NO PEACE TO KEEP: UNITED NATIONS PEACE ENFORCEMENT MISSIONS AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS AND INSURGENCIES



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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

NO PEACE TO KEEP: UNITED NATIONS PEACE ENFORCEMENT MISSIONS AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS AND INSURGENCIES by Major Lawrence J. Richardson, 151 pages.

The United Nation's Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) are actively operating against violent extremist organizations and insurgencies. These threat actors and the tactics, techniques, and procedures they employ are posing significant challenges to the way in which the international community executes peace enforcement operations. This thesis conducts a comparative analysis within a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facility, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) construct of the effectiveness of MINUSMA and AMISOM. Through examination of the information this research determined that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations is not constituted to conduct Peace Enforcement missions against violent extremist organizations or insurgencies.

The analysis of the research did provide recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and potential future United Nations peacekeeping missions.

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ACRONYMS

AU	African Union
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
COIN	Counterinsurgency Operations
СТ	Counter Terrorism
C-VEO	Counter Violent Extremist Organizations
DOD	Department of Defense
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
MINUSMA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSMA MNLA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad
	C C
MNLA	Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad
MNLA MUJAO	Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
MNLA MUJAO PEO	Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa Peace Enforcement Operations
MNLA MUJAO PEO PKO	Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa Peace Enforcement Operations Peacekeeping Operations
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Overview

The Nature of UN peacekeeping is continuously evolving as peacekeeping operations are mandated to perform an ever-growing range of activities. Given the dynamic nature of peacekeeping and the unique challenges that peacekeeping personnel face on an everyday basis, there is a need to ensure that they are adequately equipped with the knowledge, skills, and attitudes required to perform their duties.

-United Nations, Training: A Strategic Investment in UN Peacekeeping

There are currently 14 active peace United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations worldwide. Of those 14 peacekeeping missions seven are on the continent of Africa. The African Union (AU) also has two active peace operations being conducted alongside and with the support of the United Nations. Peace operations by their nature are not easy and the complex environment would challenge even the most experienced military and civilian professionals. The threat actors and instability of the 21st Century has only added more complexity to peace operations. The United Nations speaks extensively on the role of the international community and the United Nations to maintain peace through dialogue or when necessary military means. The United Nations Charter Chapter VI and Chapter VII are referenced repeatedly when people speak of peace operations. Inside of these two chapters specific articles reference the role of the Security Council and the means by which the UN can maintain or enforce peace. Articles 36 and 37 of Chapter VI are most commonly known as the peacekeeping articles and typically will result in a more restrained application of force. Chapter VI missions are commonly thought and employed as a force to maintain a mutually agreed to peace. Chapter VII missions,

however, are linked to articles 41 and 42. Chapter VII missions are referred to as Peace Enforcement missions and these missions authorize coercion in order to restore international peace. Chapter VII missions are much more robust and have more expansive powers to fulfill the mandate. The United Nations has deployed numerous military, police, and civilian formations to increase stability, create peace and stability and support fragile states struggling with internal conflict. Though violent extremist groups, insurgents and terrorists are not a new occurrence these groups are arguably more visible on the world stage. The United States and the rest of the international community are pursuing terrorist groups at a more visible rate since 9/11. The United Nations is no different in facing the challenge of these non-state groups and forces conducting peace operations are being called on to be effective when faced by these dynamic actors.

The AU also contributes to the increase of security and stability through peace operations of its own. The AU however approaches peace operations with a slightly different lens. "The AU's peacekeeping posture in Burundi, Darfur and now Somalia points to the emergence of a different peacekeeping doctrine; instead of waiting for a peace to keep, the AU views peacekeeping as an opportunity to establish peace before keeping it.¹" This mindset sits at odds with standing UN principles, but these two organizations are mutually supporting and simultaneously conducting similar missions. Both organizations also operate alongside one another in the same countries. The AU

¹ Peace and Security Council, *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security: Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence* (PSC/PR/2, (CCCVII), January 9, 2012), 19, accessed 3 March 2018, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/report-au-un-jan2012-eng.pdf.

thus sees the viability of allowing greater authority to conduct non-standard peace operations. Both organizations are facing similar threats and challenges, which means that there potentially is a rising threat.

Given that CT, counter violent extremist organizations (C-VEO), and counter insurgencies (COIN) are becoming more capable and robust the question does arise: is there a fundamental shift in the character of peace operations?

Primary Research Question

With threats to international peace arising from fragile and failed states the United Nations finds itself fighting the same old battle, but with a new more capable threat. Insurgents, extremist and terrorists can take root and infiltrate many ungoverned spaces unopposed. These ungoverned spaces are though truly not ungoverned. Though the central state authority may be weak or non-existent societies always create a system to govern their affairs. The United Nations therefore has deployed military, police, and civilian agents in far-flung corners of Africa in order to facilitate the peaceful resolution of conflict. Many of these locations in of themselves would cause significant challenges due to lack of resources and infrastructure. Add to the equation a lack of security, a lack of governmental control and porous borders that allow the free flow of fighters, weapons, funding to prop up combatants, the challenges can seem insurmountable. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to analyze and provide recommendations for the United Nations and international community on the following question. Is the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations properly constituted to conduct Peace Enforcement Operations against Violent Extremist Organizations in fragile nations that are unable to prosecute Counter Insurgency/Counter Terrorism Operations on their own?

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Secondary Research Questions

In order to answer the primary question of this study, "Is the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations properly constituted to conduct Peace Enforcement Operations against Violent Extremist Organizations in fragile nations that are unable to prosecute Counter Insurgency/Counter Terrorism Operations on their own?" additional supporting questions must be addressed. The secondary questions speak to the legitimacy of the United Nations to operate in these complex environments, the resources to enable a capable peace operations force and what if any inherent additional partnerships would be required.

The secondary questions to be answered in this thesis are:

- 1. Should the Security Council continue to authorize PEOs to conduct operations against asymmetric threats that inherently encompass CT, COIN operations to achieve the mandate?
- 2. What capabilities and additional training would be required to continue to execute mandates against asymmetric threats?
- 3. Should the UN Security Council not mandate the execution of CT and COIN implied missions, but instead require a bilateral agreement with member nations to operate in parallel to the PEO force to provide this capability?

Definitions and Terms

The following key definitions and terms are crucial to understanding peace operations and the complex environment. Understanding the below concepts will allow for a better appreciation of the problem and applicability of recommendations. <u>Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)</u>: AQIM is a Salafi-jihadi group whose senior leaders were trained in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion. A desire to eliminate all non-sharia style governments in northern Africa is what drives the group. The group operates much like its cousins across the world utilizing small ambushes, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), mortar and rocket attacks and other small scale conventional attacks. The group affiliates itself out of convenience with secular groups in northern Mali as well. The group uses trafficking, kidnapping and extortion to fund its operations.²

<u>Al Shabaab</u>: Al-Shabaab serves as the primary threat to the central government in Mogadishu as well as most of southwest Somalia. The group traces its roots to the Union of Islamic Courts that were ousted by the Ethiopian lead invasion in 2006. As the Islamist government in Mogadishu collapsed a transitional government was established. Al-Shabaab however became an active insurgent group that controlled large swathes of Somali territory. The group continuously operates using guerrilla style tactics. The group also provides a viable alternative in the more rural villages to the regional or central government. Unlike many terrorist designated groups Al Shabaab seeks to provide local governmental services and aid to the population. Al-Shabaab as a group is aligned with

² Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Peace Operations Estimate-MINUSMA*, 10 July 2017, 10, accessed October 3, 2017, http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu /default/assets/File/(170710)%20Peacekeeping%20and%20Stability%20Operations%20I nstitute%20MINUSMA%20(Mali)%20Estimate.pdf.

Al Qaeda and seeks to impose sharia law throughout Somalia. The group operates freely outside of major urban centers and has permeated many of the agencies in Mogadishu.³

<u>Al-Mourabitoun</u>: Al-Mourabitoun was created out of a merger of two armed insurgent groups in Mali. The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and The Masked Battalion created Al-Mourabitoun in 2013 and subsequently re-affiliated itself with AQIM. The group is known for their connections to illicit trafficking as well as their links with terrorist groups.⁴

Ansar al Dine: Ansar al Dine is an ethnically Tuareg group that is driven by religious factors. The group from the outset of its creation sought to impose Sharia law throughout Mali, which differed from many of the other Tuareg resistance groups. Originally Ansar al Dine was loosely collaborated with the Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), but in 2016 Ansar al Dine conducted attacks against its former ally. The group captured much of northern Mali in 2012 and was subsequently pushed back after the French and Malian forces moved north in 2013. In 2017, the group announced that it had merged with AQIM.⁵

<u>Counter Terrorism (CT) Operations</u>: [The] activities and operations [that] are taken to neutralize terrorists, their organizations, and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve

³ Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Peace Operations Estimate-MINUSMA*, 10.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

their goals.⁶ CT is composed of multiple actions ranging from Security Force Assistance, offensive operations, defensive operations, raids and other activities that spread along the range of military operations.

<u>Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN)</u>: Comprehensive civilian and military effort designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.⁷ Mali and Somalia both have active insurgencies ongoing and by the virtue of the UN and AU both significantly contributing to the security sector they both must contend with COIN operations.

Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA): The MNLA is a group primarily comprised of ethnic Tuaregs that had served in the Libyan military. After the fall of Qaddafi, the ethnic Tuaregs returned to Mali to fight for separation from the central government in Bamako. The MNLA was aided originally by AQIM aligned groups and MNLA, AQIM, Ansar al Dine, and the MUJAO all worked towards the singular goal of an independent northern Mali. The Islamist groups turned on the MNLA and became the predominate force in the summer of 2012.⁸

<u>Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)</u>: The MUJAO is an Islamist group that sought to impose sharia law in northern Mali. The group traces its

⁶ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-26, *Counterterrorism* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), VII.

⁷ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), IX.

⁸ Michael Shurkin, Stephanie Pezard, and S. Rebecca Zimmerman, *Mali's Next Battle* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2017), 11.

roots to the Gao region of Mali.⁹ The group fought alongside the MNLA, and Ansar Dine during the battles of 2012 through 2013. The group continues to operate in the Gao region and further east by south east. The group remerged with AQIM and affiliates.¹⁰

<u>Peace Enforcement</u>: Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.¹¹ Peace Enforcement missions are commonly referred to as UN Chapter VII missions.

<u>Peace Operations</u>: Peace Operations (PO) are crisis response and limited contingency operations, and normally include international efforts and military missions to contain conflict, redress peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. PO may be conducted under the sponsorship of the United Nations, another intergovernmental organization (IGO)[NATO], within the coalition of agreeing nations or unilaterally.¹²

<u>Peacekeeping</u>: Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long

⁹ Shurken, Pezard, and Zimmerman, *Mali's Next Battle*, 11.

¹⁰ Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Peace Operations Estimate-MINUSMA*, 10.

¹¹ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3, *Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), viii.

¹² Ibid., vii.

term political settlement.¹³ Peacekeeping is commonly referred to as a UN Chapter VI mission.

Stability Actions: Stabilization is the process by which military and nonmilitary actors collectively apply various instruments of national power to address drivers of conflict, foster host-nation resiliencies, and create conditions that enable sustainable peace and security.¹⁴ United Nations POs inherently conduct stability actions in order to create, restore, enforce, or ensure peace, "although peace enforcement operations often involve major combat operations...efforts often involve stabilization."¹⁵ The United Nations is fundamentally a diplomatic organization with civilian leadership. The military forces always support the diplomatic efforts of UN personnel. Instability or the lack of stability, "is the symptom of a political crisis rooted in how political power is distributed and wielded, and by whom. To help resolve the situation, stabilization efforts seek to reshape the relationships within the indigenous populations and institutions, the different communities that make up the Host Nation populace, and the elites competing for power."¹⁶

<u>United Nations Chapter VI (UN Chap. VI)</u>: UN Chap. VI provides for the legal authority to conduct Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Specifically, Chap. VI Article 37 bullet 2, "If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact

¹³ CJCS, JP 3-07.3, viii.

¹⁴ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, *Stability* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), IX.

¹⁵ Ibid., XVII.

¹⁶ Ibid., X.

likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.¹⁷

<u>United Nations Chapter VII (UN Chap. VII)</u>: UN Chap. VII is commonly referred to as the legal authority to conduct Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO). Specifically, Chap. VII Article 42 states that, "Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations."¹⁸

<u>United Nations Chapter VIII (UN Chap VIII)</u>: UN Chap. VIII provides the legal authority, with consent and mandate by the United Nations Security Council, for regional organizations to use force for the restoration of peace (e.g. AU in Somalia). Specifically, Article 53 bullet 1, "The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement of action under its authority. But no

¹⁷ United Nations (UN), "Chapter VI: Pacific Settlements of Dispute," in *United Nations Charter*, 1945, accessed 8 September 2017, http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html, Article 37.

¹⁸ United Nations (UN), "Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," in *United Nations Charter*, 1945, accessed 8 September 2017, http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html.

enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.¹⁹"

<u>United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Peacekeeping</u>: The UN uses the term Multidimensional peacekeeping to cover the wide-ranging operations a force may have to conduct. The multidimensional peacekeeping terminology allows the force to provide security as well as work on political reconciliation, protection of civilians, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the protection of human rights and the rule of law.²⁰ The utilization of *multidimensional stabilization peacekeeping* allows the UNSC flexibility when assigning tasks in the mandate that are expected to be executed in the field.

Limitations and Delimitations

There are a series of limitations on this project that cannot be addressed due to lack of availability. One of the limitations that directly impact this research is the numerous reports and studies that exist but cannot be referenced or accessed due to classification levels higher than strictly unclassified. This limitation is mitigated as the researcher has read, co-authored and authored some of these restricted releasable reports so the research is still informed by an understanding of the dynamics on the ground. Many of the members of the United Nations provide additional forces and services with

¹⁹ United Nations (UN), "Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements," in *United Nations Charter*, 1945, accessed 8 September 2017, http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html.

²⁰ United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping, "What's Peacekeeping," accessed 17 September 2017, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml.

caveats that cannot be explored thoroughly due to security considerations. Therefore, all reference to specific activities, organizations and functions currently operating or with potential to operate will be referred to in general terms as to not violate operational security. Additionally, the research will be limited to document research and interviews as the access to Mali and Somalia at the writing of this study is not achievable. The access limitation is mitigated by the fact that the researcher has significant experience in Africa, Mali and Somalia. For the sake of this thesis the researcher has placed a main delimitation on the study. The study will focus on the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in order to identify commonalities, differences and potential solutions to similar problem sets. For the sake of this study the thesis will also focus mainly on military activities and not on the political dynamics of ongoing peace talks.

The study will also focus on the unique dynamics that drive the actors and forces in Africa. This is due in part to the fact that the researcher is more familiar with the AFRICOM security dilemmas and the limited time for research necessitates an emphasis on Africa. Though the study focuses on the ongoing operations in Mali and Somalia the context and research does have relevance to other operational environments. In addition to recommendations for ongoing missions this study hopes to provide insight for the future conduct of peace operations in high intensity conflict zones.

Significance

The appreciation of the role the United States plays in the United Nations, understanding peace operations, the effectiveness of peace operations, the evolving threats, the impacts on US doctrine and potential future missions underpins the significance of this research. Currently the United States contributes 28.4 percent of the \$6.8 billion allocated for UN peacekeeping. That means that the United States is contributing roughly \$1.9 billion directly to the UN to deploy, employ, and sustain international peace operations. This does not take into account the billions that are spent by the United States bilaterally to train, equip and assist in the deployment of our partners. The United States and by default the US Department of Defense have a vested interest in the success of the United Nations and peace operations.

Peace Operations are by their nature complex missions that test the capabilities of all organizations. The United Nations however is particularly tested due to its operational model and the inherent difficulty of multinational operations. Arguably one of the core functions of the UN is to be capable of conducting peace operations and due to this, attempts must be made to heighten the odds of their success. The US military may be required to conduct COIN, CT and peace operations to assist the UN in these the complex environments. Understanding the challenges currently facing UN forces allows for the US to be better prepared in the eventuality of having to conduct POs.

The effectiveness of POs is tied directly to understanding the operating environment and being able to adapt to deal with complex threats. Due to the ungoverned spaces throughout Africa many threat actors have been able to seek refuge and grow in capability. These groups are benefiting from the porous borders that surround them and the ease of which acquiring arms enables increased capacity. The interconnected world has also allowed the free flow of information, tactics, techniques, and procedures that proved so successful against the United States and its partners. UN forces are now facing the same dynamic threats and ingenious foes that the US faces around the world. Since the US and its allies cannot be everywhere the importance of having a viable partner in the United Nations takes on increased importance to combat violent extremists, terrorists, and insurgents.

"The nature of peacekeeping itself has become more complicated in contrast to its early days of monitoring, observation, and interposition."²¹ The UN was created out of the cessation of hostilities of the Second World War. The Cold War that followed between the US and Soviet Union saw UN peacekeeping missions as mainly performing observer missions. According to the Brahimi report the UN peacekeeping mandates, "mostly had traditional ceasefire-monitoring mandates." With the conclusion of the Cold War the UN saw itself deploying more into countries and regions that were suffering from intra-state conflict with no settlement of grievances.²² As we look to Africa there have been 28 peacekeeping operations deployed to the continent and of those 21 were in the midst of active civil conflict.²³ Somalia in the 1990s, the Democratic Republic of Congo UN mission (MINUSCO), missions in the Central African Republic, Darfur and Mali have seen a host nation whose central government is weak. Though there are many drivers of the conflict and instability one thing is certain, the warring factions are better

²¹ Joachim A., Koops, Norrie Macqueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul D. Williams, eds., *The Oxford Handbook to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 7.

²² United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report, A/55/305)*, August 2000, 5, accessed 18 September 2017, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/report-of-panel-united-nations-peace-operationsbrahimi-report-a55305.

²³ Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon, "Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting," *American Political Science Review* 108, no. 4 (November 2014): 737-753.

armed and equipped than they used to be. Mali for example suffers from a central government that is unable to project force into the north nor is it capable of securing its borders. Northern Mali is home to traditional trade routes that the local Tuaregs know intimately. With the collapse of Libya in 2011 North Africa was flooded with looted weapon stockpiles from the Gaddafi regime. Now an ethnic group, the Tuaregs, who had consistently sought freedom from Bamako returned to Mali with weapons comparable to the central government.

Somalia equally suffered from a collapsed government that led to the proliferation of arms throughout the country. As Mogadishu lost control of the country in the 90s to competing war lords many of the groups used traditional smuggling routes to fund and equip themselves. Each region in Somalia established a regional authority drawing legitimacy from clan and ethnic dynamics. The regional forces filled the void left by the central government thus creating militias that rivaled any of the forces still aligned with Mogadishu. The regional administrations actively participated in smuggling and piracy to ensure solvency, which allowed the groups to tap into illicit trade routes. These routes allowed for the free flow of arms and fighters. The black-market routes in Somalia traverse west linking into central and northern Africa.

The trade routes from the Horn of Africa link-in to the trade routes in central Africa via Kenya and Ethiopia and then into north Africa. The proliferation of arms paired with extensive smuggling routes has enabled the numerous groups operating across the continent that seek to overthrow governments through insurgencies. Some insurgent groups have increasingly used terrorist tactics to advance their goals, which has caused a blurring of lines between a traditional insurgency and transregional terrorist

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groups.²⁴ In addition to the indigenous groups that operate in the fragile states of Africa a new breed of combatant is finding safe haven. Ideologically based terrorist groups have migrated due to pressure from military operations in other regions. This is seen by IS attempted expansion into northern Africa and eastern Africa from forces relocated from the Middle East. As the Islamic State grew in the Middle East, African groups like Boko Haram declared their allegiance to increase their profile, increase recruiting, but also secure an additional funding stream. Northern Africa saw Islamic State emissaries arrive to expand the group's footprint and this was demonstrated with the Islamic State's seizure of Sirte in Libya. East Africa also saw IS attempt to establish a base of operations in Somalia, but there the group has proven less successful due to Al Shabaab's relative strength. The expansion of the Islamic State pushed Al Qaeda affiliates especially in Mali further south towards Bamako. These two groups now compete with one another for supremacy, which is turn brings them more into conflict with peacekeepers who are seen as viable targets to increase either group's credibility. The Islamic State and Al Qaeda have been able to find refuge in the ungoverned spaces of countries throughout Africa. This ungoverned space and weak central state authority has led to many states' challenges with securing borders.

Insurgent groups and VEOs are successful because of their ability to take advantage of porous borders. In 2015 the High-level independent panel on Peace Operations identified that terrorist groups, extremist groups, along with illicit trafficking

²⁴ International Peace Institute, "UN Peace Operations in Violent and Asymmetric Threat Environments" (Roundtable, March 2016), accessed 28 December 2017, https://www.ipinst.org/2016/03/peace-ops-asymmetric-environments.

groups are using globalization to spread weapons, funds, and funds across state lines and into conflict zones.²⁵ Belligerents are now not as easily identifiable as they once were because insurgents and terrorists operate amongst the population and are able to blend in. These actors along with identified belligerents are also increasingly serving as what the Brahimi report refers to as "spoilers." These "spoilers," according to the report seek to undermine any peace plan even if they are signatories.²⁶

The proliferation of these groups simultaneously with fragile or weak governance has led to the UN and the AU increasingly deploying peacekeepers. These POs forces are facing complex threats and operating environments. The tactics observed throughout Iraq and Afghanistan are manifesting themselves in Africa as well. Suicide bombings and IEDs are particularly challenging to UN peacekeepers either due to lack of training or the fact they are essentially party to the conflict now.²⁷ UN and AU peacekeepers are also increasingly being confronted by threats that seek out civilian gathering locations in order to conduct assaults and result in a maximum number of casualties. This was seen in Bamako at the Radisson Blu attack and numerous attacks against cafes in Mogadishu. 2016 saw an attack on a hotel popular with UN staff and foreigners in Burkina Faso's

²⁵ United Nations General Assembly Security Council (UNSC), *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations*, A/70/95-S/2015/446, June 2015, 19, accessed 20 December 2017, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/446.

