

WHAT ARE THE HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL REASONS FOR
THE CONTEMPORARY GREEK-MACEDONIAN DISPUTE, AND HOW DO THEY
INFLUENCE CURRENT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES?

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General Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

WHAT ARE THE HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL REASONS FOR THE CONTEMPORARY GREEK-MACEDONIAN DISPUTE, AND HOW DO THEY INFLUENCE CURRENT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES?
by Major Mitko Popov, 108 pages.

The Greek-Macedonian dispute is an issue that started in 1991 after the dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the establishment of the Republic of Macedonia as an independent country. The whole issue started as a dispute over the name of the country. This dispute continues to be relevant and is a sticking point in the relations between the two countries. It is also a crucial factor that stalls the Euro-Atlantic integration of Macedonia. Even though this conflict started as a name dispute, over time this issue has evolved and changed. The reasons behind this evolution of the dispute are deeper, and very often are addressed as part of the ancient history of the region. The origins of this dispute manifest themselves in the historical, political and economic events that occurred in more recent history. The right identification of the causes that led to the dispute, and addressing the various grievances is a decisive step in the process of reaching a possible solution to the problem.

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ACRONYMS

DIME	Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economy
ELIAMEP	Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy
EU	European Union
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FYROM	The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
ICJ	International Court of Justice
JNA	Yugoslav National Army
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
USD	United States Dollars
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Research Question

Since Macedonia gained its independence in 1991 from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), Greece has opposed the constitution of the new state because it referred to itself as Macedonia. Greece's attitude toward the use of the name Macedonia continues to create friction between Macedonia and Greece and has fueled a dispute which has lasted for almost three decades. The ongoing dispute also makes the relationship between Macedonia and Greece more complex and tense at times.

The name of the country is also connected with multiple social, cultural, and political aspects; it also symbolizes part of the national identity of these nations. As such, it is understandable why this question is so important and contributes to the difficulty of finding a viable solution that both countries support. Over the years, numerous attempts were made to resolve this issue. Some of these attempts were just formalities initiated by both governments to demonstrate a willingness to solve this issue, and some were genuinely oriented toward finding a viable solution; however, all of these attempts failed. Why did these attempts fail? Why is it so difficult for both sides to reach an agreement and a solution to the problem? Why does the use of the name Macedonia bother Greece so much? To answer these questions, developing a better understanding of the historical, political, and sociological context of the dispute is required. From these ideas, the primary research question of this paper evolved: "What are the historical, political and

sociological reasons for the contemporary the Greek-Macedonian dispute, and how do they influence current relations between the two countries?”

Since the research question is complex, the use of four secondary questions will facilitate an understanding of the context, and in framing the analysis. The secondary questions are listed below:

1. What are the historical reasons for the current dispute between Macedonia and Greece?
2. What are the current political reasons behind the dispute?
3. How much do current economic interests effect the dispute?
4. How are the instruments of national power: Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economy (DIME) used by the two sides as a means of achieving national interests in this dispute?

Background

For centuries, the Balkan Peninsula is considered a “crossroad” of the world. A region where east meets west and south connects with the north, desired by powerful countries through history due to its natural resources and access to warm water ports. Its location enabled economic prosperity and the mixing of very diverse populations (cultures, religions, and ethnic groups). The Byzantine, Roman, and Ottoman Empires are some of the great powers that shaped the future of the Balkans and became a catalyst for numerous armed conflicts through history. Two of the countries in this region, Greece and Macedonia, have strong historical linkages; however, they also have equally strong differences. To understand the origins of conflict and contemporary friction between

these two countries, a basic understanding of 20th Century history is required. One of the events that rekindled friction between these two countries was the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was not excluded from these events, and in 1991 the SFRY disintegrated. Five new internationally recognized states formed on the Balkan Peninsula out of the SFRY: Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), comprised of Serbia and Montenegro. Many of these former republics of SFRY had sought to gain their independence through referendums. However, the weakened federal government of the SFRY decided to employ the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) to stop secessionist states, which quickly escalated into violence and eventually led to war. First, the war started in Slovenia. It lasted ten days and resulted in Slovenia's independence.¹ The war between Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the FRY lasted four years and became the most destructive war in Europe since the Second World War.² The motivations and reasons for the war are varied, but probably the most important revolved around the complicated ethnic and religious relationships in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Croatia. Macedonia was the only country from the former Yugoslavia that gained independence without a war. Therefore, during the 1990's, the politicians and the media were often referring to Macedonia as the "Oasis of peace" in the Balkans, emphasizing the peaceful divorce of

¹ John B. Allcock, Marko Milivojevic, and John. J. Horton, *Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: an Encyclopedia* (Denver, CO: ABC-CLIO, 1998), 274.

² On April 27, 1992 with the new constitution SFRY became Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

Macedonia with SFRY.³ However, the peaceful creation of Macedonia was not without challenges. Armed conflict with other republics of the SFRY was still possible. Bulgaria recognized the country but did not recognize the national identity of the people of Macedonia, and Greece did not recognize the new country and imposed sanctions on Macedonia revolving around the name and national identity of the people.

Due to the complicated and turbulent history of the Balkans, the neighboring countries, motivated by their national interests, acted and perceived the birth of the Macedonian state differently. The major reasons for the attitude of Greece toward the Macedonian state were based on the name of the country and the national identity of the Macedonian people. Greece considered the use of term Macedonia as its historical right which dated back to ancient Greece. Macedonia, on the other hand, argued that it had the right to use the same name which it had already been using when it was part of the SFRY, as the People's Republic of Macedonia.⁴ This name became official after the Second World War, with the establishment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The name was taken following the Balkan wars in 1912 and 1913, because part of Macedonia, which was occupied by the Ottoman Empire for more than five

³ Vasiliki P. Neofotistos, *The Risk of War: Everyday Sociality in the Republic of Macedonia* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 27.

⁴ Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, "Ustav SFRJ iz 1963" (eng. "SFRY constitution of 1963") (Belgrade, 1963), accessed February 15, 2018, <http://mojustav.rs/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Ustav-SFRJ-iz-1963.pdf>. With the constitution of 1963 the Peoples Republic of Macedonia is renamed into the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, as well as the other republics in the federation. The names of the republics are excerpts of part I, Chapter I, article 2 from the Yugoslavian constitution of 1963.

centuries, became a part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Also during these wars, the territory of Macedonia which was under Ottoman occupation was divided among the three victorious countries from the Balkan wars, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. The First World War did not bring significant changes to the policies regarding the “new territories.” During the interwar period, the official policies of Greece, Bulgaria, and the newly formed Kingdom of Yugoslavia focused on incorporating the “new territories” into their states, disregarding the minorities’ wishes and assimilating their populations.

Before analyzing the historical, economic, and political factors and their current role, a short overview of the Balkans history, and the origins of Greek-Macedonian disputes is required. During the 14th century, the Ottoman Empire became a world power and started its conquests in the Balkan region. During the 15th Century, the Ottoman Empire reaches its peak when the entire Balkan Peninsula became a part of the Ottoman Empire, and the borders of the Empire stretched to Vienna.⁵ After these two centuries, the power and influence of the Ottoman Empire started to decline. Uprisings in the conquered territories eventually lead to the formation of new states born from the ashes of the once mighty Empire. Up until the beginning of the 20th century, the Ottoman Empire lost most of its territories in Europe and the Balkan region. The great powers of Europe, Germany, France, Great Britain, Austro-Hungary, and Russia, were trying to decrease Ottoman influence and to strengthen their positions in the critical region of the Balkans. They were building their influence by providing support for the states which

⁵ Stanford Jay Shaw and Malcolm Edward Yapp, “Ottoman Empire,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed December 1, 2017, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ottoman-Empire/The-peak-of-Ottoman-power-1481-1566>.

gained their independence from Ottoman Empire. The newly created Balkan states, encouraged by the great powers and their expansionistic policies, initiated plans for war with the Ottoman Empire to expand their territory and influence.

By the end of the 19th Century, negotiations led to alliances between the Balkan states of Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, and Bulgaria to accomplish their nationalistic goals. At the same time, Serbia and Bulgaria due to their territorial proximity, religious beliefs, and Slav based language considered the population on the territory of Macedonia as Serbian or Bulgarian. This approach enabled the further division of the territory of Macedonia between these two countries to appear more legitimate, and thus the partition gained public support from their respective populations. To foster wider support and to gain public trust, especially among the Macedonian population, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro, began to use religious divides to claim that their brother Christians needed to be free from Ottoman occupation. Still, this narrative was interpreted differently by the Balkan countries which manifested itself in the varying alliances and secret annexes.⁶ The First and Second Balkan Wars exposed the aspirations of the Balkan states to gain territory at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Every country had different goals. Greece wanted the wheat fields of Macedonia, and Bulgaria wanted access to the Aegean Sea. Serbia also wanted access to the Aegean Sea, as well as the Adriatic Sea through the territory of today's Albania. Montenegro was the smallest country in the

⁶ Frank Maloy Anderson and Hershey Amos Shartle, *Handbook for the Diplomatic History of Europe, Asia, and Africa, 1870-1914* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1918), 423. In 1912 Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between Bulgaria and Serbia was signed, at the same time a secret annex set out the territorial settlement and the division of Macedonia between Serbia and Bulgaria.

Balkans and wanted to expand its territory especially in the south toward Skadar (also known as Scutarri).

The First Balkan War started in October 1912 with Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Bulgaria on one side and the Ottoman Empire on the other side. The war was short and officially ended with the London Peace Treaty in May 1913.⁷ This treaty limited the European territories of the Ottoman Empire to Tsarigrad (basically Istanbul), and the Balkan countries each gained land or other concessions. Also, the Albanian state was established, and Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece divided the territory of Macedonia among themselves and one small portion of territory assigned to Albania.

Not all these countries were satisfied with the treaty, especially Bulgaria which in June of the same year, declared war and attacked Greece and Serbia. The Second Balkan War in 1913 was fought between the former allies from the First Balkan War, and it showed the real essence of the different interpretations of the meaning of “liberation.”⁸ Unfortunately for Bulgaria, its opponents, Romania, the Ottoman Empire, and Montenegro saw an opportunity for gaining territory and entered the war against Bulgaria. Surrounded by enemies and faced with superior armies, Bulgaria was forced to

⁷ Makedonka Mitrova and Marija Pandevska, *Балканските војни и актуелните состојби на Балканот* (Balkan wars and current conditions) (Balcanica Posnaniensia. Acta et studia, XX, Poznań 2013, Wydawnictwo Instytutu Historii UAM), 108-109.

⁸ About the warring character of the Balkan check H.R. Wikinson, *Картите и политиката: преглед на етнографската картографија на Македонија* (Maps and Politic: Overview of the Ethno-Geographical Cartography of Macedonia) (Skopje, Matica, 1992), 183; Mark Mazover, *Балканот – кратка историја (Balkan-brief History)* (Skopje, Evro Balkan Press, 2003), 129-151; Latinka Perovic *Između anarhije i autokratije: Srpsko društvo na prelazima (XIX-XX)* (Between Anarchy and Autocracy: Serbian Society on Crossing (XIX-XX)) (Belgrade, Zagorac, 2006), 28.

seek peace only a month after the war started. The outcome of the Second Balkan War was the Treaty of Bucharest in which Greece and Serbia were the major winners and expanded their territory significantly. With the Bucharest Treaty, Greece maintained possession of the city of Salonika (later referred as Thessalonica or Thessaloniki) which at the time was the most important harbor on the Balkan Peninsula. It provided a trade connection for the Balkan countries with Middle Eastern countries and Africa. Gaining the city of Salonika (Thessaloniki) and its port provided the Greek government with a great advantage regarding establishing the Greek state as a critical economic and trading country on the Balkan Peninsula. In time, Thessaloniki became an important economic and administrative center and a city of great importance for Greece. Montenegro also expands its territory at the expense of Ottoman Empire. Bulgaria had gained territory with the First Balkan War but lost some of that territory as a result of Bucharest Treaty in the Second Balkan War in favor of Romania and the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire lost most of its territory in Europe in the First Balkan War but gained back some of that territory during the Second Balkan War at the expense of Bulgaria. Overall, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria were the countries which lost the most from both wars.⁹ These gains or losses of territory shaped the future of these countries and had a major impact on the political decisions made by the Balkan nations during the First and later in the Second World War.

⁹ Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans. Twentieth Century*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 99-100.

The outcome of the Second Balkan War and the decisions made with the Bucharest Treaty created settings for a new war. The countries that lost the most with the Wars of 1912-1913 were unsatisfied and were looking for ways to recover the losses, on the other hand, the winning sides were striving to keep what they gained. Hence, the preparations for a new war soon started. These preparations included series of negotiations and diplomatic calculations which enabled some of the Balkan countries to be directly involved in the war after it started. Although the Balkan states consider by many as pawns for the great powers, these states would have a crucial role in igniting the most devastating war that the world had seen to this point in history.

The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarian Empire became a friction point and a source for tensions between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Serbia. Those frictions culminated in 1914 with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir of the Habsburg throne in Sarajevo.¹⁰ The Austro-Hungarian Empire considered Serbia as accountable for the assassination.¹¹ This incident led to a series of events that eventually culminated on July 28, 1914, with the Austro-Hungarian Empire declaring war on Serbia. This event considered to be the official beginning of the First World War.¹² The outbreak of the First World War caught the Balkan states unprepared and still in the process of consolidation from the Second Balkan War.

¹⁰ The Habsburgs were the Austro-Hungarian ruling dynasty when the archduke Ferdinand was assassinated.

¹¹ Jelavich, *History of the Balkans. Twentieth Century*, vol. 2, 113.

¹² *Ibid.*, 114.

Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire were the countries that lost the most from the Balkan Wars. However, as a part of their efforts to recover losses from the Balkan Wars, both countries negotiated to join either the forces of the Central Powers or the Entente. The decisive factor in determining which side these countries would join, regardless of the bitterness and frictions with Serbia and Greece, was which side would offer more territory for joining them. As a result in return for territorial gains, the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers on August 2, 1914, and Bulgaria in September 1915.¹³

On the other side, Greece and Serbia were satisfied with the outcome of the Wars and were striving to preserve the status quo. Even though Serbia was hoping to avoid a conflict with the Austro-Hungarian Empire it had no choice. Soon after the assassination of the archduke Ferdinand, the Austro-Hungarian Empire imposed the ultimatum and a declaration of war on Serbia. Greek involvement in the First World War was very controversial. The Greek monarch, King Constantine I, was the brother-in-law of the German Kaiser (Emperor) Wilhelm II, and he supported the pro-German policy. But, because of the strong British and French presence, Greece remained neutral. On the other hand, the Greek Prime Minister Venizelos favored the Allies. After a long domestic political crisis in June 1917, King Constantine abdicated in favor of his son Alexander. Venizelos supported by Britain and France became a Prime Minister, and the same month Greece entered the war on the side of the Entente.¹⁴ With the United States entering the war in 1917 on the side of the Entente and the unsuccessfully German offensive in the

¹³ Jelavich, *History of the Balkans. Twentieth Century*, vol. 2, 116-118.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 120-121.

western front in spring of 1918, the war turned against the Central Powers. Finally, in 1918 the First World War ended, but the peace conditions for the defeated were yet to be determined. The official end of the First World War was a series of peace treaties which started with the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and the Treaty of Versailles and ended with the Treaty of Lausanne between Greece and Turkey in 1923.¹⁵

As a result of the end of the First World War, some significant decisions were made that affected not only the Balkans but Europe and the World as well. The United States became a major power and actor on the international scene, and on the proposal of President Woodrow Wilson for a League of Nations was adopted. In the Balkans, one new major power appeared, and two others disappeared. In November 1918, the Austro-Hungarian Empire fell apart and the new states, Austria and Hungary, were established.¹⁶ The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (SCS), under the rule of the Serbian King Alexander, was also established in December.¹⁷ The Turkish Republic, as a successor of the Ottoman Empire, was created in 1923, and the Mustafa Kemal Ataturk became its President.¹⁸

In addition to political changes the end of the First World War also brought territorial changes on the Balkans. Greece and the Kingdom of SCS as winners of the war

¹⁵ Michael S. Neiberg, *The Treaty of Versailles: a Concise History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), ix-x.

