FROM WHY TO HOW: CONNECTING ACTION TO POLICY
THROUGH CANADIAN MILITARY STRATEGY

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There is a general misunderstanding in Canada of what the role and purpose of policy and strategy are. This misunderstanding has led to the creation of multiple defence policies or strategies that do not fully align with strategic theory further confusing the issue and diluting the traditional responsibilities for security policy and strategy. The Canadian Armed Forces has developed relationships and processes to close this gap but the strategic culture in Canada has remained reactionary to global events. In order to better align roles and responsibilities, the Canadian Armed Forces must develop a unique, overarching military strategy built by strategists who have a fundamental understanding of the general theory of strategy and a broad understanding of Canada's unique history, traditions and partnerships. Such a strategy must take into account the interests of Canada and its citizens. With such a strategy in hand, the CAF will be better postured to advise the Government of Canada on suitable policy objectives and what is needed to achieve them.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or
any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing
statement.)

ABSTRACT

FROM WHY TO HOW: CONNECTING ACTION TO POLICY THROUGH CANADIAN MILITARY STRATEGY, by Major Jonathan M. Cox, 139 pages.

There is a general misunderstanding in Canada of what the role and purpose of policy and strategy are. This misunderstanding has led to the creation of multiple defence policies or strategies that do not fully align with strategic theory further confusing the issue and diluting the traditional responsibilities for security policy and strategy. The Canadian Armed Forces has developed relationships and processes to close this gap but the strategic culture in Canada has remained reactionary to global events. In order to better align roles and responsibilities, the Canadian Armed Forces must develop a unique, overarching military strategy built by strategists who have a fundamental understanding of the general theory of strategy and a broad understanding of Canada's unique history, traditions and partnerships. Such a strategy must take into account the interests of Canada and its citizens. With such a strategy in hand, the CAF will be better postured to advise the Government of Canada on suitable policy objectives and what is needed to achieve them.

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ACRONYMS

CA   Canadian Army

CAF   Canadian Armed Forces

CANSOFCOM   Canadian Special Operations Forces Command

CDS   Chief of the Defence Staff

CJOC   Combined Joint Operations Command

DM   Deputy Minister (of Defence)

DMC   Defence Management Committee

DND   Department of National Defence

GG   Governor General

GoC   Government of Canada

L1   Level 1 (Headquarters)

MND   Minister of National Defence

PM   Prime Minister

RCAF   Royal Canadian Air Force

RCN   Royal Canadian Navy

U.S.   United States of America

UK   United Kingdom

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> The role of the Canadian Forces in protecting Canadians and their interests and
> values will remain essential in the future.
> —Government of Canada, *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*

In June 2017 the Department of National Defence (DND) released a new defence

policy. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy* was meant to usher the

Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) into the future.[1] The policy provides an overview of how

DND plans to support Canada and Canadians in terms of national defence. *Strong,*

Secure, Engaged discusses long-term investments to modernize the force and the

development of programs to support CAF members and their families. The policy is

useful when looked at from the perspective of a Canadian citizen as it provides a general

synopsis of what activities the government and the military are undertaking and where

taxpayer money is being invested. However, when *Strong, Secure, Engaged* is examined

through the lens of a member of the military, who must translate this policy into

strategies and ultimately tactical actions, it raises a number of questions in terms of

national processes and responsibilities.

A major question to be asked about *Strong, Secure, Engaged* is if it is truly a

defence policy or if it is actually a strategy, understanding that there is a fundamental

difference between the two. At first glance, the answer seems that it is a policy simply

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[1] Canada, Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*, Government of Canada, 2017, accessed August 28, 2017, http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/canada-defence-policy-report.pdf.

because it says so in the title, however upon scratching the surface this is not as apparent as it initially seems. When examined under the context of the Prime Minister's (PM) Mandate Letter to the Minister of National Defence (MND) which directs the MND to "[c]onduct an open and transparent review process to create a new defence strategy for Canada," it is clear that the intent was for the creation of a strategy, yet a policy seems to have been produced.[2] Furthermore, *Strong, Secure, Engaged* was designed to replace the *Canada First Defence Strategy* issued by the Conservative Government under Steven Harper in 2008. Again this raises the question about whether DND has released defence policy or defence strategy. If it is strategy what is it guided by, if it is policy what is it guiding?

The debate between policy or strategy forms a portion of the problem to be examined in the following pages and the answer at this point is not yet entirely clear. The questions of quality and scope of defence policy within Canada are not unique to the most recent policies. There exists a contentious history of misaligned defence policy in Canada with some believing that "Canadian governments and Canadian politicians have a long record of doing the wrong things in defence."[3] In Canada there exists a very close connection between defence policy and tactical actions; thus, while the majority of criticism is directed towards the government, the CAF to a certain extent is complicit in the issues that have arisen. The CAF has a role in supporting defence policy and a

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[2] Canada, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, "Minister of Defence Mandate Letter," Government of Canada, November 12, 2015, accessed October 1, 2017, http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-national-defence-mandate-letter.

[3] Jack Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (Toronto, ON: HarperPerennialCanada, 2004), xvi.

responsibility to ensure that the military is ready to meet assigned policy goals, which ought to be coordinated through a unique military strategy that governs how the military will achieve its assigned goals. The overall scope of this paper is to examine how Canadian military strategy is formed and what can be done in order to better connect military actions to national interests. So while the question as to whether *Strong, Secure, Engaged* is strategy or policy is beyond the main research question, understanding the difference and implication of each is tantamount to understanding military strategy and how it fits into Canada's strategic framework.

The first observation about what guides Canadian military efforts is that there appears to be no specific military strategy guiding subordinate plans, operations or tactical actions both in peace and war. Joint planning within the CAF follows a specific Joint Planning Process, carried out by the Strategic Joint Staff on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). The Joint Planning Process itself is broken into two main phases: Strategic Watch and Active Planning. Together, these phases are meant to guide the formulation of operational plans for specific missions which come in the form of either CDS Guidance or Force Employment Strategies. The Strategic Watch phase is meant to be constant and ongoing, designed to identify potential situations where the CAF may be directed to deploy and identify and assess potential strategic response options. According to doctrine, when confronted with a specific conflict or potential mission, Active Planning activities are initiated and the Joint Planning Process drives a

process of apportioning, allocating and deploying combat power where needed.[4] The drawback of waiting for a specific mission is that the CAF is forced to apportion and allocate currently available capabilities, which are either in a state of readiness, re-tasked from other commitments or generated from a non-ready state. The procedure of generating strategic options is supported by Force Posture and Readiness management which tracks asset availability in order to provide options and associated impacts in terms of time, resources and costs to the Government of Canada (GoC).[5] This process, however, is not as clear or definitive as it may initially seem and more importantly, it places Canada in a reactive posture, based on threats as they arise not necessarily as they are anticipated.

There is inherent risk accepted in this process as the forces available may not align with the needs of impending missions in terms of training, capabilities or both. So while there is a process to generate combat power when required, this is for specific mission sets as the need or potential need arises. Force Posture and Readiness, in essence, fills the role of military strategy providing the link between "the government's defence policy preferences or priorities to the preparation of military capabilities for the execution of tasks."[6] However, the combat power available is more akin to a shopping list of

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[4] Canadian Armed Forces, B-GJ-005-500/FP-000 Canadian Forces Joint Publication 5.0 (CFJP 5.0), *The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (OPP)* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, April 2008), 1B-1.

[5] Michael Roi, *Canadian Defence Priorities, CF Force Posture and Strategic Readiness: Linking Government Policy Preferences to Resource Allocations* (Canada: Defence R&D Canada – Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA), 2012), 5.

[6] Ibid., iii.

currently available resources more so than it is a wish list for future capabilities. Again, the Force Posture and Readiness, while a step in the right direction is reactionary to what the government thinks is required, and as has been seen in the past, the CAF has not had the capacity to meet assigned goals or priorities.[7] What appears to be lacking is firm strategic direction, in the form of an over-arching, steady-state military strategy to guide daily operations and future force development needs of the CAF which in turn could be used to help inform the GoC about what is required to meet assigned goals thus shaping defence policy.

The CAF bears a share of this risk, doing what it can to fill the gaps, but is ultimately a cog in the larger framework based on direction and priorities from the GoC. In the end, it is governments who control a nation's purse strings and retain the responsibility to create, man and equip its military force. The military then has a responsibility to ensure it is able and ready to fight on its nation's behalf with the resources provided.[8] Notwithstanding the responsibilities there is no mandated requirement for the GoC to produce defence policy, nor does it always demand a defence or military strategy from DND or the CAF, adding to overall confusion or misaligned efforts.[9]

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[7] Roi, *Canadian Defence Priorities,* 2.

[8] Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* 232-233.

[9] There is no continuing requirement, but the PM retains the ability to request such strategies through things such as a mandate letter to a minister as the current PM has done to the MND. Trudeau, "Minister of Defence Mandate Letter."

In this context the theoretical difference between policy and strategy begins to emerge, where the former is meant to provide guidance on what a nation must do and why, and the latter is designed to describe how the what is achieved. "Strategy and policy are indeed distinct in theory, but strategy in practice rests on a dialogue with policy."[10] It is at this juncture where the Canadian system begins to break down. The terms policy and strategy are not fully understood and are often used synonymously having the effect of generating an all-encompassing process that does not fully meet the criteria for either policy or strategy. With no strategy, there is no dialogue with policy.

The policy documents or "Defence White Papers" that are produced often appear more politically motivated and are used as a vehicle to explain government actions to the public to garner support rather than truly directing specific priorities or vision. Additionally, there is no system of constant, formal re-evaluation of the overall environment to ensure relevant policies exist. While there have been a number of policy statements or White Papers released in the past, they are not regularly produced on a strict timeframe with only seven having been produced since 1964. In the last fifty-four years Canada has averaged one defence policy every seven years despite the sitting of eighteen separate Parliaments, supporting eleven different PMs.[11] This often leaves the formulation of military strategy to the CAF based on strategic traditions instead of

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[10] Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 19.

[11] The figure of eleven Prime Ministers includes Pierre Trudeau twice based on the election of Joe Clark in 1979 prior to Trudeau's re-election in 1980. Canada, Library of Parliament, "Prime Ministers of Canada since 1897," Parliament of Canada, accessed April 21, 2018, https://lop.parl.ca/About/Parliament/senatoreugeneforsey/book/prime_ministers-e.html.

explicitly updated defence priorities accounting for the way the CAF generates options for government. However, the CAF, in the absence of defined defence priorities, has often failed to produce an effective military strategy, operating with what it has available, contributing to the decline of military capabilities over time.

In light of these issues, Canadian strategy formulation seems to be a disjointed process undertaken in a piecemeal fashion, creating a number of inefficiencies and gaps in the Canadian strategic framework. Despite this fact, Canada maintains a proud military history having contributed to many conflicts worldwide, an odd dichotomy when balanced with Canada's previous defence choices. Part of the explanation for this is that Canada maintains an excellent tactical military, and when committed is supported by the people and the government. However, the political and strategic choices made prior to commitment have meant that Canada has almost always entered conflicts in an ill-prepared manner and forced to adapt.[12] The decisions made to create these conditions have been based on Canada's political and military traditions and assumptions derived from Canada's history, geography and international relationships more so than on the thoughtful arrangement of Canadian goals, resources, and threats.

Such gaps in the strategic development process risk that a unified and coherent response can be generated when and where needed in an emergency that is a direct threat to Canada. There is a large influence from Canadian strategic culture on how strategy is formed, and this reliance on the culture has created the disjointed process generating the inconsistencies and risks being assumed. While a large portion of this risk is accepted by

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[12] Pierre Berton, *Marching as to War: Canada's Turbulent Years 1899-1953* (Canada: Anchor Canada, 2001), 3-5.

the Canadian government, it does trickle down to the CAF, which is responsible to protect Canada and her interests by generating a coherent and achievable military strategy to reduce risks where possible.

The ability to understand and nest into Canada's strategic culture while conducting a more formalized military strategic process for CAF planning is key to improving the extant framework. The responsibility to meet assigned political goals will not be rescinded, therefore the CAF must ensure it is prepared and able to meet these goals in all circumstances. This cannot be achieved in isolation; the overarching responsibility to fund and maintain a relevant military force belongs to the GoC. The CAF and the GoC are two sides of the same coin and developing a relevant and coherent military force requires constant communication between the two. Achieving this dialogue requires military strategists to fully understand the context in which the CAF is operating and for the national leadership to ensure Canada is postured to respond effectively to any threat when called upon. In order to better align the military instrument of national power with policy goals, the CAF must create a distinct military strategy rooted in the unique Canadian culture and structure to support rational and coherent policy choices. To support this goal this discussion will examine what Canadian strategic culture is and how it influences strategy development and the how the CAF can best support the development of a military strategy to meet the specific needs of the GoC.

The quest to find answers to the questions posed begins with a set of initial recommendations. It is not expected that these recommendations remain valid throughout the analysis nor fully solve the stated problems. On the contrary, they serve the primary purpose of establishing a start point for discussion. Secondly, they help to identify my

own biases at the outset, forcing thoughtful analysis of the issues and to help track the argument over time. These recommendations evolve and only serve to further discussion. That being so, the initial recommendations are as follows.

Table 1.   Initial Recommendations

1. Force separation of strategic and policy levels by asking Cabinet for policy and advising on what this means and how strategy will be developed. 2. Change doctrine to establish a military strategy development process. 3. Create a military strategy.

Source: Created by author.

Challenging the initial recommendations begins in chapter 2 with a review of relevant literature. The literature review itself is structured on three main building blocks that set the conditions for analysis in the subsequent chapters. The first block explains the general theory of strategy and relevant terms and concepts used throughout the subsequent discussion. The strategic theory block provides an overview of how strategies are formed and nested within an overall framework designed to link national interests to tactical actions. With the general theory established, chapter 2 moves on to the Canadian context in which this theory is applied.

The second building block of the literature review examines Canadian political and governmental structure. By breaking down the key actors it explains the structure of the GoC and the responsibilities of various actors and entities involved in the creation of defence policy and military strategy. Focusing on the defence aspect of the GoC this

block differentiates DND from the CAF in terms of roles, responsibilities, and authorities and explains their relationship to each other and the rest of government. Delving further into the CAF, the breakdown of subordinate commands into Force Generators and Force Employers is described. This block concludes with current military processes and doctrine to further understand key aspects of the CAF strategic planning processes and other coordination mechanisms. The structure block links into the next building block which is used to describe the impact of geography, history and tradition on the specific actors and their relationships.

The third and final building block outlines the history and traditions that have shaped Canadian strategic culture and the various views and beliefs that shape Canadian society. The geography, historical experience and political traditions of Canada are explored in order to better understand how and why the GoC makes decisions in the manner that it does. One of the main points explored in this block is the Canadian "way of war," defined by the nature of civil-military relations and the tensions and that arise from the interaction of policy and strategy as well as war and warfare, shaping how Canada employs its military as an instrument of national power.[13] Comparing the three building blocks in specific ways helps to further reveal the Canadian way of war, forming the basis for the analysis of how to support a military strategy formulation process.

Chapter 3 outlines the specific applied professional case study methodology used to compare and examine the information provided in the three building blocks from

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[13] Bill Bentley, "Canada's Way in War," in *Institutional Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Contemporary Issues*, ed. Robert W. Walker (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007), 83.

chapter 2. The three blocks create the baseline data that is analyzed through a specific methodology to support the recommendations that are made. By combining the strategic theory and Canadian structure blocks, an ideal Canadian strategic framework is produced, explaining who should do what in a perfect system. The second step combines the Canadian structure block with the history and tradition block, taking into account the influences on the extant political and military systems, thus creating a normative strategic framework demonstrating a more accurate Canadian strategic system. Based on the inputs, the two frameworks naturally differ, enabling a contrast and comparison of the two.

The comparison is used to identify the differences between the ideal and normative frameworks and helps to shape the recommendations made by identifying how or if the two models can be rationalized. As expected the intermediate set of recommendations errs too closely to a perfect theoretical solution and is likely unachievable. Thus, in order to pull the conclusions away from a purely theoretical solution, the intermediate recommendations are analyzed through the lenses of specific key stakeholders who are vested in the military strategic development process. Doing so serves to balance any biases as best as possible and produces viable recommendations based on factual limitations and constraints that can be implemented to improve the current process.

Chapter 4 captures the results of the analysis and explains the initial and final set of improved recommendations, first by explaining the two models that are derived and highlighting how and why they are different. Having the benefit of the analysis based on the literature review the intermediate recommendations build upon the initial

recommendations already provided and seek to increase the separation between policy and strategy through a distinction of roles and responsibilities. The intermediate recommendations are still too large in scope, expanding into the policy realm and relying on advising the government on what they should be doing and requesting grand strategic and policy guidance. These recommendations tread heavily on the fine line between military advice and policy development and remain a basis for change which is achieved through the second round of analysis.

To refine the intermediate recommendations, they are examined through various stakeholder perspectives to challenge individual biases and ensure a holistic analysis is achieved. The key stakeholders all have a vested interest in and influence on what Canadian military strategy should be and what it should achieve providing relevant and varied insights on how to improve the intermediate recommendations. After examining the secondary recommendations from the perspective of the Cabinet, the CDS, and key Level One (L1) headquarters a third and final set of recommendations is produced.[14]

The final recommendations are more finely tuned to the Socratic approach that shapes the key relationships and process for the development of both policy and strategy. Despite the emphasis on relationships, there are still some shortfalls to be addressed. The major difference in the intermediate and final recommendations is the more nuanced approach aimed at leveraging extant relationships to maintain close ties with the

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[14] The L1 Headquarters are comprised of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), Canadian Army (CA), Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) and the Combined Joint Operations Command (CJOC).

Canadian political body. Doing so is assessed to have the effect of creating trust and in turn space for the development of a distinct military strategy.

Chapter 5 takes the improved final recommendations and develops an initial implementation plan which outlines a timeframe and priorities to improve the military strategy formulation process that functions within extant strategic traditions and Canadian structure. The recommendations are designed to support implementation at the CAF level; thus, they seek to inform and influence CAF decision makers, chief among them being the CDS. The major factor for consideration is the creation of a distinct military strategy. This is not, however, as simple or straightforward as simply developing such a strategy, although the process must be initiated by doing so. The solution is more about setting the conditions for its development than actually doing it and this is centred on developing individuals that have the skills to understand and develop Canadian military strategy.

The value is gained once the military strategic process has begun. This will result in a dialectic environment where strategy and policy are balanced and refined over time. To ensure continued value, the CAF must work to support the continued generation of strategy through education and the building of relationships with public servants and the GoC. Strong relationships based on people will be the key to ensuring properly nested strategy while further refining roles and responsibilities of those involved in its production. This is meant to better equip military strategists to develop relevant and effective military strategies as well as equip senior leaders with an understanding of the needs of the military so they can better advise the GoC on what is needed to meet desired policy goals.