²⁶ UN Peacekeeping, Brahimi Report, A/55/305, 4.

²⁷ Paul D. Williams, *Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa*, Council Special Report No. 73 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, May 2015), 10.

capital Ouagadougou that resulted in 29 fatalities.²⁸ Burkina Faso saw a similar attack against a restaurant in August 2017 that led to the deaths of over 18. Ouagadougou experienced another coordinated attack against multiple locations in 2018 against the French Embassy, Burkinabe Army Headquarters, and a cultural center. VEOs attacking population gathering locations or governmental facilities is not unique. Peacekeepers must face the reality that when deployed into countries like Mali and Somalia they may become first responders.

Of the new Peace Operations, "patterns have emerged: the number of peacekeepers, missions, and budgets is constantly on the rise."²⁹ The increase in missions and the evolving threat has led to the need for "partnership peacekeeping" in order to set conditions and enable peace operations.³⁰ Granted peace operations are a tool to set conditions for peaceful resolution of conflict. The problem is that recently the tool has been used in place of a strategy that cannot actively end the conflict.³¹ Mali demonstrates how the armed groups are so intermingled with the terrorist groups that there is practically no way to ensure a peace can be maintained. The blurring of lines between belligerents paired against a UN force that is stretched thin means that even the tool is inadequate. "The bottom line is that the current peace agreement is a necessary condition

²⁸ Nadia Khomani, "Burkina Faso Hotel Attack: 18 Nationalities Among Dead," *The Guardian*, 16 January 2016, accessed 22 April 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/15/security-forces-battle-suspected-jihadists-in-burkina-faso-capital.

²⁹ Williams, Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa, 6.

³⁰ Ibid., 7.

³¹ Ibid., 8.

to improving security in the North, but it is not a sufficient one," according to the 2015 Rand study.³² If a peace agreement cannot hold then the UN peacekeepers must perform a role more robust than a traditional peacekeeping Chapter VI mandate. MINUSMA continues to operate as a Chapter VII mandate and Bamako still struggles to project force outside of population centers and almost projects no force north of Gao or Timbuktu. In 2014 the most substantial force operating outside of Bamako was the United Nations and the French, which means these forces are inherently on the front lines and little has changed since 2014.³³

Somalia is little better than Mali. There continue to be large swaths of the country that the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) does not control. AMISOM forces equally struggle to project force far from their outposts. AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA)³⁴ consistently face IEDs along their patrol routes. Mortars continue to sporadically rain down on AMISOM and SNA locations throughout the country. AMISOM has faced much stiffer resistance than MINUSMA and consistently the AU forces have faced an enemy willing to conduct coordinated attacks in mass. AMISOM though technically a peacekeeping mission more closely resembles an active

³² Shurkin, Pezard, and Zimmerman, *Mali's Next Battle*, 47.

³³ United Nations General Assembly Security Council (UNSC), S/PV/7274, 7274th Meeting, 8 October 2014, 3, accessed 30 December 2017, http://undocs.org/S/PV.7274.

³⁴ The modern day Somali National Army commonly referred to as the SNA is not to be confused with the Somalia National Alliance which was associated with the Habr Gidr clan under Mohamed Farah Aideed.

combat mission conducting what arguably would be considered stability, COIN, and CT operations.

Both locations as well as many others around Africa are stretched thin in personnel, logistical capabilities, medical evacuation capabilities and combat capabilities. Many of the UN peace operations, but particularly MINUSMA and similarly AMISOM, face the challenge of vast supply lines that are insecure, which means they are vulnerable to disruption.³⁵ A study by Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman and Megan Shannon shows through analysis that an increase in the deployment level of UN peacekeepers drives down the casualties in there "Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting," which was released in 2014. Though their statistics show a significant drop in causalities with an increase in troops; the capability of those troops and the command/logistics structure supporting them struggles to keep up. Mali and Somalia are both vast countries and the forces just simply do not have the ability to be everywhere to deny safe havens. Even if the force numbers for Mali and Somalia specifically were increased the command, control, logistics, and support capabilities would only be stressed further. To address these gaps both locations have parallel bilateral forces operating near them that in turn provide occasional support. In Mali, the French have task Force Barkhane. Likewise, in Somalia numerous bilateral agreements exist with AMISOM and the FGS respectively. This partnership peacekeeping may not be required for future complex peace operations, but as for now they have demonstrated a level of increased effectiveness.

³⁵ UNSC, S/PV/7274, 21.



Figure 1. MINUSMA Deployment Map

Source: United Nations Geospatial Information, "MINUSMA Deployment Map," accessed 12 September 2017, http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic /map/dpko/MINUSMA.pdf.

The Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2100 on 25 April 2013. With UNSCR 2100 MINUSMA was set up in Bamako on 1 July 2013. The mandate for MINUSMA has been renewed each subsequent year with increasing authority to conduct operations to further resolve the conflict and reassert the authority of the central government in Bamako.³⁶

MINUSMA started as an Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) mission conducted in tandem with a French led intervention in January 2013. The intervention came on the heels of a coup d' etat led by the military that toppled the government in Bamako, Mali. The coup only further emboldened secessionist movements in the north of Mali. These separatist movements and a growing influence from extremist entities began to push their control further south. Initially the strongest group was a coalition of former Gaddafi military officers of Tuareg descent. In Libya, the Tuaregs found a supportive benefactor who armed, trained, promoted, and made it an integral part of the military structure. After the Gaddafi regime collapsed these now unemployed Tuareg military leaders returned to their native lands in northern Mali. The north of Mali and the southern part of the country had generally lived together in relative peace, but there was and remains a level of tension. This tension was created by the general neglect that Bamako and the political elite paid to the north. The return of the Tuaregs and the general lack of perceived basic needs that Bamako should provide created the conditions for the creation of separatist groups. Though there are several groups operating in northern Mali, the MNLA is the primary actor leading the secessionist movement.

The MNLA capitalized on the coup taking place in Bamako and the shift in focus of the new government to capture large parts of northern Mali. On 6 April 2012, the

³⁶ Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Peace Operations Estimate-MINUSMA*, 3.

MNLA declared independence from Bamako. The MNLA however was not the only group operating in the north of Mali. Multiple Islamic extremist groups began to increase their influence. AQIM, Ansar al Dine, and the MUJAO began to contest MNLA for control and eventually wrested whole areas from the Tuareg movements. With a growing power base and proven effectiveness these Islamic groups began to control most of northern Mali. Though hard to prove, experts believe many of the secessionist groups and Islamic extremist groups share the same members. The constant fluid nature of the cooperation between these groups has confounded the peace process.

With the increased concern of Islamic terrorism and the Tuareg separatist movements the AU and ECOWAS decided to deploy a peace operations force. The AU and ECOWAS force was called the African-led international Support Mission in Mali. The UN gave its explicit support and approval to the AU mission with UNSCR 2085, though the UN Secretary-General seemed unconvinced with the plans put forward by the AU.³⁷ The AU deployed AFISMA six months after the UN authorized the deployment under a Chapter VII mandate. With the slow deployment of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) the Islamic groups in the north only cemented their control.

In January 2013 the extremist groups in the north launched another offensive and secured the town of Konna.³⁸ Konna is roughly 70 kilometers away from Mopti a significant city in the center of the "neck of Mali." With the capture of Konna and

³⁷ Koops et al., *The Oxford Handbook to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 858.

³⁸ Ibid.

continuing the drive south the government in Bamako felt threatened. The government in Bamako requested Paris to lead an intervention to wrest control away from the terrorist groups. On 11 January 2013 the French Operation Serval was launched to recapture the cities and towns lost to the Islamic groups. The French with the Malian defense and Security Forces (MDSF), and with the support of the government of Chad pushed the Islamic groups out of the major population centers.³⁹

On 29 January 2013 the first AFISMA troops arrived. In March 2013, the UN Secretariat office provided the UN Security Council (UNSC) with options to turn AFSIMA into a UN-led peace operation. In July 2013 AFISMA became MINUSMA. The UN authorized the French to serve as a parallel force in order to continue combatting the Islamic terrorist groups. The UN allowed in the MINUSMA mandate that French troops involved in Operation Serval could "intervene in support of MINUSMA when [there are] imminent and serious threat upon the request of the Secretary-General."⁴⁰ MINUSMA found itself deploying troops to all parts of the country north of Mopti. The government in Bamako however had little ability or the forces available to project power to remote areas like Tessalit, Kidal, Manaka, and Aghalhok or other isolated areas. North of Gao and Timbuktu MINUSMA found itself as almost the sole guarantor of security. The UN forces and the French became the focus of attacks by the MNLA and Islamic

³⁹ Koops et al., *The Oxford Handbook to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 859.

⁴⁰ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Resolution 2100 (2013), 6952nd Meeting, 25 April 2013, Paragraph 18, accessed 30 September 2017, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/documents/mali%20_2100_E_.pd f.

groups. The MNLA though would occasionally also fight against MUJAO and Ansa Dine.

This put MINUSMA in the position of being closely linked with Bamako. As such the grievances of the local communities towards the central government were naturally projected on the peacekeepers. Though a Chapter VII does not require impartiality per se MINUSMA did begin to suffer from a lack of being seen as an honest arbiter between the communities and Bamako.⁴¹ This relationship only further justified in the minds of the numerous combatants the righteousness in attacking the UN. MINUSMA began to operate in a semi-permissive or outright hostile environment. Given the far-flung nature of many of the population centers that MINUSMA sought to secure the force headquarters deployed many troop contributing countries to austere locations. Northern Mali suffers from a lack of infrastructure. Roads simply do not exist in many areas in the north. The lack of infrastructure linked with the sheer distances spanned meant that resupply was a major operation in of itself. The routes for resupply are mainly unimproved or simply tracks through the desert. Sustainment in and of itself would be difficult given the conditions of northern Mali, but with hostile groups, who are intimately familiar with the territory, the danger of interdiction by them increases. There are numerous reasons why ground movement to support the UN outposts is challenging, and this will be covered later. The simple answer to address this was to use air platforms for the delivery of supplies, medical evacuation, and to serve in combat roles. Aerial

⁴¹ Lotte Vermeij, "MINUSMA: Challenges on the Ground" (Policy Brief 19, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2015), 2, accessed 21 December 2017, https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/id/365203/NUPI_PB_Vermeij.pdf.

resupply posed its own challenges to MINUSMA. Aerial medical evacuation also continues to pose problems for the force. Chapter 4 will demonstrate how aviation assets for resupply, close combat attack, and aero medical evacuation are of particular importance to MINUSMA.

The UN's decision to deploy forces to such austere locations meant that large percentages of contingents were committed to executing sustainment operations. MINUSMA in executing its mandate to assist in the establishment of security, reassertion of central government authority and protecting civilians meant that the force essentially needed to be everywhere. The need for the UN forces to be everywhere necessitated a majority of the troops simply trying to sustain the isolated locations of its garrisons. MINUSMA has addressed some of the logistical and medical shortfalls through its robust relationship with the French. The French forces operate in parallel to MINUSMA and helped create the conditions for MINUSMA's deployment originally. The ongoing French mission has also adapted over time.

The French Serval mission evolved into Operation Barkhane, which now has a regional Sahel approach to CT. This has meant a reduced troop presence dedicated to Mali, which obviously impacts the effectiveness of MINUSMA. MINUSMA suffers from a number of tactical and operational problems, that will be discussed in subsequent chapters, plaguing the troop contributing countries.

Due to the increased threats and challenges facing the force, MINUSMA's mandate continues to evolve increasingly becoming more robust, which in turn asks more from the commanders and troops on the ground. The UNSC adopted Resolution 2364 on 29 June 2017 and notable to the renewed mandate is specific task of countering

asymmetric attacks. Contained in UNSCR 2364 bullet *(d)* of the mandate reads; "In pursuit of its priorities and active defense of its mandate, to anticipate and deter threats and to take robust and active steps to counter asymmetric attacks against civilians or United Nations personnel, to ensure prompt and effective responses to threats of violence against civilians and to prevent a return of armed elements to those areas, engaging in direct operations pursuant only to serious and credible threat."⁴² The authorization to deter and take actions against asymmetric threats, laid out in the mandate, makes MINUSMA the only peace operation of the 16 with such broad permissions.⁴³

This mandate now requires MINUSMA to navigate a fine line between providing security and implementing the mandate to further increase the effectiveness of political reconciliation with the separatist movements.⁴⁴ But at same time, MINUSMA's mandate requires the force to take action against the terrorist and insurgent groups who blend in with the same separatist groups. MINUSMA is also attempting to perform stability activities in some of the most austere locations in the world. All of this means that MINUSMA is facing unique challenges and conducting missions with which the UN is unfamiliar with.

⁴² United Nation Security Council (UNSC), Resolution 2364 (2017), 7991st Meeting, 29 June 2017, 9, accessed 11 October 2017, http://undocs.org/S/RES/2364(2017).

⁴³ Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Peace Operations Estimate-MINUSMA*, 3.

⁴⁴ Koops et al., *The Oxford Handbook to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 863.
MINUSMA is facing not an altogether dissimilar challenge and threat facing the AMISOM forces in Somalia. AMISOM has faced many of the political, military and terrorist challenges that have proved daunting for MINUSMA. Somalia has only recently begun to turn the corner towards political stability though the new government in Mogadishu is still fragile. AMISOM has been a key contributor to the progress of Somalia, and the lessons learned could prove beneficial to the UN.

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)



Figure 2. Somalia Map and International Partner Headquarters

Source: United Nations Geospatial Information, "Map No. 4528," July 2015, accessed 13 October 2017, http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads /2015/11/gpor_map_somalia_july_2015_990x1303.jpg.

AMISOM was established in January 2007 in order to address the rampant insecurity throughout Somalia. The lack of governance and protracted conflict for over 15 years throughout Somalia led to rampant violence and acendancy of warlords deriving power through the inter-clan conflict. The UN has been involved in Somalia since 1992 after the overthrow of the Barre government in Mogadishu.⁴⁵ Ethiopia, Somalia's largest neighbor, and Somalia have a history of clashes dating back to the 1970s. In 2006 the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) came to power overthrowing a weak UN backed Somali Transitional Federal Government. The ascendency of the ICU led Ethiopia to intervene militarily due to its concern over having an extreme Islamist run government as a neighbor. Al-Shabaab is a hard line group that traces its roots to the ICU and began an insurgency after the ICU collapsed. The AU Peace and Security Council created AMISOM in January 2007. The UNSC authorized AMISOM in Febuary 2007 under Chapter 8 with Chapter 7, peace enforcement, authority.

AMISOM began offensive operations in 2010 in order to begin seizing key population centers.⁴⁶

To support AMISOM the UNSC established UN Support Office for AMISOM in 2009 as field support mission only. Initially the AU intended a UN peacekeeping force to

⁴⁵ Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Peace Operations Estimate-AMISOM*, 1 April 2017, accessed October 3, 2017, http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu /default/assets/File/(170401)%20Peacekeeping%20and%20Stability%20Operations%20I nstitute%20AMISOM_UNSOM%20(Somalia)%20Estimate.pdf.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

deploy in order to relieve AMISOM or "rehat" AMISOM much like MINUSMA.⁴⁷ The UNSC however decided against the transfer from AMISOM to a pure UN peace operation. Instead the UNSC further reinforced the logistical support provided to AMISOM through UNSOA. UNSOA transitioned to a full political mission under UNSCR 2102 to the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM).

In 2012 the FGS was stood up in Mogadishu. Somalia is a very clan driven society and the country contains regional administrative areas that typically wield more power than Mogadishu can ever hope to exert. In the north Mogadishu is challenged by Somaliland, which is seccessionist and very minimally interacts with the FGS. In the northeast region known as Puntland the Puntland Administrative Authority is autonomous and participates with the FGS to the extent it sees benefit. Puntland, though autonomous, has been supportive of the FGS in the past couple of years. Puntland also serves as an example of a regional administration that provides all the functions of a government with an effective security force. In the southwest Somalia, clan dynamic and tribal friction create less functional administrations. The notable exception is in the southern part of Somalia known as Jubaland. The Jubaland administration's seat of power, located in Kismayo, provides a steady income base due to the deep sea port. Jubaland is also considered a strong agricultural location. The major limiting factor, however, is that Jubaland has a small security force, which struggles to exert control outside of the major population center of Kismayo. This has enabled Al Shabaab to control the Juba river, which allows the group to essentially lock down the bread basket

⁴⁷ Center on International Cooperation, *Global Peace Operations Review: Annual Compilation 2013* (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2014), 39.

of Somalia. AMISOM has a strong presence in Kismayo and other key population centers in the south. AU forces are also arrayed along the main supply routes that connect Mogadishu to the regional administartions. These supply routes though cannot be fully secured by AMISOM, and the SNA lacks the capability to serve as a viable partner throughout the entre countryside. AMISOM now performs a mainly security and policing role simultaenously trying to increase FGS capacity.

AMISOM was originally intended to conduct offensive operations against Al Shabaab. By AMISOM conducting offensive operations the FGS would be provided space and time to retrain, equip and deploy the SNA brigades that existed. The FGS struggled and continues to slowly field and equip capable security forces. AMISOM's mandate has continued to be renewed in order to conduct offensive operations against Al-Shabaab, secure population centers, secure key supply routes, protect civilians, create condictions for the SNA to provide security, mentor SNA formations, and even operate jointly with the SNA to name a few.⁴⁸ AMISOM however has found itself overextended much like MINUSMA. AMISOM has been challenged in being able to work jointly with the SNA formations that exist outside of major population centers. As AMISOM is over extended and lacks as of yet a fully capable partner in the SNA this in turn allows Al Shabaab to exert control over many rural areas. AMISOM and the SNA control little out of major population centers and they share major road networks with Al Shabaab due to their inability to secure main supply routes. The lack of security means Al Shabaab does not lack a steady stream of income from the many towns, villages, checkpoints, tolls and

⁴⁸ Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, AMISOM, 3.

other illict trade which it still operates freely away from Mogadishu. Al Shabaab is still very capable with regards to its ability to conduct ambushes, complex attacks, targeted assisinations, and implanting IEDs to further degrade AMISOM and SNA effectiveness.

AMISOM however has made great strides with regards to providing security and combatting Al-Shabaab. The tasks AMISOM is performing mirror the tasks the US and its partners have been performing in Iraq and Afghanistan. The COIN, CT, stability activities and advise and assist missions have challenged AMISOM. These missions teamed with the sheer distances that has required AMISOM to be in far-flung areas has demanded a lot from the peace operations forces.

Conclusion

The United Nations is increasingly wrestling with more complex and dynamic environments as it attempts to address conflict zones around the world. Though MINUSMA is a unique mission the challenges the mission faces are ubiquitous in many conflict zones today. As the UN continues to authorize the MINUSMA mandate and support AMISOM it will have to adapt to the changing security environment. The UN must also address whether or not it wishes to continue to authorize PEOs like MINUSMA in the future. This study will attempt to provide recommendations and observations for the evolving threats UN personnel face. This study will attempt to answer whether the UN should operate against VEOs in fragile or failed states and if decides to send a PEO force the unique considerations that should be taken into account.

Chapter 2 deals with the literature utilized for this research. The literature review will provide a firm understanding on the past work addressing peace operations. The review will provide for a general overview of the history of United Nations peacekeeping and reform initiatives. The literature review will also cover general concepts of COIN, CT, Stabilization actions and applicability to MINUSMA and AMISOM. Finally, the next chapter will demonstrate, that though the body of work is extensive on the UN peace operations, little work has been done to draw a linkage between POs, COIN, CT and stabilization to increase capabilities.

The next chapter will allow for an informed discussion on the primary question: "Should the United Nations conduct Peace Enforcement Operations against Violent Extremist Organizations in fragile nations that are unable to prosecute Counter Insurgency/Counter Terrorism Operations?" The secondary questions and the potential answers they provide will get to the heart of whether or not the US or even the UN should tread down the path of performing arguably more robust peace operations.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Diplomacy is utterly useless when there is no force behind it. —Theodore Roosevelt

This thesis will attempt to provide recommendations on the new challenges facing UN PEOs. Asymmetric threats and actors pose a significant capability gap to current UN peace enforcement forces. These asymmetric threats are consistently evolving and requiring the UN to question how should it conduct PEOs and how far is it willing to go to enforce UNSCR mandates. Increasingly the United Nations has been called upon to deploy peace operations forces around the world. Though the locations vary recent UN missions find themselves dropped in an environment where the host nation is fragile. This fragility, lack of governance, poor governance, and wide swaths of ungoverned spaces means the UN faces challenges to its operational approach. The environment however also provides refuges to violent groups who seek to undermine, destroy, or replace the host nation government. With the ever-increasing interconnectivity of human societies these disparate groups are capable of recruiting, funding and sharing knowledge. The knowledge shared has greatly increased the combat capability and threats of these nonstate actors. Increasingly UN forces as well as other multilateral or unilateral headquarters are facing non-state actors who espouse radical ideology. Unlike other times in the UN's history these groups do not wish to be a part of the resolution process. The only resolution for them is the complete disintegration of the government. Across Africa, Violent Extremist Organizations are growing, collaborating, and becoming more

aggressive. Unfortunately, the UN finds itself already arrayed across terrain that is facing an adaptive threat. Though the UN must and is adapting to the environment on the ground in Mali it is indicative of the fact that the future likely will involve more scenarios not unlike what MINUSMA is facing now. As the UN looks to potentially tackle such environments to restore peace in security in the future it begs the question on whether or not the UN should empower its missions to conduct operations that would degrade the ability of VEOs from creating instability and insecurity.