¹⁶ Jelavich, *History of the Balkans. Twentieth Century*, vol. 2, 121.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 132.

expanded their territory. The Kingdom of SCS gained territory in Macedonia, Vojvodina, and Bosnia and Hercegovina at the expense of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Greece also expands its territory at the expense of Bulgaria and Turkey. Greece also lost Turkish territory later as a result of the campaign in Anatolia. Turkey and Bulgaria were defeated, and as such, they expected to lose some of the territories. Bulgaria lost parts of its territory in favor of Greece, and the Kingdom of SCS and Turkey lost its territories in the Middle East but regained some of the previously lost territories in favor of Greece.¹⁹

National interests drove the decisions regarding territorial changes (loss or gain) as a result of the conclusion of the First World War. The historical, national or social composition of the territory and populations, as well as the right of self-determination, were disregarded. These decisions later created additional problems, issues, and friction, especially related to minorities, that the respective countries tried to resolve using different legal and illegal means.

Different sources provide varying numbers for the minority populations from the new territories and their ethnic or national origins. This claim is partially based on the fact that Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece were not considering the populations from the territory of Macedonia as Macedonians, but rather as a Greeks, Serbs or Bulgarians to justify their assimilation policies. Even though the Greek census in 1920 was very detailed about “new territories” those facts were never made public, which leaves room for speculation about the ethnic and religious composition of the population. Greece

¹⁹ For more about the peace treaties and gains and losses of the Balkan actors of the First World War see Jelavich, *History of the Balkans. Twentieth Century*, vol. 2, 121-133.

published the results only from the “old territories” of Greece (Sterea, Evoia, Thessalia, Arta, Ionian Islands, Cyclades, Pelopones, etc...).²⁰ However, this census does provide information about the population in the area of Trikala (which is just south of the “new territories”). There, among the other languages that were spoken by the population such as Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, “Macedonian” also existed even though the number of the Macedonian speaking population was very small (only 37 people).²¹ The data from census shows that the Greek government considered the Macedonian language as a separate language and not as a part of the other Balkan languages, and hence the nationality could also be considered different and unique in comparison to the other nations. Also, after the implementation of the Bucharest and Versailles Treaties, Greece expanded its political borders to the north. With this territory also came a native population which was assimilated by the Greek state. There are no exact numbers of the total number of the people in these territories, but estimates are around 1.7 million people, after the Second Balkan War.²² Even though the numbers of the population were smaller than before the wars, there was an ethnically mixed population in which the

²⁰ Hellenic Statistical Authority, “Greece population census of 1920,” accessed April 20, 2018, http://dlib.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/yeararticles?p_topic=10007862&p_cat=10007862&p_catage=1920.

²¹ Ministère de l'économie Nationale, “Resultats Statistiques Pour Thessalie et Alta” *Recensement de la Population de la Grece, au 19 Decembre 1920 – 1 Janvier 1921*, (Athens, Imprimerie Nationale, 1929), 181-183, accessed April 20, 2018, http://dlib.statistics.gr/Book/GRESYE_02_0101_00011.

²² Anderson and Hershey, 440.

majority was from a non-Greek origin.²³ The ethnic diversity of the new territories was not popular with the Greek government, which continued the policy of assimilation of the population and became an issue for the Greek government since the process of assimilation takes time. The solution (at least partially) came with the Treaty of Neuilly-Sur-Seine²⁴ and the Treaty of Lausanne²⁵ which provided an opportunity to settle this issue. These treaties set the conditions for a voluntary exchange program for some of the population between Greece and Bulgaria, and a compulsory exchange of population between Turkey and Greece.²⁶ After the attempts for a voluntary exchange failed, all three countries started forced resettlements of the minority population. These events changed the demographic composition of the entire region, including the newly conquered territories in Greece.²⁷

²³ European Population Conference, "Changes in ethnic structure in Macedonia after emigration of Turkish minority," 2008, accessed April 17, 2018, <http://epc2008.princeton.edu/papers/80013>.

²⁴ The treaty was signed in 1919 between Bulgaria as a defeated side from the First World War and Allied victory sides including Serbia and Bulgaria.

²⁵ The treaty was signed in 1923 between allied French Republic, British Empire, Kingdom of Italy, Empire of Japan, Kingdom of Greece, and the Kingdom of Romania at the sunset of the First World War and established the borders of the Turkey. The treaty of Lausanne also led to international recognition of the sovereignty of the newly formed "Republic of Turkey" as the successor state of the Ottoman Empire.

²⁶ In accordance with the treaties additional conventions were signed between Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey for population exchange.

²⁷ Philipp Ther, *The Dark Side of Nation-States: Ethnic Cleansing in Modern Europe*, ed. Charlotte Kreutzmuller (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014), 232-233.

As a result of the Balkan Wars and the First World War, the political decisions made by the leaders of the various countries influenced the alliances formed before and during the Second World War. These political decisions drove countries to lean towards either the Allied or the Axis powers. Bulgaria, hoping to gain territory, joined the Axis. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia²⁸ joined the Axis as well. However, this did not last long due to pressure from the people, led by the communists; the government pulled out of the treaty. This was one of the reasons Hitler's Germany occupied the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and Greece, with the territories eventually being divided into occupation zones. Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria controlled these occupation zones. During this period the minority question was influenced by the development of the resistance movement and the need for mobilizing the population against the forces of the Axis. The Yugoslav communist movement, led by Josip Broz Tito, heavily influenced the resistance movement in the Yugoslavian portion. The communist slogan "Братство и Единство" (*Eng. Brotherhood and Unity*), and promises for equality among all people in the country assisted the communists in gaining wide support with the local Macedonian population. The critical event that had a major impact over the future policies and the Macedonian minority issue, as well as the role of Macedonia in the Yugoslav Federation, was the Communist Congress in 1943. The Congress took part in the city of Jajce, during which Macedonia (Peoples Republic of Macedonia) became one of the six states of SFRY.²⁹

²⁸ Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1929 was renamed in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

²⁹ Jelavich, *History of the Balkans. Twentieth Century*, vol. 2, 207.

Even though the Second World War did have an impact on the interstate relationships, it did not bring major changes in the policies and the attitudes in dealing with the “Macedonian question” in Greece. During the Second World War, Greece fought alongside the Allies, and its efforts were rewarded at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences where the decisions of the Bucharest Treaty were reaffirmed with some minor modifications in favor of the Serbian portion of Yugoslavia at the expense of Bulgaria. These decisions, as well as the support that Greece had from the Allies, shaped the future relations between Greece and Yugoslavia in regard to the “Macedonian question.”

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was created under the concept of equality between all the states within one federal system united under the communist ideology. Tito became the president of the SFRY for life. Even though each federal state in Yugoslavia had a separate communist party, they were all controlled by the Yugoslav Communist Party. Although the Soviet Communist Party, through the Cominform,³⁰ imposed its influence on the Yugoslav Communist Party in time this influence faded. The

³⁰ Bill Bland, “The Cominform Fights the Revisionism,” *Encyclopedia of Anti-Revisionism On-Line*, ed. Paul Samb and Sam Richards, accessed May 2, 2018, <https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/uk.postww2/bland-cominform.pdf>; Anna Di Biagio, “The Establishment of the Cominform” in Giuliano Procacci, *The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences, 1947/1948/1949*, vol. 24 (Milan: Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, 1994), 11-34. The Cominform was established in 1947 more as informal organization where the different communist’s parties could organize exchange of experience and coordinate its activities based on the mutual agreement. Still, the Cominform was controlled by the Soviet Communist Party and Stalin. Yugoslav Communist Party and Tito were also very respected by the Communist community, and that was one of the reasons why the Cominform headquarters were located in Belgrade and after the expulsion was transferred to Bucharest, Romania.

inability of Stalin to influence (or control) Tito led to tensions between them and culminated with the expulsion of Yugoslav Communist Party from the Cominform. Accordingly, international relations between Greece and Yugoslavia (and thus the Macedonian issue) depended on the policy decisions that Tito made with other communist parties, especially with the Soviet party, and the Cominform.

Complicated relationship followed with “cold-warm” periods was characteristic of the relationships between the SFRY and Greece. This relationship was inevitably connected to the support that Tito was providing to the Greek Communist Party. The Greek government, which was under democratic influences saw the communists as a threat and the official relationships were “cold.” After the expulsion, Yugoslavia took a friendlier approach toward the western countries and their relationship with Greece was more “warm.” The “warm” period in the relationships between the SFRY and Greece was especially evident after 1950 when Yugoslavia together with Egypt and India formed the Non-Aligned Movement as a third option between the United States and the Soviet Union.³¹ After the relationship between Tito and Stalin deteriorated, the western countries, especially the United States and Great Britain, saw an opportunity for weakening the Soviet position in the Balkans.

After Yugoslavia broke with the Eastern Bloc and adopted a non-aligned stance in the 1950s, Greece came under fierce pressure by the U.S.A. to normalize relations with her northern neighbor and refrain from stirring up mischief in the future, as

³¹ For more about the Non-Aligned movement see Natasa Miskovic, Harald Fischer-Tiné, Nada Boskovska, *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War Delhi-Bandung-Belgrade* (London: Routledge, 2014).

Yugoslavia was perceived to be a strategically important buffer state in the soft underbelly of the Warsaw Pact.³²

Even though United States of America (USA) and Great Britain, pressured Greece and stressed the importance of the Greek-Yugoslav relationship, the “Macedonian question,” remained a hot topic for the relationship between the two countries.³³ At the same time, Greece, was not immune to the communist influence in the Balkans. Greece was also under the strong democratic influence of Great Britain and the United States of America who continued their efforts to stop communism from spreading by providing support to the pro-democracy government of Greece. Eventually, tensions between these two incompatible ideologies escalated into the Greek Civil War that lasted from 1946 to 1949. This civil war was between Greek communists supported by Yugoslavia and Bulgaria³⁴ and a democratic movement supported by the USA and Great Britain.³⁵ During this war, the communists had some initial success, as they granted religious and ethnic minorities rights, which made communists popular and helped them to gain support from the local population. Macedonians were not an exception to these benefits, and they provided support to the communists. After the defeat of the communists, Greek

³² Andreas Floudas Demetrius, “Pardon? A Conflict for a Name? FYROM's Dispute With Greece Revisited,” accessed December 22, 2017, <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.598.6662&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.

³³ Ioannis Stefanidis, “United States, Great Britain and the Greek Yugoslav Rapprochement: 1949-1950,” 333, accessed December 22, 2017, <https://ojs.lib.uom.gr/index.php/BalkanStudies/article/viewFile/2175/2199>.

³⁴ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 141.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 140.

government revoked all the minority and religious rights, and massive retaliation against communist supporters started. The official democratic Greek government led these actions, and for the Macedonians, this period became known as an era of “refugee children.” During this time, between 25,000 and 28,000 children, between the ages of three to fourteen years, were evacuated from the northern parts of Greece into Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and other communist countries.³⁶ This evacuation was conducted forcibly by the Greek Communist Party and justified with humanitarian reasons and the excuse of protecting the children from the horrors of war.³⁷ But, the Greek Communist Party was not the only group to conduct evacuations. In 1947, the Greek Government conducted an operation of evacuating 18,000 children from the northern parts of Greece into orphanages called *paidopoleis*, established and funded by the Queen of Greece, Her Majesty Frederica.³⁸ The bulk of these evacuated children, particularly those evacuated by the Communists, were from non-Greek ethnic origins. This forced migration had long term consequences for the demographic and economic situation in the Balkans. Although the Greek government eventually condemned this event, the Greek policy makers enforced laws which banned repatriation of the refugees, promoted nationalization of their properties, revoked Greek citizenship, and even forbid them from reentering the country. With these actions, Greece became one of the most homogenous countries with

³⁶ Loring M. Danforth and Riki Van Boeschoten, *Children of the Greek Civil War: Refugees and the Politics of Memory* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 1-6.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 98.

its population politically supporting and loyal to the Greek state. Economically, with the nationalization of the Macedonian minority property, the Greek state became the owner of all the land once owned by the refugees. These refugees and their right to claim their legally owned properties whose value was in the billions of dollars remains a contentious and critical issue for resolving the Macedonian question. It is likely that Greece may worry that the Macedonian state could introduce the issues of repatriation and denationalization of properties as a legitimate representative of the Macedonian people. Inevitably linked to these processes are the affects they would have on the Greek economy and the political balance of power.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the situation in Yugoslavia started to deteriorate; this process escalated in 1991 when the civil war started. Macedonia, as a part of the Yugoslavian federation, used the example of the other Yugoslav states and on September 8, 1991, organized a successful referendum for Independence. The results of the referendum were officially acknowledged on November 17, 1991, when Macedonia became an independent country. Macedonia officially declared its independence on November 21, 1991, when the Parliament passed the new constitution.³⁹

The newborn country faced multiple challenges. The danger of war with FRY was still present, and the biggest concern for the political establishment was that the new country required recognition as a lawful and legal entity. With recognition, the country

³⁹ Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, *Decision for Promoting the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, No. 08-4642/1*, 1991, accessed May 23, 2018. <https://www.sobranie.mk/content/Odluki%20USTAV/Odluka%20za%20proglasuvanje%20na%20Ustavot%20na%20RM.pdf>.

would have a degree of international protection. But gaining international recognition was not an easy task, especially because of Greece, which perceived a new country of “Macedonia” as a threat to its national interests. Greece, already a member state in multiple international organizations, used its influence to impose certain terms and conditions for Macedonian membership. One of these conditions was a requirement that became a part of the Declaration on Yugoslavia:

The Community and its *member* States also require a Yugoslav Republic to commit itself, prior to recognition, to adopt constitutional and political guarantees ensuring that it has no territorial claims towards a neighboring Community State and that it will conduct no hostile propaganda activities versus a neighboring Community State, including the use of a denomination which implies territorial claims.⁴⁰

On January 6, 1992, the Macedonian Parliament amended the constitution to fulfill the European requirements for international recognition. The amendments clarified that Macedonia has no territorial claims toward neighboring countries. The fulfilment of the requirements was also confirmed by opinion No. 6 from January 14, 1992, of the Badinter Arbitration Committee.⁴¹ But it was not that easy, as Greece continued to oppose the admittance of Macedonia into international organizations and Macedonian recognition.

