

LAND OF THE FREE AND HOME OF THE BRAVE: THE DECLINE OF CIVIC SPIRIT
AND WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD IMPLEMENT
NATIONAL SERVICE TO RENEW ITS STRENGTH

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Military History

by

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ABSTRACT

LAND OF THE FREE AND HOME OF THE BRAVE: THE DECLINE OF CIVIC SPIRIT AND WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD IMPLEMENT NATIONAL SERVICE TO RENEW ITS STRENGTH, by Major Danielle K. Cork, 147 pages.

As near-peer countries compete with the United States for world power, military and political leaders must determine how to maintain America's strength and influence. The United States, while still externally engaged in conflicts overseas, continues to clash internally as well. This division stems from disconnected values amongst the citizens. At a time when the global playing field seems uncertain, the United States cannot afford to be anything but cohesive. This thesis examines the case study of Universal Military Training as a preparedness strategy prior to World War I and following World War II. It compares and contrasts each historical period and conscription legislation to discover which similarities and differences of world affairs led to this proposal, and conversely, the lack of its adoption. During both time periods, leaders within the United States and its' Armed Forces suggested Universal Military Training as the solution to reinforce the national defense policy. Additionally, they recognized many other benefits of the training namely citizens imparting their civic duty to their country. The author considers this policy as a means to secure and unite the country by providing a common experience for all citizens to draw from. The research demonstrates parallels to today's threats and explores if National Service should be implemented to secure the United States future as a strong nation and world power.

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PROLOGUE

The trainee has given up a year to his country. In return he has acquired confidence that as long as he and other boys like him are prepared for the eventuality of combat, they can look forward to a prosperous future untroubled by war.

His military training has had valuable by-products. His interests have broadened. He has learned how to play new sports and developed new hobbies. The specialist and technician training he received may develop into a vocation. He has learned the habit of concentration in study which will be of great advantage if he continues in school. The ability he has acquired to adjust himself socially to the personalities of people with diverse backgrounds has made him more tolerant and understanding. He has learned to assume responsibility and exercise leadership. He has had an experience in democracy.

He looks a man. Outdoor living, exercise, regular hours, and well-balanced meals have strengthened him and give him endurance. He is physically fit and mentally alert—ready to take on his new job or school work with the satisfaction of recent accomplishments. He should be proud, for he is a responsible citizen now, prepared to defend his country if ever the need arises.¹

¹ War Department, RG 165, *Security Classified Correspondence, Reports, Memoranda, and Other Papers Relating to Universal Military Training, 1944-48*, Entry NM-84 479, Box 345, National Archives of the United States, Washington, DC.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It may be laid down as a primary position, and basis of our system that every citizen who enjoys the protection of a free government, owes not only a proportion of his property, but even his personal services to the defense of it, and consequently that the Citizens of America from 18 to 50 Years of Age should be borne on the Militia Rolls, provided with Uniform Arms, and so far accustomed to the use of them, that the Total strength of the Country might be called forth at a Short Notice on any very interesting Emergency.

—George Washington, *Sentiments on a Peace Establishment*

The year was 1996. I just started the 6th grade at Hayes Middle School and decided to run for class president. I worked tirelessly with my grandmother on what I wished to be an inspiring speech to encourage my classmates to be the best versions of themselves and simultaneously instill some pride in our school by making it an outstanding place. One of the cross-stitched items my grandmother hung on her wall always caught my eye. It quoted President John F. Kennedy during his Inaugural Address to the United States of America. “Ask not what your country can do for you but what you can do for your country,” it instructed.² With that old wall hanging galvanized a lifelong inspiration and prompted many questions. It was from that time, at the age of ten, my motivation of service for others and the pride in doing so began.

Many Americans have fought for our nation and its freedom. But has it always been universal? Similarly, the United States is at a point in its history where the divide

² John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, “President Kennedy’s Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961,” accessed April 13, 2018, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/JFK-Fast-Facts/Inaugural-Address.aspx>.

between Americans continues to grow. Whether this divide is Democrat or Republican, male or female, black or white, the country has polarized. “We stand together,” proclaimed President George W. Bush following the attacks on September 11, 2001.³ However, not every citizen has done their part to protect “freedom and the American way of life.”⁴ Patriotic sentiments may have grown, but most citizens did not have to make sacrifices. This begs the question: should citizens spend time in service to their country?

In 1959 Robert A. Heinlein wrote *Starship Troopers*, exploring civic virtue against the backdrop of an interstellar war. Some critics even labeled the ideology as fascist because of only giving rights and full citizenship to those who served in the military.⁵ The novel exposes several civilian and military perspectives on service as well as a glimpse into civilian-military relations. His book demonstrates the divide that still currently exists and the lack of understanding each side retains for the other. The main character’s father does not want him to join the military following graduation from high school because he is better than those who do.

So what is this so-called ‘Federal Service’? Parasitism, pure and simple. A functionless organ, utterly obsolete, living on the taxpayers. A decidedly expensive way for inferior people who others would be unemployed to live at

³ George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on the September 11 Attacks” (Oval Office, Washington, DC, September 11, 2001), accessed April 15, 2018, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf.

⁴ U.S. Army, “Soldier’s Creed,” Army Values, accessed April 19, 2018, <https://www.army.mil/values/soldiers.html>.

⁵ Jasper Goss, “Starship Troopers by Robert A. Heinlein; Starship Troopers by Paul Verhoeven,” *Australasian Journal of American Studies* 17, no. 1 (July 1998): 54-56.

public expense for a term of years, then give themselves airs for the rest of their lives. Is that what *you* want to do?⁶

Even today, this view of the military from a civilian perspective is known. The term “poor man's Army” is often used to explain those who serve in the military. However, less than 11 percent come from America’s poorest neighborhoods. Another claim made is that servicemembers are ignorant and have no other means to get by as a result of poor choices made in their early years. On the contrary, servicemen and women are actually more educated than their peers.⁷

The military prides itself on its values. Those outside the military are thought to be inferior because they simply do not possess these values. Presently, it is thought that “a soldier accepts personal responsibility for the safety of the body politic of which he is a member, defending it, if need be, with his life. The civilian does not.”⁸ Again, this divisive nature stems from a lack of knowledge about the other. When the recruiter attempts to dissuade two men from joining the military, his comments reveal how the military perceives civilians:

Because it has become stylish, with some people—too many people - to serve a term and earn a franchise and be able to wear a ribbon in your lapel which says that you’re a vet’ran . . . whether you’ve ever seen combat or not. But if you want to serve and I can’t talk you out of it, then we have to take you, because

⁶ Robert A. Heinlein, *Starship Troopers* (New York: Ace Books, 1959), 23.

⁷ Stephen J. Dubner, “Who Serves in the Military Today?,” *Freakonomics*, September 22, 2008, accessed April 28, 2018, <http://freakonomics.com/2008/09/22/who-serves-in-the-military-today/>.

⁸ Heinlein, *Starship Troopers*, 24.

that's your constitutional right. It says that everybody, male or female, shall have his born right to pay his service and assume full citizenship.⁹

Since "citizenship is an attitude, a state of mind, an emotional conviction that the whole is greater than the part . . . and that the part should be humbly proud to sacrifice itself that the whole may live," it should not be faddish but something within the heart of every citizen of the nation.¹⁰ The government needs each citizen's help, but there should be an intrinsic motivation to assist. The United States can build its patriotism and bridge the divide by implementing National Service.

There are three main reasons for National Service. The first and most important purpose being the defense of the United States. The second motive is overall improved civic duties and responsibilities by giving Americans an "ennobling experience."¹¹ Finally, the last point is to bridge the military-civilian divide that exists within the country. Although renowned civil-military relations sociologist Morris Janowitz contends that "democratic states are not particularly effective at civic education," Patriotism is vital to foster pride in one's nation provided it does not take away from open-minded thought.¹² The author expects that the study of factors and proponents pre-World War I

⁹ Ibid., 27.

¹⁰ Ibid., 129.

¹¹ Charles Moskos, "Patriotism - Lite Meets the Citizen-Soldier," in *United We Serve: National Service and the Future of Citizenship*, ed. E. J. Dionne Jr., Kayla Meltzer Drogoz, and Robert E. Litan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 38.

¹² Morris Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), 194.

and post-World War II will prove to be a worthwhile case study, specifically for Universal Military Training and National Service.

Background

The Universal Military Training policy, proposed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944 and further championed by President Harry S. Truman, provided an alternative compulsory military training approach to prepare for pending conflict with the Soviet Union during peacetime. As the threat became uncertain, arguments for and against took hold. From roughly 1945 until 1952, Universal Military Training became a heated topic throughout the country. Citizens, as well as politicians, argued over the necessity and the nation's historical background of conscription. The lack of military posturing before the outbreak of two World Wars concerned many leaders within the United States. To ensure the country was not caught off-guard again, all males would receive one year of military training.

President Truman and his supporters were unable to launch Universal Military Training as a feasible option for national defense. Selective Service remained popular as a proven method should military action become necessary, but opponents of Universal Military Training strongly believed that compulsion directly contradicted democratic principles. Despite the occurrence of many real-world events, such as the Korean War, Universal Military Training did not garner enough support to develop into policy. Furthermore, other political agendas and election cycles hindered its realization.

But this was not the first time leaders throughout the United States examined this topic. Major General Leonard Wood also believed Universal Military Training was the answer to military manpower issues in 1916. He spoke to the Senate Subcommittee on

Military Affairs several times regarding a bill to provide for the military training of the citizen forces of the United States. The Preparedness Movement decidedly was for the “purpose of the creation of a reserve force,” and invoked “a spirit of national solidarity.”¹³ His viewpoint opposed those who thought it would lead to militarism and provided a solution for the fact that the United States had “no defense in any way adequate to meet an attack by a great power.”¹⁴ He recognized that by not maintaining a strong military the United States would be susceptible to aggression.

In this earlier instance, the United States did not adopt Universal Military Training during this time either, despite mounting concerns in Europe. On this occasion, it was the president who disapproved. President Woodrow Wilson believed the United States should remain neutral during World War I and let Europe sort out their own business without interference. Although his outlook began to change in 1915 and legislation later increased the size of the Army and Navy, Universal Military Training was not the implemented response.¹⁵

Today, the United States finds itself facing many adversaries, raising fear and uncertainty throughout the nation. The soldiers within the United States European Command continuously assure allies through involvement in North Atlantic Treaty Organization exercises focused on deterring Russia. The United States Pacific Command

¹³ Leonard Wood, *Universal Military Training* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1917).

¹⁴ Ibid., 119.

¹⁵ Allan R. Millet, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States from 1607 to 2012* (New York: Free Press, 2012), 304.

prepares for potential hostilities from North Korea by conducting training throughout the Korean Peninsula. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria vows destruction to the western world and the United States Central Command focuses its capabilities and efforts on Operation Inherent Resolve to defeat them and stabilize the region. China's economic and military assertion of power to pursue their regional hegemony and Iran's destabilization of the Middle East, also present challenges for the United States and partner security.¹⁶ If diplomacy should fail to resolve these situations, is the country prepared for the potential outbreak of war against all these opponents? The government holds a duty to protect its people; National Service is indeed a viable option.

Definition of Terms

Just as Janowitz strongly believed it necessary throughout his study "to ponder the definition and redefinition of nationalism, national ideology, and patriotism in the present day" in his book *The Reconstruction of Patriotism*, so too does the author feel her study requires an emphasis on these traditional terms.¹⁷ This project will use several terms throughout its entirety; some used interchangeably and synonymously. It is necessary for the reader to understand the meaning of each as meant by the author and if that meaning implies dissimilar definitions found in Merriam-Webster Dictionary. A comparison of the terms is given below.

¹⁶ Department of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2018), 14.

¹⁷ Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism*, 11.

Citizen: (1) an inhabitant of a city or town; especially, one entitled to the rights and privileges of a freeman. (2) a member of a state; a native or naturalized person who owes allegiance to a government and is entitled to protection from it.

Citizenship: membership in a community (such as a college); the quality of an individual's response to membership in a community.

Communism: a system in which goods are owned in common and are available to all as needed; a theory advocating elimination of private property.

Compulsory: mandatory, enforced

Conscription: compulsory enrollment of persons especially for military service

Democracy: government by the people; especially, rule of the majority; a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections.

Fascism: a political philosophy, movement, or regime (such as that of the Fascisti) that exalts nation and often race above the individual and that stands for a centralized autocratic government headed by a dictatorial leader, severe economic and social regimentation, and forcible suppression of opposition.

Levee en Masse: the spontaneous act of the people of a territory not yet occupied by an enemy force of taking up arms for self-defense upon the approach of an enemy without having had time to organize in accordance with recognized rules of warfare.

Nationalism: loyalty and devotion to a nation; especially, a sense of national consciousness; exalting one nation above all others and placing primary

emphasis on promotion of its culture and interests as opposed to those of other nations or supranational groups.

