annegret Berndiek recognizes a lack of definition with regard to “principled pragmatism” because any kind of guideline could govern that pragmatism.<sup>53</sup>

## Comparison of the US and EU Security Strategies on the Basis of Key Criteria

Some of the EU member states were deeply concerned about the USNSSs published under the Bush administration. Three aspects, in particular, posed issues on the European side of the Atlantic. One was the differing approach to any action, whether it be preventive military operations as articulated by the Bush administration, or preventive political engagement as articulated in the ESS. Another topic was the United States’ willingness to unilaterally pursue its national interests versus the EU’s tendency toward international cooperation. Finally, the Bush-era USNSSs and the ESS demonstrated a different understanding of the significance of international law and the role of the United Nations as the main body to enforce it. This monograph will use these three aspects as the criteria to analyze the convergence of the two security strategies over time.

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<sup>50</sup> EUGS, 24.

<sup>51</sup> “Resilience” is used 34 times within the document.

<sup>52</sup> Biscop, “The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European Characteristics,” 1.

<sup>53</sup> Berndiek, “Die Globale Strategie fuer die Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU,” 3.

## Preventive Military Operation or Preventive Political Engagement

During the Bush administration, the security strategies of the United States and the EU differed regarding the primacy of military action as a component of national strategy. This difference can be seen in both entities' use of a different understanding of how to take action in their respective security strategies. During the Obama administration, the strategies converged.

“The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction - ... To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”<sup>54</sup> This quotation by the president of the United States, George W. Bush, responded to a certain extent to the irritations of some European member states regarding the USNSS 2002's reservation of the option to use military preemption.

The terms “preemption” and “prevention” stem from two distinct strategic concepts. “Preemption” addresses an immediate threat, e.g., a hostile intervention, while “prevention” addresses a potential threat.<sup>55</sup> However, the USNSS 2002 and 2006 appear to use them interchangeably. To illustrate this, USNSS 2002 Chapter V outlines the concept of preemption, but uses the term “prevent” in the heading. However, the actual wording of this chapter uses “preemption terms” or “preempt emerging threats.”<sup>56</sup> President Bush reemphasized this element in US strategy, presenting of a broader understanding of the term “preemptive actions” during his speech to the West Point graduation class in June 2002, when he asserted:

We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act ... Our security will require transforming the military you

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<sup>54</sup> USNSS 2002, 15.

<sup>55</sup> Joseph M. Siracusa and Aiden Warren, *Presidential Doctrines: U.S. National Security from George Washington to Barack Obama* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), 170.

<sup>56</sup> USNSS 2002, 13.

will lead — a military that must be ready to strike at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for *preemptive action* [italics added by author] when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.<sup>57</sup>

The USNSS 2002 was, especially in some European countries, often judged negatively for this use of preemption. These nations considered it as a prejustification for the following Iraq invasion in March 2003. Bush's former secretary of state, Colin Powell, stated in contradiction to this: "... some observers have exaggerated both the scope of preemption in foreign policy and the centrality of preemption in US strategy as a whole. As to preemption's scope, it applies only to the undeterrable threats that come from non-state actors such as terrorist groups. It was never meant to displace deterrence, only to supplement it."<sup>58</sup>

The former EU's High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, excluded that the EU would not emulate the US-approach of preventive military actions. Instead he preferred to take a broader approach to the causes of crises before they become acute international crises. This is underlined within the ESS: "Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early."<sup>59</sup> This places the EU's focus on the civil instruments of crisis management. As Torsten Gersdorf notes: "From the European viewpoint 'an ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure' is a good motto for the foreign policy as it is for medicine."<sup>60</sup> The ESS's point of main effort is focused on civil means and is similar to what the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has labeled a "culture

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<sup>57</sup> The White House, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point," June 1, 2002, accessed January 15, 2018, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>.

<sup>58</sup> Colin L. Powell, "A Strategy of Partnerships." *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 1 (January/February 2004): 24.

<sup>59</sup> ESS, 6.

<sup>60</sup> Gersdorf, *Comparison of the Security Strategies of the United States and the European Union*, 33.

of prevention,” stressing civilian instruments in addressing socio-economic crises and post-conflict peacebuilding, rather than military operations.<sup>61</sup>

The USNSS 2006 showed no significant change with regard to the use of force. Central to understanding the USNSS 2006 is the opening statement by President George W. Bush in the cover letter: “My fellow Americans, America is at war. This is a wartime strategy required by the grave challenge we face – the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the American people on September 11, 2001.”<sup>62</sup> Consequently, the preamble described the general outline of this wartime strategy, stating: “we must maintain and expand our national strength so we can deal with threats and challenges before they can damage our people or our interests. We must maintain a military without peer – yet our strength is not founded on arms alone. It also rests on economic prosperity and vibrant democracy.”<sup>63</sup> This described the general approach to cope with the given security situation. But it also outlined the concept of military preemption or prevention and the importance of a capable military means. It clearly expressed the unchanged US main effort against the most dangerous threat mentioned in the NSS 2006, terrorists equipped with weapons of mass destruction.<sup>64</sup>

