THE NIGERIAN MILITARY IN DOMESTIC COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS: A STUDY IN RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, 1960-2017

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategic Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2018

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### 1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)
15-06-2018

### 2. REPORT TYPE
Master’s Thesis

### 3. DATES COVERED (From - To)
AUG 2017 – JUN 2018

### 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

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Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

### 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

### 14. ABSTRACT
The Nigerian military (NM) has actively intervened in domestic conflict spots across Nigeria between 1960 and 2017. The dynamic nature of domestic conflict in Nigeria, manifesting as insurgency, terrorism, riots, militancy, criminality, banditry, among others, has attracted a range of military operations (ROMO) from the NM. In the various deployments of the NM for counterinsurgency roles, ROMO has been determined by the intensity of violence. The effectiveness of the NM in ROMO has determined the duration and intensity of each domestic counterinsurgency in Nigeria. The study identified the basic challenge that faced the NM in domestic COIN was they were tasked to perform duties they are not properly trained and prepared for. The constraints faced by the NM in ROMO resulted from the need to change from conventional military roles to unconventional ones—a change that required a minimum use of force and policing/law enforcement duties. The study also identified the “constabularization” of the NM and the militarization of the civil polity as major outcomes of ROMO. The study submits that for the NM, ROMO appears demanding in terms of military professionalism.

### 15. SUBJECT TERMS
Nigerian Military, Counterinsurgency, ROMO, Constabularization, COIN
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


The Nigerian military (NM) has actively intervened in domestic conflict spots across Nigeria between 1960 and 2017. The dynamic nature of domestic conflict in Nigeria, manifesting as insurgency, terrorism, riots, militancy, criminality, banditry, among others, has attracted a range of military operations (ROMO) from the NM. In the various deployments of the NM for counterinsurgency roles, ROMO has been determined by the intensity of violence. The effectiveness of the NM in ROMO has determined the duration and intensity of each domestic counterinsurgency in Nigeria. The study identified the basic challenge that faced the NM in domestic COIN was they were tasked to perform duties they are not properly trained and prepared for. The constraints faced by the NM in ROMO resulted from the need to change from conventional military roles to unconventional ones—a change that required a minimum use of force and policing/law enforcement duties. The study also identified the “constabularization” of the NM and the militarization of the civil polity as major outcomes of ROMO. The study submits that for the NM, ROMO appears demanding in terms of military professionalism.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I want to express my complete gratitude to Almighty God for keeping me alive in good health throughout the research. I particularly thank the Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen TY Buratai for giving me the opportunity to attend this very important course at the prestigious Command and General Staff College.

I also extend my sincere appreciation to my dogged committee members, Dr Shawn Cupp, LTC David Fugazzotto, and Mr. Michael Burke for their guidance and encouragement. Your professional supervision has bolstered my knowledge of how to conduct a research. I must also express my thanks to Mrs. Bonnie Joranko for finding time out of your busy schedule to edit and fix my paper.

I also acknowledge the various people that assisted me with relevant materials for my research especially Dr Ubong Essien Umoh. I owe him a lot. I also want to thank my sponsors, Mr. Nathaniel Stevenson and Mrs. Sherry Horvath, for being part of my family and for making me feel at home even though I am very far from home.

Finally, my profound appreciation goes to my lovely wife, our children for their understanding and prayers throughout the duration of the research. I am very grateful to my parents who provided me with support since when I was in the cradle. I also owe them a lot. To many others who I am unable to mention, I say a big thank you and God bless you all.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Introduction

A preponderance of conventional force-on-force operations have given way to more complex challenges of asymmetric warfare, urban counterinsurgency, extensive civil affairs and public diplomacy work with the state’s publics, stabilization, reconstruction, and nation building (Armitage and Moisan 2005). Military forces do many things, ranging from defending national territory to invading other states, hunting down terrorists, coercing concessions, countering insurgencies, keeping the peace, enforcing economic sanctions, showing the flag, or maintaining domestic order (Biddle 2004, 5). Armitage and Moisan have argued that military forces are trained for war—force-on-force engagements against other military or armed adversaries (Armitage and Moisan 2005, 2). While the military is able to mobilize and deploy rapidly in large units, most are uncomfortable with, ill-suited to, and not generally trained for police tasks that are central to post-military conflict operations (for example, riot control, border control, domestic surveillance, securing and protecting sensitive sites). This makes for a range of military operations (ROMO). The ROMO is a fundamental construct that helps relate military activities and operations in scope and purpose within a backdrop of the conflict continuum (U.S. Army 2017, 1). It concerns not only the end of hostilities, but also the full restoration of order. It covers the elastic transition from warfighting to peacekeeping, as well as stability and reconstruction.
Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities are at the far left of the conflict continuum, while crisis response and limited contingency operations are in the middle of the continuum. Large-scale combat operations at the far right of the conflict continuum occur in the form of major operations and campaigns aimed at defeating an enemy’s armed forces and military capabilities in support of national objectives. They are often associated with war. New realities of security challenges demand the deployment of the military to active and impending crisis spots. Consequently, the architecture of security involves a large number of stakeholders. Concepts such as “plural policing,” “policing quilt,” “plural security,” or “security continuum,” on which a vast and growing number of actors operate, are being used to describe the new realities of security (Easton, Den Boer, Janssens, Moelker, and Vanderbeken 2010). Historically, conventional armies fought unconventional or irregular armies, thereby engaging in irregular wars (Booth 2013). Such engagements between
conventional and unconventional armies were marked by an asymmetry between the fighting forces with attendant differentiation in fighting tactics. Examples of the need to conform to the complex and ambiguous requirements of counterinsurgency by conventional troops has been witnessed in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Northern Ireland, Nigeria, Somalia, and India. It has resulted in the use of a ROMO. Foreign counterinsurgency operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom (US-NATO led counter-insurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan since 2001), Operation Jacana (COIN operations to clear Al Qaeda in Southeastern Afghanistan), Operation Anaconda, Operation Iraqi Freedom (US COIN operations in Iraq since 2003) have revealed a problem associated with a ROMO (West 2006; Hashim 2007; Metz 2007). This has demanded the need for Special Forces and elite warriors trained and deployed as unconventional units (Sullivan 1995; Sides 2001; Clancy 2002; Ryan 2008).

At the national level, the ROMO includes domestic counterinsurgency carried out in support of civil authorities of the state. In contemporary parlance, this is known as military aid to civil power (MACP). Few examples include Operation Banner, the British Army’s COIN operations in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 2007; Operation Blue Star, the Indian Army COIN operations to recapture the Golden Temple in Amritsar between 3 and 6 June 1984; and Operation Marmion, the British counterinsurgency plan in the early 1970s against terrorist threat in Heathrow Airport. All these showed the ROMO that limit conventional military units deployed for internal security operations.

Background of Study

The Nigerian military (NM) has its origins in the colonial military machine (Ubah 1998) made up of successive metamorphosis of military units which engaged in ROMO
in precolonial Nigeria. First, in 1863, the Lagos Constabulary metamorphosed into the “Glover Hausa,” and was used by Captain J. Glover—the Governor of Lagos—to “mount punitive expedition in the Lagos hinterland and to protect British trade routes around Lagos” (Ukpabi 1986). In 1865, the “Glover Hausa” embraced a change of name to “Hausa Constabulary” or “Hausa Militia,” operating more as a regular force. The Hausa Constabulary performed both police and military duties for the Lagos colonial government (Ukpabi 1989).

The Royal Niger Constabulary Force, the armed wing of the Royal Niger Company (RNC), first formed in 1886 as the “Oil Rivers Irregulars,” shouldered the responsibility of protecting commerce in the Niger (Ukpabi 1987). In 1897, they carried out military expeditions in Bida and Illorin (both in Nigeria). The West African Frontier Force (WAFF) was formed in 1897 and had the Northern Nigeria Regiment and Southern Nigeria Regiments until 1914. The southern regiment of WAFF conducted domestic counterinsurgency operations against the *Ekumeku Movement* in Ibusa (1898), Onicha-Olana (1902, 1903-1904 and 1909-1910), Ubulu-Uku (1904), and Ogbashi-Uku (1910-1911) (Igbafe 1971; Emordi 1990). The Northern Regiment of WAFF conducted domestic counterinsurgency operations in Nupe, Illorin, Zaria, Kontagora, Yola, Bauchi, and Gwandu of the Sokoto Caliphate (Ubah 1988; Ubah 1994, Umoh 2013). These ROMO aided the complete fall of Nigeria to British colonial rule as captured by Tamuno (1965), Crowder (1966), Ikime (1977), and Asiegbu (1984). By 1914, both regiments collapsed into the Nigeria Regiment of the WAFF and were later renamed the Queens Own Nigerian Regiments (QONR) by 1956. The QONR became the Nigerian Military Force (NMF) after the WAFF was regionalized (Ukpabi 1966). Upon independence in
1960, the NMF changed into the Royal Nigerian Army (RNA). When Nigeria became a Republic in 1963, the RNA changed to the Nigerian Army.

In post-colonial Nigeria, a succession of military operations in support of civil power dotted Nigeria’s landscape. The NM has been deployed in a variety of roles including quelling insurgencies, riots, students’ crises, religious violence, armed protest, highway patrols, combating kidnappings, and even confronting armed robbery. A few recent examples include Operation Restore Hope (a COIN operation launched between 2003 and 2009 to contain insurgents in the Niger Delta), Operation Pulo Shield (a military operation launched between 2009 and 2016 to protect oil installations in the Niger Delta), and Operation Lafiya Dole (a military operation in the northeast to contain Boko Haram insurgency) among others.

Until 2009, the NM lacked a distinct doctrine to tackle the ROMO it faced. It lacked a distinct doctrine to guide the need to modify, transform, and adapt to a non-conventional role and mission. However, the NM was not completely new to counterinsurgency roles. The NM had been involved in near unconventional warfare settings, like the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau. However, the domestic environment came with its own peculiar challenges, which can only be understood in the context of a comprehensive study.

A litany of security agencies and institutions exist in Nigeria to manage internal security crisis, such as the Nigeria Police, Nigeria Security, Civil Defense Corps, Office of the National Security Adviser, Department of State Services, National Intelligence Agency, Nigeria Police Force, Armed Forces of Nigeria (Nigerian military), Nigerian Immigration Service, Nigeria Prisons Service, Nigeria Custom Service, and the National
Drug Law Enforcement Agency. However, the NM has a constitutional provision, which permits it to intervene in domestic armed crises manifesting in the form of insurgency, militancy, terrorism, or any other kind of armed insurrection, or a complete breakdown of law and order. Section 217, Sub Section 2(c) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN 1999) specifically empowers the NM to suppress insurrection and act in aid of civil authority to restore order when called upon to do so by the President (CFRN 1999).

These tasks form the basis of participation of the NM in internal security and domestic crises. This immediately throws the NM into a ROMO. Although the Nigeria Police (NP) and Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corp (NSCDC) feature in the first line of operations in the event of internal security, prevailing security lapses in a particular locality, which stretches the resources of the civil police force, necessitating the invitation and involvement of the NM as directed by the President. The primary responsibility for maintaining law and order, safeguarding life, property, and essential services rests with the civil authorities. However, the military is often called out temporarily in aid of the civil authority when situations deteriorate and are expected to discontinue after law and order has been restored.