Chapter 5 concludes with some personal lessons learned to capture the evolution of my own thoughts and understanding of the identified issues. The hope is that the journey to understand why Canadian strategic culture is the way it is, along with its strengths and weaknesses, can add to the current body of knowledge and spur future research on this topic. Each of the lessons learned is founded on the revelation that doing strategy is less important than understanding strategy. By combining a solid understanding with an optimistic view of what can be achieved, strategists are not confined to strict theoretical models. Such models provide a useful guide for strategy development but the true value is gained when understanding where and when to deviate from theory facilitates useful and tangible strategic results.

The intent of this study is to examine how Canadian military strategy is and should be formed. Although this process is closely connected to policy, this analysis is not about specific policies. Current aspects of policy are discussed in order to highlight the issues and how they impact strategy development. This is a necessary step to fully understand military strategy in Canada and also forms part of the overall research problem. This discussion is not aimed at providing value judgments on what Canadian policy or CAF strategy actually is, nor the quality of it. The focus is on the process, even though specific examples are at times discussed to highlight the issues and facilitate viable recommendations. The study itself is meant to be a value-neutral assessment of the current process in order to aid the development of coherent and useful specific strategies in the future.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

> Canadians do not appear to comprehend that a military exists to fight wars and, ultimately, to protect the national interests.
> —Jack Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?*

The development of military strategy is only a portion of the overall strategic process yet plays a vital role in translating policy aims into specific actions down to the tactical level where "we encounter all the human realities of combat."[15] The conduct of strategy, governed by the general theory of strategy gives meaning to the actions that take place at the lower levels. However, it is not sufficient to simply do strategy as an action. Operational and tactical actions are not produced by putting specific inputs into a black box of strategy. Strategy is more than an action and the general theory while vital to understand the whole is still only a theory. Specific strategies are influenced by numerous factors, each of which shapes the output in specific contexts. To understand the impact of these influences one must first gain an understanding of the general theory of strategy itself. With a universal basis of understanding gained we can move on to understanding strategy in specific contexts each with its own unique variables and influences.

The topic of Canadian military strategy is little talked about in great detail and the major point of criticism often reverts back to government policies and the subsequent impact on military capabilities. As a result, there is not a large amount of dedicated work on Canadian military strategy to produce major schools of thought on the subject. To help

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[15] Edward Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001), 103.

illuminate the context in which the following analysis is conducted the literature review seeks to provide a foundational understanding of Canadian influences on the overall process of strategy formulation. This understanding is achieved in the margins of criticisms of defence policy coupled with an examination of Canada's history and strategic culture.

Using Canada's unique cultural context, connections are made to help explain the impact on military strategy, which is closely linked to policy decisions. To understand the Canadian context, the initial step is to understand the structure of the GoC and the CAF in order to gain an appreciation of who has what responsibilities in terms of policy and strategy development. The literature will show where and why the general theory of strategy is not fully applied in Canada and how political influence is pervasive through all levels of the strategic hierarchy. The impact of this structure is explored using Canada's history and tradition to help elucidate the specific nuances of the Canadian system.

<center>Strategic Theory</center>

The relationship between policy and strategy is one of mutual dependence. Strategy provides the method through which the aims of policy may be implemented.[16] Policy is a senior partner in this relationship, but results are not achieved through a uni-directional process of strategy. The political-strategic relationship is dialectic in nature and requires constant dialogue if coherent and relevant plans are to be generated. Strategy and policy have different roles and rely on different inputs which are necessary to form a mutually dependent relationship. British strategist Hew Strachan states that ideally,

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[16] Colin S. Gray, *Strategy and Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 1.

policy "remains a statement of one government's intent . . . [while strategy] must rest on the understanding of war and its nature because it will shape policy."[17] As such specific strategies ought to be the result of the political-strategic interface and unique to the circumstances in which they are developed.

While specific strategies are unique, strategy itself is governed by a persistent general theory. The general theory is important to understand as it helps to align the political and strategic efforts which are not perfect due to the imperfect actors who implement them or the absence of this relationship altogether in the world of statecraft and military power.[18] Military strategy is heavily influenced by the civil-military relationship of a nation, thus understanding the general theory of strategy is vital to understanding how to create and implement specific military strategies which are in line with both the general theory and specific environmental variables.

The capstone doctrine manual for the CAF, Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP) 01, *Military Doctrine*, provides the basis for the employment and functioning of the CAF. It is designed to "guide the use of armed forces" and to "assist in shaping perceptions within the Government of Canada and the [Canadian Forces] about the use of military capabilities as an instrument of national power."[19] The focus for the CAF is necessarily on the application of the military instrument of national power but must still

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[17] Strachan, *The Direction of War,* 11,14.

[18] Gray, *Strategy and Politics*, 1.

[19] Canadian Armed Forces, B-GJ-005-000/FP-001 Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP 01), *Canadian Military Doctrine* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2011), 1-4.

consider how this is applied in a whole-of-government, comprehensive approach. The military is but one instrument of national power and is likely to be applied in conjunction with other instruments of power thus while armed force is of primary concern, understanding second and third order effects and integration points with other instruments are of the utmost importance.[20]

When considering the formulation of military strategy and how the CAF is meant to guide the use and integration of armed force and the shaping of government perceptions, one must understand the terms and definitions used in the process. The varied and disjointed use of relevant terminology and concepts is a leading factor in the confusion about strategy in general and by extension Canadian strategy specifically. Understanding what we are talking about will enable a more nuanced and valuable discussion on the topic at hand. To achieve this a review of the relevant terms and concepts begins with defence and security as they provide the overall context in which military strategy is often discussed, developed, and applied.

Defence and Security

When talking about strategy, and military strategy in particular, there are many references to the terms security and defence. Regardless of the common use of these terms, they are not interchangeable and the difference must be understood if they are to be of true value. Security, understood in this instance in the context of national security,

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[20] The instruments of national power are traditionally defined as "Diplomacy," "Information," "Military," and "Economy," or "DIME" collectively. For a full definition see Commander Jeff Farlin, "Instruments of National Power: How America Earned Independence" (Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle PA, 2014), accessed April 22, 2018, http://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/87.pdf, 2-22.

is the overall condition of a state related to the safety of its citizens based the vast array of internal, external, or natural threats and dangers.[21] To further refine this concept, national security is further broken down into the sub-categories of domestic security and defence.

Domestic security is inwardly focused concerning itself with events inside state boundaries. Samuel P. Huntington understands domestic security, or what he labels internal security policy, as dealing with the "threat of subversion – the effort to weaken or destroy the state by forces operating within its territorial and institutional confines."[22] In this vein, domestic security pursues internal threats such as crime, terrorism and can be extended to natural disasters. Defence, on the other hand, is oriented outwards beginning at the borders of a state focusing on external threats. Huntington, who defines this as military security policy understands defence as a "program of activities to minimize or neutralize efforts to weaken or destroy the nation by armed forces operating from outside its institutional and territorial confines."[23] Huntington's terms and their specific implications have evolved over time and expanded in scope as methods of warfare such as terrorism or violent extremism have increased in relevance; however, the inward and outward dichotomy has persisted and is a useful construct for understanding the difference between the two terms.

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[21] Canada, Department of Public Safety, "National Security," Government of Canada, accessed April 21, 2018, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/index-en.aspx.

[22] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Solider and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), 1.

[23] Ibid.

Not fully understanding the difference between defence and security can cause confusion when considering who is responsible for what. The military is most suited to an outward defence focus, yet can still contribute to internal security issues such as natural disaster or domestic terrorism with the proper legal mandates. Similarly, internal security forces or intelligence agencies may take part in defence related activates outside of a country's borders for the sake of domestic security. Important to understand is that defence and security are related with supporting policies often developed together. The policies that are developed are not the result of isolated, internal government discussions, they are a product of the inherent values and interests of a nation and its citizens.

National Values and Interests

The overarching concepts that ultimately drive all actions of a state are national values and interests. National values, in general, are those strongly held general attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs of a particular nation about what is good, bad, or desirable.[24] Values are shaped by a nation's history, geography or political structure and help to define what sociologists Douglas Baer, Edward Grab and William Johnston call "a national character or ethos."[25] National values are themselves intangible concepts based on the beliefs of a nation's citizens at a certain moment in time. Values, thus, are mutable and require constant evaluation from a national perspective. Yet, values themselves are

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[24] American Sociological Association, "Glossary," accessed April 21, 2018, http://www.asanet.org/sites/default/files/savvy/introtosociology/Documents/Glossary.html.

[25] Douglas Baer, Edward Grabb, and William Johnston, "National Character, Regional Culture, and the Values of Canadians and Americans," *Canadian Review of Sociology & Anthropology* 30, no. 1 (February 1993): 14.

difficult to universally evaluate as every citizen will have their own unique set of values based on their own personal experiences and beliefs, reinforcing their fluid nature.

Despite the difficulties, there have been attempts to define Canadian values. The University of Waterloo has attempted to codify specific Canadian values in its Canadian Index of Well-being. Based on public surveys, a number of core values have been identified.[26] Similarly the Canadian PM, Justin Trudeau, also attempted to define Canadian values shortly after taking office. In an interview with *The New York Times*, the PM stated that "there are shared values – openness, respect, compassion, willingness to work hard to be there for each other, to search for equality and justice." These comments were preceded, however, with a comment that "there is no core identity, no mainstream in Canada,"[27] highlighting, first the flexible nature of national values based on interpretation, but more importantly the importance of codifying values, particularly by a government, to form a foundation for justifying government actions. National values provide a snapshot of who the collective citizens of a nation are based on an assessment of what beliefs are commonly held within that nation. Values are intangible yet underpin the actions and desires of a nation and must not be confused with national interests.

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[26] These values have been specified as fairness, inclusion, economic security, diversity, health, democracy, equity, safety, and sustainability. University of Waterloo, "Canadian Index of Wellbeing," June 27, 2012, accessed April 21, 2018, https://uwaterloo.ca/canadian-index-wellbeing/about-canadian-indexwellbeing/reflecting-canadian-values.

[27] Guy Lawson, "Trudeau's Canada, Again," *New York Times Magazine,* accessed April 21, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com /2015/12/13/magazine/trudeaus-canada-again.html.

If national values form the character of a nation, national interests form the needs of a nation to uphold those values. Most of the identified values, less economic security and safety, speak nothing of securing Canadians, or their prosperity and position in the world. Values indicate what citizens strive for, but interests govern what is needed to allow citizens to strive for such things. National interests are the tangible goals that support policy development and provide specific criteria upon which policy can be judged. The Canadian government has an onus to define national interests on behalf of Canadians and their values and doing so helps to guide policy actions and strategy formulation.

When balancing values and interests, the key concept is that interests, which are more easily defined and expressed on behalf of an entire nation will almost always trump values because without interests being protected or preserved, values will be unobtainable. There is an ethical conundrum inherent in this dichotomy which will sometimes influence decisions when the two are at odds. As will be shown later in the discussion, in Canada there is a belief that in the past "Canadians let their values run ahead of their reason,"[28] which has shaped some of the decisions made regarding military participation or capability development decisions. It is values, in some instances that form the basis for action. For example, the PM's attempt to identify shared Canadian values helped to support his claim that Canada is a "post-national state" and has helped to drive various immigration policies and the desire to contribute to international security

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[28] Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* 204.

through United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization missions.[29] While admirable, values must be balanced with interests, to ensure that such participation supports Canadians.

At the national level, policymakers must strive to develop "a system of civil-military relationships which will maximize military security at the least sacrifice of other social values."[30] In this comment, Huntington alludes to the fact that interests must be of prime consideration and in the system of international relations values may need to come secondary to interests for the continued survival of the state. Balancing both national values and interests is the role of the executive body of government. For it is they who must generate action through the creation of national policies that meet both to the best extent possible.

<div align="center">Policy</div>

Derived from national interests and values is policy which plays a crucial role in contextualizing interests. Understanding the characteristics of policy is crucial to understanding the role of strategy. Strachan contends that "strategy is too often employed as a synonym for policy," reminding us that they are distinct terms with distinct meanings and that most people use the terms incorrectly.[31] Retired Brigadier-General James Cox echoes this sentiment and explains that policy is made by governments, making it

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[29] Lawson, "Trudeau's Canada, Again."

[30] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State,* 2.

[31] Strachan, *The Direction of* War, 11.

innately political and as such, must necessarily be whole-of-government.[32] Policy should

provide the overarching and broad concept of what a nation will do and more importantly

why it is doing it. Policy is based on and connected to national interests and designed to

meet and further these interests thus ought to "be both aspirational and inspirational."[33]

To that end, policy can be defined as a nation's guiding principles and general direction

for the achievement of national interests. In this light, policy provides the overarching

context for strategy, guiding its development.

<center>Operations and Tactics</center>

Flowing from policy is strategy, however, to properly frame strategy this study

first skips to the operational and tactical levels of war as a means of bracketing where

strategy takes place and what it is meant to accomplish. Sitting between strategy and

tactics is the operational level where specific operations or campaigns are conducted.

Strategic theorist Colin S. Gray defines operations as "combinations of purposefully

linked military engagements" which can appear either as plans, or individual strategies.[34]

Military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz views operations as specific war plans which

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[32] James Cox, "3 Problems with the Upcoming Defence Policy Review," *The Vimy Report*, accessed September 18, 2017, http://thevimyreport.com/2016/04/defence-lite; James Cox, "Canadian Defence Policy and Grand Strategy," in *The Strategic Outlook for Canada 2017: Strategy and Mission After the Defence Policy Review*, eds. David McDonough, and Charles Davis (Ottawa, ON: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2017), accessed September 4, 2017, http://cdainstitute.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Vimy-Paper-34-Strategic-Outlook-2017.pdf, 9.

[33] Cox, "3 Problems."

[34] Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 18.

determine and direct the actions needed to achieve an intended purpose.[35] Strategist, Edward Luttwak argues that the operational level has not always existed in the strategic hierarchy but has evolved into the level where the "overall methods of war are applied [and where] . . . the ongoing command of all forces involved (in war) must unfold."[36] The operational level is what governs specific tactical tasks by directing the major steps or actions needed to achieve strategic goals.

Tactics follows from operations and covers the individual engagements and military actions prescribed by the operational level. Tactics is defined by DND as "the art of disposing naval, land and air forces in actual contact with the enemy."[37] Physical combat is conducted at the tactical level and necessitates the actions of individual humans, physically fighting. Luttwak sees the tactical level as where "we encounter the full complexities of the human dimension of combat, as we see fighting unfold within a unique context of time and place."[38] The tactical level is ultimately where policy goals are achieved by specific individuals and their actions. Taken together operations and tactics fall within the military realm and guide the direct employment of military resources to achieve specific effects that are guided by and connected to policy by strategy.

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[35] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 177.

[36] Luttwak, *Strategy*, 112.

[37] Termium Plua, "Tactics," Government of Canada, accessed April 3, 2018, http://www.btb.termiumplus.gc.ca/tpv2alpha/alpha-eng.html?lang=eng&i=1& srchtxt=tactics&index=alt&codom2nd_wet=1#resultrecs.

[38] Luttwak, *Strategy*, 109.

Strategy

Strategy connects policy to operational and ultimately tactical actions, and understanding what strategy is and how this connection is achieved begins with rationalizing the difference between strategy as a general theory and strategies as subordinate outputs of a specific process. Former army officer and academic Dr. Bill Bentley, reinforces Gray's concept of strategy asserting that "the nature of strategy is eternal and does not change, whereas the character of strategies is different in various historical, geopolitical and geo-strategic contexts."[39] Bentley and Gray emphasize the existence of an overarching theory of strategy and the specific plans which constitute various strategies to accomplish assigned objectives. This distinction is important as the proceeding discussion seeks in part to understand how the theory of strategy in general influences the development of Canadian military strategy in particular.

In the definition above, while Bentley discusses the characteristics of strategy, he does not define what strategy actually is. Gray outlines the fundamental architecture of strategy as being the connection of policy ends (politics) to military means (tactical units) through strategic ways and because not all information will ever be known, each of these elements are further governed by a common set of assumptions.[40] It is the connection of the ends and means with specific ways that make up the fundamental process of strategy which governs the creation of specific strategies or plans.

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[39] Bill Bentley, *Military Strategy: A Primer* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2011), 1.

[40] Gray, *The Strategy Bridge*, 31.

Henry Mintzberg, a Canadian professor of business and management, further defines the difference between strategy and strategies in his book, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*. Mintzberg begins with a definition of planning achieved by pulling together various aspects or viewpoints on what planning is. To this end, he understands planning as an amalgamation of future thinking, controlling the future, and integrated decision making.[41] He concludes that planning is a process defined as "a formalized procedure to produce an articulated result, in the form of an integrated system of decisions."[42] Planning then is a formal process used to facilitate the decision-making, ultimately to guide future action. Mintzberg's next step is to compare planning to strategy.

Like planning, strategy is understood in different ways, which Mintzberg attempts to rationalize. A specific strategy in its basic form is a plan – it guides actions to get from current conditions to a future goal. When compared with Gray's definition of operations, it becomes clear that a specific strategy is a plan, the output of strategy as a process, or in other words an operational plan to guide individual tactical actions. Strategy, the general theory is more than a plan or specific output; it is the "direction and use made of means by chosen ways in order to achieve desired ends."[43] It supports what must be achieved and outlines how this will occur. Gray's definition alludes to strategy being a specific thought process however it can also be characterized by a pattern defined as "consistency

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[41] Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 7-11.

[42] Ibid., 12.

[43] Gray, *The Strategy Bridge*, 18.

in behaviour over time."[44] This is important as it illuminates the possibility that a strategy can be defined by actions and not purely direction or guidance. This means Mintzberg's argument that a realized strategy or a strategy that is acted upon can be the result of either an intended strategy, deliberately pursued or perhaps it can be the result of an emergent strategy which was not initially intended but develops through actions and continued behaviours.

Such a distinction leads to the understanding that strategy must not necessarily be directed from a central authority and that cultural norms and behaviours may influence the formation of strategy itself.[45] Strategy, therefore, does not require policy to be created. This, however, is not an ideal circumstance based on the political-strategic relationship. Strategy provides policy with a means of action, and policy provides strategy specific meaning. In order to be effective, both aspects of this relationship must be aligned and work symbiotically. When they are not aligned or properly nested, issues arise such as acting without a clear political goal.

How and why emergent strategies evolve are closely linked to strategic culture. These plans, or strategies, are a product of strategy as a process which is iterative and recursive not the product of one-time analysis. Following from this analysis it is possible to define strategies as the plans used to guide the required actions and decisions needed to achieve desired ends using specific resources or means. Thus it is possible for strategy to produce strategies or a specific strategy which contributes to the confusion about what is

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[44] Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, 23.