After the independence of Macedonia, most of the trade and imports for Macedonia flowed through Thessaloniki. Greece used Macedonia’s reliance on this port

⁴⁰ Christopher Hill and Karen E. Smith, *European Foreign Policy: Key Documents* (London: Routledge, 2000), 375, accessed May 24, 2018, http://hist.asu.ru/aes/EFP_Documents_0415158222.pdf

⁴¹ Dimitry Kochenov and Elena Basheska, *Good Neighbourliness in the European Legal Context* (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2015), 251.

as a means to apply economic pressure by establishing economic sanctions on Macedonia in order to re-assert Greek demands regarding the name and national identity of the country. The reasons behind these demands have both historical and economic origins. Repatriation of the dispersed persons and denationalization of the land effected the political decision for the reintegration of the population and recognizing the Macedonian state and their identity. These factors were some of the reasons why almost immediately after the independence of Macedonia, Greece established policies aimed at negating Macedonia as a country and its national identity. Also, massive protests and border blockades occurred in Greece against the newly established state. Additionally, Greece as a UN member used their diplomatic power to oppose and delay the process for Macedonia to become a UN member by its constitutional name.

Macedonia submitted a request for UN membership in July 1992, and despite the diplomatic opposition from Greece, it became a UN member on April 8, 1993.⁴² This process was preceded by intense international and bilateral contacts that resulted in a Macedonian membership by the name of “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” which was intended to be a temporary name used until the dispute between Greece and Macedonia could be resolved. This process culminated in 1995 when an Interim Accord between these two countries was signed.⁴³ With this accord, Greece,

⁴² United Nations General Assembly, *Admission of the State Whose Application is Contained in Document A/47/876-S/25147 to Membership in the United Nations* (New York: UN, 1993), accessed May 23, 2018, http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/193066/A_RES_47_225-EN.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y.

⁴³ United Nations, *Interim Accord (with related letters and translations of the Interim Accord in the languages of the Contracting Parties)* (New York: UN, 1995), accessed May 23, 2018, <https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker>

which was and still is a member of multiple international organizations, by Article 11 of the Interim Accord, agreed not to block Macedonian membership in international organizations if the reference “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” was used:

Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord. the Party of the First Part agrees not to object to the application by or the membership of the Party of the Second Part in international, multilateral and regional organizations and institutions of which the Party of the First Part is a member; however, the Party of the First Part reserves the right to object to any membership referred to above if and to the extent the Party of the Second Part is to be referred to in such organization or institution differently than in paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution 817 (1993).⁴⁴

With the Interim Accord ended the international political isolation of Macedonia (or the “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” as it was now referred to), and the Greek economic embargo. Access to organizations such as International Monetary Fund, World Bank and other international financial, economic, political, military, and law institutions was now available to Macedonia. This accord benefited both Greece and Macedonia. As a result of the Interim Accord, Macedonia changed its constitution and the flag of the country and agreed to use the reference FYRM for official international use, which complied with Greek demands. In turn, Macedonia gained access to the international organization and still was able to use its constitutional name “Republic of Macedonia” in bilateral communication with other countries. This status quo remained until the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008.

[.un.org/files/MK_950913_Interim%20Accord%20between%20the%20Hellenic%20Republic%20and%20the%20FYROM.pdf](https://www.un.org/files/MK_950913_Interim%20Accord%20between%20the%20Hellenic%20Republic%20and%20the%20FYROM.pdf).

⁴⁴ United Nations, *Interim Accord*.

History often repeats itself, and once again an agreement in Bucharest was a setback for Macedonia. The NATO summit held in Bucharest in 2008 was historic. The summit brought together three countries seeking admission to NATO: Macedonia, Croatia, and Albania. Croatia and Albania gained invitations to join NATO, but not Macedonia. Even though there was not an official veto from Greece against Macedonia, unofficially Greece used their political power to influence the decision. As a result, in the final version of the “Bucharest Summit Declaration,” the word “veto” is never used in the official documents.⁴⁵ Yet, Article 20 of the summit declaration states that Macedonia will join NATO after the dispute with Greece has been settled. Macedonia asserted that the provisions of the Bucharest Summit Declaration contradicted article 11 from the Interim Accord and subsequently opened a court case within the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against Greece. The ICJ confirmed this interpretation with its report from December 5, 2011.⁴⁶ However, ICJ decisions are not binding, and the organization has no real power to change the decisions from the Bucharest summit of 2008.

Since 2008, there have been changes regarding the dispute between Macedonia and Greece. Both countries, continue to negotiate to find common ground. Many times these negotiations were hindered by internal or international factors, such as project

⁴⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Bucharest Summit Declaration*, (Bucharest: NATO, 2008), accessed January 18, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_8443.htm.

⁴⁶ International Court of Justice, *Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)*, Judgment of December 5, 2011, Reports 2011, (New York: UN, 2011), 644, accessed May 23, 2018. <http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/142/142-20111205-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf>.

“Skopje 2014,” country elections, and the European refugee crisis, or negotiations intensified during election periods or major political, international conferences and summits. Intensifying or stalling the negotiations was due to the political calculations of governments of both countries, to influence public opinion and to gain public support.

Over the last three decades, there have been attempts through the political process to settle the dispute between Greece and Macedonia regarding the use of the name “Macedonia” internationally or bilaterally. These efforts and negotiations, led by the United Nations Special Representative, were conducted either under pressure from the international community or initiated by Macedonia or Greece. Yet to date, none of these efforts have brought lasting results. The reasons behind the issue vary, but all involve the complicated nature of the issue and its historical, social, economic, and political implications.

Assumptions

In this paper, a few assumptions have been made to answer the research question better.

1. The process of changing the current territorial boundaries in the Balkans is over for the foreseeable future and cannot be changed without military intervention.
2. Greece and Macedonia have no hidden agendas which will include territorial ambitions toward each other. Despite the argument between Greece and Macedonia, neither side looks for territorial gains.

3. The EU and NATO will continue the process of integration of the Balkan countries into the EU and NATO.
4. Macedonian will continue with its efforts and intentions to become a member of the EU and NATO.

Limitations

The first limitation is the existing biases of both Macedonia and Greece. Both sides claim that they are right and often use select historical facts that are interpreted in the way that supports one side or the other. The second limitation is the large number of books and articles that address this issue written in a variety of languages. Because of this language barrier, translation and interpretation can make citing documents difficult when dealing with this question. Furthermore, the historical observations will be focused on the region that covers Greece and the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (which controlled Macedonia until 1991), and later Macedonia itself. The other regions and historical facts which are important for addressing this issue will be addressed on occasion but not analyzed in detail. The last limitation involves the time periods used in the analysis. The analysis focuses on the period between 1910 and 2016. This paper will cover the events prior and after that period only as needed for the reader to become more familiar with the context and some important events without going into further depth.

Scope and Delimitations

To avoid any biases, the use of the Macedonian and Greek sources will focus on official documents from both parties connected with the issue. The analysis and opinions from Macedonian and Greek secondary sources might be referenced only as source

material. These documents will be used later in this thesis as a foundation for analysis of the current and past historical, political, and economic nature of the dispute. Different books and articles will be used from international authors whose perspective is more independent and unbiased.

This main focus of this thesis is on the contemporary Greek-Macedonian dispute, and even though it may touch some other concerns, it will not address the other issues that Macedonia or Greece have with other neighboring countries.

Significance of the Study

Since the Balkan Peninsula is geographically positioned between Europe and Asia, it has always been important for the major powers especially the European powers. Macedonia has a central position on the Balkan Peninsula and its history and existence for the last three millenniums have been full of controversy and an area of interest for its neighbors. Following the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation and the independence of Macedonia, the Macedonian question was initiated once again. This became an especially sensitive and important issue for Greece which perceived the new state as a threat to its national interests. The complexity of the issue required Greece and Macedonia to mobilize and involve all the intellectual, political, and academic capabilities of their respective countries to justify their position in the dispute or to examine possible solutions to the problem. This disagreement between Macedonia and Greece continues today and will probably continue even after a compromise is reached. This thesis is not going to solve all the issues that have been present for such a long time; however, it might generate additional questions that will require further explanation,

analysis, and research. This thesis will attempt to clarify a small segment of the reasons and their relevance to the ongoing situation between Macedonia and Greece, and it will focus on the dispute regarding Macedonian national identity and the name of the country, providing recommendations for a possible solution. Even though this thesis will make recommendations, due to the complexity of the issue, it is questionable that a viable solution is even possible at this time, and further analysis is required.

Definitions

Ethnic Macedonian and Macedonian: refers to a person who identifies himself or herself as a member of a Macedonian culture different and separate from a Slav, Greek, Bulgarian or Serbian culture or identity.

Macedonian citizen: refers to a citizen of the Republic of Macedonia and is not necessarily an ethnic Macedonian.

Skopian, Slav-Macedonian, and Fyromian: are degrading terms generally used by the Greeks to describe the Macedonians who live in Republic of Macedonia or FYROM.

Ethnic Greek and Greek: is a person who embraces the Greek identity and culture as separate from any other culture or identity.

Greek citizen: refers to a person who is a citizen of Greece⁴⁷ and is not necessarily an ethnic Greek.

⁴⁷ The country in the international use is referred as Greece as translation of the official name of the country which is Ελληνική Δημοκρατία (Hellenic Republic).

Republic of Macedonia and Macedonia: refers to the constitutional name of the country recognized in the United Nations as the “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.”

Geographic Macedonia: is the ethnic Macedonians’ homeland, which includes the Republic of Macedonia (also known as Vardar Macedonia), Aegean Macedonia (currently part of Greece), Pirin Macedonia (currently part of Bulgaria), and a small segment within Albania’s borders (Mala Prespa and Golo Brdo).

The name dispute: refers to the dispute between the Macedonia and Greece where the name of the country is the main issue but also includes other issues such as national identity, national symbols, language, letters and other national symbols which are unseparated but variable part of the negotiations for the name.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Even though the name issue between Greece and Macedonia is a dispute that has existed since Macedonia gained its independence in 1991, it is more than evident that this dispute has deep historical origins and background in the region that manifests itself in contemporary relations. Although scholars are divided on the historical periods that need to be analyzed and the importance of various issues, all of these scholars, have the period from the First Balkan War to present in their analysis. Events prior to the First Balkan War have some significance, and they are generally covered in this paper to enable the reader to develop an understanding and situational awareness of contemporary events. Thus the literature relating to the topics of this thesis will focus on the time period from the First Balkan War to 2016, with some limited references to events before the First Balkan War.

The history of the Balkans and its conquest by the Ottoman Empire has been a topic for many members of academia. Barbara Jelavich's "*History of the Balkans*"⁴⁸ (in two volumes) covers the history of the Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and the Ottoman Empire within the context of the Balkan history between the Eighteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Both volumes are prepared as part of a program that provides histories of Eastern Europe. Even though the author of this project is Barbara Jelavich,

⁴⁸ Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans. Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1983); Jelavich, *History of the Balkans. Twentieth Century*, vol. 2.

still, other experts, mainly professors from different American universities have a contribution in providing their expertise in preparation of the final version. As such, this project is full of historical facts, providing a valuable and unbiased overview of the events that took place in the Balkans. Additionally, the books are primarily written for readers from the American continent and do not require prior knowledge of the Balkan region. Because the Balkan states were using three different calendars, Jelavich admits that dating of the events was a significant challenge. Taking this into consideration Jelavich converted all the dates in her book into the New Style dates (Gregorian Calendar). The “*History of the Balkans: Eighteen and Nineteen Centuries*,” for this research is important as a source of information that provides a general overview of the Balkans states and a history of the rise and decline of the Ottoman Empire. Also, the establishment of the Balkan states of Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Montenegro, and the international influence are valuable parts of the historical background of the Balkan region covered in this volume.

The second volume “*The History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century*,” covers the time period that is the main focus of this paper’s research. With an overview of historical events, Jelavich also provides insights into the political, economic, and social relations as well as the international influence over the Balkan states. Additionally, the different perceptions of the Macedonian territory and people from the Balkan states described in the book are a vital part of this research. Some of the events that require a more detailed analysis and are part of Jelavich’s second volume are: The Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, the First World War, the Greek-Turkish War of 1919-1922, the Second World

War, the creation and development of the communist ideology in Balkans and the creation of SFRY, the Greek Civil War of 1946-1949 as well the events after the war in regard of the Macedonian question. Volume 2, provides details and reliable source of information for all of the Balkan states, and their role in shaping Balkan history, including Austria-Hungary, the sections focused on Serbia (Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)), Bulgaria, Greece and the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) are the most valuable, as they are main actors that influenced the contemporary dispute between Macedonia and Greece.

Since Jelavich's work ends in the 1980's, Misha Glenny's "*The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers 1804-1999*"⁴⁹ represents an additional resource that covers the gap. He covers the historical period of the last two centuries (between 1804 and 1999). Additionally, Glenny's focus is on the influence of the great European powers, Great Britain, France, Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Russia and their role in shaping the history of the Balkans. Glenny is critical of the great European powers and their meddling in Balkans affairs which arguably contributes to the root cause of some of the contemporary issues such as Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This book provides a broader context and details that help to explain the overall attitudes about Macedonian territory and the populations and how they were perceived by other Balkan states and its importance from a diplomatic perspective. Glenny's work for this research

⁴⁹ Misha Glenny, *The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers 1804-1999* (New York: Penguin Books, 2000).

is important because it covers the period after 1980's. This period is important because of the dissolution of the SFRY and creation of an independent Macedonian country. In that context, Glenny's book is a valuable source for examining the Macedonian question in the context of international relations.

After the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and the decisions made at the Berlin Congress of 1913, the integration of the new territories and the people into the Balkans states started. Philip Carabott in "*Aspects of the Hellenization of Greek Macedonia, ca. 1912-ca. 1959*,"⁵⁰ provides an insight into the official Greek policy toward the new territories and how this influenced the demographic picture of the new territories.⁵¹ It covers the period between 1912 and 1959 which is described as the most crucial period for implementing the assimilation policy of the Greek government. Carabott also gives insights into the continuous rivalry between Greece and Bulgaria, and how everyone who opposed the Greek policy of Hellenization was perceived as a "Slav-speaking Bulgarian" or supporter of the Bulgarians.⁵² Furthermore, Carabott's literature provides evidence of the appropriation of the land and giving it to the incoming Greek refugees.⁵³ All these processes inevitably reflected and impacted aspects of peoples' lives: "The advent of

⁵⁰ Philip Carabott, *Aspects of the Hellenization of Greek Macedonia, ca. 1912 - ca. 1959*, Cambridge Papers in Modern Greek, No. 13 (Thessaloniki, GR: Kambos, 2005), accessed January 4, 2018, https://www.academia.edu/9096364/Aspects_of_the_Hellenization_of_Greek_Macedonia_ca._1912_-_ca._1959.