Chapter 2 will annotate the past academic, governmental, and non-governmental reports and studies that inform the execution of peace operations. Crucial to understanding the primary question and answering it will be to demonstrate how the UN can achieve success against the growing threats. Chapter 2 is arrayed to provide the legal justification of conducting peace operations, current doctrine for conducting peace operations, what stabilization activities really are and how CT and COIN nest within these activities. Finally, the literature review will clearly provide linkages through all of the doctrine, legal authorities, and previous studies to demonstrate the need for and capabilities required to enable the UN.

United Nations Charter

The purpose of the United Nations is clearly stated in Article 1 of the United Nations Charter.

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and

international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.⁴⁹

The United Nations Charter provides the authority to conduct peace operations. Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter describes the authority to conduct what is commonly referred to as peacekeeping missions, the means by which the UN can take to resolve a dispute peacefully. Articles 33-38 speak to the authority of the UN to participate in any dispute that is, "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.⁵⁰ As one reads through the articles it becomes clear that the UN primarily encourages, enables and supports the settlement of disputes peacefully. This is done through facilitating the communication, settlement, and support of mutually agreed resolutions. The Security Council does have the ability to take action and is laid out in Article 37 of Chapter VI.

If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.⁵¹

Peacekeeping operations are commonly referred to as Chapter VI mandates and missions. Articles 33-38 provide guidance and justification for deploying personnel to address a given dispute. Peacekeeping forces have limited mandates and are restricted in the activities they may perform. Peacekeeping however is not the only type of operation

⁴⁹ United Nations (UN), "Chapter I: Purposes and Principles," in *United Nations Charter*, 1945, accessed 8 September 2017, www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html, Article 1.

⁵⁰ United Nations (UN), "Chapter VI," Article 33.

⁵¹ UN, *United Nations Charter*, Chapter VI, Article 37.

that the UN may mandate the deployment of. Chapter VII of the UN Charter speaks to a more robust mechanism that may be necessary for the restoration of international peace and security. Organized from Articles 39-51, Chapter VII is referenced when a Peace Enforcement mandate is implemented and forces are deployed. The Articles 39, 41 and 42 provide the legal justification for the UN to impose non-military and military means to, "maintain or restore international peace and security.⁵² The purpose of this study will be reinforced specifically via Article 42. As illustrated in chapter 1 of this study, the primary question "Should the United Nations conduct Peace Enforcement Operations against Violent Extremist Organizations in fragile nations that are unable to prosecute Counter Insurgency and Counter Insurgency Operations?", facilitated the creation and answering of three secondary questions. Secondary question #1 is addressed by Article 42.

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.⁵³

Clearly Article 42 provides for the legal justification to empower an UN Peace Enforcement force, if given such a mandate, to conduct C-VEO by way of COIN and CT operations. Upon reading Article 42 the language is vague, but stating "as may be necessary" clearly places the onus on the Security Council to decide what necessary steps are worth taking. The Security Council provides the international community and the UN

⁵² UN, United Nations Charter, "Chapter VII," Article 39.

⁵³ Ibid., Article 42.

Secretariat with the steps it deems necessary through the issuance of a mandate. The mandate is thought of as an Operations Orders/Commander's Vision within the military community or more simply the mandate instructs the UN Secretariat to take actions as prescribed by the mandate to restore security. Though most immediately conjure up peacekeeping for all peace operations, there is a clear distinction between peacekeeping (UN Chapter VI) missions and peace enforcement (UN Chapter VII) missions.

PKOs fundamentally happen after belligerents have either entered into a truce or have begun peace negotiations. A PKO force enters a nation at the invitation of the host nation and the warring parties. Consent, impartiality, legitimacy, restrain and minimum use of force are fundamentals to PKOs.⁵⁴ PEOs however do not require the invitation or consent of the host nation and thus may be required to forcibly separate belligerents or conduct combat operations in order to achieve access to the area of operations.⁵⁵ The potential need for a PEO force to be capable of conducting full scale combat operations means that it also must be prepared to conduct all the subordinate tasks to ensure success. Full scale combat operations inherently must transition at some point to conducting stability operations.

PEOs are designed to set the conditions for the host nation's civil governance and ability to provide security through local law enforcement agencies.⁵⁶ If the intent is for the force performing peace operations to transition functions of security to local civilian

- ⁵⁵ Ibid., Chapter III-1.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid., Chapter III-3.

⁵⁴ CJCS, JP 3-07.3, Chapter II-1.

control then inherently the force must conduct stabilization operations. Stabilization operations include a myriad of tasks and the PEO mandate will authorize the protection of civilians, protection, and re-establishment of the host nation's authority.

United Nations Peacekeeping Doctrine

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Guidelines: The UN Peacekeeping Operations Guidelines serves as the capstone doctrinal document for peacekeeping operations. A thorough understanding is a requisite to properly appreciate the guiding principles, key concepts, methodologies, and scope of United Nations peace operations. The document lays out the principles that form the core of peacekeeping operations. The guidelines provide a UN perspective on the history of UN peacekeeping missions and how they have essentially become a tool without being explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter.⁵⁷ Chapter 1 of the guidelines provides a clear description of how the Security Council links the act of deploying peacekeepers and the mandate associated with the deployment to the United Nations Charter. The UN document continues to discuss the changing character of peacekeeping, which provides insights from the UN perspective on the role peacekeeping can play. Chapter II provides for the basic principles that UN peacekeeping holds itself to in order to execute Security Council mandates. Section II discusses the planning process for the deployment and execution of peacekeeping operations. The remainder of the document serves to illustrate the what the UN believes

⁵⁷ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO), *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 2008, 13, accessed September 8, 2017, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/united-nations-peacekeeping-operations-principles-and-guidelines-the-capstone-doctrine/.

is necessary to successfully implement a given mandate. The value of the document to this study is it provide a baseline of understanding as to where peacekeeping originated and the basic tenets. The guidelines were produced prior to the execution of MINUSMA, and there are glaring discrepancies between MINUSMA's deployment and execution with the basic principles, which will be discussed further throughout this study. The guidelines still are necessary to this study in order to understand the thinking behind peacekeeping.

United Nations Force Headquarters Handbook: The Force Headquarters Handbook is crucial to this study as it provides the leading doctrine on the role, responsibilities, types, structures, staff functions, and relationships the military force inside a peacekeeping mission provides. To thoroughly understand how MINUSMA's military component is structured and the methods by which it operates the handbook is required. The handbook provides clarification on the differing types of mission command structures the UN uses and its scalable headquarters depending on the size of the mission. The handbook also provides for an understanding as the staff functions and how they are intended to operate in relation to the mandate, one-another, and other UN or non-UN agencies. Of specific interest to this study is how a multidimensional force structure like MINUSMA is designed to deal with "spoilers" to effective mandate implementation as described by the handbook.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO), *United Nations Force Headquarters Handbook*, November 2014, 28, accessed December 21, 2017, http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/89596.

United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual Volumes I and II: The UN infantry battalion serves as the primary peacekeeping formation deployed in multidimensional peacekeeping operations.⁵⁹ The two manuals provide for the functions, roles, structure, and manning standards for UN infantry battalions. The volumes also discuss the equipment that should be associated with each infantry battalion as well as the training all units should receive. These volumes provide insights into the basic level of capability that infantry battalions deploying in support of UN missions should be able to bring to bear in theater. The UN manuals and task organization however are recommendations, which with this understanding also provides insights into the way in which troop contributing countries provide formations to UN missions and with what capabilities they tend to provide.

United Nations Military Special Forces Manual: The United Nations Special Forces Manual contributes to this study the thinking the UN has behind the role of special forces in the conduct of peacekeeping. The manual provides overarching concepts of what skills and task special forces should bring to the force commander. This is understanding is important as there are UN special forces deployed from NATO countries that are directly inside the chain of command of the force commander. Special forces also have unique tasks and skills that the UN believes are particularly suited to special forces. MINUSMA and AMISOM both are deployed against a number of threats, but insurgents and terrorists are key components of those threats. Understanding the limits of what the

⁵⁹ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO), *United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual Volume 1*, August 2012, 177, accessed 26 December 2017, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/UNIBAM.Vol.I.pdf.

UN believes special forces are useful for provides for potential capability gaps or solution development recommendations in the future of such dynamic multidimensional missions.

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Operational Readiness Guidelines: The operational readiness guidelines were published in 2016 and lay out the basic skills that all personnel deploying to a UN mission must possess. This document also lays out the tasks infantry and non-infantry units must train on and be certified as completing prior to arrival in theater. These guidelines are crucial to this study because it lays out what the UN believes is necessary for units to be successful in a mission are. These guidelines provide a basis from which this study can begin to assess the efficacy of UN peacekeepers to the tasks of COIN, CT, and stability activities. If this study discovers that there are training and capability gaps in the effectiveness of UN forces the knowledge and information provided by the guidelines allows for a first step at addressing capability gaps.

US DOD Doctrine

Joint Publication 3-07 Stability Operations: Joint Publication 3-07 provides for a common understanding and definition of stability operations as well as the components of stability operations. JP 3-07 defines stabilization as the process by which military and nonmilitary actors collectively apply various instruments to address drivers of conflict and enable sustainable peace and security.⁶⁰Security serves as one of the functions of stability operations and links actions performed under COIN and CT operations.

⁶⁰ CJCS, JP 3-07, IX.

Joint Publication 3-07.3 Peace Operations: Joint Publication 3-07.3 establishes a common definition of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations as authorized by the UN. JP 3-07.3 also describes the 15 fundamentals of peace operations which are: consent, impartiality, transparency, credibility, freedom of movement, flexibility and adaptability, civil-military harmonization and cooperation, restraint and minimum force, objective/end state, perseverance, unity of effort, legitimacy, security, mutual respect and cultural awareness, and current and sufficient intelligence.⁶¹ JP 3-07.3 provides this study a basis to understand the planning considerations, employment, legal authorizations, fundamentals of each specific type of peace operation, tasks, and command relationships. The joint publication on peace operations also demonstrates how peace operations support stabilization activities eventually leading to peace operations forces redeployment.

Joint Publication 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*: Joint Publication 3-24 is used in this thesis in order to establish a common understanding of the definition of COIN and the elements that make up COIN. COIN is defined as a comprehensive civilian and military effort to defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.⁶² The secular and non-secular groups operating in Mali are insurgencies that use terror as a tool in order to achieve their aims. Al Shabaab also is an insurgency and seeks the overthrow of the government in Mogadishu. Both MINUSMA and AMISOM are by their existence and operations to defeat, counter, and hinder the threats facing them conducting COIN. The

⁶¹ CJCS, JP 3-07.3, IX.

⁶² CJCS, JP 3-24, 1-2.

UNSC has mandated that both forces provide security and further enable the host nation to exert control. Using JP 3-24 for this study enables a clear understanding of some of the necessary steps that must be executed by both MINUSMA and AMISOM.

Joint Publication 3-26 Counterterrorism establishes the United States Department of Defense (DOD) definition for CT operations as well as the aspects that make up CT. The joint publication defines terrorism as the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political.⁶³ Terrorism is a tactic and not an ideology per se, but both Mali and Somalia suffer numerous terrorism incidents and many are targeting the peace enforcement operations as represented by MINUSMA and AMISOM. JP 3-26 defines CT as the activities conducted to neutralize terrorists, their organizations, and networks making them incapable of coercion of governments and societies to achieve their objectives.⁶⁴ The joint publication also discusses the fundamentals of CT operations and the function CT performs across the range of military operations. CT can be conducted in conjunction with limited contingency operations, which Joint Publication 3-0 classifies peace operations as limited contingency operations.⁶⁵ Though the UNSCR does not specifically state that MINUSMA should conduct CT operations it does however state that MINUSMA should

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ CJCS, JP 3-26, II-3.

⁶³ CJCS, JP 3-26, 1-5.

employ what the United Nations calls "active defense".⁶⁶ In countering asymmetric threats MINUSMA is expected to, "anticipate and deter threats and to take robust and active steps to counter asymmetric attacks against civilians or United Nations personnel."⁶⁷ Later in the same paragraph the mandate instructs MINUSMA to prevent the return of armed elements and to engage in "direct operations...to serious and credible threats."⁶⁸ This would lead to the conclusion that MINUSMA is authorized to conduct CT operations, though this has been and continues to be debated at the policy level.⁶⁹ AMISOM does conduct CT operations, specifically the Ugandan reconnaissance formation, in and around Lower Shabelle. JP 3-26 specifically states that peace operations should be prepared to conduct CT operations as CT against spoilers does not run counter to the fundamental of impartiality.⁷⁰ Finally, CT operations span everything from providing training to host nation and intelligence collection to kinetic strikes, which this thesis will demonstrate is already being conducted by MINUSMA and AMISOM.

Mali and Somalia are strong examples how stability operations occur in parallel with COIN and CT operations. Both examples also demonstrate how a PEO finds itself in the midst of needing to possess all the skills and resources to conduct stabilization, CT and COIN. The nature of peacekeeping is changing and has been changing since the

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid., II-6.

⁶⁶ UNSC, Resolution 2364 (2017), Paragraph 20, Bullet (d).

⁶⁹ John Karlsrud "Towards UN Counterterrorism Operations?," *Third World Quarterly* 38, no. 6 (2017): 1223, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2016.1268907.

earliest days of the United Nations. Global terrorism seeks havens amongst the turmoil caused between a fragile state and poor governance and the disenfranchised populations who seek to redress their grievances. Mali and modern-day Somalia did not appear overnight and the nature of the challenges that PO forces face has progressively grown more dangerous.

Peace Operations Literature

Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. A/55/305, S/2000/809: On 21 August 2000, the United Nations released a report that is today commonly referred to as the Brahimi Report. The Brahimi Report provides this study a background on how the United Nations sees the challenges facing peace operations into the future. This provides a baseline of understanding the political mindset and general willingness the UN officially states it has with the conduct of more complex peace operations. The Brahimi Report is recognized as one of the leading documents one should read for understanding the United Nation's role in peace operations. The report in 2000 recognized that with a new century the UN would face new challenges and a growing responsibility. The Brahimi report clearly laid out that the era of traditional peacekeeping and monitoring was no longer the rule. Globalization was identified as a factor in spreading instability as well as the complex tasks that the UNSC asked of peacekeepers almost always meant that the increased complexity directly correlated to the threat.⁷¹

The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: The Oxford handbook was used for this thesis in order to gain an overview of all the peace operations

⁷¹ UN Peacekeeping, Brahimi Report, A/55/305, 3.

conducted by the UN from 1947 to 2013. The handbook also allows for identifying how peace operations have evolved from their initial implementation and the challenges facing peace operations forces. The Oxford handbook lays out five challenges facing the UN and its role in conducting peace operations. The authors of the Oxford handbook state that firstly the member states of the UN lack the will to stand behind the peacekeepers once they are deployed into these complex situations.⁷² The editors go on to explain that the UN institutional structure is ill-suited to conducting large multidimensional and multinational operations, the current environment has become more complicated, overly high expectations on the level of success the forces can have and finally, debates about the effectiveness and inherent flaws of peacekeeping in the global security governance.⁷³

With the above documents serving as a base an entire library has been written about all the facets of peace operations and the role of the UN and other international organizations. For the purposes of this study all the literature used centers around the evolving nature of peacekeeping, the evolving threats, "robust peacekeeping," what the UN terms "asymmetric threats" and combatting those threats, AU approaches and lessons learned, the unique challenges facing MINUSMA, and finally multilateral/parallel peace operations. The following is a list of such references:

The Global Peace Operations Review 2013: The Global Peace Operations Review for 2013 provides an analysis of both Mali and Somalia. This document also compares

⁷² Koops et al, *The Oxford Handbook to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 7.

⁷³ Ibid.

the commonalities between Mali, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the chapter covering the changing aspects of peace operations. This study provides for a side by side comparison of the challenges facing the UN in the conduct of peace operations. The study discusses the similarities between the French invasion in Mali and the deployment of the Rapid Intervention Brigade in DRC. The study also discusses how the UN came to take up the missions in DRC and Mali and that has informed its actions with regards to Somalia. The study provides insight into the cautiousness and trepidation the UNSC had with regards to its interventions in Mali and DRC.⁷⁴ The 2013 review also discusses how the UN leadership is addressing the use of force in peace operations. This chapter is crucial to this study as it discusses how UN leadership should frame the use of force and how the use of force can be nested inside the political objectives of UN POs. Finally, the report offers notes on peace operations around the world and highlighting specific challenges facing the respective missions.

Global Peace Operations Review 2015: The annual Global Peace Operations Review compilation for 2015 is used for this study in order to further develop an understanding on how the UN has trended towards more forceful measures to implement their prescribed mandates. The 2015 provides trend analysis on how political pressure is being applied for PO forces to increase the use force, but also how is works. The study further attempts to address this more robust enforcement of the mandate taxes the sustainment capability of the UN, which undercuts the forces' effectiveness. The 2015 review also addresses the innovations taking place in peace operations by enhancing

⁷⁴ Center on International Cooperation, *Global Peace Operations Review* (2013),18.

intelligence, surveillance detection, attack aviation, and unmanned aerial aircraft in order to more properly combat the asymmetric threats facing UN troop contributing countries.

Global Peace Operations Review 2016: The 2016 Global Peace Operations Review is used in this study in order to inform on the challenges in deploying combat power to UN PEOs and PKOs. This study addresses the challenges the UN has had to deploy combat power Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central Africa Republic, and South Sudan. Understanding the difficulty the UN faces to deploy forces into heavily contested areas, with little infrastructure, speaks to the potential capability gap in the UN to operate in austere locations with limited infrastructure. This capability gap directly impacts this thesis as violent extremist organizations (VEOs) tend to thrive in areas where the government and by extension the UN struggle to operate and deploy. This study was also used for this thesis because it analyzes if there is a point at which the UN should walk away. The question of whether the UN should walk away informs this thesis because if the UN can identify that a PEO would need to conduct COIN or CT, which implies mission perseverance and potentially at odds with impartiality or legitimacy, should the UN rightly decide to not execute a mission that may at its core be intractable. Finally, the 2016 review is used for this thesis as it discusses the relationship and necessary cooperation between the UN and the AU, and what lessons can be learned from the AU approach to countering violent extremism and addressing instability.

2015 Rand study on Mali's CT capabilities: The 2015 Rand study on the central government in Bamako's capability to combat the terrorist and insurgent groups in northern Mali directly speaks to the threats this thesis addresses. The Rand study also goes on to analyze and discuss the challenges that have plagued the UN and how the

asymmetric threats in northern Mali are a symptom of the larger problem throughout the Sahel region of Africa. This thesis attempts to draw on the analysis of this Rand study to better inform the necessary equipment and capability gaps that would be necessary in order to combat VEOs whose tactics mimic those throughout the middle east.

This thesis also will draw heavily on the writings and publications of Paul D. Williams, John Karlsrud, and Cedric Coning. These writers have written articles and studies specifically addressing challenges of UN POs and the execution in Africa. All three of the above mentioned writers also specifically address this thesis' primary and secondary questions as their works speak towards the emerging threats facing UN POs, the mandates and authorities under which these PEOs operate, and the capability gaps that currently face the PEOs in Mali and Somalia. These writers also compare Mali to the other PEOs in CAR and DRC, and though not specifically addressed in this thesis the analysis does help inform on the spectrum of conflict PEOs are facing in regards to asymmetric threats and capability gaps even when not specifically fighting against VEOs.

The Paul D. Williams' works used most importantly for this thesis are "*Peace Operations in Africa: Lessons Learned Since 2000*" and "*Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa*" as published by the Council on Foreign Relations. Paul Williams also contributed to the Global Peace Operations Review studies used for this thesis addressed above. Paul Williams co-authored with Abdirashid Hashi the "*Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somalia*" which is used in this thesis to understand how the AU has conducted its PEO in Somalia and the continued challenges ahead. Paul Williams also co-authored another works critical to this thesis in "The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia" which was written with Walter Lotze. This writing helps identify lessons learned, capability gaps, and the applicability when conducting a PEO against VEO, which requires conducting CT and COIN operations.

The most crucial John Karlsrud work is "The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali" published in 2015. This study further describes the political process that led the UN to establish PEOs in the Mali, CAR, and DRC and the implications those decisions had and continue to have on the execution of PEOs against asymmetric threats and the level of force necessary to be successful.

Finally, the Cedric de Coning study on "*Peace enforcement in Africa: Doctrinal distinctions between the African Union and United Nations*" is used in this thesis as it addresses doctrinal requirements, personnel, lessons learned, and helps inform the necessity of a parallel force to operate alongside a PEO to counter asymmetric threats. annually publishes articles compiled that speak to the current issues concerning PO forces.

Conclusion

The focus of this chapter was to draw attention to the past writings on peace operations, stability operations, CT, and COIN operations. Most of the United States doctrine and United Nations publications lay out theoretical considerations for the conduct of POs. The purpose of this study is not to utilize past research in order to advocate for increased POs or increasing the amount of personnel in POs. Rather this study is designed to identify potential capabilities that would be needed if the UN decides to establish a peace operation force in another country like Mali or Somalia. Additionally, this study will continue to focus on MINSUMA in Mali and AMISOM and Somalia as they both serve as arguably two of the most complex peace operations currently ongoing. In order to identify the unique capabilities and authorizations that may be needed for future peace operations in environments that share similarities with Mali and Somalia this study will provide case studies of both operations. These case studies and the comparison will illustrate commonalities and lessons learned that can be applied to: the authorization, mission requirements, mission tasks to be conducted, force creation, training, equipping, deployment, sustainment, and objectives for future peace operations.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this research is to answer the primary research question, "Is the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations properly constituted to conduct Peace Enforcement Operations against Violent Extremist Organizations in fragile nations that are unable to prosecute Counter Insurgency/Counter Terrorism Operations on their own?" as well as the secondary questions necessary to support the overall assessment. My research methodology will consist of qualitative document analysis. I will analyze scholarly, peer-reviewed, and authoritative texts both directly and indirectly related to peace operations with a focus in Africa.