Gary L. Guertner analyzes both security documents published under the Bush administration with respect to the preemptive use of force.<sup>65</sup> The overarching element of the US strategy is to: “prevent attacks by terrorist network(s) before they occur. A government has no

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<sup>61</sup> Kofi Annan, “Secretary-General Stresses Shift from Culture of Reaction to One of Prevention in 1999 Report on Work of Organization.” *SecGen Press Release*, SC/6759, November 29, 1999, accessed January 15, 2018, <https://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19991129.sc6759.doc.html>.

<sup>62</sup> USNSS 2006, Foreword.

<sup>63</sup> USNSS 2006, Foreword.

<sup>64</sup> USNSS 2002, 23.

<sup>65</sup> Gary L. Guertner, “European View of Preemption in US National Security Strategy,” *Parameters* 37 (Summer 2007): 31-44.

higher obligation than to protect the lives and livelihood of its citizens.”<sup>66</sup> Although Guertner argues that in this passage the term “preemption” is not mentioned, it is implied. Guertner considers this style of writing, which changed “preemption” to “prevention,” as one of the notable aspects of the inter-agency process that produces these kinds of documents.<sup>67</sup>

In Chapter V of the USNSS 2002 and the USNSS 2006, the term “preemption” is used in connection with states: “When the consequences of an attack with WMD are potentially so devastating, we cannot afford to stand idly by as grave dangers materialize. This is the principle and logic of preemption.”<sup>68</sup> In most EU societies the general concept of preemption, or the anticipatory use of the military against another state without any evidence of an imminent threat, was not acceptable for its leaders. As Guertner states, “This unilateral declaration of when to use military force against another state is the point where most Europeans and many Americans diverge from the Bush Doctrine’s explicit rejection of deterrence.”<sup>69</sup> Guertner further argues, the use of “prevention” in Chapter III in the USNSS 2006 “as applied against the war on terrorism and the retaliatory war against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan are widely supported on both sides of the Atlantic;” reinforcing the idea that the EU supports prevention when a demonstrable threat is evident.<sup>70</sup>

While the last NSS of the Bush administration used “preemption” three times, it is not found in the NSSs of his successor. Instead, President Obama’s USNSS 2010 replaced it with

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<sup>66</sup> USNSS 2006, 12.

<sup>67</sup> Guertner, “European View of Preemption in US National Security Strategy,” 32.

<sup>68</sup> USNSS 2006, 23.

<sup>69</sup> Guertner, “European View of Preemption in US National Security Strategy,” 33. The “Bush Doctrine” only became known as such after the fact. In general terms, it refers to the concepts articulated in the USNSSs 2002 and 2006.

<sup>70</sup> Guertner, “European View of Preemption in US National Security Strategy,” 40.

“prevention.” This less provocative key word can be viewed as a harmonization with the RI-ESS because the EU security papers never use the term “preemption” in the international community as it is considered to have negative connotations. Instead, the USNSS 2010 stated, “To this end, we will place renewed emphasis on deterrence and prevention by mobilizing diplomatic action, and use development and security sector assistance to build up the capacity of at-risk nations and reduce the appeal of violent extremism.”<sup>71</sup>

The EU stated in the RI-ESS: “Preventing threats from becoming sources of conflict early on must be at the heart of our approach.”<sup>72</sup> This approach refers not necessarily to military means, but rather to peacebuilding and long-term poverty reduction as essential.<sup>73</sup> The USNSS 2010 did use the term “war” in a different way than its predecessor in 2006: “As we secure the world’s most dangerous weapons, we are fighting a war against a far-reaching network of hatred and violence.”<sup>74</sup> This change in the United States’ understanding of “war” was made possible by defining the threat of terrorism or violent extremism as only one threat amongst others, such as climate change, pandemics, or infectious disease.<sup>75</sup>

One of the central statements in the ESS 2003 describes the broad variety of instruments, mainly non-military means, that can be used to counter threats. The RI-ESS is slightly different, as it more prominently discusses the requirement to treat each situation individually: “Each situation requires coherent use of our instruments, including political, diplomatic, development, humanitarian, crisis response, economic and trade cooperation, and civilian and military crisis

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<sup>71</sup> USNSS 2010, 48.

<sup>72</sup> RI-ESS, 7.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> USNSS 2010, 4.