Patriotism: love for or devotion to one's country.

Socialism: (1) any of various economic and political theories advocating collective or governmental ownership and administration of the means of production and distribution of goods (2) a system of society or group living in which there is no private property; a system or condition of society in which the means of production are owned and controlled by the state (3) a stage of society in Marxist theory transitional between capitalism and communism and distinguished by unequal distribution of goods and pay according to work done.

Research Question

The central question of this paper is: “should the United States implement National Service?” This paper explores the Universal Military Training proposals during pre-World War I and post-World War II, using original research, as an applicable case study in preparing the United States military and safeguarding against conflict. This question is relevant and important because the situation faced today seems eerily parallel to that encountered in the 1950s with deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the idea of Universal Military Training also garnered significant attention right before the United States entry into World War I demonstrates a slightly different perspective in which leaders supported this option to defend the nation and prepare for what lies ahead in an ongoing conflict to support allied nations. This paper also investigates national service as an answer to the military and civilian divide within the United States as a secondary issue. Analysis of Universal Military Training set the stage

for how, during times of crisis, the United States was exactly that: united. National security and preparedness for any further conflict requiring the armed forces are the foremost benefits of implementation of Universal Military Training but national solidarity cannot be overlooked as an equally important factor.¹⁸ Educational, social, and physical benefits are mere bi-products of this proposal, and although ideal, shall not be the key considerations for enactment. The preliminary hypothesis is that the United States should indeed implement National Service to better prepare for future hostilities and also to ground the country in the ideals of citizenship American forefathers envisioned.

In addition to the aforementioned primary research question, the following secondary questions need to be addressed:

1. What events led the United States to believe Universal Military Training was necessary for all males in the 1950s? 1910s? Does this state exist today?
2. Why was President Truman and supporters unable to get Universal Military Training off the ground? General Wood and his supporters?
3. What were the political, social, and military implications of this policy?
4. Would anyone need an exemption from military training? Who?
5. Should women also receive military training?
6. Can a free society compel people to undergo military training?

¹⁸ Edward A. Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1945), 4.

Examination of Literature and Research

An analysis of the literature and research supports the hypothesis and offers evidence for an alternative consideration to Universal Military Training. The proposal of Universal Military Training has been harshly disparaged throughout the last century, in both times of war and especially in times of peace. First, those against believe that it is inherently anti-democratic. Second, opponents judge that the training provided would scarcely benefit the military or provide the nation's defense. Lastly, critics feel the sizeable number of trainees are unnecessary as two ocean borders grant the benefit of protection. Conscription and the draft remain two of the most unpopular topics in American history. Nonetheless, Universal Military Training was never meant to force active service but instead offer a deterrent for adversaries who wish to harm the United States and an immediate, already trained force should the nation need prompt action to address belligerents.¹⁹

This paper follows historical methods, both explanation and evaluation, based on primary sources found at Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri. This thesis does not examine monetary concerns such as economic cost, how the media impacts the divide, or exemptions for those who cannot serve based on medical or age limitations or conscientious objector status. Additionally, it does not fully explore countries which currently employ or previously utilized conscription within their militaries. However, it does explore the positive impact of Universal Military Training on

¹⁹ Taylor, *Every Citizen A Soldier*, 36.

the current plan of Selective Service, offering a more robust plan of action should citizens be called upon to defend and serve.

Chapter 2 of this paper chronologically displays the history of nationalism and the concept of citizen-soldier, presenting the context of United States conflicts prior to World War I and World War II and after. It also introduces each related legislation, relevant documents, and effects thereof by discussing the diplomatic and military state of affairs that shaped conditions for Universal Military Training development. Henry C. Dethloff and Gerald E. Shenk detail where the United States started at her inception and the progression with regards to military service in, *Citizen and Soldier: A Sourcebook on Military Service and National Defense from Colonial America to the Present*. Additional items represented within this chapter are individual pieces of legislation and documents from key members of the administration and War Department.

Chapter 3 of this paper examines the national debate on the Universal Military Training movement before World War I. First, it will discuss those backing the plan and their reasons the United States should profit. Then, it will discuss those against the plan and the reasons they presented to counter the argument. It follows a general course of benefits to the individual and to the state and further analyzes the effects upon the individual and the state before inferring overall military effectiveness characteristic of the time and methods proposed. It reveals here the first glimpse of supporting evidence towards the overall thesis. It does show that the reasons for desiring Universal Military Training and National Service in 1914 still stand true today. *The Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913-1920* by John Garry Clifford details the movement and provides precise information about the camps. Furthermore, Major

General Wood's statements made before the Senate and House Subcommittees on Military Affairs in *Universal Military Training*, give a firsthand account of the thoughts and conclusions on the topic from both Major General Wood and the Congressmen during the hearings. It includes additional material submitted such as letters, charts, and tables related to the debate.

Chapter 4 of this paper considers Universal Military Training as a post-World War II option for preparedness and national defense. Although the Allied Powers defeated Germany, supporters of the proposal understood that a looming threat from the Soviet Union required measures to dissuade them from the use of force. Those opposed felt a large, standing Army was completely unnecessary because they could not fathom another war so soon. Similar to the previous chapter, it will follow a common path of benefits to both the individual and the country before discussing effects to, respectively. Finally, the chapter culminates by determining how each line of reasoning and their proponents understood the effectiveness of the military during the time. William A. Taylor provides a comprehensive examination of the Universal Military Training proposal and the Fort Knox camps in his book *Every Citizen A Soldier: The Campaign for Universal Military Training After World War II*. Additionally, *Universal Military Training* by Edward A. Fitzpatrick dissects the policy after World War II hostilities come to a close from a senior leader within the United States Army. His book defines Universal Military Training benefits and gives historical context to why the American government has the right to compel service from its citizens.

To conclude, chapter 5 discusses the importance of Universal Military Training for the present-day United States. It also expresses the need for additional research on

topics not covered throughout this paper. It draws parallels between the diplomatic and military environments of World War I and World War II to that of today. Furthermore, it explains why National Service not only provides a defense strategy but unifies the nation with shared purpose and values. *The Reconstruction of Patriotism* by Janowitz and *National Service: Social, Economic, and Military Impacts* edited by Michael W. Sherraden and Donald J. Eberly describe plans from a sociology perspective on how and why National Service provides the balance of rights and obligations for a democratic society.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORY OF NATIONALISM AND THE CITIZEN-SOLDIER

From now on, until the complete expulsion of all our enemies from the territory of the Republic, all French people are subject to military service. The young men will march to the battle, the married men will forge arms and transport supplies, the women will produce tents and clothes and serve in the hospitals, the children will make dressing material from old linen, the old men will be carried to public places to encourage the warriors and to preach hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic.

— *Article 1, Mobilization Decree of the French Revolution*, quoted in Wolfgang Kruse, “Revolutionary France and the Meanings of *Levee en Masse*”

The fundamental question of this chapter is: What events and conditions led the United States to believe Universal Military Service was needed for all males? This theme sets the lens through which we view the historical foundation, shaping how the United States viewed its readiness for involvement in both World Wars I and II. Despite growing international influence and the hostilities of allies abroad, the country remained divided on this topic and ultimately cautious about maintaining a sizeable military. Even though both sides of the Universal Military Training controversy agreed on the military’s existence to defend the homeland, fear of militarism and despotism remained greater than concern over outside foreign threat, which deterred overall support.

There are three essential elements to understand and establish the background of Universal Military Training. First, is the historical evidence of the United States military’s purpose and nationalist mentality. Second, is the country’s isolationist approach in its initial reaction to the outbreak of World Wars I and II. Third, is the limited degree of the resolve of the American population to participate in any further

military engagements once a war transpired and concluded. Together, these components contributed to notions of Universal Military Service and eventually its defeat.

The history of volunteering and conscription throughout American history provides insight that, although volunteering seems more idealistic, following the national will is equally romantic.²⁰ Prior to World Wars I and II, virtually none of the United States' earlier conflicts were decided and won strictly by volunteers. Legislation was necessary to assist in meeting a manpower gap when volunteerism fell short.²¹ Moving forward, this is important to remember.

This chapter begins by examining the rise of National Service with regard to Patriotism during the American Revolution and Nationalism during the French Revolution and how they are linked. It further establishes the terms relevant to this thesis such as Nationalism, Patriotism, Democracy, Conscription, and Citizenship. The chapter then moves through pieces of legislation and documents that provide background as to where the United States started on ideas of military service through conscription and where it currently stands on this topic.

It is vital to note that both Fascism and Socialism are mentioned in this thesis strictly to ensure the reader's clarity that civic responsibilities within Democracy not be confused with either of these political philosophies. Although it can be argued that 'the real novelty of fascism and communism was their dedication to the concept that all people had an assigned role in the mobilized nation,' the same could be true about

²⁰ Edward A. Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1945), 144.

²¹ Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism*, 1.

Democracy as well.²² Therefore, this is not a unique consideration. Both Fascism and Socialism are extreme versions of a collective group approach over the individual and a regimented distribution of goods. The United States and France also felt the principles of community were important because they wrote it into their revolutionary documents. Both the American and French Revolutions took place well before these immoderate ideas came to maturity.

The French Revolution and National Service Origins

Beginning the study with Nationalism is essential. Although the French Revolution is credited with the onset of this idea, the French were undoubtedly inspired by events that took place across the Atlantic in 1775. With France's help, colonists were able to secure freedom from the British and found their new country: The United States of America. After realizing victory against the crown was possible, Frenchmen instigated a rebellion, and the French Revolution changed the course of history by introducing universal conscription or *levee en masse*.²³

The French Revolution was the beginning of the concept of Nationalism. Before this, society did not fight for the pride of one's country but instead for money and limited objectives such as a neighboring town's land. Or did they? Wars were not fought by citizens but rather mercenaries, loyal to a nobleman and his purse strings. Or were they?

²² Allan R. Millet, "Patterns of Military Innovation in the Interwar Period," in *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, ed. Williamson A. Murray and Allan R. Millet (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 332.

²³ Orville T. Murphy, "The American Revolutionary Army and the Concept of Levee en Masse," *Military Affairs* 23, no. 1 (Spring 1959): 20; Kruse, "Revolutionary France and the Meanings of Levee en Masse," 299.

One could argue that the American Revolution, fought before the French Revolution, is the real introduction of Nationalism. While it is true that Nationalism caused such a fundamental change in society and military operations, perhaps its origin is prior to France's revolt against their monarchy.²⁴

Regardless of where Nationalism first embedded itself in history, its emergence on mainland Europe caused widespread panic. The surrounding nations' Kings feared for their power and determined they must stop the French *levee en masse* before a flame ignited in their people as well. Even though mobilizing every citizen to play their part would give them larger numbers of men to fight their biddings, the idea of common people voicing their opinions and wanting to be heard was ultimately too dangerous a concept for the monarchies of Europe to consider. It was not until Napoleon and his forces annihilated the rest of Europe that other nations decided to adopt varied versions of Nationalism. This was not a simple process and was almost immediately stamped out in places like Prussia after Napoleon's fall from power for fear of their own internal revolution. Nonetheless, without this implementation and several nation's further acceptance of the citizen-soldier concept throughout the 19th century, war would be fought much differently today.²⁵

²⁴ Murphy, "The American Revolutionary Army and the Concept of Levee en Masse," 20.

²⁵ Jack A. Meyer, "Napoleon's Generalship Reconsidered, or Did Napoleon Really Blunder to Glory?," in *The Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1750-1850: Selected Papers, 1994*, ed. Ronald Caldwell et al. (Tallahassee: Institute on Napoleon and the French Revolution - Florida State University, 1994), 539-546.

There is no shortage of articles, books, and journals regarding the topic of Nationalism. When researched, the topics of conscription, total war, patriotism, and national service often garner discussion as well. Furthermore, it is heavily debated by historians about the draft and Selective Service. Often, the conversation is limited to the latter topics and concludes that the United States was correct in abolishing the draft and conscription. Some authors go as far as to say that Nationalism is the direct opposite of democracy and the two cannot exist together.²⁶ However, there are numerous historical examples during several American conflicts, when Nationalism prevailed, demonstrating the strength and solidarity of its populace. Although not conscripted or forced to do so, citizens and entire committees supported their country by means other than military service. Patriotic views and Nationalism inspired Americans to participate in things such as the Ground Observer Corps to warn fellow countrymen and women of imminent Soviet attack during the Cold War era.²⁷ One may argue that the voluntary nature made it that much more powerful, but as Clausewitz proposed, a military with its citizens backing is more powerful than one without support.

Nationalism has been an ideal deeply rooted in each of the United States' major conflicts. From the Revolutionary War to the Global War on Terror, American preservation of their way of life rallied men and women to fight. When outside ideas began to encroach on life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, Americans rallied to

²⁶ Marc Helbling, "Nationalism and Democracy: Competing or Complementary Logics?," *Living Reviews in Democracy* (November 2009): 7-9.

