Cuba to Korea: Applying Lessons Learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the Next North Korean Crisis

A Monograph

by

COL James C. Reese
US Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
US Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, KS

2019

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*	**2. REPORT TYPE**	**3. DATES COVERED** *(From - To)*
23 05 2019	Master's Thesis	JUNE 18-MAY 19

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Cuba to Korea: Applying Lessons Learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the Next North Korean Crisis

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)
COL James C. Reese

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
ADVANCED STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP STUDIES PROGRAM

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

At the onset of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Fidel Castro sought strategic weapons to deter US ambitions to depose his regime, secure his legacy, and solidify a key strategic partnership. Kim Jong Un continues to develop North Korean nuclear weapons capabilities for arguably similar purposes. This paper explores the context and background surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis and the current tensions between the United States and North Korea, then compares them in order to make recommendations for either avoiding or resolving a future crisis between the US and North Korea. Graham Allison and Scott Sagan provide frameworks regarding leader behavior as well as motivations for pursuing nuclear weapons to compare and contrast the Cuban Missile Crisis and the current situation on the Korean peninsula regarding nuclear weapons. Comparing and contrasting the events leading up to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the current conditions between the US and North Korea leads to recommendations for creating a series of diplomatic pressure valves similar to the security and economic solutions between the US and USSR during the Cuban Missile Crisis. These recommendations allow for a relief of tensions while preserving North Korean pride and self-reliance versus compelling changes to the North Korean government and society. By preserving the aforementioned aspects of North Korean national identity, the potential exists for the creation of an internally driven change to the current dynastic regime structure.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			**17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**	**18. NUMBER OF PAGES**	**19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**
a. REPORT	**b. ABSTRACT**	**c. THIS PAGE**			**19b. PHONE NUMBER** *(include area code)*
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	46	913 758-3300

Monograph Approval Page

Name of Candidate: COL James C. Reese

Monograph Title: From Cuba to Korea: Applying Lessons Learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the Next North Korean Crisis

Approved by:

_____, Monograph Director
Barry M. Stentiford, PhD., ASLSP Director

_____, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Kirk C. Dorr, COL

Accepted this 23rd day of May 2019 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, PhD

Abstract

Cuba to Korea: Applying Lessons Learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the Next North Korean Crisis, by COL James C. Reese, US Army, 45 pages.

At the onset of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Fidel Castro sought strategic weapons to deter US ambitions to depose his regime, secure his legacy, and solidify a key strategic partnership. Kim Jong-un continues to develop North Korean nuclear weapons capabilities for arguably similar purposes. This paper explores the context and background surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis and the current tensions between the United States and North Korea, then compares them in order to make recommendations for either avoiding or resolving a future crisis between the US and North Korea. Graham Allison and Scott Sagan provide frameworks regarding leader behavior as well as motivations for pursuing nuclear weapons to compare and contrast the Cuban Missile Crisis and the current situation on the Korean peninsula regarding nuclear weapons.

Comparing and contrasting the events leading up to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the current conditions between the US and North Korea leads to recommendations for creating a series of diplomatic pressure valves similar to the security and economic solutions between the US and USSR during the Cuban Missile Crisis. These recommendations allow for a relief of tensions while preserving North Korean pride and self-reliance versus compelling changes to the North Korean government and society. By preserving the aforementioned aspects of North Korean national identity, the potential exists for the creation of an internally driven change to the current dynastic regime structure.

Contents

Acknowledgements

I want to thank my family for their continued support. Sarah provides the motivation to be a better husband, father, and friend and our daughters provide a never-ending vision of hope for a more peaceful tomorrow. I would also like to thank the mentors, peers, and subordinates, whose investment of time and patience in my professional development is greatly appreciated, it is my sincere hope that I will continue to uphold the outstanding examples that they have all provided.

Introduction

As of early 2019, the world is experiencing an unprecedented period of relative stability in regards to relations between the United States, the Republic of Korea, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. From August 2017 until June 2018, armed conflict appeared imminent between the United States and North Korea. North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un's announcement of an operational nuclear capability in April 2018 coupled with ballistic missile technology capable of striking the North American continent represents the culmination of thirty-three years of research and development. His declaration and continued weapons testing led to some the highest levels of rhetoric between the leaders of the United States and North Korea since North Korea began its pursuit of nuclear weapons in 1986.[1] The June 2018 Singapore Summit between President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un created the diplomatic space required to deescalate hostilities and enable further negotiations. A key outcome from the Singapore Summit was an agreement between the United States and North Korea on the four key framework principles of normalized relations, denuclearization, peace between the United States and North Korea, and POW/MIA remains repatriation.[2] On the surface, dialogue continues to progress between the United States, South Korea, and North Korea to deescalate tensions along demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea, cessation of large scale US-South Korean combined military exercises, and economic development. In an environment where North Korea retains its nuclear capability, trust is oftentimes lacking due to miscommunication, and the

[1] US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation*, by Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mark E. Manyin, Mary D. Nikitin, Caitlin Campbell, and Wil Mackey, R41259, July 27, 2018, 10, accessed November 13, 2018, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41259.

[2] Donald J. Trump, "Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit," The White House, accessed November 14, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/.

Thucydean principles of fear, honor, and interests. Under these conditions, any future crisis will most assuredly escalate quickly.

The importance of comparing the current situation with North Korea to the Cuban Missile Crisis revolves around the importance of the term "crisis." As US Representative (R) Darrell Issa discussed during a CNN interview on August 8, 2017, there are correlations between the situation with North Korea and the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 and by reviewing those similarities, solutions to future crisis are attainable.[3]

The *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics* states that there is no central definition for crisis in terms of foreign relations. However, "crises typically involve the centralization of power, are associated with a narrowing of options and the increased use of analytical shortcuts, and typically feature increased vertical communications and argumentation among advisers as well as increased pressure to attain comprehensive rationality."[4] In the event of a breakdown in the current dialogue, a crisis will undoubtedly emerge between the United States and North Korea. Similar to the situation that President John F. Kennedy faced in October 1962; strategic leaders will have limited decision space to provide guidance with potentially catastrophic effect. The purpose of this paper is to provide recommendations based on the similarities and differences between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba leading up to October 1962 and current conditions that may contribute to future crisis with North Korea.

At the onset of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Cuba's Prime Minister, Fidel Castro, sought strategic weapons to deter US ambitions to depose his regime, secure his legacy, and solidify a key strategic partnership. Kim Jong-un has produced nuclear weapons capabilities for arguably

---

[3] Darrell Issa, interview by Jake Tapper, "The Lead with Jake Tapper", August 8, 2017, accessed November 14, 2018, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1708/08/cg.01.html.

[4] David Houghton, "Crisis Decision Making in Foreign Policy," *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, September 26, 2017, accessed November 14, 2018, http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-403.

similar purposes. This monograph explores the parallels between the Cuban and North Korean pursuits of nuclear weapons and offers recommendations to develop new strategic approaches.

In terms of the Cuban Missile Crisis, extensive literature exists examining the policies, actions, individual personalities, and group dynamics of the governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent, Fidel Castro's Cuba. Raymond Garthoff's *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Revised to Include New Revelations from Soviet & Cuban Sources* provides the starting point for this monograph. Garthoff served on the US negotiating team during the Cuban Missile Crisis and published his study in 1989 with subsequent revisions based on declassified Soviet era documents to describe the strategic interactions between the United States and the Soviet Union in order to provide lessons learned for future negotiations.[5] He found that for nations with competing global interests, crisis prevention and avoidance based on political restraint and accommodation are preferred over crisis management.[6]

As highlighted by Bruce W. MacDonald, writing for the United States Institute for Peace, the breadth of writings on the Cuban Missile Crisis generally point to four key lessons. First, decision space for diplomacy is required while refraining, but not excluding, the use of force as an option to compel resolution. Second, a "face-saving" option is required to allow all sides an acceptable way out of crisis. Third, senior leadership absolutely must have a trusted means of communication; either directly or through a common trusted emissary. Lastly, all sides must understand the consequences of failure to head off or resolve crisis.[7]

---

[5] Raymond L. Garthoff, *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 1989).

[6] Ibid., 154.

[7] Bruce W. MacDonald, "Looking Back on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 50 Years Later," United States Institute of Peace, accessed January 8, 2019, https://www.usip.org/publications/2012/10/looking-back-cuban-missile-crisis-50-years-later.