As conflict escalate and de-escalate from one form to another across Nigeria, the deployment and intervention of the NM to such conflict spots involves a ROMO, which swings from kinetic conventional operations to unconventional policing and administrative duties. Consequently, terms like Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), low intensity conflict (LIC), stability operations (SOs), special operations, internal defense operations (IDO), small wars (SW), irregular warfare, unconventional
warfare, complex operations, humanitarian intervention (HI), disaster relief operations (DRO), mass atrocity response operations (MARO), and protection among others are used to refer to a ROMO in counterinsurgency (COIN). War fighting, policing, cordon and search, house-to-house search, securing population, community building, local administration, election monitoring, conflict management, provision of basic amenities, teaching and education, refugee camp supervision and management, guarding of vulnerable points and critical infrastructures, guarding of important persons, and show of force among others make up the range of activities that the military deploy for counterinsurgency duties. This range of activities defines the kind of training, organization, equipment, education, and doctrine that the soldier requires before being deployed to the field. The nature of assigned missions is carefully assessed to determine the appropriate mix of forces and discern implied missions and requirements. However, the extent to which the soldier succeeds in ROMO is an indication of the level of professionalism. While the ROMO of Western forces in counterinsurgency has attracted scholarly interest, African militaries appear less studied, making for a gap in knowledge on the theme of counterinsurgency. This compels the need to study the ROMO of the NM in domestic counterinsurgency between 1960 and 2017.

**Research Question**

The primary research question is: How does ROMO of the NM in domestic counterinsurgency operations affect overall military success? The secondary research questions are:

1. How has the duration and intensity of domestic COIN operations in Nigeria been affected by ROMO?
2. How is military power in domestic COIN constrained by ROMO?

Assumptions

There are few assumptions that guide this study. The first is that the NM is exposed to a wide ROMO in counterinsurgency situations. The second is that no two military operations are alike in terms of scope, duration, and tempo, as well as cultural and political context. The third is that the NM, until recently, was trained and deployed to face a conventional enemy in a conventional military operation. However, domestic counterinsurgency operations and low-end security has overstretched such military units, forcing a higher than desirable operations tempo, jeopardizing other priority military missions for which only they are trained and equipped. The fourth has it that military activities like security cooperation and engagement take place simultaneously with major combat operations and irregular warfare. Consequently, the NM lacks the full gamut of specialized equipment (lethal and nonlethal) to deal with lower levels of stabilization and nation building. The fifth is that NM ROMO sets out to conclude hostilities on conditions that favor the Federal Government of Nigeria.

Definition of Terms

This section will define central terms used in the course of this study.

Internal Security. Internal Security (IS) has been defined as the act of keeping peace within the borders of a sovereign state or other self-governing territories, generally by upholding the national law and defending against internal security threats. As a military role, IS is any military role which involves primarily the use of force necessary
to maintain and restore law and order and essential services in the face of civil disturbances and disobedience (NA 2011c).

**Internal Security Operations.** Internal security operations are activities, which are collectively undertaken by security agencies, towards the restoration of law and order in Nigeria (TRADOC 2014).

**Insurgency.** Insurgency embraces all forms of violence, often loosely controlled, with national or international political objectives which seeks to change or overthrow an existing political or social order (NA 2009).

**Counterinsurgency.** Counterinsurgency are military operations carried out to complement those political, economic, psychological, and civic actions necessary to defeat an armed insurgency (NA 2009).

**Terrorism.** Terrorism involves the use of violence to intimidate a population for political, economic, social, and/or religious ends (NA 2009).

**Counterterrorism.** These are all efforts—military, political, psychological—put forward by a state to defeat terrorism or dilute a terrorist threat (NA 2009).

**Military Operations Other than War.** These are operations carried out by the military, which appear not to have reached the intensity to be called war. While they involved the use of the military, they are carried out with the least investment in violence (NA 2009).

**Military Support to Civil Authorities.** These military assisted activities provide temporary support to domestic civil authorities when permitted by law. They are usually taken when an emergency overtaxes the capabilities of civil authorities. They can consist of restoration of law and order after a riot, protection of life and property, or providing
relief in the aftermath of natural disaster. They comprise MACP and Military Aid to Civil Authority (MACA) (NA 2011b).

Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO). This is a contingency operation to halt the widespread and systematic use of violence resulting in mass atrocities such as ethnic cleansing, genocide, and crimes against humanity carried out by state or non-state armed groups against non-combatants (NA 2011d).

Military Aid to Civil Power (MACP). This means the provision of military assistance to civil power in its maintenance of law, order, and public safety using specialist capabilities or equipment in situations beyond the capability of civil power. Whereas, a civil power is a civil authority that has constitutional or statutory responsibility for the maintenance of law and order (NA 2011b).

Military Aid to Civil Authority (MACA). This means military assistance to civil authority to enable it render service to the public as well as maintain services whenever directed by the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria (NA 2011b).

Peacetime Military Engagements. Peacetime Military Engagement (PME) are military activities discharge during peace. They are conducted primarily to assist the civil administration to meet sudden challenges to internal peace and tranquility due to local disturbances initiated by a segment of the population or due to natural or man-made calamities (NA 2011a).

Range of Military Operations (ROMO). This refers to varying scale of military involvement and assistance measured by the degree of violence dispersed. They include, but are not limited to military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence through
smaller-scale contingencies and crisis response operations, as well as irregular warfare (US Air Force 2016).

**Scope of Study**

The thematic scope of the work is ROMO within Nigeria’s domestic environment. Counterinsurgency operations make for an integral aspect of the thematic scope given that it falls under ROMO. The thematic scope of the work is chosen because the researcher has interest in unconventional war and warfare. The geographical scope of the work is Nigeria, located in West Africa along the Atlantic Ocean’s Gulf of Guinea. Its land borders are with Benin to the west, Cameroon and Chad to the east and Niger to the north. It has a land area of 356,667 square miles (923,768 square kilometers) and a population of over 170 million. The chronological scope of the work is between 1960 and 2017. The geographical scope of the work is chosen as Nigeria because the researcher is a NM officer. The starting chronological scope of the study is 1960 with the launch of Operation Adam and the terminating chronological scope is 2017 with marked the launch of two significant counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria: Operation Crocodile Smile II and Operation Python Dance II.

**Limitations of the Study**

The external limitations of this study include having access to restricted information on training, doctrine, and strategy of the NM in counterinsurgency operations. However, the researcher will use his position in the NM to access needed official documents. There are also very few textbooks on the military range of operation
in counterinsurgency in Nigeria. Available textbooks on counterinsurgency in Nigeria appear to avoid an examination of military range of operations.

**Significance of Study**

This research is significant to the military profession and other scholars because it will expose the challenges that the military faces in various counterinsurgency operations. These challenges are product of the ROMO in counterinsurgency. These challenges have been known to affect the success of counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria.

**Summary**

This chapter provided an introduction and background to the research topic. It introduced the concept of ROMO in domestic COIN that is carried out by several western countries globally. The Nigerian case is placed in the context of the colonial origins of the NM. From its colonial evolution the Nigerian military appeared trained for internal security tasks. After independence, the Nigerian military appeared trained and prepared for conventional task but was still involved in IS. The chapter showed that up till 2009, the NM lacked a standard doctrine to carry out ROMO in COIN. However, this did not mean that the NM was never exposed to such kind of activities before the period under study.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

The review of literature for this dissertation will attempt to satisfy the primary and secondary research questions. The primary research question engages ROMO and COIN with respect to overall military success. The secondary research question engages the duration and intensity of COIN as affected by ROMO as well as the limitations of kinetic military power in ROMO. Consequently, the literature review will review studies on COIN, aspects of ROMO such as Small Wars (SW), Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC), MOOTW, and Stability Operations (SO) among others. It will also examine the concept military power and its application in internal security (IS) operations in Nigeria.

Counterinsurgency

Galula argues for the primacy of political power over military power in a ratio of 80:20 (Galula 1964). He argues for a strategy that favors the winning of the hearts and minds (HAM), i.e., civilian-centric operations. According to him, effective counterinsurgency should be focused on securing and controlling a given population rather than focusing on a military defeat of the insurgents. This goes against kinetic war fighting using heavy, indiscriminate weaponry, which often alienates the population.

Thompson analyzed how Britain had defeated the Malayan communist insurgency between 1948 and 1960 (Thompson 1966). The cardinal principle of counterinsurgency, articulated by Thompson, is that “the government must function in accordance with law.” From his analysis, he outlined five broad principles for successful counterinsurgency: A clear political aim; work within the law; the development of an overall plan; defeat political subversion and secure base areas (Thompson 1966).

Kitson examines the roles of politics, intelligence, civil-military co-ordination, and psychological operations in defeating insurgency. He argues in another work that there can be no such thing as a purely military victory because insurgency is not primarily a military problem (Kitson 1977). According to Mockaitis:

The British began with the vital assumption that insurgency was not primarily a military problem. Unrest must be dealt with through a combination of reform (winning “hearts and minds”) and police measures. If necessary soldiers would be brought in to bolster the police, but the soldiers would always be acting “in aid to the civil power” and would be bound, like the police themselves, to use only that degree of force “which is essential to restore order, and must never exceed it.” (Mockaitis 1993)

Moore argues that counterinsurgency is an integrated set of political, economic, social, and security measures intended to end and prevent an insurgency (Moore 2000).
The works of these classic counterinsurgency theorists have attracted revisions. David, one of those who have carried out a revision, argues that the twenty-first-century is a new counterinsurgency era (Ucko 2009). Consequently, the twenty-first-century comes with significant challenges for policy makers and practitioners in the profession of arms. He sees counterinsurgency as a war waged by a government using the instruments of state power in a combination of military, political, economic, civil, legal, and psychological means. He argues that twenty-first-century counterinsurgency should not be centered on the people or the enemy, but on achieving campaign objectives (Ucko 2009).

In 2006, the United States Department of Defense published the Joint US Army and Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. The manual served as a guide for the practice of counterinsurgency by the United States Marines. However, the classic works on counterinsurgency and the revisions that follow hardly incorporate the Nigerian situation. The extent to which the NM has made attempt to apply these classical theories of counterinsurgency in its domestic situation remains relatively unknown and understudied. This study identifies this as a gap and sets out to fill it. In 2011, the Nigerian Army published a set of doctrines for counterinsurgency. Volume 2B labeled, “Military Aid to Civil Authority,” and 4B labeled, “Counterinsurgency Operations,” which served as field manual guides for the Nigerian Army engaged in MOOTW. While this doctrine serves as an important primary document, it does not address the challenge made possible by the ROMO in counterinsurgency. The present study sets out to achieve this.
Military Power and ROMO

ROMO in counterinsurgency appears sometimes buried beneath the avalanche of ambiguous phrases like military power, military might, military strength, military capacity, military force, and military security. Millis (1961), Guttridge (1964), Martin (1973), Howard (1974), Garnet (1975), Coker (2002) and Biddle (2004) all make an attempt to show the overlapping meaning of these concepts in the context of usage and practice. Garnet views military power as the legally sanctioned instrument of violence, which governments use in their relations with each other, and, when necessary, in an internal security role. He indicates the assumption that military power is a purposive, functional thing—one of the many instruments in the orchestra of power, which states use at an appropriate moment in the pursuit of their respective national interests (Garnet 1975, 50). However, it must be able to pursue political objectives without which it becomes a blind and senseless instrument of unreasonable death and destruction.