⁵¹ Ibid., 44, table 4.

⁵² Ibid., 30-31.

⁵³ Ibid., 31.

modernity in Greek Macedonia was bound to bring about significant changes in the politics, socio-economic fabric, and cultural milieu of all communities – co- and hetero-religious, co- and hetero-lingual alike.”⁵⁴

The politics regarding the “Macedonian question” and the relations between the SFRY and Greece, at least from the Greek standpoint, are described in “*Modern and Contemporary Macedonia: History, Economy, Society, Culture.*”⁵⁵ The book is edited by Koliopoulos Ioannes and Hassiotis Ioannes and is a collection of research papers from multiple authors. The book provides information on the Macedonia role in Greek society, culture, economy, and history. One of the authors, Tsiovaridou, is focused on the economic development of Aegean Macedonia and the role that plays it in the Greek economy. Two other authors, Lagani and Kofos, are more focused on the external policies and relationships between the SFRY and Greece. In contrast to these authors who are focused on external factors, Anastasia Karakasidou in the “*Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990*” is more internally focused and provides information about the demographic structural and cultural changes in Aegean Macedonia.⁵⁶ Secondly, it provides an insight into the actions taken by the Greeks toward Macedonia for the Greek legacy in the Greek region of Macedonia to be

⁵⁴ Carabott, 34.

⁵⁵ Koliopoulos Ioannes and Hassiotis Ioannes, *Modern and Contemporary Macedonia: History, Economy, Society, Culture*, vol. 2 (Thessaloniki, Greece: Papazissis Publishers – Paratiritis Publishing House, 1994).

⁵⁶ Anastasia Karakasidou, *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passage to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

protected, following Macedonian independence in 1991. All of these events had impacts that directly or indirectly influenced the contemporary policies of Greek diplomacy.

The position of Macedonian national identity as separate from the other Balkan identities is the focus of Shea's "*Macedonia and Greece: The Struggle to Define a New Balkan Nation*." Shea posits that the Greek-Macedonian dispute is a continuation of the political intrigues that took part at the end of the 19th Century, and is a part of broader issues that involves Macedonia, Greece and their neighbors.⁵⁷ He also describes the absurd Greek demands and claims toward Macedonia, and their efforts to be presented as inseparable part of Greek history. In the introduction of his book, Shea uses a pamphlet distributed by the Greek Orthodox Church with 17 claims to illustrate his point regarding the Greek narrative, using different pieces of evidence to disprove these claims are without grounds.⁵⁸ Shea examines the period from Alexander the Great, around 300 BC, until the end of the 20th Century, but the majority of his research is concentrated on the 20th Century. Even though Shea tries to remain objective by providing the Greek point of view, his claims logical and well supported, are in defense of the Macedonian position. His work has value for this thesis since it provides evidence of the national uniqueness of the Macedonian nation and the Greek stand point toward the Macedonian question and the minority rights in Greece.

⁵⁷ John Shea, *Macedonia and Greece: The Struggle to Define a New Balkan Nation* (London: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers Jeferson, 1997), 2.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 6-20.

Regarding economics, it appears that after Macedonia gained independence, the economic relationships between the two countries, except for the economic embargo from 1991-1993, were not so drastically affected by politics. In fact, after the Interim Accord was signed, bilateral cooperation in the economic sector improved. Haralambos Kondonis in his *“Bilateral Relations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,”* explains the relationship between Greece and Macedonia after the Interim Accord:

Despite the unresolved issue of the name, bilateral relations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) have improved at all levels since the Interim Accord was signed in New York on 13 September 1995. Conscious of the complexity and sensitivity associated with the name issue, the two parties have focused their efforts on creating a climate of cooperation. This co-operation has taken place on the political and economic levels, and in military affairs, policing, cultural and educational relations, development co-operation and infrastructures.⁵⁹

The contemporary dispute between Macedonia and Greece is a complicated issue which has a deep connection with critical events of history in the region. The scholars and experts are divided on the roots of the issue and its impact on the current dispute. Even though the research and analysis date the dispute back to Ancient Macedonia and Greece, the events that took place in the Balkans in the 20th Century are an inevitable part of the problem set. Analysis of these events provides insight into the political, historical and economic changes that occurred during the 20th Century. Although opinions vary and existing scholarship provides diverse perspectives, most western

⁵⁹ Kondonis Haralambos, “Bilateral Relations Between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” 55, accessed April 6, 2018, http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/InterimAgreement/Downloads/Interim_Kondonis.pdf.

scholars categorize the dispute and Greek demands as irrational. On the other hand, Greek policy uses the history to justify the Greek position and demands in the dispute. As the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis stated on January 25, 2007, in Strasburg stated: “I am a Macedonian myself, just as 2.5 million Greeks are Macedonians.” He referred to the Greeks living in the Aegean part of Macedonia as direct descendants of the Ancient Macedonians.

The focus of this research is on these events and the possibility that even though the ancient history is important, it is just a distraction for the real causes behind the current dispute. The historical events that took place in the Balkans during the 20th Century are inherently connected with the political and economic factors that have influenced the dispute.

To better understand and analyze the research question, additional documents, censuses and analytical data from primary sources will be used. These documents include information from sources such as United Nations, NATO, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and governmental documents connected with the research questions.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The Greek-Macedonian dispute over the name “Macedonia” is an issue that even after almost three decades is still important for both countries and casts a shadow over the relationship between them. This also applies to the relationships between Macedonia and other international organizations where Greece has a vote. Still, for the issue to be resolved with a mutually acceptable solution for both countries, the causes that led to this dispute, need to be understood.

This research paper concentrates on specific periods over the last two centuries and the events that predominantly took place on the Balkan Peninsula. These historical periods are relevant to the problem set and provide insight into certain effects and influence on the contemporary dispute and the varying perspectives of actors involved in the dispute.

The first period is the period just prior to the First Balkan War (1912) and goes through the end of the Second World War (1945). The second period is from the end of the Second World War (1945) until Macedonian independence in 1991. Finally, the third period is from the Macedonian independence in 1991 to 2016.

The whole dispute between Macedonia and Greece, regardless of the period, was driven and enabled by events that happened in the past. The casual case study method provides an excellent technique for identifying the reasons behind the issue by looking at

those past events. It provides an explanation by providing an in-depth understanding of the social, political and cultural context that led to the dispute.⁶⁰

Even though limitations are imposed to avoid biases and to reach an objective conclusion, the flexibility of the casual case study method allows these biases to be avoided by using sources and data from third parties when possible. Focusing the research on the last two centuries and the region of the former Yugoslavia and Greece will help focus the analysis on the contemporary dispute. Additionally, it will not allow shifting from the Research Question and having other issues become a distraction.

Though the disadvantage of this method is the difficulty in reaching a far-ranging conclusion, this method is most suitable because it can identify the reasons behind the whole range of processes and an assessment of the changes on the norms.⁶¹ Additionally, the impact that the historical events had on the dispute can be better observed and analyzed. Finally, these events had an impact on the national interests and the use of political and economic tools as elements of national power. Although the casual case study is the primary research methodology, quantitative and qualitative methods will also be used during the analysis to add greater validity to the study. A general qualitative approach will be used to consider the human dimensions of the issues and challenges noted throughout the paper. Some reference will be made to available quantitative information, such as census and economic data, that may inform the analysis, conclusion,

⁶⁰ The Open University, “6 Methods of Data Collection and Analysis,” *Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (MEAL)*, 25, accessed March 5, 2018, www.open.edu/openlearncreate/mod/resource/view.php?id=52658.

⁶¹ Ibid.

and recommendations presented. Mixing both research methods will allow triangulation of the findings, which can strengthen the validity and increase the utility of analysis.⁶²

Different scholars have different opinions and interpretations of the issue that led to the contemporary dispute. However, all of them in their observations and analysis have certain historical, political, and economic factors that contributed to the dispute, which will be the focus of this research. Additionally, the use of the instruments of national power, in order to impose one state's will over the other has become an inseparable part of any international issue.

⁶² The Open University, "6 Methods of Data Collection and Analysis," 25.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

In 1991, just 18 months following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the situation in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) started to deteriorate. As a result, many of the Republics within the SFRY initiated secession from the Federal state. The federal government, in order to preserve the SFRY and its territories, started a war that began in Slovenia and progressed to, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. As these wars progressed, on September 8, 1991, Macedonia organized a referendum for independence and seceded from the SFRY. The referendum was successful, and Macedonia became one of the world's newest independent countries, but the road to international recognition and becoming a part of the international community as an independent country was difficult. Even though the newly born country faced many issues and opened new dialogues with neighboring countries, the most important and most difficult issue became the dispute with Greece. Greece was part of the European Union, and in 1991, the only NATO member country sharing a border with Macedonia. Greece perceived the new born country, and particularly the name "Macedonia" as a threat to its national interests and opposed international recognition of Macedonia.

This issue, an ongoing dispute which has lasted nearly three decades, continues to have strong political and social effects whose origins are deeply connected with the history of the Balkan region. Both countries considered themselves to be the righteous party in the dispute and used their diplomatic, economic, information, and military instruments of national power to attempt to impose their will on the other side. During the

last three decades, the dispute has evolved with each side modifying their positions at varying times along with public opinion and policies in both countries.

Every problem has its own origins, and in order to reach a viable solution, the conditions and causes that contributed to its creation need to be understood and eliminated. The issue itself is a product, and a symptom, of the causes. Only by understanding the roots of the issue and addressing them can a fruitful compromise and mutually acceptable solution for both parties in the dispute be reached. Of course, this presumes that both sides want a solution and are prepared for certain concessions.

This chapter will analyze some of the reasons for the dispute between Macedonia and Greece. Even though various parties predominantly cite that ancient history is a reason for the dispute, the author considers this just an excuse for some other more important questions/issues to be avoided. This is why the focus of this research is on the period between the beginning of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. Events that occurred during this time are crucial for understanding the dispute that continues to plague contemporary relations between Macedonia and Greece.

The research analysis is divided into three separate periods. The first period is between 1910 and the end of the Second World War in 1945. The second period is from the rise of the SFRY (1945) to its disintegration in 1991. The final period is from the independence of Macedonia (1991) to 2016. An analysis of the events that take place during these timeframes provides potential linkages between the past and the present. Additionally, provides a structure that enables a better understanding and analysis of the

historical events and their political and economic implications in contemporary times which is the basis for this research.

First Period: 1910 to 1945

Until present days, both sides in this dispute were attempting to use historical events to support certain contemporary political claims. Both sides used that history selectively. The period between 1910 and 1945 from a historical perspective, was a significant period not just in the Balkans and Europe but the world as well. The First and the Second Balkan Wars, which put an end to the Ottoman Empire's domination in the Balkans, were two critical events. This period, especially after the end of the Second Balkan War, is full of controversy and includes events that represent both a cause and effect for the contemporary dispute between Macedonia and Greece.

In the current official state policy of Macedonia and Greece, this period is barely mentioned as a reason for the dispute. The whole dispute is concentrated on the ancient roots and the links between the ancient civilizations and the modern states. Hence, both Macedonia and Greece were heavily invested in dedicating and expending resources to provide evidence for the connection between the current states and their ancient civilizations. The period, which is the main focus of both countries, is the period around the 3rd Century BC or the time of Alexander the Great. This was a period during which the Balkan region and the people living there were experiencing major changes which influenced the society and culture of the people. Since this time, the Balkans have been conquered by the Romans, Byzantines, and the Ottomans. It also survived the Crusades and the settlement of the Slavs and Tatars. All these events had a major effect on the

national sense of belonging of the peoples and left a permanent mark on this territory and the populations.

Thus the conclusion is that both sides were and are using ancient history as an excuse for avoiding the real reasons for the dispute such as the Bucharest Treaty and the partition of Macedonia. The policies and territorial changes that occurred as a result of the Bucharest Treaty generated numerous issues such as minority rights, repatriation of the population, and property questions (legal ownership) that are considered very sensitive.

From a historical perspective, the period from the beginning of the 20th Century until the end of the Second World War is crucial for understanding the reasons behind the contemporary dispute. It started with the Balkan alliance and the war in 1912. The reason behind the alliance and the war itself was not the liberation of Macedonia, but the Balkan nations desire to expand their territories at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. The evidence of that claim is supported by the treaties between the Balkan states and the secret annexes that treat the question of dividing and ruling the newly occupied territory.⁶³ Additionally, the events that followed, especially the Second Balkan War among the former Balkan allies, culminated with the Bucharest Treaty of 1913, confirmed these claims. With the Bucharest Treaty, the Ottoman Empire lost most of its territory in the Balkan region, and Greece was the biggest winner, almost doubling its

⁶³ Maloy and Shartle, 423. In 1912 Treaty of Friendship and Alliance Between Bulgaria and Serbia was signed, at the same time a secret annex set out the territorial settlement and the division of Macedonia between Serbia and Bulgaria.

territory and population.⁶⁴ This territory included parts of the Balkan Peninsula as well as islands in the Aegean Sea and the island of Crete. The largest section of the new Greek territory was part of the Macedonian region. Additionally, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Albania received some portion of the Macedonian region as a result of the treaty.

With this treaty, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire were the biggest losers, and this event led to a decision, to join the Central Powers in the First World War, while Greece and Serbia to join the Triple Entente. Macedonia remained divided among the four states during the First World War. The Paris Peace Conference, the Treaty of Neuilly-Sur-Seine in 1919, and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 confirmed the decisions of the Bucharest Treaty.

The interwar period was characterized by the consolidation of territorial gains from the previous period, and incorporation of the new territories into select state winners as a result of the war. This continued until the beginning of the Second World War. Prior to the beginning of the Second World War, the Macedonian territory and Macedonian question were used as an incentive for influencing the Balkan states to join the Axis or the Allies. With the beginning of the Second World War and especially after the German attack on the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 1941, the division of spheres of influence became more overt and took on the nature of the military occupation. The occupied Balkan territory was divided between Germany, Italy and Bulgaria. The official government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and Greece fled their countries. This created a

⁶⁴ Maloy and Shartle, 440. Greece expanded its territory from 25.014 to 41.933 square miles and population grow from 2.6 million to 4.3 million.

political vacuum and conditions for the development of a resistance movement and insurgency influenced by communist ideology. The Macedonian population, guided by the communist philosophy of *Brotherhood and Equality*, saw an opportunity and joined the communist resistance.

The period of the Balkan Wars from 1912 and 1913 can be categorized as the most important period, not only for Macedonia itself but for the rest of the Balkan region. The London Treaty and later the Bucharest Treaty set the conditions for some of the crucial events that took place on the Balkan Peninsula later. The decisions and gains, from the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, influenced the Greek government to perceive the creation of the independent Macedonian state as a threat to their national interests. From a political perspective, these events were too sensitive to be emphasized in the contemporary dispute. The underlying logic was that discussing these reasons would create other issues. In this sense, covering the real historical reasons for the dispute with more ancient history seemed convincing and less excruciating. By avoiding this issue, other political issues connected with the existence of the Macedonian minority and their rights in Greece, are avoided as well. These decisions were clearly political and had continuity from the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 until today.