Analysis of North Korean strategic thought prior to the 1980s is sparse primarily due to the consistency and stability of Kim Il-sung's regime; simply put, the greater context of the Cold War overshadowed his leadership. Analysis focusing on North Korea expanded as Kim Jong-il transitioned with his father in the late 1980s and succeeded Kim Il-sung in 1994. Literature during this period focused on the potential for reform and North Korea's nuclear ambitions and strategic intentions. Similarly, as Kim Jong-un transitioned with Kim Jong-il in 2011, literature focused on potential reform and deciphering the background of Kim Jong-un.

Two concepts provide a standardized framework for comparing Castro's and Kim Jong-Un's pursuit of strategic nuclear weapons capability. In 1968, Graham T. Allison outlined and modeled various factors influencing strategic leader decision making. Allison focused on Rational Policies, Organization Processes, and Bureaucratic Politics. Applying Allison's models to Castro and Kim Jong-un finds that surrendering their personal strategic objectives will not come when perceived strategic costs outweigh benefits. Change most likely occurs as the result of individual political shifts enhancing the effective power of those whom oppose advocating for war. He also found that the actions of a victor could influence the perceptions of advantages and disadvantage to individuals in the opposing or losing government.[8]

The second concept for why nations seek nuclear weapons comes from Stanford University Professor Scott D. Sagan. Sagan found that nations justify their pursuit of these types of weapons for national security reasons, domestic agenda purposes, or national pride and position on a global stage. He concludes that given these reasons, no single policy can solve all future nuclear proliferation issues. In applying Sagan to Castro in 1962 and Kim Jong-un in the

[8] Graham T. Allison, *Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Rational Policy, Organization Process, and Bureaucratic Politics* (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, August 1968), 60.

modern era, we can find that we can work to reduce the power of an individual leader's interests in favor of nuclear weapons while addressing simultaneous efforts concerning state security.[9]

There is a decided lack of analysis in the field of academic literature comparing the current situation with North Korea and the conditions surrounding the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba in 1962. A detailed study of journalistic sources provides some surface level comparisons; however, they lack the depth to go beyond conversation pieces. For the purposes of this study, provided is an analysis of the conditions that led to the Cuban Missile Crisis and the predominant Cuban factors regarding its resolution. Secondly, reviewing the policy, leadership decisions contributing to North Korea's nuclear weapons capability, US policy and engagement with North Korea, and the resulting successes and failures are important considerations for comparison.

Cuba

The Cuban Missile Crisis remains a benchmark for rapid decision-making and development of ends, ways, and means for the resolution of strategic crisis. In drawing lessons learned from the Kennedy Administration approach to resolving the Cuban Missile Crisis, analysts must understand the context of the events prior to October 1962 and the immediate impacts of the de-escalation of hostile rhetoric. The clear majority of studies focus, properly so, on the dynamics between President John F. Kennedy and his Executive Committee, the National Security Council, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additional studies focus on the dialogue between the President and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev within the greater context of the Cold War and nuclear deterrence, however there are less studies written on the motivations and strategic objectives of Fidel Castro.

[9] Scott Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996): 54–86.

Providing a complete biographical background for Fidel Castro is beyond the scope of this paper and does not add significant relevance in terms of comparisons to North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un. There is significance in understanding what motivated Castro's mindset in requesting a Soviet military presence on Cuba and his understanding of the implications of emplacing intermediate and medium range ballistic missiles; a strategic offensive weapons system given its proximity to the North American mainland coupled with nuclear delivery capabilities.

When President Kennedy announced the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in October 1962, numerous critical events had already solidified in Fidel Castro's mind the requirement for a greater capability than he possessed. According to Senate Report 94-465 published on November 20, 1975, from the time Castro seized power on January 1, 1959 until the end of 1965, there were eight planned CIA assassination attempts against his person.[10] The two most important failed attempts at regime change in Cuba were the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April 1961 and the subsequent series of assassination attempts associated with Operation Mongoose. The overall strategic goal for the United States was the restoration of a government more compliant with American strategic interests.[11]

Fidel Castro was only thirty-four years old when he seized power in Havana in 1959. A young man educated as a lawyer by profession and a graduate of the University of Havana, Castro rose to power after initially leading a failed insurgency against the government of Cuban President Fulgencio Batista. Initially the Eisenhower Administration, while not supportive of Castro, agreed that a change was required in the corrupt Cuban government. According to the

[10] US Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, 94th Congr., 1st Sess., 1975, S. Rep. 94-465, n.d., 71–179, accessed November 15, 2018, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf.

[11] Ibid., 148.

"History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense," the official history of Robert McNamara's time as Secretary of Defense,

> The initial flush of enthusiasm following the overthrow of the repressive Batista regime in January 1959 gave way before the end of the year to U.S. disenchantment with the behavior of Castro, Batista's charismatic successor. Castro quickly cast the United States as the enemy, proclaimed himself a communist, and turned to the Soviet bloc for support.[12]

One of the key factors that emerged from Secretary's McNamara's history was that Fidel Castro was not an avowed communist prior to seizing power. It was not until later in 1959 that Fidel Castro declared himself and his government communist after the United States imposed an oil embargo and banned the import of Cuban sugar. Following the influence of his communist brother Raul Castro and activist Che Guevara, Fidel Castro reached out to the only Communist regime he felt capable of countering US aggression against Cuba, the Soviet Union. Continuing with Secretary McNamara's official history, "It is doubtful that a less hostile US stance might have turned the Castro revolution away from Soviet influence, given the symbolic and ideological importance of Yankee imperialism to the Cuban revolution. A break with the United States more likely provided vital cement for the new dictatorship."[13]

Starting with his initial seizure of power, Castro focused on consolidating his political gains by deporting or arresting dissidents, establishing himself as a credible national leader, and assuring Cuba's status in the western hemisphere. As the United States continued its embargoes and broke diplomatic ties, Fidel Castro began to see himself as geographically and politically isolated and sought a strategic advantage to attain his goals. The most feasible solution for Fidel Castro was to align himself with the United States' chief adversary at the time, the Soviet Union,

---

[12] Lawrence S. Kaplan, Ronald D. Landa, and Edward J. Drea, *The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961-1965*, vol. 5, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006), 172.

[13] Ibid.

for strategic advantage and economic and military partnership. Castro's alliance with the Soviet Union created the conditions for American intervention.

The first significant event that reinforced Castro's perceptions that the United States threatened his regime survival occurred on April 17, 1961, with the Bay of Pigs invasion, otherwise known as Operation Zapata. Fidel Castro knew of the presence of a US trained and equipped invasion force training in Guatemala composed of Cuban exiles, reinforcing his sense of isolation and desire for weapons to protect the fledgling revolutionary regime.[14] This knowledge allowed Castro to prepare his loyalist forces and by April 19, 1961, the invasion of Cuba had failed. The 1,400 man Cuban Brigade faced 20,000 Castro loyalist troops possessing armor and close air support. The US trained rebels met slaughter or capture with only fourteen members of the Cuban Brigade rescued by US naval vessels.[15] Additionally, the Bay of Pigs debacle influenced the new Kennedy Administration's future approaches to crisis by educating President Kennedy and his staff on the importance of utilizing strategic patience in dealing with the Soviet Union and the value of concessions.[16]

Unfortunately, the Bay of Pigs left a desire for redemption for the Kennedy Administration. According to historian Sheldon Stern, Operation Zapata left President Kennedy with, "an obsession with getting rid of Castro and erasing this blot on the Kennedy record. Cold War ideology, combined with personal anger over the Bay of Pigs, had created a powerful incentive for the Kennedy's to launch a 'secret war' to get even with Cuba."[17]

---

[14] Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, *The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961-1965*, vol. 5, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 183.

[15] Ibid., 185–186.

[16] Ibid., 167.

[17] Sheldon M. Stern, *The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 8.

In Soviet Premier Khrushchev's view, the Bay of Pigs invasion coupled with his self-professed victory in the Berlin Crisis of 1961 served as the impetus for developing plans to provide military capabilities to Cuba.[18] Soon after the Bay of Pigs, the KGB actively began training and administering the Cuban security, intelligence, and police apparatus. Requests for military aid support generally met with approval from the Soviet Politburo. Furthermore, Khrushchev viewed his support of Castro as protection of the first legitimate communist lodgment in the western hemisphere. In early 1962, the Premier began actively planning the deployment of long-range bombers and intermediate and medium range ballistic missiles to Cuba in order to offset US Jupiter ballistic missiles in Turkey as well as addressing the missile gap between Soviet and US ICBM capabilities.[19]

Most importantly, from Fidel Castro's perspective, the Bay of Pigs confirmed his belief that the United States would not stop its efforts at regime change and that a second, even larger invasion would occur. With this confirmed US threat in mind and an escalating sense of isolation, Castro openly embraced Soviet support.[20] He further used the resulting nationalistic rush of support to expand arrests of dissidents and improve domestic support from the Cuban population. Castro embraced and highlighted Cuba's role as an oppressed country to secure the strategic capabilities of the Soviet Union to protect his power and provide the USSR with a counterbalance to the US in Berlin.