The methodology will then compare the United Nations mission in Mali, MINUSMA, with the AU mission in Somalia, AMISOM. This study will compare MINUSMA and AMISOM as they are both peace enforcement missions whose primary tasks are centered on stability activities, COIN, and CT activities. From the comparison, the study will then determine lessons learned and applicability for peace enforcement missions. Finally, this study will use aspects of the US military Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) construct to determine if UN missions are structured and possess the resident capacity and capability to conduct missions in which stability activities, COIN, and CT play a crucial role. The DOTMLPF-P analysis will also identify potential capability gaps and help in the identification of mitigation measures for the shortfalls if any are discovered.

Aspects of Comparison

This study will identify commonalities between MINUSMA and AMISOM by using available literature, interviews, and a case study that are provided in chapter 4. The study will encompass the establishment of MINUSMA in 2013 through current operations and the establishment of AMISOM in 2007 to current operations. The case studies will focus primarily on the military aspects of peace enforcement in order to identify the common tasks and skills applied to deal with the threats. Chapter 1 and chapter 2 have already established the legal authority for the UN to conduct COIN and CT in the execution of a UNSCR/mandate. The case study and comparison will strive to identify those skills and tasks that would be necessary if the UN chooses to assume another mission in the vein of MINUSMA. The case studies will also demonstrate through necessary skills and tasks aspects that the UN should consider prior to a mandate which encompasses stability, COIN, and CT activities against VEOs in failed or fragile states.

Aspects of DOTMLPF-P

This study will address aspects of DOTMLPF-P in order to clearly answer the primary and secondary research questions. This study will take current US DOD doctrine, which the UN has leaned heavily on to develop its own doctrine, to identify potential gaps in UN doctrine. This study will not address facilities or policy to answer the primary research questions. The UN has robust facilities when operating in missions that can support combat personnel. Even in austere locations the UN has demonstrated the ability to construct effective camps that can be used to conduct operations. This study has also already established that the UN has the legal authority to conduct missions in the vein of MINUSMA. The literature review has also demonstrated that though the UN may publically be skeptical of missions as robust as MINUSMA and AMISOM the Security Council continues to demonstrate, as a matter of policy, its willingness to continue execution of the missions through the renewal and expansion of the mandates. This study will primarily focus on the Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, and Personnel aspects of DOTMLPF-P.

Organization is identified as a critical aspect to answer the primary and secondary questions as the type of military formations the UN requests and receives directly impacts on the ability to implement the mandate. The study will seek to identify if the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations is structured to conduct COIN, CT, and stability activities. Through the analysis of the DPKO structure it will also identify if current UN military formations are the most ideal for stability, COIN, and CT operations. Understanding the niche skills sets of certain formations can directly contribute to mission success.

Training is another aspect of DOTMLPF-P that is crucial to successful implementation of the mandate as defeating threats like those faced in Mali and Somalia is a mission that must be specifically trained for. This study will identify the skills Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) should be trained to conduct as a part of peace operations against VEOs. This study will also demonstrate how programs like those run through the US DOD Global Peace Operations Initiative, the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program, and the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership program can train TCCs for the dynamic threats faced scenarios akin to MINUSMA and AMISOM.

Material and equipment will be analyzed in this study to identify what equipment is best suited for missions like MINUSMA and AMISOM. This study will also strive to determine what equipment should be used to match the average training of UN TCCs. Maintenance of equipment and material also plays a central role in the sustainability of UN missions. The common occurrence of heavy vehicles that require extensive logistical support may prove to become more of a hindrance to TCCs than an enabler [MRAPs vs light trucks sustainable on local economy]. This study will seek to address the necessary role rotary and fixed wing aircraft play when supporting forces in far flung and austere environments [make sure to address the training for ground TCCs to better use the capabilities of helos for MEDEVAC, CCA etc.]. This study will also identify emerging technology and crucial equipment that UN missions would need due to the unique requirements of operations against VEOs [drones, SIGINT, etc.].

This study will strive to identify the key leadership attributes that are required to be successful against VEOs or when conducting stability, COIN, and CT operations. The solicitation and employment of personnel with the requisite education and leadership is crucial. This study will identify traits and attributes that should be sought out to aid in the successful execution of PEOs especially as military personnel serve as supporting officers inside the UN structure.

Finally, this study will address the general personnel issues that should be addressed in order to be successful in MINUSMA or AMISOM style missions. The type of personnel and the quantity of personnel necessary is critical when conducting CT and COIN operations. Stability operations also will require personnel with unique skill sets that may not be easily trained and cannot be trained effectively especially in mission or on the job.

Conclusion

The goal of using this type of research methodology is to provide a thorough context of the problems facing UN forces if the Security Council decides to authorize another mission in which stability, COIN, and CT activities will be a crucial aspect. The context and framing of the problem will be provided through the case studies of the United Nations mission in Mali, MINUSMA, and that of the AU mission in Somalia, AMISOM in chapter 4. These two case studies will then identify common aspects to each mission and how peace enforcement operations are currently called upon to conduct stability, COIN, and CT tasks. The lessons learned and common aspects will then be grouped by organization, training, material, leadership, or personnel in order to determine potential solutions to capability gaps in chapter 4. This will all lead to the synthesis and recommendations and conclusions in chapter 5, which will then address the primary and secondary research questions.

CHAPTER 4

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Introduction

This study has attempted to provide context and background as to the changing character of peace operations as well as the increasing complexity the operational environment has on the execution of peace operations. The purpose of this study is to single out specifically that peace operations in areas plagued by insurgent and terrorist activities are facing an evolving threat. The threat caused by insurgent, transnational groups and terrorists have been classified by the UN as a particular and malignant threat to international peace and security.⁷⁵ This chapter of the study will further analyze the specific peace operations being executed by the United Nations (UN) in Mali and the AU operation in Somalia. The UN's MINUSMA began in 2013 and has faced an ever evolving threat to current day. Simultaneously, the UN is supporting the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as it attempts to support the fledgling government in Mogadishu. Both missions are similar in that they are operating in countries with poor infrastructure, weak governance, a history of violence and ethnic rivalries, and both missions are facing insurgent and terrorist groups. These groups are referred to as "spoilers" by the United Nations and this term is used typically associated with groups that utilize asymmetric tactics against peacekeepers.⁷⁶ The following case studies of MINUSMA and AMISOM will be centered around providing examples of the threats and

⁷⁵ UNSC, A/70/95-S/2015/466, 19.

⁷⁶ UNSC, S/PV/7274, 3.

examples of tactics used by the violent extremist organizations operating against the peace operations forces. At the conclusion of each case study the facts presented will be compared against the aspects of DOTMLPF-P as identified in chapter 3; Organization, Training, Material/Equipment, Leadership, and Personnel, in order to identify capability gaps or positive lessons learned. As both missions suffer from numerous incidents a year it would be impossible to analyze each one. This study is merely demonstrating through the presentation of incidents, spanning all years in each mission, that the threat actors facing MINUSMA and AMISOM pose a significant challenge to the conduct of peace operations. In the following case studies, it will be demonstrated that the violent extremist groups operating in Mali and Somalia are using similar tactics, techniques and procedures considered asymmetric by the United Nations.⁷⁷

<u>The Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization</u> <u>Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)</u>

The deployment of the MINUSMA traces its roots to the French and AU intervention in 2013. A military coup broke out in Bamako in March of 2012 and these events led to the eventual deployment of African regional forces.⁷⁸ The political instability in Bamako provided the opportunity for ethnic tensions in the north to boil over. As the new government in Bamako worked to consolidate its position the tribes in the north began to push south eventually seizing Kidal, Gao, Timbuktu, and other smaller towns. In response to the offensive from the north, France began a military operation to

⁷⁷ UN DPKO, United Nations Force Headquarters Handbook, 1.

⁷⁸ Koops et al., *The Oxford Handbook to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 855.

restore Malian governmental authority in the recently lost territory in January of 2013.⁷⁹ The AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed a peace support operation to coincide with the French operation, which established the African-led international Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). AFISMA would eventually be re-hatted as MINUSMA and expanded under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2100 on 1 July 2013.⁸⁰

AFISMA was turned into a United Nations mission at the request of the transitional government in Bamako as well with support from France.⁸¹ The decision to deploy a multidimensional integrated stabilization mission came as the UN Security Council was given the option of providing a multidimensional integrated political presence to work alongside AFISMA or the option of deploying a multidimensional integrated mission under a Chapter VII mandate with a parallel military force.⁸² MINUSMA's mandate fell under a Chapter VII deployment with key tasks of stabilizing key population centers, reasserting state authority, protection of civilians and UN personnel, protect human rights, support humanitarian assistance, support cultural preservation, and support international justice.⁸³ France's military force originally operating under the name Serval, which later transitioned to Barkhane with a more

- ⁸¹ Ibid., 858.
- ⁸² Ibid., 859.
- ⁸³ Ibid., 860.

⁷⁹ Koops et al., *The Oxford Handbook to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 855.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 854.

regional approach, was authorized to serve as a parallel force to MINUSMA by the Security Council.⁸⁴

MINUSMA found itself immediately at a disadvantage upon assuming control of the mission as northern Mali lacks substantial infrastructure and at the time of assumption the AFISMA troops in country were operating below the standards of the UN.⁸⁵ MINUSMA has also struggled to reach its authorized military personnel strength.⁸⁶ The challenge to provide for enough personnel was further exacerbated when the Security Council expanded MINUSMA's presence beyond the population centers of Gao and Timbuktu, in order to further provide for protection of civilians further north.⁸⁷The UN Security Council, through Resolution 2227, in June of 2015 authorized MINUSMA 11,240 military personnel and 1,440 police personnel. As of 1 April 2016 MINUSMA had 10,320 military personnel and 1,105 police personnel with 91.96 percent and 95.25 percent respectively deployed in regions.⁸⁸ In October 2017 MINUSMA had reached 11,231 contingent troops and 1,745 police, which with teamed with the remaining UN staff brings the current number of deployed UN personnel to 14,865.⁸⁹ MINUSMA as of

⁸⁴ UNSC, Resolution 2100 (2013), Paragraph 18.

⁸⁵ Koops et al., *The Oxford Handbook to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 861.

⁸⁶ Vermeij, "MINUSMA: Challenges on the Ground," 2.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ United Nations (UN), "Fact Sheet: MINUSMA," accessed 24 December 2017, https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/fact-sheets.

⁸⁹ United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping, "MINUSMA Factsheet," accessed 28 December 2017, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma.

October 2017 is authorized 15,209 military personnel, which includes police as well.⁹⁰ It has not been demonstrated that the amount of personnel on the ground addresses the issue of capacity which MINUSMA faces in order to implement its robust mandate.⁹¹

MINUSMA also implemented the Modular U-Staff construct for operations in Mali. The UN adopted the multidimensional integrated staff construct in order to increase communication, synchronization and coordination between all the various civilian and military offices.⁹² The multidimensional mission staff is designed specifically to address violent "spoilers" and asymmetric threat actors.⁹³ The creation of the multidimensional staff aims to align all vested parties that play into operations, operations support, and personnel and evaluation and training to achieve unity of effort to accomplishment of the mandate.⁹⁴ The below structure figure shows the relationship between the Force Commander and the various staff functions. The Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) for Personnel, Evaluation and Training focus on personnel actions, lessons learned, and mission effectiveness, which then feeds into identified training requirements. The Deputy Chief of Staff for (DCOS) Operations plans (U5) and executes operations (U3) while being informed by intelligence (U2). The DCOS for Operations staffs serve to synchronize actions and enablers through aviation (AirOps), maritime, information

93 Ibid.

⁹⁰ UN Peacekeeping, "MINUSMA Factsheet."

⁹¹ Vermeij, "MINUSMA: Challenges on the Ground," 2.

⁹² UN DPKO, United Nations Force Headquarters Handbook, 28.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 27.

operations, liaisons, and communications capabilities. The Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) for Operations Support provides enabler and logistical support to deployed units through. The U4 provides planning and supply distribution operational support. The U9 serves as the Civil Military integration staff (CIMIC), which is crucial to the multidimensional staff structure. The U8 provides engineering support. The DCOS for Operational Support also houses any EOD capability required in the mission. The staff is supplemented by other staff focusing on human rights, gender equality, and child protection. The Joint Operations Center (JOC) is encompassed in the Force Headquarters and coordinates daily military activities as well as provide situational awareness.⁹⁵ The Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) serves as a coordinating staff synchronizing civilian and military information requirements to inform decision makers.⁹⁶

⁹⁵ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Force Headquarters Handbook*, 15.

⁹⁶ Ibid.


Figure 3. UN Multidimensional Mission: Modular U-Staff Structure

Source: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Force Headquarters Handbook*, November 2014, 28, accessed December 21, 2017, http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/89596.

Mali is the 25th largest country in the world with 1,240,192 sq km.⁹⁷ The capital of Bamako sits 1,190km from Gao (Sector East Headquarters), 1,003km from Timbuktu (Sector West Headquarters), and 1,542km from Kidal (Sector North Headquarters) all via roadway. By comparison Baghdad sits 404km via roadway from Mosul and at the best Mali's roadway infrastructure can be considered at parity with Iraq's. In order to manage this vast amount of terrain MINUSMA organized into three sectors and established regional Sector HQs. These sector headquarters serve as forward deployed locations to

⁹⁷ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "Africa: Mali," World Fact Book, accessed 18 September 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ml.html.

better implement the mandate and thus in turn report back to the overall Force HO located in Bamako. Sector North with a headquarters in Kidal, Sector East with a headquarters in Gao, and Sector West with a headquarters in Timbuktu provides MINUSMA forward deployed staffs, enablers and direct links to the individual units deployed into theater. MINUSMA has struggled with positioning troops forward due to the severe lack of infrastructure throughout the country, which is particularly pronounced north of the Niger river.⁹⁸ The lengths to which supplies needed to be delivered also meant that aircraft would be crucial in the ability to conduct resupply operations.⁹⁹ MINUSMA is tasked with providing security in the north, but this was done prior to the support capabilities being in place.¹⁰⁰ The UN forces suffer from over extended lines of communication and supply. This is due to the fact that an average UN infantry battalion is anywhere from 500-850 soldiers. A formation of this size can easily be consumed in purely conducting logistical resupply, with little time or capacity to secure the population centers or achieve other vital aspects of the mandate.¹⁰¹ This overextension creates vulnerabilities to MINUSMA as a great deal of effort is dedicated to securing convoys, which then leads to forces being placed into static positions due to logistics

⁹⁸ Vermeij, "MINUSMA: Challenges on the Ground," 2.

⁹⁹ Koops et al., *The Oxford Handbook to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 861.

¹⁰⁰ Shurkin, Pezard, and Zimmerman, *Mali's Next Battle*, 96.

¹⁰¹ John Karlsrud, "The UN at War: Examining the Consequences of Peace-Enforcement Mandates for the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali," *Third World Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2015): 46, DOI: 10.1080 /01436597.2015.976016. requirements.¹⁰² The logistical situation in northern Mali creates a condition where essentially MINUSMA's forces are conducting operations for survival and not in achievement of the mandate.¹⁰³

Given the asymmetric threats that face MINUSMA the UN has focused on deploying Explosive Ordinance Explosion (EOD) and has identified training in defeating IEDs as a concern for those TCCs deploying into MINUSMA. As of October 2017, MINUSMA has fielded four EOD units to support each of the sectors.¹⁰⁴ These EOD formations are to support the maneuver forces in each sector upon the report of an IED incident or any IED identified, but undetonated. This in turn requires each patrol to request EOD support that can range from Gao out to Menaka or Asongo for example. This leads to a level of responsiveness that may preclude the reporting of IEDs or lag in report times. This leaves UN infantry battalions to handle IED threats without the proper training and equipment.¹⁰⁵

Given the complex nature of the threats operating in Mali the UN has had to adapt its traditional model of peacekeeping. These asymmetric threats and groups ranging from organized crime to violent extremist organizations and liberation movements means that MINUSMA is working against a complex network of personalities and interests. The

¹⁰² Shurkin, Pezard, and Zimmerman, *Mali's Next Battle*, 96.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ United Nations (UN) Geospatial Information, "MINUSMA Deployment Map," accessed 12 September 2017, http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic /map/dpko/MINUSMA.pdf

¹⁰⁵ Shurkin, Pezard, and Zimmerman, *Mali's Next Battle*, 96.

operating environment in northern Mali shares many similarities to those the United States has seen in Iraq or Afghanistan over the last 16 years. With complex situation that exists in Mali the UN deployed a new intelligence capability provided primarily by the Scandinavian countries of NATO. The All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU) was fielded in MINUSMA in 2013 and was the first deployment of a dedicated military intelligence entity inside a UN mission.¹⁰⁶ The ASIFU also deployed with unmanned aerial vehicles to perform intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions, which were further reinforced by Dutch attack helicopters.¹⁰⁷ In order to provide for additional means of information collection the ASIFU deployed capabilities to conduct human intelligence, an intelligence analysis cell, and an open source intelligence section, all of which allowed the ASIFU to begin to understand the network of threats in northern Mali.¹⁰⁸ The ASIFU has provided a valuable resource to MINUSMA and the leadership, but as time has progressed the ASIFU has spent more time on tactical level intelligence to enable decision making.¹⁰⁹ Originally the ASIFU was geared towards understanding the divers of conflict and operational level intelligence, which has meant it may only be providing intelligence to treat symptoms of the larger drivers of the conflict.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ David Nordli and Morten Lindboe, *Intelligence in United Nations Peace Operations* (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Defence International Centre, 2017), 9.

¹⁰⁷ Karlsrud, "The UN at War," 46.

¹⁰⁸ Nordli and Lindboe, Intelligence in United Nations Peace Operations, 16.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 19.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 20.

PEOs typically are deployed as the result of complex social issues or unresolved political issues.¹¹¹ As MINUSMA's mandate includes the reassertion of central government authority police and law enforcement plays a crucial role. According to the UN there are currently 1,747 police deployed inside MINUSMA.¹¹² These police are split between the sectors and play a role in developing the capacity of the Malian government to provide law enforcement.

The underlying conflict in northern Mali has led to MINUSMA being one of the most dangerous missions the UN has conducted. Since MINUSMA began operations in 2013 it has had 95 fatalities that the UN classifies as due to "malicious act" as of November 2017.¹¹³ The tactics used against UN peacekeepers has ranged from ambushes, improvised explosive devices, mortar and rocket attacks, and suicide bombs. Part of the problem the UN and MINUSMA finds itself is that with the Malian military withdrawal from the north the peacekeepers are serving as the main security presence.¹¹⁴ Peacekeepers from Niger were attacked during a convoy operation in October 2014 in the Gao region of Mali by armed men on motorcycles, which left nine peacekeepers dead.¹¹⁵

¹¹¹ CJCS, JP 3-07.3, I-10.

¹¹² United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping, "Troop and Police Contributors," accessed: 9 January 2018, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors.

¹¹³ United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping, "Fatalities by Mission and Incident Type,"
 30 November 2017, accessed 24 December 2017, http://peacekeeping.un.org/sites
 /default/files/statsbymissionincidenttype_4_5.pdf.

¹¹⁴ UNSC, S/PV/7274, 3.

¹¹⁵ United Nations (UN) Secretary General, "Statement Attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary General on Mali," 3 October 2014, accessed 30 December

The peacekeepers were operating a convoy from Ménaka to Asongo in Sector East. From reports the armed assailants attacked the convoy with heavy weapons and at the time was the deadliest attack on peacekeepers in Mali.¹¹⁶ The fatality total in 2014 reached 28 due to malicious activity, which was the highest of any other ongoing peace operation that year.¹¹⁷ 2014 saw numerous attacks against peacekeepers in which many were ambushed, exposed to IEDs or under attack from indirect fire.¹¹⁸

In 2015 the fatalities for MINUSMA fell to 12 due to malicious activity. In 2015 as well the first engagement by Dutch attack aviation occurred when a UN Bangladeshi force, near the town of Tabankort in the Kidal region, came under persistent heavy weapons fire.¹¹⁹ The town, its civilian population and UN peacekeepers had been isolated by elements of MNLA for days, and the aviation attack was done within the constraints of the mandate according to the force headquarters in Bamako.¹²⁰ The incident in Tabankort demonstrated the need for aviation support, but it also demonstrated that the

¹¹⁷ UN Peacekeeping, "Fatalities by Mission and Incident Type."

¹¹⁸ UNSC, S/PV/7274, 3.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

^{2017,} https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2014-10-03/statement-attributable-spokesman-secretary-general-mali-scroll-down.

¹¹⁶ News Africa, "Nine UN Peacekeepers Killed in Mali Ambush," 3 October 2014, accessed 21 December 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/10/nine-un-peacekeepers-killed-mali-ambush-201410312210524407.html.

¹¹⁹ David Lewis and Emma Farge, "Dutch UN Attack Helicopters Strike Mali Rebels in North," *Reuters News*, 20 January 2015, accessed 21 December 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-fighting-un/dutch-un-attack-helicopters-strikemali-rebels-in-north-idUSKBN0KT29520150120.

armed groups in northern Mali have at minimum parity with regards to combat power as the average UN fighting force. The Tabankort incident also highlighted the response process that MINUSMA uses. For the aviation support to be released the isolated Bangladeshi unit had to relay their request for support through the sector North headquarters, which then passed the request to Bamako for crisis planning and response. The sector headquarters in Kidal did not have release authority for attack aviation to respond to the battle. The requirement for the approval, planning, planning and authority resting with Bamako as opposed to the closer headquarters demonstrates the predominance on centralized control. The battle at Tabankort came under heavy scrutiny for the use of hellfire missiles even though force used by the aviation was within the authority of the mandate and after issuing warning shots. The introduction and utilization of attack aviation in MINUSMA provided additional capability to counter the threats in northern Mali. The ground force numbers in MINUSMA however did not increase. The enabler support in MINUSMA provided more security for convoys and a reasonable expectation of substantial and responsive support in the event of a concerted attack. The enabler support however did not increase the capacity of the UN ground to shift from logistical missions to protection of civilians and providing stability.