<sup>75</sup> USNSS 2010, 48.

management.”<sup>76</sup> Military means are only mentioned again with regard to crisis management, which can be seen as indicator that even five years after publishing its ESS the EU considers itself mainly as a civilian global player. This is due to both the EU’s limited military capabilities and, more importantly, the lack of will to use them.<sup>77</sup>

Both strategic documents, the RI-ESS and USNSS 2010, see the necessity for the use of military force under certain circumstances, and are more closely aligned than previously regarding their choice of response. Further, statements from President Obama demonstrate that he was more reluctant to use military force than his predecessor:

Our Armed Forces will always be a cornerstone of our security, but they must be complemented. Our security also depends upon diplomats who can act in every corner of the world, from grand capitals to dangerous outposts; development experts who can strengthen governance and support human dignity, and intelligence and law enforcement that can unravel plots, strengthen justice systems, and work seamlessly with other countries.<sup>78</sup>

The USNSS 2015 describes some requirements that are necessary for the United States to be willing to use its unchallenged military dominance. President Obama stressed in his foreword: “We possess a military whose might, technology and geostrategic reach is unrivaled in human history.”<sup>79</sup> But he also pointed out: “Moreover, we must recognize that a smart national security strategy does not rely solely on military power. Indeed, in the long-term, our efforts to work with other countries to counter the ideology and root causes of violent extremism will be more important than our capacity to remove terrorists from the battlefield.”<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> RI-ESS, 7.

<sup>77</sup> Klohs and Niemann, “Comparing the US National Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy in the First Decade of the 21st Century,” 16.

<sup>78</sup> USNSS 2010, Preamble, 1.

<sup>79</sup> USNSS 2015, 1.

<sup>80</sup> USNSS 2015, 2.

The United States' shift to this broader approach and understanding of security was stated by President Obama in his speech at the US Military Academy in May 2014: "US military action cannot be the only - or even primary - component of our leadership in every instance. Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail."<sup>81</sup> He went on to speak about the United States need to broaden its tools to include diplomacy and development. Thus, the United States at this time is merging with the European side.

This is very much like the European approach, which is based on a broad understanding of the meaning of "security" and the means to provide security and face threats.<sup>82</sup> The EU's concept uses the term "preemptive peace" and explains it accordingly: "It has long been known that preventing conflicts is more efficient and effective than engaging with crises after they break out. ... The EU enjoys a good record on pre-emptive peacebuilding and diplomacy."<sup>83</sup>

At the same time, however, the EU is moving towards the US approach by stressing that using so-called "soft power" is not enough to be a decisive global actor.<sup>84</sup> As Jerome Legrand stated, "First and foremost, if a stronger European 'hard power' capable of fulfilling its ambitions for strategic autonomy is to be built, it must have the capacity to act accordingly. The approach in the Global Strategy towards strengthening EU capabilities is focused chiefly on quality and efficiency rather than on quantity."<sup>85</sup> Hence, the EU did not provide enough of the necessary tools

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<sup>81</sup> The White House, "Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony," May 28, 2014, accessed January 15, 2018, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-military-academy-commencement-ceremony>.

<sup>82</sup> EUGS, 28. The document dedicates an entire subparagraph to it: "An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crisis."

<sup>83</sup> EUGS, 29.

<sup>84</sup> Jerome Legrand, "Does the new EU Global Strategy Deliver on Security and Defence?" *Policy Department of the European Parliament* (September 2016): 11, accessed February 15, 2018, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/570472/EXPO\\_IDA\(2016\)570472\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/570472/EXPO_IDA(2016)570472_EN.pdf).

<sup>85</sup> Legrand, 13.



and instruments to back up its own claim. Instead, the EUGS focuses on increasing effectiveness of defense through closer cooperation: “To acquire and maintain many of these capabilities, Member States will need to move towards defence cooperation as the norm.”<sup>86</sup> It also stresses that EU member states are to remain sovereign in their defense decisions.<sup>87</sup> Annegret Berndiek sees here a lack of realism in seeking to manage EU tensions resulting from decreasing resources, continuing strategic disunity within the member states, and the difficulty of achieving unanimity within the EU’s decision making process.<sup>88</sup>

The tools to assure that EU core interests can be protected are largely the same as they were in 2003. When the document refers to the EU’s ability to conduct operations on its own if and when necessary, it is facing the same challenge as it has for the past fifteen years. It has not been feasible because even when the necessary capabilities within the EU were available, the willingness to act outside the NATO framework was largely absent.<sup>89</sup>

With regard to general actions, the USNSS 2015 and the EUGS were closer together than their predecessors. This was mainly because the United States under President Obama used a broader understanding of the term “security” itself. In return, the EU recognized that soft power is insufficient to be a decisive actor on the world stage. Soft power must be backed up with military capabilities at an appropriate level of quality and sufficient quantity if it is to be effective.