April 1961 through October 1962 where far from quiet and further pushed Castro into a position where nuclear weapons would become a viable option for regime survival. By the end of November 1961, as the Berlin Crisis deescalated and the Kennedy Administration could refocus

---

[18] Stern, *The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 168.

[19] Ibid.

[20] James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993), 17.

on Cuba, a proposal for new, covert actions to overthrow Fidel Castro and potentially execute a US led invasion went before the President. President Kennedy's special assistant, Richard Goodwin, as well as General Edward Lansdale, Chief of Operations for the Secretary of Defense, led the planning effort for what would become Operation Mongoose.[21] President Kennedy formally approved of Operation Mongoose on November 30, 1961 with the express purpose to "use our available means to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime."[22] Under the mandates of Operation Mongoose, Fidel Castro and his regime were subject to an array of covert actions including assassination attempts and operations to foster an insurgency within Cuba. Additionally, overt military exercises by US naval and ground forces throughout the Caribbean sent clear messages regarding the American policy intentions to invade Cuba.[23]

Military activities were not the only factors that continued to foster Castro's sense of isolation. Diplomatic and economic actions by the United States along with varying degrees of support for US policies towards Cuba from countries throughout Central and South America continued to limit the options available to Castro for national and regime sustainment. According to authors James Blight, Bruce Allyn, and David Welch, between Castro's open acceptance of socialism as the established form of government and declaring himself a communist, fourteen Latin American countries cut all diplomatic ties with Cuba, expelled Cuba from the Organization of American States, and enacted or supported economic sanctions against Cuba.[24] The main motivation for Latin American opposition to Cuba was "Castro's anti-American rhetoric,

[21] US Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, 139.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, *The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961-1965*, 5:198.

[24] Blight, Allyn, and Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse*, 17.

increasing Soviet influence in the hemisphere, and the revolutionary nature of Marxism-Leninism encouraged by Castro's revolution." [25]

As a direct result of the isolation of Cuba on the world stage, multiple covert and overt attempts to force regime change against the Castro government, and diplomatic and economic sanctions against his country, Fidel Castro found willing support from the Soviet Union for the emplacement of strategic weapons on Cuba. As stated previously, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev actively planned for the placement of ballistic missiles capable of attacking the continental United States within Cuba beginning in April 1962 and he approved the action in May 1962. Castro and Khrushchev agreed to place nuclear-armed ballistic missiles on Cuba in July 1962 and the first ballistic missiles arrived in September of that year. The unmounted nuclear warheads as well as the missiles remained under strict Soviet military control in order to prevent their use unless directed by Soviet leadership.[26]

There is ample history explaining the facts detailing the specific dates and events during the Cuban Missile Crisis. To retain focus on the purpose of this paper to draw comparisons between Cuba and the ongoing situation with North Korea, it is important to expand beyond the established isolation of Castro. Paramount is reviewing why he requested and allowed nuclear weapons on Cuba, knowing that in the event of war, his regime, Cuba's people, and his country would not survive.

From the US strategic perspective, the placement of these missiles did nothing to alter the balance of global nuclear weapons. According to Benjamin Schwarz, the United States' ICBM nuclear arsenal significantly outnumbered the Soviet arsenal by a six to one ration with 203 US ICBMs to thirty-six operational Soviet ICBMs, as well as 144 American submarine launched

---

[25] Robin R. Pickering, "Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy: Motivation, Intention, and the Creation of a Crisis" (Humboldt State University, 2006), 33, accessed November 15, 2018, http://humboldt-dspace.calstate.edu/bitstream/handle/2148/89/Pickering.pdf;sequence=1.

[26] Ibid., 93.

nuclear ballistic missiles (SLBM) to the seventy-two possessed by the USSR. Furthermore, if missile flight times posed a significant issue, SLBMs targeting US coastal cities possessed significantly less flight times than missiles deployed in Cuba.[27] What nuclear missiles on Cuba did provide was a forcing mechanism to view Cuba as a significant influencer within the greater context of the Cold War, requiring US action to counter communist expansion and bolstering President Kennedy's credibility in dealing with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, addressing nuclear missiles in Cuba provided President Kennedy the opportunity to regain political credit for his perceived inability to deal with communism in the Western Hemisphere amongst his domestic political rivals.[28] President Kennedy said the following in addressing the Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba and being compelled to action, "Last month I said we weren't going to permit Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba and last month I should have said … we don't care. But when we said we're not going to, and the Soviets go ahead and do it, and then we do nothing, then I would think that our risks increase."[29]

According to a study by RAND researcher Therese Delpech and supported by multiple studies since the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev's motivation was to "restore parity (nuclear balance) and to complicate a possible U.S. first strike. Furthermore he intended to deter US military activities towards Cuba in a similar fashion to Washington's use of extended deterrence towards West Germany."[30] Jason K. Roeschley in his article titled "Nikita Khrushchev, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Aftermath" found further evidence of extended deterrence against the US regarding Castro and Cuba. He stated that, "Khrushchev would later

---

[27] Benjamin Schwarz, "The Real Cuban Missile Crisis," *The Atlantic*, last modified January 2, 2013, accessed November 15, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/01/the-real-cuban-missile-crisis/309190/.

[28] Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, *The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961-1965*, 5:204.

[29] Schwarz, "The Real Cuban Missile Crisis."

[30] Thérèse Delpech, *Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons From the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy* (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2012), 68.

write in his memoirs that the purpose of the placement of nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba was to maintain the independence of the Cuban people after Kennedy had endorsed the US orchestration of an invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961."[31]

With the overarching historical details established and the context of the prominent leaders' decisions outlined, conceptual models are applicable to explore and explain why Fidel Castro willingly placed Cuba at risk of annihilation. Two primary frameworks are pertinent for use in comparing Fidel Castro and his role in the Cuban Missile Crisis and Kim Jong-un and his pursuit of nuclear weapons. The first framework is an exploration of conceptual models for leader decision making by noted political scientist Graham T. Allison titled "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Rational Policy, Organization Process, and Bureaucratic Politics." Political scientist and Stanford University professor Scott D. Sagan provides the second framework through his work for *International Security* titled "Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in search of a Bomb."

In 1968, Graham T. Allison conducted one of the first serious studies regarding the development of conceptual models to explain leader behavior and decision-making for the RAND Corporation as it was studying strategic options in relation to North Vietnam. In his study, Professor Allison states that there are three conceptual models for leader decision-making and links them primarily to Kennedy and Khrushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The first model he describes revolves around the rational choices of a state and assumes that "occurrences can be most satisfactorily understood as purposive acts of national governments, conceived as unitary, rational agents."[32] Allison describes that the Rational Policy model is the standard model that most analysts use to explain a nation's foreign policy decision. In analyzing the Cuban

---

[31] Jason K. Roeschley, "Nikita Khrushchev, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Aftermath," *Constructing the Past* 12, no. 1 (2011): 3.

[32] Allison, *Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Rational Policy, Organization Process, and Bureaucratic Politics*, 1.

Missile Crisis through the Rational Policy model, Allison focuses on Soviet intentions by asking, "Why did the Soviets place missiles in Cuba?" By using the Rational Policy model to explain Soviet missile presence in Cuba, Allison outlines four specific inputs and outputs.

Initially, he framed the question as "why does a nation make a choice?" Second, analysts set the unit of analysis as national choice, asking what a nation decides to do in terms of ways and means. Third, analysts focus on specific concepts, in this case national objectives of what they want to accomplish. Fourth, the outcome for an analyst using this model draws patterns of inference that explains that a country commits certain acts to achieve certain goals.[33] In light of Soviet decisions to place nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in Cuba, the Rational Policy model was a reasonable choice for Khrushchev in view of Soviet strategic objectives previously outlined. Allison explains that the Rational Policy model provides an adequate baseline for analysis of actions by nations; however, it requires supplement or even replacement. He posits that additional models should focus on the detailed "functioning and malfunctioning of organizations and individuals in the policy process."[34] Essentially, he is going beyond treating the state as an individual making choices and looks deeper into the influencers within the state.