²⁷ David W. Mills, *Cold War in a Cold Land: Fighting Communism on the Northern Plains* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2015), 135-152.

support and defend their country. On the other hand, if there is no perceived threat, the people's support of the government and the military wane. That is, the government, military, and people no longer work in concert as a part of the paradoxical trinity suggested by Clausewitz.²⁸ This concept describes how the military, tasked to do the government's political and diplomatic bidding, should have the people's support in order to be successful. Throughout history, the United States' engagements demonstrated both good (World Wars) and bad examples (Vietnam) of the trinity, representing the strength of the nation when society works towards the greater good, and how division creates internal strife.

National Service Before the World Wars

In 1793, the French enacted the *levee en masse* to confront the threat of war both at home and with foreign enemies. This "institutionalizing of total war" was the beginning of national service as we know it today.²⁹ To determine how to remedy the current situation of divide within the United States, the conversation must start with the history of conscription.

Different legislation gave conscription different names throughout history and shaped it over time. An example of this is the Selective Service Act of 1948 changed to the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 and to the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 which all amendments passed through Congress. It is imperative to

²⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.

²⁹ Scott Lytle, "Robespierre, Danton, and the Levee en Masse," *The Journal of Modern History* 30, no. 4 (December 1958): 325-337.

recognize each piece of legislation and the reasoning behind each to understand how the United States evolved.

George Washington, the Founding Father of the United States and first president, firmly believed that citizens had an obligation to protect the country and keep its peace.³⁰ His *Sentiments on a Peace Establishment* in 1783, pondered national defense and its dependence on citizen-soldiers within the militia of each state. He was wary of large, standing armies as this could be used to promote tyranny, which he fought to overcome in the war with England.³¹ Although a volunteer system was in place, General Enoch Crowder later summarized that “it took seven years, with the aid of a foreign ally, for the American nation, then three million strong, to expel an invading force, the maximum strength of which was forty-two thousand men.”³² Even during the birth of the country, the leaders of the United States understood that legislation was needed to secure proper national defense, and reliance on volunteers would not guarantee this.

In 1789, Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution granted Congress the power “to raise and support Armies,” but militias preserved the laws of the union,

³⁰ Henry C. Dethloff and Gerald E. Shenk, *Citizen and Soldier: A Sourcebook on Military Service and National Defense from Colonial America to the Present* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2010).

³¹ George Washington, “Sentiments on a Peace Establishment,” in *Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799*, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, George Washington Bicentennial Commission, vol. 26 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1938), 374-398.

³² E. H. Crowder, *The Spirit of Selective Service* (New York: Century Company, 1920), 68-69; Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training*, 145.

suppressed insurrections, and repelled invasions.³³ The Uniform Militia Act of 1792 instituted a uniform militia throughout the United States. This legislation was the antecedent of what is now the National Guard and maintained the expectation and obligation of enrollment of all free white males from 18 to 45 years of age while exempting many state officials from service.³⁴ It also preserved the concept of universal military service by enabling men to arm and equip themselves and demonstrates how some of the United States' earliest laws spoke to the notion of universal obligation as a foundation for the country.³⁵

While publicizing the ratification of the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton suggested that even those who participated in the American Militia understand that their efforts alone did not result in the liberty of the country, and that large, prepared armies are what was necessary to defeat a disciplined force. The penning of *The Federalist Papers* displayed his support for the citizen-soldier and preparedness. "The Militia of the country is its natural bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the national defence" countered the argument, "we must receive the blow before we could even prepare to return it."³⁶ These ideas outlined what comprised the United States of America's national security and protection in the most cited resources for interpretation of the Constitution.

³³ *The Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 8*, accessed February 10, 2018, <http://constitutionus.com/>.

³⁴ Public Acts of the 2nd Cong., 1st sess., Chapter 33, *United States Statutes at Large, Volume 1*, 1845.

³⁵ Millet, Maslowski, and Feis, *For the Common Defense*, 83.

³⁶ Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Gary Wills (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 123-124.

Although attempts were made to raise an army through conscription following the War of 1812, the Civil War was the first United States conflict to utilize national level conscription. Both the Union and the Confederacy employed it, but initially it was not a successful practice to gain additional men; however, it largely influenced forced enlistments.³⁷ After the Confederacy introduced the Confederate Conscription Act in April 1862 to retain experienced soldiers, the United States Congress followed with their Act, authorizing a state militia to draft when it could not meet its quota with volunteers.³⁸ In 1863, the Conscription or Enrollment Act “for enrolling and calling out the national Forces, and for other Purposes,” then replaced this as the symbolic first national conscription law once state administration failed and thus redefined the character of the relationship between citizen and state.³⁹

Both the War of 1812 and the Civil War demonstrated failed attempts at raising an Army by a voluntary system. Had it not been for naval victories and simultaneous British engagements with Napoleon, the United States may have lost the War of 1812.⁴⁰ The burning of the capital also showed how ill-prepared the American military was and

³⁷ Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training*.

³⁸ Margaret Levi, “The Institution of Conscription,” *Social Science History* 20, no. 1 (1996): 144.

³⁹ *The Conscription Act of 1863*, 37th Cong., 3rd sess., Chapters 74, 75, 12 Stat. 731, 1863, accessed December 10, 2017, <http://legisworks.org/sal/12/stats/STATUTE-12-Pg731.pdf>; John W. Chambers, *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America* (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 51; Levi, “The Institution of Conscription,” 145.

⁴⁰ Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training*, 146.

the complications of a dual-purposed militia.⁴¹ Furthermore, both the Union and Confederacy adopted legislation to bolster their manpower after realizing neither side filled their quota authorizations. General James Oakes expressed his hope “that the great lessons of the war” would not be lost on the country and also prophesized the United States would execute another war more successfully and with greater advantages if these lessons are improved.⁴²

The Spanish-American War began the transition of the militia to a proper National Guard.⁴³ A poor showing of volunteers led to the standardization of equipment and training of the National Guard as a reserve force.⁴⁴ The isolationist mentality faded and ambitions rose as the United States stepped onto the global stage. Citizens and politicians now considered the defense of the country to be a national issue, not just a state or community affair, thus reaffirming the citizen-soldier tradition. After the *Maine* sank in Havana Harbour, the Volunteer Bill of 1898 raised the accepted number of volunteers to 125,000 because certain states refused to volunteer unless all their community’s men could join. By the end of the war, legislation reconstituted 225,000 state militiamen.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Marion Breunig, “A Tale of Two Cities: Washington and Baltimore during the War of 1812,” in *War in an Age of Revolution, 1775-1815*, ed. Roger Chickering and Stig Forster (Washington, DC: The German Historical Institute, 2010), 370.

⁴² Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training*, 149.

⁴³ Dethloff and Shenk, *Citizen and Soldier*, 58.

⁴⁴ Robert K. Griffith Jr., *The U.S. Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force 1968-1974* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History United States Army, 1997), 6.

⁴⁵ Dethloff and Shenk, *Citizen and Soldier*, 59.

The Dick Militia Act of 1903 divided the militias into two sub-components: state militia and National Guard, or the country's primary reserve force.⁴⁶ This act provided equipment, pay, allowances equal to that of those in the regular army while in national service and was also the first national recognition of conscientious objection. This language set a precedent for each of the Selective Service Acts to come by establishing specific verbiage to prevent the government from compelling those to serve who felt it violated their religious beliefs.⁴⁷

At the outbreak of World War I in Europe, American military and political leaders recognized they were woefully unprepared should the conflict spread to their borders. This revelation led to the Preparedness Movement and Plattsburg Camps, headed by Major General Wood and former President Theodore Roosevelt, sought to increase the Army's officer reserve strength by "establishing a number of 'civilian' military officer training camps" in Plattsburg, New York.⁴⁸ The camps would train citizens for six months in order to receive their commission and began the model of accelerated preparation of citizens into soldiers. However, the United States perceived no direct danger, declared its neutrality, and therefore did not build military capacity. It was only after the sinking of the *Lusitania* in 1915, the intercepted Zimmerman Telegram correspondence between Germany and Mexico in early 1917, and the return of

⁴⁶ Ibid., 63.

⁴⁷ *The Dick Militia Act of 1903*, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., Chapter 196, 32 Stat. 775-780 (1903), accessed December 9, 2017, <http://legisworks.org/sal/32/stats/STATUTE-32-Pg775.pdf>.

⁴⁸ Dethloff and Shenk, *Citizen and Soldier*, 70.

unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany that legislation was finally put forth to ready the United States for fighting in World War I.⁴⁹ Though, President Wilson originally called for a larger regular army backed by the Federal Reserve and National Guard, current events forced him to seek alternatives, leading to conscription after the outbreak of WWI.⁵⁰ The National Defense Act of 1916 was a pivotal piece of legislation in laying out the structure for the Army of the United States comprised of the Regular Army, Volunteer Army, Officers' Reserve Corps, Enlisted Reserve Corps, and the National Guard.⁵¹ It allowed the President to utilize the National Guard in time of war and increased the number of personnel in the regular Army from 127,588 to 286,000 and from 66,594 to 400,000 personnel in the National Guard.⁵² Furthermore, this act also established the Officer Reserve Corps trained through the Reserve Officer Training Corps, which provided direct commissions into the Army and Navy after successful completion of their colleges' commissioning program.⁵³

Upon comprehending Germany's effectiveness, the United States plainly understood that "no intelligently directed nation could afford to enter the conflict with

⁴⁹ Ralph Barton Perry, *The Plattsburg Movement* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1921), 25, 162-164.

⁵⁰ Griffith, *The U.S. Army's Transition to the All-Volunteer Force 1968-1974*, 6.

⁵¹ Dethloff and Shenk, *Citizen and Soldier*, 71.

⁵² *The National Defense Act of 1916*, 64th Cong., 1st sess., Chapter 134, 39 Stat. 166 (1916), accessed December 10, 2017, <http://www.legisworks.org/congress/64/publaw-85.pdf>.

⁵³ Dethloff and Shenk, *Citizen and Soldier*, 86.

less than its entire strength.”⁵⁴ In order to organize a nation in such a way, legislation was once again necessary to prosecute war and wartime industry effectively. Increased personnel strength was not the only requirement to prepare.

National Service During the World Wars

The Selective Service Act of 1917 was introduced shortly after the United States entered World War I to assist with obtaining personnel after the initial volunteer turnout was much lower than expected.⁵⁵ Additionally, it allowed for exemptions to service and prohibited purchased substitutions. The act established a “liability for military service of all male citizens,” and President Wilson echoed the draft, “is not only the drawing of men into the military service of the Government but the virtual assigning of men to the necessary labor of the country.”⁵⁶ These changes aimed to resolve issues with the Civil War era legislation and propose an effective and favored way forward that also mobilized the citizens. It was during this time in the United States history, the “human energy,” or people within the country, mobilized to “actually produce all the war materials we are to have for use in the war.”⁵⁷ Special 90-day Officer Training Schools produced over 80,000

⁵⁴ U.S. Provost Marshal General’s Bureau, *Report of the Provost Marshall General to the Secretary of War: On the First Draft under the Selective Service Act, 1917* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1918), 6.

⁵⁵ *The Selective Service Act of 1917*, 65th Cong., 1st sess., Chapter 15 (1917), accessed December 10, 2017, <http://www.legisworks.org/congress/65/publaw-12.pdf>.

⁵⁶ Levi, “The Institution of Conscription,” 146; Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 219.

⁵⁷ Harold G. Moulton, “Industrial Conscription,” *Journal of Political Economy* 25, no. 9 (1917): 917-945.

officers to lead soldiers during World War I; a model which stemmed from the Plattsburg training camps. The government looked at this as a process to provide citizens a chance to “work or fight” instead of just a mere draft.⁵⁸

An imbalance in the military and industrial aspects of wartime efforts could certainly send the nation down a path of destruction and defeat. If the United States sent too many soldiers to the frontlines, resulting in an insufficient amount back home to maintain the manufacturing of supplies needed, it would be disastrous towards victory. To hold the advantage over Germany, the United States military had to maintain a steady supply chain flowing to troops. Several leaders took notice of the “pernicious system” called recruiting for volunteers.⁵⁹ By continuing to accept volunteers, the United States Selective Service system did not work as it was designed. The system was meant to organize the procurement of recruits to ensure minimal negative effects to the industrial base or economy.⁶⁰ The failure to stop volunteering is noted as one of the challenges of 1917-1918.⁶¹

Once World War I ended, the National Defense Act of 1920 slowed the demobilization of the United States military forces by expanding the National Guard and Reserve Officer Training Corps programs despite decreasing the number of regular army

⁵⁸ Dethloff and Shenk, *Citizen and Soldier*, 98-99.

⁵⁹ U.S. Provost Marshal General’s Bureau, *U.S. Provost Marshall General, Second Report to the Secretary of War on the Operations of the Selective System to December 20, 1918* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1919), 13.