According to Garnet,

Military power may depend to a large extent on the availability of military force, but conceptually it is quite different; it emphasizes a political relationship between potential adversaries rather than a catalogue of military capabilities. In a nutshell, the difference between the exercise of military force and military power is the difference between taking what you want and persuading someone to give it to you. (Garnet 1975, 59)

Drawn from the above extrapolation, the use of military force represents the breakdown of military power. To this end, military power can be exploited without military force being used. Consequently, military power does not have to be used to be useful (Garnet 1975, 60). In all, military power is best characterized by the extent to which actors’ strategic political-military goals including, but not restricted to battlefield victory are achieved (Gentry 2012).
Shelling (1966) threw up the terms “tough negotiations,” “diplomacy of violence,” “coercive warfare,” and “compellance” to describe the use of military force for goals, which are not strictly military at all. To Schelling, “the object is to make the enemy behave” rather than weaken or defeat him (Schelling 1966, 173). To Gentry, military power is the ability to consistently, favorably influence strategic military outcomes (Gentry 2012). An actor in Gentry’s view has military power if the actor 1) accurately identifies exploitable vulnerabilities in a target adversary; and 2) successfully exploits one or more of the target’s critical vulnerabilities (Gentry 2012). This made for Gentry’s “Vulnerability Theory.” To succeed in a ROMO, the military has to generate or produce and effectively use assets in six broad, but interrelated dimensions: 1) national will; 2) resource mobilization, 3) resource conversion, 4) force generation, 5) leadership, and 6) operational execution (Gentry 2012, 3). Consequently, the military can be defeated if its production of military power is disrupted at any point in its process. Jones submits that the use of military power may have diminishing returns as shown in South Vietnam where the United States used virtually all military means short of nuclear warfare to bring North Vietnamese withdrawal (Jones 1985). Yet for all its firepower, it failed to achieve its objective.

Boserup and Mack add to the discussion on ROMO by arguing that conventional military methods cannot be relied upon as the final arbiter in political conflict (Boserup and Mack 1974). They used the Vietnamese experience to show the inadequacy and indecisive character of conventional military methods under certain circumstances. Despite the supply of weapons and manpower being virtually limitless and the military superiority of the United States overwhelming, it did not translate directly into defeat.
Buhaug complements this by adding, “Military superiority does not always secure peace and its victorious outcomes of war” (Buhaug 2010, 112). The more so when the enemy is shadowy, shapeless, and determined and the objectives are nebulous (Akpan 2013).

Gentry stresses upon the relationship between vulnerability and military power. Andre (1909), Moaz (1983), Stoessinger (2011), Umoh (2013) and Wilcox (2014) have all shown how resolve could compete with capability in sustaining the duration of a war and increase the futility of victory. Jones (1985) cites an example where the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, infinitely less powerful militarily, were able to seize upon national will and deteriorating support for the war in the United States and among the Washington’s allies to achieve politically what they could not achieve militarily: governmental self-determination and the expulsion of American force. Consequently, the reality of an asymmetric battlefield becomes more obvious. Hammes (2004) and Arreguin-Toft (2005) show how the “weak” leverages on an asymmetric battlefield and escape losing wars. The terrain of irregular and regular warfare appears to have drifted apart. As such, Liddle Hart had pontificated that:

> Violence takes much deeper root in irregular warfare than it does in regular warfare. In the latter it is counteracted by obedience to constituted authority, whereas the former makes a virtue of defying authority and violating rules. It becomes very difficult to rebuild a country, and a stable state, on a foundation undermined by such experience. (Hart 1991, 369)

Indeed, the asymmetric battlefield appears to blur the boundaries between conventional and non-conventional military operations, giving rise to the idea of a ROMO. The diminishing returns of American firepower, together with the superior intangible resources that the North Vietnamese were able to utilize, redressed the apparent asymmetry of their relationship, revealing the impotence of military power.
(Jones 1985, 246). Hammes (2005) stretches the argument of asymmetric dimension of modern warfare to overlap with “fourth-generation warfare” as a distinct reality of modern warfare. He submits, “The fundamental precept of modern insurgencies is that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power.” This is so because “it is organized to ensure political rather than military success.” which makes this type of warfare difficult to defeat (Hammes 2005). Hammes further provides the strategic, political, operational, and tactical focus of “fourth-generation warfare” thus:

Strategically, fourth-generation warfare remains focused on changing the minds of decision makers. Politically, it involves transnational, national, and subnational organizations and networks. Operationally, it uses different messages for different audiences, all of which focus on breaking an opponent’s political will. Tactically, it utilizes materials present in the society under attack—to include industrial chemicals, liquefied natural gas, or fertilizers. (Hammes 2005, 1)

In Hammes’ view, this kind of warfare have been lost in Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia, Algeria, and Afghanistan. It has also been won in Malaya (1950s), Oman (1970s), and El Salvador (1980s).

The concept of internal security becomes a reluctant outcome of ROMO examined above. Internal security operations weave military and policing duties into a tapestry. As argued by Mockaitis, conventional war is the primary task of most armies and internal security an interruption (Mockaitis 1993). Bayley and Shearing (2001), Loader (2002), Bigo (2005), and Lutterbeck (2005) have all examined the overlapping and blurring boundaries between the military and police in domestic security. Easton, Den Boer, Janssens, Moelker, and Vanderbeken (2010) argue that the blurring military and police roles are just one piece of “the play” in the security “theatre.” They contend
further that the increased importance of military-style police forces and the use of
military-style technology and equipment, the deployment of police officers in peace and
related stability operations and the military involvement in domestic issues are just a few
forms that such blurred boundaries can assume. In their submission, they put it that these
“blurred boundaries,” which could be either complementary or competitive, are based on
the assumption that some institutions adopt a larger amount of tasks, while the range of
duties and tasks of others are shrinking. As a result, several tasks and activities are
overlapping traditional boundaries and objectives.

Geser contends that more troops, a mixture of police and military, are needed to
operate in micro (police), meso (counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism), and in macro
violence (warfare) environments (Geser 1996). These troops, according to Geser, are able
to execute both police and military functions. Arguing that the role of the military is
changing from a more absolute into a more pragmatic focus on practical conflict
resolution, Janowitz introduces the concept of “constabulary force” to explain the
continuous preparations and commitment of the military to use minimum force to secure
policy rather than blind victory (Janowitz 1960). For Moelker and Soeters, the modern
soldier is developing into a diplomat, policeman, social worker, conflict manager, and
advisor of local authorities (Moelker and Soeters 2003). Haltiner contends that military
organizations in addition to their classical warfare task are turning into instruments for
creating international order and nation building (Haltiner 2003). Easton, Den Boer,
Janssens, Moelker, and Vanderbeken (2010) opined that to perform this role, the military
is needful of competence in force escalation and de-escalation within a short period of
time and within short intervals.
The blurred boundaries are further made vicious by the overlapping use of range of expressions that capture military operations short of war in the context of conceptual limited wars. Few scholars have devoted their academic and intellectual energies to exploring the melting pot of related operations, which involves the military. Garnet (1975) had identified limited wars to be wars limited by geography, objective, means and targets. Davidson (1981), Rothenberg (1978) as well as Corum and Johnson (2003) all opine that small wars predates almost all others. Arguing differently, but in agreement, they present that the use of the term “small wars” came into the lexicon of military studies in the late nineteenth-century during the Napoleonic wars of French invasion. Between Valmy and Waterloo, small wars were used to describe any armed conflict against non-regular armed forces such as guerrilla, bandits, rebellious tribes, or insurgents of various stripes (Davidson 1981; Rothenberg 1978; Corum and Johnson 2003).

Aspects of ROMO: Small Wars, Low Intensity Conflicts, Military Operations Other than War, and Stability Operations

In the post-Waterlonian era, small wars came to mean any armed conflict waged against a non-state entity by regular military forces. As argued by Corum and Johnson (2003), “small wars” witnessed a widespread use in the first half of the twentieth-century with the United States Marine Corp’s publication of the *Small Wars Manual*. This manual outlined a comprehensive doctrine for dealing with the various rebels, insurgents; bandits and warring factions commonly encountered by the marines during their numerous intervention operations before the Second World War (Osakwe, Akpan, and Umoh 2016). A range of military operation soon came to be inclusive in, and much later, overtake the term, “small wars.” They included counterinsurgency, suppressing banditry,
peacekeeping, supervising and supporting elections, and training foreign forces (Bickel 2001). Consequently, Peifer (2010) noted that COIN operations are not merely a less-intense form of conflict within the Range of Military Operations, but an entirely different arc of the warfare continuum and require specialized units, operations, tactics, and skills that are beyond capabilities of an organic conventional force.

The Banana Wars in Central America and the Caribbean, as well as the frequent U.S. involvement in Latin America, appeared an almost perfect fit for such categorization (Schmidt 1971; Musicant 1980; Langley 1983, 1995). After the Second World War, the military doctrine of the United States replaced the term “small wars” with “low intensity conflict” (LIC), emphasizing the constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and level of violence. In the mid-1990s, LIC faced a glacial retreat, giving way to Military Operations Short of War (MOSOW), and almost immediately, MOOTW. By the late 1990s, MOOTW lost favor and appeared to have been modified with “stability operations” (Osakwe, Otoabasi, and Umoh 2016). In all these operations, the military was the central actor, and in the process was made to carry out a ROMO that involved both active and passive violence in a disproportionate mix. All these made up the various shades of grey in the chaotic concept of war.

Biddle (2004) sees the capability as the ability of the military to success at any assigned mission in its range of operations. Consequently, in the array of operations, capability is assessed differently. Accomplishment is also measured via three interconnected criteria: the ability to destroy hostile forces while preserving one’s own; the ability to take and hold ground; and the time required to do so (Biddle 2004). The measurement of success and accomplishment using casualties, ground gain, and duration
appear to define the full ROMO. However, in most cases when small-scale military efforts prove insufficient, more armed pressure is applied. Mearsheimer, arguing in line of success in conventional military operations, opines that the most common holds the requirement of 3:1 local superiority (Mearsheimer 1989). Others have argued that an advantage is only provided by technological superiority. Since violence is technologically dependent, technology defines the relative ease of success. Technology determines if a state would rely on defense or embrace attack (Quester 1977; Jones 1995; Everam 1999; Biddle 2001).

A smaller, technologically superior force can make for numbers giving rise to the idea of Special Forces (Sides 2001; Clancy 2001; Clancy 2002; Couch 2003; Bahmanyar 2005; Ryan 2008; Couch 2008; Urban 2011). According to Clancy (2002), Special Forces depending on task may perform the following operations: airborne operations, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, covert operations, hostage rescue, high value targets/man hunting, intelligence operations, mobility operations and unconventional warfare. The U.S. Army Rangers, US Navy Seals, UK Special Air Service, South African’s Recces, Argentina’s *Brigada del Ejercito* 601 and 602, Austria’s *Gendarmerieeinstatzkommando* (GEK) “Cobra”, Canada’s Joint Task Force (JTF)-2, Columbia’s *Lanceros*, Egypt’s Task Force 777 (TF 777), Cuba’s *Comando de Misionwa Especiales* (CME) are few examples of the special forces in the international system. Special Forces provide discreet military presence without the political complications of legitimate approval for a full-scale military operation.

The Special Forces are completely different from the conventional soldier since they have to wage war against forces that often outnumber them; and they can only do
this through superior firepower and tactics (Umoh 2015). The domain for Special Forces is special operations—a distinct type of ROMO that requires the dash of skill, professionalism, and technology. Special operations are typically carried out with limited numbers of highly trained personnel that are able to operate in all environments, utilize self-reliance, are able to easily adapt and overcome obstacles, and use unconventional battle skills and equipment to complete objectives (Robinson 2012). They are usually performed independently or in conjunction with conventional military operations. Special operations require exceptionally trained small-unit forces to conduct small-unit activities as commando operations and intelligence gathering (Robinson 2012).


The Nigerian Military and Internal Security Operations

Elaigwu (2003) argues that the Nigerian Military has been a genuine factor in crisis management in Nigeria since independence. He argues that the tactics employed by the Nigerian Military in internal security operations are informed three basic considerations: a) the principle of the use of minimum force; b) enemy equipment holding, his operational methods and habits; and c) the topography of the enemy’s location (Elaigwu, 2003). Building upon this, Elaigwu captures the limits of military involvement in domestic crisis management by showing that deployment of a military force in Tiv division in 1960 could not deter the eruption of violence in the area in 1961. Nor could a similar exercise of military force in February 1964 dissuade the people from
further acts of violence between July and August 1964, culminating in another military deployment in November 1964. He argues further that in 1980, the full force of military might was deployed in Kano against Maitatsine, but neither this nor subsequent exercise of physical force could discourage similar occurrences in Bullumkuttu, Rigasa, Jimeta-Yola, and Gombe in 1982, 1984, and 1985, respectively (Elaigwu 2003). However, the study is limited to the first thirty-three years of Nigeria’s independence, neglecting the recent past.