## National Interests versus International Cooperation

The second difference between the security strategies of the United States and the EU concerns US power as a global actor, that is able and willing to influence other nations or

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<sup>86</sup> EUGS, 45.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Bendiek, “Die Globale Strategie für die Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU,” 3.

<sup>89</sup> Dijkstra, 2.

organizations. Both the USNSS 2002 and the ESS expressed their preference for multilateralism and international cooperation. The USNSS 2002 stated: “There is little of lasting consequences that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe.”<sup>90</sup> However, the conclusions outlined in both papers are remarkably different. The ESS’s aim was to establish “an international order based on effective multilateralism”<sup>91</sup> to maximize the effects of cooperation. On the other hand, the USNSS 2002 stressed that the United States would not misuse its world-leading position only for its own will without taking the interest of existing friends and partners into consideration, and “while the United States will constantly strive to enlist the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary.”<sup>92</sup> In the United States at that time, criticism had become louder that multilateralism was not helpful to its security interests. Joachim Krause argued such, in his article “Multilateralism: Behind European Views,” asserting that multilateralism was not helpful to American security interests and that history has shown that in most of the cases where multilateralism could have been applied successfully, the system failed.<sup>93</sup>

In addition, there is another important aspect to take into consideration about the United States ability to influence a state or an organisation and the EU’s consistent search for international cooperation. When Americans use the term “multilateralism,” they have in mind a policy that actively seeks the support of others. But even for the group of Americans who generally refer to themselves as multilateralists, it is not mandatory to get the blessing of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In contrast, “The European position accordingly argues that a major power

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<sup>90</sup> USNSS 2002, 25.

<sup>91</sup> ESS, 9.

<sup>92</sup> USNSS 2002, 6.

<sup>93</sup> Joachim Krause, “Multilateralism: Behind European Views,” *The Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 47.

cannot promise to abide by the decision of UNSC and then act unilaterally — if the decision of the UNSC does not please that power, for whatever reasons.”<sup>94</sup> Hence, for Europeans, multilateralism is indivisibly connected with the UNSC acting in its role as the primary body that guarantees international peace and security. When the UNSC acts in this function it can authorize any action, whether it be sanctions or military operations, in order to provide the necessary international legitimacy.<sup>95</sup>

NATO, the symbol of the transatlantic partnership, also generally acts under UNSC resolutions when Article 5 does not apply.<sup>96</sup> According to the ESS, “The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management.”<sup>97</sup> The USNSS 2002 viewed a global role for the alliance, not subordinate to the UNSC, stating, “The Alliance must be able to act wherever our interests are threatened, creating coalitions under NATO’s own mandate, as well as contributing to mission-based coalitions.”<sup>98</sup> In this regard, the US positions go beyond the EU’s understanding of the term “multilateralism.”

The United States sees cooperation with other partners as a tool that can support the implementation of US interests. Otherwise, the concept is without relevance and has to be subordinated to the general attitude of US pragmatism. In US strategic thinking, multilateralism

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<sup>94</sup> Hall Gardner, *American Global Strategy and the “War on Terrorism”* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), 38.

<sup>95</sup> Annika Nulle, “The Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU” (master’s thesis, Linköping University, 2014), 35.

<sup>96</sup> “Collective defense“ means that an attack against one ally is considered as an attack against all allies. The principle of collective defense is enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

<sup>97</sup> ESS, 12. The Berlin Plus agreement of 2003 allows the EU to make use of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations.

<sup>98</sup> USNSS 2002, 25.

does not possess a usefulness of its own. According to Colucci, critics who claim that the NSS's published under president Bush is a repudiation of multilateralism are not interpreting them correctly: "There was never a desire to act alone but rather a desire to act. If this meant to act unilaterally, then Bush's answer was 'so be it'."<sup>99</sup>

When the USNSS 2010 describes global engagement with regional counterparts, NATO is again mentioned in the passage about Europe. The organization is referred to as "the pre-eminent security alliance in the world today."<sup>100</sup> With the other members the United States will continue to deter potential threats and promote security for all twentyeight NATO members and their populations.<sup>101</sup> The USNSS 2015 and EUGS treat NATO comparably. Both documents stress this organization's importance: The USNSS 2015 states: "We will continue to deepen our relationship with the European Union (EU), which has helped to promote peace and prosperity across the region, and deepen NATO-EU ties to enhance transatlantic security."<sup>102</sup> The EUGS sees NATO as "the bedrock of Euro-Atlantic security for almost 70 years. It remains the strongest and most effective military alliance in the world."<sup>103</sup>

The RI-ESS reemphasized the European view of a multilateral approach: "The ESS called for Europe to contribute to a more effective multilateral order around the world. Since 2003, we have strengthened our partnerships in pursuit of that objective."<sup>104</sup> In the USNSS 2010 there can be found something comparable: "To that end, strengthening bilateral and multilateral cooperation cannot be accomplished simply by working inside formal institutions and frameworks. It requires

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<sup>99</sup> Colucci, *The National Security Doctrines of the American Presidency*, 432.