The next model provided by Allison, Organizational Process, focuses on the outputs of large organizations rather than the acts and choices used in the Rational Policy model. Using Organizational Processing, the question transitions from "why" a country makes a choice to what outputs of which organizations within a nation directly contributed to an event with the unit of analysis being organizational output. An analyst using the Organizational Model then fixates on the standard operating procedures of an organization and its overarching themes and messages. The output of this model states that if an organization produced a certain outcome during this period, then their operating procedures and principles produced similar outputs in the past and

[33] Allison, *Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Rational Policy, Organization Process, and Bureaucratic Politics*, 2–3.

[34] Ibid., 3.

will in the future.[35] The second model focused on identifying the relevant Soviet organizations and their patterns of behavior that drove the decision to place missiles on Cuba.

The third model, Bureaucratic Politics, most closely bears on Castro's decision-making. According to Allison, foreign affairs under the Bureaucratic Politics Model are not choices or outputs, but are "outcomes of various overlapping bargaining games among players arranged hierarchically in the national government."[36] Continuing the focus on individuals versus faceless nations or organizations, Allison used this model to look at what outcomes resulted from the bargaining between individuals with authority to influence national behavior. He analyzed desired political outcomes with a focus on the maneuvering of individuals. The patterns Allison identified finds that if a nation performs an action, it was a result or outcome of the bargaining, maneuvering, understanding, and misunderstanding of principal individuals.[37] Allison focused his analysis of this model on President Kennedy's Executive Community and the decision to quarantine Cuba.

The third model provided by Allison in the period leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis highlights some key factors regarding Castro. As the appointed leader of Cuba, having led and survived Batista's overthrow, the Bay of Pigs, numerous assassination attempts, and constant US diplomatic and economic pressure on his people, Castro was forced to make bargains and maneuvers to assure his regime and country's survival. Based on his perceived isolation and motivation, the outcome Castro desired to achieve was Soviet strategic support to guarantee the security of his regime, economic cooperation to counteract economic sanctions, and lastly, agreement on the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons to support the communist revolution. Castro's pursuit of nuclear weapons was a self-professed act of solidarity with the Soviet Union

[35] Allison, *Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Rational Policy, Organization Process, and Bureaucratic Politics*, 3.

[36] Ibid., 4.

[37] Ibid., 35.

that allowed for Cuba's use as a means for Khrushchev's strategic objectives.[38] Castro's agreement and complicity clearly show that the actions surrounding nuclear weapons deployment was a result or outcome of his bargaining, maneuvering, understanding, and misunderstanding of US and Soviet intentions coupled with Castro's own sense of isolation, survival, and intent to solidify the loyalty of his people.

Professor Scott D. Sagan provides the second framework for discussing why states pursue nuclear weapons. Scott D. Sagan, in his article titled "Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons?" challenges the assumption that states acquire nuclear weapons when they face a military threat that they cannot match. Conversely, if they do not face such a threat then a state will remain focused on conventional versus nuclear means.[39] His framework reinforces Allison's Bureaucratic Processes model and further explains Castro's willingness to obtain nuclear weapons, even if they were under Soviet control.

Professor Sagan states that nations acquire nuclear weapons for three reasons. The first reason he discusses relates to the *security* nuclear weapons provide against foreign threats. The second reason sees nuclear weapons as political tools to advance a *domestic* agenda. The third is *norms* reasoning, nations seek nuclear weapons to enhance their perceptions as a modern state and fosters a greater national identity and pride.[40]

All three of Sagan's explanations for pursuing nuclear weapons are clearly applicable to the Castro and Cuban Missile Crisis scenario. In the case of security reasoning, a Soviet nuclear presence on Cuba clearly met Castro's needs to counter US aggression. As Philip Brenner pointed out in his study,

---

[38] Philip Brenner, "Cuba and the Missile Crisis," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 22, no. 1 (1990): 122.

[39] Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," 54.

[40] Ibid., 55.

> there is the possibility that Cuban leaders did expect the missiles might be used. They may have anticipated that a direct invasion by US forces would trigger the missiles. Castro has said that he drew little distinction between a conventional assault on Cuba and a nuclear retaliation, because from the Cuban perspective a conventional attack would cost Cuba millions of lives and would thus affect Cuban society much the way a nuclear attack would ravage the United States.[41]

In the case of the domestic politics, even though Castro had won a significant victory in 1961 in defeating the US backed invasion, nuclear weapons would further allow Cuba to oppose American influence and erode the world image of an invincible United States. Brenner highlights that "if an avowedly socialist country were able to resist US attacks, then it would encourage similar resistance elsewhere."[42] Castro's main domestic agenda beyond security was gaining domestic support to spread the communist revolution throughout the western hemisphere.

Finally, in terms of the norms, Soviet nuclear weapons on Cuban soil provided Castro a stage to better elevate Cuba's role in the Cold War. In revising his own historical documents and public speeches, Castro changed the agreed to purpose for the weapons deployment from "saving the Cuban revolution" to "providing mutual assistance to the Soviet Union."[43] His change to the purpose of Soviet strategic weapons on Cuban soil not only impacted Castro's domestic audience but also highlighted the shared solidarity and risk with other communist bloc nations; providing a source of national pride for the Castro regime and its contributions to defending and spreading a socialist system throughout the world.

After reviewing important details regarding the events and motivations for Castro and the Cuban Missile Crisis, there are noteworthy details in the immediate aftermath of the events of October 1962. Castro was not an active participant in the negotiations between the US and the USSR, making his concerns known through Soviet Ambassadors Alexander Alexeyev and

---

[41] Brenner, "Cuba and the Missile Crisis," 126.

[42] Ibid., 122.

[43] Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, "Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International Security* 14, no. 3 (1989): 150.

Anastas Mikoyan. Castro discovered the pending resolution of the crisis through open source radio broadcasts and became infuriated. The lack of input in negotiations fueled Castro's anger, including the Soviet agreement to US inspectors on the ground in Cuba to verify the removal of the nuclear weapons.

In an attempt to have a greater voice in the negotiations, Fidel Castro bypassed his Soviet supporters and provided a Cuban national policy statement known as the "Five Points" directly to the United Nations in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. His points included the end of the US economic embargo, the United States cease subversive activities against Cuba, the cessation of 'pirate' attacks from bases in the United States and Puerto Rico, the ending of US violations of Cuban airspace, and the return Guantanamo Naval Base.[44] While none of these conditions was met, Castro's anger at the Soviet leadership opened direct conversations between Cuba and the United Nations and provided leverage with the Soviet government for future concessions. Castro's negotiations with UN Secretary U Thant and Soviet Ambassador Mikoyan guaranteed Cuban security as well as provided incentive for the Soviet Union to make concessions to assume more economic responsibility for Cuba as well as the permanent stationing of 3,000 Soviet troops on Cuban soil as a deterrent against perceived US aggression.[45] Additionally, Castro's actions post-crisis forced concessions that denied access to US inspectors.

Most historical writings focus on the greater Cold War context, crisis management and decision-making by Kennedy and Khrushchev, and the impacts of the Cuban Missile Crisis with little regard for Castro and Cuba's role. As Robin Pickering stated, "Fidel Castro was not a passive player, and his personality and actions influenced the causes of the crisis, as well as the character of the conflict and its eventual resolution."[46] To apply these models to any future North

[44] Brenner, "Cuba and the Missile Crisis," 133.

[45] Ibid., 133–136.

[46] Pickering, "Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy: Motivation, Intention, and the Creation of a Crisis," 60.

Korean nuclear crisis, professionals providing recommendations to strategic leaders must be cognizant of certain conditions. They must understand whether they are forming recommendations based on North Korea as a nation or focused on the organizations or leaders making the decisions. Leaders must understand the context of why North Korea seeks to retain and potentially employ nuclear weapons.

North Korea

Kim Jong-Un's regime has successfully tested ballistic missile technology that directly threatens the American homeland coupled with the potential to miniaturize nuclear warheads; providing him an undeniable role on the global stage. As compared to Castro's Cuba, who had less than three years to secure a strategic weapon capability, North Korean nuclear capacity represents the most current step on a journey that began with its policies in the 1950s and the eventual development of the capability to produce fissionable material for nuclear weapons in 1986..[47] External as well as indigenous nuclear weapons research and development has brought the United States, North Korea, as well as partners, allies, and competitors in northeast Asia to heightened tensions numerous times. In developing recommendations, planners and leaders must understand the policy, historical, and North Korean leadership context as they develop approaches to preventing or resolving crisis. By reviewing the available literature on North Korean development of nuclear weapons, leadership under the dynastic Kim regime, then analyzing Kim Jong-un through Allison's Conceptual model and Sagan's theories of why nations build nuclear weapons, we can then build a baseline of information for comparison with Castro and Cuba from 1962.