Akpan (2011) presents that Nigerian history is replete with cases of the use of the military to attempt to quell domestic rebellions. The first recorded use of the NM in domestic politics was in 1964 when it intervened in the Tiv riot. Ever since, in Akpan’s view, Nigerian leaders have been making use of the military in political crises even when there is no evidence of success in such interventions. He presents the Niger Delta as the latest example of the deployment of the military as instrument of crisis management. He concludes that the excessive use of military force to levels previously regarded as disproportionate to a domestic crisis and objectives of the parties satisfies the Mad Man’s Theory and submits that the military is ill suited for conflict resolution and crisis management in a domestic setting that requires political solution (Akpan 2011, 157).

Dode (2012) argues that personnel of the Armed Forces of Nigeria over the years have maintained a track record of effective peace keeping campaigns in the world, pointing to Sierra Leone and Liberia. However, this record does not seem to be playing out in their security and crisis operations in Nigeria. In Dode’s view, military operations in internal security situations have largely proved ineffective in solving civilian crisis in Nigeria. They have been largely used to serve the interest of some political elites. Dode
concludes that it is politically dangerous to encourage the drafting of military personnel to settle civilian problems in a democracy (Dode 2012). Animasawun contends that the deployment of the military for internal security operations in conflict communities in Nigeria comes with its own peculiar challenges, which are often locale-specific (Animasawun 2013).

Akpaotor and Oromareghake (2013) identify armed groups in Nigeria such as Odua People’s Congress (OPC), Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), *Boko Haram* as well as groups involved in sectarian violence in Jos, as terrorist groups (Akpaotor and Oromareghake 2013). The liberal political space opened by Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999 is argued to be the floodgate that released these militant elements, Ocheche (2013) identifies three types of terrorism in Nigeria—state terrorism, group (ethno religious) and externally influenced terrorism—all of which have continued to pose great threat to Nigeria’s stability. He argues that overbearing military operations which affect a large number of civilian directly make for state sponsored terrorism; citing the NM operations in Odi and Zaki Biam in 1999 and 2001 respectively (Ocheche 2013).

The activities of ethnic militias whose modus operandi include hostage taking, assassination, burning properties, looting, raping, and maiming victims among others have often been labeled as group terrorism in Nigeria. Groups such as Odua People’s Congress (OPC), Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Egbesu Boys, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and Bakassi Boys among others have carried out such actions. Externally influenced
terrorism involves acts of terrorism perpetuated by individuals or bodies external to Nigeria but having links or collaborators inside Nigeria.

Osakwe and Umoh (2013) examine the conundrum evident with Nigeria employing its armed forces to contend insurgency. They identify the security of the local/civil population as a vital aspect of any counterinsurgency strategy. However, for the NM, success in counterinsurgency has often been arrested and given the lack of defined within context. The NM highlights three doctrines to constitute the basis for any successful COIN: Confront, Build and Transfer carried out by a combination of an assault force, a support force and a security force. The military assault force is required to confront secured bases and deny insurgents of their sanctuaries. The support force is required to build the host community. Thereafter, transfer would be made to the civil security forces to checkmate criminality.

Osakwe (2013) examines professionalism in the Nigerian Army between 1960 and 1965. The concept of professionalism is drawn upon the argument of Creveld (1990) and Huntington (2001). Osakwe’s study of professionalism in the NM half a decade into Nigeria’s independence harps upon the management, education, and training of the Nigerian Army exclusively. Professionalism is examined as a process and not an event. Variables and superlatives such as discipline, loyalty, corporateness, patriotism, and gallantry are easily thrown up to capture the determinants of professionalism in Nigerian Army in the period under review. The British colonial authorities eroded much of what would be termed professionalism upon their departure in 1960. To the extent that this was deliberate appeared not to be examined in details. Stretching the discussion across the African continent, Ouédraogo (2014) identifies the legacy of colonialism as a significant
obstacle to professionalism in Africa. Built from the ashes of colonial forces Ouédraogo (2014) argues that African militaries inherited the seeds of ethnic bias sown by the colonists that paved the way for a deficit of professionalism. Typically, minority ethnicities constituted the bulk of the colonial armed forces in order to counterbalance historically more powerful ethnicities. This initial ethnic bias had a major impact on the formation of post-independence militaries. The wave of coups d’état that swept aside some of the first post-independence regimes was, in many cases, carried out by military officers from these ethnic minorities.

Lipede and Osakwe (2014) examine troop deployment and violent conflicts in Nigeria. They argue that the NM has spread itself too thin carrying out roles that range from policing to combat. Lipede and Osakwe (2014) argue that by 2013, almost thirty out of the thirty-six states in Nigeria had subscribed to the “military save the state” mission. Operation Mesa became a generic name for all state government sponsored internal security operations. He examines complex operations like Operation Restore Hope as well as less complex ones like Operation Iron Fence (highway military patrols to ensure the safety of highways). This is in competition with the Nigeria Police Force, which has the statutory responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and guarantee of domestic security. Lipede and Osakwe (2014) further argue that the deployment of the military for policing duties erodes military professionalism. He concludes that conventional forces as shown in relevant historical situations and the Nigerian condition have not been known to deter insurgent operations.

Odu (2014) examines the challenges of the Military Joint Task Force (JTF) in counter-terrorism operations between 2009 and 2014. The dual role of the NM as
outlined in the 1999 constitution is captured: defending Nigeria from external aggression and suppressing insurrection. Odu (2014) further argues that, the cooperation between the NM and other security agencies is achieved through institutional mechanism. The study identifies lack of strategic guidance for inter-agency cooperation, inadequate technical intelligence equipment, insufficient capacity, logistical constraints, and low level of public support as some of the basic challenges confronting the JTF.

**Summary**

Available studies examined shows that in an examination of ROMO in domestic counterinsurgency, the case study of the NM leaves a gap to be filled. The studies have captured the theoretical and empirical relationship between ROMO and military power without indulging the Nigerian experience. The distinct operating environments for ROMO—the micro, messo, and macro—have been captured as well as Indeed, our knowledge of domestic COIN and ROMO appears limited without a systematic study of the NM. Available literature on COIN, aspects of ROMO, IS, and military power leave a gap in the seldom examination of ROMO of the NM with the aim of assessing how it impacted upon successes in domestic counterinsurgency. This study identifies this vacuum and sets out to fill it.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction
Methodology seeks to answer the “how” question in carrying out research. This chapter provides guide on how the primary and secondary research questions will be answered. The primary research question is: How does range of military operations (ROMO) of the Nigerian Military (NM) in domestic counterinsurgency (COIN) affect overall military success? The secondary research questions are how has the duration and intensity of domestic COIN operations in Nigeria been affected by ROMO, and how is military power in domestic COIN constrained by ROMO? The chapter shows how information available in primary and secondary evidences will be utilized. The research approach and research data will be the focus of this section.

Research Approach
The research relied upon a combination of complementary methods. This included content analysis of texts, comparative study, passive observation, historical investigation, review of primary documents, and qualitative analysis of available data on Nigerian domestic military operations. Major secondary documentary literature (unclassified) that covered various aspects of the subject under study were collected, reviewed, and synthesized. The approach used to arrive at an understanding of the NM in domestic COIN from the perspective of ROMO, is the use of content analysis (Holsti 1969; Krippendorf 1980). This approach will serve as techniques for the collection and analysis of data.
Content analysis of primary and secondary textual material on the subject served as the methodology. It is a research method that allows the qualitative data collected in research to be analyzed systematically and reliably so that generalizations can be made from them in relation to the categories of interest to the researcher (Haggarty 1996). The content analysis approach is used here as a technique for systematically collecting text information from the mass media and libraries. Texts can be defined broadly as books, book chapters, essays, interviews, discussions, newspaper headlines and articles, historical documents, speeches, conversations, advertising, theater, informal conversation, or really any occurrence of communicative language (CSU 2004). Content analysis is distinguished from other kinds of social science research in that it does not require the collection of data from people. Like documentary research, content analysis is the study of recorded information, or information which has been recorded in texts, media, or physical items (ISU 2017). Although this method has its strengths and weaknesses, it will rely upon imperfect data from primary and secondary text materials.

The study will rely on the Theory of Organizational Adaptability as a guide for recommendation. While Wheatley (2006), Goldstein, Hazy, and Lichtenstein (2010) see organization as complex organic living systems, the Army Research Institute (ARI) defined adaptability, “as an effective response to an altered situation” (White, Mueller-Hanson, Dorsey, Pulakos, Wisecarver, and Mendini 2005, 2). The Institute of Defense Analysis (IDA) sees adaptability as, “the degree to which adjustments are possible in practices, processes, or structures to projected or actual changes in climate. Adaptation can be spontaneous or planned and be carried out in response to or in anticipation of changes in conditions” (Tillson, Freeman, Burns, Amnesty International Michel,
It is a response “to changing threats and situations with appropriate, flexible, and timely actions” (US Army 2012a, 9-5). Adaptability is essential in mission success, especially missions in complex environments. It is the basis of capability where capabilities are organizational processes and routines rooted in knowledge (Uhl-Bien and Arena 2018).

While there is individual and organizational adaptability, the study relies upon organizational adaptability since the Nigerian Military is a formal organization. Organizational adaptability is a derivative of organizational change. Organizational adaptability can be a planned or unplanned change (Kotter 2012; Lippitt 1958). It has to do with the ability to anticipate changes and respond to changes to meet the fluctuations of a shifting environment. ROMO is considered because of the shifting environment of conflict and violence. Thus, organizational adaptability is an essential requirement for success in ROMO.

Organizations demonstrate their adaptability in planning by proactively anticipating problem areas (Boyland and Turner 2017). They accept that the plan is a point of departure for execution and not an immutable path to the end state. Organizations demonstrate their proactive adaptability in planning by developing options during the planning process that anticipate the non-linearity of the operating environment (Boyland and Turner 2017). By expecting change and developing a variety of options, organizations are better able to reduce the reaction time to changes in the environment.

**Research Data**

Material texts for the content analysis were drawn from a wide variety of unclassified sources and publications. Much of it were primary sources, which included
published précis and doctrinal manuals on the Nigerian Military such as The Nigerian Army Doctrine (2009); The Nigerian Army in Military Operations Other Than War (Vol. 1) (2011); The Nigerian Army in Military Operations Other Than War (Vol. 2B) (2011); The Nigerian Army in Military Operations Other Than War (Vol. 4A) (2011) and The Nigerian Army in Military Operations Other Than War (Vol. 4B) (2011).

Other publications included foreign précis and operational manuals, especially that of the US Army such as Department of the Army Doctrine Publication 1 (2012); The Department of the Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 (2011). Department of the Army Doctrine Publication 5-0 (2012). Department of the Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0 (2012); Department of the Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22 (2012).

Supplementary information was derived from a wide variety of complementary sources and synthesized to provide a larger and more complete picture of the subject matter as much as possible. This made for the need to rely on secondary evidences derived from sources such as public and private libraries. The need for secondary sources was even more necessary given that official military documents on the NM in domestic COIN were only set of instructions manuals, lacking analysis and case studies (Stewart and Kamins 1993). These data were used to examine the three factors researched and the six case studies considered.