⁶⁰ George Q. Flynn, *Lewis B. Hershey, Mr. Selective Service* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 95.

⁶¹ Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training*, 155.

soldiers.⁶² Emerging pacifism and isolationist mentality began the downward trend for military funding. The United States' politicians fear of militarism, combined with the stock market crash in 1929 shrank the appetite regarding military expenditures. Additionally, the public perception was that military training programs bred militarism within the nation.⁶³

In 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt became President and brought the hope of stabilizing the United States through programs like the Civilian Conservation Corps. Although it competed for resources with the United States military, it provided “a significant pool for future military service.”⁶⁴ The Civilian Conservation Corps not only provided hope in an otherwise taxing time during American history, it also taught young men vocational skills and gave them an experience in character and overall citizenship and obligation to their country.⁶⁵ This public work example made a lasting impression upon the nation and those who took ownership and pride in creating a national treasure.⁶⁶

⁶² *The National Defense Act of 1920*, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., Chapter 227 (1920), accessed December 10, 2017, <http://www.legisworks.org/congress/66/publaw-242.pdf>.

⁶³ Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training*, 125-126, 285-286.

⁶⁴ Dethloff and Shenk, *Citizen and Soldier*, 101.

⁶⁵ Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training*, 2-4.

⁶⁶ Harris Wofford, “The Politics of Service,” in *United We Serve: National Service and the Future of Citizenship*, ed. E. J. Dionne Jr., Kayla Meltzer Drogoosz, and Robert E. Litan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 46; Harry C. Boyte, “Public Work and the Dignity Politics,” in *United We Serve: National Service and the Future of Citizenship*, ed. E. J. Dionne Jr., Kayla Meltzer Drogoosz, and Robert E. Litan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 257.

The interwar years between World War I and II showed how American's were apprehensive of altering the existing state of affairs and left their policies unintegrated with their allies. Additionally, the United States reduced military spending because appetite the for war ceased. The politics of each nation, although "responsive to economic and domestic social issues," dominated its ability to progress.⁶⁷ The failure to learn from past experience and move the military forward or innovate had a direct impact on the United States entry into World War II and its appeasement of Germany leading up to 1939.⁶⁸

When Germany conquered France in 1940, support for a peacetime draft throughout the United States soared. Some United States citizens felt it was inevitable that the country would enter the war, while others did not want to involve themselves in the business of Europe. Nonetheless, the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, which required males between 18 to 35 to register, became the first conscription effort to take place during peacetime.⁶⁹ If selected by lottery, men would serve twelve months of duty beginning in October 1940. Once the United States entered the war, modifications were made to this act, as many Americans volunteered after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Ultimately, Presidential Executive Order 9279 in December 1942 stopped volunteering

⁶⁷ Millet, "Patterns of Military Innovation in the Interwar Period," 333.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 333-335.

⁶⁹ *The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940*, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., Chapters 719, 720, 54 Stat. 885 (1940), accessed December 10, 2017, <http://www.legisworks.org/congress/76/publaw-783.pdf>; Millet, Maslowski, and Feis, *For the Common Defense*, 370.

for all those qualified for service under the Selective Service Law, to maintain an orderly and “most effective mobilization” process.⁷⁰

Both World War I and World War II revealed reasons to prohibit volunteering at the beginning of each conflict. Primarily, it disrupted the Selective Service draft process. Another reason demonstrated during World War I was that it created an “us versus them” complex. Society viewed soldiers differently if they volunteered vice waited their turn to be called by the lottery. Moreover, the Army characterized both types of service differently and this lent itself to issues within the organization. Lastly, waiting until volunteering slowed to initiate the lottery was an ineffective manning policy and went against disturbing the industrial structure as little as possible.⁷¹

The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 also provisioned for Conscientious Objectors. Section 5 states, “nothing contained in this Act shall be constructed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the land and naval forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.”⁷² This instituted the program of Civilian Public Service from 1941 to 1947 and what is now known as

⁷⁰ Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training*, 159; Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Executive Order 9279,” The American Presidency Project, last modified December 5, 1942, accessed April 26, 2018, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=60973>.

⁷¹ Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 87, 126, 187.

⁷² *The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940*.

Alternative Service Program, “so all may serve” their country in some capacity.⁷³

Although excused from military service, the government required them to “perform their duty to the nation through civilian work of national importance” such as service as a guinea pig in scientific labs.⁷⁴

Defense of the nation took on many different forms, giving other citizens the opportunity to serve their country in different capacities. Women and many minorities answered the call of their nation during World War II. In 1940, the War Department accepted ten percent of African-Americans, or roughly the same proportion of the national population. The establishment of the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps and other women’s Naval reserve units in 1942 paved the way for women’s service and foretold what was to come several decades later. Although initially not recognized by military status, a change by Congress in 1943 to the Women’s Army Corps continued to facilitate progress for women. Approximately 100,000 women served, but competition from industry in the face of labor shortages and male opposition hindered reaching full authorization of 150,000 within the Women’s Army Corps.⁷⁵

⁷³ Selective Service System, “Background of the Selective Service System,” accessed December 13, 2017, <https://www.sss.gov/About/History-And-Records/Background-Of-Selective-Service>.

⁷⁴ Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training*, 309-310.

⁷⁵ Dethloff and Shenk, *Citizen and Soldier*, 115.

President Roosevelt also targeted non-citizens for service. The Second War Powers Act of 1942 promised United States citizenship to all non-citizens who served.⁷⁶ Numerous Japanese-American and Filipino men enlisted under these conditions. In addition, the government adopted the Bracero Program in which they hired millions of Mexicans to fulfill agricultural labor roles vacated by men who went to war.⁷⁷

National Service after the World Wars

By 1946, the United States stopped drafting new inductees and began to demobilize. Following World War II, President Truman advocated for Universal Military Training as a means of preparing the United States for any future conflicts like the emerging Soviet threat. He referenced the lack of readiness at the commencement of the two previous wars and used this to fuel his argument as to why citizens and the country needed this training. America obtained a new role after World War II and “it could not be sustained without adequate manpower which meant either Universal Military Training or continuation of the draft.”⁷⁸ Additionally, the Korean War and start of the Cold War with the Soviet Union served as two real-world reasons justifying his proposal. President Truman and General George C. Marshall were the two most enthusiastic proponents for Universal Military Training. General Marshall made it the “principal subject” in his final

⁷⁶ *Second War Powers Act of 1942*, 77th Cong., 1st sess., Chapter 199, 56 Stat. 176 (1942), accessed December 10, 2017, <http://legisworks.org/congress/77/publaw-507.pdf>.

⁷⁷ Bracero History Archive, “About,” accessed April 29, 2018, <http://braceroarchive.org/about>.

⁷⁸ Flynn, *Lewis B. Hershey, Mr. Selective Service*, 143.

report as Army Chief of Staff and continued to promote it as Secretary of State.⁷⁹ Despite their fierce support of the proposed bills, neither President Truman nor Secretary Marshall were able to see the legislation through to policy.

Significant changes in the restructuring of the United States military agencies also took place after the war. The National Security Act of 1947 laid the groundwork and provided the template for what we know as today's Department of Defense. This Act merged the War Department and the Department of the Navy into the National Military Establishment.⁸⁰ Additionally, it created the Air Force as an equal service and department, repositioned out from under the Army Air Corps.⁸¹ Lastly, it established the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Council to synchronize intelligence efforts to protect the nation against attacks such as Pearl Harbor.

In 1948, President Truman signed an executive order to racially integrate the Armed Forces in his first of three developments influencing the United States military for the next few decades. First, he signed Executive Order 9981, which called for "equality

⁷⁹ George C. Marshall, *Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services on Universal Military Training*, Day 1, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., March 17, 1948, accessed January 7, 2018, 4-33, <https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/universal-military-training/>.

⁸⁰ Office of the Historian, "Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations, 1945-1952," accessed February 11, 2018, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/national-security-act>.

⁸¹ *The National Security Act of 1947*, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Chapter 343, 61 Stat. 495 (1947), accessed December 10, 2017, <http://www.legisworks.org/congress/80/publaw-253.pdf>.

of treatment and opportunity for all persons” serving in the military.⁸² Next, President Truman asked Congress to renew the draft. And finally, he commissioned a review of labor resources, which led to the ready reserves.⁸³ The uncertainty of the world’s stability, highlighted by the Korea War and even more so by the Cold War, led to the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. The Truman Doctrine promised American aid to Greece and Turkey once the British withdrew theirs and the Marshall Plan supported the European reconstruction to prevent economic collapse.⁸⁴ With both of these policies, the United States dedicated itself to quelling communist expansion by aiding democratic nations and restoring the balance of power in Europe. Set to expire in 1950, the Selective Service Act of 1948 was reauthorized in 1951 as the Universal Military Training and Service Act, namely because of events in Korea.⁸⁵ Measures of hasty preparedness would continue to be the trend of managing conflicts. Real-world events made it extremely difficult to assess the possibility of long-term Universal Military Training and extensions, and renaming of previous legislation became the United States defense strategy.

⁸² Harry S. Truman, “Executive Order 9981,” Executive Orders Harry S. Truman 1945-1953, last modified July 26, 1948, accessed January 8, 2018, <https://www.trumanlibrary.org/9981a.htm>.

⁸³ Dethloff and Shenk, *Citizen and Soldier*, 129.

⁸⁴ Barton Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, eds., *The Truman Administration: A Documentary History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 251-259.

⁸⁵ Michael Ray, “Selective Service Acts, History, Significance, and Facts,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed February 10, 2018, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Selective-Service-Acts>.

In 1967, Congress renamed the Universal Military Training and Service Act as the Military Selective Service Act.⁸⁶ President Lyndon B. Johnson, facing pressure during the Vietnam War, commissioned a review into the Selective Service program and discovered that the local board process was entirely too subjective. The Marshall commission discovered that there existed a perceived ability to defer based on status or college enrollment which unfairly placed the majority of the service burden upon the lower classes.⁸⁷ The resulting legislation sought to improve and standardize the process for draft selection to avoid perceptions of unjust deferments and stifle protests throughout the country. This Act was later amended in 1969 to “authorize modifications of the system of selecting persons for induction into the Armed Forces,” returning it to lottery selection by President Richard Nixon.⁸⁸ Furthermore, President Nixon appointed another commission to consider an All-Volunteer Force and in 1970, the Gates Commission’s findings supported enactment as well as many improvements to military life.⁸⁹ In 1973, the Department of Defense suspended the draft, and with it, the Military Selective Service Act expired. The United States has not conscripted Soldiers into the military since this time.

⁸⁶ 50 USC Ch. 49, *Military Selective Service*, accessed December 13, 2017, <http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title50/chapter49&edition=prelim>.

⁸⁷ Griffith, *The U.S. Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force 1968-1974*, 12.

⁸⁸ *The Selective Service Amendment Act of 1969*, 91st Cong., 1st sess., Chapter 220, 83 Stat. (1969), accessed December 10, 2017, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-83/pdf/STATUTE-83-Pg220.pdf>.

⁸⁹ Griffith, *The U.S. Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force 1968-1974*, 13.

President Gerald Ford terminated the Selective Service Act requiring registration of all male citizens in 1975. However, in 1980, President Jimmy Carter rebooted the Military Selective Service Act, reinstating the requirement for all males to register with the Selective Service System.⁹⁰ This five-year hiatus period occurred following criticism during Vietnam and ended because of threats taking place in the Middle East. Today, all male citizens and immigrants, ages 18 to 25 must register and would be called upon to serve in the event of an emergency.⁹¹

Summary

Over a two hundred year history, the United States policy on conscription continuously changed to clarify and reflect the nation's military needs. Since 1776, politicians, citizens, and even military members debated the most beneficial policy for the country. There are several reasons the United States did not adopt Universal Military Training, and this ultimately led to an all-volunteer force.

Historical evidence indicates the nationalist or patriotic mentality grows if attacked and significantly fades once war ends. Additionally, the United States has a tendency to withdraw across the oceans that protect its borders and adopt an isolationist mentality to worry solely about issues affecting Americans, disengaged from meddling in European or other allies' affairs. To accompany this isolationist mindset, Americans further assumed a passive attitude towards any future conflict, rendering them incapable of capitalizing on lessons learned or plan for the future. Each of these in conjunction with

⁹⁰ Ray, "Selective Service Acts, History, Significance, and Facts."