[45] Ibid., 23-26.

actually being created and the intended goal. Based on the characteristics of arranging

ends, ways and means it is possible for subordinate levels of strategy to exist which bears

further delineation.

Merriam-Webster defines strategy as "the science and art of employing the

political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group to afford the

maximum support to adopted policies in peace and war."[46] This provides a holistic

understanding as a science and art of employing all aspect of national power in the

achievement of national policies. This falls in line with the CAF definition of strategy

which depicts strategy as "the application of national resources to achieve policy

objectives."[47] In this light, it is viewed as a deliberate action that translates resources into

results based on policy goals. More importantly, it is a process that extends beyond

purely military resources and control.

Strategist Thomas Mahnken explores strategy within the context of strategic

theory and its relationship to war. From his perspective strategy is first and foremost

"about how to win wars."[48] He sees it through a Clausewitzian lens as a tool that enables

war to be fought for political ends. It is a "rational process . . . based upon clearly

identifying political goals, assessing one's comparative advantage relative to the enemy,

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[46] *Merriam-Webster*, "Strategy," accessed September 30, 2017, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/strategy.

[47] Termium Plus, "Strategy," Government of Canada, accessed September 24, 2017, http://www.btb.termiumplus.gc.ca/tpv2alpha/alpha-eng.html?lang=eng&i=1& srchtxt=Strategy&index=alt&codom2nd_wet=1#resultrecs.

[48] Thomas Mahnken, "Strategic Theory," in *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, 4th ed., eds. John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 61.

calculating costs and benefits carefully and examining risks and rewards of alternative strategies."[49] This falls in line with the Canadian doctrinal understanding of strategies being "plans, or ways of achieving desired ends, utilizing defined means."[50] If we balance this with Mintzberg, we see a connection in Canadian doctrine between strategies and plans, defined as "a method of achieving something: a way of carrying out a design."[51] In this light Mahnken provides a framework to connect strategies as plans to strategy formulation as a process.

Further defining strategy in these terms highlights an important point by way of identifying means capable of achieving political ends or goals. The military is but one instrument of national power, or one means to achieve specified ends. Military strategies, directing military means might not always link directly to national objectives. There exists an intermediate, or grand strategic level directing all elements of national power towards the achievement of national policy objectives which are inherently whole-of-government.

Grand Strategy

Understanding national strategic frameworks is helped with a top-down approach beginning with the overall structure to distinguish between policy and strategy. Policy is a tool of the government to express what they wish to achieve and why based on

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[49] Mahnken, "Strategic Theory," 62-63.

[50] Canadian Armed Forces, CFJP 01: *Canadian Military Doctrine*, 3-2.

[51] Termium Plus, "Plans," Government of Canada, accessed September 24, 2017, http://www.btb.termiumplus.gc.ca/tpv2alpha/alpha-eng.html?lang=eng&i=1& srchtxt=Plan&index=ent&codom2nd_wet=1#resultrecs.

expressed interests. The next step is to explain how this is achieved forming the basis for the grand strategic level of war. The nomenclature used to describe grand strategy varies and is seen in the literature as either grand strategy, major strategy, or national strategy. There exists some expressed preference for the use or avoidance of either term, but these terms serve the same purpose and while the use differs the meaning remains constant. [52]

Grand strategy sets conditions for the development of specific strategies, most commonly aligned with specific instruments of national power. Colonel Dennis Drew and Dr. Donald Snow, refer to grand strategy as "the art and science of coordinating the development and use of those instruments [of national power] to achieve national security objectives."[53] Drew and Snow go on to argue how even though policy is a broader term than grand strategy the two can be used interchangeably. This depiction of the two levels is misleading, particularly in the generation of the grand strategy, and although similar in some respects, the distinction between the two must be clearly understood and maintained.

Grand strategy like policy "is also a whole-of-government endeavour because it incorporates all elements of national power."[54] Thus when considering defence policy it must be clear that defence is more about what external threats exist and how the nation can protect against them. It is not simply how the military can be used, even though in

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[52] Strachan, *The Direction of War*, 16.

[53] Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, *Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1998), 16.

[54] Cox, "Canadian Defence Policy and Grand Strategy," 9.

some cases the preponderance of power will be generated from military means. Grand strategy is an all-encompassing strategy that must exert control over and mobilize any of a nations assets in order to coordinate a collective strategic effort.[55]

All threats to interests and values, in all forms, must be considered in the development of a defence or security strategy. Grand strategy goes beyond the purpose of policy and provides the broad how in terms of defending against such threats, using multiple instruments of power.[56] In Canada this would allow for unified action across multiple departments such as DND, Public Safety Canada, or Government Affairs Canada (GAC) to integrate foreign policy, domestic security and defence efforts This breadth of reach must be maintained by the government to ensure integrated responses to all threats, not just military ones. It is still strategy, but a higher form than that of military strategy or other supporting strategies, reinforcing the structure of supporting strategies in a hierarchical setting.

The level of grand strategy, coordinating all aspects of national power and explaining how it will be achieved, enables the creation of subordinate strategies opening the door to the strategic level of war. The strategic level is where specific instruments of power are free to develop specific strategies based on grand strategic direction, which ought to amplify policy goals. In considering the strategic level, a base implication in the development of individual strategies is that there is an aspect of constant coordination with the other instruments of power to ensure complementary efforts within overall

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[55] Gray, *The Future of Strategy,* 83, 86.

[56] Cox, "Canadian Defence Policy and Grand Strategy," 9.

resources available, further reinforcing the role of government as the lead at the grand strategic level. Following this thread downwards we come to the military instrument of national power and the development of a specific military strategy.

Military Strategy

The introduction of a grand strategic level brings with it the justification for the specific realm of military strategy. Military strategy extends the traditional etymology of the term strategy itself. The word strategy is an indirect derivation of the Greek word *strategos* meaning "general," however, a closer equivalent to the term is the Greek *strategike episteme*, meaning "general's knowledge."[57] Strategy is traditionally about the direction of military forces in specific conflicts for the achievement of political aims and falls strictly within the realm of military commanders. In recent history the use of the term has been expanded to be a more encompassing term to capture the arrangement of ends, ways, and means both in business and governments alike.[58] The separation of the terms has only increased over history as fewer kings or national rulers also filled roles as military commanders forcing a separation of politics and strategy.

Canadian doctrine refers to the military strategic level of conflict defining military strategy as "the level where military strategic goals consistent with the desired national policy end state of a conflict are determined. At this level military strategies are

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[57] Rich Horwath, "The Origin of Strategy," The Strategic Thinking Institute, accessed 4 April, 2018, http://www.strategyskills.com/Articles_Samples/ origin_strategy.pdf.

[58] W. D. MacNamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald, "A National Security Framework for Canada," *Policy Matters*, 3. No 10 (October 2002): 3.

formulated, resources allocated, and political constraints established."[59] Military strategy

determines what military objectives must be achieved. This definition also reinforces the

reactionary posture of the CAF by tying military strategy to the specific end state of

specific conflicts, leaving a gap in direction for peace-time employment and direction of

the CAF. This has the effect of pulling the formation of strategy into the operational or

tactical realm when compared to the definitions of operations and tactics which is

predicated on the actual contact with or direct military effort against a specific adversary.

As J.F.C Fuller argues, "our peace strategy must formulate our war strategy, by which I

mean that there cannot be two forms of strategy, one for peace and one for war."[60] This

increases the risk assumed when having diverse independent strategies for times of war

which are not as relevant or supported in peace-time.

The evolution of the term strategy has contributed to the confusion surrounding

the term itself, or with this level being overlooked or dismissed as too specific and not

filling the need of a comprehensive government approach to extant or emerging

problems.[61] There exists a desire to shift away from specific strategies such as military

strategy in favour of more broad grand or national strategies. The fact remains, however,

that there is still a need for explicit military strategies which deal specifically with the

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[59] Canadian Armed Forces, CFJP 01, *Canadian Military Doctrine*, 2-11.

[60] J.F.C. Fuller, *The Reformation of War* (London, UK: Brookhaven Press, 1923), 218.

[61] In the example provided of how CDS guidance should be structured and the content that it ought to cover CFJP 5.0, *The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process* describes the shift away from "stove-pipe strategies" such as military strategy in favour of more broad, whole-of-government strategic objectives. Canadian Armed Forces, CFJP 5.0, *The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process,* 5M-2.

military instrument of power and the application of military force in pursuit of political aims. It becomes a matter of the military being able to protect national interests when in times of war it is the military who become "the executors of war" and it is military strategy that enables this.[62] Military strategy has been defined as "the art and science of coordinating the development, deployment, and employment of military forces to achieve national security objectives."[63] It is a specific type of strategy that deals with a specific type of power designed to achieve specific goals.

Acknowledging the various layers, Gray understands strategy more in a classical sense "as a bridge between military power and political purpose . . . [it] provides the 'how' answer to what in its absence are political ambition and military activity."[64] The concept and role of strategy extend to encompass both grand strategy and military strategy, and it is at this juncture and in this role that strategy obtains its value.[65] This is not to say that military strategy is the ultimate link in the strategic chain as grand strategy alludes to the need for other specific strategies that can be coordinated into a unified security strategy to coordinate all aspects of national power. Like military strategy, these too are supporting strategies, but will not be discussed in detail as they are beyond the scope of this paper which focuses on the role of military strategy and the CAF. What must be kept in mind is that any good military strategy will integrate with other specific

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[62] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 317.

[63] Drew and Snow, *Making Strategy*, 18.

[64] Gray, *The Future of Strategy*, 21-23.

[65] Ibid., 23.

supporting strategies wherever possible and is only a part of a larger puzzle. To reinforce how military strategy is framed within the Canadian context we must now align the parts of strategic theory with the structure of the GoC to help shift our perception of theory to a more practical and specific interpretation.

<div align="center">Canadian Government Structure</div>

The GoC is an intricate structure tied to Canada's origins as a self-governing nation and steeped in tradition and founded on relationships. Canada is a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliamentary structure as well as being a Commonwealth country, meaning that the Head of State is the reigning British Monarch, currently Queen Elizabeth II.[66] The Queen is represented in Canada by the Governor General (GG) who is appointed by the Queen on the recommendation of the PM and charged with fulfilling her Royal duties in Canada. Furthermore, the GG is the Commander in Chief of the armed forces and all military authority stems from the Queen through the GG to the CDS, though in practice daily management is vested in the MND. The Crown, through the GG, forms the core of the three branches of the Canadian government.

The formation of the judicial, legislative and executive branches of government is a product of the relationship of the Crown, the PM and the Canadian people. The judicial branch is embodied by the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme court justices are appointed by the GG on the advice of the PM and the Privy Council Office and serve until the age of 75 years. The legislative branch, based on the Parliament of Canada, is

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[66] Government of Canada, *Constitution Act, 1867*, Justice Laws Website, accessed April 21, 2018, http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const/.

comprised of the House of Commons and the Senate. The House of Commons is made up of Members of Parliament who are elected through a plurality vote in a specific geographical region, or riding, defined by overall population. This ensures that each one of the 338 seats in the House has equal representation. Legislation is initially tabled, discussed and voted on in the House of Commons and upon agreement, through majority voting is sent to the Senate for a second reading. The Senate is comprised of 105 seats with individual Senators being appointed until the age of seventy-five, by the GG on the advice of the PM. Once a piece of legislation is agreed upon by both the House and the Senate it is sent to the GG to receive Royal Assent which turns the legislation into law. Following Royal Assent, the executive branch is responsible to implement, support and enforce laws as interpreted by the Supreme Court.

The executive branch consists of three major entities, the Queen, represented by the GG, the PM as head of government, and the Cabinet which is made up of the PM and Members of Parliament who have been appointed by the GG on advice of the PM to become ministers and heads of various departments. The PM is also a Member of Parliament who is appointed by the GG and it is customary that the GG appoint the leader of the party with the most seats in the House of Commons as PM. Although the executive branch includes the GG it is traditional that there be very little to no Royal involvement in the daily running of the government which is left to the Cabinet.

Within Canada, the security effort is designed to be led by Public Safety Canada who coordinates across federal departments and agencies to protect Canadians and their interests. This protection is achieved through a comprehensive effort that coordinates efforts across areas such as "counter-terrorism, critical infrastructure, cybersecurity and

transportation security."[67] Such a structure is crucial to understand as it mirrors that which should be followed for national defence, as will be discussed later on in this chapter. Although Public Safety Canada is the overall lead for national security, the Minister of Public Safety is most concerned with domestic security with the MND playing a supporting role.

The other facet of national security is defence of the state. In Canada, the MND is the appointed head of DND and is responsible for issues related to national defence. Supporting the Minister in this portfolio are the Deputy Minister of National Defence (DM), the senior civil servant in the Department, and the CDS, the senior serving military officer. The DM is charged with "departmental policy, resources, interdepartmental coordination and international defence relations. The CDS is responsible for command, control and administration of the CAF and military strategy, plans, and requirements."[68] So while the defence of Canada itself is the responsibility of the MND we begin to see the role and responsibility of the CDS for military strategy to ensure that defence objectives are met by the military.

DND is structured upon two main entities: the department itself, made up mostly of public servants working under the DM and the CAF, comprised mostly of military officers and personnel under the CDS. Together these entities work together to generate and manage the military instrument of national power and generate strategies which

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[67] Canada, Public Safety Canada, "National Security," Government of Canada, accessed September 30, 2017, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/index-en.aspx.

[68] Canada, Department of National Defence. "Organizational Structure," Government of Canada, accessed October 14, 2017, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-org-structure/index.page.

govern the use of military force. As indicated earlier, military strategy in Canada is the responsibility of the CDS and is supported by a number of subordinate strategies unique to each service environment. These subordinate strategies stipulate how military forces will look and how they will be tactically employed. An important distinction to be made is that while military strategy is responsible for coordination, the actual authority for where and when the military is employed remains a political decision made at a national level with input or advice from the CAF and DND on what is achievable based on what capabilities are available.

The national strategic level is above the CAF and DND and defined as "the level where the nature and quantity of a country's resources dedicated to achieving national policy objectives are determined by the political leadership. It is this level that the coordination of all instruments of national power occurs and military-political aims are established."[69] This definition focuses on the development of military-political aims and is inherently whole-of-government and where all policies and national level strategies are combined into a comprehensive approach; or in other words, grand strategy.

The varied language used in Canadian doctrine is part of the hindrance to strategy formulation. Doctrine itself does not use the term grand strategy, however, based on the above definition of the national strategic level, the CAF expects a grand strategy of sorts. Whether this grand strategy is labelled national defence or national security is ultimately irrelevant, as long as there is something that supports this need. Such discrepancy

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[69] Canadian Armed Forces, CFJP 01, *Canadian Military Doctrine,* 2-11.

provides an initial glimpse of how doctrine is misaligned with both the theory of strategy and the specific Canadian context that it is meant to be used in.

From the national strategic or grand strategic level comes military strategy. In Canada, military strategy is geared very much towards force employment on specific operations or missions as identified by the GoC. The process for generating military strategic guidance, which officially comes through either CDS Directives or Force Employment Strategies can be found in CFJP 05 *The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process*. The process itself is titled "The CF Force Employment Planning Process" and focuses more on the employment of forces in specific conflicts rather than a general strategy to guide the CAF through force generation strategies.

This misalignment of doctrine is further supported in subordinate levels of doctrine. B-GL-300-001 *Land Operations*, which is Army doctrine recognizes the role of national strategy, consistent with CFJP 5.0, but also reinvigorates the need and role of military strategy as a subset of national strategy that involves "the application of military resources to the achievement of the goals of national strategy."[70] From an Army perspective, military strategy determines military strategic objectives and is implemented at the operational level. Military strategy for the Army is aligned with strategic theory forming a portion of the foundational bridge between policy and operations. The misalignment of CAF doctrine is one example showing how there is no universal understanding of what strategy is or what it is meant to achieve.

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[70] Canadian Army, B-GL-300-001/FP-001, *Land Operations,* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2008), 2-5.

The commanders of the RCN, CA, RCAF, CANSOFCOM, and CJOC, as subordinates to the CDS, all have a specific role to play in military strategy. Overall military strategy ought to provide overarching direction for each subordinate headquarters, informing specific subordinate strategies based on their unique environments. The RCN, CA, and RCAF, who are responsible for generating forces to be employed under command of CJOC will be most interested and influenced by the development of forces and capabilities. It is CJOC, who deploys and employs military forces in specific theatres that is most affected by the employment aspects of military strategy. CANSOFCOM is unique in that it manages its own force development, deployment and employment separately from the services and CJOC thus would be affected by each aspect of an overarching military strategy and responsible for its own SOF strategy.[71] Flowing through CJOC or CANSOFCOM, military strategy is then translated into operational or tactical plans and actions by deployed military forces for specific missions.

The entities and relationships discussed in this section begin to show how strategy is meant to work in Canada in theory, but this is not always as clear as it sounds due to other influences. The next section builds on the structure of the GoC by using Canadian history and traditions to highlight the obstacles to strategy development. The Canadian construct is explored more holistically by examining the impact of tradition and history on the major players identified who are affected by Canada's strategic culture.

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[71] Mike Rouleau, *Between Faith and Reality* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2012), 75-76.

Strategic culture, defined as "the combination of historical experience, geography, and political tradition," [72] plays a defining role in a nation's perception and use of the military. Culture is a prime factor in the development of Canadian policy, with a trickle-down effect on the formulation of military strategy. The specific factors will be examined in more detail as the amalgamation of each aspect of strategic culture forms the basis for the unique Canadian way of war. The geography and demographics of Canada will briefly be examined first, followed by a brief discussion of the history and political tradition to help identify some of the external influences applied to the general theory of strategy in Canada.

Geography and Demographics

A near constant aspect of Canada's outlook on the world and influence on its policy and strategic choices is its physical geography. Canada is the world's second-largest country, covering just under ten million square kilometers. It is surrounded by three oceans and when including the Arctic Archipelago in the north, boasts the world's largest coastline totaling approximately 200,000 kilometers. The arctic climate spanning from the northern Innutian mountain ranges, arctic lowlands and northern Canadian shield create inhospitable terrain and the permafrost from the cold temperatures makes it unconducive to vast development.

As a result of the inhospitible terrain, the majority of the 35.1 million Canadians live within 300 kilometers of the Canada—United States (U.S.) border, the longest

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[72] Drew and Snow, *Making Strategy*, 57.

undefined international border in the world.[73] There exists three major physical

approaches to Canada: from the North across the large Arctic ocean, across one of the

two largest oceans on earth, the Atlantic or Pacific, or from the South along the United

States border. The geography itself provides a natural obstacle to incursion into Canadian

territory and the perception of geographic safety has worked to shape a number of

political traditions as well as Canada's history as a sovereign state.