North Korea's nuclear weapons program is the ultimate expression of their ideology and policies of *Juche*, *Songun*, and *Byungjin*. Suh Dae-Sook's research on Kim Il-sung provides valuable context to not only gain a better understanding of North Korea's leadership, but also

[47] Kongdan O. Hassig, *Confronting North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions: US Policy Options and Regional Implications* (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2003), 2.

their drive for nuclear weapons. Much like the previous section regarding understanding Cuba and Castro, it is important to understand North Korea's leaders and their policies to gain a better understanding of why they seek nuclear weapons.

Suh's research into the Juche policy found that North Korean ideology and its impact on the population and government policy remains centrally focused on the Kim regime. As a concept, Juche, originally appeared in the 1930s as a concept developed by Kim Il-sung to oppose Japanese exploitation of the Korean peninsula. Kim Il-sung searched for and developed a simple ideology around which he could rally his Korean followers and oppose Japanese rule, further refining his policy while in exile in Siberia during World War II.[48] Juche, according to Suh's research is a word created by Kim Il-sung combining two Korean words, "chu" or "ju" meaning master, and "che" meaning the body or the whole. The concept behind being the master of the body entails two things for the North Korean leadership and population. First, the imperative for independence from other nation's influence and second the desire to be the deciders of their own destiny as a nation. Kim Il-sung would further add the "song" suffix to Juche to signify that North Korea would act in accordance with its own judgement, regardless of outsiders' opinions or objectives.[49]

According to Suh's research and confirmed through North Korea's actions over the past sixty years, Juche is both a foreign relations as well as domestic foundation for policy. In terms of foreign relations, Juche signified an end to North Korea's subordination to the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent, the People's Republic of China. Kim Il-sung's desire to diverge ideologically from the USSR was a reflection of the politics of the Soviet Union of the late 1950s as it went through a period of "de-Stalinization." Kim Il-sung likewise sought to distance himself from

[48] Arielle Shorr, "The Failure of U.S. Coercive Diplomacy Towards North Korea" (Brandeis University, 2013), 34.

[49] Dae-Sook Suh, *Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1995), 301.

Stalin and fortify his regime from Soviet influence, performing purges and staff realignments to elevate himself as the supreme leader of North Korea and establishing a dynastic regime.[50]

Domestically, Juche allowed Kim Il-sung to consolidate power and develop policies based on his own philosophies without following the principles of Marxism in the same fashion as other communist nations. Ideologically, this became most apparent as the influence of Confucianism and its strong father-son and central leader principals emerged. Under this Communist-Confucian hybrid view, the leader focuses all efforts on taking care of their followers; the followers then focus all of their efforts on taking care of the leader and the nation. Under this belief, one's identity comes from their nation or community and as long as the community survives, then that person never truly dies.[51] As a policy, Juche encompasses the idea of *chaju*, or independence, in foreign as well as domestic affairs, *charip*, self-sustenance in economic policy, and *chawi*, self-defense, in military affairs.[52] Juche did not remain static as an ideology or policy and evolved under Kim Il-sung's son Kim Jong-il and North Korea's current leader Kim Jong-Un.

Kim Il-sung began grooming his son, Kim Jong-il to assume leadership of North Korea as early as 1974 and in the ensuing twenty years, Kim Jong-il maneuvered himself through the Party apparatus to consolidate his power as well as set conditions for his eventual assumption of leadership of the regime. Kim Jong-il developed the first evolution to his father's Juche policies by adding his own "Songun" or "Army First" policies after assuming the mantle of "Dear Leader" in 1994. Under this policy, military capabilities, including nuclear weapons would be the first priority for research, development, and resourcing.

---

[50] Suh, *Kim Il Sung*, 301.

[51] William Boik, *Understanding the North Korea Problem: Why It Has Become the "Land of Lousy Options,"* The Letort Papers (US Army War College, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2011), 37–39.

[52] Suh, *Kim Il Sung*, 302.

Once again, events in the Soviet Union influenced policy in North Korea. Just as the death of Stalin influenced Juche, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the primary economic and military supporter of North Korea, influenced Kim Jong-il and his Songun policies. Under Songun, the military became the primary contributor to and beneficiary of North Korean economic output. Despite a significant economic downturn resulting from the loss of Soviet aid, sanctions over its emerging nuclear weapons capabilities, famine, and natural disasters, Songun remained a key compliment to Juche, directly influencing North Korean nuclear weapons development to assure the survival of the Kim regime. This combination of international events and domestic troubles further reinforced the leadership and national view that North Korean citizens could only rely upon their own means for survival.[53]

The latest evolution of Juche emerged under the current North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. According to a report provided by the Congressional Research Service entitled "*North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation,*" Kim Jong-un's policy of Byungjin is his attempt to develop and reinforce policies guaranteeing the survival of the regime. Byungjin encompasses two key aspects, first, the development of economic policies to increase the quality of life across the country, further solidifying his domestic support. Secondly, Byungjin policies explicitly pursue strategic nuclear weapons to guarantee regime survival.[54] According to additional Congressional Research Service reports elaborating on Kim Jong-un's policy regarding Byungjin,

[53] Zack Beauchamp, "Why North Korea Claims to Have Cured AIDS and Invented the Hamburger," *Vox*, last modified June 18, 2018, accessed November 29, 2018, https://www.vox.com/world/2018/6/18/17441296/north-korea-propaganda-ideology-juche.

[54] US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation*, 14.

> On April 1, 2013, North Korea's party congress adopted the "Law on Consolidating Position of Nuclear Weapons State." The official media (KCNA) summarized the law as saying that nuclear weapons serve the purpose of deterring and repelling the aggression and attack of the enemy against the DPRK and dealing deadly retaliatory blows at the strongholds of aggression until the world is denuclearized.[55]

With policies established directly supporting North Korea's nuclear weapons development, of particular relevance is the historical aspects of North Korean nuclear weapons development and US led efforts to curb the Kim regime's nuclear ambitions, leading to a sense of isolation similar to Fidel Castro. In the 1950s, Kim Il-sung signed agreements with Moscow and China enabling their support in developing a nuclear research program for energy consumption purposes. North Korea received their first Soviet provided nuclear reactor in 1965. While the US noted the construction of the reactor, assurances from the Soviet Union reduced any sense of alarm regarding the purpose of this type of support. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union agreed to support the construction of a new reactor in North Korea and the United States supported this initiative once North Korea agreed to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1985; in 1986, the reactor at Yongbyon became active.[56]

Dr. Kongdan Oh Hassig, writing for the Institute for Defense Analysis, provided an enlightening history of North Korean nuclear weapons development and its impacts. Dr. Hassig found that Kim Il-sung began initial talks with the Soviet Union for its second nuclear reactor in 1974, ten years prior to construction. In order to secure Soviet support, North Korea joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and agreed to inspections to ensure that the nuclear power produced would be for peaceful, energy production purposes. Because of this agreement, in the early 1980s, the USSR agreed to aid in the construction of four 440-megawatt reactors in order to upgrade the North Korean power grid. To finalize Soviet support, Kim Il-sung agreed to

---

[55] US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress*, by Kathleen J. McInnis, Andrew Feickert, Mark E. Manyin, Steven A. Hildreth, Mary D. Nikitin, and Emma Chanlett-Avery, R44994, November 6, 2017, 9, accessed November 15, 2018, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44994.

[56] Shorr, "The Failure of U.S. Coercive Diplomacy Towards North Korea," 41.

sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, as Dr. Hassig outlined, Kim Il-sung used various strategies to avoid inspection after the Soviets ended their aid and North Korea pulled out of the NPT in 1993 when faced with pressure by the Clinton Administration.[57] Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union did not allow for the completion of any new reactors beyond those in North Korea's possession at the time.

From 1993 through 2006, tensions peeked on multiple occasions as North Korea would agree too, and then withdraw from various agreements to support the Non-proliferation Treaty, the IAEA, and other guarantees to delay or stop their development of nuclear weapons. The events that eventually led to the extreme tensions of 2017 arguably started in 2006. North Korea's first recorded nuclear weapons test occurred in 2006 under the leadership of Kim Jong-il. In 2009, a second nuclear test occurred followed by a third in February 2013 after Kim Jong-il's death in December 2011 and in direct opposition to warnings by China, Russia, the European Union, and the United States.[58] Parallel to their development of nuclear weapons was the development of ballistic missile technology increasing the range and payload capacities of North Korean ballistic missiles, culminating with the 2017 testing of two Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of attacking the continental United States.[59]

Similar to the review of US policies towards Cuba and Castro in the 1950s and early 1960s, it is important to note key diplomatic efforts that emerged in relation to the periods of heightened tensions in response to the Kim regimes' testing of nuclear weapons. According to a Congressional Research Service report from November 2017 titled "*The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress*", two key diplomatic efforts were enacted

[57] Hassig, *Confronting North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions: US Policy Options and Regional Implications*, 2–3.