⁹¹ Selective Service System, "Background of the Selective Service System."

two-party politics, responsive to their constituents' disputes, resulted in the downfall of Universal Military Training.⁹²

The United States cannot afford to wait until conflict begins to establish a well thought out manning policy, conscription or volunteer. Repeated overreliance on volunteerism is something each of the United States previous conflicts confirmed as a weak policy. To uphold agreements with allies and defense of its citizens, the United States military cannot rely on their pre-World War II manning strategy. If the nation resolves “to extend the prohibition to the raising of armies in time of peace, the United States would then exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle, which the world has yet seen—that of a nation incapacitated by its constitution to prepare for defense, before it was actually invaded.”⁹³

Throughout United States history, nationalism, conscription, and service have been woven into the fabric of the nation. President Washington understood the significance of citizens defending their country even at its inception. Presidents and lawmakers reviewed and changed legislation over time to adapt to the changing needs and threats to America's security. Senior officials and military generals found themselves on both sides of the argument for Universal Military Training and Service. The security of the United States must remain at the forefront of each citizen's mind, and democracy cannot thrive without every citizen's participation and willingness to protect it.

⁹² Millet, “Patterns of Military Innovation in the Interwar Period,” 333.

⁹³ Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, 123.

The next two chapters guide the reader through the Universal Military Training proposals central to the military manpower query. The author leads with the period immediately prior to World War I and follows up with the period immediately following World War II. The proponents in favor of and opposed to applied or manipulated the aforementioned legislation to shape the outcome of preparedness as a result of political deliberation. Both sides of the argument are presented in an orderly fashion to highlight the opinions of the time.

CHAPTER 3

PRE-WORLD WAR I POLICY OF UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING

A prominent Englishmen recently wrote me, saying that ‘if we had listened to Lord Roberts we should have been ready now. The pacifists and the opponents of preparedness were always asking Lord Roberts, “Who are you getting ready to fight?” We have our answer now. I notice that a similar class of people are asking in the United States “whom are you getting ready to fight?” No one can tell, but someday you will have an answer.’ We are not getting ready to fight any particular people. Our preparedness is against war with any people.

—Major General Leonard Wood,
“Statement for the House Committee on Military Affairs”

This chapter focuses on the Preparedness Movement before World War I. First, it discusses the political environment leading up to the war and the United States frame of mind before entering the war. Then, the chapter transitions to the proponents for Preparedness through Universal Military Training and main points on the topic. Next, it proceeds to those arguing against the movement and their reasons for disapproval. Lastly, it moves on to assess the proposal’s overall military effectiveness before offering a conclusion as to why this proposal was ultimately denied.

Political Environment preceding World War I

In 1912, the United States Army General Staff released to the public an executive document, *The Organization of the Land Forces of the United States*, which focused on the lack of “adequate reserve force with prewar training.” It further claimed that “the United States could not fight a major war without reserves from the citizenry,” and warned the nation would not receive ample time to prepare and train forces in future

wars.⁹⁴ However, it was an election year and soon-to-be President Wilson did not view reforming land forces as an important national issue.

The United States “as a whole remained wedded to the myth of the militia and the volunteer principle.”⁹⁵ Nonetheless, there were those that felt reliance on volunteers was not a permanent solution and the United States should adopt a more organized manning approach. The Preparedness Movement, spearheaded by Major General Wood and former-President Theodore Roosevelt, was an overall plan to defend the nation and demonstrate democratic, civic traditions. The Plattsburg Camps, as they came to be known, started out on a small scale in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania and Monterrey, California and grew as curiosity and approval of preparedness and military training cemented amongst the citizens.⁹⁶ Major General Wood chose to use his remaining time as Chief of Staff of the Army to sponsor “summer military training camps for college students,” identifying “company grade officers” as the most critical shortage in wartime.⁹⁷

In 1911, cadet training programs had 29,000 participants, in which Major General Wood saw promise, and expanded the initiative to create two six-week “Students’

⁹⁴ Millet, Maslowski, and Feis, *For the Common Defense*, 305.

⁹⁵ Griffith, *The U.S. Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force 1968-1974*, 6.

⁹⁶ John Garry Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913-1920* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1972), 1.

⁹⁷ Millet, Maslowski, and Feis, *For the Common Defense*, 305.

Military Instruction Camps” for college students in 1913.⁹⁸ By then, the number of participants who received some type of military training increased to more than 30,000. Major General Wood “first pictured it as a device for coordinating instruction in the land-grant schools,” providing a common operating picture for all.⁹⁹ In 1914, he held four camps, enrolling 667 students at Monterrey, California; Ludington, Michigan; Asheville, North Carolina; and Fort Ethan Allen in Burlington, Vermont.¹⁰⁰ Citizens paid their own expenses and received citizenship and policy indoctrination, in addition to technical military training.¹⁰¹ Initially, Major General Wood considered the camps more than just a defense objective. He believed these camps could be a “most subtle engine” to focus on the “implanting of a sound military policy” and drive reform.¹⁰²

The War to End All Wars jumpstarted the American trajectory toward world power. Europe kept peace for almost one hundred years, but the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in 1914 set off a series of events that completely changed history and led to one of the deadliest wars known to mankind. Although America vowed to remain neutral and not interfere in European affairs, it did not stop politicians and citizens from expressing varying opinions on the matter, especially regarding the United States’ defense. Many desired a small, regular Army force backed by a reserve force.

⁹⁸ Millet, Maslowski, and Feis, *For the Common Defense*, 305; Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers*, 1.

⁹⁹ Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers*, 12-14.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 24-25.

¹⁰¹ Millet, Maslowski, and Feis, *For the Common Defense*, 306.

¹⁰² Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers*, 2, 14.

However, some felt the “preparedness policy contained policy contradictions and antagonistic goals.”¹⁰³ In spite of these divergences, all could agree that it “represented the first time that defense policy in peacetime influenced American politics and involved more people than a limited policymaking elite.”¹⁰⁴

In 1915, Major General Wood continued the camps at five locations, this time enrolling nearly 4,000 citizen volunteers.¹⁰⁵ Additionally, he decided to conduct a “Business Men’s Camp” for men in their twenties and thirties in Plattsburg, New York. Major General Wood knew he was onto something after the successful first summer, enrolling 1,200 businessmen.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Millet, Maslowski, and Feis, *For the Common Defense*, 304.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers*, 61; Millet, Maslowski, and Feis, *For the Common Defense*, 306.

¹⁰⁶ Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers*, 57-60, 71.



Figure 1. Plattsburg Posters

Source: Michael E. Hanlon, “The Plattsburg Movement Where General Pershing Found His Officers,” *Roads to the Great War*, last modified July 10, 2013, accessed May 1, 2018, <http://roadstothegreatwar-ww1.blogspot.com/2013/07/where-did-general-pershing-find-all.html>.

As the Great War went on, the division between the pacifists and the preparedness advocates increased. President Wilson “favored cutting back military and naval expenditures for the coming fiscal year” in January 1915.¹⁰⁷ President Roosevelt’s speech to trainees: “to treat elocution as a substitute for action, to rely on high-sounding words unbacked by deeds, is proof of a mind that dwells only in the realm of shadow and shame” was an undeniable jab at President Wilson and his policies in August 1915.¹⁰⁸

Initially, the training camp planning was conducted in Major General Wood’s office, but once this was discovered, it was moved out immediately. Grenville Clark, a

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 44.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 85.

prominent lawyer, and his American Legion and Military Training Camps Association contacts took over the camps and movement in 1916, and it reached between 10,000 and 16,200 volunteers at ten to twelve different camps.¹⁰⁹ The Plattsburg Camps demonstrated a “depth of interest in military training” and presented Congress with proof that portions of the public were willing to make sacrifices to ensure peacetime preparedness.¹¹⁰ No one could object to the values it projected: increased civic responsibility, “role of military service in reducing class, ethnic, and regional antagonisms,” and preparing “American youth for leadership.”¹¹¹

The Military Training Camps Association also had a hand in the important military legislation of 1916. The National Defense Act of 1916 secured provisions for the Plattsburg training camps although it gave up a separate federal reserve. Their compromise led to appropriations for the “cost of uniforms, food, and transportation,” directly influencing and increasing citizens’ participation.¹¹² They firmly believed that “if the camps were to become democratic in fact as well as in spirit, persons of every social class should be able to attend.”¹¹³ What started as a broadening influence for the elite

¹⁰⁹ Millet, Maslowski, and Feis, *For the Common Defense*, 306; Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers*, 152.

¹¹⁰ Millet, Maslowski, and Feis, *For the Common Defense*, 306.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers*, 144, 117.

¹¹³ Ibid., 130.

class of northeastern businessmen, spread throughout the country.¹¹⁴ Support for citizen military training was truly bipartisan.



Figure 2. Military Training Camps Association Poster

Source: Greenwich Faces the Great War, "Military Preparedness," accessed March 17, 2018, <http://greenwichfacesthegreatwar.org/military-preparedness.php>.

The sinking of the *Lusitania* in 1915, the raid by Pancho Villa into Texas in 1916, and the discovery of the Zimmerman Telegram in 1917 drove support for United States

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 28.

entry into World War I. By 1917, the Plattsburg Movement transitioned to the Plattsburg Idea, and encompassed “all organized efforts to prepare civilians for service in time of war.”¹¹⁵ Even the Navy wanted to be part of the Plattsburg Idea. Then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, wanted to “offer summer training cruises” to build the naval reserve.¹¹⁶ The support was at an all-time high as President Wilson declared war and considered proposed legislation to raise the Armed Forces. Imitators of groups supporting universal military training sprung up in New York and other parts of the country. Those who attended previous Plattsburg Camps voiced their opinion and attempted to persuade legislators. In the end, President Wilson also compromised. Men would be “chosen upon the principle of universal liability of service” but only for “the period of the existing emergency.”¹¹⁷ This disappointed those who desired a permanent resolution to military manpower.

Despite President Wilson “not now preparing of contemplating war or any step that need lead to it,” the Plattsburgh Camps served as the basis for a plan to commission officers.¹¹⁸ The mobilization planning for World War I eventually came together, but it could have come much sooner had the United States prepared. The United States Army entered the war just 250,000 soldiers strong, compared to the 1,000,000 recommended.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵ Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers*, 181.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 182.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 223-224.

¹¹⁸ Walter Millis, *Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History* (New York: Van Rees Press, 1956), 233.

¹¹⁹ Chambers, *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America*, 149.

Less than a year later, the National Defense Act of 1916 was supplemented with the Selective Service Act of 1917 to conscript after volunteer efforts failed. The rapid need to augment the law signified how unprepared the country was upon declaring war. Further exposing this weakness, Major General Wood testified that “the time it has taken us to get ready to put out a moderate supply of rifles has been longer than the duration of the average modern war.”¹²⁰ The military institution almost had to be entirely rebuilt from the ground up.¹²¹

Those in Favor of Universal Military Training

The Plattsburg Movement had many advocates within business and political spheres of influence, but it also grew amongst the population at large. Leading the charge for preparedness was Major General Wood and his fellow Rough Rider, former President Theodore Roosevelt. However, affluent men such as Clark gave Universal Military Training a bipartisan purpose and identity that men from all over the country could stand behind.

Born in New Hampshire, Major General Wood held a significant part in shaping the United States outlook regarding military reform and preparedness.¹²² Following his commencement from Harvard Medical School, he began his career in the army in 1885 as

¹²⁰ Wood, *Universal Military Training*, 259.

¹²¹ Millis, *Arms and Men*, 235-236.

¹²² Jack C. Lane, “Wood, Leonard,” American National Bibliography Online, February 2000, accessed March 19, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1093/anb/9780198606697.article.0600730>.

an assistant surgeon.¹²³ His military career was undoubtedly extensive as a Medal of Honor winner, Rough Rider, colonial administrator, and Chief of Staff of the Army, all within twenty-five years.¹²⁴ His service to the United States groomed him for passionate sponsorship of Universal Military Training.

During his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee in December 1916, Major General Wood described how he envisioned the country's preparedness:

Let us assume that we are boys of 19 and are going to take out training this year, beginning the first of May, because we want our six months during the good weather season, as the life is to be in camp and all our time devoted to intensive training. We receive six months of intensive training and then return to our homes. On July 1 of the year in which we become 21 we report to the regiment or other organization to which we have been assigned. It will necessarily be an organization of the arm for which our training has fitted us.

We receive from 20 to 30 days, preferably 30, of intensive training—a course of repetition. We remain in the regiment or organization until the 30th of June of the following year, the year in which we become 22. We then pass into that portion of the first line or first group of citizen soldiery which includes all men up to their 29th year.¹²⁵

His plan for the United States defense included professional, Regular Army soldiers backed by “a citizenry trained to arms,” just as President Wilson suggested in his earlier speech.¹²⁶ He did not believe the National Guard, under its current construct, could provide the reserve force necessary for national defense.

¹²³ Leonard Wood, “Universal Military Training,” in *National Service Library: Universal Military Training*, ed. Charles E. Kilbourne, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: P. F. Collier and Sons, 1917), 11.

¹²⁴ Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers*, 3.

¹²⁵ Wood, *Universal Military Training*, 145.

¹²⁶ Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers*, 82.