The geographic figures become more telling when compared relative to each

other. Comparing the population of Canada to the overall size of the country gives an

average population density of 3.9 people per square kilometer demonstrating the vastness

of Canadian territory and the beginning of issues in controlling such terrain.[74]

Furthermore, approximately 46.5 percent of the Canadian population, or just over 17.1

million people, fall within the age range of 15 to 54 which coincides closely with the

required age for military service.[75] When compared to the size of the CAF which is set to

grow to 126,500 under the new defence policy just under 0.74 percent of the eligible

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[73] Statistics Canada, "Census Program," Government of Canada, accessed May 11, 2018, https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/index-eng.cfm.

[74] Ibid.

[75] The actual minimum age for service in the CAF is 17 or 16 if enrolled in the Primary Reserve with parent/guardian permission and the maximum age is 55, but this provides a generally accurate figure for the purpose of this analysis. Statistics Canada, "Population by sex and age group," Government of Canada, accessed 4 April, 2018, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/demo10a-eng.htm; National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, "Queen's Regulations and Orders Volume 1 – Chapter 6 Enrollment and Re-Engagement," Government of Canada, accessed 13 April, 2018, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-queens-regulations-orders-vol-01/ch-06.page.

population works for the military.[76] This figure includes regular and reserve forces and civilians so the actual figure of fighting strength is less than this.

Despite Canada's size, the small population means that there is a small tax base from which to generate national revenue. Having such a small tax base creates a reliance on the development and exportation of Canada's natural resources, or other income generating activities. It also creates difficulties for defence, as the cost of defence per capita is much higher than other countries such as the United States who have a much larger population, resulting in higher taxation for Canadian citizens to make up for the limitations.[77] These factors when put together create additional issues for the government and become items which influence policies or political initiatives to gain support in national elections. It often boils down to a balance between individual Canadian values, such as ceasing resource exploration activities in the North in favour of stronger environmental protection desires.[78] Or it becomes a matter of choice, for example maintaining a smaller military to support lower tax rates, or placing more emphasis on

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[76] Canada, Legislative Services Branch, "Mandate of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces," Government of Canada, accessed 13 April, 2018, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-us.page.

[77] Canadians are taxed by the federal government at a rate of 15 percent on the first $46,605 of taxable income up to 33 percent for income over $205,842. In addition to the federal tax rates Canadians are provincially taxed at a rate of between 4 to 9.8 percent up to 11.5 to 21 percent depending on their province of residence. Government of Canada, "Canadian income tax rates for individuals – current and previous years," accessed April 21, 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/tax/individuals/frequently-asked-questions-individuals/canadian-income-tax-rates-individuals-current-previous-years.html.

[78] *CBC News*, "Trudeau announces review of Arctic strategy, join drilling ban with U.S., December 20, 2016, accessed April 21, 2018, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-obama-arctic-1.3905933.

other government programs.[79] It is a matter of priorities for the GoC to manage on behalf of the Canadian population and can at times put values and interests at odds. As discussed interests are what allow a nation to support its values, but this creates difficulties in achieving re-election if working towards securing these interests seems at odds with more emotionally charged values held by Canadians. One way to reduce these frictions is to search for ways to mitigate threats through other means and relationships, which in the case of Canada has had a major impact on the military and the perceptions about how Canada can meet its security interests.

The relatively small size of the military, when compared to population and territory size, creates a delta in terms of physical security that must be bridged to ensure continued protection. There has been a constant desire for the GoC "to maintain or to be seen to maintain an effective military capability for a minimum of resources" which has caused the government to search for efficiencies in defence.[80] The first perceived line of defence is Canada's physical geography itself, as has been discussed. The next factors to mitigate this risk are Canada's alliances and global political positioning. It is this second set of circumstances that has continued to shape how Canada develops policy and thus strategy. Geography remains constant but the relationships with others are how Canada

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[79] To highlight further the impact of political choices and the impact on government revenue is that the value of Canada's natural resources dropped 73 percent from 2014 to $287 billion in 2015 due to lowered energy costs. Statistics Canada, "Canada's natural resource wealth, 2015," Government of Canada, accessed April 22, 2018, https://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/161216/dq161216b-eng.htm.

[80] Michael K. Jeffery, *Inside Canadian Forces Transformation: Institutional Leadership as a Catalyst for Change* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 62.

fulfills additional security needs and has helped to shape its history and current political traditions.

History and Political Tradition

Although a relatively young country at 150 years old, a complete history of Canada is far beyond the scope of this paper. The focus, therefore, is on Canada's political-military aspects of history from the nineteenth century onwards and more specifically the major events which have helped to define and shape the Canadian way of war. Canada has often answered the call of global allies and worked to enhance global peace and security yet, the GoC has remained a target for intense criticism for its perceived inability to develop effective defence policy which supports true Canadian interests.

The last major conflict fought on Canadian territory was the War of 1812 against the United States. This war itself, was not a Canadian war, rather a British colonial conflict, but does have an impact on Canadian traditions and has a definitive role in shaping how Canada views the world and the relationships it maintains. Shortly after Confederation in 1867 there was an understanding that Canada alone would be unable to directly oppose American aggression if needed. There was a belief that America's Manifest Destiny which spurred westward expansion, could also turn North into Canada following the withdrawal of the British Army. [81] This threat created a desire and need to work with other nations, particularly the United Kingdom (UK) to achieve Canadian

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[81] Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo*, 4th ed. (Toronto, ON: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1999), 86-93.

security and has become a constant theme in Canadian strategic culture. The American

threat never truly materialized into major direct actions and disputes were often settled

diplomatically, but these conditions reinforced Canada's need to rely on a major ally with

a larger military force and led to early military expeditionary efforts in support other

nations.

It is difficult to draw a direct existential threat between young Canada and a

British conflict on the African continent at end of the nineteenth century, yet Prime

Minister Wilfred Laurier, understanding the importance of supporting the UK, committed

Canadian forces to a war in South Africa in 1899.[82] This began a tradition of what the

current CDS, General John Vance calls "contribution warfare" that is still prevalent

today.[83] This tradition carried on into the First World War where Canada as a dominion

of the UK was automatically at war upon the British declaration of war against Germany.

Because of the Statute of Westminster the Second World War was Canada's first

opportunity to make its own decisions and Canada did not spend much time in declaring

war when the need to support its allies arose.[84] Canada has not declared war since the

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[82] Bernd Horn, *Establishing a Legacy: The History of The Royal Canadian Regiment 1853-1953* (Toronto, ON: Dundurn Press, 2008), 41-42.

[83] Jonathan Vance, "Tactics Without Strategy or Why the Canadian Forces Do Not Campaign" in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives, Context and Concepts* eds. Allan English, Daniel Gosselin, Howard Coombs, and Laurence M. Hickey (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 280.

[84] Canada declared war against Germany on September 10, 1939. C. P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict Volume 2: 1921-1948 The Mackenzie King Era* (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 237-264; United Kingdom, *Statue of Westminster,* The Official Home of UK Legislation, accessed 4 April, 2018, .http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1931/4/pdfs/ukpga_19310004_en.pdf.

Second World War, but has a long history of contributing soldiers to conflicts around the world to include, Korea in 1950, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Libya in 2011 and many more UN, NATO, or coalition efforts.[85] The major link between all of these conflicts is that none of them, less the Second World War, posed a direct military threat to Canada, just like the Boer War in 1899 did not. What was gained is international recognition, and support which has helped to reinforce alliances and by extension Canadian security and sovereignty through the strength of its allies.

As diplomatic relationships between the United States and Canada stabilized in the late-1800s to mid-1900s there was a gradual shift from seeking British protection to that of the United States, mainly due to geography and closely integrated economies and perceived threats external to North America. The close ties and reliance on the United States are highlighted by an address given by President Franklin Roosevelt at Kingston, Ontario in 1938 where Roosevelt gave his "assurance that the people of the United States would not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire."[86] This speech was a precursor to the Ogdensburg Agreement signed in 1940 which established the Permanent Joint Board on Defence designed to coordinate defence issues of the North American continent between Canada and the United States.[87]

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[85] For a more in-depth understanding of specific military contributions see Canada, Veterans Affairs Canada, "Historical Sheets," Government of Canada, accessed April 22, 2018, http://www.veterans.gc.ca/ eng/remembrance/history/historical-sheets.

[86] Franklin Roosevelt, "Address at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada. August 18, 1938," The American Presidency Project, accessed October 23, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15525.

[87] Canada, Legislative Services Branch, "The Permanent Joint Board on Defence," Government of Canada, accessed April 22, 2018,

The Permanent Joint Board on Defence was a result of a true existential threat to Canada, at the outset of the Second World War. Canada who had managed to increase its military force from an ill-equipped 10,000 strong to over 750,000 personnel with the fourth largest allied air force and third largest navy in the world had become the UK's largest ally following the failed invasions in Dunkirk resulting in Germany ejecting allied forces from the European continent and threatening the British Isles.[88] If the United Kingdom were to fall, Germany would have access to the Royal Navy and this threatened Canada and thus North America via the North Atlantic.[89] In fact, German U-Boats had infiltrated Canadian waters reaching as far as Kingston, Ontario, reinforcing the German threat to North America.[90] The Ogdensburg Accords "guaranteed the safety of Canada's homeland" while allowing Canada to fully contribute to the war effort overseas.[91] This created a unique defence relationship based on securing North America, with the United

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http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=the-permanent-joint-board-on-defence/hnmx19nf.

[88] T. Robert Fowler, *Courage Rewarded: The Valour of Canadian Soldiers Under Fire 1900-2007*, (Victoria, BC: Trafford Publishing, 2009), 141; Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 177; National Air Force Museum of Canada, "Royal Canadian Air Force (1925-1968)," accessed April 21, 2018, http://airforcemuseum.ca/en/ the-display-gallery/royal-canadian-air-force-1924-1968; Alfred Leroy Burt, *A Short History of Canada for Americans* (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1944), 292; Hugh A. Halliday, "Canada's Air Force in War and Peace," Canadian War Museum, accessed April 21, 2018, http://www.warmuseum.ca/learn/dispatches/#tabs; Roger Sarty, "The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle of the Atlantic, 1939-1945," Canadian War Museum, accessed April 21, 2018, http://www.warmuseum.ca/learn/ dispatches /#tabs.

[89] Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* 186.

[90] Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 199.

[91] Jack Granatstein, *Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace* (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2002)*,* 186.

States underwriting Canadian security, a major factor of Canadian defence policy that still exists today. This base assumption has been maintained and when reinforced through other alliances such as NATO and the reliance on Article 5, underpins Canada's policy and strategic choices regarding defence.[92]

With the shift in reliance on the United Kingdom towards the United States, Canada was once again relieved of managing potential existential threats on its own accord. Because the United States has a vested interest in and superior capability to defend approaches into Canada and thus the United States, Canada has been able to leverage this security in order to pursue other political goals which speak more to Canadian values than interests. What is unique is the use of military force is seen more as a political action to show and receive support then it is for strict self-preservation. In this light, the formation of military strategy to achieve the fundamental goal of "defending Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests" can be seen as a second priority to contributing internationally and assisting others, who will act to support Canada if threatened.[93]

The direction of military forces or the development of military capabilities is often rooted and influenced more directly by political masters who use military forces for political leverage or clout on the international stage, for example, regaining a seat for

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[92] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The North Atlantic Treaty (1949), Article 5," https://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf (accessed 13 April 2018).

[93] Canada, Canadian Army, *Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow* (Kingston, ON; Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, 2011), 46.

Canada on the United Nations Security Council or to support the national economy.[94]

Granatstein has noted that "Canada has a long history . . . of arming its forces with weaponry designed more for political purposes than the battlefield."[95] With security ensured by the United States, the capabilities and size of the military are perceived as less important than its willingness and ability to support our allies despite the small contributions possible.

The traditions and circumstances that shape Canadian defence policy in the post Second World War period are reflected in the White Papers on defence and continue to recognize the reliance on Canada's allies for defence. The advent of nuclear weapons posing a risk to North America as a whole has worked to shape Canada's relationship with the United States, mainly through the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD).[96] The 1964 White Paper does not focus solely on the relationship with the United States and begins to expound on the value of Canada as a good partner, particularly to partner nations within the NATO in order to "ration its commitments" which if unrestrained would place a large burden on the "relatively small population."[97] The goal of developing forces flexible enough to deploy when and where needed reinforces the importance of "a Canadian 'presence'" within NATO which will provide a

[94] Kathleen Harris and Melissa Kent, "Trudeau unveils Canada's plan to seek 2021 UN Security Council seat" *CBC News*, 16 March 16, accessed 13 April 2018, http://www.cbc.ca/news/ politics/canada-united-nations-security-council-1.3491917.

[95] Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* 56.

[96] Canada, Department of National Defence, *White Paper on Defence (*Ottawa, ON: Queen's Printer, 1964), 6.

[97] Ibid., 7.

higher rate of return on the investment in these capabilities if additional force is ever needed to defend Canada.[98] Seeking to fulfill such security goals in this manner has shaped the Canadian military today and has been the subject of much criticism.

Defence priorities have remained relatively constant and are still reflected in today's stated priorities.[99] Yet despite the expressed priorities the Canadian military went through a sharp decline in funding and capabilities following the end of the Korean War, only to begin its climb back up beginning with the War in Afghanistan in 2001. Historian Jack Granatstein in his book, *Who Killed the Canadian Military*, provides an excellent synopsis of the policy decisions that led to the decline. His main thesis is that the GoC and its politicians have a long history of making poor decisions in Canadian defence policy, and these decisions were underwritten by the Canadian public who has not demanded more from their military.

Granatstein further argues the essential role of the GoC is to protect its people and to do this "Canadians need a strong, capable military to project and protect their interests."[100] These beliefs are reinforced by the former chair of Defence Studies at Queen's University, Douglas L. Bland who, in his book *Canada without Armed Forces*

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[98] Canada, Department of National Defence, *White Paper on Defence* (1964), 21, 27.

[99] The most recent priorities are: (1) Strong at home, meaning the CAF is prepared to defence Canadian sovereignty and assist in other emergencies; (2) Secure in North America, renewing partnerships with the United States through such agreements as NORAD; and (3) Engaged in the world, meaning the CAF contributing to global security through peace support operations and peacekeeping. Canada, Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, 14.

[100] Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* xvi-xix.

explores the impact of specific reductionist government policies on the ability of the CAF to maintain credible forces for employment on the international stage. Although this book was written in 2004 the message remains relevant today and serves to highlight the role of the government in developing defence policy. Bland reinforces the government's role in balancing the current force and the future force and more importantly how in Canada future capabilities often fall victim to current needs.[101] By taking capital investments to pay for operations, maintenance and personnel costs of the current force past defence policies have failed to develop requisite capabilities that would allow the CAF to meet their core mission of defending Canada. Bland calls for the need of an updated defence policy review, like was initiated in 2016 but warns of reviews that are based on the assumption that all options are open as this tends to produce a mundane set of recommendations that are not useful to senior defence planners in developing effective future capabilities.[102] Such an open call for input relies on individual beliefs or values, rather than interests due to the perceived safety of Canada. The lack of foresight and robust future capability planning coupled with the desire to participate in partnership with allied nations in the name of values has helped to shape military employment choices.

General Jonathan Vance, the current Chief of Defence Staff, touches on this in "Tactics Without Strategy or Why the Canadian Forces Do Not Campaign," which looks at operational art within the Canadian military. His main argument is that operational art

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[101] Douglas L. Bland, *Canada without Armed Forces?* (Kingston: ON, Queen's University School of Policy Studies, 2004), 3.

[102] Ibid., xviii.

does not explain how strategic goals or interests are translated into tactical actions.[103] Although his argument focuses mostly on the operational level it does provide useful insights into the strategic environment in which the CAF operates. Vance explains that as a medium power Canada "has a history of and preference for being a force provider at the tactical level, and not a force employer at the operational level of war."[104] Canada's desire to contribute has evolved to seeking leading roles at the operational level.[105] These efforts however are not uniquely Canadian and require additional forces, but serve to elevate Canada's stature as a militarily capable nation.

Canadian forces are then often employed in line with a shared strategy, not a uniquely Canadian one. Vance's argument concludes with the point that because the goal is to contribute, Canada does not require operational art to translate strategic goals into these tactical contribution actions. However, it behoves the Canadian military to continue to learn what it is and how it is applied to make its officers able to operate in coalitions with major powers who do campaign. This requirement is further validated by recent operations led by Canada. With this in mind, it is again prudent to wonder why this is relevant to the Canadian system.

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[103] Vance, "Tactics Without Strategy," 273.

[104] Ibid.

[105] For example, Canada has provide a Joint Task Force Headquarters in Regional Command South in Kandahar Afghanistan, commanding multi Battle Groups from Canada, the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. Institute for the Study of War, "Regional Command South," accessed 29 April, 2018, http://www.understanding war.org/region/regional-command-south-0.

The fact that operational art is not required for the CAF to translate strategy into

tactics makes Canadian military strategy and the associated process all the more relevant.

Since Vance's article the CAF has gone through a major transformation that has resulted

in the creation of CJOC to manage military operations, but this remains an operational

and tactical focus. Specific guidance is geared towards the conduct of specific operations,

not the development of effective defence forces in and of themselves.[106] Developing and

deploying forces that are able to seamlessly integrate with our major partners provides a

valuable insight into an unwritten strategic goal of being regarded as a reliable partner to

our allies to ensure national safety and protection. While the troops contributed may not

be vast in number, their ability to integrate into the operational level enables successful

tactical performance. The ultimate goal of such participation is to be a good partner to

nations such as the United States who underwrite Canadian security interests and is how

Canada can support policy and the security of Canadians.

This unique relationship has created a focus on tactical output and garnering the

most benefit possible from relationships by forcing policy goals very quickly down to the

tactical level. This has the effect of reducing the reliance on the strategic level of war and

illustrates why such things as recent defence policies are very tactical in nature by

indicating the specific capabilities needed in terms of individual vehicles or personnel

numbers, instead of directing the general roles the military must fulfill once again

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[106] CJOC is the result of a second iteration of transformation which amalgamated the initially created Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM), Canada Command (CANCOM), and Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM) to better streamline the command and control of all military operations.

focusing on the employment of forces vice the development of capable fighting forces for Canada's own security needs.

The goal of the Force Employment Planning Process is to produce a CDS directive, which in essence is the military direction for a specific mission. Key portions of the CDS directive include national policy, which in this case are specific to force employment activities, and strategic objectives. The strategic objectives are seen again as whole-of-government and seek to apply multiple instruments of national power. There is a deliberate shift away from specific military strategies or other "stovepipes strategies" based on a perceived need to integrate all aspects of national power at all levels, including tactical and operational levels.[107] Doing so shifts military strategy towards an organizational strategy that includes military aspects but also integrates supporting instruments of national power, producing a shared strategic and operational outlook.