[58] Jerrold M. Post, "Kim Jong-Un of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," *Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs* (Winter 2016): 62.

[59] US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress*, 44.

in order to provide North Korea with incentives and punitive measures to influence their nuclear weapons program. The first initiative, the Agreed Framework brokered by President William J. Clinton's Administration, became established US policy towards North Korea from 1994 until 2002.[60] The Agreed Framework approach ended under President George W. Bush's Administration in 2002 as he worked towards a more "comprehensive approach". President Bush and his Administration found that the US allowed too many concessions to Kim Jong-il, allowed for North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, and enabled the expulsion of IAEA inspectors from North Korea in 2003.[61]

The Bush Administration brokered the Six-Party Talks, which began in 2003, and emerged as official policy in 2005. The Six-Party Talks between North Korea, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States, ran from 2003 to 2009 and represented a new approach to the North Korean nuclear threat. These discussions provided few concrete results and in October 2006, North Korea actively began testing its nuclear weapons capability.[62] Both the Agreed Framework as well as the Six-Party Talks produced similarly dismal results in regards to denuclearizing North Korea. As noted in a report to Congress, "During both sets of negotiations, in exchange for specific economic and diplomatic gains, North Korea committed to eventual denuclearization, froze nuclear material production, and partially dismantled key facilities. Since withdrawing from the Six-Party Talks in 2009, North Korea has not agreed to return to its past denuclearization pledges."[63]

---

[60] US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress*, 7.

[61] Boik, *Understanding the North Korea Problem: Why It Has Become the "Land of Lousy Options,"* 8.

[62] Ibid., 11.

[63] US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress*, 7.

Since 2009, US diplomatic efforts from both President Barack Obama and President Donald Trump remain focused on increased sanctions and economic pressure to enforce UN Security Council resolutions, referred to as "Strategic Patience."[64] In 2009, North Korea completely withdrew from the Six-Party Talks after announcing a satellite launch in February 2009, masking a test of its intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missile technology, conducted a ballistic missile test in April, a second nuclear test in May, and shorter-range ballistic missile tests in July. Kim Jong-il offered smaller "Four Party Talks" but never fully implemented this initiative, arguably due to his failing health.

In 2010, the North Korean provocation cycle increased again when the Kim regime authorized the sinking of the South Korean naval vessel, the *Cheonan*, killing 46 sailors. North Korea then shelled Yeonpyeong Island on the west coast of the Korean peninsula in response to a South Korean artillery exercise in November, killing four South Korean civilians, and announced that they had built a new uranium enrichment facility.[65]

In 2017, the Trump Administration adopted a policy informally titled "Maximum Pressure." Actions under this policy were an amplification of the Obama era policies of increased economic pressure and included persuading China to intervene along with expanding US missile defense, intelligence, and offensive capabilities tied to the alliances between the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. The Maximum Pressure policy led to the passing of four UN resolutions resulting in increased sanctions against the Kim Jong-un regime and emphasized the options of a preventative US led strike against North Korean nuclear capabilities; echoing

[64] US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress*, 7.

[65] Shorr, "The Failure of U.S. Coercive Diplomacy Towards North Korea," 56.

President Kennedy's options versus Cuba in 1962.[66] Arguably, the Maximum Pressure approach combined with South Korean President Moon Jae-in's outreach to Kim Jong-un and Kim's confidence in his nuclear capability seems to have created the current environment of relative calm and diplomacy resulting from the June 2018 Singapore Summit.[67]

With a better understanding of the policy and historical aspects of the North Korean nuclear weapons program, the focus can now shift to Kim Jong-un and his motivations for nuclear weapons. Much like Castro in 1962, isolation, the need to consolidate his grasp on power, and regime survival are key factors for the North Korean leader. Jerrold Post opened his article titled "Kim Jong-un of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: In the Shadow of his Grandfather and Father" by stating, "One cannot understand the personality and political behavior of Kim Jong-un without placing him in the context of the life and leadership of his grandfather, Kim Il sung and his father, Kim Jong-il."[68]

The policy of Juche, Songsun, and Byungjin has institutionalized the concept of isolation in the national psyche of North Korean leaders and citizens. The secrecy and surprise surrounding the designation of Kim Jong-il's designation of Kim Jong-un as his successor coupled with the mythology surrounding the Kim family embodies the isolation of the North Korean leaders.

Jerrold Post elaborated that, "The aggressive, provocative acts by the DPRK at that time (2008-2011) were probably designed to demonstrate the regime's toughness and pave the way for the dynastic succession."[69] Since assuming leadership of North Korea in 2011, Kim Jong-un has followed similar patterns to his father despite lacking the almost thirty years of grooming that Kim Il-sung provided his son. Kim's purges of supporters of his father's regime, including the

---

[66] US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation*, 4.

[67] Ibid., 5.

[68] Post, "Kim Jong-Un of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," 53.

[69] Ibid., 61.

execution of his uncle, Jang Song-taek, designated by Kim Jong-il as Kim Jong-un's mentor, is similar to his father actions to consolidate power.[70]

Where Kim Jong-un differs from his father and grandfather is in his approach to the domestic population. According to the Congressional Research Service, Kim garners support from his population by depicting, "stylistic changes" and "attempting to seem young and modern and to conjure associations with the 'man of the people' image cultivated by his grandfather Kim Il-Sung, the revered founder of North Korea."[71] Citing the same report, Kim has achieved a limited nuclear deterrent and has pursued better economic opportunities by launching a "charm offensive" to restore better relations with South Korea and China. In addition, he has achieved at least a temporary breakthrough with the United States and therefore created space to negotiate against more punishing sanctions.[72] It is this author's speculation that Kim Jong-un's overseas experience while receiving an education in Switzerland, coupled with a lack of political or military experience, leads perceived insecurities and isolation within his government and a need to consolidate power both within the regime as well as with the population.

With the provided overview of the North Korean nuclear weapons development, Graham Allison's Bureaucratic Politics models as well as Scott D. Sagan's explanations for a nation's pursuit of nuclear weapon are applicable. Using Allison's Bureaucratic Politics model to analyze Kim Jong-un highlights several key factors. As a dynastic leader of North Korea whom was unexpectedly thrust into power while enduring constant US diplomatic and economic pressure, Kim's use of internal purges, portraying himself as a "man of the people", and his aggressive posturing to the international community forces him into bargains and maneuvers to assure regime and national survival. According to the Congressional Research Service and based on the

[70] US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation*, 14.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid.

North Korea's focus on self-reliance and isolation, "Kim's confidence in asserting himself on the world diplomatic stage reinforces the impression that he has consolidated power at the apex of the North Korean regime. Some analysts credit Kim with successfully pursuing a plan to both ensure the survival of his regime but also build up his country's struggling economy."[73]

Kim's realization of his father's and grandfather's nuclear ambitions clearly show that his actions regarding nuclear weapons development was a result (outcome) of his bargaining, maneuvering, and understanding of historic patterns of the United States' removal of regimes opposed to their interests.

Kim Jong-un challenges some aspects Scott D. Sagan's theory on why states build nuclear weapons by following the more conventional norms of using nuclear weapons to offset his aging and arguably increasingly ineffective conventional weapons capabilities. If North Korea maintains its nuclear weapons capacity, then the implication is they no longer have a high level of confidence in their conventional military means to defend the regime. Kim's reliance on nuclear deterrence supports the assumptions that states build or acquire nuclear weapons when they face a military threat they cannot match.

While the strategic nuclear complement to conventional capabilities applies to North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons, they also certainly fit the mold for Sagan's specific security, domestic, and norms models. There is no doubt that a North Korea with nuclear warheads and the capabilities to target the United States deters military actions by the US. Furthermore, possession of nuclear weapons reinforces his economic domestic agenda as displayed by the Byungjin policies. Lastly, Kim has achieved a level of diplomatic influence in the international community unheard of with his father and grandfather, increasing the prestige of Kim Jong-un's leadership.

To highlight the economic aspects of why Kim requires nuclear weapons and reinforce the domestic model aspects of Dr. Sagan's theory, Dr. Hassig highlighted that,

[73] Ibid.