Into the spring of 1917, Major General Wood continued to campaign actively for universal training. It was at this time, just before the United States entry into World War I, that President Wilson removed him from command of the Eastern Department. His talents would not be used in Europe. President Wilson, although somewhat adopting Major General Wood's view, chose to execute "the principle of civilian control of the military" and deal with this unmanageable general officer.

President Theodore Roosevelt was born in New York in 1858. Like Major General Wood, he also graduated from Harvard. Following this, he entered Columbia Law School and developed a fascination of the naval battles of 1812, on which he published a book. He was captivated by Alfred Thayer Mahan's idea that only the nation with the greatest fleet could, control the oceans, defend its borders, and apply diplomacy.¹²⁷ He maintained a very ambitious political career with positions as President of New York City Police Commissioners, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Governor of New York, Vice President, and ultimately President of the United States.¹²⁸

In 1898, President Roosevelt resigned as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy in order to form a volunteer Cavalry Regiment with then-Colonel Wood.¹²⁹ Later known as The Rough Riders, then-Colonel Roosevelt led troops during the Spanish-American War,

¹²⁷ Peter Karsten, "The Nature of 'Influence:' Roosevelt, Mahan, and the Concept of Sea Power," *American Quarterly* 23, no. 4 (October 1971): 585-600.

¹²⁸ Theodore Roosevelt Association, "Brief Biography," accessed March 19, 2018, http://www.theodoreroosevelt.org/site/c.elKSIdOWIiJ8H/b.8684643/k.9DB0/Brief_Biography.htm.

¹²⁹ Theodore Roosevelt Association, "The Soldier," accessed March 19, 2018, <http://www.theodoreroosevelt.org/site/pp.aspx?c=elKSIdOWIiJ8H&b=8344381>.

demonstrating the success of a citizen-soldier volunteer unit. Afterward, he returned to political life. While serving as the Vice President, Roosevelt became the youngest American president after the assassination of President William McKinley in 1901.¹³⁰ During his tenure as President of the United States, he maintained his diplomatic policy of: “Speak softly and carry a big stick—you will go far.”¹³¹

Clark is one of the lesser-known men to shape the Preparedness Movement and further contributed his efforts after World War II. Born in New Hampshire, he attended Harvard University and became a lawyer on Wall Street in 1906. One of the first projects Clark assumed was that of the Plattsburg Camps in 1915. Although Major General Wood was more publicly recognized, Clark diligently worked behind the scenes to further the movement's agenda. Described as the “statesman incognito,” he devoted his time and service to lobbying for the “particular impulses of the national conscience.”¹³²

Brigadier General John M. Palmer held one of the strongest ties to the movement, spanning across both World Wars. He grew up in Springfield, Illinois and graduated as part of the West Point class of 1892. Brigadier General Palmer served on the General Staff under General John J. Pershing, where he first proposed a reorganization of the Army. It was because of his work on this topic that, in 1941, after a fifteen-year break in

¹³⁰ Theodore Roosevelt Association, “Brief Biography.”

¹³¹ Nathan Miller, *Theodore Roosevelt: A Life* (New York: Morrow, 1992), 337.

¹³² Emily Mace, “Clark, Grenville (1882-1967),” Harvard Square Library, last modified July 28, 2012, accessed March 18, 2018, <http://www.harvardsquarelibrary.org/biographies/grenville-clark/>.

service, General Marshall reactivated him from retirement to continue his work and advisement of the administration.¹³³

The main advocates for Preparedness through Universal Military Training felt strongly about two things. One, that the country was unprepared should the United States be destined for war. Two, if the United States went to war, it should be the duty of its citizens to serve in her time of need. In late 1916, Major General Wood reported to Congress that “we have no defense adequate to meet any attack by a great power.”¹³⁴ He continued, “universal military training . . . exemplifies the basic principle of democracy; that is, that equality of obligation goes hand in hand with equality of opportunity and privilege. This principle is the very foundation of the republic.”¹³⁵ The comments presented by Major General Wood exhibit not only his opinions, but that of which the United States was founded. During a speech at the New York State Fair in 1903, then-President Roosevelt stated, “The welfare of each of us is dependent fundamentally upon the welfare of all of us.”¹³⁶ His remarks conclude that the burden of civic duty fell to each citizen, which was the objective of Universal Military Training. Both men went on to

¹³³ John M. Palmer, “John McAuley Palmer Papers,” last modified 2013, accessed March 18, 2018, <http://rs5.loc.gov/service/mss/eadxmlmss/eadpdfmss/2010/ms010233.pdf>.

¹³⁴ Wood, *Universal Military Training*, 119.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Theodore Roosevelt Association, “Quotations from the Speeches and Other Works of Theodore Roosevelt,” accessed March 19, 2018, http://www.theodore-roosevelt.org/site/c.elKSIdOWliJ8H/b.9297493/k.7CB9/Quotations_from_the_speeches_and_other_works_of_Theodore_Roosevelt.htm.

criticize and apply pressure to the administration, and ultimately Major General Wood's outspokenness on the policy ended his career.

Individual Benefit

As United States constituents considered the topic of Universal Military Training, many reasons presented themselves in favor. Of the arguments, three stood out among the rest regarding individual benefit. The disciplinary value, the consolidating of citizens under core civic principles, and training for battle best embodied the reasons to adopt Universal Military Training.

The Swiss System of conscription for military forces, from which the United States mirrored its own concept, had a reserve of citizen-soldiers which were dual-purposed to their Cantons and their federal government, reporting at the age of twenty for service.¹³⁷ This system did not divert attention away from studies or occupation so the trainee may focus entirely on military training. Therefore, Universal Military Training provides "better conceptions of discipline, organization and . . . responsibility."¹³⁸ These benefits provided by military training would bolster success once soldiers entered the workforce as well.

One of the most highly regarded civic principles is a citizen's obligation to serve their country. In 1916, Henry Breckinridge, the Assistant Secretary of War, stated Universal Military Training would solidify the United States as "a real melting pot, under

¹³⁷ Lucien Howe, *Universal Military Education and Service: The Swiss System for the United States*, 2nd ed. (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1917), 36-39.

¹³⁸ John McAuley Palmer, *The Army of the People: The Constitution of an Effective Force of Trained Citizens* (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1916), 9-10.

which the fire is hot enough to fuse the elements into one common mess of Americanism.”¹³⁹ During this time, the United States received many immigrants, and this training could assimilate or integrate the workers and families into their new nation. This common thread could bring everyone together under democracy.

American patriot Major General Henry Lee III was quoted as saying, “that government is a murderer of its citizens which sends them to the field uninformed and untaught, where they are to meet men of the same age and strength, mechanized by education and discipline for battle.”¹⁴⁰ The Plattsburg Camps provided a means for men to receive training, not just as individuals, but as part of an organized unit. Most Americans could support conscription during wartime but were opposed to the idea under peacetime conditions. This exposed the average American’s lack of understanding towards preparation. “Modern war gives no time for preparation. Its approach is that of the avalanche and not of the glacier,” commented Major General Wood.¹⁴¹

National Benefit

Since the movement called itself Preparedness, the singular most important motive to implement Universal Military Training was national defense. This invariably

¹³⁹ Henry Breckenridge, “Solving the Hyphen,” *Forum*, 55 (November 1916): 583-588.

¹⁴⁰ Leonard Wood, *The Military Obligation of Citizenship* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1915), 62-63.

¹⁴¹ Finnegan, *Against the Specter of a Dragon*, 190.

tied itself to the leveling influence advocates also spoke of.¹⁴² Moreover, just as common civic principles advantage the individual, collectively that benefit grows as a unified nation.

When President Wilson announced the United States would join the war, he did so to “make the world safe for democracy.”¹⁴³ Nonetheless, Army General Staff understood, “the army which went to war was an obsolete one, organized on pre-1914 lines and underequipped.”¹⁴⁴ The President’s position to remain neutral and appeal to that segment of the population inevitably put the United States behind in its preparation. Although, Major General Wood and others tried to convince Congress and the President that “organization for war after war is upon us” was an unwise policy, the United States continued down this path.¹⁴⁵ The disconnect between the military and its’ civilian politicians was further exploited when California Representative Julius Kahn asked Major General Wood if he could train each soldier more than half a year before sending them to Europe. He matter-of-factly replied, “If you could spend even six months’ time in doing that, it would be because the enemy had gone to sleep.”¹⁴⁶ This diverse understanding of the reality of war troubled those for preparedness.

¹⁴² Unknown, *Universal Military Training-No!*, 1919, E-book, accessed March 20, 2018, https://www.forgottenbooks.com/en/books/UniversalMilitaryTrainingNo_10137874.13.

¹⁴³ Finnegan, *Against the Specter of a Dragon*, 188.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 189.

¹⁴⁵ Wood, *Universal Military Training*, 257.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 267.

The Preparedness Movement rested on the principles of those who created the country. One of its aims was to reduce division across the nation. Major General Wood declared:

Real democracy rests upon one fundamental principle, and that is that equality of opportunity and privilege goes hand in hand with equality of obligation. In war as well as peace; that suffrage demands obligation for service, not necessarily in the ranks, but wherever it can best be rendered. The army to-day is the army of the people.¹⁴⁷

Universal Military Training provided a common purpose for the American people. In fact, “the whole idea of separate class interests is an illusion and, if cherished, fatal to the welfare of all classes.” Preparedness inclined individuals maintained that “education, in citizen participation in government, and in a sense of the duty of citizenship” would create togetherness that the United States needed to “Americanize” everyone.¹⁴⁸

Those Opposed to Universal Military Training

For as many citizens who supported Universal Military Training, there were just as many against it. Whichever side the leader of the country remains will likely be the side that wins. Woodrow Wilson served as President of the United States throughout the entirety of World War I. He disagreed with Wood, Roosevelt, Clark, and other Preparedness Movement supporters but would also make speeches favoring certain aspects of the concept. He was hopeful the United States could mediate the conflict in Europe, and the Germans would be too exhausted to attack the country for many years.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ Wood, “Universal Military Training,” 94.

¹⁴⁸ Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 92.

¹⁴⁹ Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers*, 45.

Despite campaigning on keeping America out of the war, he bowed to political pressure. The 1915 *Lusitania* sinking “converted Wilson to preparedness” and roused general support producing the termination of diplomatic relations with Germany after they reignited their unrestricted submarine warfare strategy in 1917.¹⁵⁰

Born in Virginia, President Wilson attended what is now known as Princeton University. Upon graduation in 1879, he attended law school but finally settled at Johns Hopkins University for his Doctorate after bouts with illness.¹⁵¹ Nicknamed the “schoolmaster,” President Wilson’s academic study of politics never focused on anything outside domestic affairs. His “watchful waiting” policy reflected the lack of international diplomatic policy and demonstrated the President’s lack of knowledge regarding military matters.¹⁵² This clashed with aggressive preparedness types like Major General Wood and former President Roosevelt.

President Wilson’s support of the Plattsburg camps in September 1913 began as a practical endeavor in which, “the camps will also tend to disseminate sound information concerning our military history and the present policy of the Government in military matters.”¹⁵³ He also acknowledged the men would receive a considerable amount of military instruction to prepare them in case their services should ever be necessary. Nevertheless, during his annual message in December 1914, President Wilson did not

¹⁵⁰ Millet, Maslowski, and Feis, *For the Common Defense*, 304.

¹⁵¹ John M. Mulder, *Woodrow Wilson: The Years of Preparation. Wilson Supplemental Volumes* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), 71-72.

¹⁵² Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers*, 47, 26, 45.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 421.

associate the training camps with that of military reform and dismissed the Plattsburg Movement for overall national defense. Instead, he felt much of it was based on partisanship and announced, “we shall not alter our attitude toward the question of national defense because some amongst us are nervous and excited . . . let there be no misconception. The country has been misinformed. We have not been negligent of the national defense.”¹⁵⁴ Conversely, in the same month, he bore witness before Congress that the country would rely upon trained citizens for defense. Standing firm on American forefather’s sentiments, President Wilson affirmed,

more than this carries with it a reversal of the whole history and character of our polity. More than this . . . would mean merely that we had lost our self-possession, that we had been thrown off our balance by a war with which we had nothing to do, whose causes cannot touch us, whose very existence affords the opportunities of friendship and disinterested service which should make us ashamed of any thought of hostility of fearful preparation for trouble.¹⁵⁵

He ended the year with this interpretation of the founders of the country and therefore supporting Universal Military Training, though he seemed a bit ambivalent and noncommittal.

Heading into the following year, President Wilson altered his remarks, aiming to reduce military spending as late as January 1915. He “focused almost exclusively on domestic considerations” and “this unfamiliarity with the military, combined with the belief that morality and principle were more important than force, made the president reluctant to view international affairs in terms of power.”¹⁵⁶ However, by the end of the

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 34.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 42.