Even though history is shaped by different social, economic, and even technological factors, politics remains one of the biggest factors in forming history. Additionally, history, sometimes under the influence of political pressure can be interpreted to prove or refute a certain agenda. From a political perspective, this period is helpful to understand the official Greek policy toward the “new territories,” occupied

after the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, and their integration into the Greek state. The compulsory exchange and forced immigration policies initiated by the Greek government during this period as part of their assimilation of the populations in the “new territories” have a direct impact on the current ethnic composition of the Greek state.

At the beginning of the Twentieth Century, a noticeable increase in political activities from both internal and external actors occurred in the Balkan region. These activities were predominantly driven by the idea of building a favorable position for future territorial gains at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. In order to justify these actions, Greece as well as other Balkan states, such as Serbia and Bulgaria, started a systematic disavowal of the Macedonian population. For a long time, the Macedonian population had no state, the majority of the people were illiterate, and the absence of a valid census left room for speculation and interpretation about the ethnic affiliation of the population.⁶⁵ This is why the Balkan states were referring to the people who were living in that region as Bulgarians, Serbs, Greeks, and Turks, which gave a certain legitimacy to their territorial claims. These claims for the non-existence of the Macedonian population were not true since the Greek census results from 1920 under the category of “Language” defines the Macedonian language as a separate to the other languages.⁶⁶ It is evident that Greece recognizes that the Macedonian language as separate and distinct from the other

⁶⁵ Jelavich, *History of the Balkans. Twentieth Century*, vol. 2, 91.

⁶⁶ Republique Hellenique, Ministere de l'economie Nationale, “*Recensement de la Population de la Grece*,” (Athens: Imprimerie Nationale, 1929), 181-183, accessed April 20, 2018, http://dlib.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/yeararticles?p_topic=10007862&p_cat=10007862&p_catage=1920

languages. Thus, if the language, as one of the features that distinguish one culture from another, is separate and different, the group that speaks the language itself is also different culturally.

The predominate language that the Slav population, including the Macedonian population, was speaking was of a Slavic origin and was more similar to the Bulgarian and Serbian language which is also Slavic based.⁶⁷ Even before the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, Greece was aware of this fact, and in order to mitigate it, the Greek authorities tried to present the Slavic population as Slavophone Greeks, to justify their territorial claims.⁶⁸ Also, the Greek, as well as the Bulgarian, government started to implement population assimilation policies long before the First Balkan War in 1912. The Greek Orthodox Church was also one of the actors that were actively involved in this process of assimilation.⁶⁹ With the outbreak of the First World War this process was stalled; however, after the War, it was even more fiercely implemented by the Greek government. The Treaty of Neuilly-Sur-Seine in 1919 and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 provides evidence of how Greece, by diplomatic means, changed the demography in the “new territories” occupied in 1913. The Treaty of Neuilly-Sur-Seine, a treaty between Greece and Bulgaria, enabled a voluntary migration of the ethnic minority populations between both countries. Until 1931, the total number of resettled population was approximately

⁶⁷ Jelavich, *History of the Balkans. Twentieth Century*, vol. 2, 92.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

102,000 Bulgarians and 53,000 Greeks.⁷⁰ The second treaty contained provisions for the compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey. With this treaty, approximately 1.5 million Orthodox Christians from Turkey were resettled in Greece, and almost 350,000 Muslims from the “new territories” were resettled in Turkey.⁷¹ Most of the Christians from Turkey were resettled in the “new territories” (Aegean Macedonia), in Greece, which had relatively low population density and an abundance of land which was owned by the departing Muslims.⁷² This had a huge impact and changed the demographic structure of the population in this region.

The process of homogenization of the population and implementing policies of assimilation did not stop with the resettlement of the population and shifting the demographic structure in the “new territories.” The official Greek policy was a continuous effort for erasing all non-Hellenic connections from the land and the minds of the Slav-speaking population. These policies included changing the names of the cities, villages, historical and geographical sites with Greek ones, changing the names of the people and forbidding them to use their native language.⁷³ The assimilation policies, in

⁷⁰ Ther, 73-74.

⁷¹ Karakasidou, 145.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Karakasidou, *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood*, 189; Carabott, 35-38; Human Rights Watch, “Denying Ethnic Identity: The Macedonians of Greece,” 1994, 14-17, accessed May 23, 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/pdfs/g/greece/greece945.pdf>.

Greece, culminated during the Metaxas dictatorship.⁷⁴ During his rule, a series of government legal measures were implemented for changing the Slavic or Turkish geographical names. Additionally, other policies were supported and implemented in order to change the national feeling of the people and to disconnect the Macedonian population from their national feeling. These policies included forcibly changing the Macedonian surnames to Greek and forbidding the public use of the Macedonian language, as well as educating the population in their Hellenic origin.⁷⁵ This practice of changing the names continued through the beginning of the Second World War and stopped with the defeat of Greece by the Axis forces.

An important fact that connected with the contemporary dispute is that the majority of the population that lives today in the Aegean part of Macedonia are not natives. They are settlers who came from Asia in the first half of the 19th Century. Thus, their claims that they are true Macedonians who are heirs of Alexander the Great and the ancient Macedonian kingdom can be disregarded. It can also be interpreted that this is a part of the Greek information campaign to create a connection between the current people and the ancient population who lived in that territory. The rest of the population, who are from different ethnicities, lost their original sense of ethnic belonging under pressure

⁷⁴ For more on the Metaxas dictatorship see Jelavich, *History of the Balkans. Twentieth Century*, vol. 2, 209-201.

⁷⁵ Karakasidou, *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood*, 189; Anastasia Karakasidou, "Politicizing Culture: Negating Ethnic Identity in Greek Macedonia," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 11, no. 1 (May 1993), accessed February 13, 2018, <https://www.scribd.com/document/7017000/Karakasidou-Anastasia-Politicizing-Culture-Negating-Ethnic-Identity-in-Greek-Macedonia-Journal-of-Modern-Greek-Studies-11-1-may-p>); Carabott, 48.

from the Greek government over time. They now perceive Greece as their own nation. The contemporary name dispute when viewed with its connection to the nationality of the people is just a continuation of the policy of denying the existence of the Macedonian nation, different and distinct from the other nations, especially Bulgarian and Serbian.

By the end of the Second World War, the Greek government, with the Treaties of Neuilly-Sur-Seine and Lausanne changed the demographic structure of the “new territories,” including the Aegean part of Macedonia. Additionally, the Greek government continued with the incorporation of the “new territories” under a broad assimilation policy by implementing draconian measures. Some of them included changing the names of the cities, villages, regions, names, and surnames of the population with the Greek names, and forbidding the use of the Macedonian (Slavic) language. All of these events, especially the resettlement of the population had economic implications, which also influenced the Greek standpoint in the contemporary dispute.

Geographically, the Macedonian region is positioned at the center of the Balkan Peninsula. As such, for many years it was the main trade route for the Ottoman Empire that provided a link between the Middle East and Europe. The port of Thessaloniki was the most important port for the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. Most of the trade from the Ottoman Empire was going through this port. Thessaloniki was the second most important port after Constantinople, it was also the economic center of the Macedonian region.⁷⁶ The railroad through Thessaloniki connected the Ottoman Empire with the rest of Europe through Macedonia. Its potential was recognized by the other Balkan states as

⁷⁶ Jelavich, *History of the Balkans. Twentieth Century*, vol. 2, 90-91.

well. As a result, the city became a friction point between Greece and Bulgaria in 1912, after the Greek army seized the city from the Ottomans. This is only a small portion of a larger issue that must be examined in context to understand the true nature of the contemporary dispute between Macedonia and Greece. The real economic reasons for the dispute came after the Balkan Wars, with the resettlement of the population between 1919 and 1939. After the resettlement of the inhabitants, a majority of the Muslim and Macedonian population, identified as a non-Greek, were forced to abandon the Greek state. When the Macedonian and Muslim populations were expelled from their land, they did not receive any compensation for their land.⁷⁷ It was seized by the Greek government and local landlords and given to the new settlers.

With the formation of the newly independent state of Macedonia in 1991, Greece perceived the Macedonian state as a legally recognized entity that could represent the interests of the resettled Macedonian population. As such, the Macedonian government would have a legal right to ask for financial compensation or return of the property of the Macedonian resettled population to its rightful owners. By not recognizing the state as “Macedonia” and their citizens as “Macedonians” basically there is no connection with the people who had lived or live in Greece and identify themselves as “Macedonians.” Hence, the Macedonian state would have no legal right to represent or defend the interests of the population who identify themselves as “Macedonians” and have certain legal demands in Greece. Additionally, the Thessaloniki port is critical to the Macedonian economy. The majority of the economic trade for Macedonia was and still is conducted

⁷⁷ Karakasidou, *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood*, 165.

through the port. Greece understands this and is using this fact as a means for enforcing their terms and positions in the negotiations for the name dispute. The classic application of realpolitik using the economic instrument of national power to solve the dispute in their favor.

The period between 1910 and 1945 historically is the most significant period from which the political and economic decisions were made that influenced the future development of this region. Understanding the events between 1910 and 1945 is taking us a step closer toward understanding the real reasons that contribute to the contemporary dispute between Macedonia and Greece. This period raises some very complicated and sensitive topics, but they still need to be addressed in order to understand the context of the name dispute. By admitting the real nature of the issue the first step toward the solution can be achieved. But even though this period was the most important for understanding the real nature of the dispute it does not stop there. There are also other historical, political and economic reasons, which are a continuation of the previous approaches and attitudes that helped to shape this dispute.

The Second Period: 1945 to 1991

The second period that provides insight into the contemporary Greek-Macedonian dispute extends from the end of the Second World War until the creation of the independent Macedonian state in 1991. This period is characterized by the spread of communism and the creation of the Macedonian Republic (state) as a part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The relationships between the SFRY and Greece are strongly relevant to the Macedonian question. This period was characterized

by changing cold-warm relationships between the SFRY and Greece. The SFRY held a unique place in history and was heavily influenced by Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on one side and the United States (USA) and Great Britain on the other side. These relationships ebbed and flowed in an extremely complicated international environment and had lasting impacts on the political, social and economic situations for both, the SFRY and Greece regarding the Macedonian question. These relationships were also extensively reinforced by using other instruments of national power in order to build a more solid position in protecting their own national interests. Among the instruments of national power, it is important to put an emphasis on a political analysis of these events and their influence on the contemporary dispute

The defeat of the Balkan states and absence of government and legal authority provided fertile soil for the development of the communist movement in the Balkans by the end of the Second World War. At this time the overall political landscape in the Balkans had changed. The SFRY was formed under a communist regime. The Vardar Macedonia became a Peoples Republic of Macedonia⁷⁸ as an equal of five other republics in the Yugoslav Federation. Bulgaria was also under a communist regime. Although Greece was a democracy, supported by the United States and Great Britain, it was struggling to keep up with the opposition movement and growing support for the communist party. These two different ideologies, democracy, and communism created friction that escalated with the Greek Civil War from 1946-1949. The Greek communist

⁷⁸ With the constitution of 1963 Peoples Republic of Macedonia was renamed into the Socialist Republic of Macedonia.

party and their ideology had a great deal of support in the Greek Macedonia.⁷⁹ A large part of this support was as a result of the policy that the Greek communist party had toward the Macedonian question. Additionally, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were already negotiating for a Balkan Federation and unification of the Vardar, Pirin and Aegean parts of Macedonia.⁸⁰ This is one of the reasons why Greece perceived the establishment of an independent Macedonia in 1991 as a threat to its security and national interests. As a result, Greece vigorously demanded changes to the Macedonian Constitution. These demands were primarily to address the issue that the Macedonian state had no territorial demands in Greece. Bulgaria and especially Yugoslavia were hoping to create a federation and unification with the support of the Greek communist party. This is why Bulgaria and SFRY with the approval of Soviet Union were providing a significant amount of military support to the Greek communist party. In return, the Greek communist party granted certain freedoms and rights to the Macedonians in territory under communist control. These actions by the Greek communist party appealed to the Macedonian population, and by the end of the war, “Macedonians” were a major component of the communist forces.⁸¹ This support was not without risk. Yugoslav-Soviet relations worsened, and as a result, Yugoslavia was expelled from Cominform in 1948.⁸² This action weakened the support that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were providing

⁷⁹ Jelavich, *History of the Balkans. Twentieth Century*, vol. 2, 307.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 321.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 307.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 324-326.

to Greek communist forces. Without this support, the Greek communists were defeated, and the Greek Civil War ended in 1949. After the civil war, the Greek government abolished all the benefits granted by the communist party. Additionally, under the pretense of protecting the population from Greek governmental retaliation, the Greek communists evacuated between 25,000 and 28,000 children, from the northern parts of Greece into Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and other communist countries.⁸³ Most of them never return to their homes. After this event, the Greek government continued their policies of assimilation of the population and created a homogenized society comprised almost exclusively of Greeks. Still, the influence of the Yugoslav government and their interests regarding the Macedonian question continued. These interests and the attitude of Yugoslavia was largely shaped by its relationships with both the USSR and western countries.

The Greek government was trying to negate the existence of the Macedonia question by referring to the Macedonian minority as “Slav speaking Greeks.” With this assertion, Greece was emphasizing their Greek origin and historical connection with the Greek nation. At the time, the terms used to identify specific ethnic origins changed and evolved. Some of the other terms that were used were “Slav Greeks,” “Macedonian Greeks,” “Slavo Macedonians,” or simply as “Bulgarians” or “Serbs.”⁸⁴ This policy of

⁸³ Loring M. Danforth and Riki Van Boeschoten, *Children of the Greek Civil War: Refugees and the Politics of Memory* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 4-6.

⁸⁴ For more about the terms used by the Greek government and population look at Carabott; Jelavich, *History of the Balkans. Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, vol. 2; Glenny, *The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers 1804-1999*; Karakasidou, *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passage to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990*;

denying the existence of the Macedonian nation is closely connected with the name dispute that Greece has with Macedonia. For many years, Greece has been trying to deny the existence of the Macedonian minority simply because there was no official country that existed for the population living in the territory with which to identify. Even though the Macedonian republic was established as a part of the SFRY, Greece was not able to do anything regarding this question because Macedonia was a part of the larger federation. Additionally, in this period Greece was facing political and economic instability which influenced their international relationships. Greece at that time, due to historical and political reasons, concentrated their efforts on solving the situation internally within Greece including the Macedonian question. This situation continued until the end 1980s and the beginning of 1990s with the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation.

The events after the Second World War until Macedonian independence were focused on the Greek Civil War and the creation of the Yugoslav Federation as events that had a significant impact on the Macedonian question. Indeed, the Greek Civil War from 1946-1949 brought some positive changes toward minority rights in the regions under the communist control; however, following the defeat of the Greek communist party all the benefits were revoked by the official Greek government. As a result, these actions generated large refugee populations and strained relationships with the SFRY.