**Nigerian Military in ROMO**

The first step in this methodology is to examine how ROMO affects success in domestic COIN. The Nigerian Military has been deployed to crisis spots marked by guerrilla wars, low-intensity conflict, contingency operations, riot control, anti-banditry,
policing, election monitoring and other forms of emergencies much more times than they have been deployed to conventional military operations. Military operations slide along an imprecise scale of violence and scale of military involvement, from theater-wide major operations and campaigns; to smaller scale contingencies and crisis response operations; to engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence. In assessing the NM in ROMO, the study identified that no two operations were alike in scope, duration, tempo, and political context. Each situation and operation vary widely. Some operations changed from one form to another, either escalating or deescalating making for a range in operations. Although trained basically for conventional MOs, the NM has come to embrace ROMO as a part of their domestic security reality.

**ROMO and Duration of Domestic COIN**

The second step in this methodology is to examine how ROMO impacts upon the duration of domestic COIN. The need to maintain proficiency and professionalism in ROMO task increases the duration of COIN operations. For a military trained for high intensity war, the challenge of ROMO in domestic COIN appears enormous. COIN demands routine military activities, which makes for its duration and varying intensity. Successfully transitioning from war to peace is an extremely complex, resource intensive, and long duration endeavor (Culpepper 2010).

**ROMO and Military Power in Domestic COIN**

The third step in this methodology is to examine how ROMO affects military power in a domestic COIN setting. ROMO covers both war and military operations short of war. It involves combatant and non-combatant military operations. Given that the
population is central in COIN, the display of military power has effects on the population. One of such is the increased militarization of the civilian population and the increased preference for military solutions to domestic crisis.

**Summary**

The chapter examined the method used to provide answers to the primary and secondary research questions. Content analysis of primary and secondary textual material on the subject served as the methodology. Content analysis of existing works on the Nigerian Military in ROMO, ROMO and Duration of Domestic COIN, as well as ROMO and Military Power in Domestic COIN. The Theory of Organizational Adaptability was used as a theoretical guide. The purpose of this research method is to present a well-organized and an all embracing understanding of the Nigerian Military in range of military operations in a domestic counterinsurgency setting.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

Military operations are an offshoot of military instrument—a subset of military power and military force (Greener 2017). Military power is a useful, perhaps even indispensable, instrument of policy. It is one of the instruments that provide the sword for policy-makers to wield. It implies the capacity for violence. For good or ill, military power is an asset of a country. States that wield the most military power tend to be more influential; their wishes, the most respected; and their diplomacy, the most heeded (Garnet 1975, 55). However, military power does not translate into military force, and the ability to exert power is not limited to forceful situations (Jones 1985). Externally, it determines whether a state will prevail or not in the pursuit of its foreign policy goals and diplomatic initiatives (Akpan 2011, 155). Internally, the military is also an instrument of domestic conflict management and resolution. As a legitimate and disciplined establishment structured to dispense violence, the military is the credible means to defend the national interest of a state and protect it from internal sabotage. As Garnet (1975, 50) argued, military power can be used when necessary in an internal security role and goes further to link the prosperity, prestige, and influence of states to military power. Hegre (2008) and Buhaug (2010) agree that from the writing of Thucydides, the most obvious dimension of state strength is military power. They contend further that military strength is generally regarded as an important determinant of state capacity. However, military power has often been expressed as the capacity to kill, maim, coerce, and destroy (Garnet
1975). Notwithstanding, it serves as a good deterrence to domestic and external misbehavior of actors.

However, the utility of military power in domestic crisis has been queried on grounds that most domestic crisis are market spaces for the ventilation and commercialization of ideologies, ideas, and ideals. To this end, ideas cannot be eradicated without destroying all the books where they are written down and killing all the people who have heard of them. Consequently, military power serves as an inappropriate weapon because ideas cannot be defeated by force of arms. The Niger Delta and Boko Haram examples in Nigeria stand out as clear examples. To this end, while military power might serve political objectives, a political solution appears to be the “silver bullet.” Arguably, the physical use of military deterrent power shows not how strong a state is but how impotent it has become. There is also the tendency of military force to leave a bitter legacy, which could provide the basis for a future threat to the newly established order of things.

In spite of the weight thrown upon that argument, the proposition that ideas cannot be defeated by military force cannot be accepted without serious qualification. Garnet (1975) contends that the argument that military power cannot defeat political ideas is only part of a more general argument, which queries the appropriateness of military power as an instrument of modern statecraft. Even though it may appear impossible to eliminate ideas, it certainly appears possible to render them politically ineffective by the use of military force (Garnet 1975, 56). The use of military force for domestic crisis management appear to support the thesis that the modern military force tends to be threatened and manipulated in peacetime rather than used in war.
Range of Military Operations in Support of Nigeria’s National Security

ROMO indicates a continuous and recurring manifestation of military operations and involvement. They include, but are not limited to military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence through smaller-scale contingencies and crisis response operations, as well as irregular warfare (US Air Force 2016). At another scale, it includes major military operations and campaigns such as conventional wars. ROMO is not a set of discrete and increasingly escalatory steps but rather a continuous range of operations in support of national security.

National security has been used to justify ROMO in domestic situations. Indeed, one of the core essences of ROMO is to guarantee national security. The Nigerian state has often used the threat to national security to justify its deployment of the military to crisis spots and flash points like the Niger Delta (made up of Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Ondo and Rivers states), Nigeria’s North East (of particular Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states), Kaduna state, Plateau state (especially Jos), Benue state, and South East Nigeria (of particular Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu states) among others. Indeed, there is hardly any geopolitical zone and arguably a state that the NM has not been deployed in the name of national security. The NM has been deployed to deter, or cope with, crime, rebellions, secessions, coups, general levels of instability and the possible threat, real or perceived, from non-state actors such as terrorist groups.

Although the term national security remains elastic, it is not altogether vague. To Wolfers, security in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked (Wolfers 1962). The idea of national security has gone beyond Luciani’s concept of
withstanding aggression from abroad (Luciani 1989). Imobighe captures it as a reasonable freedom from, or not being exposed to, external aggression and internal sabotage (Imobighe 1983, 1). A nation is secured to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values (Buzan 1983, 1991). Ayoob argues that security-insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities—both internal and external—that threaten or have the potential to bring down or weaken state structure, both territorial and institutional, and governing regimes (Ayoob 1995, 9). Contemporary stakeholders in the field of security all agree that security is about survival, and the referent object defines which component of society that survival is directed towards (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998; Collins 2007; Buzan and Hansen 2009). Akpan has argued that some countries are more threatened by their neighbors, whereas their own citizens mostly threaten less developed countries (Akpan 2013). The array of domestic crisis in Nigeria since independence arguably shows that Nigeria’s national security appears to be threatened more by its own citizens than an external enemy. To the extent that this approximates a domestic variant of Bull’s anarchical society appears arguable (Bull 1977). However, the frequent and almost permanent deployment of the NM to domestic crisis spots adds credence to this position.

**Range of Military Operations in Internal Security**

Internal or domestic security often calls for a ROMO given its ambiguity and elasticity. Crimes, banditry, armed resistance to constituted authority, terrorism, and fundamentalism among others dot Nigeria’s internal security ring. While there is an array of civil authorities concerned with the measurement and management of such manifestation of disorders, the military have often been called upon to lend assistance.
Military assistance is usually requested when the local civil government efforts have been defied and at least part of its machinery has broken down. The Armed Forces may be used for IS operations only under the following conditions: 1) when the situation is gone out of control of the Police; 2) when the civil authorities in the crisis area are convinced of the seriousness of the occurrence, and make a request for military intervention; 3) when there are evidences that the situation could spread and threaten national security; and 4) When external support is suspected or could be encouraged by the prolongation of the crisis. The nature and characteristics of crisis do not take to a particular pattern. In order to be able to cope with the spontaneity of crisis, there is need to identify the phases of IS operations. The phases, which cater to the periods of relative calm as well as crisis situations, are the Situation Development Phase; Information Management Phase; Police Intervention Phase; Military Intervention Phase; and Consolidation Phase; and Reappraisal Phase.

The Situation Development Phase may be described as a period of uneasy peace. Critical and objective monitoring of the situation is carried out by all the security agencies, and information is made available to the political leadership. All the factors associated with the conflict situations, which are likely to develop into crisis, are logged and analyzed to provide directions for government decisions at all levels. The key actions in this phase are effective monitoring and pre-emptive measures to forestall crisis eruptions and further threats.

The Information Management Phase marks the phase in which the eruption of crisis is imminent. It requires the contribution of critical information by security agencies and institutions.
The phase escalates into the Police Intervention Phase when a crisis situation escalates and grows in intensity. In that phase, the police intervene professionally, and reasonably apply any or all the options available.

It is when the police fail to restore order that the crisis crosses over into the Military Intervention Phase, and the military is invited to intervene in the crisis situation. Upon the success of the military in returning the situation to a manageable state by civil authorities, the situation is handed over to the police.

This phase is known as the Consolidation Phase. At this phase, records of events including the dead, prisoners, wounded civilian, displaced persons, and all seized items should be handed over to the police. However, in most cases, the military is often required to maintain its presence and, if possible, perform complementary roles to the police for some time.

Although the Armed Forces Act 105 (as amended) 1999 assigns IS roles to the Nigerian Navy (NN) and the Nigerian Air Force (NAF), the Nigerian Arms (NA), as the land force, appears to be the arrowhead of major IS operations throughout Nigeria. This appears so since most IS operations takes place solely on land. The level of command responsibility of NA during IS operations are the Nigerian Army Headquarters, Division Headquarters, Brigade Headquarters, and Battalion Headquarters.

In the application of force during IS operations, the NM is often guided by the following: 1) Force must not be used at all unless it is necessary; 2) Force is unjustifiable unless the immediate effect can be achieved by using it within the soldier’s legal power; 3) No force may be used than is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances; 4) The degree of force cannot be reasonable if it is more than is required to achieve the
immediate aim; and 5) Force must never be used for punitive purpose or as a deterrence for the future.

**Nigerian Military Range of Operations across Selected Domestic Areas**

NM ROMO covers insurgency, terrorism, kidnapping, and armed robbery among others. These operations are carried out across the Nigerian state. The Nigerian Army Order of Battle (NA ORBAT) 1996 Committee Report identified terrorism as a dangerous phenomenon and recommended the training in rudimentary anti-terrorism drills in order to be capable at short notice, to tackle any emergency terrorist situation within or very close to its location (NA ORBAT 1996, 9-14). The official position submits thus:

Although internal security is Nigerian Army’s secondary responsibility, it ought to be planned for the interim as a primary responsibility because of the inadequacies of our national law enforcement agencies . . . most countries particularly those of the Third World, Nigeria inclusive, must therefore plan ahead for the containment of unprecedented organic or spillover hyper nationalism. (NA ORBAT 1996, 14-15)

This position is in line with the constitutional role of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, which among others, is “suppressing of insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so” (CFRN 1999). However, terrorism appears to be an elastic concept in both identification and application of a response. As argued by Ocheche, there is an inherent difficulty in classifying the actions of ethno-religious groups in Nigeria that apply extreme terror (Ocheche 2013). However, the possibilities of their actions crystalizing into terrorism, by themselves or in collaboration with other movements, after sustained periods of action are strong. Albeit, threats
delineate the character of the security question and security needs define the nature of defense doctrine.

The Nigerian Military and the Tiv Riots

The Tiv riots of 1960 and 1964 were the first major uprising in post-independence Nigeria. The violent riots by the Tiv, a minority group in Northern Nigeria, were directed against an alleged domination and political control of the group by the Hausa-Fulani group (Falola and Oyebade 2010). In 1960 and 1964, the Nigerian military were deployed four times to Tiv to quell a riot. In these four cases (April 1960, August 1961, February 1964, and November 1964), contingents of the Nigerian military were deployed to reinforce the Nigeria Police in an IS task. However, the November 1964 deployment of the Nigerian Military to quell the Tiv riot – Operation Adam III - appeared to have been more sustained and coordinated as it became apparent from the nature of the disturbances that the riot had changed from civil disobedience to armed guerilla warfare (see Elaigwu 2003).