¹⁵⁶ Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers*, 44-46.

year, President Wilson launched his own preparedness campaign. In November 1915, he tried to unite the country under one idea: “we have it in mind, to be prepared, not for war, but only for defense; and with the thought constantly in our minds that the principles we hold most dear can be achieved by the slow processes of history only in the kindly and wholesome atmosphere of peace, and not be the use of hostile force.”¹⁵⁷ The president further strengthened his opinion when he made preparedness the key topic of his annual address in December 1915.

There were many others who actively worked to bring the Preparedness Movement to its demise, but none could be singled out as much as President Wilson. Virginia Representative James Hay certainly voiced his concern, but it is not clear whether his stubbornness was a result of the policy or those personalities representing the cause. It is known that he disliked Major General Wood and would not support any legislation proposed by him or Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison.¹⁵⁸

Individual Detriment

Pacifists, as the opposition to preparedness movement were known, had no appetite for the readiness of the nation. The base of this came from farmers, socialists, organized laborers, and German-Americans.¹⁵⁹ Several arguments took shape within these circles. The most prominent opinions were that the lower classes would bear the

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 123.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 10, 120.

¹⁵⁹ Finnegan, *Against the Specter of a Dragon*, 124.

brunt while the progressive elite would greatly benefit from war and preparing for war.¹⁶⁰ Additionally, they saw preparedness as provocation. Their strong desire to keep peaceful relations deterred them from considering any benefit in preparedness.

Those opposed to Universal Military Training viewed it as a scheme to “take from the poor and give to the rich.”¹⁶¹ The burden to individual taxpayers would grow should preparedness become policy. As large corporations, especially those producing items needed for the military, vocalized their support, critics warned the movement was “tinged with greed and pelf.”¹⁶² The Plutocrats, or “those that have,” are only supporting Universal Military Training because they fear they will lose their current lifestyle and wealthy status.¹⁶³ Instead of benefit for the greater good, individual advantage seemed a more substantial influence.

Furthermore, conciliatory citizens maintained that the “alleged disciplinary value” of preparedness was invalid.¹⁶⁴ They felt it was impossible to increase preparation without cultivating hatred, leaving “its soldiers wanton aggressors” and discipline focused “with thoughts of killing.”¹⁶⁵ None of this spelled out peace to the opposition.

¹⁶⁰ Unknown, *Universal Military Training-No!*, 4.

¹⁶¹ Finnegan, *Against the Specter of a Dragon*, 123.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 122-123.

¹⁶³ Unknown, *Universal Military Training-No!*, 4.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 14.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 4. 7-8.

All of this alludes to their “obsession of likely foreign oppression” and “constitutes the main barrier to progress toward international brotherhood.”¹⁶⁶

National Detriment

Intimately tied to the diminishment of the individual are those ideas affecting the nation. Pacifist groups adhered to the notions that armaments led to war, that preparedness was too expensive, and it would give the United States greater bargaining leverage among the powerful countries of the world.¹⁶⁷

Furthermore, preparedness advocates thought a strong military could also project diplomatic power at the international table, while pacifists were skeptical of “so-called leveling influence.”¹⁶⁸ Great Britain avoided conscription and their “security has really depended upon diplomacy to prevent an alliance of three or four navies against her.”¹⁶⁹ In their eyes, it was possible to achieve national defense without subjecting the country to Universal Military Training.

Many within the opposition to the Preparedness Movement felt the United States already spent more than it should on defense. Those against deemed Universal Military Training “not only outrageously expensive, but wasteful” and that “only when confronted with certain trouble, should we let the cost of protection be limitless—not until then.”¹⁷⁰ If

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 6, 3.

¹⁶⁷ Finnegan, *Against the Specter of a Dragon*, 122.

¹⁶⁸ Unknown, *Universal Military Training-No!*, 4, 13.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 12.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 4, 9-10.

the United States allowed the government to dedicate unlimited funding to the military, what would separate the country from that of Germany? It was a question that the pacifist side felt would lead to the federal government gaining too much control.

Antimilitarists saw the bellicose example of Germany and avidly warned against it. They forecasted that if the United States readied itself, other smaller nations would ally against the country. It was easy to compare the situation not just to the current situation with Germany but reaching back to Napoleon's annexation of his neighbors as well, claiming neither could resist their own military might. "Power which is available will be too readily used. It is human nature to play with instruments at our disposal," and the United States will not be able to help themselves once they attain this force.¹⁷¹ As a result, "training in peace time in anticipation of international discord sows its own seed" and invites hostility.¹⁷²

Overall Military Effectiveness

Army professionals such as Major General Wood stood by his testimony to Congress that, "We should all bear equally our share of this burden of service for the nation."¹⁷³ He emphasized the number of trained soldiers must increase to prevent another Great War and advocated against a very large regular Army force; adamant that it is not needed once Universal Military Training establishes reserve force. He went on to

¹⁷¹ Halford L. Hoskins, "Universal Military Training and American Foreign Policy," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 241 (September 1945): 63; Unknown, *Universal Military Training-No!*, 10-11.

¹⁷² Unknown, *Universal Military Training-No!*, 8.

¹⁷³ Wood, *Universal Military Training*, 117.

stress the importance of keeping all active units at full strength until we have adequate reserve then we might be able to cut them to “90 or 85 percent,” advising to never go below 15 percent of full strength and this should not apply to the foreign garrisons.¹⁷⁴ In Major General Wood’s eyes, Universal Military Training was necessary for the security of the nation and any other benefits were subordinate to this purpose. Universal Military Training serves as “an insurance for peace as far as our relations with foreign countries go,” a “training nucleus for our citizen soldiers,” provides “maintenance of order at home,” and “stands ready to meet with great promptness the first shock of war.”¹⁷⁵

On the other hand, a point of view of many Americans was, “why prepare at all if we cannot prepare for everything.”¹⁷⁶ In their opinion, France strived for readiness and preparation and it resulted in Germany attacking. Undoubtedly, Universal Military Training was responsible for German eagerness to attack making them a “national bully.”¹⁷⁷ Opponents views swayed from the spectrum of waiting to see what future threats emerged to the belief that preparing for war made the United States a target, prime for attack.

Brigadier General Palmer while developing a plan for the organization of land forces assessed that,

when I assumed a peacetime nucleus big enough to make a real foundation for effective expansion for a great war, I found that the American people would be saddled with a big standing army in time of peace. When I assumed a peacetime

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 144, 260–261.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 293.

¹⁷⁶ Unknown, *Universal Military Training-No!*, 12.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 15.

nucleus small enough to give any chance of acceptance by Congress, it would result in too small a war army.¹⁷⁸

Moreover, he expounded that if citizen armies could do as well as Washington's Continentals and as well for Grant and Lee, their capabilities would increase "if organized and trained in time of peace."¹⁷⁹ His evaluation carried the topic of Universal Military Training from President Washington's era, through the interwar period, and into World War II, where he assisted General Marshall with his manpower strategy just as he helped Major General Wood.

However, anti-preparedness individuals contested that Universal Military Training would not be accomplished overnight because "it took years to build armies and navies."¹⁸⁰ Representative Walter Mondell echoed this by pointing out, "if we stand in the danger that the alarmists claim we do, the great and ambitious military programs running into the distant future are pathetically and ridiculously inadequate to meet the situation."¹⁸¹ If the threat occurred now, the United States could not wait for Universal Military Training to guarantee safety. Many felt time and distance would remain favorable to American defense.

Ultimately, Major General Wood felt "our preparation is really a preparation against war."¹⁸² He conveyed to the House Committee, that "a real war, a war with a

¹⁷⁸ Palmer, *America in Arms*, 136.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 137.

¹⁸⁰ Finnegan, *Against the Specter of a Dragon*, 123.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Wood, *Universal Military Training*, 299.

prepared nation will not be successfully fought by the United States until that principle is in every man's head and has been acted upon," but critics did not see it that way. Within the Army, those influenced by Emory Upton, "had no faith in our traditional citizen army," regarding the National Guard as an untrained and undisciplined force.¹⁸³ What is more, the opponents of Universal Military Training frankly did not see the point.

Summary

The Selective Draft Law Cases of 1917 established, "it may not be doubted that the very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render military service in cases of need and the right to compel it."¹⁸⁴ This legislation, in conjunction with the outbreak of World War I brought the United States military manning policies to the level of national debate. Within the United States, nearly fifty years after the Civil War, compulsory training never caught on as a universally accepted policy.¹⁸⁵ Even though the population understood that conscription might be required upon entry into war, volunteerism still prevailed as the overall strategy.¹⁸⁶

President Wilson and the Democratic Party did not support Universal Military Training. Most of the support given to the movement emanated from the Republican

¹⁸³ Palmer, *America in Arms*, 157.

¹⁸⁴ Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training*, 283.

¹⁸⁵ Griffith, *The U.S. Army's Transition to the All-Volunteer Force 1968-1974*, 6.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

Party.¹⁸⁷ The removal of Major General Wood prior to the announcement of the United States entry into World War I showed that despite his fundamental and successful preparedness notions, the administration had to maintain their authority.¹⁸⁸

Furthermore, “newly dominate, issue-oriented, pressure-group politics which emerged during the progressive era,” pushed their agenda and was then “emotionalized by the new mass media.”¹⁸⁹ Groups like the Military Training Camps Association mobilized to carry out this pressure and cement themselves within the politics of Washington. “Incessant propaganda” for Universal Military Training conditioned the people to accept compulsory service.¹⁹⁰

However, the Army did not collectively support Universal Military Training. A poor showing of volunteers during the Spanish-American War led to the standardization of equipment and training of the National Guard as a reserve force. The National Guard and regular Army did not agree on this policy. The preparedness movement pitched Universal Military Training and despite similarities between the two camps, “a consensus seemed impossible.”¹⁹¹

World War I required immediate action regarding manpower and Universal Military Training was a long-term strategy the United States could not employ. However,

¹⁸⁷ Taylor, *Every Citizen A Soldier*, 16.

¹⁸⁸ Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers*, 302.

¹⁸⁹ Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 106.

¹⁹⁰ Finnegan, *Against the Specter of a Dragon*, 191.

¹⁹¹ Griffith, *The U.S. Army's Transition to the All-Volunteer Force 1968-1974*, 6.

“the Plattsburg Movement provided the necessary framework to recruit and train the vast number of reserve officers which a huge wartime force needed.”¹⁹² Without the preparedness movement before World War I, “it would have been psychologically and as well physically impossible for us to have gone in, when we did go in, as deeply as we did.”¹⁹³ Nonetheless, General Pershing felt if the country prepared earlier instead of projecting neutrality, it might have deterred Germany from commencing unrestricted submarine warfare.¹⁹⁴ Although, the Plattsburg Camps resoundingly assisted in the United States success, “the Spirit of 1920” as described by James W. Wadsworth, prevented Americans from imagining any future wars could occur.¹⁹⁵

Numerous reasons kept the United States from adopting Universal Military Training and the Preparedness Movement. First, political strife created a divide within Congress and the country. They could not agree, resulting in several bills pushed forward. This confusion led to a lack of one strong plan and many disjointed alternatives. Second, the military and specifically the Army was not unified on their support to the proposal. The National Guard was at odds with the Regular Army establishment.¹⁹⁶ Third, the

¹⁹² Finnegan, *Against the Specter of a Dragon*, 191.

¹⁹³ Millis, *Arms and Men*, 235.

¹⁹⁴ Finnegan, *Against the Specter of a Dragon*, 191.

¹⁹⁵ Taylor, *Every Citizen A Soldier*, 13.

¹⁹⁶ Perry, *The Plattsburg Movement*, 88-91, 146-147.

United States isolationist attitude towards world affairs caused Americans to view preparedness as goading and pointless because “there will never be another war.”¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁷ Taylor, *Every Citizen A Soldier*, 20.

CHAPTER 4

POST-WORLD WAR II POLICY OF UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING

First, it could be used to care for a large number of veterans, so-called walking cases in contra-distinction to more helpless persons, because the housing is not fireproof. Second, some of the housing could be used for vocational training of veterans. Third, it could be used for training young men.

—President Franklin D. Roosevelt, quoted in
Edward A. Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training*

This chapter discusses the proposal of Universal Military Training following World War II. Like chapter 3, it begins with the political environment, providing the background and context of the country's outlook during this time period. The chapter then moves into the arguments for the proposal and the figureheads pressing the issue. Next, it shifts to those against the topic and their opinions. Then, the chapter addresses the overall military effectiveness of Universal Military Training. Finally, the chapter offers concluding remarks and reasoning behind the downfall of the policy.

Political Environment Following World War II

As President Roosevelt suggested above, with the end of the war near, the United States “had a very real postwar problem in the question of what to do with the high quality housing,” built and used to train members of the Armed Forces.¹⁹⁸ He referenced the Civilian Conservation Corps and the training young men received for their betterment as his initial objective for universal training. He believed that the facilities developed during wartime should not go unused once the war concluded and Americans should

¹⁹⁸ Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training*, 2.

begin forming their opinions on the matter. His emphasis did not appear to be a matter of military training but more of a social objective. It was not until later, during his State of the Union message on January 6, 1945, that he referenced military defense: “An enduring peace cannot be achieved without a strong America—strong in the social and economic sense as well as in the military sense.”¹⁹⁹ President Roosevelt passed away before his ideas and plan came to fruition.