Major-General Mike Rouleau discusses this connection in his monograph *Between Faith and Reality* where he explains the special operating relationship CANSOFCOM maintains with other special agencies such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the required connection and relationship with the Privy Council to integrate efforts. Although these relationships help to generate strategic effect they are more tactical relationships needed to coordinate niche special operations. Rouleau goes on to explain how such a relationship is not traditional for the other three services and highlights the needed relationship to ensure military action is properly nested in an overall national security

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[107] Canadian Armed Forces, CFJP 5.0, *The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process*, 5M-2.

framework.[108] If not properly balanced the mismanagement of this relationship will have the effect of removing the CAF from generating its own military strategy for the application of military-specific power which is an explicit role of the CDS.

The unique Canadian traditions and relationships reveal why military strategy in Canada is frequently consumed by higher national strategic and political levels. This occurs for two main reasons. Firstly, the Canadian military is often employed at the tactical level with an understanding of operational art. Senior civilian, or political officials look at issues from higher level national interests and values positions. Secondly, the distinction and value of the various levels of strategy is little discussed or understood and there exists little literature on Canadian military strategy itself. As pointed out by Major-General Eric Tremblay and Bill Bentley "military strategy *per se* has been and remains little studied outside the frameworks established by the United States and the UK."[109] This statement is made as a reference to an element lacking in the development of the Canadian officer corps but highlights the lack of discussion on the topic in general. Thus there is a gap at the grand strategic and military strategic levels in an attempt to connect tactical actions to national interests.

The issues with military strategy and its role are expanded when the scope of development is considered. In all cases, military strategy, or even national strategies are considered in terms of specific conflicts or environments. They are designed to be implemented in the Active Planning phase and are reactionary based on what capabilities

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[108] Rouleau, *Between Faith and Reality,* 15.

[109] Eric Tremblay and Bill Bentley, "Canada's Strategic Culture: Grand Strategy and the Utility of Force," *Canadian Military Journal* 15 no. 3 (Summer 2015), 14.

are currently available, pushing CAF planning into the operational and tactical levels. This brings the discussion back to the Strategic Watch phase and the requirement for an overarching military strategy for peace, war and anything in between. Such a strategy would be used to guide the development of military capabilities for future employment in line with operations that will support national interests, mainly the physical defence of Canada.

An overarching military strategy would surely be less prescriptive than a specific operational plan based on the epistemological truth that the future is both unknown and unknowable.[110] There would be a number of assumptions required and if supported by clear policy guidance and intent the CAF would be able to approximate where and how it would fight to preserve national interest. At this point, Canada will remain behind the power curve and be forced to employ current capabilities to meet future threats. Due to the iterative and dialectic nature of strategy, specific strategies will never be perfect, but they need only be "'right-enough' to enable us to survive the perils of today – and possibly able – to cope strategically with the crises of tomorrow."[111] In order to be right enough, such a strategy must first exist and be crafted by individuals who understand the general theory and the unique circumstances in which it must be implemented. How this ought to be supported in Canada is explored next.

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[110] Gray, *The Future of Strategy*, 74.

[111] Ibid., 117.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

> If war is an instrument of policy, strategy is the tool that enables us to understand
> it and gives us our best chance of managing and directing it.
> —Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War*

Given the concepts, structures, and history that have shaped Canadian strategic culture, recommendations on how to improve the process of actually making strategy are sought using an applied professional case study. The initial literature is used to examine how and why the CAF formulates military strategy. This particular case study methodology was selected for conducting coherent research due to the dynamic and human-centric nature of the problem. Although initially founded on theoretical concepts, the inclusion of multiple stakeholders, each with distinct interests, creates a number of variables that make the act of strategy development a human endeavour. As Gray reminds us "perfect theory is applied by flawed executives, always."[112] It is along this seam between theory and those making strategy that recommendations are made in order to mitigate the inherent flaws present when implementing strategy and helping to support overall policy development in Canada.

Applied Professional Case Study

The case study focuses only on the Canadian system and key stakeholders and does not look to the strategy formulation process of other nations to provide analogs to support analysis. The focused application of the case study is mainly due to the unique

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[112] Gray, *The Future of Strategy*, 62.

context of Canada. While a wide range of case studies would provide a useful picture of how strategic theory is applied in different nations it does not greatly support the development of a specific Canadian solution. We are reminded of the impact of geography and culture on strategic choices which must be implemented in a specific time and place and under individual circumstances.[113] All nations will implement policy and strategy in accordance with their own unique history and culture and Canada is no different.

A viable solution is not simply to copy the process of others but to develop a uniquely Canadian solution to a uniquely Canadian problem. The goal of the applied professional case study is to provide a foundational understanding of the environment in which Canadian strategy development occurs to answer descriptive and explanatory questions about what or why it is happening.[114] The single or embedded case study design is used as a foundation to make informed recommendations on how to improve the CAF's ability to formulate strategy and thus influence policy choices based on an understanding of the unique circumstances.[115] To achieve this, the recommendations are designed to provide stepping stones to link various parts of the analysis to form a coherent path leading the reader through the arguments.

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[113] Gray, *The Future of Strategy*, 82.

[114] Robert K. Yin, *Applications of Case Study Research,* 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2012), 6.

[115] Ibid., 7-8.

Recommendation Structure

To support the selected case study model there are three sets of recommendations

made throughout the analysis. The recommendations are made in such an order as to

support continued examination throughout and as a way to ensure biases are

acknowledged, challenged and minimized allowing for a neutral, academic study of the

issues.[116] This, in turn, provides a viable and personally unbiased set of recommendations

for implementation at the end of the analysis.

Given the initial problem set, the initial recommendations made in chapter 1 are

preliminary, personal responses and thoughts on how to solve the perceived problem.

These recommendations serve to acknowledge initial beliefs and form a basis for change

once proper academic rigor is applied through the research method.[117] A set of

intermediate recommendations, found at the beginning of chapter 4, are based on the

literature review and are the result of preliminary analysis of the problem set. This

intermediate step updates the initial recommendations by challenging initial thoughts

with concrete data by using the theory of strategy as a lens to examine the structure and

political traditions of Canada.[118] The result is more thoughtful analysis that arrives at

more relevant and deliberate solutions to a refined problem set.

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[116] Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods,* 5th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2014), 73.

[117] Ibid., 76-77.

[118] John C. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2009), 62.

The set of final recommendations found at the end of chapter 4 are improved through the benefit of an additional round of analysis for the intermediate recommendations. While the intermediate recommendations are grounded in an analysis of the literature and relevant facts, the final recommendations serve to eliminate any remaining bias and produce an implementable solution. The final recommendations are created by examining the intermediate recommendations through the perspective of multiple stakeholders each of whom has a vested interest in the overall process of strategy in Canada. The interests of each stakeholder are at times at odds and any viable solution must identify and rationalize these perspectives. Conducting the analysis in this phased approach helps to explore the problem from multiple viewpoints to arrive at a relevant and useful conclusion.

<u>Models and Concepts</u>

The literature review conducted in the previous chapter has produced three major outputs forming the basis for analysis. The three blocks are summarized into strategic theory, Canadian government structure and Canadian history and tradition, as it relates to policy and strategy formulation. The strategic theory block provides the underlying theory of what strategy is and where it fundamentally sits within the strategic formulation hierarchy. Strategic theory outlines how strategic formulation should be conducted in a vacuum with no influences from the environment or as Gray says "culture-neutral."[119] The Canadian structure block outlines the specific environmental influences adding the unique Canadian context to strategy development. The strategic framework is based on

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[119] Gray, *The Strategy Bridge*, 59.

the unique structure of the Canadian government with a focus on DND and the CAF. The final block produced summarizes the history and traditions of Canada. By understanding the influencing factors such as geography and demographics, international relations, perceived threats and political tradition we begin to see the specific influences that have shaped how and why Canadian policy and strategy has evolved the way it has. The three main blocks form the basis for analysis and when combined in specific ways work to define desired and normative strategic frameworks within the Canadian context.

The ideal Canadian framework is created by joining the strategic theory block with Canadian structure producing a system of what policy and strategy development should look like in Canada. It is possible to assign roles and responsibilities to various players or levels of government and the military, outlining who should produce what, with a logical flow from national interests down to tactical operations. This is, of course, a theoretical framework which has not been fully achieved or implemented in Canada due to a number of external factors.

The second framework includes the relevant external influences preventing or influencing the implementation of the ideal framework captured in the history and tradition block. By joining the Canadian framework with the history and tradition block a more accurate, normative Canadian framework is derived. Contrary to theoretical roles, this framework takes into account actual government and military actions and outputs to demonstrate who is actually doing what and what is missing. The normative framework naturally differs from the theoretical framework forming the basis for analysis and improvement. The reasons why the frameworks differ and how they can be improved are the primary target for the ensuing analysis and improvement.

The analysis seeks to understand why gaps exist between the two frameworks and make recommendations for closing the gaps in order to align the normative and theoretical frameworks as best as possible. The intermediate recommendations will look at the gaps with a view of providing sound recommendations based on the theory of strategy to align the two frameworks. This takes little account of the environmental and traditional factors which have caused the divide. The value, however, is that it provides a theoretical basis for understanding why the gaps have occurred and how to potentially close them. The intermediate recommendations serve to focus discussion yet still remain a basis for change.

The intermediate recommendations will pull the actual framework too close to the theoretical framework, thus provide no enduring value to improving military strategy formulation. The final recommendations take into account the views of relevant stakeholders and begin to pull the intermediate recommendations away from the ideal framework by better understanding the various factors influencing strategy formulation in the specific Canadian context.

<u>Stakeholders and Chief Decision Maker</u>

The intermediate recommendations are fed through three lenses corresponding to three major stakeholders who are most affected by or involved in military strategy development. The first is the Cabinet, who will have the final say in any military strategy, thus appeasing this body is paramount in the creation of any military strategy. As the executive branch of government, Cabinet enjoys Royal Prerogative to make policy and oversee strategies as they see fit. They must wield all instruments of national power to achieve desired effects and are not necessarily primarily concerned with military action

per se but more so with the strategic impact military actions have and overall governance of the nation.

Second is the CDS, who is explicitly responsible for developing military strategy. When discussing the CDS as a stakeholder it is important to note that it is not his perception alone that counts. He is supported by a number of other entities and people within the CAF, such as the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Strategic Joint Staff, the Chief of Programme, and Chief of Force Development, that help him coordinate and nest military strategy into policy.

The third stakeholder is the collective group of L1 Headquarters within the CAF. The L1s should all rely on the production of an overarching military strategy. Such a military strategy would be used to generate service-specific strategies or plans in line with the overarching CAF military strategy and direction. Of the L1 headquarters, an overarching CAF military strategy would be most useful to the RCN, CA, RCAF, and CANSOFCOM as the distinct services. While a military strategy is useful to CJOC for understanding the direction of the CAF, the Commander CJOC is more involved with developing operational plans in support of specific missions developed in the Active Planning phase of the Joint Planning Process. Commander CJOC would receive and help build CDS guidance for specific mission sets, often based on what capabilities are currently available, while the services will look at the development of capabilities over the long term based on the strategic guidance provided by an enduring military strategy, active mostly within the Strategic Watch phase of joint planning.

The second round of analysis will examine the initial recommendations from the unique perspectives of each of these stakeholders and investigate the feasibility of each

recommendation. Each recommendation has a different impact on each stakeholder and the secondary analysis seeks to identify and reconcile these differences as best as possible. The product is a refined solution that is either amenable to each stakeholder or that identifies priority stakeholders and their immediate needs in order to improve the current process and outputs. While these recommendations will not completely close the gap between theory and reality, they do stand to improve the current process by better aligning the normative Canadian framework where possible. A perfect theoretical solution is likely unattainable but understanding where Canada can do better is the first step to making the current process more relevant and efficient. Such an understanding forms the foundation for implementing the proposed recommendations.

The final set of recommendations are aimed at influencing the identified Chief Decision Maker for the CAF, who in this case, is the CDS and who happens to also be a key stakeholder. Based on the CDS' assigned responsibility for military strategy and the overall intent for a CAF based solution to the proposed problems, the CDS is best situated to authorize or direct the recommended implementation plan. It is acknowledged that there will need to be a certain level of discussion outside of the CAF to achieve all of the recommendations but all of the results are designed to directly impact military personnel and the CAF itself making this of primary concern for the CDS. The direct results on the CAF and its ability to create a distinct military strategy will have a secondary effect of strengthening political goals and helping to guide and shape future defence or security policies in a positive direction.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

> The organization [The Canadian Armed Forces] either planned or it acted; otherwise the two seemed unrelated. When the military had nothing to do, it planned, almost as an end in itself.
> —Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*

By codifying the current Canadian strategic process as best as possible, gaps and inconsistencies have been identified between the theoretical and normative frameworks. Using the political and military history and traditions of Canada to frame how and why decisions are made, recommendations are offered to shift the strategic process as closely as possible to the theoretical structure. The disparity between the two frameworks is not entirely tied to political traditions and the Canadian way of war as there is some error to be found in the general understanding of how and why strategy is formed, prompting remedies that are incorporated into the subsequent recommendations.

The process of exploring the literature of what strategy is and how it is formed, and balancing it with the extant roles and responsibilities within the Canadian government and military, has provided a theoretical framework for how military strategy should be formed within Canada. As the executive branch of government, Cabinet should begin with national priorities, policy and grand strategy that could support subordinate government strategies, including military strategy. Such a framework is however, theoretical. Based on the geography and political history of Canada, a uniquely Canadian way of war has emerged and has had a major impact on Canadian military strategy. This statement does allude to there being a strategic formulation process in place in Canada, but what is important to understand is that this process is often more emergent than it is

planned or deliberately structured. Strategy is happening, but in a more dispersed fashion across different parts of DND and the CAF. This is the context in which subsequent recommendations are made which seek to shift to a more deliberate process, bringing with it certain benefits.

Canadian Strategy Models

The two models created—theoretical and normative—form the basis for analysis of Canadian military strategy. When the definitions, roles and responsibilities, and theoretical construct of strategy formulation are combined, the ideal framework (Figure 1) spans the political to the tactical levels of war. This structure attempts to codify who should do what at each level in order to support the development and proper nesting of policy, strategy and plans.

Figure 1.   Ideal Strategic Framework

Source: Created by author.

The theoretical model while in line with the overarching theory is not entirely accurate in terms of how Canada actually formulates strategy. Lacking from this depiction is the impact of culture and political tradition which skews the theoretical model. The second model (Figure 2) depicts the normative framework for how policy and strategy are currently being formed in Canada. The first major difference is the size of the political sphere which spans from policy down into operational or in some cases tactical plans. The expansion of policy has reduced the size of the strategic sphere and removed the grand strategic sphere altogether. The two models together serve to demonstrate the overt difference in how Canadian strategy should be formed in theory and how it is actually being formed and then used to explore how current practices should be refined or to explain why current practices exist and should continue to.

Figure 2.   Normative Strategic Framework

Source: Created by author.

Models Analysis

The theoretical model of strategy formulation is in line with and heavily influenced by the general theory of strategy. According to Gray the theory of strategy governs the formulation of all strategies but is in itself "eternal and ubiquitous."[120] The everlasting structure and process of strategy provides a useful guide to better align current practices with the overarching theory. When compared to the normative model of Canadian strategy formulation it becomes clear that a large misalignment exists.

The largest difference between the two models is the scope of political influence on the entire process. In the ideal framework, Cabinet is responsible for policy and grand strategy. An important nuance is that Cabinet, led by the PM, is responsible for defence policy while grand strategy, still a Cabinet-level responsibility, may fall under the purview of a lead Minister who coordinates overall effort across other departments through the other Ministers. In actuality, the political realm expands to heavily influence the entire process. Policy consumes the grand strategic sphere and delves into specific environmental strategies and in some instances into operational or tactical plans, attempting to articulate the why, what, and how.

The production of the *Strong, Secure, Engaged,* a DND publication, elevates DND to the policy level, which in effect means the MND is publishing Cabinet-level documents on behalf of the PM and rest of Cabinet. By elevating the MND to this position there is a structural gap formed between the Minister and the CDS who must

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[120] Colin S. Gray, *The Future of Strategy* (Malden, MA; Polity Press, 2015), 9.

remain at the military strategic level as it would be improper for a military officer to fill

this gap by producing grand strategy, a responsibility firmly belonging to Cabinet.[121]

With the expanded influence of policy, space for the CDS to develop and oversee

military strategy is reduced in terms of translating policy into military strategy and

operational direction. In order to make a military strategy, there must be strategic space

where this can take place. Operational plans are heavily influenced by national policy and

usually based on what resources and capabilities are available at the time needed and

informed by the Force Posture and Readiness process.[122] Force employment strategy,

which is issued as CDS guidance, is not entirely contentious because it is based mainly

on currently held capabilities and is a matter of strategic responses for rapid employment.

It does help to provide context and evidence for the traditional Canadian way of war and

its reactionary posture to global events and supports Canada's tactical contributions to

global conflicts. What is more contentious and more deeply influenced by the normative

framework is the lack of an overarching military strategy and the absence of a

requirement to produce one on a regular basis.

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[121] This is an important distinction and based on the fact that the National Defence Act mandates that the CDS be responsible for the guidance and formulation of military strategy. Furthermore, it would be inappropriate for the CDS, as a military officer to develop government policy, which is influenced in many cases by politics. Military officers must remain apolitical when discharging their duties and allow for civilian control of defence policy, the antithesis of which is "military participation in politics." Canadian Armed Forces, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution,* http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2013/dn-nd/D2-313-5-2007-eng.pdf, accessed February 27, 2018, 16, 51; Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 70, 83-85.

[122] Roi, *Canadian Defence Priorities*.

The lack of a central military strategy has two major impacts. Firstly, it prevents the focused application of strategic direction across the CAF reducing the necessity for L1s to tie their specific force generation strategies to a common military theme which will translate to operational plans for the force employer. This allows a wide swath of freedom for the L1 commanders to develop strategies based on their own interpretation of policy. This is not a far off concept and has happened in the past where "each service had its own tasks and war plans, and none was geared to support the others in war."[123] The lack of a single military strategy creates an environment where disputes over strategic thinking and budgets between L1s is fostered.[124] When compounded with infrequent defence policies, the perceived needs of the military can potentially vary between commanders who may interpret the policy environment differently. Without unified foresight it is difficult to generate coherent capabilities creating a perpetual cycle where the CAF is unable to provide needed capabilities in any future conflict. If a new capability is needed there is a rapid procurement process initiated which takes place to fill the gaps quickly, often at the cost of future projects, as was seen with the procurement of used Leopard tanks in Afghanistan in 2008.[125] Time will tell what the impact will be to

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[123] Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* 72-73.