<sup>100</sup> USNSS 2010, 41.

<sup>101</sup> USNSS 2010, 42.

<sup>102</sup> USNSS 2015, 25.

<sup>103</sup> EUGS, 37.

<sup>104</sup> RI-ESS, 9.

sustained outreach to foreign governments, political leaderships, and other critical constituencies that must commit the necessary capabilities and resources to enable effective, collective action.”<sup>105</sup> In Colucci’s judgment, in which he disagreed with the US president, “a huge aspect of the Obama Doctrine is multilateralism.”<sup>106</sup>

The RI-ESS invited the United States to cooperate more closely with European partners on an effective multilateralist approach; however, at the time it was unclear whether the United States would accept this invitation.<sup>107</sup> It quickly became apparent that the US response was “No.” This is because there is still an important gap between the two strategic concepts of the EU and United States. When it comes to actions to protect the American population against threats, the USNSS 2010 stated bluntly: “The United States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend our nation and our interests, yet we will also seek to adhere to standards that govern the use of force.”<sup>108</sup> Siracusa and Warren see in this choice of wording an indication of Obama’s intent to maintain a hegemonic position – i.e., one where the United States maintains its role as the preeminent global power.<sup>109</sup> It may be a hegemonic commitment, but at least it is one upon which the world can build.

However, it shows the rest of the world that the United States is not willing, notwithstanding the lack of support from the international community, to surrender its inherent right to choose any action to protect its citizens. Obama’s repeated criticism of the US intervention in Iraq does not make him a pacifist. “Ironically, the president used the Nobel Peace Prize

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<sup>105</sup> USNSS 2010, 42.

<sup>106</sup> Colucci, *The National Security Doctrines of the American Presidency*, 477.

<sup>107</sup> RI-ESS, 9.

<sup>108</sup> USNSS 2010, 22.

<sup>109</sup> Siracusa and Warren, *Presidential Doctrines*, 197.

acceptance speech as an occasion to articulate his philosophy of war. He made it very clear that his opposition to the Iraq war didn't mean that he embraced pacifism — not at all.”<sup>110</sup> In fact, Obama stands with this policy choice in his USNSS 2010 in unbroken tradition with his predecessor, George W. Bush, and the other US presidents, who also have claimed the right to use their power unilaterally. In a speech President Obama gave in front of West Point cadets in 2014, he underlined that he will use [the US's] military “hammer” “unilaterally if necessary, when our core interests demand it — when our people are threatened, when our livelihoods are at stake, when the security of our allies is in danger.”<sup>111</sup>

In his article “The EU Global Strategy: from Effective Multilateralism to Global Governance That Works?,” Balazs Ujvari discusses four aspects in which the EUGS differs from its predecessor.<sup>112</sup> One of these aspects is financial in nature. The EUGS expresses a remarkably different approach with regard to the importance of international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). This is a consequence of the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on Europe and its member states. Less importance is given to some other financial institutions, like the New Development Bank (NDB), the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), and the Continent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), as the EU member states have only limited or no influence on these institutions.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Peter L. Bergen, “President Obama, Warrior in Chief,” *The New York Times*, April 28, 2012, accessed February 15, 2018, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/opinion/sunday/president-obama-warrior-in-chief.html>.

<sup>111</sup> USNSS 2015, 8.

<sup>112</sup> Balazs Ujvari, “The EU Global Strategy: from Effective Multilateralism to Global Governance That Works?,” *Egmont-Royal Institute for International Relations*, Security Policy Brief, No. 76, July 2016, 2, accessed March 10, 2018, <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2016/06/SPB76.pdf?type=pdf>.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

The other aspect is that the EUGS stresses the increasing importance of collaboration on the international stage. The ESS considered NATO and a handful of other regional organizations, like the African Union (AU) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and cooperation with the United States as paramount for effective multilateralism. The EUGS instead, took other institutions, such as the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) into consideration as upcoming powers.<sup>114</sup>

For example, both the EUGS and USNSS 2015, describe China, with its powerful economy, as an important partner: “The EU will engage China based on respect for rule of law, both domestically and internationally. We will pursue a coherent approach to China’s connectivity drives westwards ...”<sup>115</sup> The USNSS 2015 also stated, “The United States welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful and prosperous China. We seek to develop a constructive relationship with China that delivers benefits for our two peoples and promotes security and prosperity in Asia and around the world.”<sup>116</sup> In addressing China as an upcoming decisive global actor, these two versions of the strategic documents are very close to each other.