2016 saw an uptick in violence in Mali with the total number of fatalities coming to 27 due to malicious activity.¹²¹ February of 2016 the UN camp in Kidal was subjected to a mortar and rocket attack that was used in order to facilitate a suicide vehicle attack

¹²¹ UN Peacekeeping, "Fatalities by Mission and Incident Type."

that left 30 peacekeepers wounded and six dead.¹²² May of 2016 saw four separate attacks against peacekeepers with two of them consisting of IEDs and follow-on ambush, which is in line with other complex attacks seen throughout Africa and the Middle East.¹²³ On 31 May 2016 two incidents took place in Gao with an attempted vehicle borne suicide bomb attempted to breach the main UN camp while a UN Mine Action Service contractor and two security guards were assassinated.¹²⁴ The UN peacekeepers came under attack again in August, October and November with a combination of IED attacks against convoys as well as ambushes.¹²⁵ These incidents only highlight the fatalities, but there were numerous other incidents around Mali that did not leave any other peacekeepers dead, but still involved the use of suicide bombing attempts and ambushes.¹²⁶

As of 30 November 2017, the fatalities in MINUSMA have totaled 24. The sector headquarters in Timbuktu was attacked by gunmen and resulted in seven personnel being killed with a similar style attack against a UN camp near Mopti in central Mali in August

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²² United Nations (UN), "At Least 32 United Nations Personnel Killed as Assailants Deliberately Attack Peacekeeping Operations in 2016," UN Press Release, 14 February 2017, accessed 21 December 2017, https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/org1643.doc.htm.

¹²⁶ Arthur Boutellis, "What Can Mali Teach the UN About Confronting Terrorism," Global Observatory, 18 October 2016, accessed 24 December 2017, https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/10/terrorism-mali-minusma-barkhane/.

of 2017.¹²⁷ The Gao and Kidal region continue to see IED and small scale attacks against UN facilities and personnel throughout 2017. The increase in attacks is forcing the UN to trend towards heavy vehicles capable of surviving IEDs. This however is reactionary and the threats will simply use heavier explosives. The heavy vehicles also restrict all UN ground movement to roads, which are easily targeted especially with little variation in convoy procedures or timing of movements. Heavy vehicles also restrict the ability of UN patrols from effectively maneuvering off roads, which then effectively limits the patrol's ability to seek a position of advantage from which to deal with the threats. Heavily armored vehicles serve to increase logistical convoy survivability and with limited infrastructure the necessity of maintaining open convoys is obvious. Heavily armored vehicles may reduce UN causalities, but it does not necessarily correlate to the successful implementation of the mandate. The circumstances in Mali require variety in UN force type, composition, capability, equipment, and training.

From 2013 through 2017 MINUSMA is facing the same threats that have been seen across the Middle East and Africa. Crucial to success in these environments is the ability to understand all the dynamics and networks operating in a region. Tactical intelligence can serve to increase survivability of patrols, but to successfully counter asymmetric threats intelligence must simultaneously be oriented operationally to better understand the dynamics driving conflict. Especially with the UN's aversion to offensive operations tactical intelligence serves a reactionary role, but does not increase capability.

¹²⁷ News Mali, "Several People Killed in Attacks on UN Camps in Mali," 14 August 2017, accessed 24 December 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017 /08/soldiers-killed-attacks-camps-mali-170814213142119.html.

As the UN focuses on defensive measures intelligence assets oriented operationally will better serve the sectors and Force Headquarters.

MINUSMA is effectively serving as the sole provider of security in northern Mali.¹²⁸ MINUSMA has placed itself in direct opposition to the violent extremist groups in the region thus essentially becoming party to the conflict, which undermines the ability to serve as a peacekeeping force.¹²⁹ MINUSMA is also expected to employ what the UN calls active defense to prevent the return of armed elements and also engage in direct operations to serious and credible threats.¹³⁰ The mandate under operative paragraph 20 and subsequent bullets tasks MINUSMA with not only ensuring protection of civilians, but also the task to actively prevent attacks by asymmetric threats. This language means that the UN has given MINUSMA the responsibility and authority to actively target and defeat the VEOs in northern Mali. The UN Security Council has also actively decided to support the host nation government in Bamako and issued orders as such in the mandate. The implementation of MINUSMA's mandate does require the central governmental authority in Bamako to be reestablished in the north, which inherently requires MINUSMA to be able to conduct joint operations with the Malian security forces. There is still a question as to whether MINUSMA is capable of joint operations with the Malian

ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/458/32/PDF/N1545832.pdf.

¹³⁰ UNSC, Resolution 2364, Paragraph 20, Bullet (d).

¹²⁸ UNSC, S/PV/7274, 3.

¹²⁹ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), S/2015/1038, "Letter dated 24 December 2015 from the Chair of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations Addressed to the President of the Security Council," 4, accessed 21 December 2017, https://documents-dds-

security forces or simply coordinating.¹³¹ MINUSMA's mandate also requires it to perform tasks that allow for and require for preventive actions, which in some aspects could be considered counter-terrorist in nature.¹³² MINUSMA's mandate make the force a party to the conflict siding with the government in Bamako, which poses the concern for the mission that it is caught performing COIN operations in order to win the support of the local population against the other threat actors.¹³³

Aspects of DOTMLPF-P

Organization

Force Headquarters

MINUSMA's Force Headquarters uses the Multidimensional Modular U-Staff construct which, is designed to fit inside an Integrated Mission Headquarters Structure.¹³⁴ The Force Commander serves as the primary military advisor to the Head of Mission, and is responsible for synchronizing military operations towards political objectives.¹³⁵ As MINUSMA is utilizing the modular U-Staff construct the staff is aligned to achieve operational objectives. The execution of operations falls under the purview of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, whose staff comprises intelligence(U-2), operations (U-3), plans (U-5), communications (U-6). Due to MINUSMA's extensive mandate and force

¹³¹ Shurkin, Pezard, and Zimmerman, Mali's Next Battle, 95.

¹³² Ibid., 4.

¹³³ Vermeij, "MINUSMA: Challenges on the Ground," 3.

¹³⁴ UN DPKO, United Nations Force Headquarters Handbook, 20.
¹³⁵ Ibid., 21.

requirements the Operations staff is supplemented with an Air Ops, Information Ops, and liaison cells (see figure 3).¹³⁶ The MINUSMA headquarters also has a Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Support, which includes the logistics (U-4), engineering (U-8), civilmilitary affairs (U-9), explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and other support staff (see figure 3).¹³⁷ Finally, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Evaluation, and Training staff includes the personnel section (U-1), training (U-7), best practices, and evaluation (ORA) staffs (see figure 3).¹³⁸ Due to the size and complexity of MINUSMA, as well as the distances required to operate, the Force Headquarters established similarly structured headquarters in each of the sectors. The Force Headquarters is required to establish a Military Operations Center to serve a command, control, communication, and integration function for all military operations.¹³⁹ Each of the sector headquarters also is responsible for establishing their own respective Military Operations Center. The UN Force Headquarters handbook provides roles and responsibilities for the staff and subordinate cells, but the UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines also annotates that civilian and governmental agencies are more comfortable with ambiguity than military staffs are, which may pose challenges to operations in a complex environment.¹⁴⁰ The UN is a top down organization which empowers decision makers at senior levels due to

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 30.

¹³⁶ UN DPKO, United Nations Force Headquarters Handbook, 28.

¹⁴⁰ UN DPKO, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 71.

the innate political nature of the situation in which they deploy. MINUSMA's sector headquarters serve as essentially forward nodes to facilitate understanding at the Force headquarters in Bamako. The different sector headquarters must relay and coordinate with the headquarters in Bamako for any operation to take place. The U5 plans all missions from logistic convoys to crisis response plans. This essentially takes all command and control authority away from the sector headquarters and the units operating in the various regions. This mentality though is not as adequate in a situation like Mali, where units are operating in far flung locations and encounter situations ad hoc. The Mission Headquarters according to UN doctrine should synchronize and provide clear guidance and strategy to the Force Headquarters, which would in turn be disseminated down to the Sector headquarters.¹⁴¹ Ideally the Force HQ would provide a clear intent and clear guidance down to subordinate locations as decentralized decision making is essential in executing COIN.¹⁴² MINUSMA at times has suffered from a lack of clear strategy and guidance to the military component that would in turn allow for the proper allocation of military resources against country objectives.¹⁴³ The Force Commander given appropriate guidance and working closely with the civilian leadership should be able to generate an operational approach for the overall military contingent to successfully operate in an environment where insurgents or terrorist groups are the

¹⁴¹ UN DPKO, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 72.

¹⁴² Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 341.

¹⁴³ Vermeij, "MINUSMA: Challenges on the Ground," 3.

primary antagonists.¹⁴⁴ The modular U staff construct however still operates in parallel to the civilian mission staff. This parallel structure means there is potential for a lack of unity of effort or stove-piping limiting communication. UN doctrine also does not offer examples or protocols on how to integrate a staff with what is commonly referred to as fusion cells in US parlance. The UN force headquarters staff must be capable of informing on the operational environment so the Force Commander and the civilian leadership can adjust or react properly to the changing situation.¹⁴⁵ The UN force headquarters does have a plans section inside the U-5 directorate, but there is no clear linkage between the formulation of plans from long term to short term execution. An example of this is seen in NATO countries when plans move from the J-5 through the J-35 on to current operations with the J-3. MINUSMA is aided by the support provided by the All Sources Information Fusion Unit, which is a formation that was first deployed in order to provide a better understanding of the operational environment in order to inform planning and execution.

Intelligence Capabilities

The All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU) was first deployed in 2014 in support of MINUSMA and this served as the first time a UN mission had its U-2 supplemented with a purely military intelligence unit.¹⁴⁶ The role of the ASIFU is to analyze intelligence to support operational decision making and the unit is comprised

¹⁴⁴ HODA, FM 3-24, 345.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Nordli and Lindboe, Intelligence in United Nations Peace Operations, 5.

mainly of NATO or NATO associated countries. The organization uses primarily NATO intelligence doctrine. The organization was also intended to provide analysis of nonmilitary factors such as ethnic and tribal dynamics as well as illicit trafficking activities.¹⁴⁷ The ASIFU is supposed to support the Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC) which was already resident in multidimensional missions whose purpose was to synchronize and share information from civilian, military, police, and humanitarian UN agencies. The JMAC's primary role was to report to the Head of Mission (HOM/SRSG) with medium to long term analysis but was not primarily supporting military operations.¹⁴⁸ The U-2 served as the primary connective tissue to the JMAC. The intent of the ASIFU was to provide a more robust intelligence capability to the Force Commander and answer Priority Intelligence Requirements for the military component.¹⁴⁹ The ASIFU provides capability to generate, identify, analyze, and disseminate intelligence through surveillance platforms, human intelligence, and open source intelligence.

The ASIFU manages a number of surveillance platforms through unmanned aerial vehicles whose full capabilities are classified. However, given the size of the terrain in which MINUSMA the UAVs on hand are inadequate to the tasks required.¹⁵⁰ As of this writing and in reference to the current force deployment information published by the UN

¹⁴⁷ Nordli and Lindboe, Intelligence in United Nations Peace Operations, 9.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 16.

there is no ASIFU element supporting Sector North in the Kidal region. This immediately identifies a potential knowledge and capability gap. The ASIFU are also using NATO equipment whose capabilities and limitations are not immediately releasable to UN contingents. The UN does not possess its own intelligence collection platforms, which means it operates at the whim of the contributing countries and caveats on willingness to share the full suite of capabilities.

The ASIFU has been focused on tactical level intelligence to address force protection concerns, which may or may not be a limiting factor on the ability of the unit to further address the drivers of conflict or threat actors.¹⁵¹ The ASIFU currently passes all information up through the chain of command to the Force Commander who is then authorized to release information to subordinate commanders. This potentially creates a long timeline in which information is collected, analyzed and disseminated in order to address the tactical concerns of the Force Commander.¹⁵² Arguably this would not be a concern if the ASIFU was concerned with providing operational intelligence to inform planning and future operations, but as identified earlier the focus has shifted to tactical operations and force protection.¹⁵³ The ASIFU is incapable of providing direct feeds to the sector HQs or non-NATO ground units due to the previously mentioned classification requirements used by the intelligence platforms, which in turn has limited the

¹⁵¹ Nordli and Lindboe, Intelligence in United Nations Peace Operations, 15.

¹⁵² Ibid., 18.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 15.

intelligence's value.¹⁵⁴ This then leads to the ASIFU focusing on tactical intelligence to support static defense or intelligence to prevent attacks against UN facilities or personnel in the surrounding areas. MINUSMA's ability to conduct process, exploitation, dissemination (PED) for military planning seemed to focus primarily on tactical level considerations.¹⁵⁵ This combined with a lack of shared common intelligence competence has hindered the effectiveness of the JMAC, U-2, and enabler support provided by the ASIFU.¹⁵⁶ The UN, at the force headquarters or sector headquarters does not conduct what would be considered in US DOD parlance "working groups" focusing and prioritizing intelligence collection to inform plans or any intelligence cycle.

Infantry Organization

As of this writing there are currently nine Infantry Battalion headquarters deployed to support MINUSMA with an associated 34 infantry company groups (ICGs) as referred to by UN standards (see figure 3). As previously discussed Mali is the 25th largest country in the world and MINUSMA has garrisoned forces along three main sectors (North, West, East, and in Bamako). The UN infantry battalion and associated infantry companies are the mainstay of UN peacekeepers and the most prevalent.¹⁵⁷ The UN provides for a suggested organization for infantry formations and training guidelines to ensure a baseline of capability upon arrival in a UN peacekeeping mission. The UN

¹⁵⁴ Nordli and Lindboe, *Intelligence in United Nations Peace Operations*, 18.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 27.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 28.

¹⁵⁷ UN DPKO, United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual Volume 1, 177.

has identified that a battalion should consist of three to four infantry companies and one support company with and entire battalion strength comprising some 850 personnel.¹⁵⁸ The UN infantry battalion identifies material capabilities that should arrive with an infantry battalion and subsequently with all associated companies. The UN structure is not significantly different than US DOD structure, but the UN caveats its organizational requirements with the statement that there is flexibility during the negation of the MOU (memorandum of understanding).¹⁵⁹ The UN also requires the UN infantry battalions and companies to provide at least one company and one platoon per outpost as quick reaction forces.¹⁶⁰ The UN does not require the support company, which provides logistical support and transportation, to be equipped with weapons or vehicles capable of convoy protection. This leads to the infantry companies assigned to a given area to provide convoy protection, which in turn limits ability to conduct patrols. Given the distances so convoys may have to travel between outposts in Mali an infantry company may lose an entire platoon for a series of days. The preponderance of infantry companies are stationed at primary population centers like Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu while some other units are in minor locations like Asongo or Menaka. As the Security Council forced MINUSMA to expand outside of Gao and Timbuktu the infantry battalions were further stretched thin leading to an even larger gap in personnel.¹⁶¹ This expansion exacerbated an already

¹⁶¹ Vermeij, "MINUSMA: Challenges on the Ground," 2.

¹⁵⁸ UN DPKO, United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual Volume 1, 127.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 139.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 135.

significant challenge of being able to resupply and support the infantry formations due to poor infrastructure.¹⁶² The deployment of two companies in Menaka a total of 220km from their battalion headquarters in Asongo, which is a further 97km from Gao and the main resupply base demonstrates the potential hazards of deploying basic infantry battalions. The current environment in northern Mali requires formations be deployed into very austere locations to protect the population and fulfill the mandate, which has the impact of every form of sustenance and housing be provided externally in order to even occupy the terrain.¹⁶³ The three-sector headquarters do not have transport or logistical units assigned to them. The infantry battalions provide security, logistical convoy support, and patrols supporting all the camps. The tasks of camp security and convoy security detract from the capacity of the infantry units to conduct patrols and serve their main role of protection of the population. The austere locations and frequency of attacks along main supply routes, or on isolated cantonments, means that countries are also less willing to deploy their infantry into regions where the threat is high and the battalions have limited capability to defend themselves.¹⁶⁴ The size of the areas in which the infantry battalions operate in Mali also serves as a limiting factor on capability. The capacity and capability limitations serve to exacerbate any training deficiency. The threats faced in Mali require specific training needs and material capabilities. The threats and environmental considerations means that specific unit types and capabilities must be

¹⁶² Vermeij, "MINUSMA: Challenges on the Ground," 2.

¹⁶³ Robert Perito, *UN Peacekeeping in the Sahel Overcoming New Challenges* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, March 2015), 5.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 2.

identified and resourced to fill specific needs. Transport formations capable of defending themselves would free up regular infantry to conduct their primary tasks. Infantry formations in all-terrain vehicles allows for maneuverability to ability to project presence denying areas to threat actors. Mechanized infantry versus motorized infantry has organizational impacts and capability impacts, which should be parsed against mission requirements. Mechanized or heavy infantry is not addressed in the organizational charts in the UN infantry manual, but likely would depict smaller formations that would require more robust logistical support. Light infantry functions well in austere environments with poor infrastructure with light vehicles thus providing more flexibility. However, when any formation is stuck to operating on roads this then creates a vulnerable target, which then means combat power must be assigned against in order to increase force protection.¹⁶⁵ The infantry battalion does not have organic engineering or counter-IED (C-IED) as annotated in the UN manual. This then further stretches thin any combat power an infantry battalion provides. This study is not capable of assessing if MINUSMA has done the planning associated with tailoring requests for specific types of infantry to fulfill roles against required mission sets.

The infantry battalion staff sections are similar to those of US Army staff element sizes, but this size may be inadequate when the battalion does not have a brigade or higher element to plug into with additional enablers.¹⁶⁶ This would suggest that battalion staffs should be more robust with associated enablers or that deployment of infantry

¹⁶⁵ UNSC, S/2015/1038, 4.

¹⁶⁶ UN DPKO, United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual Volume 1, 130.

battalions with no higher UN parent unit is not adequate. The lack of higher parent unit teamed with a sector headquarters with limited authority further impacts operational capability. The UN infantry manual provides for a robust infantry company with equipment and personnel, but arguably these capabilities are not being deployed to MINUSMA as TCCs seem reluctant to provide troops for service in the northern regions of Mali.¹⁶⁷

Training

The UN Operational Readiness Guidelines (ORG) primarily serve as a reference for pre-deployment training and are "self-evaluated" by the individual TCC.¹⁶⁸ The guidelines also provide a baseline of capability each soldier should possess prior to deployment. The UN Global Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment in 2013 identified that weapons firing was a skill that required further enhancement for peacekeepers.¹⁶⁹ This observation teamed with the firing requirements as laid out in ORG demonstrates that as early as 2013 the UN identified that either personnel were not arriving trained for their missions or that the associated guidelines prior to 2013 were not adequate.

¹⁶⁷ Vermeij, "MINUSMA: Challenges on the Ground," 2.

¹⁶⁸ United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations, *Operational Readiness Preparation for Troop Contributing Countries in Peacekeeping Missions*, December 2016, 2, accessed 26 December 2017, http://dag.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/400690 /20170106%20Operational%20Readiness%20Preparation%20signed%20version.pdf?seq uence=2&isAllowed=y.

¹⁶⁹ United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations, *Global Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment, Final Report 2012-2013*, 21, accessed 16 September 2017, http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/89581/2012-2013%20Global%20TNA%20Report.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

Numerous sources have identified that TCCs are wholly unprepared to conduct operations in a COIN environment.¹⁷⁰ The ambush in 2014 of the Niger convoy demonstrates how ineffective some ground forces have proven against insurgent attacks. The Tabankort battle highlights how ground forces are being out maneuvered and isolated. The constant success of mortar and rocket attacks demonstrate the inability of UN forces to respond quickly and thus eliminate repeated threats. The requirement for the Force headquarters to conduct any reactionary planning to an incident prior to any actions in the sectors being taken highlights how overly centralized control further limits effectiveness against insurgent threats.

In order to maneuver against threats or properly support logistical operations understanding of basic tenets of mounted movement are required. UN personnel must be capable of land navigation and map reading though there is no mention of mounted navigation. The ORG also does not lay out a difference in types of patrols.¹⁷¹ The ORG also does not specify skills infantry should be capable of except general patrolling, antiambush, observation post, and sentry duties.¹⁷² No mention is given to C-IED training, or any mention of skills such as vehicle recovery, medical evacuation save the generic 9-Line medical report, logistical or convoy operations all of which have identified as required skills needed to addressed during pre-deployment training.¹⁷³ The UN has

¹⁷⁰ Vermeij, "MINUSMA: Challenges on the Ground," 2.

¹⁷¹ UN Peacekeeping Operations, *Operational Readiness Preparation for Troop Contributing Countries in Peacekeeping Missions*, 10.

¹⁷² Ibid., 11.

¹⁷³ UNSC, S/2015/1038, 4.

invested heavily though in "in-mission training for C-IED" skills. The ORG also does not identify the capability grounds units should have to communicate with aviation assets, which have proven so crucial in Mali. In order to fully use aviation assets for medical evacuation the TCCs on the ground must at a minimum must be capable and fluent in calling for support, and communicating with the air platform, which is not a required skill set according to the ORG.¹⁷⁴ The 9-Line medical call for support presupposes capabilities that may not be inherent to the average UN infantry company. The UN has not standardized the communications equipment TCCs must be equipped with as a TCC's equipment is a national requirement so long as it complies with the Statement of Unit Requirement.¹⁷⁵ The ORG does not provide any guidelines on how a company or battalion would conduct or provide intelligence into the U-2 intelligence cycle.¹⁷⁶ The force headquarters handbook does provide templates for incident reports or medical casualty reports, but these reports are not required training for infantry units based off of the ORG tables. The ORG again only requires a TCC to provide a memorandum identified in Annex E of the Operational readiness Assurance and Performance

¹⁷⁴ UN Peacekeeping Operations, *Operational Readiness Preparation for Troop Contributing Countries in Peacekeeping Missions*, 11.