[124] Ibid., 93.

[125] Murray Brewster, "Canada to lease tanks for Afghanistan," *The Star*, 3 April, 2007, accessed 13 April 2018, https://www.thestar.com/news/2007/04/03/ canada_to_lease_tanks_for_ afghanistan _source.html.

the RCAF with the recent announcement of purchasing used fighter aircraft from Australia as a stop-gap measure to developing a new fighter platform.[126]

The second impact is the political influence on commanders subordinate to the CDS. With the policy sphere delving down to subordinate L1 strategies which in some cases blend with operational plans, the CDS stands to lose the flexibility to command and provide strategic leadership to the CAF, contrary to the established authority derived from the National Defence Act. Allowing L1s to interpret and act upon policy direction has the potential to impact procurement and employment of military forces in accordance with political goals which may disperse focus and affect unity of effort across the department.

<div align="center">Intermediate Recommendations</div>

In order to address the issues identified in the two models, a set of intermediate recommendations is captured in Table 2. The proposed recommendations serve to highlight larger systemic issues. Although some of these are beyond the scope of a purely CAF level solution, they do further explain the context in which strategy is formed in Canada. This understanding will be helpful when the final recommendations are made as they will work to develop viable solutions that fit within the larger political-strategic framework.

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[126] Murray Brewster, "Aging fighter jets to be replaced in mid-2020s, Liberals will buy used Aussie plans as a stopgap," *CBC News*, 12 December, 2017, accessed 13 April 2018, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/fighter-jet-competition-australian-announcement-1.4444466.

Table 2.   Intermediate Recommendations

1. Improve staffing and administrative work.
2. Seek grand strategic direction and produce a distinct Canadian military strategy.
3. Update CAF doctrine.

Source: Created by author.

Improve Staffing and Administrative Work

Moving forward the first recommendation may seem somewhat pedantic, however, acknowledgement of these simple issues is the first step to understanding the larger systemic problems with strategy formulation. This solution can be applied across most levels of the current government structure, but to be fully implemented must happen at the policy levels to have a lasting impact and support proper nesting of strategies. This fact is problematic as it expands beyond the scope of a CAF solution. However, it bears mention as recognizing this issue helps to elucidate the general lack of understanding of the political-strategic interface and the specific responsibilities across the GoC.

The initial steps are mostly administrative in nature, but are important nonetheless, as they deal with authority and communication strategy. First, any defence policy should be clearly and deliberately released by Cabinet; this means being released under the signature of the PM. It is whole-of-government policy, thus should be endorsed by the head of government. Furthermore, simply changing the letterhead will go a long way to reducing confusion.

The current policy document, *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, has been released as a DND document under the authority of the MND with a supporting message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs.[127] The inclusion of a message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs calls into question the organization of Canadian policy development especially when coupled with the release of a Foreign Affairs Policy Statement on 6 June, 2017, the day prior to the release of *Strong, Secure, Engaged.*[128] This statement, while not fully replacing a definitive foreign policy alludes to the government recognizing that defence policy ought to be congruent with foreign policy, which should outline international interests and goals, which the military can contribute to. The timing of these releases seems designed to properly nest defence policy in the overall Canadian political-strategic context and highlights a separate issue to be explored namely whether the Government ought to produce an overarching national security strategy that would guide subordinate departmental strategies aimed at supporting overall Canadian security efforts, both at home and abroad.

In looking at the current defence policy, although it is labelled as a policy it is unclear if this is departmental or government policy. If the former, then as discussed, it is misaligned with the theory of strategy which calls for policy to necessarily be whole-of-government. Furthermore, when the content is examined it reads more like strategy as it seeks to rationalize ends, ways, and means to achieve policy goals. The current structure

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[127] Canada, Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, 7.

[128] Canada, Global Affairs Canada, "Address by Minister Freeland on Canada's foreign policy priorities, 6 June 2017, accessed 4 March, 2018, https://www.canada.ca /en/globalaffairs/news/2017/06/address_by_ministerfreelandoncanadasforeignpriorities.html.

of document production blurs the lines between policy and strategy which translates into unclear roles and responsibilities across the government. This is not unique to the current government, the Conservative government and the *Canada First Defence Strategy* had a similar effect with Cabinet releasing a document which ought to have been policy but was released as a strategy, under the signature of the PM, adding to confusion. Simple, proper staffing will reinforce proper authorities and help to alleviate confusion by clearly communicating with those producing such documents as well as those charged with interpreting them and generating subordinate strategies. This recommendation is closely connected to the second which focuses directly on the CAF.

<u>Seek Grand Strategic Direction and Produce</u>
<u>a Distinct Canadian Military Strategy</u>

To produce a unified military strategy the CAF must seek grand strategic guidance from the GoC. This ought to be a Cabinet-level guidance aimed at coordinating defence efforts across all government departments to ensure all aspects of national power are properly leveraged and aligned. This again, speaks more so to the need for a national security policy, of which national defence would be a subset.

This recommendation focuses on using such grand strategic direction to produce a military strategy that would help to organize the military instrument of national power and guide the actions of the CAF. This can be implemented by exercising a certain degree of autonomy at the CAF level. The outcome would be the production of a military strategy regardless of what the government produces. This will create flexibility for the CAF to interpret policy and grand strategic direction and translate it into viable, unified military direction based on information needed by subordinate military commanders. It is

not merely political messaging about what is being done or delivered to support Canadians. A military strategy will have a secondary effect of pushing the policy-strategy debate back to the political realm and is tied to the first recommendation for clear administration of the various documents.

Producing a military strategy runs an early risk of duplicating some information or direction that may exist in policy, but doing so is far outweighed by the advantages it brings. A military strategy allows the CDS to further shape policy direction and guide the L1s in the generation and employment of military forces. It will produce focused guidance in the unique military context for how the CAF will achieve all assigned objectives and serve to assign priorities and coordinate efforts across all L1s producing options and capabilities to meet current and future demands for employment.

The duplication of effort is likely to be more prevalent early on in the process of developing military strategy. Over time as military strategy is produced, the space in which military strategy is formed will increase in scope and begin to force grand strategy and policy back towards the government levels as it meets the needs of current defence policies. A continuous military strategy would help to combat shortfalls in the current process and provide a litmus test for the subordinate force generation and employment strategies of the L1s through which a link can be made from tactical through to strategic decisions and actions. Acknowledging the creation of military strategy in this manner will be reinforced by the following recommendation which seeks to codify this step in military doctrine.

<u>Update CAF Doctrine</u>

The CAF is unique in that it produces and relies upon its own doctrine to guide actions, unlike the remainder of government that may not have or follow specific doctrine. Current doctrine is not fully synchronized nor does it reflect the emergent nature of strategy development and the focus on Active Planning and apportionment of currently available capabilities. This is reinforced by the emphasis on tying military strategic and operational levels of war to campaign objectives and planning respectively, which are doctrinally guided by national strategic direction from the government.[129] An analysis of the current strategic framework shows that the distinction is not this clean. Furthermore, there is a distinction between specific campaign objectives and military strategy to guide overall military development and preparedness in times of peace and war which are currently treated separately.

The CAF should look to update its current doctrine to better reflect the nature of strategy development in the Canadian context. These changes should align doctrine with the influence and role of policy on military strategy. To do so the levels of war must be updated to include a method and structure for an over-arching military strategy process that combines all the strategy-like efforts and choices that do take place, in places like Chief of Force Development or Chief of Programme, who manage the development of future capabilities and CAF business planning on behalf of the CDS. Doctrine should be updated and aligned at all levels to better reflect the true nature of policy and strategy in

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[129] Canadian Armed Forces, CFJP 01 *Canadian Military Doctrine*, 2-11.

both theory and in the Canadian context, while also ensuring that the tactical and operational levels of war are properly nested.

The grand strategic level must be included in the update. Gray argues about the importance of grand strategy claiming that it is what guides "the direction and use made of any or all of the assets of a security community."[130] The current nature of war requires a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to achieve lasting and coordinated results.[131] Understanding and implementing such a response ought to be governed by a grand strategy, and building this into doctrine will help CAF members understand why and how to use this level. Not incorporating this vital level creates a gap in understanding that risks the effective development and implementation of future strategies.

Understanding the theory of strategy will be reinforced through an update to doctrine by providing a common interpretation of how the theory should be implemented and form a portion of the baseline CAF education on to topic. Firstly, it will help to focus the generation of CAF level direction and highlight the value of producing military strategic guidance for implementation at subordinate levels. Secondly, doctrine properly reflecting the theory of strategy will help to reinforce understanding and be of prime benefit when CAF members interact with counterparts in the government by producing a common understanding and constant message of how the CAF views strategy development. This is something that if leveraged properly could be used to explain what

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[130] Gray, *The Future of Strategy*, 86.

[131] Emile Simpson, *War From the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 69.

the CAF needs in terms of guidance in order to fulfill its objectives, achieving positive second or third order effects in terms of policy development.

Updating doctrine will have a secondary effect of codifying and defining roles and responsibilities outlining who ought to do what. Those officers employed in key roles within the government in such places as the Privy Council Office or the DM's office can leverage this framework and knowledge to guide those recommendations. While the CAF has no influence on those outside the military, it does form a basis for how the CAF frames recommendations to the government to outline what is needed to achieve military effects.

To better understand how this could be achieved, or to understand why such a strict codification is not possible or valuable we must turn to the individual stakeholder perspectives. To determine the final recommendations, the intermediate recommendations are analyzed from the stakeholders' perspectives. While the intermediate recommendations provide a universal solution, the final recommendations are refined and will work to provide more specific solutions grounded in an understanding of the unique Canadian influences. Each of the stakeholders has a different perspective on the issues, which must be understood and rationalized to support viable final recommendations.

<div align="center">Stakeholder Perspectives</div>

The above recommendations have been made to better align Canadian strategic formulation with strategic theory, which technically should improve the Canadian process. However, based on the numerous variables within the Canadian context, a truly theoretical structure is not possible or desirable. The following analysis explores some of

the major factors as to why a theoretical Canadian framework is not achievable. By using

the various stakeholders, the key variables and perspectives are considered and used to

produce the final recommendations and practical solutions to the problem of military

strategy formulation in the CAF.

The value of this analysis is in understanding why the two frameworks are

misaligned and why a simple realignment with strategic theory is both insufficient and

impractical in the Canadian context. Samuel Huntington would remind us that the CAF is

the "active directing element of the military structure and is responsible for the military

security of society. The state is the active directing element of society and is responsible

for the allocation of resources among important values including military security."[132]

This means that while military competence is of prime consideration for the CAF, the

GoC must balance this with other competing needs and impact how it resources the CAF

in light of other priorities. Although each of the stakeholders is working towards a

common goal, their individual roles and responsibilities provide competing influences

which must be rationalized or prioritized.

The Cabinet

The first aspect to consider regarding Cabinet is their role as the executive body

of government and their unique set of political motivations. Each Cabinet Minister is also

a member of Parliament with a seat in the of the House of Commons thus are motivated

by political factors because being elected is how they gain the ability to influence

decisions. This influence, in turn, allows Cabinet to enact policy and procedures that

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[132] Huntington, *The Solider and the State*, 1.

focus on delivering on promises made in campaigns or in support of individual constituents and citizens. Being a part of Cabinet reinforces this ability by providing the flexibility to develop policy to support the daily functioning of the GoC.

To support the need for political effect, the first issue Cabinet would direct its attention to is the matter of Royal Prerogative. The Statute of Westminster, and the Canadian Constitution Act of 1867 has had the effect of shifting the day to day management of Canada and the governmental affairs to the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The authority derived from the various acts and the Canadian Constitution mean that Cabinet, as a major part of the executive branch of government, will exercise its decision making authority as it sees fit.

While Cabinet may acknowledge the validity of the intermediate recommendations, such as the staffing framework and creation of a grand strategy, implementing them does not provide great political gains, thus is of low priority. Cabinet is interested in communicating with Canadians, which can be leveraged to gain and maintain public support for the incumbent party. This helps to explain why current defence policy contains the information that it does. It is used as a vehicle to message to the Canadian public more so than driving overall military capability development or employment. The format or perceived level of the document is secondary to the messaging attached to such initiatives. A document that can be understood by the greater Canadian population is more valuable to Cabinet than a narrowly focused document to be utilized mainly by strategic practitioners.

The political focus does not necessarily mean that the military and its development are not important, rather it speaks to priorities. Canada's priorities can be

seen as a positive aspect of its global position. The fact that defence may rank below other issues such as domestic social programs or global humanitarian crisis, speaks to the positive security climate Canada faces, and is an opportunity to support others globally and project Canadian values. The Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chrystia Freeland, speaks to this perception in her Foreign Policy address to the House of Commons. Canada by virtue of its geography and alliances is relatively secure. Yet this does not preclude spending money on defence and capability development.[133]

The nuanced shift is that this spending is not necessarily for the direct defence of the homeland. While the defence of Canada must be a prime consideration, defence spending and global military involvement are about defending Canada forward by being a good partner and supporting our allies, who in turn will support Canada. This is the underlying assumption of Canada's relationship with the United States and other global partners who are leveraged to bolster Canadian security. This means that the "CAF must be able to operate jointly with our friends when the decision is made to participate."[134] Doing so allows Canada to focus on projecting Canadian values while still raising its international stature to gain more power in the international community, which in turn furthers Canada's national interests, such as the defence of Canada.

Although defence in the Canadian context is a *de facto* secondary priority as discussed above, it is still a major tool used to further national interests. This begs the question of why, then, is defence and security policy and military strategy not more

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[133] Global Affairs Canada, "Address by Minister Freeland."

[134] Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* 232.

formalized to the support political goals? The answer to this question is flexibility. Firstly, Cabinet is not mandated to have such a formal system with specific documents produced on a regular schedule, so Cabinet will produce what it feels is necessary. More importantly, not having a formalized process does not commit the government to a predefined trajectory based on a single document produced at a certain point in time and circumstance. Any document produced is subject to critique either by the opposition or Canadians writ large and could potentially limit responses available in times of need. Not producing multiple documents guiding future action allows for changes in policy or programs to better reflect emerging issues, which better reflects the iterative process of strategy development itself and shifts the process back towards an emergent nature based on actions over time and not necessarily concrete plans.

On the other hand, having some formalized plan is better than no plan at all as it speaks to messaging and delivering on promises. The production of *Strong, Secure, Engaged* is a happy medium from the perspective of Cabinet. The all-encompassing nature of the document means that supporting documents are not needed, reducing the number of aspects which can be critiqued or limit future flexibility. Current policy provides sufficient guidance to the DND and the CAF while still communicating with Canadians and speaks to specific programs which benefit the larger Canadian population. For Cabinet, Canada's defence policy provides a vehicle to showcase the ongoing or upcoming programs while also guiding future development and employment of the CAF for a wide array of mission sets.

In terms of recommendations which seek to adjust internal CAF processes or procedures, the Cabinet is not overly concerned. The only caveat is that any CAF

initiatives are not contrary to and reinforce policy objectives. Cabinet should be content as long as any CAF strategies or programs are properly coordinated with DND and other vested Departments and approved by the MND or PM where appropriate prior to release or implementation. In this light, while Cabinet should not preclude the development of a specific military strategy the key for the CAF is managing this relationship and communicating with the GoC which forms a large portion of the stakeholder analysis from the CDS perspective.

Chief of the Defence Staff

From the perspective of the CDS the major issue in shifting to a more theoretical framework lies in the practicality of such a shift which stands to detract from CAF influence on the current policy process. The CDS' argument centers around the principles of relationships and influence which together produce flexibility for the CAF and Canada. The relationship of main concern for the CDS is between the CAF and the DM as this is where influence is gained. This relationship is currently, and must continue to be, leveraged in order to support the continued and effective employment of the CAF now and in the future. Changing the current structure risks this level of interaction and influence.

The CDS and members of the CAF are professional military officers and non-commissioned members. This lends credence to and supports the CDS' role as the chief military advisor to both the MND and the PM.[135] While these relationships are of utmost

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[135] It is acknowledged that the current Minister of National Defence is a former Primary Reserve officer with military experience, however this is not always the case, and cannot be relied on as more than a coincidence in this case. Furthermore, such a fact

importance, a foundational relationship in terms of policy and strategy development is with the DM. As discussed in the literature review, the DM is responsible for drafting policy on behalf of the Minster and by extension the Cabinet. The DM and CDS being co-equals with a shared staff who ought to achieve a common front provides a ground-level entry point for the CAF to influence and appropriately shape policy.[136] The majority of policy is drafted and coordinated through the Associate Deputy Minister for Policy (ADM(Pol)), who is a civil servant supported by a staff of civil servants and military members. It is at this confluence of staff where the opportunity to shape policy is found.

There is a fine line to be walked in the development of policy and CAF members must remember the impact of politics on policies and remain apolitical in their advice and collaboration.[137] Ultimately, the policy will be and must be a government policy, not a military one. The key to maintaining this balance is identifying "militarily relevant objectives that can be executed at the operational and tactical levels" and then providing guidance and advice to shape policies which support these objectives.[138] This may at first seem to be a backward approach but it is, in fact, more about developing realistic and achievable goals, so policy does not overreach reality. Furthermore, it must be understood that there may be direct involvement by Cabinet in strategy depending on the

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likely does not detract from political goals or pressures once elected as member of the House of Commons.

[136] Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* 86.

[137] Canadian Armed Forces, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution*, 51.

[138] Ibid., 52.

situation and importance. This is a Minister's prerogative at play and likely linked to specific issues that are of interest to the GoC and by extension the Canadian people. In such instances, the role of CAF advisors is not to prevent this detailed focus, but leverage it to ensure proper and constant dialogue so military and political goals remain synchronized and supportable.[139]

The occasional involvement of politicians or other civil authorities in military strategy has the effect of enlarging the sphere of policy which in turn creates a larger overlap with strategic spheres as previously seen in Figure 2. If not understood or properly managed, the friction caused by this overlap can be detrimental to both strategy and policy. "The top military leaders inevitably operate in this intermingled world of strategy and policy" and ought to welcome this unavoidable overlap and maximize its advantages.[140] This means taking every opportunity to influence policy through proper communication and leveraging the relationships created.

Despite such an overlap seeming to be contrary to the theory of strategy, there are a number of advantages. Policy and thus strategy ought to be an extension of Canadian values and interests. If the theory of strategy is properly followed, then Canadian interests will be interpreted through at least two levels prior to reaching military strategy. By shortening this chain of interpretation, military strategy and objectives are more likely to align with Canadians themselves. Ultimately, this closer connection provides a military strategy that is better connected to policy context and the people it is meant to support.