Evangelos Kofos, "The Macedonian Question From the Second World War to the Present Day," in *Contemporary Macedonia: History, Economy, Society, Culture*, vol. 2, ed. Koliopoulos Ioannes and Hassiotis Ioannes (Thessaloniki, Greece: Papazissis Publishers – Paratiritis Publishing House, 1994), 246-295.

Over the next few decades, the relationship between Greece and Yugoslavia would continue to be complicated, and the changes directly correlate to the relationship that Greece and Yugoslavia had with the USSR, the USA, and Great Britain. Regardless of the relationship with Yugoslavia, Greece continued with its policy of denying the existence of the Macedonian minority within Greece even as the independent state of Macedonian state emerged from the disintegration of the SFRY in 1991.

From a political perspective, the Greek Civil War from 1946-1949 had profound consequences on the creation of the official Greek policy toward the Macedonian question and its reflection in the contemporary dispute. After the Greek Civil War in 1946-1949 and the defeat of the Greek communist party, official Greek policy primarily had the purpose of abolishing all the minority rights granted by the Greek communist party. Secondly it started to retaliate against the part of the population that supported the Greek communists. This resulted in many people fleeing their homes and asking for sanctuary, primarily, in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia but other countries as well.⁸⁵ Finally, the Greek government, with a series of legislative acts, altered the demographic and political structure of the population in the Aegean part of Macedonia. The purpose of these acts, designed to achieve a full homogenization of the Greek population, negated or diminished the need to deal with the Macedonian question and the other minority questions as well. The first in this series of acts was legal act 2536, issued on August 23, 1953. This act allowed the Greek government to confiscate the property of those who fled

⁸⁵ Shea, 117.

Greece and did not return in a three year time period.⁸⁶ Additionally, a campaign was started for resettling of the population from the northern territories “with new colonists having healthy national consciousness,” Yugoslavia politically had opposed this plan, and it was never realized.⁸⁷ In 1959 a new legal act, number 3958, was issued by the Greek Government. This act provided the legal means to confiscate the lands of the population who were not “Greek by birth,” who left the country and did not return within a five year period.⁸⁸

In 1962 another act was issued. The legal act of 4234 banned the return to the country of all persons whose Greek citizenship was revoked. This law was also extended to the spouses and the children.⁸⁹ As it is noted by the Human Rights Watch report from 1994, this law is still in force. With this law, the people who are identified as Macedonians are not allowed to enter Greece (including the refugee children). A continuation of this policy is the legal act of 1969 which allowed the abandoned Macedonian farms to be settled by the Greek farmers. This helped the return and resettlement of over 100,000 Greek immigrants from the Soviet Union.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ Shea, 117.

⁸⁷ Ebrar Ibraimi, “The Rights of Minorities in Greece,” *International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research* 4, no. 12 (December 2013), accessed February 27, 2018, <https://www.ijser.org/researchpaper/The-Rights-of-Minorities-in-Greece.pdf>.

⁸⁸ Shea, 118.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

In 1982, act No. 106841 allowed Greeks by birth who flee the country and whose citizenship had been revoked to be able to return to Greece and to reclaim their Greek citizenship.⁹¹ Again, the emphasis was on the right of the “Greeks by birth,” which means that all the others, including the Macedonians, were not able to fulfil the requirements for citizenship or to go back in Greece.

Legal act 1540/85 of April 10, 1985, basically amended previous acts regarding property questions. With this act, the political emigrants who fled from Greece are defined as “Greek by genus,” in order to be able to claim their property rights according to the other legal acts.⁹² With the phrase “Greek by genus,” the Greek government was referring to the people who had Greek origin or identify themselves as being ethnic Greeks.⁹³ Again, this act excluded all the other residents of Greece not “Greeks by genus” and made exercising their rights to claim properties impossible.

In 1989, legal act No. 1863/1989 was issued; this act provided opportunities for participants in the Greek Civil War from 1946-1949 to be rehabilitated.⁹⁴ The act also granted pensions and other incentives to the participants. Again, the act was only

⁹¹ Human Rights Watch, Appendix B.

⁹² Ibid., Appendix C.

⁹³ Ibid., 9.

⁹⁴ Iosif Kovras, *Truth, Recovery and Transitional Justice: Deferring Human Right Issues* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 135.

referring to the Greek citizens, and other fighters, including the Macedonians, who were deprived of their citizenships with the previous acts were not eligible.⁹⁵

These legal acts are not the only measures that were taken by the Greek government to suppress the idea of the existence of minorities, including Macedonians in Greece. Since 1961, no census contains information about the minority or different ethnic groups in Greece.⁹⁶ Other measures, official or unofficial, were also taken in order for Macedonian minority to diminish in Greece. Teaching the Macedonian language was forbidden as well as giving Macedonian names to newborn babies. The Greek government also made public statements of feeling “Macedonian” a crime that could be punished by prison and fines.⁹⁷

During this period, Greece had numerous political challenges with different parties in power; however, what remained constant was their position toward the Macedonian question. By the end of 1980, the main Greek position and policy toward minorities, particularly the Macedonians is that everyone in Greece is Greek (except for the notable exception of the Muslim minority). Thus there cannot be a Macedonian or any other minority question since there are no minorities.⁹⁸ Even though this position was condemned by the international community, it continues to exist.

⁹⁵ Shea, 119.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibraimi.

⁹⁸ Shea, 119.

This attitude toward minority issues is reflected in the current Greek position toward the name dispute with Macedonia. Over the years the Greek government has made a conscious effort to destroy every connection of the Macedonian minority with their culture and to present them as a part of Greek history from the time of Alexander the Great. But these claims have fallacies since the historical facts and the Greek policy for homogenization of the country are documented and elaborated on as part of this thesis. These documents are strong evidence against Greek propaganda and their attempt for assimilation of the minorities in the country. Additionally, in the words of the Professor Peter Hill:

The modern “Greeks” are not descended from the ancient Greeks. They appropriated ancient Greek cultural symbols in the 19th Century simply because they happened to live in more or less the same part of the world as the ancient Greeks did. Their justification for this was thus the same as that used by the present day Macedonians in appropriating the ancient Macedonian heritage. Most of the 19th Century “Greeks” not only did not call themselves Hellenes (it was the intellectual nationalists that taught them to do that), they did not even speak Greek, but rather Albanian, Slavonic, or Vlach dialects.⁹⁹

In addition to achieving the homogenization of the country, there are also economic reasons behind this position. The economic reasons contributing to the dispute from this period are generally connected with the territory and geographic position of the Aegean part of Macedonia on the Balkans Peninsula. From an economic perspective, this region except for the port at Thessaloniki had no significant economic value. During the Ottoman Empire, this region was not industrialized, and agriculture was the main occupation of the people in this region. But the port at Thessaloniki, a strategic point, and

⁹⁹ Michael Underdown, *Current Issues Brief Number 11: Background to the Macedonian Question* (Sydney: Department of the Parliamentary Library, 1994), 12.

a crossroad, which connected the Middle East with the rest of the Balkans, was very important. Thessaloniki also had a railroad that connected the port to Belgrade and further into Europe. Over time the area developed a railroad network which connected the port with the other areas in Greece and the Balkans. Also, after the Second World War and with industrialization, the Thessaloniki area became the second largest industrial area in Greece after Athens.¹⁰⁰ Additionally, the port remains a significant trade center for Greece and southeastern Europe. As such, the port represents a significant means and asset through which Greece can exercise its economic power in the Balkan region. Thessaloniki, geographically, belongs to Aegean Macedonia, and because of its strategic importance, the Macedonian question can only be seen through this port as connected to a part of the Greek territory.

With the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, Greece expanded its territory significantly. It is not important how it accomplished this, but as a result of these acquisitions, a significant demographic change occurred in the Aegean part of Macedonia. Greece's policy exacerbated this demographic change. This land, abandoned for a variety of reasons, was nationalized by the Greek government and given to the new settlers or kept under the governmental rule. The Aegean part of Macedonia is lowland that abounds in fertile soil for the development of agriculture, and this is the area in which Greece heavily

¹⁰⁰ Theano Tsirovadiou, "The Economic and Social Structure of Macedonia Since Liberation," in *Modern and Contemporary Macedonia: History, Economy, Society, Culture*, vol. 2 ed. Koliopoulos Ioannes and Hassiotis Ioannes (Thessaloniki, Greece: Papazissis Publishers – Paratiritis Publishing House, 1994), 146.

invested. In 1921, Aegean Macedonia represented 18% of the total land which was under cultivation in Greece, and by 1971 this percentage had climbed to 26%.¹⁰¹

Greece feared that if it recognized the Macedonian state, it would open a Pandora's Box and the refugees would demand their land back or some other compensation for the land and properties. With this in mind, the potential existed for the land and goods to be "taken" from the refugees under a pretext of the nationalization of land, which would create an enormous financial and legal issue for Greece. Already burdened with economic and financial problems, Greece, especially in recent years, realized that this is a problem that they do not need and want. This issue remains a hot topic in both Greece and Macedonia, and it is in close correlation with Greek policy. This is one of the reasons why Greece so vehemently opposed the forming of the independent country called Macedonia in 1991. These factors are driving the official Greek policy towards Greece's old-new neighbor, now named The Republic of Macedonia.

The Third Period: 1991 to Present

At the beginning of the 1990s, Yugoslavia began its spiral of disintegration. Referendums for independence were organized across most of the federal republics (states). As a result, the new democratic movement collided with the old socialist system and a civil war started across the country. Macedonia, as a part of the federation in 1991, organized a referendum and gained independence peacefully. Right after independence, Greece opposed the forming of a country named Macedonia and soon after independence,

¹⁰¹ Tsirovadiou. 142.

negotiations were initiated between Macedonia and Greece to settle this issue. This is a predominant characteristic of this third period, in which numerous negotiations and attempts to settle the dispute and to negate the denial of Macedonian existence were attempted.

It is important to understand how both countries implemented their instruments of national power to attempt to impose their will on the other side. This period saw an intense implementation and use of diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power. The military instrument of national power, even though it was present, was never directly used by either side. Its role, especially in the early stage of the dispute, was more in demonstrating the power and providing a deterrence mostly from the Greek side. When the JNA retreated from Macedonia, almost all the whole military technique and personnel went with them as well. What left was the light weapon and small state territorial units which became a core for creating the Macedonian army. Hence, as a young country at the beginning of 90's, Macedonia arguably even had a military.

The period after the 1990s was a tumultuous period for the Balkan region with challenges that impacted both internal and international relations and continued to shape the dispute between Greece and Macedonia. The war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991-1995), the Greek trade embargo, the Kosovo conflict and the Kosovo refugee crisis in 1999, and the Macedonian ethnic conflict in 2001 are some of the factors and triggers that directly or indirectly influenced the process of negotiating a settlement to the dispute between Greece and Macedonia.

Immediately following independence, Macedonia faced its biggest challenge to its existence and international recognition as a country. At this time, Greece was doing everything to stall, delay, or stop international recognition of Macedonia. At the heart of the dispute was the name of the country. The use of the name Macedonia was considered a threat to Greek national interests, in that the use of the name “Macedonia” was an exclusive Greek cultural legacy and part of Greek history. In addition, the name, as a central part of the dispute between the two countries, is actually a recent aspect.¹⁰² Before the independence of Macedonia, Greece had not objected to the use of the name “Macedonia,” even when the Socialist Republic of Macedonia was a part of the Yugoslav federation. Greece did not refer to any part of its territory as Macedonia until 1988 when the Papandreou government officially replaced the name of “Northern Greece” with the name “Macedonia.”¹⁰³ So, historically the name Macedonia was never an issue, even among the other neighboring countries. Hence the name dispute may be just a diversion from other more important issues such as identity, territory, language, and history.

Greece was claimed that the use of the name “Macedonia” as a name of the country was insinuating that the Republic of Macedonia had a territorial claim toward Greek territory. Some of the arguments that Greece used included the constitution of Macedonia. This Greek statement is not without some truth. Guided by historical events

¹⁰² Heinz-Jurgen Axt, “The Greek Macedonian Name Dispute - Reconciliation through Europeanization?” 26 (2006), quoted in Victor Sinadinovski, *When a Name Becomes a Game: Negotiating the Macedonian Identity*, 93, accessed May 3, 2018, <http://www.makedonika.org/whatsnew/Final+Mak+Paper.pdf>.

¹⁰³ Shea, 282.

in Macedonia, there were always certain individuals and political parties who sought to unify all parts of geographical Macedonia into one Macedonian Balkan state. This process was driven by events that happened between 1912 and 1949. Additionally, some of the political parties in Macedonia were using national rhetoric to garner public support, mobilize political will and stay in power. This was evident in the period after 2006 when the new government led by VMRO-DPMNE¹⁰⁴ started the process of proving the continuity and connection of the current Macedonian nation with Ancient Macedonians. This connection with the Ancient Macedonian civilization was emphasized by numerous projects and actions funded by the Macedonian government. Some of the projects included renaming of the Skopje's international airport and the main highway, from Serbia to Greece, into "Alexander the Great." The national stadium was also renamed into "Philip II of Macedonia" (father of Alexander the Great). What was especially perceived as a provocation to the Greek government was the so called project "Skopje 2014". With this project the center square of the capital city was completely transformed to reflect the connection between modern and ancient Macedonia. The layout of the square was changed as well as multiple statues from the Ancient and more recent history of the country were placed to reflect the connection and continuation of the Macedonian history from Ancient time. As part of the process of making this project a reality, an

¹⁰⁴ VMRO-DPMNE or "Внатрешна Македонска Револуционерна Организација – Демократска Партија за Македонско Национално Единство" (eng. Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity), is a political party established after the independence and consider itself as successor of the IMRO which was created during the Ottoman rule in Macedonia and whose goal was liberation from the Ottoman occupation and establishing a united Macedonian state.

intense information campaign was initiated to reflect the ancient past among the population and the students. This policy was not well received by Greece. It was also used by Greek politicians, backed with information and propaganda, to support their claims concerning Macedonian irredentism, even though these policies were not a significant threat to Greece.

In order to meet the Greek demands and recommendations from the Badinter Commission.¹⁰⁵, in 1992 the Macedonian government changed its constitution. In opinion No.6 from the Badinter Commission, it was confirmed that Macedonia had no territorial aspirations toward its neighboring countries. But still, Greek politicians opposed the admission of Macedonia into the UN, stating that Macedonia was a threat to Greece. Finally, a compromise solution was achieved, and the UN admitted Macedonia as The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). This was a transitional solution that led to the Interim Accord between Macedonia and Greece in which Macedonia changed its constitution and the national flag, and Greece agreed not to oppose the admission of the country into the international institution by the reference of FYROM. Despite its flaws, the Interim Accord had many positive effects. Even though the justification of the Accord is still disputed in both countries, there is no doubt that it had a major positive effect on the bilateral cooperation between Macedonia and Greece. The Accord opened

¹⁰⁵ For more about the Badinter Committee and its role look at Laura Silber, and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 178-280. Arbitration committee was appointed by the European Community to establish preconditions that each republic from now former SFRY to be recognized by the European Community. The Committee was led by Judge Robert Badinter of France and it became known as Badinter Committee.

the doors for Macedonia to become a member of multiple international organizations, it put an end to the economic embargo imposed by Greece, and it contributed to economic cooperation between the two countries. Greece and Macedonia even established liaison offices between the two countries, which was a major political event. Even though the Accord was a major development in bilateral cooperation between Macedonia and Greece, especially in the economic realm, Greek fears and claims of Macedonian territorial demands as well as the final settlement of the name dispute, remained.