¹⁷⁵ United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations, *Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement*, December 2015, 6, accessed 13 December 2017, http://dag.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/400699/Policy%20Operational% 20Readiness%20Assurance%20and%20Performance%20Improvement%20Policy.pdf?se quence=1&isAllowed=y.

¹⁷⁶ Vermeij, "MINUSMA: Challenges on the Ground," 28.

Improvement Policy of December 2015.¹⁷⁷ To sum up there is noticeable additional requirements in training that an environment like MINUSMA requires. Non-material solutions such as pre-deployment training for COIN environments could alleviate some of the most effective tactics used by threat actors in northern Mali.

Material

Ground Vehicles

Due to the high number of IEDs the natural inclination would be to provide vehicles similar to the mine resistant ambush protected (MRAPs) fielded in Iraq by the United States. The UN has fielded MRAP variants alongside the more traditional land cruiser/land rover equivalent vehicles. The MRAPs do serve a role of providing survivability along main supply routes or roads on which UN convoys are particularly vulnerable.¹⁷⁸ The value in light trucks is their ability to move off roads and maneuver easily in response to ambushes or while conducting patrols. The MRAP though quite survivable is restricted to hard surfaces, which requires more training to mitigate threat actor tactics. The use of heavily armored vehicles serves a role when used for the purpose of logistical resupply. The value of heavy vehicles be them wheeled or tracked can be offset by tactics used by threat groups. Heavily armored vehicles serve a specific role, but their limitations also restrict the effectiveness of a force intended to do anything besides defend itself or conduct logistical resupply.

¹⁷⁷ UN Peacekeeping Operations, *Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement*, 19.

¹⁷⁸ Perito, UN Peacekeeping in the Sahel Overcoming New Challenges, 6.

Light vehicles provide more maneuverability, speed, and are easier to maintain through local procurement as most areas in Mali have light pick-up trucks. The attributes of light vehicles actually increase UN forces' potential effectiveness against threats. This is all said to identify that any material solution must be properly aligned to the specific mission set of a TCC. An infantry battalion's effectiveness in mission tasks can be increased or limited by the vehicles with which it operates.

Communications Platforms

The TCCs in MINUSMA face basic challenges with regards to communication equipment. All TCCs are required to deploy with appropriate communication equipment to accomplish their unit requirements, but there is no standardized UN communication platform. At the basic level this creates a minimum of two issues: one is the ability of separate communication platforms to actually talk with one another; while the second means that the logistical support for replacement parts is wholly the responsibility of the TCC or the UN Department of Field Support which would be required to assist in the support of varied communication sets. As of September 2017, each MINUSMA sector did have an assigned communication unit ranging from a platoon to company size element. UN forces have tactical communications platforms, but formations do not have strategic level communications in order to ensure ability to effectively communicate from very isolated locations. These communications elements can serve as a way to facilitate the synchronization of communication capability across the TCCs conducting ground operations while linking in available aviation assets.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

MINUSMA is one of the first UN missions to field a UAV capability as seen from analysis of the ASIFU. The UN Infantry manual also identifies that each infantry company and battalion should deploy with a minimum of one small UAV to support ground operations.¹⁷⁹ The identification of the usefulness of UAVs is one that recognizes the role increased situational awareness plays into survivability and mission accomplishment. The challenge MINUSMA faces with UAVs is firstly; again the UN infantry handbook prescription for UAVs at the individual company level is a suggestion but not a requirement, secondly; the ASIFU has the most robust UAV capability but that capability has been shown to be limited due to the distances required, and finally; that unless a tactical unit has UAVs then the immediate impact felt to the tactical unit by the ASIFU's UAV support may not be timely in the lengthy approval chain to allocate and release information.

Aviation

There have been many works identifying the need for aviation assets in missions like MINUSMA in order to provide everything from early warning, reconnaissance, close combat attack, surveillance, logistical resupply, and medical evacuation. According to the MINUSMA force deployment map of September 2017 the UN has deployed aviation assets to Gao, Timbuktu, and Bamako. Kidal does receive aerial resupply, but MINUSMA has in the past had issues due to the airfield's location amongst the population. The location of the airfield teamed with the security requirements has

¹⁷⁹ UN DPKO, United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual Volume 1, 132.

precluded the deployment of aviation assets to Sector North. The value of helicopters is undeniable when considering the environment MINUSMA operates in. Aviation though continues to be however one of the primary requests and high value enablers the UN is requesting from TCCs.

Leadership

The threats MINUSMA faces requires peacekeepers to adapt to a capable enemy that is arguably informed by successes and failures from the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The threats require UN peacekeeper leadership to possess traditional skill sets such as the capability to properly integrate with civilian partners and senior civilian leadership. Asymmetric threats as termed by the UN also requires peacekeeper leadership to operate in ambiguity more often. The UN's centralized command and control structure limits the ability of lower level leaders to effectively employ their forces. Asymmetric threats adapt and their adaptation requires that UN peacekeeping leaders be equally adaptable. As demonstrated above requiring all decisions and responses be made by the Force Headquarters leadership limits initiative and timely responses to incidents. The time created through the current decision-making process decreases the ability of UN forces to be seen as effective in the eyes of the population.

Situational awareness and understanding is crucial to success in the complex environments that characterize insurgencies. The force headquarters and subordinate commands must be capable of identifying the current situation by incorporating all various information inputs and then developing approaches that achieve the desired outcomes.¹⁸⁰ Though leadership's capability to facilitate a close relationship with the local population is not new, when operating in a COIN environment the people now serve as the enabler to being success as never before.¹⁸¹ MINUSMA leaders must be capable of making informed decisions at tactical levels within the guidance of senior leaders. Leaders at the tactical level to include non-commissioned officers must be empowered to make decisions while understanding their strategic implications.¹⁸²

Personnel

The largest contingents in UN peacekeeping missions do not come from western nations. As the threats evolve in regions that the UN has deployed troops the need for more niche capabilities has increased. Many of these niche capabilities honed over time and through combat come from NATO countries or NATO aligned countries who have supported operations in the middle east over the last 16 years. Though some of the other TCCs have themselves fought insurgencies few have fought COINs with the enabler support available to western militaries. As seen in MINUSMA the main intelligence capability is provided through the ASIFU, which is essentially a NATO capability. MINUSMA is currently fielding one aviation unit from South America while the rest come from NATO countries. The infantry battalions however all come from African or South Asian countries. The asymmetric threats do not necessitate infantry battalions

¹⁸² Ibid., 303.

¹⁸⁰ UN Peacekeeping Operations, *Global Peacekeeping Training Needs* Assessment, Final Report 2012-2013, 15.

¹⁸¹ HQDA, FM 3-24, 295.

deploying from NATO countries, but the threats do necessitate more robust niche capabilities.

Aviation has already been identified, but EOD, engineering (currently there are engineering units located in all sectors), and potentially special operations forces to name a few are increasingly needed. MINUSMA as a multidimensional operation requires robust civil military operations capabilities as well as information operations capacity.¹⁸³ Any COIN and CT operation takes place in an environment where criminal actors or transregional crime plays a role, which are prevalent in developing/failed countries and aid in terrorist activities.¹⁸⁴ Security Sector Reform (SSR) does not simply apply to the military aspect of a nation's security apparatus, but also to local or national law enforcement agencies.¹⁸⁵ In the vein of SSR the UN Police mission in MINUSMA plays a crucial role. It is especially crucial when one considers the fact that northern Mali is plagued by transregional criminal activity and those networks facilitate the violent extremist networks.

MINUSMA has demonstrated through its parallel force in the French Task Force Barkhane or the deployment of NATO special forces the need for a capable decisive action arm. Barkhane however is not a part of the UN mission, but available for assistance. It is not known how populations perceive Barkhane for this study, but whether

¹⁸³ UN DPKO, United Nations Force Headquarters Handbook, 28.

¹⁸⁴ CJCS, JP 3-26, I-3.

¹⁸⁵ CJCS, JP 3-24, 169.

or not Barkhane undermines the legitimacy of the Malian forces or the UN does identify a potential increased capability to the UN or pose an increased risk to the mission.

Similar to the French Barkhane operation the Sahel 5 has begun deployment of a regional military force. In the summer of 2017 the initial operational capability was established in Mali. The organization is still young and receives funding from France and the European Union. The Sahel 5 is actively seeking to secure UN funding and logistical support. This force is expected to operate alongside MINUSMA and Barkhane, which only raises the question of again unity of effort, deconfliction, synchronization, and ultimately legitimacy for the MINUSMA. An additional parallel force in Mali may only contribute in further mudding the waters of situational awareness. The deployment of the Sahel 5 may expose MINUSMA to more retaliation has it will now be associated with yet another military force operating in its area of operations, but does not exercise any command or control over.

The UN manual for Special Operations lays out key tasks that include everything from surveillance, reconnaissance, to what are termed Special Tasks.¹⁸⁶ Importantly the UN does not specify what makes a special forces unit, merely it identifies tasks that a special forces unit must be capable of doing. This leads to the implication that any country can provide forces that have received the appropriate training to conduct the UN SOF tasks can be deployed and identified as UN SOF. Currently Senegal provides SOF to MINUSMA and these forces are advanced trained infantry.

¹⁸⁶ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO), *United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Special Forces Manual*, January 2015, 17, accessed 14 September 2017, http://repository.un.org/handle/11176/89590.

The UN is also operating alongside a Malian military that is receiving support to increase its capacity. As identified earlier it is not clear if MINUSMA is interoperable with the host nation forces or simply attempting to coordinate operations.¹⁸⁷ With the mandate to reassert central government authority the UN may also need to be capable of training host nation forces in order to achieve the mandate, which through the use of special forces according to UN doctrine is feasible. Though the European Union is currently conducting a program to increase the capacity of the Malian government, the UN has a vested interest in participating in any host nation capacity building. In order to assist in the reassertion of central government authority MINUSMA must inherently have a role to play in building partner capacity activities ongoing in the country. The UN Special Forces manual states that the UN can use Special Forces troops to conduct training, advising, and mentoring.¹⁸⁸ These tasks would fall in line with what US DOD calls Foreign Internal Defense. All of these niche capabilities require UN personnel who are specifically trained or aligned to non-standard peacekeeping roles.

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

Somalia like many countries in Africa is large and similar to other Sahel countries contains many open regions of little vegetation. Somalia is slightly smaller than Texas at

¹⁸⁷ Shurkin, Pezard, and Zimmerman, *Mali's Next Battle*, 95.

¹⁸⁸ UN DPKO, United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Special Forces Manual, 19.

637,657 sq km with a coastline of 3,025km.¹⁸⁹ Somalia has suffered from governmental instability and famine over the last thirty years. These conditions have created an environment that has consistently drawn international attention. Since the early 1990s the United Nations has been involved in Somalia due to the violence and lack of strong central state governance.¹⁹⁰ The instability in the early 1990s began the instability and cycle of violence that still takes place in Somalia. The 1990s saw the UN intervene in Somalia with arguably two very challenged missions in the first UN Mission to Somalia (UNOSOM I) and the subsequent UN Mission to Somalia II (UNOSOM II). Though UNOSOM I transitioned into UNSOM II, the latter is considered a disaster and complete failure.¹⁹¹ UNOSOM II's departure led to the creation of the UN Political Office Somalia (UNPOS) stationed in Kenya. UNPOS assisted with the creation of the Transitional Federal Government, and its overthrow by the Islamic Courts instigated a military intervention by Ethiopia. Eventually, Ethiopia was replaced by the AMISOM.

In March 1995 all UN personnel had departed Somalia and the UN established the UN Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS). UNPOS was headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya and mainly served to maintain links with political leaders and assist where possible in

¹⁸⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, "Africa: Somalia," The World Factbook, accessed 16 January 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html.

¹⁹⁰ Center on International Cooperation, *Global Peace Operations Review: Annual Compilation 2013*, 39.

¹⁹¹ Koops et al., *The Oxford Handbook to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 430.

peace processes.¹⁹² UNPOS helped to enable the creation and establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004. 2006 saw the rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which was a coalition of moderate and extremist groups, and their seizure of large swaths of Somalia and Mogadishu. Ethiopia perceived this rise as a direct threat to the security in the region and launched an intervention that ejected the Islamic Courts Union. The ICU's collapse led to the creation of Al-Shabaab and the insurgency that continues to take place in Somalia.

The United Nations authorized the AU to deploy a peace enforcement force in February 2007 with UNSCR 1744. Originally AMISOM was authorized for a six-month deployment and mainly facilitate the security of the reestablished TFG.¹⁹³ Initially a force of some 1,600 Ugandan troops deployed to replace a much larger Ethiopian force that had ejected the ICU from power.¹⁹⁴ The original force of Ugandans swelled to a combination force of 3,500 comprised of Ugandan and Burundian troops. Al Shabaab contested the deployment of the AU's contingent and thus a battle ensued for control of Mogadishu. The AU force fought alongside the TFG forces to finally push Al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu in 2011.¹⁹⁵ This battle for Mogadishu consisted of mainly urban street

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 3.

¹⁹² Center on International Cooperation, *Global Peace Operations Review:* Annual Compilation 2013, 39.

¹⁹³ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Resolution 1744 (2007), 5633rd Meeting, 20 February 2007, 3, accessed 15 September 2017, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1744(2007).

¹⁹⁴ Walter Lotze and Paul D. Williams, *The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia* (New York: International Peace Institute, May 2016), 4.

to street fighting throughout the city. In 2011 Kenya and Ethiopia both intervened in Somalia and deployed troops thus opening multiple fronts against Al Shabaab. By the end of 2012 Mogadishu had been secured as well as the surrounding suburbs. Simultaneously the Kenyans had secured the southern strategic town and port of Kismayo, while the Ethiopians had secured the cities of Baidoa and Belet Weyne in south-central Somalia.¹⁹⁶

AMISOM had originally been intended to eventually transition into yet another UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia. This however never occurred due to senior level disagreement and skepticism at the UN.¹⁹⁷ AMISOM has never followed the traditional role of a peacekeeping mission and has been more recognizable as a conventional military mission.¹⁹⁸ With the TFG again postured in control of Mogadishu and supported by AMISOM the AU decided to begin a stabilization mission.¹⁹⁹ This evolution turned AMISOM into something that resembled a multidimensional peace enforcement mission, whose role was to support the political stability of the TFG as well as continue to support the institutional development of the central government.²⁰⁰ The UNSC adopted

¹⁹⁶ Lotze and Williams, *The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia*, 4.

¹⁹⁷ Center on International Cooperation, *Global Peace Operations Review:* Annual Compilation 2013, 39.

¹⁹⁸ Paul D. Williams and Abdirashid Hashi, "Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somali," The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, February 2016, 9, accessed February 26, 2016, http://www.heritageinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Exit-Strategy-Challenges-for-the-AU-Mission-in-Somalia.pdf.

¹⁹⁹ Lotze and Williams, *The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia*, 4.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 5.

Resolution 2036, which laid out the role AMISOM should play in the supporting delivery of stabilization plans, the establishment of an AU police mission to support Somali police units, and finally to provide security throughout south-central Somalia.²⁰¹ Resolution 2036 also authorized the AU to increase the force size of AMISOM from 12,000 to 17,731 comprised of military and police units.²⁰²

AMISOM was originally designed as a war fighting mission and not necessarily a stabilization and peacekeeping mission.²⁰³ As already noted AMISOM would have transitioned to the UN in order to perform the required stabilization roles. The command structure for AMISOM has always remained more a multinational construct as opposed to a fully integrated political and military construct more in line with the UN Multidimensional mission.²⁰⁴ Consistently AMISOM is criticized that the Force Headquarters does not exercise true operational control over the sectors. Each sector of AMISOM is controlled by a different country and as such the TCC's generally pursue their own nations' political and military objectives.²⁰⁵ This has created a situation in which the Force Headquarters in Mogadishu serves a coordination function at the

²⁰¹ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Resolution 2036 (2012), 6718th Meeting, 22 February 2012, 3, accessed 14 September 2017, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2036(2012).

²⁰² Ibid., 4.

²⁰³ Williams and Hashi, "Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somali,"30.

²⁰⁴ Lotze and Williams, *The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia*, 11.

²⁰⁵ Williams and Hashi, "Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somali,"30.

most.²⁰⁶ This lack of actual operational control is not suited to deal with a threat like Al-Shabaab and also means that the ability of AMISOM to effectively implement stabilization programs is limited.²⁰⁷ AMISOM lacks the consolidated command and control mechanisms and interagency coordination or synchronization capabilities that MINUSMA has. AMISOM's command and control construct along with the national sector construct means the coordination and security along the TCC sector borders has suffered. Al-Shabaab has been able to exploit the sector gaps in security and has effectively found a safe haven in between AMISOM forces.²⁰⁸ AMISOM's national caveats and objectives of each of the respective TCCs has made any cross-sector coordination challenging for the mission. AMISOM has struggled to incorporate civilian or police experts in conjunction with the mission's transition from a military centric warfighting command structure to a more UN styled multidimensional mission structure.²⁰⁹ Effectively AMISOM's expansion out of Mogadishu meant that the headquarters only lost more control over the forces.

With Al-Shabaab's removal from Mogadishu and other major population centers the organization transitioned to an insurgency. The insurgent tactics implemented by Al Shabaab forced AMISOM to adapt as well and in 2012 Kismayo, Baidoa, and Belet

²⁰⁶ Lotze and Williams, *The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia*, 11.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.
Weyne became AMISOM Sector Headquarters.²¹⁰ The Sector Headquarters serve as spokes from which smaller settlements would then be occupied by AMISOM camps. In 2012 the country of Djibouti provided a force to AMISOM and the Kenyan forces that had intervened unilaterally now came under the AMISOM umbrella.²¹¹ The Ethiopians however maintained a unilateral force independent of AMISOM mainly focused around Baidoa and Belet Weyne.

Al-Shabaab by mid-2013 had been pushed out of the major cities in south-west Somalia, but instead of abandoning the cities outright the organization left sleeper-cells that continue to harass local government and AMISOM forces.²¹² Al Shabaab regularly conducts IED attacks, ambushes, targeted assassinations, suicide bombings, and rocket/mortar attacks. The threats in Mali regularly use the same tactics to further undermine the legitimacy of the government. In addition to insurgent attacks against AMISOM Al-Shabaab still maintains the capability to extract taxes and resources from smaller villages that AMISOM cannot occupy. This ability directly leads to Al-Shabaab's capability to conduct highly effective operations against AMISOM. AMISOM recognized that Al Shabaab possessed the means to extort local communities and thus led to an expansion its presence further into rural areas attempting to bring the newly formed SNA along with them. As AMISOM increased its footprint their formations found

²¹⁰ Lotze and Williams, *The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia*, 5.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid., 7.

themselves in isolated forward operating bases with long and vulnerable supply routes.²¹³ In 2013 AMISOM's Military Operations Coordination Committee recommended that AMISOM cease expansion as it could no longer support the expanded requirements and the mission's capacity had been reached.²¹⁴ Again, we see that MINUSMA and AMISOM share a common problem set of over-extension.

As AMISOM has expanded and increased its presence the isolated and far flung outposts have become surrounded by terrain in which Al Shabaab has freedom of maneuver. The freedom of maneuver enjoyed by Al Shabaab has allowed the group to mass on isolated AMISOM, SNA, or regional security forces, which has led to a number of incidents where Al Shabaab has secured victory and thus increased its resources for continued operations. In 2014 Al-Shabaab defeated the Jubaland security forces at Koday island, which further diminished the capability of the southern region's local security apparatus.²¹⁵ In January 2016 the Kenyan outpost at El Adde was overrun by Al-Shabaab. The El Adde attack handed Kenya one of its worst military defeats and led to the deaths of over 100 Kenyan soldiers according to the Somali President at the time, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, though the Kenyan government disputed this total.²¹⁶ The El

²¹⁵ Williams and Hashi, "Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somali,"29.

²¹³ Williams and Hashi, "Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somali,"29.

²¹⁴ Lotze and Williams, *The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia*, 8.

²¹⁶ Conor Gaffey, "Al-Shabab Killed 180 Kenyan Troops in El Adde: Somali President," *Newsweek*, 25 February 2016, accessed 13 January 2018, http://www.newsweek.com/somali-president-al-shabaab-el-adde-430287.

Adde outpost was located in the Gedo region and its isolated location teamed with lapses in the Kenyan security posture allowed Al Shabaab to mass and maneuver on the camp. Al Shabaab closed in quickly on the outer perimeter at dawn and through surprise, massed fires and a VBIED effectively breached the gate. The Kenyan unit was routed and with the fall of El Adde Al Shabaab secured further arms and ammunition. Similarly, a year earlier in 2015 a Ugandan base located in Janaale was overrun by Al-Shabaab as they used a vehicle borne IED to breach the perimeter. After the perimeter was breached an exploitation force followed behind to continue the attack and eventually forced the withdrawal of the Ugandans.²¹⁷ 2015 saw another high-profile attack at an AMISOM base located in Leego. These complex attacks provide Al-Shabaab the opportunity to capture additional equipment that then allows the group to continue its insurgency in the country. The freedom of maneuver Al-Shabaab enjoys essentially has created a stalemate and allows the group to continue its control of much of the rural local population.²¹⁸ Al-Shabaab continues to extort local populations to fund its operations and continues to pose a significant threat to the government in Mogadishu. In October 2017 Al-Shabaab detonated the largest vehicle borne IED to date in downtown Mogadishu killing at least 300 and wounding hundreds more.²¹⁹ Along with the large attacks Al-Shabaab continues

²¹⁷ News Africa, "Al-Shabab Claims 'Scores' Killed in Attack on AU Troops," 1 September 2015, accessed 13 January 2018, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/alshabab-claims-scores-killed-attack-au-troops-150901041528125.html.