In conclusion, one must stress that the United States continues to claim its right to act unilaterally. Despite his differences with his predecessor, US President Obama saw an inherent right to protect his nation and interests against any opponent when these are endangered. However, generally speaking, the US view of multilateralism has moved towards the European understanding according to the USNSS 2015.

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<sup>114</sup> Ujvari, 3.

<sup>115</sup> EUGS, 38.

<sup>116</sup> USNSS 2015, 24.

## The Role of the United Nations and the Significance of International Law

The role of the United Nations and the significance of international law in the strategies strongly related to multilateralism. As with preventative military action or preventative political engagement and national interests versus international cooperation, the United States and EU security strategies converged over the period from 2002-2016.

President Bush stated in his foreword to the USNSS 2002, “The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO as well as other long-lasting alliances. Coalitions of the willing can augment these permanent institutions.”<sup>117</sup> Hence, the US president wanted simply that the mentioned institutions “last”. He went on to stress the importance of fulfilling the obligations involved. Another occasion in which the UN is mentioned, again amongst others, is in the discussion of the war in Afghanistan.<sup>118</sup> Klohs and Niemann argue that “if the UN or other international organisations do not work for US purposes, specific ‘coalitions of the willing’ are to be formed.”<sup>119</sup>

In contrast to the American position, the ESS stressed the central role of the UN and the value this organization has for a globalized world, and especially the importance of the UNSC. The ESS called upon the EU members to provide the necessary means for the UN to fulfill its missions: “We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework

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<sup>117</sup> USNSS 2002, Foreword, 3.

<sup>118</sup> USNSS 2002, 7.

<sup>119</sup> Klohs and Niemann, “Comparing the US National Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy in the First Decade of the 21st Century,” 15.



for international relations is the United Nations Charter.”<sup>120</sup> The European approach acknowledged the primacy of the UN and its ability to conduct worldwide engagement.<sup>121</sup>

The other important aspect is the significance of international law. The ESS emphasizes the rules-based international order and therefore that international law must be adapted to “new” challenges such as terror and proliferation. However, there is one characteristic of international law which is not addressed by these adaptations. The call for “preventive wars” brought into question a concept which can be considered as the central element of the Westphalian State system for more than three hundred years: the concept of state and its sovereignty. This concept is a central assumption for the foundation of the European Union. To question this concept in order to justify “preventive wars” against another state, with no concrete indications of a planned attack or humanitarian intervention with military means, was not acceptable for the EU’s member states.<sup>122</sup>

In contrast to former strategic documents where there was no reference to an international rules-based order, the USNSS 2010 devoted an entire chapter to this concept, expressing this through the terms “international norms” or “international standard.”<sup>123</sup> Moreover, the USNSS 2010, which expressed the Obama strategy while reviewing the presidency of George W. Bush, he asserted: “In recent years America’s frustration with the international institutions has led us at times to engage the United Nations systems on an ad hoc basis. But in a world of transnational challenges, the United States will need to invest in strengthening the international system from

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<sup>120</sup> ESS, 9.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> Jana Zitzler, “Die Bindungswirkung des Völkerrechts. Die Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie als Gegenmodell zur Nationalen Sicherheitsstrategie der USA” Postgraduiertenstudiengang Europawissenschaften Berlin, Masterarbeit 2004/2005, 51.

<sup>123</sup> USNSS 2010, 40.

inside international institutions,”<sup>124</sup> At page 12 of the same document the US president stated: “This engagement will pursue an international order that recognizes the rights and responsibilities of all nations. As we did after World War II, we must pursue a rules-based international system that can advance our own interests by serving mutual interests.”<sup>125</sup> Klohs and Niemann consider the term “international rules-based system” as evidence of a convergence between the USNSS 2010 and the ESS: “Both strategies are similarly oriented on individuals. This means a dramatic shift from the traditional state-centred security concepts.”<sup>126</sup>

The US security document of 2010 use the words, “[S]trengthening the legitimacy and authority of international law and institutions, especially the UN, will require a constant struggle to improve performance.”<sup>127</sup> The RI-ESS again stressed the general importance of the UN: “The UN stands at the apex of the international system.”<sup>128</sup> It expressed a commitment to the UN and its reform started in 2005 to maintain the central role of the Security Council for international peace and security.<sup>129</sup>

An illustration of this shift is the EU’s support for the International Criminal Court (ICC). President Obama, like his predecessor, was unwilling to sign up as this would mean that US citizens would be subject to its jurisdiction. The EU however argued for an increased role for the ICC, notwithstanding that it operates outside the formal UN system, stating: “The International Criminal Court should grow further in effectiveness, alongside broader EU efforts to strengthen

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<sup>124</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>126</sup> Klohs and Niemann, “Comparing the US National Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy in the First Decade of the 21st Century,”13.