The Nigerian Military and the Nigerian Civil War

The Nigerian Civil War or the “Biafran War” was a military operation carried out by the Nigerian Military against the secessionist Eastern Region between 2 July 1967 and 15 January 1970. The various phases of the war defined the ROMO of the Nigerian Military. Five phases of the MO were identified: First Phase (July 1967 – August 1967); Second Phase (August 1967 – October 1968); Third Phase (October 1968 – April 1968); Fourth Phase (April 1969 – November 1969); Fifth Phase (November 1969 – January 1970) (see Cervenka 1971).
The First Phase was regarded as a “police action” carried out by the NM to arrest the “band of rebels” in the Eastern Region. It involved the encirclement and isolation of Biafra through the imposition of effective blockade (Cervenka 1971). The overall intent was to isolate Biafra and capture its capital in Enugu. By August 11, 1967, the “police action” gave way to the Second Phase - a full-scale military operation aimed at crushing the rebellion. The Nigerian state declared “no mercy will be shown to the rebel clique and their collaborators anywhere” in the bid to keep Nigeria from disintegration. Consequently, Phase Three and Phase Four of the military operations peaked at the continuum of large-scale combat operations. This followed two other phases marked by varied intensity, culminating in the final phase, which was the capitulation of the rebel forces on January 12, 1970. The last four stages of MOs involved full combat operations wherein the full weights of military resources were deployed against the rebellion.

The Nigerian Military and the Maitatsine Religious Insurgency

Before the Boko Haram religious insurgency in Nigeria’s North East, the Maitatsine revolt of 1980 was the most violent and widespread. It started in Kano in Northern Nigeria in December 1980, and soon spread to other cities in Northern Nigeria such as Kaduna (1980), Yola (1984) Bauchi and Maiduguri. The Kano episode lasted between 18 December 1980 and 3 January 1981 and led to the deaths of 4,177 persons. That uprising was put down by the Nigerian military. The Nigerian Military was deployed to quell the Maitatsine insurgency in Kano. The operations were short and sharp, lasting from about 0700 hours on 28 December to about 1030 hours on 29 December, 1980. After a day’s COIN, the NM handed over the operation to the Nigeria Police.
The first set of crises in the Niger delta has been twofold: minority agitation and ethnic crisis. In post-independence Nigeria, Isaac Daka Boro was the first to lead a violent minority agitation in the Niger Delta. He organized and led a VNSG called the Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) against the Nigerian state in 1966. The NDVS received paramilitary training in camps and launched a guerrilla campaign against the Nigerian state in February 1966. With the inability of the Nigeria police to intercept the insurgency, the Nigerian military was deployed. In twelve days, the Nigerian military were able to intercept Isaac Boro and his men. The Nigerian military handed Boro and his men over to the police for prosecution.

The Niger Delta has also been a hot bed for various inter-communal and inter-ethnic armed. Between 1993 and 1994, Ogoni had armed clashes with its neighbors – Andoni, Okrika, Ndoki. Also, between 1996 and 1997 as well as between 2002 and 2004, Warri, an oil city in the Niger Delta, was the scene of inter-ethnic armed violence between the Ijaw and Ishekiri ethnic groups. In the wake of the Ogoni crisis in 1993 in the Niger Delta, the Nigerian Military was deployed to Ogoniland and remained there carrying out peacetime military operations for five years.

The Nigerian Military and Crude Oil Criminality in the Niger Delta

Few have argued that one of the needs to control the lucrative business in crude oil theft through “bunkering” is central in the causal explanation of inter-communal and inter-ethnic armed conflict in the Niger Delta (see Asuni 2009; Obi 2011). Violent crude oil criminality became central to the motives and an instrument of the struggle of the
various insurgent groups dotted across the Niger Delta (Ikelegbe 2011). The various VNSAs that sprang up after 1999 appeared to have had clashes among themselves much more than they had with the Nigerian military deployed to restore order. The control of oil bunkering routes and the struggle for patronage has been used to explain motives. Consequently, their struggles unlike that of Isaac Boro in 1966 fitted more into the Rational Actor (RA) model than the Derived Actor (DA) model (see Jakobsen 2011) since resource mobilization and opportunity structure appeared to have motivated the insurgent groups more than issues deprivation. For instance, between 2003 and 2004, one of the VNSAs, the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) engaged another rival armed militia, the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) in several deadly confrontations over the control of oil bunkering (Falola and Oyebade 2010)

In the context of ROMO in the Niger delta since 1999, three distinct operations and one exercise can be identified: Operation Restore Hope (2003-2010), Operation Pulo Shield (2010-2016), Operation Delta Safe (since 2016) and Exercise Crocodile Smile (September 2016) (Umoh, 2017). Operation Restore Hope was limited to three states cum sectors - Sector I (Delta State), Sector II (Bayelsa State), and Sector III (Rivers State) given that these three states witnessed the highest frequency of violent ethno-political clashes and bunkering activities on the eve of the deployment of Operation Restore Hope (Umoh 2017). The operation was mandated to protect vulnerable areas, oil infrastructures such as oil rigs, flow stations, tank farms in the three states of Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers, as well as guard important persons working for oil companies. The most significant military assault carried out by the Nigerian military under the mandate of Operation Restore Hope was the attack on the insurgent strong hold in Camp 5 in Delta state. This
was by all assessment a military operation involving war. The fall of the insurgent’s stronghold in Gbaramatu in Delta state crippled the insurgents’ infrastructure considerably and was immediately followed by a Presidential declaration of Amnesty in June, 2009 which promised to pardon insurgents who lay down their arms and get integrated into the society (Osakwe and Umoh 2012).

With a significant number of insurgents accepting the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) after the fall of Camp 5, there was a considerable lull in insurgency throughout the Niger Delta (Umoh 2017). However, this did not altogether end the insurgency. Some NSVAs like John Togo’s Niger Delta Liberation Force (NDLF) pulled out of the Amnesty Deal and continued with attacks on the Nigeria’s oil infrastructure in the Niger Delta. Consequently, Operation Restore Hope was dismantled and replaced with Operation Pulo Shield mandated to defend oil infrastructure and facilities across the entire Niger Delta of nine states (Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers states). Its renewed mission included, but was not limited to elimination of pipeline vandalism, crude oil theft, illegal oil refining, “illegal” oil bunkering, elimination of piracy and all forms of sea robbery within its AOR. This was intended to create a conducive environment for the operation of the oil and gas industry in Nigeria’s Niger Delta (Umoh 2017).

The geographical reach of Operation Pulo Shield was divided into 5 sectors to cover the nine states. Sector I covered Ondo, Edo, and Delta states in its AOR. Sector II covered Bayelsa and Rivers states in its AOR. Cross River and Akwa Ibom were covered by Sector III; while Abia and Imo states were covered by Sector IV and Sector V respectively (Danja 2013). Paramilitary agencies such as the Nigeria Police Force, the
Nigeria Mobile Police, National Intelligence Agency, Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC), Nigerian Prisons Service, Nigerian Customs Service, Nigerian Immigration Service, Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, were integrated into the mandate and operations. This seamless integration presented the overall force mandate as a MOOTW. The Nigerian military thus acted in the context of MACA such as Presidential Committee on Maritime Safety and Security (PICOMSS), Nigerian Ports Authority, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and Oil Producing Companies (Umoh 2017).

Between 2010 and 2012 JTF-OPS arrested 1,945 suspects engaged in crude oil bunkering and artisanal refinery, seized while 18 oceangoing vessels used in transporting stolen crude oil. Around the same period, 7,585 anti-illegal bunkering patrols were conducted by contingents of JTF-OPS in the creeks of the Niger Delta; while 133 barges, 1,215 boats, 187 tankers trucks, 178 illegal fuel dumps and five surface tanks were destroyed (see Umoh 2017). Major General Johnson Ochoga, commander of JTF-OPS between 2010 and 2012, revealed that JTF-OPS had reduced crude oil theft in the Niger Delta by about 84 percent – from 9.5 million barrels to 1.5 million barrels (Ochoga 2013).

In June 2016, Operation Pulo Shield followed the way of the dinosaurs and was replaced with Operation Delta Safe. The essence of the change in operational mandate was to ensure “better service delivery, efficiency and effectiveness to contain security challenges in the Niger Delta especially the protection of critical national assets . . .” (MOD 2016). According to Nigeria’s Chief of Defence Staff, General Gabriel Olonisakin, “the
change was expedient in order to inject new tactics and robust operational initiative to tackle the emerging security challenges in the Niger Delta region such as piracy, bunkering, vandalism and other criminalities prevalent in the area” (Olonisakin 2016).

Despite the ROMO conducted by the Nigerian military under the mandate of three distinct operations, the basic problems that plagued the Niger Delta such as crude oil criminality and pipeline vandalism continued albeit on a lesser scale. Renewed agitation for resource control sparked off between 2016 and 2017 necessitating the need for Exercise Crocodile Smiles by the Nigerian military. The exercise objective was the sharpening of the skills of military personnel for proficiency in internal security duties in maritime arears of the Niger Delta.

The Nigerian Military and the Boko Haram Insurgency

Since its re-emergence in 2009, an Islamist group, Boko Haram (western education is sinful), has been unleashing a systematic campaign of bombings, kidnapings, and drive-by shootings across much of North Eastern Nigeria (Maiangwa and Agbiboa 2014). The group appears convinced that secular education (boko) and westernized elites (yan boko) are the twin problems of the Nigerian state (Zenn, Barkindo and Heras 2013). With a fundamentalist interpretation of early Islam and commitment to actively promote the cause of returning to the original state of Islam, Boko Haram employs violence against government agencies, civilians, public places among others. Their activities and the phenomenon have been interpreted by the Nigerian state as terrorism and insurgency (Akpan 2013). This has attracted the responses of the Nigerian state in the form of counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency carried out by the NM and encapsulated in various operational names.
Dotting the landscape of the North East battlefield has been nuances such as: Operation Restore Order I (ORO I), Operation Restore Order II (ORO II), Operation Boyona, Operation Zaman Lafiya, Operation Lafiya Dole, Operation Crackdown, Operation Gama Aiki, and Operation Safe Corridor. Each of these operations defined specific ROMO. Operation Restore Order I, which was active between 2009 and 2011, was mandated, to restore law and order to the North Eastern part of the country with emphasis on Maiduguri in Borno state since the insurgency was interpreted as an internal security matter or the work of a criminal gang in the guise of religion (Lagbaja 2017). Operation Restore Order II, which was launched in 2011, extended beyond Borno state into Yobe state. A third one Operation Boyona came into effect following the violent escalation of Boko Haram activities in 2013 and a declaration of a state of emergency by the president of Nigeria, Goodluck Ebere Jonathan. Its AOR extended to cover Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states in northeast Nigeria. A fourth on, Operation Zaman Lafiya superseded Operation Boyona in August 2013 when Boko Haram insurgents started taking over territories and proclaiming caliphates. The Boko Haram insurgency appeared to have gained more traction during this NM operation as the insurgents took control of swathes of territory in Nigeria’s North East (AIR 2015a). The kidnap of 276 female high school students in Chibok, a town in Borno state, in April 2014, showed the extent and ease to which the insurgents could operate without restriction by the Nigerian military. Consequently, the NM ROMO involved the protection of schools, markets, churches, internally displaced camps, and other vulnerable spots.