> Its economic weakness is caused by the failure of a socialist command economy and by the financial drain of supporting a large military. The Kim Jong-il regime needs a strong military to deter potential aggressors (of which there have been many in Korea's long history) and control the civilian population. The weaker the economy, the more vulnerable the regime is to foreign aggression and to a dissatisfied citizenry, and therefore the more important is the regime's avowed "military first" policy.[74]

She further states that possession of nuclear weapons provide two key economic purposes for North Korea, "direct sales to other countries or subnational groups, and 'blackmailing' foreign governments into providing economic aid."[75]

Comparisons between Castro and Kim

Graham Allison and Scott Sagan's models explaining why leaders and nations decide to acquire nuclear weapons provide a foundation for comparing and contrasting the Castro and Kim regimes. Using Blair's Bureaucratic Politics model, which focuses on individual leader decisions in relation to foreign policy and Sagan's Security-Domestic-Norms models for acquiring nuclear weapons provides a starting point for forming recommendations to resolve a potential crisis with North Korea.

First, according to the Allison Bureaucratic Politics model, outcomes are the key focus of leaders like Fidel Castro and Kim Jong-un. Those outcomes are the result of overlapping bargains among individuals, and not the organizations, of a national hierarchy. Those individuals determine national behavior and not the institutions that govern a nation.[76] Striking similarities between the Castro and Kim regimes arise within this model. In both cases, outcomes that guaranteed regime survival, economic countermeasures to sanctions, and effective counters to US policy and influence where, and continue to be key objectives.

---

[74] Hassig, *Confronting North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions: US Policy Options and Regional Implications*, 1.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Allison, *Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Rational Policy, Organization Process, and Bureaucratic Politics*, 4.

In both cases, these leaders had limited time in which to consolidate their hold on power both internally as well as externally. In Castro's case, his limited time was driven by the internal factors of establishing a new government while fending off US subversion and overt displays of national power in the region; isolating Cuba geographically and Castro personally. In Kim's case, his limited time to consolidate power was a result of an unexpected and rapid ascension within an existing government framework coupled with purging opposition and creating his own power base. In both nations, survival of the regime remains intrinsically linked to national survival and in North Korea's case, this idea remains ingrained in the national psyche. Van Jackson, in his book *On the Brink: Trump, Kim, and the Threat of Nuclear War*, a 2017 interview was cited in which a member of the North Korean Foreign Ministry stated, "Three million people have volunteered to join the war if necessary . . . in terms of dignity we are the most powerful in the world. We will die in order to protect that dignity and sovereignty."[77]

Reflecting on the bargaining and maneuvering aspects of Allison's model, there is a noted and clear difference between these two leaders in terms of external bargaining. Castro, in recognizing his geographic isolation as well as desire to contribute to the Soviet Union's strategic objectives of communist expansion, willingly embraced external support to guarantee his survival and facilitate national security via nuclear weapons. In North Korea and Kim's case, by the very nature of the Juche, Songun, and Byungjin policies, he is hesitant to reach out to an external patron despite geographic proximity with two key competitors to US influence in the region, China and Russia.

Where Allison's model provides a comparison of individual leaders, Sagan's exploration of why nations pursue nuclear weapons provides additional aspects. In both Cuba's and North Korea's cases, they clearly meet all three of his criteria for strategic nuclear weapons. In

[77] Van Jackson, "Book Excerpt—On the Brink: Trump, Kim, and the Threat of Nuclear War," *The National Interest*, last modified December 13, 2018, accessed December 14, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/book-excerpt%E2%80%94-brink-trump-kim-and-threat-nuclear-war-38642.

accordance with Sagan's model, both countries sought nuclear capabilities for increased security against foreign threats, to advance a domestic agenda for prestige and economic security, and lastly to provide an opportunity for international influence out of proportion to the size and capabilities of either nation; the norms model. Additionally, neither Cuba nor North Korea completely match Sagan's model as strategic weapons additionally served the purpose of offsetting a lack of conventional weapon capability.

Recommendations

Before making recommendations based on comparing the lessons learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis to a nuclear-armed North Korea, critical factors affect any advice to senior leaders. First, now that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, the focus of deterrence must shift from weapons development to deterring their use until North Korean internal reforms occur in accordance with Graham Allison's model. The most prominent reforms would revolve around a gradual opening of North Korean society to outside information and soft power influence, closer economic and diplomatic ties to South Korea, and a lessening of their focus on military first policies. With the exception of South Africa, no country with indigenously developed nuclear weapons capability has willfully given up those weapons. In South Africa's case, a combination of the collapse of Soviet influence in southern Africa coupled with the change from an Apartheid government drove the dismantling of their weapons.[78] Of note, South Africa gave up its nuclear weapons program due to internal changes in policy and not due to external forcing mechanisms. Secondly, any recommendations must encompass both the immediate and long-term conditions in the region to include the contributions of nations such as South Korea, Japan, and China to stabilize tensions diplomatically and economically; particularly in regards to the established government of North Korea.

[78] Greg Myre, "Giving Up Nuclear Weapons: It's Rare, But It's Happened," *NPR*, accessed January 1, 2019, https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/05/08/526078459/giving-up-nuclear-weapons-its-rare-but-its-happened.

Lastly, and potentially most importantly, any recommendations must take into account the extreme levels of national pride within North Korea and the importance of saving face for the Kim regime. The North Korean population has existed under some form of perceived war since the 1930s, either as a conquered people, as a people fighting South Korea and the United Nations, or under the perception of imminent US invasion. In a 1995 interview with journalist Bradley Martin, a North Korean defector stated that, "The problem is, people want war. They believe they are living this hard life because there's going to be a war. They believe they'll die either way, from hunger or war. So the only solution is war."[79] The United States and its allies are facing a long-term information campaign to reverse this image as an invader.

A starting point for dealing with potential crisis with North Korea involves a change to our terminology. Informally, we refer to "off-ramps" during crisis planning, actions to compel an adversary to change their behavior to meet US objectives. In the case of North Korean nuclear weapons informed by lessons learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis, pressure valves may offer a better example. A pressure valve is used to control or limit pressure in a system that may otherwise build up and disrupt or destroy that system. Of importance is that the system is not changed, the pressure vents to an area where it does no harm to the overall mechanism or captures the pressure for future use.

Prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis, US actions against Fidel Castro created extreme pressure compelling him to seek the basing of nuclear weapons on Cuban soil. Removal of US nuclear weapons in Turkey coupled with Soviet guarantees of Cuban security created a pressure valve that addressed the crisis between the Soviet Union and the United States without fundamentally changing the status quo of any of the governments involved; including Cuba. In the case of North Korea, in the near term we must accept any attempts at regime change will potentially result in nuclear weapons use and is not a feasible course of action, similar to the Cuba-US-USSR standoff in 1962. Therefore, we must identify and develop

[79] Jackson, "Book Excerpt—On the Brink."

effective pressure valves that can vent the effects of the Maximum Pressure, Juche, Songun, and Byungjin policies safely while maintaining an overall structure protecting the interests of all involved and facilitating negotiations and reform. Within this complex environment, negotiations must be deliberate and incremental, acknowledging the changes in pace to capture or vent excess pressure while preserving the negotiating structure.

Potentially the best place to emplace a diplomatic pressure valve is through a proxy nation with vital interests for stability. Currently, South Korea seems to be the best candidate for this role and US policy should reinforce South Korean president Moon Jae-in's efforts. If threats to North Korean regime survival and its economy are creating pressure that could reach dangerous levels, then South Korean brokered talks could serve as an effective release valve providing security and economic guarantees while putting a Korean face on potential solutions.

Continuing the discussion of pressure and its impacts, according to Van Jackson, North Korea pursues a dual strategic approach to deterrence and security in response to outside influence. The first is an *imperative to the offense* that purposefully accepts risk in using hostility and aggressiveness to deter adversary actions. The second approach is in *adversarial reputations*. Using a reputational approach, North Korea as a government institution, believes that, "adversaries will judge its future resolve based partly on what it does in the present moment; small actions of toughness or weakness can therefore have exaggerated consequences in the future."[80]

While the Cuban Missile Crisis does not offer an example for countering this offensive and reputational approach, it does reinforce the pressure valve analogy. If we remove or redirect the purpose of the offensive, security and economic purposes North Korea's objectives, then South Korean diplomatic and economic efforts on the peninsula could not

[80] Ibid.

only serve US strategic interests in regards to a nuclear North Korea, but also reinforce a more nuanced "juche" approach that allows the North Korean government to manage its own destiny.