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[139] Canadian Armed Forces, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution*, 52.

[140] Huntington, *The Solider and the State*, 73.

Based on this constant overlap there is already a process in place to support the continued policy development that is in line with achievable military objectives.

This influence is not a haphazard approach based on chance meetings and interaction, rather it is conducted through formalized relationships and efforts, namely through the Defence Management Committee (DMC). The DMC is co-chaired by the CDS and DM and is comprised of the L1s and ADM(Pol) as main actors, although others may be invited to attend based on the nature of items being discussed. The Committee is coordinated by the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff who synchronizes the efforts of both the military and civilian members of the committee. The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff is supported by key players such as Chief of Programme who "leads corporate strategies, and offers analysis on planning and resource allocations" and Chief of Force Development who "integrates activities to boost military forces."[141] The DMC provides a forum for both the CDS and DM to receive advice from their subordinate commanders as well as discuss and synchronize efforts.[142] The position of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff supporting both the DM and the CDS provides another level of influence for the CAF to understand and influence policy development in a coordinated manner.

The DMC and its structure demonstrate the unique nature of the Canadian defence apparatus. There is no strict formula for the development of either military strategy or defence policy but there is an ad hoc nature of strategy and development based on

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[141] Canada, Department of National Defence, "Vice Chief of the Defence Staff," Government of Canada, accessed April 25, 2018, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-org-structure/vice-chief-defence-staff.page.

[142] Canadian Armed Forces, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution*, 54.

communication and constant evaluation which enhances flexibility and responsiveness to changing circumstances. The desire to avoid strict policy formulation for the Cabinet has trickled down to the CAF through the DMC and one of the best ways to ensure a flexible policy is to have an equally flexible strategy development system. Through the DMC the CDS is more closely connected to Canadian interests and is able to influence and communicate relevant and achievable military objectives. Supported by constant dialogue, the DM is able to draft relevant policies for the MND that align both with the Canadian interests and that can be achieved by military means or projected needs. This strikes the balance between the Cabinet's desire to deliver objective and measurable results while at the same time enabling the CAF to develop the requisite capabilities and conduct operations that are feasible and aligned with Canadian values. This development of capabilities and suitable operations then forms the bulk of L1 perspectives which are analyzed next.

Level 1 Commanders

Based on its structure and responsibilities and political tradition, the CAF does not commit its forces to operations as a complete entity. Although the CDS retains command authority over all actions of the CAF and its members, the conduct and control of operations are achieved through CJOC or CANSOFCOM. The other L1s such as the RCN, CA, and RCAF as force generators do not conduct operations either but are responsible to provide people and capabilities to CJOC for employment in operational theatres. For the force generating L1s, it comes down to readiness and capability development so that CJOC is able to respond to threats as they occur.

The goal of capability development for the L1s in some respects is better supported by the current structure and process than if the theory of strategy were strictly adhered to. This is in part due to the centralized procurement structure of the GoC where all major procurements and projects are managed through Public Services and Procurement Canada with influence from the Treasury Board.[143] Much like the CDS, the L1s are already involved in policy development and able to influence policy objectives through the CDS and the DM which is achieved through the DMC. There is a sub-process which works to integrate CAF actions and priorities prior to integration with policy at the DMC level. The Armed Forces Council of which each L1 is a member, achieves this integration.

The current defence policy is useful in highlighting the input from the L1s in terms of guiding future capability development. There is so much detail on the types of projects to be initiated or continued that it is not difficult to surmise the bottom-up input in defining such specific needs and costs. This type of detail is produced for the Armed Forces Council and coordinated on behalf of the CDS prior to communicating these projects and needs to the DMC. The L1s have been able to leverage this process to ensure their needs are met, giving a more direct line to national procurement bodies. The defence policy is in such detail that, as discussed, it strays into the territory of strategy. It fulfills the ends, ways and means triad of strategy. Specifically, the ends are provided through the desired global context, the ways are the ability to anticipate, act and adapt to the

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[143] Public Services and Procurement Canada, "Public Service and Procurment Canada," accessed April 25, 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/public-services-procurement.html.

changing global threats achieved through the various projects and the means are the money attached to the projects.[144] The defence policy, with such overarching and specific guidance substitutes for military strategy from the perspective of the L1s. Furthermore, it is a strategy that they themselves helped to create thus is more a reflection of the status quo and ongoing projects than it is a major driver of future capability development and strategic guidance.

The utility of this construct is seen through the creation of specific service strategies which are derived from the defence policy. Each of the services has a unique force generation strategy for their respective elements which is what is important to them. Defence policy in its current form fills this gap of military strategy and the services are better able to influence their own futures thus the current process meets their specific needs. This may seem like a somewhat selfish outlook but creating a military strategy will only add a layer of complexity that stands to detract from L1 influence which may impact capability development in the long run. Thus from a L1 perspective, the current process is beneficial to meeting their needs, by providing a method of influence and flexibility.

<div align="center">Final Recommendations</div>

The previous set of intermediate recommendations designed to bring the Canadian strategy formulation process in line with the theoretical model are all seemingly simple and achievable. However, if this were truly the case they would have likely been implemented by now and friction would have been reduced or eliminated. There are

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[144] Canada, Department of National Defence, *Strong Secure, Engaged*, 49-88.

reasons for why this has not yet occurred based mainly on the interests and actions of various stakeholders. The final set of recommendations takes into account the viewpoints of key stakeholders and revises the intermediate recommendations to develop more achievable recommendations amenable to each stakeholder, but more importantly will help to maintain a military capable of being successful in armed conflict, the primary role of any military.[145]

At first glance, it seems that the current process is sufficient to meet the needs of each of the stakeholders, and there are no major motivations to change how business is currently being done. However, the ultimate stakeholder must be the Canadian citizen and despite the gains achieved in the current framework, there are ways to refine the current process to ensure continued strategy development. The current stakeholder perspectives, particularly of the CDS and the L1s is viewed in their current context with a defence policy having just been released in the summer of 2017. We must keep in mind that *Strong, Secure, Engaged,* is only the seventh defence policy since 1964. During the past fifty-four years, Canada has witnessed or been involved in many events that have or should have had an impact on Canada's defence outlook. What's more, Canada need only look at its track record for defence management. Running from the interwar period between the First and Second World Wars up to the so-called "decade of darkness" in the 1990's cutbacks severely degraded the capabilities of the Canadian military until such a time as new capabilities were required, causing Canada to play a game of catch up due to the sudden requirement to procure new equipment.

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[145] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 11.

So while there is value in the current process and the future may look promising, Canada is riding a new defence policy. What happens when this policy stagnates or other priorities emerge, reinvigorating the traditional guns or butter debate? We must have a system that supports Canada and its citizens and fulfills the primary role of the military in protecting their interests, not a process that is simply amenable to the separate stakeholders for their own benefit. This is where the CAF needs to be prepared and leverage the creation of a military strategy to help maintain a capable fighting force. The military must remember that the CAF is more persistent than Cabinet both in terms of people and role and the CAF must be equally as prepared to influence and work with subsequent governments. There will remain a need for military power to support political goals, and while how and when this power is applied is a governmental decision, the military must be prepared to fight wars and win on its nation's behalf. With this in mind, the final recommendations are as follows.

Table 3.   Final Recommendations

1. Develop and issue a distinct Canadian military strategy.
2. Make and express explicit assumptions.
3. Develop competent strategists to achieve flexibility in the strategy process.

Source: Created by author.

<u>Develop and Issue a Distinct Canadian Military Strategy</u>

This recommendation provides a more useful update to the intermediate recommendation of improving staff and administrative work that is capable of being implemented by the CAF. As we have seen the government will do what it sees as reasonable to achieve political goals, thus the CAF must work within its own boundaries. A distinct, overarching military strategy ought to be developed regardless of what the government produces by way of policy or strategy. Whether or not certain government policies are in fact strategy in disguise or not, should not be of large concern, and the CAF should treat all Cabinet documents as either grand strategy or policy. If the government decides to alter how policy is developed and wants to develop a national security policy in the future, as it has in the past, then the CAF is still prepared to handle such an inject into the strategy process.[146] Taking all higher level documents as policy or even grand strategy and using them as a basis for a unique military strategy better aligns military effort with theoretical models and provides supporting guidance that may not be as politically relevant but is of consequence to the military itself in terms of general administration and operations.

If policy continues down a similar road as the most recent defence policy, then there is a chance of major overlap between policy and military strategy documents. The first argument is that this would be a wasted effort as the strategic guidance is already included in the policy. However, we only need look at the frequency of defence policy to

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[146] The 2004 International Policy Statement is viewed as such a wide ranging government policy document covering multiple aspects of security and defence. Canada, Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa, ON: Privy Council Office, April 2004).

understand that while it currently aligns, this argument requires the constant revision and update of defence policy, which is likely more difficult to achieve than updating a strategy based on the constant set of defence priorities. If the work overlaps it means that most of the work is already done and committing this to another document likely is not much more onerous a project. Furthermore, this is where additional background information and guidance that is not appropriate for a policy document can be added.

If policy and strategy overlap by adding this step, there isn't much impact to the overall construct. Yes, there may be some superfluous information, but as long as it aligns then there are no major drawbacks. This provides a secondary benefit to developing a military strategy by creating an evaluation method to monitor progress. If military strategy does not conform with defence policy, then there is a requirement to amend one (likely the strategy) which can act as a forcing function for continued dialogue which is a good thing and reinforces existing relationships. Communication will ensure military efforts remain on track with government priorities and avoid wasting resources on misaligned projects or efforts. This is of particular value if there is a change of government where the military strategy, which should remain apolitical, can be used as a basis to inform a new defence policy as it will have a longer-term outlook and not be as politically subjective as a previous government's policy may be. In reality, policies may not differ greatly as priorities have not changed drastically over time and there is an opportunity to manage perceptions and influence government in an acceptable direction in cases such as this which ought to be used whenever possible.

Finally, to ensure a military strategy remains relevant there must be a mechanism for continuous review and update as circumstances change. Strategy is not constant and

the outputs of strategy can impact future inputs creating the need to amend the strategy itself. This is particularly true in military strategy where threats and adversaries have a say by way of their actions. To start, a biennial review of a military strategy seems sufficient as a routine measure along with the ability to review and adjust the strategy whenever deemed necessary. Regularly reviewing strategy provides a way to balance political ends with given resources while still allowing annual operations planning to take place.[147] Doing so also stands to ensure that such operational planning is constantly aligned with political constraints and goals.

The strategy review process itself need not be an overly onerous affair. It should be a matter of ensuring that the environment in which the strategy was first developed is still valid. This means verifying that the resources or means match the ways in which the CAF plans to achieve the political ends assigned. If they are still aligned then the CAF can continue on course, if not then an early adjustment to re-align will be more effective than waiting for a new government policy to be released. Constant review of military strategy feeds into the second recommendation to make sure that the environment or perceived environment has not been altered greatly from the original conditions.

<u>Make and Express Explicit Assumptions</u>

This recommendation is not only tied to issuing a military strategy it also amplifies the previous recommendation of seeking grand strategic guidance. Making and expressing explicit assumptions forces the government to either challenge the validity of

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[147] Operations planning in this instance refers to daily operating and management functions of the CAF itself, a function currently carried out by the Chief of Programme, not the application of combat power in specific theatres.

CAF planning factors or prove them as fact enabling strategy formulation and proper nesting. Gray's model of strategy requires assumptions to guide ends, ways and means, which help the process to move forward in an uncertain environment since the future cannot be known. Assumptions serve a second purpose of identifying and acknowledging potential risks, allowing for them to be mitigated or accepted. These assumptions need not be publically released as some may be restrained for national security needs, but they must be made and communicated nonetheless. Moreover, they ought to be joint level CAF assumptions in order to amalgamate all services and set a unified stage for subordinate environmental and Force Employment strategies.

Explicitly stating the assumptions goes beyond filling gaps in knowledge which allow planning and strategy formulation to continue, it also keeps lines of communication between the CAF and the government open. These assumptions will form the basis for continued discussion and provide an additional vehicle through which advice can be provided. A portion of the assumptions to be made are beyond the military scope of the CAF, such as external threats and where and how the government would commit forces into combat or other operations. The government must underwrite these assumptions as either valid or refocus military efforts to better align with political goals. Either way, this dialogue and validation serve to improve military understanding of political contexts and vice versa which serves to pull the two levels closer in line. With constant revision, the CAF and the government can ensure continued dialogue and complementary efforts.

Validating assumptions as fact, or denying them will focus strategy efforts and stimulate proper dialogue on complicated issues. Overall it will have the effect of creating space for military strategy to take place, better aligning and nesting strategy into

policy based on the assumptions and goals of each level. As trust is gained and processes are better aligned there will be a natural shift in political scope. If the government sees that the military has a sound understanding of political goals and resources while still having a mechanism to challenge and adjust strategic efforts, they are more likely to allow the CAF room to plan based on a demonstrated competence with flexibility built in. This means the government is able to focus more on whether Canada should participate militarily focusing on answering the why question, not if it can participate which focuses more on how this can be achieved. This is where military strategic space is created allowing the CAF to actually develop a military strategy. Additionally, the CAF will continue to refine its political understanding, and see where and how to provide the most valuable advice to shape policy and create the space for the government to focus on policy and grand strategy.

A secondary effect of making assumptions is supporting subordinate strategy development. Assumptions made at the CAF level will be taken as fact by the L1 headquarters' serving to focus planning by removing them from political assumptions. This does not mean reducing their input, but rather creating a secondary interface to free the L1s to focus on environmental issues while the CAF works the military-political interface their behalf. This has the same effect as nesting policy and strategy at the political-military interface but at a lower, strategic level and can still make use of the Armed Forces Council and DMC to achieve a unified approach. The key to this recommendation is the constant dialogue. If assumptions and strategy are not explicit, there is a perception that this provides flexibility to change strategy. However, it also does not force discussions when and where needed which in turn can stove-pipe or avoid

issues that could arise. There is no basis for change if base assumptions are not recorded in any fashion.

Develop Competent Strategists to Achieve
Flexibility in the Strategy Process

As alluded to in the previous recommendation, creating a distinct military strategy with explicit assumptions has a role to play in creating flexibility. Flexibility is further achieved by refining the intermediate recommendations of updating doctrine and defining roles and responsibilities. The stakeholder analysis and previous recommendations provide a more comprehensive understanding of how flexibility can be achieved and its fundamental value. Flexibility is gained, however, not through the process but through people implementing it.

Firstly, dialogue and communication beget flexibility, if conducted properly. This means from a position of mutual respect which is achieved through relationship building and which is a cornerstone of the CDS perspective. There is no getting around the fact that Canadian military strategy will always be greatly influenced by government policies and there is no value in attempting to stop political dives into strategy or below. The value is gained in leveraging these dives to highlight and explain military needs to, in turn, influence policies according to achievable and needed ends.

By making a distinct military strategy with basic assumptions, flexibility is gained by creating a start state that can be reviewed and adjusted as circumstances change. To support this change, doctrine should be updated to provide a better explanation of strategic theory within the Canadian context and outlining the roles and responsibilities of key players within the CAF. This means identifying and explaining the theoretical

models, and I argue adding the grand-strategic sphere into the doctrine. But the doctrine must acknowledge that this is a model and that there are many ways of implementation to achieve expected outputs. Furthermore, greater emphasis on the relationships would benefit those who do not have the experience of such political-military interface. To support the doctrine, CAF members must continue to receive education on the functioning of the Canadian government so they gain a solid appreciation of the unique factors which influence strategy development in Canada. This understanding, supported by definite roles, will work to create flexibility by opening the lines of communications and providing constant feedback mechanisms to maintain proper alignment across the strategic spectrum.

The overall key to these three final recommendations is that the relationships are the key aspect to leverage but that there can be steps taken to formalize and strengthen them. A definitive military strategy with regular revisions will form the basis for change as well as provide constant guidance for subordinate L1s when defence policy grows stale. Furthermore, it is a method to express assumptions that can be validated by Cabinet which maintains open lines of communication and acts as a forcing function for both the military and government to ensure policy and strategy remain aligned and relevant to current global contexts and political goals. By creating a basis for change through constant revision, flexibility is gained and will ultimately stimulate relationships. This is particularly useful if defence were to drop in priority, as it has in the past, by forcing the dialogue since it is more difficult to ignore an explicit gap or misalignment in strategy and policy than it is to ignore a perceived gap. Following these recommendations will

create the foundation for the theoretical bridge between policy and strategy while

ensuring the flexibility to fit within the unique Canadian context.[148]

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[148] Gray, *The Strategy Bridge*, 29-30.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The separation of strategy and policy can only be achieved to the detriment of
both.
—Henry Kissinger, quoted in Baylis, Wirtz, and Gray,
Strategy in the Contemporary World

Recommendations on their own will produce little result. They must be coupled

with a rational and achievable implementation plan if they are to generate any value for

the CAF. The conclusions and recommendations in this chapter seek to outline such a

plan. The implementation plan recommends a method to the Chief Decision Maker, the

CDS, on how the final recommendations can be turned into reality. To do this it proposes

short and long-term priorities. Following the implementation plan is a collection of the

issues which have arisen during the preceding analysis but were beyond the specific

scope of discussion. Pursuing these additional questions will help to advance the lessons

from this study and provide a more fulsome understanding of the issues themselves. This

chapter and the entire discussion is concluded with a reflection on personal lessons

learned. These lessons not only explain my own experiences but help to justify the

recommendations that have been made as well as the suggested implementation plan.

Understanding the lessons learned also helps set the initial conditions to support

continued research on the suggested topics that have been identified but pushed off for

further, more specific analysis.

Implementation Plan

The final recommendations presented in chapter 4 are somewhat general in nature and require additional action to ensure a suitable program is implemented. Because of this, an in-depth implementation plan is beyond the scope of this paper, but a general plan and priorities for implementation are provided. Implementing this plan becomes more valuable as the current defence policy stagnates and Canada approaches another federal election scheduled to take place around October, 2019.[149] By acting in the short term the first steps taken will facilitate greater moves in the future.

Looking far forward and scanning horizons at the ten and twenty-year marks and beyond is useful, particularly for activities such as capability development. Such long-term influence and goals must continue as this will pull strategy and policy forward to ensure it remains relevant and sets the CAF up for future success. However, for the purposes of these recommendations, the implementation plan will deal with short-term priorities which can be implemented in the next one to two years and long-term priorities which can be implemented or initiated in the next three to five years.