²¹⁸ Lotze and Williams, *The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia*, 8.

²¹⁹ Jason Burke, "Mogadishu Truck Bomb: 500 Casualties in Somalia's Worst Terrorist Attack," *The Guardian*, 16 October 2017, accessed 13 January 2018,

to conduct localized IED attacks, ambushes, and assassinations of AMISOM and government personnel.

The AU has defined the stabilization effort as the presence of AMISOM in all regions and further providing support to increase the Somali law enforcement's capacity. The focus on building police capacity is teamed with civilian administrators to increase the capacity of local governance.²²⁰ In 2014 the AU published the new Concept of Operations for AMISOM and the approach was essentially the clear-hold-build COIN formula.²²¹ This approach requires AMISOM to jointly operate with an increasingly capable SNA. The joint AMISOM SNA expansion of control would eventually facilitate a handover and withdrawal of AU forces. Al-Shabaab during this expansion allowed the SNA and AU forces to move into smaller towns, but typically only after leaving IEDs or booby traps and then only retreating far enough away to still conduct raids or convoy ambushes.²²² In addition Al Shabaab simply retreats into the countryside, but still will exert control over the population through the establishment of checkpoints.²²³ AMISOM and the SNA's footprint has extended and their expansion has forced Al-Shabaab to move further into the countryside. Al Shabaab's relocation further into rural areas has

²²² Ibid.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/15/truck-bomb-mogadishu-kills-people-somalia.

²²⁰ Lotze and Williams, *The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia*, 8.

²²¹ Ibid., 9.

²²³ Williams and Hashi, "Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somali,"29.

diminished the group's combat effectiveness. Al Shabaab simply avoids direct combat with AU forces and thus rarely loses any equipment or suffer from high casualty rates.²²⁴ The preservation of Al-Shabaab's combat power means that the threat to AMISOM and the SNA has not significantly diminished and, likewise means that the local population is not secured through stabilization activities. The group's perseverance undermines the government's legitimacy.²²⁵

AMISOM and the FGS in Mogadishu do not always share the same understanding of purpose behind the stabilization campaign.²²⁶ AMISOM and other actors be it SNA, NGOs, or other governments involved in Somalia find it hard to operate jointly or in coordinated actions due to perceived operational security gaps.²²⁷ The military expansion was not supported with those governance or stabilization personnel to consolidate the military gains.²²⁸ AMISOM did not have sufficient police or civilian experts who could properly implement any of the required stability programs that would directly challenge Al-Shabaab's influence and provide legitimacy to the government in Mogadishu.²²⁹ With

²²⁴ Lotze and Williams, *The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia*, 12.

²²⁵ Williams and Hashi, "Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somali,"29.

²²⁶ Ibid., 27.

²²⁷ Lotze and Williams, *The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia*, 10.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Williams and Hashi, "Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somali,"31.

no personnel to backfill the military and conduct stabilization activities AMISOM's military forces are only extending their presence but not increasing governmental control. MINUSMA also suffers from a lack of capability to provide stabilization activities in the northern reaches of Mali, thus leaving the UN military units providing limited security while not addressing the roots of instability. The Somali government's expansion of control teamed with AMISOM's has suffered from a perceived lack of legitimacy due to some security forces being considered illegitimate and foreign due to ethnic dynamics.²³⁰ Like many places in Africa clan and ethnic dynamics can contribute or hinder the effectiveness of security forces.

AMISOM's primary partner in providing security is the SNA, which has struggled due to limited capability.²³¹ In order for AMISOM and the SNA to expand their area of control, and subsequently counter Al-Shabaab, both AMISOM and the SNA require a minimum level of interoperability. Effective interoperability between AMISOM and the SNA has not materialized.²³² The inability of the two organizations to work jointly allows Al-Shabaab to capitalize on the divisions between the two.

Also, in order to reestablish central governmental control, it is crucial that the FGS foster a trusting and cooperative relationship with the regional administrations. The central government in Mogadishu's relations with the various regional administrations

²³⁰ Lotze and Williams, *The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia*, 10.

²³¹ Williams and Hashi, "Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somali,"32.

²³² Ibid.

has been strained in the past due to the existing clan divisions in the countryside.²³³ The implication of clan dynamics means that AMISOM must be capable of working tactically with the regional leaders. Simultaneously, AMISOM must be capable of incorporating regional forces and considerations at the operational and strategic level in conjunction with the central government. All of this has to be done recognizing that due to the lack of governance and security many of the regions developed their own security apparatus. These apparatuses do not necessarily run contrary to AMISOM or the FGS's goals, but their presence means the SNA alone may not be the guarantor of security after AMISOM's handover of areas. This means AMISOM also cannot deny the regional security organizations that are legitimate a role in countering Al-Shabaab. The security situation in Somalia will necessitate continued persistent engagement from the international community, whether or not AMISOM transitions to a UN mission or remains an AU mission until the government in Mogadishu is capable of supporting itself.

AMISOM was originally designed to transition to a UN mission. As the security environment evolved and the threats in Somalia persisted the UN continued to not take full responsibility for the peacekeeping mission in Somalia. In order to support AMISOM, but also not have to take full responsibility for the execution of the mission, the United Nations has built two organizations to enhance the capability and build stabilization capacities inside AMISOM.

²³³ Williams and Hashi, "Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somali,"11.

UN Support

The United Nations has two parallel efforts operating inside Somalia: The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the United Nations Support office in Somalia (UNSOS). UNSOM's primary role is to support AMISOM through policy advisement, peacekeeping advisement, demobilization disarmament and reintegration activities, security sector reform (SSR), and rule of law to name a few. UNSOM also supports the FGS through similar activities. UNSOS provides the overarching logistical support to AMISOM, UNSOM and the SNA in limited circumstances or when operating alongside AMISOM forces for operations.²³⁴ The two UN organs operating inside of Somalia have separate roles but mutually supporting ones that aim to increase the capability to AMISOM and the effectiveness of the FGS. The SNA however are still not fully supported by UNSOS.²³⁵ The level of support provided by UNSOS to the Somalis has led to situations where SNA forces, which are chronically under resourced, are incapable of operating effectively when not alongside AMISOM.²³⁶ Similar to how outside donors support the Malian security forces, the SNA does receive outside donor support to increase capacity through the European Union Training Mission in Somalia, the United States, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates. These efforts to build capability and

 ²³⁴ United Nations (UN) Support Office in Somalia, "UNSOS Mandate," accessed
 3 February 2018, https://unsos.unmissions.org/unsos-mandate.

²³⁵ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Resolution 2245 (2015), 7551st Meeting, 9 November 2015, 3, accessed 14 September 2017, http://undocs.org/S/RES/2245(2015).

²³⁶ Williams and Hashi, "Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somali,"32.

capacity in the SNA will allow the SNA to work alongside AMISOM and receive further support in the fight against Al Shabaab. Until the SNA shows a sustained ability to work jointly with AMISOM the implications will be that AMISOM must serve as the main offensive, holding, and stability force.

Aspects of DOTMLPF-P

Organization

Headquarters

AMISOM was originally designed and deployed as a military mission with stabilization as a secondary concern, which primarily would have been executed by a UN mission. AMISOM continues to evolve in order to execute its increasing stability role, but AMISOM is essentially still a multinational headquarters. As a multinational headquarters the AMISOM leadership in Mogadishu consistently had command, but little control over the national contingents in their respective sectors.²³⁷ AMISOM consistently suffered from a lack of unity of effort between the sectors. Each sector is controlled by a single troop contributing country. This created a situation where the AMISOM headquarters.²³⁸ Ethiopia and Kenya's involvement is linked to their national interests in Somalia. Ethiopia and Kenya deployed forces under the auspicious of the AU, but they conduct operations that are primarily aimed at achieving national interests. The

²³⁷ Lotze and Williams, *The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia*, 11.

²³⁸ Ibid.

AMISOM headquarters has proved lacking in its ability to ensure that all TCCs operate within the mandate, which degrades the legitimacy of the mission to the local population. Any violation of civilian rights by AMISOM troops simultaneously undermines faith in the FGS in Mogadishu, as AMISOM and the SNA are also associated with the FGS.²³⁹ The parallel operating structure has meant that AMISOM has struggled to conduct synchronized offensive operations, which allows Al Shabaab to exploit the seams between sectors.²⁴⁰ An example of the lack of synchronization is seen in the Juba River region, which serves a strategically important area for the FGS to clear of Al Shabaab. The Juba River Offensive has been in planning for years and has yet to be launched allowing Al Shabaab a region to operate within and collect funds from the local population. The Juba River Offensive requires cross sector coordination and synchronization of effects to ensure Al Shabaab is effectively removed. These operations have proved difficult for AMISOM to execute, part of this is due to the force headquarters' inability to provide an operational framework that the TCCs will operate within.

Each of the countries apart of AMISOM have security interests in Somalia. The involvement of Ethiopia and Kenya are particularly nuanced as the fragility of Somalia directly impacts their shared boarders. The political dynamics between Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Burundi, and Uganda all play out in AMISOM's execution of the mission's mandate. Ethiopia serves as the primary political and military power in East Africa.

²³⁹ Lotze and Williams, *The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia*, 18.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 11.

Kenya generally ranks second in the power dynamics of eastern Africa. Djibouti regularly follows Ethiopia's lead with regards to Somalia policy. Uganda and Burundi having deployed under AMISOM the longest generally maintain force presence for international recognition in the United Nations and the AU. Uganda's central government in the recent years has faced domestic discontent with the seemingly never ending military investment that the UN and the AU have requested. Uganda has been a major proponent in the last two years for implementing a draw down and handover of security to the FGS. This is partially due in part to the years long AMISOM mandate and little perceived progress by the FGS.

Ethiopia and Kenya became involved in AMISOM due to the threat posed by Al Shabaab's operations. Kenya has endured numerous cross border incursions by the group including the infamous attack on the Westgate Mall in 2013, which left over 65 people dead. In 2015 a similar attack occurred at the Garissa University in Kenya. These attacks reinforced the calculus that Kenya needed to remain inside Somalia to maintain pressure on Al Shabaab and hinder the group's ability to conduct activities inside Kenya. Ethiopia like Kenya has national security interests in Somalia. Ethiopia's original incursion was to topple the Islamic Courts prior to AMISOM's deployment. Al Shabaab's emergence from the collapsed Islamic Courts Union only reinvigorated Ethiopia's desire to remain involved in Somalia. Ethiopia also has economic reasons for its involvement in Somalia. Somalia's location and fledgling government serve as a ripe opportunity for investment. Ethiopia sees the ability to reach the Indian Ocean through investment projects as a crucial line to increase the economic vitality of Ethiopia. All of these concerns and interests directly drive and contribute to Ethiopia's willingness to remain involved. The national interests that drive involvement in AMISOM also can undermine the mission's headquarters ability to provide for unity of effort. The command and control that can be exercised by the mission HQ extends as far as the contingents' home country governments allow. The relationship the TCCs have with AMISOM command and control structure has direct impacts on effectively operating against a group like Al Shabaab.

AMISOM has struggled in coordinated military operations between the TCCs. The coordination difficulties are amplified by the mission's expanding areas of operation. These areas facilitate Al Shabaab's ability to consolidate, move and threaten local populations. AMISOM has expanded its presence over the years to seize more territory from Al Shabaab, but much like Mali this expansion has only made supply routes and convoys more vulnerable.²⁴¹ This expansion has sometimes had catastrophic impacts. Numerous AMISOM outposts that are not mutually supporting was part of the reason the Kenyan base in El Adde was overrun in 2016. AMISOM is still in the process of evolving its Force Headquarters into a structure more closely related to a UN multidimensional mission, but still recognizing that the mission must still be capable of warfighting operations.

AMISOM much like MINUSMA is designed to work alongside the host government security forces. AMISOM continues to train and increasingly operate parallel to SNA formations. The SNA however is still in its infancy is slowly becoming a force capable of securing regions AMISOM clears or effectively operating in while being

²⁴¹ Lotze and Williams, *The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia*, 17.

reinforced by AU troops. AMISOM headquarters as of yet still has not integrated SNA personnel into its structure to increase interoperability. The SNA and AMISOM suffer from a trust deficit in some regions and among some commanders.²⁴² which likely has influenced the lack of integration of SNA personnel into the force headquarters. Distance also plays a role as the AMISOM headquarters is located within the AU compound inside the Mogadishu International airport complex while the SNA headquarters is roughly a 45-minute drive north on the outskirts of Mogadishu at Villa Gashandiga. The international airport in Mogadishu has turned into an ecosystem within itself that the SNA struggles to penetrate further leading to challenges of integration between AMISOM and the SNA.

AMISOM as well as the SNA receive support from international donors and the UN. AMISOM is particularly reliant on the UN. The United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) both serve as examples of how the UN has chosen to support, as opposed to be in the lead of, a peace enforcement style mission against violent extremist groups.

Intelligence Capabilities

AMISOM has taken full advantage of the benefits that intelligence operations can have on improving the security environment. AMISOM has consistently received support from donors, other than the UN, in intercepting communications between Al Shabaab networks. AMISOM has been trained and equipped or provided assets during operations

²⁴² Williams and Hashi, "Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somali,"33.

ranging from reconnaissance UAVs, signals intelligence, and other ISR platforms.²⁴³ AMISOM's intelligence is significantly aided by the fact that three of the TCCs are direct neighbors of Somalia and thus share ethnic, tribal, and cultural ties making it easier to develop an understanding of the threat networks. Due to the command and control aspects of AMISOM and the fact that each sector ostensibly is the sole responsibility of a singular TCC, the coordination and intelligence-sharing is not always done. Each one of the TCCs also use their respective host nation's intelligence methods inside Somalia. Differing methods and techniques means that it is impossible to fully understand the specific benefits and lessons learned from the individual countries' operations in Somalia. AMISOM does not have the same level of transparency as MINUSMA, but this is no different than any other traditional military operation and there is a noticeable level of importance placed on operational security.

Infantry Organization

AMISOM's troop contributing countries have made a point of deploying fully manned infantry battalions as well as niche unit formations to Somalia. Generally, AMISOM's forces are light infantry with full battalion staffs.²⁴⁴ A unique attribute of the AMISOM forces is that each TCC has deployed forces that existed in their home country and are serving as a rotation in Somalia. The habitual relationship and history of the formations implies that generally the forces' commanders and staffs know the strengths

²⁴³ M. Freear and C. de Coning, "Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for Peace Operations in Mali," *International Journal of Security and Development* 2, no. 2 (2013): 6, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.bj.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 11.

and weaknesses of their respective units. There is no standard battalion or formation that deploys as a part of AMISOM and the battalions are sourced by the TCC at a determination of the force requirements in their respective sector. Once in Somalia many of the AU forces fall in on equipment supported by the UN field office in Somalia. Many of the AMISOM troops travel in mine resistant ambush protected heavily armored vehicles. Much like in Mali the AMISOM troops are light infantry that are restricted to roads due to the employment of heavily armored vehicles. During the early stages of the AU's deployment the forces were less reliant on heavily armored vehicles, which served them well in the battle for Mogadishu and Kismayo. As time as progressed though AMISOM has transitioned to increasing the armor with which its forces operate. The early successes of AMISOM against Al Shabaab with light infantry that was reinforced by limited armored vehicles demonstrates that MRAPs do not necessarily ensure success. Al Shabaab moves quickly, is light, and easily blends into the population, which when being pursued by slow unwieldy vehicles stuck to fairly hardened roads only further aids the terrorist group.

In addition to the traditional TCC infantry battalions AMISOM has also seen the deployment of country specific enhanced infantry. The Ugandans in Sector 1 have deployed infantry with increased capability as well as the Kenyans in Sector 2. These formations have received additional training and perform more than targeted missions, which further reinforce the stability missions of the more traditional infantry formations.

<u>Training</u>

The TCCs for AMISOM receive significant support from outside donors in the pre-deployment training for Somalia deployments. The US Department of State's Africa

Contingency Operations Training and Assistance is only one such pre-deployment program. These activities have tailored their training regime for Somalia using historical techniques used by Al Shabaab to inform training. Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance supports all of Africa, but unlike Mali, the AMISOM TCCs focus more on abilities to respond to asymmetric attacks that are equally informed from numerous prior rotations fighting against Al Shabaab. The environment in which AMISOM operates means small unit tactics, ambush drills, outpost defense, and IED defeat plays a crucial role in pre-deployment training. AMISOM has demonstrated its ability over the years to conduct effective offensive operations to clear areas of Al Shabaab. The shortcomings come in the training on stability operations as the mission transitioned from primarily warfighting to stability. The requirement for secure environment has generally been filled by AMISOM military units due to the limited number of police units deployed by the AU.²⁴⁵ Law enforcement, good governance, and judiciary functions are not a focus for AMISOM's military units, thus civil services and law enforcement functions expertise is lacking. The UN has proved very adept at performing police functions and training. AMISOM has cleared numerous areas but lacked the ability to exploit the expulsion of Al Shabaab due to a robust police capability.²⁴⁶ The struggle to provide security demonstrates that a pure warfighting force, in the likes of AMISOM, needs an equally robust law enforcement arm.

²⁴⁵ Williams and Hashi, "Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somali,"31.

²⁴⁶ Lotze and Williams, *The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia*, 13.

<u>Material</u>

Ground Vehicles

AMISOM troop contributing countries have fielded everything from light wheeled vehicles, tanks, armored personnel carriers, armored wheeled vehicles, and variants of MRAPs. As AMISOM continues its operations the force must ensure it does not become overly reliant on MRAPs that due not increase the capability of its forces to attack pursue Al Shabaab. Al Shabaab consistently targets AMISOM convoys with IEDs, which have necessitated the deployment of heavily armored vehicles. Though MRAPs serve a purpose, when Al Shabaab attacks it is in light pick-up trucks and hit and run tactics are not mitigated when the AU troops cannot pursue due to their vehicle limitations. The SNA typifies how Al Shabaab maneuvers because both organizations ride in what are commonly referred to as "technicals" that are easier to maintain and cross country capable. AMISOM must ensure that it does not sacrifice effectiveness for security when deploying vehicles.

Communications Platforms

The AU TCCs in Somalia have been supported with common communications platforms from the UN and numerous fielding programs from donors. This has led to AMISOM having the capability to communicate throughout its formations. AU troops have been resourced with NATO complaint communications systems and commercial systems that are interoperable. The AMISOM's communication interoperability was not always the case. During the Kenyan clearing operation in Kismayo generally was done without solid communications between AMISOM HQ in Mogadishu and the Kenyan military headquarters.²⁴⁷ A common or at some minimum interoperable communication systems allows for adjacent contingents to support on another.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

Many of the AMISOM TCCs have been supported by bilateral forces' UAVs or the deployment of their home nation's platforms. AMISOM has used UAVs to successfully support offensive, convoy, and counter IED operations. The contingents have also received substantial home station training and equipment fielding from bilateral partners in preparation for Somalia deployments. The TCCs in AMISOM have a higher level of proficiency with UAVs due to the fact the systems are more ubiquitous. UAVs in reconnaissance roles to support convoys or offensive operations further enabled the effectiveness of AMISOM troops.²⁴⁸

Aviation

AMISOM, similar to MINUSMA, has suffered from a lack of aviation assets. The lack of attack rotary aircraft has limited AMISOM's ability to strike Al Shabaab in austere regions further forcing ground troops to follow and pursue.²⁴⁹ AMISOM's ability to provide rapid aviation support to convoys, offensive operations, and reactionary strikes has been hindered to the shortfall in aviation, which has consistently been voiced to the

²⁴⁷ Freear and de Coning, "Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for Peace Operations in Mali," 10.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 6.

²⁴⁹ Williams and Hashi, "Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somali,"30.

UN Security Council.²⁵⁰ UNSOS supports search and rescue, logistical resupply, and aerial medical evacuation for AMISOM troops through over 100 helicopter landing sites and fixed wing services to the six sector headquarters and smaller outposts.²⁵¹ The size of Somalia and the varied requirements of the mission has proven the necessity of a robust aerial capability to support ground operations.

Leadership

Many of the leaders in AMISOM have numerous rotations with the mission, which has meant that most have a very thorough understanding of the situation and threats. The leaders in Somalia are learning the necessity to be adaptable and persistent as they have transitioned to stability operations alongside more traditional warfighting missions. As addressed above though AMISOM suffers from a number of leadership challenges. The AMISOM Force Commander has limited command and control over the respective sectors and contingents.²⁵² The sometimes limited unity of command has required leaders of AMISOM to navigate the political caveats of each respective troop contributing country. The leaders at the sector headquarters similarly retain a level of autonomy from the force headquarters in Mogadishu. The sector commanders generally answer to their respective home nations' capitals, which can further undermine the

²⁵⁰ Williams and Hashi, "Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somali,"25.

²⁵¹ United Nations (UN) Support Office in Somalia, "Aviation Services," accessed 10 February 2018, https://unsos.unmissions.org/aviation-services.

²⁵² Lotze and Williams, *The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia*, 18.

legitimacy of the Force Commander and similarly limited effectiveness.²⁵³ The sector commanders in AMISOM do receive general guidance from the home nation as well as from the force headquarters. This allows each of the sector contingents to pursue operations that strive towards desired end states. Unlike MINUSMA the AMISOM sector headquarters have a more robust command and control relationship and this is likely due to the homogenous nature of the contingents operating in each sector. The autonomy of each sector commander allows for the freedom to adapt an approach that works towards success, but simultaneously this situation sometimes is done without sector objectives nesting within the force headquarters designs only further undercutting the Force Commander's legitimacy.