A key lesson learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis was in the importance of maintaining multi-lateral negotiations. According to Phillip Brenner, Castro felt cast aside by his absence from the unilateral negotiations between the United States and USSR. Castro's perceptions were that, "the agreement was seen as an insult to Cuban sovereignty and dignity, as if Cuba were 'a pawn' in a great power chess game."[81] Where Cuba had no credible means to counter this diplomatic slight, North Korea possesses military capabilities to destabilize the region if left out of the negotiating process and forced into scenarios that Kim does not perceive as beneficial. If the United States adopts a Korean approach to addressing nuclear security issues, we must ensure openness with North Korea and Kim Jong-un regarding our intentions. Similarly, a US-North Korea unilateral approach would in all probability, affect both allies and adversaries in the region requiring further discussion to mitigate unforeseen consequences.

In terms of longer-term solutions to relieving tensions in the region, the United States must accept that North Korean government and human rights reform must manifest internally and will take significant time to implement. Recent history provides ample evidence supporting the negative results of attempting to compel reform within a nation. If we attempt to compel reform within the Kim regime, we can expect aroused tensions and reinforcement of North Korea's offensive and adversarial reputation approaches as well as bolstering regional competitor narratives of excessive US influence in Asia. Support to information operations that expose North Korean officials and civilians to South Korean standards of living would in all probability, plant the seeds for future, long-term reform and create pressure valves internal

[81] Brenner, "Cuba and the Missile Crisis," 135.

to the Kim regime and lines of communication at the government level to facilitate strategic communication.

The majority of the provided recommendations focus on diplomatic and economic efforts to relieve pressure, however there is a potential military component that complements long-term efforts in the form of military-to-military contact similar to US efforts with China. Military to military contacts may not create informal communication channels due to the highly centralized nature of the Kim regime; however, it could create impetus for reforms within the North Korean government given the military's extreme influence under the military first policies.

Conclusion

> Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to the choice of either humiliating defeat or a nuclear war.[82]
>
> —President John F. Kennedy

Resumption of direct military hostilities between the United States and North Korea is not a foregone conclusion. Similar to the discovery of nuclear missiles on Cuba in 1962, North Korean nuclear weapons increase the "costs of misperception, miscalculation, and worst-case scenarios."[83] Additionally, nuclear weapons provide North Korea greater options to utilize offensive and adversarial reputation approaches, increasing their unpredictability.[84] Given this type of environment, any future crisis between the United States and North Korea will most likely become a rapidly evolving event with nuclear weapons serving as a means for the Kim regime to influence other nations' courses of action. By taking into consideration the security and economic solutions between the United States and USSR during the Cuban Missile Crisis,

[82] "Commencement Address at American University, Washington, DC, June 10, 1963 | JFK Library," accessed November 15, 2018, https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/american-university-19630610.

[83] Jackson, "Book Excerpt—On the Brink."

[84] Ibid.

pressure valves that relieve tensions while preserving North Korean pride and self-reliance, can rapidly deescalate or avert crisis and potentially affect long-term internal reforms.

Graham Allison's Bureaucratic Politics modeling of leader decision making applies to the centralized decision making authority possessed by both the Castro and Kim regimes. In both cases, the pursuit of nuclear weapons was, and for Kim Jong-un currently remains, a focus for highly personal reasons; to deter US ambitions for regime change, securing a legacy, and solidifying key strategic partnerships. For Cuba and North Korea, the direction of the nation reflects the personalities of their leaders and change occurs when either the leader changes his policies, internal political opponents gain enough power to shift policy, or a third party possesses the influence to ease tensions. In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the USSR was arguably the third party that controlled Fidel Castro; no such prominent third party control has emerged between Kim Jong-un and the United States. However, South Korea clearly displays the potential to fulfill this role and provides the United States with better options than with, for example, China fulfilling the role of the third party. Similarly, the traditional cost-benefit analysis approach of rational actor politics does not apply given Castro's and Kim's outlook of equating leadership with personal survival. By seeking ways and means to ease individual concerns of leaders like Kim Jong-un, there is potential to affect North Korean state policy short of war.

Scott Sagan's reasoning for why states pursuit of nuclear weapons in regards to security, domestic politics, and normative means for foreign policy likewise bears true for both Cuba in 1962 and the current North Korean reasoning. In addition to a lack of conventional military means to win in conflict with the United States and its partners and allies, both Cuba and North Korea are similar in their motivations for pursuing nuclear weapons. In both cases, the stated purpose of nuclear weapons is to maintain security, advance domestic prestige and politics, and to possess international influence beyond that expected of nations of their size geographically and economically. Similar to focusing on the individual leaders in the Allison model, Sagan's reasoning provides multiple lines of effort within the security, domestic politics, and international

norms framework to deter North Korean use of nuclear weapons and influence their internal policies over the long term.

Bibliography

Allison, Graham T. *Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Rational Policy, Organization Process, and Bureaucratic Politics*. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, August 1968.

Allyn, Bruce J., James G. Blight, and David A. Welch. "Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *International Security* 14, no. 3 (1989): 136–172.

Beauchamp, Zack. "Why North Korea Claims to Have Cured AIDS and Invented the Hamburger." *Vox*. Last modified June 18, 2018. Accessed November 29, 2018. https://www.vox.com/world/2018/6/18/17441296/north-korea-propaganda-ideology-juche.

Blight, James G., Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch. *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993.

Boik, William. *Understanding the North Korea Problem: Why It Has Become the "Land of Lousy Options."* The Letort Papers. US Army War College, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2011.

Brenner, Philip. "Cuba and the Missile Crisis." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 22, no. 1 (1990): 115–142.

Delpech, Thérèse. *Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons From the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy*. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2012.

Garthoff, Raymond L. *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 1989.

Hassig, Kongdan O. *Confronting North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions: US Policy Options and Regional Implications*. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2003.

Houghton, David. "Crisis Decision Making in Foreign Policy." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics* (September 26, 2017). Accessed November 14, 2018. http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-403.

Issa, Darrell. "The Lead with Jake Tapper," August 8, 2017. Accessed November 14, 2018. http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1708/08/cg.01.html.

Jackson, Van. "Book Excerpt—On the Brink: Trump, Kim, and the Threat of Nuclear War." *The National Interest*. Last modified December 13, 2018. Accessed December 14, 2018. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/book-excerpt%E2%80%94-brink-trump-kim-and-threat-nuclear-war-38642.

Kaplan, Lawrence S., Ronald D. Landa, and Edward J. Drea. *The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961-1965*. Vol. 5. History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006.

MacDonald, Bruce W. “Looking Back on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 50 Years Later.” *United States Institute of Peace*. Accessed January 8, 2019. https://www.usip.org/publications/2012/10/looking-back-cuban-missile-crisis-50-years-later.

Myre, Greg. “Giving Up Nuclear Weapons: It’s Rare, But It’s Happened.” *NPR*. Accessed January 1, 2019. https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/05/08/526078459/giving-up-nuclear-weapons-its-rare-but-its-happened.

Pickering, Robin R. “Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy: Motivation, Intention, and the Creation of a Crisis.” Humboldt State University, 2006. Accessed November 15, 2018. http://humboldt-dspace.calstate.edu/bitstream/handle/2148/89/Pickering.pdf;sequence=1.

Post, Jerrold M. “Kim Jong-Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” *Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs* (Winter 2016): 53–64.

Roeschley, Jason K. “Nikita Khrushchev, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Aftermath.” *Constructing the Past* 12, no. 1 (2011): 7.

Sagan, Scott. “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb.” *International Security* 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996): 54–86.

Schwarz, Benjamin. “The Real Cuban Missile Crisis.” *The Atlantic*. Last modified January 2, 2013. Accessed November 15, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/01/the-real-cuban-missile-crisis/309190/.

Shorr, Arielle. “The Failure of U.S. Coercive Diplomacy Towards North Korea.” Brandeis University, 2013.

Stern, Sheldon M. *The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005.

Suh, Dae-Sook. *Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1995.

Trump, Donald J. “Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit.” The White House. Accessed November 14, 2018. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/.

US Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations. *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*. 94th Congr., 1st Sess., 1975, S. Rep. 94-465, n.d. Accessed November 15, 2018. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf.

US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. *North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation*. by Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mark E. Manyin, Mary D. Nikitin, Caitlin Campbell, and Wil Mackey, R41259, July 27, 2018. Accessed November 13, 2018. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41259.

———. *The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress*. by Kathleen J. McInnis, Andrew Feickert, Mark E. Manyin, Steven A. Hildreth, Mary D. Nikitin, and Emma Chanlett-Avery, R44994, November 6, 2017. Accessed November 15, 2018. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44994.

"Commencement Address at American University, Washington, DC, June 10, 1963 | JFK Library." Accessed November 15, 2018. https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/american-university-19630610.