<sup>127</sup> USNSS 2010, 13.

<sup>128</sup> RI-ESS, 9.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., 11.

international justice and human rights.”<sup>130</sup> While the EU desires that the ICC continue to grow in effectiveness, this will be a challenge when other political heavyweights like China, Russia, or Israel have not yet signed the founding Rome statute, leaving their populations not subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC.<sup>131</sup>

Most evident is that both strategic documents have identified a rules-based order as one of their four core interests. The USNSS 2015 called for a rules-based international order with “U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.”<sup>132</sup> Meanwhile, the EUGS will “promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core.”<sup>133</sup> The obvious similarities are evidence of merging policies in one of the most important characteristics of these strategic documents.

When it comes to the UN, both security documents, the USNSS 2015 and the EUGS stress the importance of the organization, but the EU goes a step further, expressing in the current security document: “A multilateral order grounded in international law, including the principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is the only guarantee for peace and security at home and abroad.”<sup>134</sup> But as strong as this statement may be, it can also be seen as turning away from the ESS’s almost adoring words about the UN, especially in terms of the importance of the UNSC.<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> RI-ESS, 12.

<sup>131</sup> Gardner, *American Global Strategy and the “War on Terrorism,”* 170.

<sup>132</sup> USNSS 2015, 2.

<sup>133</sup> EUGS, 15.

<sup>134</sup> EUGS, 16.

<sup>135</sup> ESS, 9.

The EU seems to be more realistic and closer to the US approach regarding the effectiveness of the international system. This means the EU is less confident about its ability to reform this most important body of the UN while not underestimating the urgent need for this critical endeavor.<sup>136</sup> The USNSS 2015 also called for the need to reform the UN and other multilateral institutions. While doing so, the document also stated: “We will work vigorously both within the UN and other multilateral institutions, and member states, to strengthen and modernize capacities – from peacekeeping to humanitarian relief – so they endure to provide protection, stability, and support for future generations.”<sup>137</sup>

## Conclusion

This analysis concludes that based on key criteria, the similarities between the respective security strategies from 2002-2016 increased. The ESS was, with regard to the given security challenges and their respective answers, very different than the security documents published under the Bush administration. This was evident in the USNSS 2002 and even more in the USNSS 2006 focused on the GWOT, which afterwards became known as the “Bush Doctrine.” To use the words of Lamont Colucci: “This doctrine and its resultant policy come out of a belief in ‘crusading realism,’ which is the ideology of primacy, preemption, prevention, and democracy promotion created by the new international conditions of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), rogue states, and new transnational terrorism catalyzed by the events 9/11.”<sup>138</sup>

Most European leaders did not agree with this view of the world and the American perspective that the United State was taking part in a war. However, that was the setting of the

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<sup>136</sup> EUGS, 39.

<sup>137</sup> USNSS 2015, 23.

<sup>138</sup> Colucci, *The National Security Doctrines of the American Presidency*, 429.

security environment in which President George W. Bush unilaterally chose to wage war against Iraq, regardless of whether there were other options.<sup>139</sup> The EU was unsure how to handle this situation and split into two groups: those who would follow the United States into war, and those who would not.<sup>140</sup> To overcome this division, and also as an answer to the new Bush doctrine, the ESS was published in 2003 outlining an alternative approach to meet those security challenges. “The ESS was produced partly in order to adapt to new circumstances but also to convince the USA that Europe was not totally mired in delusional ‘soft power’ thinking.”<sup>141</sup>

The strength of the ESS was that, for the first time, the EU stated with one voice its vision of the security environment and the EU’s place within it. As Sven Biscop summarizes the core of the ESS: “The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.”<sup>142</sup>

In some central aspects, President Barack H. Obama’s first NSS presents a renunciation of the former US security strategies to take up the wording of the ESS; hence, it more closely resembled the ESS document. “The tone of President Obama’s 2010 USNSS with its stress on diplomacy and multilateral approach is very much different from that of its 2002 and 2006

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<sup>139</sup> Siracusa and Warren, *Presidential Doctrines*, 173-174.

<sup>140</sup> Steven Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy since World War II*, 20th ed. (Los Angeles, California: SAGE Publication, 2016), 252-276.