Operation Lafiya Dole both complemented and supplemented Operation Boyona as it handled the overall CT-COIN operations comprising three divisions in more than
five states in the North East. Abdulhamid (2017) argued that the pre-LAFIYA DOLE counterinsurgency was the most trying moments in the over 50 years of the NM experience in both conventional and unconventional wars. This was arguably a result of poor knowledge of the adversary and reliance on an induction training which concentrated more on the traditional ISO manual grossly inadequate in the circumstance (Abdulhamid 2017). LAFIYA DOLE had as its objective the rescue of all persons abducted by the Boko Haram insurgents including the Chibok girls and to equally ensure the restoration of civil authority in those areas that were previously captured by the Boko Haram; thereby facilitating the movements of national and international NGOs and Government agencies to provide relief materials to IDPs (see James 2017). This greatly expanded NM ROMO in the North East. This was, however, complemented with Operation Crackdown and Operation Rescue Finale mandated to wind down the war against insurgents and clear the remnants of the Boko Haram sect in the Sambisa Forest. In the course of these complementary operations, the NM personnel served as teachers in IDP camps for children of internally displaced persons. An extension to it was Operation Gama Aiki, which was mandated to serve the same purpose as Operation Crackdown in the northern part of Borno state. Post military operations—Safe Corridor and Operation Rescue Finale—were set up for the de-radicalization and rehabilitation of repentant Boko Haram members. The combination of these operations resulted in the eventual fall of Camp Zero in the Sambisa forest of the North East.

The Nigerian Military and Pro-Biafran Agitation in the South East

After Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999, a wave of pro-Biafran nationalism cut across the South East geopolitical zone of Nigeria made up of Abia,
Anambra, Imo, Ebonyi, and Enugu states. The first was the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) formed in 1999. This was followed by the formation of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in 2012 (AIR, 2016). Others included the Biafran Liberation Council (BLC), Biafra Youth Congress (BYC), Biafra Zionist Movement (BZM), Coalition of Biafra Liberation Groups (COBLIG), Biafran International Movement (BIM), Rebrand Indigenous People of Biafra (RIPOB) and the Reformed Indigenous People of Biafra (RE-IPOB). However, MASSOB and IPOB gained notoriety of being the most vocal pro-Biafran movement since the end of the Nigerian Civil War. Both groups showed the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect political change. The group reintroduced and promoted Biafra anthem, flags, emblems, currency, international passport, and an international media to promote its cause (Onuoha 2013).

The Nigerian state responded to the pro-Biafra uprising in various ways ranging from attempt to deradicalize the idea and movement to the deployment of the Nigerian Military to quell pro-Biafran violent demonstration and agitation. Exercise Python Dance was launched in Nigeria’s South East in 2016 to contain pro-Biafran agitation. In Python Dance, the NM carried out a range of operations. The first was a command post exercise aimed at planning, preparing, and conducting internal security operations, and intensify training on counter terrorism and internal security operations to deter the activities of kidnappers, cultists, armed robbers, and violent secessionist agitators. The second was a field training exercise such as anti-kidnapping drills and patrols. The third was MOOTW such as raids, cordon and search, checkpoints, roadblocks, and show of force. In the third
range of the operations, bases of pro-Biafra activists were raided, with activists arrested and propaganda materials confiscated.

**Challenges of the Nigerian Military in Range of Military Operations**

Twin issues challenge ROMO: the complexity of the operating environment and the military organization. ROMO involves the superior exhibition of risk and adaptability. This is so since ROMO is often carried out in an environment where cause and effect are often indiscernible, where traditional responses often fail, and solving problems requires new ways of thinking. Seijts, Billou, and Crossan (2010); Vasconcelos and Ramirez (2011); Collinson and Jay (2012); Dervitsiotis (2012), Haynes (2015) have all examined the complexity of the operating environment. ROMO struggles with a security gap, which according to Dziedzic, is the byproduct of three gaps: a deployment gap (in which intervening forces are mismatched to public security requirements); an enforcement gap (in which international police elements lack the authority or capacity to enforce law and order); and an institutional gap (in which the host nation lacks capacity to perform key law and order functions) (Dziedzic 1998).

This compels the need for military adaptability in ROMO, which involves changing situations in complex environments. Adaptive organizations respond to the changing situation by assessing the situation and developing feasible actions to succeed. Adaptable military units are thus responsive to change, but also proactively plan for changing conditions in ROMO. The definitive measure of the military’s adaptability is its success in a changing environment. The expected volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity of ROMO environment will only increase the need for adaptability. Nigeria’s vast landmass provides a complex geography in terms of environment.
As a legitimate force to secure state objectives, the NM operations across spectrums is guided by operational goals, the rules of engagement (ROE), choices about the composition of forces (force structure) employed in operations, targeting decisions, as well as casualty aversion. These arguably constitute the first line of challenges for the NM as its adversary hardly keeps to similar guidelines. This is made possible by the asymmetric nature of the operations, which demands a limited approach from the NM, but an almost unlimited approach (at least limited by its means—weaponry) by the insurgent forces. The construction of war goals, as well as the tactics deployed and weight of morality, are often contested in an asymmetric setting. As argued by Mack, the effect on the metropolis of “small wars”—or insurgency wars—depends upon the “structure” of interest asymmetry of each conflict (Mack 1975).

Success in ROMO connects with the extent of military power and the degree of military force. In general, standards of assessment of degrees of success and failure are determined by the goals that actors postulate when entering the conflicts, not ones modified later to deflect domestic criticisms of failure. For the Nigerian military, it appears that response to specific acts of violence results in more success than response to collective acts of violence. Sometimes the problem arises out of an apparent inability to make a clear distinction between the state of violence and specific acts of violence (Elaigwu 2003).

Effects of Range of Military Operations on the Nigerian Military

The study identifies the “constabularization of the military” as one of the effects of ROMO on the NM. Frequently tasked with IS duties, the NM have gradually fallen back to constabulary duties, which defined their origin and development since 1863. The
term constabulary refers to “a force organized along military lines, providing basic law enforcement and safety in a not yet fully stabilized environment” (Schmidl 1998, 8). It entails police forces with military status. Although trained in military skills, their focus and equipment are on minimal or nonlethal use of force and tasks normally associated with police functions. As argued by Armitage and Moisan, unlike traditional soldiers, the goal of constabulary units is to defuse potentially violent situations through negotiations and conflict management, rather than to “neutralize” the enemy or destroy a target (Armitage and Moisan 2005).

The concept of a constabulary force was introduced in 1960 by the American sociologist, Morris Janowitz (1960). Janowitz introduced the concept of a “constabulary force” to show how a professional military in a liberal democratic state might use modern weapons and yet conserve the existing political order (Janowitz 2005). Janowitz based his concept on the policing missions that the British Army conducted in the former colonies. According to Janowitz, “the military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory” (Janowitz 1960, 418). The role of the military is changing from a more absolute into a more pragmatic focus on practical conflict resolution. Janowitz’s constabulary force concept “encompasses the entire range of military power and organization.” At the upper end there are the weapons of mass destruction; those of flexible and specialized capacity are at the lower end, including the specialists in military aid programs, in paramilitary operations, in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare (Janowitz 1960, 418-419). A constabulary force serves as a solution to an immediate need for IS operations of which domestic counterinsurgency is a part. They
perform tasks, which are too high for traditional combat soldiers and too low for community police.

The concept of a constabulary force implies that the military is able to operate in a great variety of situations at the higher end of the continuum of military force, and at the lower end of the spectrum. The military thus has to be able to vary and fluctuate the intensity of its use of force. This requires competences to escalate and de-escalate in the application of force within a short period of time and short intervals. A constabulary force also needs the ability to deal with a range of different environments and specific security scenarios. In addition to their classical warfare task, military organizations are turning into instruments for creating international order and nation building (Haltiner, 2003, 179). The modern soldier is developing into a diplomat, policeman, social worker, conflict manager, and advisor of local authorities (Moelker and Soeters 2003, 33).

Historically, the NM developed as a constabulary force started by Captain J. Glover for the purpose of pacifying and suppressing local and foreign challenges to the actualization of British policies in the area that later became known as Nigeria. This was done through the application of force along a spectrum of operations. In Nigeria’s post-colonial democratic and autocratic setting, the NM were expected to use modern weapons and yet conserve the existing political order. Armitage and Moisan have argued that an effective response to crises along the full spectrum of conflict requires at least three types of security forces: high-end combat forces to neutralize hostile, organized adversaries; constabulary or paramilitary forces to handle crowd control and lower levels of organized violence; and community-based law enforcement organizations (police, judicial, and penal authorities) to rebuild legal and judicial institutions (Armitage and Moisan 2005).
Effect of Range of Military Operations on the Civil Society

The study identifies the militarization of civil space as one of the outstanding effects of ROMO on the Nigerian society. Militarism is a state of affairs where war and the use of threat of military force are accorded the highest priority by the state in pursuit of its political ends (Dunmoye 2017). In Vagts’ (1967) view, militarism as the “domination of the military man over the civilian, an undue preponderance of military demands, an emphasis on military considerations.” Militarism affects policy, shapes culture, as well as dominate the media and public opinion. Lasswell and Kaplan noted that, “an arena is military when the expectation of violence is high; civic when the expectation is low” (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950). Instability and disorder have characterized the internal structure of the Nigerian state, making for high expectations of violence. Indeed, domestic violence in Nigeria since 1960 has been comparatively frequent and common. There has been frequent resort to violence to change the constitution, government, or politics. This makes it difficult to disagree with the assumption that the post-independence Nigerian state is more or less a military arena.

The Nigerian condition and reality appear to satisfy Carr’s assertion that “war lurks in the background of international politics just as revolutions lurk in the background of domestic politics” (Carr 1940, 102). A significant aspect of this revolution has taken place in the cities, thereby satisfying Fidel Castro’s pontification that “the city is the graveyard of revolutionaries and resources.” Almost giving up on the reality, Garnet professed that, “We live in a military age and there are few signs that either our children or grandchildren will experience anything else” (Garnet 1975). The conduct of military operations in the context of national security has resulted in grave civilian casualties,
especially in conflict areas where the dividing line between civilians and armed fighters is blurred. As noted by Kagan, “It is a fundamental mistake to see the enemy as a set of targets. The enemy in war is a group of people. Some of them will have to be killed. Others will have to be captured or driven into hiding. The overwhelming majority, however, have to be persuaded” (Kagan 2003).

Due to the militarization effect, security in Nigeria in the period under study is largely is viewed as fundamentally a military matter and military issues appear to dominate the security agenda. Consequently, the use of force or the threat to use force is high on the list of possible responses to any disputes which may arise in Nigeria. This has resulted in specialists of violence being the most “powerful group in society” (Lasswell 1941, 455). It has also validated military power and placed the Nigerian state in a constant state of preparation for war. Military personnel and military activities dot the Nigerian landscape. From the markets to the schools in Nigeria, the NM are deployed to ensure security and safety. This has exposed civilians to military values over time.

Effect of Range of Military Operations on Success

Military power can mean different things in different contexts. It is often deployed by states to perform a range of activities such as defending national territory, invading other states, hunting down terrorists, coercing concessions, countering insurgencies, keeping the peace, enforcing economic sanctions, showing the flag as well as maintaining domestic order (Biddle 2004). However, the proficiency of the military in one or even several range of operations does not imply proficiency in all of them. To this end, good defenders of national territory can make poor peacekeepers; countries that can defend national territory may not easily conquer their neighbors. Each mission carried out
by the military has “success” defined differently. ROMO affects success considerably. From the ROMO carried out by the NM in domestic COIN, success has been measured by increase in military power over time. However, while ROMO has an increasing effect on military power, it appears to have a diminishing effect on military force.