Greece continued with its allegations of possible territorial and historical claims by the Macedonian state, which intensified after 2006 when the VMRO-DPMNE party came into power and started to emphasize the connection between the current and ancient Macedonian state. Even though the government led by VMRO-DPMNE continued with its pro-European course and significant reforms were made to fulfill European and NATO requirements. As a result of the aggressive policy of “Antiquization” in Macedonia, the diplomatic relationship with Greece deteriorated. Although these actions, represent only a small portion of government initiatives, using these actions reinforced domestic political power and increased popular support enabling the predominant political power to control the direction of the government for ten years. From an external political perspective, these actions were damaging the process of Macedonian integration into the EU and NATO, where Greece was already a member. These actions encouraged Greece to use its position of influence based on its national interests to use its diplomatic position in both the EU and NATO to hinder Macedonian integration in these organizations. The biggest diplomatic defeat that Macedonia suffered due to the policy of

“Antiquization” was at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008. During this summit, Greece used their diplomatic power to influence the decisions of the summit members. In the final statement from the summit, a condition was set that Macedonia would be able to join NATO only after the name dispute with Greece was solved. Following the decision from the NATO summit in Bucharest, Macedonia initiated legal action with the ICJ, against Greece, for violating the article 11 of the Interim Accord. Macedonia won the case against Greece with only a moral victory since ICJ has limited power to enforce its decisions. Still, this was irrelevant since Macedonia lost this opportunity to join NATO by provoking Greece in their unrealistic demands over the name issue. Additionally, with more than 80% of the Greek population supporting a veto if the name dispute was not settled in favor of the Greek position, any other decision but veto most probably would be political suicide for Greek politicians.¹⁰⁶ Nevertheless, Greeks statements and policy justifying the dispute are questionable and hard to prove.

The weakness of the claim that Macedonia is a threat to Greece can be inferred with a comparison of the two countries. There is a great disparity between these two countries regarding the territory, population, and economy. All of these are in favor of Greece.¹⁰⁷ What is especially important regarding Greek claims of a threat from Macedonia, is the advantage of their diplomatic influence and power in international

¹⁰⁶ Michael Seraphinoff, “Dimensions of the Greek-Macedonian Name Dispute,” accessed April 5, 2018, <http://www.makedonika.org/whatsnew/Michael%20Seraphinoff/Dimensions%20of%20the%20Dispute.pdf>.

¹⁰⁷ Data for the comparison of the two countries in regard of the population, territory, and economy are from Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA World Factbook,” accessed April 18, 2018, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>.

organizations. Greece is a member of a great number of international organizations, including the two most important, NATO and the EU. Hence the possibility that a small land-locked country with limited diplomatic influence (in 1991 and 2016) and not a member of the collective security organizations could attack a NATO and EU member to impose territorial demands is vastly overstated.

Another possibility that could fuel Greek fears was the possibility of Macedonian support for the insurgency in Aegean Macedonia as a transition toward the unification and expansion of Macedonia. Again, these claims are without merit. First, Greece's official policy does not recognize any minority (except Muslim), which from a legal perspective would make any rebellion against its domestic population as a criminal or terrorist act. Second, the majority of the Macedonian population who were living in the Aegean region were resettled or displaced in the population exchanges of 1929, 1923, and 1949. Hence the population, which stayed in this region was very small in comparison with the overall demographic structure of the region. Third, since 1913, Greece's policy implemented measures for the systematic assimilation of the Macedonian population by forbidding the use of the language, changing the names of the people, and renaming the geographical structure of the country. Also, the government was heavily investing in creating a homogenized society, especially through the educational process. This had the effect of replacing the minority cultural identity with the Greek one. In time, the Macedonians started to believe that what the Greek state was saying was true, and they became loyal members. So, hypothetically, even if there was a popular will, the resources that the Macedonian government possessed were arguably nonexistent to

support this kind of movement. As the history has shown, insurgence cannot succeed without wide public and international support. This again shows that Greek fears of potential Macedonian demands were just a distraction from the real issue.

From a diplomatic perspective, the name dispute and the selective nature of Greece's policies regarding the use of the name "Macedonia" were dangerous and set a precedent for the use of the name in different countries. There are examples of the use of the name Macedonia in other places in the world. There are seventeen places in the United States of America, two in Columbia and one in Romania and Brazil.¹⁰⁸ Hence, if Greece has the exclusive right over the use of the name Macedonia than it should also demand that these countries change its use of the name "Macedonia" as well. Greece has never objected to the use of the name Macedonia in these countries or accused them of stealing Greek history. Greece only takes the issue of the name with its northern neighbor.

A comparison could be made for the use of a name as a country and as a region and is not interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. An example is the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg (Luxemburg) in Europe and an area in Belgium that is also named Luxemburg. These are two separated but geographically very close areas, and yet no one is mixing those two areas, and there is no dispute between Luxemburg and Belgium for the use of the name Luxemburg. When it comes to the use of the name Macedonia or Macedonians, it is not so easy to misinterpret the meaning of Macedonia and

¹⁰⁸ Geotargit, "How Many Places Are Named Macedonia," accessed March 4, 2018, <https://us.geotargit.com/called.php?qcity=Macedonia>.

Macedonians. First, Greece does not recognize the Macedonian ethnicity in Greece as they are referred to as a Greek Macedonians. The United States of America is usually referred as an America and its citizens as Americans; even though, in the geographical terms, the USA is only a part of the American continent. No one from the American continent opposes the use of the name, and no one is mixing Mexico and Mexicans or Canada and Canadians with America and Americans. The restricted and very narrow use of Macedonia and Macedonians would be similar to the Canada or Mexico opposing the use of the name America or Americans from the USA.

Since its independence in 1991, the Republic of Macedonia has set its strategic goal as joining NATO and the EU. As such, Macedonia has implemented numerous reforms in order to meet the requirements for joining these institutions. In many cases, Macedonia has succeeded in meeting the requirements, but because of the name dispute with Greece, it cannot become a member of NATO and the EU. In both organizations, Greece has the power to veto along with other member countries. This in effect means that without full consensus the admission of new member states is impossible. In 2008 at the Bucharest Summit, Macedonia was on track to become a member of NATO; however, its membership was blocked by Greece, demonstrating the real diplomatic power of Greece and the seriousness of the problem.

Since 1991, Macedonia's bilateral relationship with Greece has varied. The period between 1991 and 1995 was difficult, and it was characterized by political efforts from both countries. Macedonia was trying to be recognized, and Greece was hindering these efforts with political and economic means. After the Interim Accord was signed, there

was a period when the relationship “normalized” between these two countries. This was especially evident in the economic realm. The third period started after 2006 when the Macedonian government tried to emphasize the connection between the ancient and current Macedonian state. This period culminated with Greece’s veto of Macedonia’s membership in NATO at the summit in Bucharest. During this period, negotiations over the name continued even though the Greek position and fears over the potential of Macedonia initiating legal actions to claim territory and claims that it represented security threat were suspect. In this dispute, Greece used a combination of diplomatic and economic means to impose its will over Macedonia and to present the dispute as a name issue that has nothing to do with the events that occurred from 1919 to 1949.

Since 1991, and the establishment of the Republic of Macedonia as independent country Greece has opposed its existence. This opposition focuses on the use of the name “Macedonia” with Greece claiming that the name “Macedonia” can only be used by Greece. Greece used a combination of instruments of national power, particularly economics, to “encourage” the Macedonian government to change the name of the country. In 1992 and 1993, Greece frequently blocked the import and export of goods from and to Macedonia.¹⁰⁹ Finally, on February 16, 1994, the Greek government decided to cancel all trade links and to close the border with Macedonia.¹¹⁰ This was the beginning of a trade embargo that Greece imposed on Macedonia. This embargo had a significant negative impact on an already weak and fragile Macedonian economy, which

¹⁰⁹ Shea, 279.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 284.

was heavily dependent on the port at Thessaloniki as the main trading link to the rest of the world.¹¹¹ The reasons for the Greek embargo are obvious. Greece used Macedonian dependency on the port at Thessaloniki to add pressure on Macedonia to concede to Greece's demands on the name dispute. The public opinion in Greece supported the blockade, while in Macedonia the public was still against changing the name. Both countries, but especially Greece, were under international pressure to settle the dispute and to end the embargo.¹¹² The blockade lasted for 18 months until Macedonia and Greece signed the Interim Accord on September 13, 1995.¹¹³ Public opinion in both countries was negative and perceived the Accord as a betrayal of the national interests. This public opinion signifies that a true compromise was achieved. Both countries won something and also lost something. Politically good or bad, from an economic perspective, the accord opened opportunities for the economic cooperation between the two countries. Soon after the accord was signed, Greek investments in Macedonia reached record levels, and Greece became one of the biggest investors in Macedonia with total investments of over 400 million dollars.¹¹⁴ The resulting effects of these actions can be analyzed from two perspectives. One is the economic aspect, and the other is a political aspect. From the economic perspective, all these investments were made because there was an economic justification for the investments. The investors were driven by

¹¹¹ Underdown, 12.

¹¹² For more about the Embargo and the international reactions see Shea, 284-304.

¹¹³ Shea, 304-305.

¹¹⁴ Haralambos, 71.

potential profit. The other, a more political reason was the greater strategic interests and the possibility to extend Greek influence in Macedonia. Companies, encouraged by the official government, invested into the strategic branches of industry in Macedonia. This significant capital could provide Greece with a degree of control over the strategic industrial and economic capabilities of Macedonia. Control of these resources would create a Macedonian dependence on foreign investments and would make the country more vulnerable to outside pressure. Between 2000 and 2006, Greece invested around 263 million United States Dollars (USD) in Macedonian companies.¹¹⁵ With this capital, 17 out of the 20 most sizable investments in banking, energy, telecommunications, industry, and food were financed with Greek capital.¹¹⁶ The real intent of these Greek investments is not clear. Was it to control these strategic resources and use them as a means to apply pressure in the name dispute or were they just good investments? These investments were never used as a means of pressure, but it did create a dependence that could be leveraged in the future.

Even though the Interim Accord was controversial among the populations of both countries, the economic and political benefits are difficult to dispute. It created a foundation on which both countries could build their bilateral relationship, especially in the economic realm. Internationally, for Macedonia, it opened the doors for membership into other international organizations. For Greece, it provided a ground to restore the

¹¹⁵ Sam Vaknin, *Macedonia: A Nation at a Crossroads* (Skopje: Narcissus Publications Imprint, 2009), accessed April 14, 2018, <http://samvak.tripod.com/macedonia.pdf>.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

position in the international community which was shattered with the blockade of Macedonia.

The name of the country “Macedonia” is the newest approach in the Greek-Macedonian dispute and is just a façade to mask the real issues and problems that originated in historical events but are political and economic in nature. Understanding the essence of the Greek-Macedonian dispute is best observed through three periods. The first two took place between 1910 and 1991 and represent the roots for the contemporary dispute between Greece and Macedonia. The third period from 1991 to present is a period where the dispute continues as well as the negotiations for resolving it accompanied with varying attempts to negotiate a viable and lasting solution to the problem.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATIONS

The name dispute between Macedonia and Greece is a sensitive and complex issue that goes beyond the name of the country. Understanding the real causes that led to this dispute is just one step toward finding a solution. The second step is addressing these causes and concerns. By “putting all the cards” on the table from both sides and openly discussing the issues a positive outcome is possible. By hiding the real causes of any issue or diverting attention away from the real issue with another issue is just a farce through which a solution can never be made since there is no real commitment. In this case, often the side that is covering the real issues does not even know what they really want. This appears to be the case with the Greek-Macedonian dispute. With the Interim Accord from 1995, which both sides signed, Greece agreed not to block Macedonian membership into international organizations as long as the country was referenced as FYROM.¹¹⁷ Yet, Greece is continuing to hinder Macedonian membership in NATO and EU even though Macedonia fulfilled all the membership requirements for these institutions.

In the Greek-Macedonian dispute, even though the name is an issue, it was never the crucial component for solving the dispute. The issues are hidden in the historical events that took place in the 20th Century and were supported by the official Greek policy. So while the name is not a threat to Greece, the real threat is the existence of the

¹¹⁷ UN, *Interim Accord*, article 11.

Macedonian state. With its existence, Macedonia is a reminder of the events from the 20th Century that had lasting consequences in political, historical, ethnic and social aspects of both countries. The existence of Macedonia represents a part of history which the modern Greeks would rather erase and pretend that never happened. Also, the dispute in the last three decades has evolved, and the positions and demands on both sides changed. This attitude might be acceptable from a political standpoint, but it does not help in solving the core issue. In the Greek-Macedonian case, it is essential to address issues such as minority rights, denationalization of the land, repatriation of refugees and their properties, and national identity (at a minimum), regardless of how sensitive and unpleasant these issues might be. These are the real causes for the dispute, and they need to be recognized as such. There might be even more issues that need to be addressed, and that is why further research on this issue is required. Once all causes for the dispute are revealed, only then can the real problem be formulated and the path toward an enduring solution be reached. Despite the current flawed formulation of the dispute, a solution is still possible, and a few possible solutions exist.

Recommendations

The Interim Accord from 1995 provides a solid base for achieving a valid and permanent solution acceptable for both sides. But, since 1995 the political environment in the world and the bilateral relationship between Macedonia and Greece has changed. In order to make some recommendations for the possible solution a few facts need to be addressed:

1. The right of self-determination of the nation is the fundamental human right determined in Chapter 1, Article 1, part 2 from the Charters from the UN.
2. The territory of Macedonia has been divided during the Balkan wars, and now those territories are an integral part of the other Balkan countries including Greece.
3. Since 1991 Macedonia has established bilateral cooperation with many nations, and it has been recognized by its constitutional name, Republic of Macedonia, by more than 130 countries.
4. Eventual change of the name of the country will also affect the national identity, language, alphabet, international agreements, regulative, etc.
5. Macedonia is a small landlocked country with limited resources and as so does not possess capabilities to be a military threat to Greece.

These are facts and internationally accepted policy. Embracing them and coping with emotions, will help in bridging the gaps and personal biases and reaching a solution based on logical, rational and internationally accepted rules and laws. From this, both countries, Macedonia and Greece, need to manage their expectations and accept the reality. Greece needs to accept the existence of Macedonia as well as Macedonia needs to accept that Aegean part is an integral part of Greece.