Personnel

AMISOM currently has deployed 22,126 uniformed personnel that includes military as well as police.²⁵⁴ The security situation in Somalia and the threat actors require a capable military arm, a police arm, and a civil advisory aspect. Somalia has come a long way from the late 1990s and early 2000s and the political advancements are due in large part to AMISOM's ability to degrade Al Shabaab. Al Shabaab has lost enough capacity that the organization is forced to fight as an insurgency rarely confronting AMISOM in open conventional combat. Alongside conventional infantry

²⁵³ Lotze and Williams, *The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia*, 18.

²⁵⁴ African Union Mission in Somolia (AMISOM), "Frequently Asked Questions," accessed 10 February 2018, http://amisom-au.org/frequently-asked-questions/.

units AMISOM has also deployed enhanced and specialty trained combat formations capable of precision strikes, information operations, civil affairs, and medical evacuation with the Kenya Rangers and the Ugandan People's Defense Force Special Forces Group serving as examples.²⁵⁵ These forces fill what the UN would consider Special Forces roles and provide the commanders with an agile effective force compared to traditional peacekeeping infantry formations.

Alongside the enhanced infantry capabilities AMISOM has developed an ever increasingly robust EOD capacity to combat Al Shabaab IEDs. Each TCC in AMISOM fields some level of EOD capability, which has increased the survivability of convoys and regular patrols. The tactics that Al Shabaab uses has forced AMISOM to rely more on niche capabilities than on purely light infantry. The long lines of communication and sometimes isolated outposts further means that AMISOM must be capable of sustaining forces that have been projected into rural areas. AMISOM forces must have formations that are capable of coordinating with air platforms for medical assistance as well as close combat aviation. AMISOM relies heavily on UNSOS for medical capacity and due to this UNSOS manages medical evacuations. UNSOS' management of medical evacuation limits AMISOM's institutional knowledge of conducting MEDEVAC operations. UNSOS though has proven that the UN is quite capable of conducting MEDEVAC as the organization is responsive and proactive in that UNSOS has designated numerous helicopter landing zones throughout Somalia. The establishment of landing zones

²⁵⁵ Seth G. Jones, Andrew M. Liepman, and Nathan Chandler, *Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Assessing the Campaign Against Al Shabaab* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2016), 48.

alleviates the issue of AMISOM's inability to properly establish landing zones and conducting responsive air to ground integration. This reliance has the impact that formations have less responsive medical care from their organic organization and thus at the mercy of the UN's ability to respond.

In conjunction with reliance on UN air platforms for medical evacuation AMISOM also suffers from a lack of attack aviation. The lack of aircraft means that AMISOM suffers from a lack of knowledgeable staff and personnel trained in the employment of aviation. Those TCCs that have deployed their own aviation assets have had to supply the personnel to ensure the operability of the equipment as well as the maintenance.

It has already been identified above, but AMISOM must increase its capacity in police advisors and civil governance advisors. The FGS has recently had another round of elections with a new president and cabinet. These 2016 elections highlight how Somalia is further progressing towards a more legitimate government and AMISOM's support to that government will require robust law enforcement and rule of law support. To be successful the military arm of AMISOM must have a coordinated and synchronized civil-military cooperation plan with personnel trained in the aspects of security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.

As Al Shabaab continues to attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the national and regional governments AMISOM must have a capable partner in the Somalia security organizations. AMISOM currently is working alongside the European Training Mission in Somalia to train and advise the growing SNA. Simultaneously AMISOM's Police arm is working to train Somali Police and thus create a capable partner. The necessity to have a partner capable of parallel or joint operations has thrust AMISOM into the role of warfighter as well as trainer. The role of advisor and trainer requires specialized training and thus requires an additional capability resident inside AMISOM.

Finally, AMISOM has fielded forces that are capable of operating jointly with bilateral partners that are currently conducting CT operations in Somalia. The ongoing CT operations in Somalia have supported AMISOM and the SNA by operating simultaneously but not at cross purposes per se.²⁵⁶ The United States has conducted operations unilaterally as well as with AMISOM and the SNA respectively. The unilateral and bilateral operations conducted by third parties does share the similarity with MINUSMA.

Conclusion

MINUSMA and AMISOM share many similarities. Both missions demonstrate two methods the United Nations has taken toward addressing the threat violent extremist organizations operating in fragile states pose. Mali and Somalia also share fragile state institutions that have struggles to conduct CT, COIN, and stability operations.

This chapter has attempted to lay out the environments in which MINUSMA and AMISOM operate. Simultaneously through the analysis of the history and current operating constructs in which the UN and AU function this chapter has identified key aspects of organization, training, material, leadership, and personnel pertinent to each

²⁵⁶ Jones, Liepman, and Chandler, *Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Assessing the Campaign Against Al Shabaab*, 49.

mission. Through analyzing the above aspects certain lessons learned and capability gaps have been identified and will be addressed in chapter 5.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The United Nations is now more actively engaged in combatting violent extremist organizations (VEOs) as seen in Mali or insurgent groups like Al Shabaab in Somalia. MINUSMA is the first United Nations Peacekeeping force deployed with the specific mandate to support the reestablishment of a host nation's sovereignty against insurgent groups, while also specifically responsible with combatting VEOs.²⁵⁷ The United Nations was on a steep learning curve when it transitioned AFISMA to MINUSMA. The United Nations was still learning from the ongoing AMISOM about the resilience of terrorist groups and how difficult and complex a peace operation is against a lethal terrorist organization. MINUSMA and AMISOM have forced the DPKO to come to grips with the evolving threats peacekeepers now face, and whether or not the organization can be successful against such actors.

Conclusion

This study has laid out the facts and completed an analysis of whether or not the DPKO is structured to execute peace enforcement mandates in a fragile state where that state cannot prosecute CT, COIN, or stability operations. The inability of the host nation to successfully conduct CT or COIN operations thrusts responsibility for the conduct of these missions to the UN force. In order to make a determination the below secondary

²⁵⁷ UNSC, Resolution 2364, Paragraph 20, Bullet (d).

questions had to be answered: First, should the Security Council continue to operations against asymmetric threats that inherently encompass CT and COIN to achieve the mandate? Second, can a PEO force properly conduct stability activities in a fragile state and, if so, what capabilities and additional training is required to continue to execute mandates against asymmetric threats? Third, should the UN Security Council exclude CT and COIN operations from peace enforcement mandates, but instead empower a bilateral agreement with member nations to operate in parallel to the PEO force? Finally, what capabilities and additional training would be required to continue to execute mandates against asymmetric threats?

Analysis of the AU's mission in Somalia and the UN's mission in Mali shows the Security Council should not authorize mandates that encompass CT or COIN tasks, because the normal TCCs do not possess the specialized units and training to conduct these missions. The United Nations as an organization does not readily embrace the execution of COIN and especially CT missions. The UN SECGEN has demonstrated that the UN is willing to conduct CT activities, but through the current Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) those actions are focused on counter propaganda, addressing roots of terrorism through stabilization activities, and through communication and coordination. The UN must be willing to take kinetic actions to C-VEOs in the field. The DPKO must operationalize its C-VEO approach and team with a peace enforcement mission. VEOs are extremely capable of operating transnationally, which poses immediate challenges to the UN because PEOs are solely based in a singular country. For the UN to be effective the peace operations must take a regional approach. This organizational unpreparedness leads to the troop contributing countries (TCCs)

being equally unprepared or untrained to operate in an environment where VEOs or insurgent groups serve as the main adversary. The United Nations and DPKO can effectively support stability activities in a fragile state, but the organization cannot effectively conduct stability activities while simultaneously facing VEOs and/or insurgent groups. MINUSMA has demonstrated how the United Nations struggles to even effectively support its own forces in an austere environment facing asymmetric threats. The United Nations has allowed individual nations to conduct unilateral or multilateral operations in the same operational areas as peacekeeping forces. The United Nations has authorized the French taskforce Barkhane and just recently the Sahel 5 to conduct operations against the same threats facing MINUSMA. MINUSMA's reliance on other organizations to directly combat the asymmetric threats demonstrates the lack of capability inside the peacekeeping force. These parallel forces allow MINUSMA to defer responsibility for offensive acts, but in actuality these are not disassociated from MINUSMA. The local inhabitants and threat groups associate these bilateral forces with MINUSMA, which can undermine the legitimacy of the mission and simultaneously justify the targeting of MINUSMA. The fact that these bilateral forces are associated with MINUSMA, but don't operate under its purview means the UN pays the consequences of any actions taken by Barkhane or the Sahel 5, forces it doesn't control. This means that MINUSMA could fail to achieve unity of effort with these parallel forces. If a third party or bilateral force is not used to combat VEOs or insurgents then the PEO force must be properly structured, trained, equipped, and supported.

This study has demonstrated that MINUSMA is not trained or equipped to execute mandates against VEOs or insurgent group. The DPKO must update its

procedures to identify and recruit troop contributing countries with the requisite skill sets. This leads to the overarching question this study has attempted to answer, which is the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations properly constituted to conduct Peace Enforcement missions against Violent Extremist Organizations in fragile nations that are unable to prosecute Counter Insurgency, Counter Terrorism, or Stability Operations on their own?

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations is not constituted to be successful in mandates such as MINUSMA. DPKO and MINUSMA suffer from structural deficiencies that prevent them from combatting violent extremist organizations. They must address several issues involving capabilities, training, restructuring, and resourcing to be successful in this new environment. This study of MINUSMA and AMISOM has led to a series of recommendations to increase the operational effectiveness of UN forces against VEOs.

Recommendations

First, in these missions, the UN multidimensional modular U staff force structure must be fully integrated with the political mission headquarters. The separation of the two staffs means that the entire mission lacks unity of effort and a shared campaign plan. Bringing all of the UN's agencies under one staff structure allows for positioning civilians alongside military staff officers further increasing a common understanding and shared purpose.

The observations of AMISOM and MINUSMA both demonstrate how essential effective command and control is to conducting operations against VEOs or insurgents. Both missions demonstrate that effectiveness is closely linked to the ability of the force headquarters to properly synchronize and communicate with subordinate headquarters. To improve common understanding, communications, and staff effectiveness the multidimensional force headquarters should have a Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCOS OPS), a Deputy Chief of Staff for Future Operations and Plans (DCOS FUOPs-P), a Deputy Chief of Staff for Operational Support (DCOS OS), and finally a Deputy Chief of Staff for Information (DCOS-I).

The DCOS Ops would be responsible for the Joint Operations Center, battle tracking, ensuring the leadership had a common understanding of the environment, and final responsibility for the execution of all operations inside the mission's area of responsibility. The Operations staff would be supported by civilian and military representatives from all UN agencies and associated staff sections. Similarly, it would be supported by air operations, maritime operations (as necessary), explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) cell, a CT cell, and police and law enforcement personnel. Finally, the United Nations must recognize the value in the employment of indirect fires assets. The DCOS Ops should encompass a fires cell to properly employ these assets. The fires cell would be capable of planning lethal and non-lethal fires as required through the area of operations. MINUSMA and AMISOM have both proven that peacekeepers must be capable of properly targeting and returning indirect fire. The incidents at Tabankourt and Kidal demonstrate that UN forces can easily be fixed and suppressed due to enemy indirect fires, and the units must have the capacity to respond. This ability achieves one

of the core aspects of the MINUSMA mandate, which is to protect UN personnel and facilities.²⁵⁸

The DCOS Ops would be supported by a U35 staff who would serve as a bridge from future operations and plans to current operations. The U5 and associated staff would be in the lead of the DCOS FUOPs-P, a staff that includes civil affairs experts, CT planners, political advisers, police and law enforcement advisers, humanitarian assistance advisers, UN agency LNOs and finally the evaluation (ORA) and best practices cells. This staff must develop a campaign plan and lines of effort. MINUSMA's past and current operations have demonstrated that the force is challenged by the fact that besides the tasks in the initial mandate no other campaign plan exists to guide the mission. Without a detailed plan the forces on the on ground who are perpetually in a reactionary mode. A complete and holistic campaign plan that encompasses all civilian and military actions with measures of effectiveness and performance allows the U5 and Force Commander to gauge progress and accountability.

Crucial to the execution of operations and the allocation of resources is a robust operational support staff. The U4 would serve as the lead for the DCOS OS. Incorporated within the DCOS OS staff would be the U1, medical leads, and the U6. MINUSMA and AMISOM have both demonstrated the dangers of overextension and supply shortfalls. An effective OS staff would help alleviate this.

VEOs have also proven their lethality and a need for robust and responsive medical assets. MINUSMA and AMISOM both share a necessity for medical evacuation

²⁵⁸ UNSC, Resolution 2364, Paragraph 20, Bullet (e).

via ground or more commonly via air. A lack of medical support or planning only serves to discourage TCCs from actively patrolling and then allowing VEOs or insurgents to have freedom of maneuver throughout the area of operations.

Crucial to any force conducting stability operations or facing asymmetric threats is a robust intelligence collection and analysis capacity. Traditionally the UN has shied away from intelligence collection due to perceived sensitivities. Understanding the drivers of conflict, threat networks, population dynamics, and enemy actions requires the UN to establish this capacity. The multidimensional force structure should create a DCOS-I in order to provide the leadership and other staff the best information to properly plan against. The DCOS-I would be led by the U2 and be composed of an ASIFU like capability. The ASIFU has proven to be a force multiplier in MINUSMA, but there is untapped potential as currently structured. The ASIFU is essentially a NATO capability and thus information sharing has been a challenge due to national disclosure regulations. If the UN developed an in house ASIFU capability then all information collected and analyzed would be capable of being shared throughout the organization and to all TCCs. The JMAC and UN ASIFU equivalent could then be merged thus increasing efficiency and streamlining efforts. Finally, the DCOS-I (a civilian) would support the messaging campaign through a military information support operation (MISO) cell to ensure appropriate messaging from the mission. Messaging has proven to be crucial when combatting VEO or insurgent groups as it serves as direct link to the populace and recruiting mechanism. Messaging by the enemy necessitates the need for a force to be

capable of creating a timely and effective messaging campaign to isolate bad actors from the population.²⁵⁹

Restructuring the main force headquarters is not sufficient. Proportional, robust staff structures at subordinate sector headquarters is also required. The central headquarters cannot be expected to effectively manage operations over the spans of distances that countries like Mali or Somalia represent. The sector headquarters should have the same capabilities and integration as the force headquarters to properly disseminate and communicate the mission and vision to subordinate troop contributing countries' formations. The sector headquarters should provide bottom-up refinement back to the force headquarters. The sector headquarters in MINUSMA and AMISOM both share the commonality that the TCCs have deployed battalions into the missions. These battalions typically do not deploy with robust staff sections and thus require aid from the sector headquarters. This means the sector headquarters effectively serves as the brigade command staff for the battalions. MINUSMA and AMISOM both struggle with span of control as each sector is allocated more than three to five battalions, which is historically demonstrated as the most any one brigade can effectively command and control. The force headquarters and sector headquarters are simultaneously acting alongside the host nation forces.

MINUSMA and AMISOM both must be capable of interoperability with the host nation's forces which leads to two additional requirements identified from this study: 1) the host nation should be incorporated into the headquarters through LNOs. 2) The

²⁵⁹ HQDA, FM 3-24, 511.

headquarters must possess the capacity to train the host nation's forces. In both countries bilateral agreements exist with third party countries to train host nation's forces. This initial training provides the host nation forces basic skills but it is dependent on the UN forces in the field, to operate jointly or at a minimum in parallel before attempting to act independently. This facilitates the need for the UN to have some capacity to conduct foreign internal defense or security force assistance. The principles of building partner capacity in the host nation are well suited for special forces units. This would allow UN special forces units to advise, assist, and accompany host nation forces thus working towards the mandate objective of reestablishment of central governmental control.

The sheer size of countries like Mali and Somalia demonstrate that these complex missions cannot successfully be done with sparse manning. A little over 13,000 forces in MINUSMA cannot be expected to effectively secure a country larger than the state of Texas. The UN must recognize that it must design and attempt to recruit a force capable of occupying such a large footprint realizing this is dependent on the constraints of willingness of TCCs to provide forces and budgetary considerations. However, under manning a mission has demonstrated that the force becomes consumed with simply trying to resupply itself rather than conducting operations to seize, retain, and deny the enemy a safe haven.

If the UN desires to continue to execute missions such as MINUSMA then it must recognize the fact that not all infantry are suited to accomplish the same tasks. Al Shabaab in Somalia and the Al Qaeda or ISIS linked groups in Mali are very maneuverable and capable of massing quickly to conduct attacks. After their attacks the groups are capable of melting back into the local population, thus making pursuit difficult. Due to the asymmetric nature of the threats, this study recommends the UN deploy a mixture of light infantry, heavy infantry, and special forces or advanced infantry combined with the increased intelligence collection discussed earlier.

The light infantry would be equipped with light trucks for standard patrols and traditional peacekeeping tasks. The light infantry formations would be more maneuverable in austere environments and increased maneuverability would improve force survivability. The forces could effectively pursue attackers. These light infantry battalions would be trained and very capable in small unit tactics for mounted or dismounted operations. These forces must also be self-sufficient and capable of long duration patrols. The light infantry would then be best suited for denying threat groups a safe haven. The increased operational tempo would also serve the function of allowing the staff to receive consistent reports with regards to the local population. This information injected from the tactical units would allow higher commands to adjust planning, resources, or address incidents that may undermine the effectiveness of the mission. The other benefit of light infantry would be the lower cost of maintenance and the employment of vehicles that could be supported through the local economy.

The role of convoy security or resupply operations would rest with the heavy infantry formations. These formations would not be expected to pursue attackers, but must be survivable against the tactics employed by asymmetric threats. The heavy infantry would be equipped with mine or improvised explosive device resistant vehicles such as Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. The heavy infantry would receive additional training on convoy operations, vehicle recovery, and vehicle maintenance. The heavy infantry would provide the force headquarters a formation dedicated to addressing the constant supply requirements without draining combat forces from necessary patrolling missions. The heavy infantry would also serve as route security forces and if necessary as formations to provide a platform for cordon operations.

Finally, the UN should recruit more SOF qualified forces from troop contributing countries. AMISOM has proven the effectiveness of employing special forces or advanced infantry to C-VEOs. The Ugandan Special Reconnaissance unit serves as an example of this in Somalia or the relatively new Senegalese advanced infantry deployed in Mali. These forces are crucial to being able to conduct operations directed at those asymmetric threats and have the training to be more effective than a traditional peacekeeping infantry battalion. These forces when properly trained, deployed, resourced, and managed allow the UN to mitigate the actions of parallel forces while effectively achieving the aims outlined in the mandate. The UN has already recognized the value of SOF and designated specific missions for SOF identified units through its UN Peacekeeping Missions Military Special Forces Manual from 2015. The tasks and skills required to carry out these missions are already resident in many of the TCCs that deploy in Africa. The United States currently trains numerous partner countries in skills that would qualify them to serve as UN SOF. DPKO can encourage the recruitment and deployment of these advanced infantry or SOF forces through financial incentives.

Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) units are also becoming increasingly necessary due to the proliferation of improvised explosive device (IED) tactics and materials. EOD units must be deployed to meet sector requirements for route clearance and support patrols.

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Additionally, MINUSMA and AMISOM have demonstrated that a robust unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capability can pay large dividends. Each infantry unit should deploy with small UAVs, but each sector headquarters should also have an UAV component. UAV forces at each sector headquarters would provide increased situational awareness, ISR support, increased survivability, and route reconnaissance. The UN force must also reconsider requirements for manned aircraft to support heavy lift operations and medical evacuation missions.

Aviation should not be primarily aligned against support operations but should be forward deployed as they prove crucial in responsiveness to conduct CT and COIN operations. Mandate's such as MINUSMA's allow for attack aviation to conduct kinetic operations. AMISOM has effectively deployed attack aviation to serve as a quick reaction force (QRF) when available. Al Shabaab's exploitation of their attack on El Adde was cut short by the response of Kenyan attack aviation. Aviation limited to QRF does hinder a more proactive capability to effectively C-VEOs. Similarly, the UN use of Dutch attack aviation in Tabankort preserved the lives of UN peacekeepers

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement is a complex and dynamic environment by their nature but operating against insurgencies or VEOs adds an additional layer of complexity. The UN already possesses the institutional knowledge to conduct stability operations. That knowledge must be teamed with a clearer understanding of how to conduct operations against the asymmetric threats that operate in places like Mali or Somalia. The UN should incorporate specific mission training for leaders and soldiers alike on COIN and CT operations. Kinetic operations against threats like those in Mali or Somalia can be taught at home station through programs similar to those already conducted by the US or European Union. The leaders, soldiers, and their staffs must be trained on the non-kinetic aspects of CT and COIN operations. For the UN to be successful in missions like Mali or Somalia the staff and leaders must understand how to isolate threat actors from the local population while similarly not alienating themselves or undermining the mission's legitimacy.

This study has laid out how the force structure should be organized and adjusted in order to conduct missions like MINUSMA. Similarly, the evidence has shown that increased personnel and variations in types of units with niche capabilities pay huge dividends. The threats faced by forces like MINUSMA and AMISOM require specialized training to be effective. The staff and force commanders must be trained to properly employ niche forces and equally trained to use these forces against VEOs or insurgents. Missions like MINUSMA require robust enabler equipment, but equipment that is equally survivable and maintained. Leaders operating in missions like MINUSMA must be agile and adaptive simultaneously they must be innovative and not risk adverse. The VEOs and insurgents are very adept at taking advantage of instability and ungoverned spaces. Peace operations leaders facing forces like those in Mali must be capable of providing a common vision and communicating that vision. Finally, the leaders must be capable of visualizing the operating environment and developing innovative approaches to achieving their mandates.

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