In the short term, the first priority must be the creation of a distinct Canadian military strategy. There is a fleeting opportunity to leverage the release of a current defence policy to properly synchronize and differentiate policy and military strategy. Doing so will help create a baseline standard and proper nesting of strategy within policy for future implementation as well as provide the means for ensuring the current policy

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[149] Elections Canada, "FAQ on Elections," accessed 13 April 2018, http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=vot&dir=faq&document=faqelec&lang=e#a10.

and the recommended strategy remains relevant. The CAF should be translating *Strong, Secure, Engaged* and the supporting groundwork into a series of individual plans and programs to support the new policy, thus it makes sense to capture this direction in one overarching document.

Producing this document within the next year will ensure that the CAF can move through the upcoming election with a roadmap to help guide advice and rebalance priorities late in 2019. If the government changes, it is a way to help demonstrate ongoing initiatives and their military value to the new government or as a tool to validate assumptions and priorities of the current government in the case of re-election. A re-elected government, like a new one, may develop new priorities based on the prospect of another term in office when not immediately focused on another election. In either case, the production of a military strategy will help to smooth any future transition which may take place at least two years after the current defence policy, which is in line with the recommended review schedule, had a supporting military strategy been released with or shortly following the current policy.

To support the development of a military strategy, the CAF ought to resource a team to develop such a strategy. This will not be as easily achieved as the CAF works on a constraint of personal numbers with a set of required tasks and responsibilities. Resourcing such a team, although relatively small in nature would need to come at the cost of something and need to achieve a zero balance in the short term.[150] An analysis of

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[150] It is possible that this team be an amalgamation of current position who are connected to strategy development-like initiatives in offices the Chief of Force Development or Chief of Programme and amalgamate them under the Colonel in the Strategic Joint Staff who currently manages the Force Posture and Readiness documents,

competing needs and available manpower would need to be conducted to see what can be risked to achieve a military strategy development team. On a positive note, the strategy functions are taking place in various forms across the CAF in places like Chief of Programme. It may be a simple matter or amalgamating these people and functions under one unified military strategy office.

The immediate options are to resource these out of current manpower or leverage the projected growth to provide the necessary personnel. However, it is difficult to simply assign an officer as a strategist, there is a certain level of experience and education required for proper strategy development. The baseline education needed is likely held by majors who have completed the Joint Command and Staff College or equivalent allied courses who have received instruction on strategy development and a basic understanding of how it interacts with the political realm.[151] There would need to be other more senior officers who have had advanced education to help guide the development to ensure a usable and implementable product. Thus the suitable pool of available members is likely rather shallow as these individuals are likely assigned to other key responsibilities across the operational and tactical levels again creating a need to prioritize positions and people. Leveraging growth is likely a longer-term solution as it again connects to and impacts competing priorities. Despite the initial shock of creating a strategy team, the value will

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or alternatively create a strategy working group from across these offices to achieve the same effect.

[151] The Joint Command and Staff Programme curriculum includes mandatory instruction on National Security and Defence Studies designed to provide the ability to "translate national security strategy into military responses." Canadian Forces College, "Joint Command and Staff Programme Syllabus," Government of Canada, accessed 13 April 2018, https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca /118/401/cfc300-44-eng.pdf, 1-4-1-20.

be gained in future years as a process and structure for military strategy development is created and improved.

Although in the short term, it would be beneficial to have a process or doctrine which mandates the creation of supporting L1 strategies, particularly from the force generators, this is likely a bridge too far. Integrating all the necessary processes and procedures to ensure proper nesting and implementation will take time. The current structure is sufficient for now as there are current processes to ensure business planning and capability development initiatives are integrated into the Armed Forces Council and then the DMC. Implementing such direction risks derailing ongoing projects without providing sufficient time to properly analyze and adjust internal processes. Additionally, there is likely to be a heightened level of discourse as a new military strategy is developed, despite its probable similarity to defence policy. The priority is to get the military strategy process right first then build the supporting subordinate strategies. In the short term, annual operation and business planning should be sufficient to translate a military strategy into L1 direction due to the close relationship with current defence policy.

It is expected that the short-term priorities will bleed into long-term priorities as the needs evolve and longer-term solutions are implemented and improved. However, even the long-term solutions require consideration now, or else they are unlikely to materialize. The first priority for the long term is to fully fund and structure a strategy development team. At first glance, it would seem that the such a team should be housed underneath the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff who supports both the CDS and DM and contains some key strategic players. After all, this is where the efforts for the DMC are

integrated with ADM(Pol) and the DM. Although it is acknowledged that the political-strategic interface is an important one, there is value in keeping military strategy a military endeavour and reducing the direct influence of the department and politics into military strategy. In that vein, I would recommend that the strategy team be established underneath the Strategic Joint Staff to keep it rooted in the military realm.

This is not meant to be an isolationist move and discussion and interface through the DM to Cabinet remains vitally important. The process and procedures for this interface must be worked out in greater detail to ensure that military strategy is properly integrated with the drafting of defence policy. The key distinction, in this case, is to remember that policy is a reflection of Cabinet priorities based on Canadian interests. This means that it is more relevant to those outside the CAF. Military strategy on the other hand, although it must be transparent, is of most value downward through the CAF to guide operations and plans. Military strategy will have more specific direction on what the CAF needs to do and how it needs to do it.

To support the creation of this strategy team, the CAF ought to continue to work to produce strategists capable of filling this role now and into the future. "Education and the capacity to think are essential for all members" of the military and this ability must be deliberately fostered by the CAF.[152] Currently, the Canadian Forces College provides courses to build a baseline knowledge of operational art to the national security strategy. This path of strategic education begins at the rank of major for those attending the Joint Command and Staff Programme and progresses as the officers advance in rank and attend

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[152] Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* 233.

the National Security Programme and perhaps the Executive Leaders Programme.[153] Through this program there already exists an educational framework which can be leveraged to develop strategists who can fill specific roles.

The development requires more than education and not all graduates of the Canadian Forces College will be suitable for these roles. The right person with the right education and the right experience will be the most beneficial. The experience portion can begin prior to the strategic education to set conditions for a broad professional outlook. Having junior officers sent to the National Defence Headquarters or a L1 force generation headquarters will provide valuable exposure and a broadening experience that will set them up for future success. There is no one key position to support this, and any spot that provides a broad understanding of how the CAF is structured and how it interfaces with the rest of DND or government will fit the need.

Once coupled with additional education these officers will be better suited to interface with policy developers and better translate policy into coherent military strategy. This need not be a direct or exclusive chain of employment and a wide array of experiences must be sought and balanced with other military responsibilities at the tactical and operational levels as well, as this will keep these strategists grounded in the military context and better able to provide relevant advice. This model should be akin to the Chief Petty Officer First Class / Chief Warrant Officer strategic development model

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[153] Canadian Forces College, "Joint Command and Staff Programme Syllabus;" Canadian Forces College, "National Security Programme Syllabus," Government of Canada, accessed April 13, 2018, https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/119/187/404/331-eng.pdf; Canadian Forces College, "Executive Leaders' Programme Syllabus," Government of Canada, accessed April 13, 2018, https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/119/325/316/cfc450-eng.pdf.

but must start earlier in an officer's career and include opportunities for employment at

all levels to refine and broaden baseline knowledge and skills.[154]

The ultimate key to success for developing strategists is the person themselves.

Candidates for these positions must have a broad outlook and an ability to understand and

translate political context into military direction and keep in mind how the two interact.

Communication skills, both verbal and written coupled with good interpersonal skills will

go a long way to stimulate useful discussions and action and should be sought and

developed in these strategists. If possible providing a broader, interdisciplinary

perspective would also be beneficial. Seeking additional educational and experiential

opportunities is of value. Positions across the government should continue to be sought

and leveraged to both provide experience as well as expose other departments to the

military and its members. It is likely that the military continues or even increases its

cooperation with other departments and we must keep in mind that relationship building

is a key aspect of strategy in Canada. Increasing secondments to other departments such

as GAC or Public Safety Canada will only broaden individual outlooks on the issues

faced by Canada and better enable the CAF to integrate with others.

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[154] The CPO1/CWO development model is a progressive professional development plan to prepare NCOs for employment at the strategic level. The baseline employment for the ranks of Private to Master Warrant Officer focus on trade-specific employment opportunities at the tactical levels. It then progresses through additional employment opportunities and competency development to prepare CPO1/CWOs for employment at the strategic level. The only difference for officer development is the need for early exposure to the strategic and operational levels while still maintaining tactical competencies to facilitate continued employment opportunities, particularly command opportunities. Canada, Department of National Defence, *Beyond Transformation: The CPO1/CWO Strategic Employment Model* (Winnipeg, MB: 17 Wing Winnipeg Publishing Office, 2011), 23-29.

In addition to employment and experience, advanced educational opportunities should be sought. Such initiatives already exist where members are provided funding and time to attend specific educational programs, often offered at civilian universities. The opportunities are normally followed with a period of mandatory service in a specific position as a utilization tour to derive value from the costs. These positions are normally more technically focused, however, there should be a plan for the development of strategists as well. Currently, a few members of the military are selected to attend advanced allied schools such as the United States Army School of Advanced Military Studies, or the United States Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfare Studies, this must continue or the CAF ought to develop its own course on par with the educational experiences gained elsewhere. More broadly focused advanced degrees should be sought for strategists and the CAF should invest in these opportunities to produce more open-minded and experienced officers able to operate and understand issues outside a purely military context.

This implementation plan is ultimately focused on people more so than the process of strategy itself. Beyond the need for identified bodies to create a strategy, the ability to produce officers who understand strategy is far more important than actually doing it. Obtaining a usable strategy is admittedly important and brings with it a number benefits for the CAF but managing the relationships to do so is the key. The CAF must focus its efforts on developing the people who can harness these relationships to ensure continued implementation of relevant military strategy in the future.

<u>Ideas for Future Research</u>

With an understanding of how military strategy fits into the Canadian framework and some recommendations on how to improve the current process, it is time to turn to the other issues which arose throughout this discussion that are worthy of independent investigation. While this thesis sought to focus on military strategy it is clear that strategy is inextricably linked to policy. To achieve the stated purpose of the research many issues dealing with national level policies and procedures were explored to the extent required then set aside to again focus at the military level forming the basis for future research efforts.

To obtain a truly holistic understanding of the issues at hand further research into the mechanics of Canadian national strategy and policy development is needed. This should begin much like this thesis by seeking an understanding of how strategy works, both in theory and within the Canadian context. The two structures should be compared and inconsistencies identified and attempt to merge the two made. Of course, this too is likely not achievable but this is where the value is found. Understanding the nuances and reasons why the two cannot or should not be merged will provide a foundational understanding of what can be achieved and opportunity will be born out of these gaps when fully understood.

Questions that support this research are should Canada have a national security strategy to fill the grand strategic sphere within the strategic hierarchy and how would that impact military strategy. This would be something like the 2004 National Security Policy released by Paul Martin's Liberal government that was supported by chapters from the major ministers and provided a unified approach without privileging one department

over another allowing a unified, whole-of-government document to guide specific efforts. Based on its structure this can be understood to have combined policy and grand strategy, unlike the current defence policy which seems to join policy with military strategy. Related to this are the relationships between defence and security policies and how they ought to be integrated across the Canadian government. This is of particular relevance with emerging threats from the cyber realm or transnational terrorism and crime which expand the available approaches to Canada. A unified Canadian approach is required but this is beyond a purely military or even public safety solution.

After a general understanding of national strategy and policy development is obtained it would be useful to delve into specific policies and strategies. To reinforce how Canadian strategy is made at both the national and military level it would be useful to examine what type of strategy best fits the CAF and the GoC in light if the unique influences. This could be structured along the various schools of strategy in an attempt to explore in more detail what Canadian strategy should do and how this could be achieved to refine the Canadian process.[155] Following this would be asking what the national security policies or grand strategies should be and how they can best support and protect Canadians. This will help to integrate a government-wide effort forcing Cabinet to think more broadly. This will have a secondary benefit of pulling policy a little further out of the military strategy realm mainly out of necessity based on the increased scope of the problem; a culture of trust and communication will help to support this.

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[155] Henry Mintzberg and Joseph Lampel, "Reflecting on the Strategy Process," in *The Strategy Process: Concepts, Context, Cases,* 5th ed., eds. Joseph,Lampel, Henry Mintzberg, James Brian Quinn, and Sumantra Ghoshal (Edinburgh, UK: Pearson Education Limited, 2014), 21-24.

Such a broad and complete national policy or grand strategy will, in turn, support the need for a unique and comprehensive military strategy that is mutually supportive and integrated into government-wide initiatives. The obvious question to support this is what should that military strategy be? In the near term, the answer is likely to look much like current defence policy but if the policy scope increases there are likely to be additional needs to create a unified approach across government which will require some unique military capabilities and operations that fit with all other efforts and directed from an overarching governmental approach. This supports the need to create a military strategy now, so if or when a larger government policy is developed the CAF is prepared to integrate as necessary and in a more formal capacity. Moving forward we need a general understanding of policy but most useful will be the content of the specific policies and supporting strategies that will create a unified Canadian approach to future problems.

<u>Personal Lessons Learned</u>

As I set out to research how Canada manages the linkage between the strategy and policy, I was bothered by the lack of a definitive military strategy. I perceived a gaping hole in a well-researched and applicable theory and wondered why it was that Canada seems to lack such a foundational document to guide its military action. As I progressed through the research I began to see this divide widen and continued to wonder how such a divide could be achieved. At this point, I was lucky enough to succumb to a shift in my own thinking. As I continued to question why things were apparently wrong, I had forgotten to ask why things were right. I realized that at the outset I had fallen victim to a very pessimistic outlook. My initial biases led me to focus on the negative aspects of the Canadian structure. Only after a realization of the unique circumstances of Canada's

history and political structure and goals did I begin to focus on the positives. This evolution in thinking can be seen in the structure of this paper as biases and initial thoughts were challenged by the analysis and unique stakeholder perspectives. By taking a more optimistic view of the problem I was able to look past the apparent errors in theoretical structure and begin to see what is gained by not restricting strategy development to its theoretical boundaries. This underlying revelation was supported by a number of other points that together capture the main personal lessons learned throughout this process.

The first lesson is foundational to understanding military strategy and its relationship to policy. Government as a representative of the people will do what it wants and believes is in the best interest of the public. These efforts often do not directly align with specific military goals or desires, nor does the process necessarily align with the military understanding of want strategy is and how it is supposed to work. Military members have a tendency to want to strictly codify the process and outputs, however, our role is not to do so. It is to serve the public and remain subservient to civil control. The best we can do is continue to be an honest advocate for what the CAF needs in order to be ready to protect Canadian interests.

Military members come with unique perceptions, experiences, and educations which must be blended with those of civil servants or politicians who have equally unique perceptions and experiences which are equally as valid. This blending is achieved through fair, open discussion and recommendations whenever needed, followed by steadfast follow-through of any direction received. The key to this balance is strong

relationships based on clear communication with the government to help achieve a common goal.

To this same end, it has become clear that strategy cannot be examined in isolation. Every attempt to look at how military strategy was formed resulted in a connection back to political or policy levels due to the nature of the Canadian context. In strategic theory the levels of war are distinct spheres, however, they do overlap. This overlap was expected and not a big surprise at the outset and was understood as a point of integration between strategy and policy to ensure proper integration. However, what was not expected was the size and scope of overlap. Strategy, particularly within Canada, takes place almost exclusively in the political-strategic interface. Any realm of strategy outside of this overlap is equally tied to the lower levels and serves as an integrating point between operational and in some cases tactical levels of war and acting as a fusion point for the whole system.

Lastly, it became clear that theory is only theory and can only take us so far. Unique, real-world issues are quickly injected into the theoretical models when it comes time for application. It became apparent that in some cases not following theoretical models can provide flexibility, enabling freedom of action. Learning how strategy is developed in Canada, in general, has broadened this horizon and reinforces the importance of understanding the theory of strategy. Ultimately, understanding strategy and the context in which it is applied is far more valuable than actually doing strategy. This understanding provides a freedom of thought and action in changing environments and creates the opportunities to act in accordance with national interests and values down to the lowest levels. It is this flexibility that must be harnessed and relationships built to

ensure that, while it may not be perfect there are opportunities to be exploited and the Canadian strategic process is appropriate and responsive to the safety and security of Canadians and the world.

In the end, while I don't think that the current process is perfect and there is room for improvement, I did learn that strategy is more ethereal than I originally thought. One simply does not do strategy; it is not a black box of defined inputs and outputs. It is a complex, iterative process that requires constant adjustment and testing to ensure the outputs are aligned with the inputs wherever and whenever possible. Theory only takes us so far. I initially set out to find a method through which a complete overhaul of the current process could be achieved. Understanding strategy is of the utmost importance and the skill of the military strategist is "an extraordinarily complex intellectual skill requiring comprehensive study and training."[156] To achieve this the CAF must invest in its people to properly equip them to develop coherent strategies and provide steadfast advice to the policy-makers.

While the final recommendations such as simply creating a military strategy may seem somewhat mundane, vague or oversimplified, it is not the recommendations themselves that are of the greatest value. This examination has served to highlight not only the theory of strategy but more importantly how theory changes when applied. By considering the unique Canadian influences of the GoC structure and its history and traditions, I gained a better understanding of the Canadian way of war. This unique way of war is the result of the external influences and relationships more than it is a product of

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[156] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 13.

strategy itself. Understanding these relationships and why they differ from theory has helped me to shape the recommendations, which in fact are secondary to the need to understand strategy itself prior to specifically implementing it.

At its root, part of the problem is the lack of understanding of the true costs of developing defence capabilities coupled with a belief that the country is not at risk thus there is no requirement to invest heavily in military capabilities.[157] This belief is echoed by the Canadian public themselves who at times let values trump interests. Reinforcing the point made by Granatstein, it is the role of Cabinet and the GoC to educate the voters on true Canadian interests, but it is also the CAF's job is to educate Cabinet.[158] The creation of a viable military backstop for Canadian interests and open dialogue is the cumulative responsibility of both the CAF and the GoC. There is a mutual dependence between the two, each with a unique, yet complementary set of roles and responsibilities.

The first step for the CAF is to make a military strategy which will allow a "consistent message based on a pragmatic approach to capability development aspirations."[159] A military strategy now will only be a basis for change, but it starts the process and that is what is important. Continuing the process must be supported by individuals who understand what the process is and how to manipulate or leverage the theory to unique circumstances to produce viable and coherent strategies that can be used to shape the future of the military. So while a plan for the complete restructuring of the

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[157] Jefferey, *Inside CF Transformation*, 63.

[158] Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* 238.

[159] Canadian Army, *Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, 33.

Canadian strategic development process may not have been entirely achieved, the more valuable lesson of how the Canadian context shapes the theory of strategy for specific implementation is far more valuable. With this understanding in hand, it is time to take the first step and begin creating a distinct Canadian military strategy and supporting its continued review and relevance so that the CAF can fulfill its foundational mandate of protecting Canadians.

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