The success of the Interim Accord cannot be argued, and with a few exceptions, it is working. It also benefited both countries. The road toward the membership of the international organizations became open for Macedonia. Greece's international integrity was restored. The bilateral cooperation in all segments of Accord was advancing. But,

what is more, important are the lessons learned from the implementation of the Accord. These lessons need to be implemented in the future negotiations and to be used as a basis for building the solution. The use of the “double formula” which is part of the Interim Accord seems the most suitable solution. Greece can refer to their northern neighbor with whatever name Macedonia and Greece agree to. Macedonia will use the name for internal use and will keep the national attributes that distinguish the nation from the other world’s nations. The rest of the world countries can also choose, from one of the two names, which one will be used in their bilateral communication. The use of the name in the international organizations is more complicated and probably “double formula” will face resistance from Greece. This issue needs to be examined further and a possible solution to be implemented with the “double formula.”

Summary

The Greek-Macedonian dispute is unique. Its nature, its political, social and historical factors contribute to its complexity. Still, it contains insights that apply to other international questions. There are other cases, such as Luxemburg and Belgium, that are separated by borders, share mutual name and a history, and they still coexist. Since 1991, the Republic of Macedonia became a reality and continued to exist in the international community as an independent country. The ongoing dispute that Greece has with the name of the country is just a mask behind the real causes for the dispute. Historical, political and economic reasons whose origin can be traced and linked to the events from the 20th Century are the real reasons behind the dispute. These reasons are fundamental and cannot be resolved without first addressing the issues that are analyzed in this paper.

But, nevertheless, whatever the reasons are behind the dispute the right of self-determination and the identity and existence of the people as the fundamental human right must never be disputed.


APPENDIX A

THE BALKAN TERRITORIES UNDER OTTOMAN RULE - MID 16th CENTURY

Source: Dennis P. Hupchick and Harold E. Cox, *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of the Balkans* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), mMap 21.

APPENDIX B

MAP OF THE BALKAN ASPIRATIONS (SHOWING BOUNDARIES OF 1912)



Source: University of Texas Libraries, "Pery Castaneda Library Map Collection," University of Texas, accessed April 25, 2018, https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/balkan_aspirations_1914.jpg.

APPENDIX C

TERRITORIAL MODIFICATIONS IN THE BALKANS - CONFERENCE OF LONDON (MAY 1913) AND TREATY OF BUKAREST (AUGUST 1913)



Source: University of Texas Libraries, "Pery Castaneda Library Map Collection," University of Texas, accessed April 25, 2018, https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/balkan_modifications_1914.jpg.

APPENDIX D

THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA IN FEDERAL YUGOSLAVIA (1944-1991)



Source: University of Texas Libraries, “Pery Castaneda Library Map Collection,” University of Texas, accessed April 25, 2018, https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/balkan_modifications_1914.jpg.

APPENDIX E
THE INTERIM ACCORD

No. 32193

**GREECE
and
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC
OF MACEDONIA**

**Interim Accord (with related letters and translations of the
Interim Accord in the languages of the Contracting Par-
ties). Signed at New York on 13 September 1995**

Authentic text: English.

Registered by Greece on 13 October 1995.

**GRÈCE
et
L'EX-RÉPUBLIQUE YOUGOSLAVE
DE MACÉDOINE**

**Accord intérimaire (avec lettres connexes et traductions de
l'Accord intérimaire dans les langues des Parties con-
tractantes). Signé à New York le 13 septembre 1995**

Texte authentique : anglais.

Enregistré par la Grèce le 13 octobre 1995.

Vol. 1891. I-32193

INTERIM ACCORD¹

Minister Karolos Papoulias, representing the Party of the First Part (the "Party of the First Part") and Minister Stevo Crvenkovski, representing the Party of the Second Part (the "Party of the Second Part"), hereby DECLARE AND AGREE as follows:

Recalling the principles of the inviolability of frontiers and the territorial integrity of States incorporated in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in Helsinki,²

Bearing in mind the provisions of the United Nations Charter and, in particular, those referring to the obligation of States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,

Guided by the spirit and principles of democracy and fundamental freedoms and respect for human rights and dignity, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a new Europe³ and pertinent acts of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,

Considering their mutual interest in the maintenance of international peace and security, especially in their region,

Desiring to confirm the existing frontier between them as an enduring international border,

Recalling their obligation not to intervene, on any pretext or in any form, in the internal affairs of the other,

Desiring to develop their mutual relations and to lay firm foundations for a climate of peaceful relations and understanding,

Realizing that economic cooperation is an important element for the development of mutual relations on a stable and firm basis, as well as desiring to develop and promote future cooperation,

Desiring to reach certain interim agreements that will provide a basis for negotiating a permanent Accord.

Have agreed as follows:

¹ Came into force on 13 October 1995, i.e., the thirtieth day following the date of signature, in accordance with article 23 (1).

² *International Legal Materials*, vol. XIV (1975), p. 1292 (American Society of International Law).

³ United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fifth Session, document A/45/859*.

A. FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

Article I

1. Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the First Part recognizes the Party of the Second Part as an independent and sovereign state, under the provisional designation set forth in a letter of the Party of the First Part of the date of this Interim Accord, and the Parties shall at an early date establish diplomatic relations at an agreed level with the ultimate goal of relations at ambassadorial level.

2. The Party of the First Part shall as promptly as possible establish a liaison office in Skopje, the capital of the Party of the Second Part, and the Party of the Second Part shall as promptly as possible establish a liaison office in Athens, the capital of the Party of the First Part.

Article 2

The Parties hereby confirm their common existing frontier as an enduring and inviolable international border.

Article 3

Each Party undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and the political independence of the other Party. Neither Party shall support the action of a third party directed against the sovereignty, the territorial integrity or the political independence of the other Party.

Article 4

The Parties shall refrain, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or use of force, including the threat or use of force designed to violate their existing frontier, and they agree that neither of them will assert or support claims to any part of the territory of the other Party or claims for a change of their existing frontier.

Article 5

1. The Parties agree to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to Security Council resolution 845 (1993)¹ with a view to reaching agreement on the difference described in that resolution and in Security Council resolution 817 (1993).²

2. Recognizing the difference between them with respect to the name of the Party of the Second Part, each Party reserves all of its rights consistent with the specific obligations undertaken in this Interim Accord. The Parties shall cooperate with a view to

¹ United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-eighth Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1993 (S/INF/49)*, p. 33.

² *Ibid.*, p. 132.

facilitating their mutual relations notwithstanding their respective positions as to the name of the Party of the Second Part. In this context, the Parties shall take practical measures, including dealing with the matter of documents, to carry out normal trade and commerce between them in a manner consistent with their respective positions in regard to the name of the Party of the Second Part. The Parties shall take practical measures so that the difference about the name of the Party of the Second Part will not obstruct or interfere with normal trade and commerce between the Party of the Second Part and third parties.

Article 6

1. The Party of the Second Part hereby solemnly declares that nothing in its Constitution, and in particular in the Preamble thereto or in Article 3 of the Constitution, can or should be interpreted as constituting or will ever constitute the basis of any claim by the Party of the Second Part to any territory not within its existing borders.

2. The Party of the Second Part hereby solemnly declares that nothing in its Constitution, and in particular in Article 49 as amended, can or should be interpreted as constituting or will ever constitute the basis for the Party of the Second Part to interfere in the internal affairs of another State in order to protect the status and rights of any persons in other States who are not citizens of the Party of the Second Part.

3. The Party of the Second Part furthermore solemnly declares that the interpretations given in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article will not be superseded by any other interpretation of its Constitution.

Article 7

1. Each Party shall promptly take effective measures to prohibit hostile activities or propaganda by State-controlled agencies and to discourage acts by private entities likely to incite violence, hatred or hostility against each other.

2. Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the Second Part shall cease to use in any way the symbol in all its forms displayed on its national flag prior to such entry into force.

3. If either Party believes one or more symbols constituting part of its historic or cultural patrimony is being used by the other Party, it shall bring such alleged use to the attention of the other Party, and the other Party shall take appropriate corrective action or indicate why it does not consider it necessary to do so.

Article 8

1. The Parties shall refrain from imposing any impediment to the movement of people or goods between their territories or through the territory of either Party to the territory of the other. Both Parties shall cooperate to facilitate such movements in accordance with international law and custom.

2. The Parties agree that the European Union and the United States may be requested to use their good offices with respect to developing practical measures referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 5 so as to assist the Parties in the implementation of Article 8.

B. HUMAN AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

Article 9

1. In the conduct of their affairs the Parties shall be guided by the spirit and principles of democracy, fundamental freedoms, respect for human rights and dignity, and the rule of law, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,¹ the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,² the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,³ the Convention on the Rights of the Child,⁴ the Helsinki Final Act,⁴ the document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe.

2. No provision of the instruments listed in paragraph 1 above shall be interpreted to give any right to take any action contrary to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter, or of the Helsinki Final Act, including the principle of the territorial integrity of States.

Article 10

Convinced that the development of human relations is necessary for improving understanding and good-neighborliness of their two peoples, the Parties shall encourage contacts at all appropriate levels and shall not discourage meetings between their citizens in accordance with international law and custom.

C. INTERNATIONAL, MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Article 11

1. Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Party of the First Part agrees not to object to the application by or the membership of the Party of the Second Part in international, multilateral and regional organizations and institutions of which the Party of the First Part is a member; however, the Party of the First Part reserves the right to object to any membership referred to above if and to the extent the Party of the Second Part is to be referred to in such organization or institution differently than in paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution 817 (1993).

¹ United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Part I*, p. 71.

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 213, p. 221.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. 660, p. 195.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 1577, No. 1-27531.

2. The Parties agree that the ongoing economic development of the Party of the Second Part should be supported through international cooperation, as far as possible by a close relationship of the Party of the Second Part with the European Economic Area and the European Union.

D. TREATY RELATIONS

Article 12

1. Upon entry into force of this Interim Accord, the Parties shall in their relations be directed by the provisions of the following bilateral agreements that had been concluded between the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Party of the First Part on 18 June 1959:

- (a) The convention concerning mutual legal relations,¹
- (b) The agreement concerning the reciprocal recognition and the enforcement of judicial decisions,² and
- (c) The agreement concerning hydro-economic questions.³

The Parties shall promptly consult with a view to entering into new agreements substantially similar to those referred to above.

2. The Parties shall consult with each other in order to identify other agreements concluded between the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Party of the First Part that will be deemed suitable for application in their mutual relations.

3. The Parties may conclude additional bilateral agreements in areas of mutual interest.

Article 13

Having regard to the fact that the Party of the Second Part is a land-locked State, the Parties shall be guided by the applicable provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea⁴ as far as practicable both in practice and when concluding agreements referred to in Article 12.

Article 14

1. The Parties shall encourage the development of friendly and good-neighborly relations between them and shall reinforce their economic cooperation in all sectors, including that of water resources management. In particular they shall promote, on a

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 368, p. 81.

² *Ibid.*, p. 69.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. 363, p. 133.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vols. 1833, 1834 and 1835, No. I-31363.

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reciprocal basis, road, rail, maritime and air transport and communication links, using the best available technologies, and facilitate the transit of their goods between them and through their territories and ports. The Parties shall observe international rules and regulations with respect to transit, telecommunications, signs and codes.

2. To this end the Parties agree to enter forthwith into negotiations aimed at promptly implementing agreements of cooperation in the aforementioned areas, taking into account the obligations of the Party of the First Part deriving from its membership in the European Union and from other international instruments. Such agreements shall relate to visas, work permits, "green-card" insurance, air space transit and economic cooperation.

E. ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LEGAL RELATIONS

Article 15

1. The Parties shall strengthen their economic relations in all fields.

2. The Parties shall in particular support development and cooperation in the field of capital investments, as well as industrial cooperation between enterprises. Special attention shall be paid to cooperation between small and medium-size companies and enterprises.

Article 16

1. The Parties shall develop and improve scientific and technical cooperation, as well as cooperation in the field of education.

2. The Parties shall intensify their exchanges of information and of scientific and technical documentation, and shall strive to improve mutual access to scientific and research institutions, archives, libraries and similar institutions.

3. The Parties shall support initiatives by scientific institutions and by individuals aimed at improving cooperation in the sciences.

Article 17

1. The Parties shall take great care to avoid dangers to the environment and to preserve natural living conditions in the lakes and rivers shared by the two Parties.

2. The Parties shall cooperate in eliminating all forms of pollution in border areas.

3. The Parties shall strive to develop and harmonize strategies and programs for regional and international cooperation for protecting the environment.

Article 18

The Parties shall cooperate in alleviating the consequences of disasters.

Article 19

1. The Parties shall cooperate in improving and promoting business and tourist travel.

2. Consistent with the obligations of the Party of the First Part arising from its membership in the European Union and from relevant instruments of the Union, the Parties shall make joint efforts to improve and accelerate customs and border formalities, including simplification in the issuance of visas to each other's citizens, taking into account Article 5, paragraph 2, of this Interim Accord.

3. The Parties shall endeavor to improve and modernize existing border crossings as required by the flow of traffic, and construct new border crossings as necessary.

Article 20

The Parties shall cooperate in the fight against organized crime, terrorism, economic crimes, narcotics crimes, illegal trade in cultural property, offenses against civil air transport and counterfeiting.

F. FINAL CLAUSES

Article 21

1. The Parties shall settle any disputes exclusively by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

2. Any difference or dispute that arises between the Parties concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Interim Accord may be submitted by either of them to the International Court of Justice, except for the difference referred to in Article 5, paragraph 1.

Article 22


This Interim Accord is not directed against any other State or entity and it does not infringe on the rights and duties resulting from bilateral and multilateral agreements already in force that the Parties have concluded with other States or international organizations.


Article 23

1. This Interim Accord shall enter into force and become effective on the thirtieth day following the date on which it is signed by the representatives of the Parties as set forth below.


2. This Interim Accord shall remain in force until superseded by a definitive agreement, provided that after seven years either Party may withdraw from this Interim Accord by a written notice, which shall take effect 12 months after its delivery to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Parties have, through their authorized representatives, signed three copies of this Interim Accord in the English language which shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. Within two months of the date of signature, the United Nations is to prepare, in consultation with the Parties, translations into the language of the Party of the First Part and the language of the Party of the Second Part, which shall constitute part of the registration of this Accord.

¹
Representative of the
Party of the First Part

²
Representative of the
Party of the Second Part

WITNESSED, in accordance with Resolution 845 (1993) of the Security Council, by:


Cyrus Vance
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations

DONE at New York on the 13th day of September 1995

¹ Karolos Papoulias.
² Stevo Crvenkovski.

Source: United Nations, *GREECE and THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA Interim Accord (with related letters and translations of the Interim Accord in the languages of the Contracting Parties)* (New York: United Nations, 1995), accessed May 23, 2018, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MK_950913_Interim%20Accord%20between%20the%20Hellenic%20Republic%20and%20the%20FYROM.pdf.

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