<sup>141</sup> Christopher Hill, “Britain and the European Security Strategy,” *German Foreign Policy, A Quarterly E-Newsletter on German Foreign Policy*, Vol 5, no. 13 (2004): 25, accessed March 10, 2018, [http://www.phil.unipassau.de/fileadmin/dokumente/lehrstuehle/stahl/Publikationen\\_\\_Votr%C3%A4ge/mono\\_03\\_book\\_review.pdf](http://www.phil.unipassau.de/fileadmin/dokumente/lehrstuehle/stahl/Publikationen__Votr%C3%A4ge/mono_03_book_review.pdf).

<sup>142</sup> Sven Biscop, “Global and Operational: A New Strategy for EU Foreign and Security Policy.” IAI Working Papers 15/27 (July 2015), 3.

predecessors.”<sup>143</sup> The strategies have converged with respect to some central ideas. Just as the EU widened the definition of security in its discussion of “preventive engagement,”<sup>144</sup> Obama also broadened the understanding of the term “security.” This broader understanding enabled the USNSS 2010 to shift the focus from the classic understanding of state-centered security to a more individual-based one.

Some parts of the USNSS 2010 echo certain aspects of EU policies, such as the comprehensive approach and the dominant perception that the world has changed.<sup>145</sup> President Obama stated in his preamble to the USNSS 2010, “Time and again in our nation’s history, Americans have risen to meet – and to shape – moments of transitions. This must be one of those moments. We live in a time of sweeping change.”<sup>146</sup> Similarly, the EU stated in the conclusion of its 2008 Implementation Report: “But the world around us is changing fast, with evolving threats and shifting powers. To build a secure Europe in a better world, we must do more to shape the events.”<sup>147</sup> Both papers stressed the phenomenon of the changing security environment more than their respective predecessors. For President Obama, this approach provided the necessary space “to restore the U.S. position away from what he saw as debatable expeditions and the legal obfuscation pertaining to the way it wielded its unilateral use-of-force.”<sup>148</sup>

The EU launched its Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy in 2016. It can be considered as a new starting point for the EU’s approach to the rest of the world. One year earlier,

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<sup>143</sup> Christine Gray, “President Obama’s United States National Security and International Law on the Use of Force,” *Chinese Journal of International Law* 10, no. 1 (March 1, 2011): 52.

<sup>144</sup> ESS, 11.

<sup>145</sup> Klohs and Niemann, “Comparing the US National Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy in the First Decade of the 21st Century,” 14.

<sup>146</sup> USNSS 2010, Foreword.

<sup>147</sup> RI-ESS, 10.

<sup>148</sup> Siracusa and Warren, *Presidential Doctrines*, 189.

President Obama published his second NSS in 2015. Both security strategies took the most recent negative developments with Russia's attempt to draw a new map of Europe and other disadvantageous effects into consideration. The US document, Janine Davidson judges, "is not 'leading from behind,' as the president's restless and war-ready critics love to claim. Nor is it hard-charging unilateralism ... It's smart multilateralism – working within the international system while also being willing to bear the burden of defending it, although not always with military power. This is likely as close as we'll get to an 'Obama Doctrine'."<sup>149</sup>

However, the USNSS 2015 and the EU's Global Strategy are unified in the way they address the rest of the world. Both security papers are very similar in their wording and show that their respective interests derive from commonly shared values. They are also similar in seeking to use multilateralism and all the instruments of power, not just military, to deliver political end states. Nevertheless, there is still a lack of coherence in how to achieve an identified interest because the EU sees the use of military force as a last resort, preferring diplomatic or economic activities to solve the upcoming security challenges. It is simply that the United States can use a military "hammer" if necessary and without any hesitation, whenever a threat against its population or interests occurs. The EU is not able to do so because there is no military tool instantly available to make a difference, given the EU's consensus-based rules.

Another observation is that the second NSS published under the respective presidents is never significantly different than the general structure and outline of the first. One can therefore deduce that the first strategic document of an administration reflects the political background of the incoming president. The selection process for the key actors involved in the staffing process of

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<sup>149</sup> Janine Davidson, "Obama's Last National Security Strategy: The President and the Philosopher," *Foreign Affairs*, March 2, 2015, accessed January 18, 2018, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-03-02/obamas-last-national-security-strategy>.

these kinds of documents are also influenced by the political party that comes into power, unless there is a continuation of either a Democratic or Republican administration. It is also apparent that the strategic dimensions of one single event, like the 9/11 attacks, are relevant for more than one president's time in office.

The United States searches for a partner who is capable and clearly shows the willingness to accept its responsibility for the upcoming, and hopefully commonly perceived, security challenges. This includes the EU, but the people of the member states of that organization must be willing to contribute appropriately: "We must now swiftly translate this vision into action."<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> EUGS, p. 51.



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