Professionalism and the Nigerian Military in Range of Military Operations

Military professionalism is essential in success in ROMO. Indeed, the degree of success in ROMO appears influenced significantly by military professionalism. In Huntington’s (1964) view as captured in Soldier and the State, military professionalism rests upon three elements: expertise, responsibility and corporateness. Expertise signifies the specialized knowledge and skill necessary to become a professional in a given field; responsibility is a requirement that a “professional” needs to be involved in work that is essential to the maintenance of society; and corporateness is the sense of unity shared by a group (Huntington 2001). Arguably, military organizations are shaped by both functional and social imperatives. Functional imperatives are special characteristics of military organizations driven by their need to be capable of defending the state against external threats. Societal imperatives arise from “the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within society” (Huntington 2001). It has also been argued that professionalism not a fixed solely on the functional imperative of the military but rather societal and political realities determine the narrative of professionalism in the military. Consequently, independent military professionalism appears problematic given that the effectiveness of military means and military power can only be evaluated in relation to the political ends or objectives (Nelson 2005).
Janowitz (1964, 420) argues that a strong guarantee of professional soldiering is the military’s “meaningful integration with civilian values.” Janowitz emphasizes on self-esteem and moral worth. Values that distinguish the actions of a professional soldier include discipline, integrity, honor, commitment, service, sacrifice, and duty. Such values thrive in an organization with a purposeful mission, clear lines of authority, accountability, and protocol (Ouédraogo 2014). The notion of military professionalism in democratic states, therefore, must embody basic values such as acceptance of the legitimacy of democratic institutions, nonpartisanship in the political process, and respect for and defense of individuals’ human rights (Finer 2002). To Ouédraogo (2014), military professionalism is much more than an administrative concept, as the stability and vibrancy of the society depends on militaries conducting themselves in a disciplined and honorable manner.

As argued by Ouédraogo, an ethical culture is a prerequisite for building a professional military (Ouédraogo 2014). Soldiers must be inculcated with specific training in ethics, just as they learn discipline, law, and combat—all within the bigger picture of the military’s role in a democratic society. This entails values such as accountability of military leaders and soldiers for their actions, as well as demonstrating competent, impartial, and humane security enforcement, which do not come naturally, but must be taught. Although many African military leaders have been exposed to professional values and principles throughout training in Western military academies and staff colleges, Ouédraogo notes that these values are rooted in African culture (Ouédraogo 2014).
It has been argued that political and economic weakness, corruption, and a lack of institutionalized democratic structures erode military professionalism. Howe (2005) blames it on an ambiguous order. Consequently, weak military professionalism is evidenced by militaries collapsing in the face of attacks by irregular forces, coups, looting, human rights abuses against civilian populations, corruption, and engagement in illicit trafficking activities (Ouédraogo 2014). Authority, responsibility, and accountability are essential elements of professionalism.

The responses of the Nigerian military to domestic crisis have been marred with issue of human rights abuses. The official manual for the Nigerian Army in MOOTW expect commanders involved in MOOTW to exert the highest level of professionalism, competence and likewise stimulate subordinates. Professionalism is seen to be best achieved while observing the general principles of unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, legitimacy, coordination, and cooperation (NA 2011b). The case of Odi community in Bayelsa state (1999) and Zaki-Biam community in Benue state (2001) points to mass killings of civilians. In Odi, the Nigerian military were deployed to arrest members of a criminal gang who had killed seven policemen in the community. The military operation was tagged carried out Operation Hakuri II. However, by the time the Nigerian military concluded Operation Hakuri II, the gang members were neither apprehended nor killed but rather 2,483 people, including women and children lay dead (ERA/FOE 2002). Another account reports that the attack lasted for about 4 hours (1400 hours to 1800 hours) and left behind 2,483 casualties made up of 1,460 male casualties and 1,023 female casualties drawn from 109 families and 11 compounds (HRW 1999; Surhne and Henssonow 2010).
Two years later, a similar scenario took place in Zaki-Biam community in Benue state. Armed militia in the community had killed 19 soldiers deployed to the community to restore order. The Nigerian military responded by rounding up the community, killing predominantly male members. Both cases implied a serious violation of human rights, making the endeavor of the Nigerian military counter-productive to society.

In Nigeria’s North Eastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, the Nigerian military has faced professional issues in their ROMO against the Boko Haram sect. In the battlefield of the North East, counterterrorism is often factored in a counterinsurgency strategy. Between 2011 and 2012, a counterinsurgency strategy not too distinguished from a counterterrorism strategy was developed and circulated as an official doctrine. Indeed, a clinical separation of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in the North East of Nigeria appears avoided.

Boko Haram fighters often hide among and blend into the civil population in the North East, tempting the Nigerian military to indulge in unprofessional actions. The accuracy in distinguishing between combatants and civilians as well as distinguishing between military targets and civilian population stands out as a professional challenge for the Nigerian military. Consequently, violence has become elastic, ubiquitous, unselective, and cruel, making the protection of non-combatants much more difficult.

Collateral damages have often soared on the popular commentary of Boko Haram armed group using human shields. This has made the Nigerian military CT-COIN progress slow and its success limited. The illusion is complicated by the reality that a circumspect battlefield is hardly ascertained. Allegations of human rights abuses against civilians by the NM in the course of their deadly battle with the Islamist fundamentalist
group *Boko Haram* suggest weak command and control capabilities. They also undermine the broader objective of stabilizing Nigeria’s northern region.

Amnesty International Report in 2013 and 2014 on North East military operations have shown footage of extensive reprisal attack on the local population consequent upon the suspicion that the local population fell short of being neutral. The Nigerian military has been bogged down by the baggage of guilt placed on them by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, among other global human rights organization (Osakwe 2017). The combination of under-resourcing, low morale and impunity for violations has created an atmosphere in which the security forces have not only repeatedly failed to protect the civilian population from attacks by *Boko Haram*, but have also been involved in rampant human rights violations through extrajudicial execution. A case in point is the mass execution of over 640 recaptured *Boko Haram* detainees from military detention facility at Giwa Barracks in Maiduguri, Borno state in March 2014 (AIR 2015b). Also, torture has featured as a war crime during obtaining information or extracting confessions from *Boko Haram* members using punishment, intimidation, or coercion. It appears that respecting human rights make it difficult to defeat *Boko Haram*.

Given the complex and uncertain operating environment, ROMO of the Nigerian military in the context of internal security duties usually involve allegation of human rights abuses. This has made military officers to become targets of vengeance attacks from groups in societies that were victims of the military’s internal security mission (Adeakin 2015). Some of the NSVAs justify their attacks on the military because of the allegations of human rights abuses perpetrated by this institution.
The Odi, Zaki-Biam and Giwa cases negates the virtue of military professionalism and cognate ethical standards. Corruption and under-resourcing was also known to erode military professionalism as seen in ROMO in the North East of Nigeria which was marred by poor maintenance of equipment and facilities, under payment of soldiers, termination of mandatory six months troop rotation, cancelation of leave among fatigue soldiers, as well as low morale (see James 2017).

Conclusion

As argued by Armitage and Moisan (2005), the belief that the traditional military remains the best institution to deal with new world operational requirements has been challenged. The operational environment of internal security operations has posed basic challenges for the NM demanding a ROMO. It is a fragile and dynamic one. Also, military engagements are known to restore law and order in the short term but does very little to deal with the underlying reasons for the conflicts (Harris 2004).

Domestic COIN does not present the NM with a completely “new face of war” as it has been the basic military challenge facing the NM from its formative stage in 1863. Indeed, while previous studies have pointed out that conventional war has been the primary task and focus of the NM and internal security an interruption, the study submits that internal security has been the norm for the NM and large-scale conventional war the exception.

The study identified that ROMO is made up of two parts—the military (the high intensity phase) and policing parts (the low intensity phase). The former encompasses the kinetic combat operations; the latter encompasses the restoration of civil order. The
kinetic compart aspect appears to be the easy part for the NM given their orientation and traditional training, while the restoration of civil order appears to be the difficult part.

The effect of ROMO on the Nigerian society is the glorification of military interests and values, and an increase in the reliance of the military in domestic conflicts (Best 1999). It has created “a reliance on force, rather than persuasion” (Obi 2007).
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The Nigerian state with its “monopoly of the use of force” has been challenged considerably by violent non-state actors. The security environment in Nigeria between 1960 and 2017 can be described as increasingly violent, unstable, complex, and ambiguous. Between 1960 and 2017, the Nigerian Military has been challenged by domestic riots and upheaval (like the Tiv Riot of 1960), a civil war (1967-1970), ethnic crisis, religious crisis, religious insurgency (like the Maitasine and Boko Haram insurgencies), resource control insurgencies (like the MEND insurgency), farmers-herdsmen crisis, among others. Given the asymmetric reality of each conflict, the Nigerian military have had to resort to a range of military operations (ROMO). The peculiar security challenges in Nigeria such as kidnapping, abduction, armed robbery, farmers-herdsmen clashes, communal crisis, traffic gridlock, insurgency, and violent secessionist agitation among others, have been managed by the Nigerian military through ROMO.

The NM has been deployed to a wide variety of challenges along a conflict continuum that spans from peace to war. Indeed, the NM appears to be involved in almost all spheres of national life in the context of national security. This appears to have distracted it from its traditional role thereby compromising discipline and professionalism since they were hardly trained to intervene directly to deal with crime or civil violence. The Nigeria military have proven to be best suited to address high-end conflict operations like the Nigerian civil war, but appears much more challenged by the realities and
dynamics of varied forms of domestic insurgencies which requires their “constabularization.” This does not diminish the success of the NM in various external peacekeeping operations. The research showed a security gap between the end of military combat, peace support, relief operations, and the start of restoration of civil authority. The most complex and challenging phases of ROMO in domestic counterinsurgency in Nigeria are the post-combat operations.

Drawn from the case studies, the study observed that while the Nigerian military has been often effective at ROMO in specific acts of violence like riots and protests, it has found it difficult to conduct ROMO directed against state violence in the form of an insurgency. Despite the frequency of military responses to domestic insurgency in Nigeria, the tide of domestic insurgency has been increased and sustained. VNSAs appear to be getting already familiar with military deployment to domestic crisis that would have been handled by the Nigeria Police. Neither the deployment of military force in Tiv Division in 1960 did not stop the eruption of violence in the area in 1961, nor a similar show of military force in February 1964 dissuade the Tiv people from further acts of violence in August 1964. Also, the deployment of the Nigerian Military to the Niger Delta in February 1966 did not deter a renewed insurgency in the region between 2003 and 2009. Another case in point is the deployment of the Nigerian Military in Kano in 1980 against the Maitatsine insurgency, but neither this nor subsequent deployments discouraged similar occurrences of Maitatsine insurgency in Adamawa and Gombe states. It did not also stop the eruption of the Boko Haram insurgency in parts of the North East of Nigeria since 2009 till date.
Recommendations

As opined by Boyland and Turner (2017), war is an environment where traditional responses often fail, and solving problems requires new ways of thinking. Consequently, the need for adaptability becomes very essential. The practice, process and structure of the NM should conform to the security realities that define the Nigerian environment. Such adaptation must be planned and not spontaneous. However, the challenges presented by the complex and uncertain environment of COIN makes the use of ROMO essential. Winning domestic counterinsurgencies by the Nigerian military in the context of ROMO requires coherent, patient action that encompasses the full range of political, economic, social, and military activities. There is need for a mix of capabilities that allow for a shift of the NM from ground combat to operations of a law enforcement character. There is a compelling need for the NM to develop specialized capabilities that can fill the gap between the point where military operations leave off and community-based policing activities pick up. This can be achieved by updating aspects of NM education, training, and doctrine.

The NM still operates like an attrition-based military trained for high intensity conflict. This throws up challenges for ROMO in domestic COIN. The study recommends that the best option for NM, and for the Nigerian state at large, is to design a force more capable of dealing with an ambiguous, uncertain, and vague environment. This might involve the increased use and demand of Special Forces armed with special skills to carry out ROMO. This implies the selection of elite soldiers trained to carry out ROMO. In all, NM ROMO in domestic COIN requires complete overhaul. It requires
entirely new kind of strategy, an entirely different kind of force, and an entirely different kind of military training.
REFERENCE LIST


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