Following World War II, the United States military began to demobilize rapidly. The government’s policy had little regard for future conflicts or threats. Similar to the post-World War I era, there was minimal interest in any future war. Many believed that with the creation and use of the atom bomb, war would no longer require large, standing ground troop formations, but instead aircraft and other technology. Army basic training reflected this by rapidly reducing their training requirements from thirteen weeks to eight, and down to four weeks in the last months of 1946. From 1945 to 1950, no new procurements occurred concerning weapons, equipment, or ammunition and live-fire training exercises postponed.²⁰⁰ The readiness outlook of the United States military was bleak.

¹⁹⁹ Franklin D. Roosevelt, “State of the Union Address,” January 6, 1945, accessed April 19, 2018, http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_resources/images/msf/msfb0204; Franklin D. Roosevelt, “The State of the Union Address,” George M. Elsey Papers, Box 89, National Defense - Universal Military Training, folder 1, January 6, 1945.

²⁰⁰ William W. Epley, *America’s First Cold War Army 1945-1950* (Arlington, VA: The Institute of Land Warfare Association of the United States Army, 1999), 13-15; James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction - The First Year* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History United States Army, 1992), 45, accessed April 28, 2018, <https://history.army.mil/books/PD-C-03.HTM>.

By this time, the Cold War had begun. The Soviet Union presented itself as an adversary that the United States could not ignore. This undefined variable caused some to put their support behind Universal Military Training as a means to combat the threat since war seemed more likely. On the other hand, because it was not a threat easily seen, many citizens did not perceive it as the same type of threat as Germany or Japan had been. Regardless, the Soviets aimed at the Americans with everything they did. A new reality existed; for each conflict that the United States involved itself in, the Soviet Union would support the opposition.²⁰¹

It was during this time that President Truman and Secretary of State Marshall picked up the reigns of Universal Military Training and championed it as a policy to offset a smaller standing force. Universal Military Training would consist of one year of training for all males to ensure preparedness should mobilization be necessary. Following their training, the military would organize each trainee into the Reserves or National Guard for no more than three years.²⁰² Another motion proposed moving trained men into a secondary reserve after six years. Later, the training period was reduced from one year to six months.²⁰³ In all cases, each man shall only be liable for service in the case of emergency.

²⁰¹ Robert L. Ivie, "Fire, Flood, and Red Fever: Motivating Metaphors of Global Emergency in the Truman Doctrine Speech," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 29, no. 3 (September 1999): 574-582.

²⁰² Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training*, 62, 66.

²⁰³ Howard G. Crowell Jr., "Wind Down to Wind Up 1945-1950: A Special Project Report" (Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 1972), 29.

In January 1947, the Army sponsored a six-month Universal Military Training pilot program conducted at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Initially envisioned for one year, the Army settled for six months of mostly individual training. “Umties” as the trainees were referred to, were under twenty years of age, had no previous military training, and represented every state in the country. The intention behind this experiment was to demonstrate how Universal Military Training could be applied into practice as a nationwide plan.²⁰⁴

Initially, one company of trainees was planned to be composed of African-American personnel. However, because the experimental unit would only consist of one battalion, the plan was revised, and the War Department decided that “Negro personnel will not be included in this demonstration.”²⁰⁵ This reflected the policy of segregated companies throughout the Army. Undoubtedly, this angered African-American leaders and caused racial issues within the military to transpire.

Unlike the Plattsburg Camps, the Fort Knox experiment focused more on civic instruction than combat training. By cleaning up the facilities and providing Morale, Welfare, and Recreation type activities on post it became clear that its efforts were more aligned with harmonious public relations rather than military duty. The program also established a program of moral instruction designed to develop a man’s character. This vehicle for public relations traded citizenship and morality education for military effectiveness, attempting to polish some of the harsher aspects of military training. This

²⁰⁴ Taylor, *Every Citizen A Soldier*, 104-106.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

was further confirmed by tracking of “each company not primarily on their training proficiency but instead their conduct.”²⁰⁶

The Fort Knox Experiment conducted at least two six-month classes that were initially thought of as a success.²⁰⁷ Before the completion of the first iteration of training on June 30, 1947, President Truman’s Commission on Universal Military Training produced their findings and unanimously recommended the adoption of universal training.²⁰⁸ After celebrating a one-year anniversary of the program in November 1947, many thought the success marked promise for the program to continue.²⁰⁹ However, after several Congressional Hearings, the program ended in favor of resuming selective service and the draft with the enactment of the Selective Service Act of 1948.²¹⁰

Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1948, which increased the total number of servicemen needed for military occupation in Germany and Japan, in addition to national defense. The smaller force frankly could not manage all tasks given. This idea

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 109-116.

²⁰⁷ Hanson W. Baldwin, “Army’s Youth Unit Called A Success,” *The New York Times*, May 18, 1947, accessed April 25, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/1947/05/18/archives/armys-youth-unit-called-a-success-but-regular-soldiering-will-be.html>.

²⁰⁸ The New York Times, “Summary of the Truman Commission’s Findings on Universal Military Training,” *The New York Times*, June 2, 1947, accessed April 25, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/1947/06/02/archives/summary-of-the-truman-commissions-findings-on-universal-military.html>.

²⁰⁹ The New York Times, “UMT Test Unit Year Old,” *The New York Times*, November 29, 1947, accessed April 25, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/1947/11/29/archives/umt-test-unit-year-old-program-at-fort-knox-to-mark-anniversary.html>.

²¹⁰ Hanson W. Baldwin, “Draft Held Need of Hour,” *The New York Times*, April 4, 1948, accessed April 25, 2018, <https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1948/04/04/96590977.html?pageNumber=40>; *The Selective Service Act of 1948*.

of Universal Military Training, built upon President Roosevelt's initial thoughts for the program, lent itself more to the national defense strategy than simply teaching young men how to function civilly in the country.²¹¹

In 1950, the Korean War demonstrated once again how unprepared the United States was for conflict. Although military manpower increased to meet the demand of war, President Truman and Secretary Marshall understood they needed a permanent solution to prevent this from happening again. Their continued endorsement of this resulted in Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, "to provide for the common defense and security of the United States and to permit the more effective utilization of manpower resources of the United States by authorizing universal military training and service, and for other purposes."²¹² Even though this legislation called for Universal Military Training, there was a stipulation for the clause requiring the enactment of further legislation. Because this clause was never ratified, it rendered the legislation ineffective, pursuant to Universal Military Training goals.

Those in Favor of Universal Military Training

There were proponents far and wide standing behind Universal Military Training for the male citizens of the United States. Historians, educators, politicians, and even American mothers voiced their opinions and reasons in support of legislation for all male

²¹¹ *The Selective Service Act of 1948.*

²¹² *Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951*, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., Chapter 144, 65 Stat. 75 (1951), accessed December 10, 2017, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-65/pdf/STATUTE-65-Pg75.pdf>.

citizens to receive military training.²¹³ However, those with the loudest, and likely most influential, voices were President Truman and Secretary Marshall.

Harry S. Truman grew up in Missouri. He served during World War I with the Missouri National Guard as an artilleryman and was promoted to the rank of Captain.²¹⁴ After the war, President Truman remained in the reserves, eventually appointed to the rank of Colonel. Additionally, he went on to become a lawyer and district judge before running for the United States Senate.²¹⁵ While serving as a Senator, he was selected as the Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate and running mate of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944. Once elected as Vice President, he assumed Presidential duties soon thereafter when President Roosevelt passed away in early 1945.

From his background, it is clear President Truman felt fervent about public service. His experience in the reserves cemented his advocacy of Universal Military Training once President Roosevelt died. President Truman was convinced of the United States' need for an insurance policy to protect against outside threats and effectively dissuade any belligerent nation from initiating conflict.²¹⁶

²¹³ Janice B. Harrington, *Universal Military Training: A Selected and Annotated List of References* (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, General Reference and Bibliography Division, 1945).

²¹⁴ Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum, "Chronology: Harry S. Truman's Life and Presidency, 1840s-1945," accessed February 11, 2018, <https://www.trumanlibrary.org/truman-c.htm>.

²¹⁵ Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum, "Harry S. Truman Papers," accessed February 11, 2018, <https://www.trumanlibrary.org/hst-pape.htm>.

²¹⁶ Harry S. Truman, "A Plan for Universal Military Training Under Postwar Conditions," George M. Elsey Papers, Box 89, National Defense - Universal Military Training, folder 1, June 23, 1945, 3; "Unanimity on UMT," *The New York Times*, Records of Temporary Committees, Commissions and Boards: Records of the President's

George C. Marshall Jr. was born and raised in Pennsylvania; attended the Virginia Military Institute and graduated in 1901. After commissioning as an infantry officer in 1902, General Marshall saw action in the Philippines, served on General Pershing's staff during World War I, and instructed at both the Army Staff College and the Army War College.²¹⁷ He also supervised and commanded in the Civilian Conservation Corps before his swearing in as the Chief of Staff of the Army in 1939. He went on to become the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense in 1947 and 1950, respectively.

Secretary Marshall was a career soldier, serving in his country's military from his youth until retirement over the course of 43 years. After active military service, he continued to serve for six additional years at the senior levels of the United States government. His service led him to regard Universal Military Training as the "essential foundation of an effective national military organization."²¹⁸ What is more, he served as General Pershing's aide-de-camp, who testified on behalf of citizen soldiery post-World War I.²¹⁹

Secretary Marshall's directive to War Department planners demonstrated his commitment to commence designing and developing this strategy. The directive, given in September 1944, had three assumptions: Congress will pass a Universal Military Training

Advisory Commission on Universal Training, Record Group 220, Box 14, Newspaper Clippings Folder 1, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, June 2, 1947.

²¹⁷ George C. Marshall Foundation, "Timeline," accessed February 11, 2018, <https://marshallfoundation.org/marshall/timeline-chronology/>.

²¹⁸ Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training*, 70.

²¹⁹ Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers*, 282.

program, trainees will go into the reserve, and the reserve will be available in case of emergency. He further describes distinct advantages to a military organization comprised of a peacetime establishment and a citizen reserve. Secretary Marshall's goals involved lessening the divide between civil population and military affairs and reducing regular Army cost.²²⁰ His confidence in the policy allowed for him to task his staff to launch preparation, even before World War II concluded. His determination stemmed from his firm beliefs that the organization of the military between regular and reserve is exactly what President George Washington envisioned for the United States.

In addition to Secretary Marshall and President Truman, there were individuals who supported the Preparedness Movement before World War I who felt it was their duty to continue the push for manpower change within the military. Brigadier General John McCauley Palmer, a longtime Universal Military Training advocate, was recalled out of retirement by General Marshall to begin work on a post-war manpower plan. It is because of his influence that the Army went from barely any support of Universal Military Training during World War I, to the ones trying to implement the policy after World War II.²²¹

Brigadier General Palmer had known General Marshall for a long time and also worked for General Pershing on a permanent national military system during World War I. His previous experience qualified him as an expert in the field and his ideas resonated throughout the Army. He firmly believed that President Washington's idea of a well-

²²⁰ Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training*, 70, 76-78.

²²¹ Taylor, *Every Citizen A Soldier*, 27.

organized militia was the foundation on which the United States should base its military policy.²²² Brigadier General Palmer would continue to unite the Army on Universal Military Training.

President Truman, Secretary Marshall, Brigadier General Palmer, in addition to men like Clark, whose influence on the Military Training Camp Association carried over, all had their part to play in advocating Universal Military Training. Even though funding to the military decreased during the interwar period, the voluntary camps set up before World War I continued. Training at what was then known as Citizen's Military Training Camps converted from military instruction to "essentially schools in citizenship," as stated by President Calvin Coolidge.²²³ The camps kept Universal Military Training moving forward, even if not in the original context it planned. Because of this and the perpetuation of the gentlemen advocating it, Universal Military Training never ceased and found renewed energy in the years following World War II.

²²² Ibid., 18, 22.

²²³ Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers*, 295-297.



Figure 3. Citizen Military Training Camps Poster 1

Source: James P. Wharton, “CMTC Citizens’ Military Training Camps, National Defense,” Pritzker Military Museum and Library (Washington, DC: Engineering Reproduction Plant, 1939-1945), accessed March 17, 2018, <https://www.pritzker military.org/explore/museum/digital-collection/view/oclc/798928873>.



Figure 4. Citizen Military Training Camps Poster 2

Source: Engineer Reproduction Plant, “Citizens’ Military Training Camps,” Pritzker Military Museum and Library (Washington, DC: Engineering Reproduction Plant, 1923), accessed March 17, 2018, <https://www.pritzkermilitary.org/explore/museum/digital-collection/view/oclc/914300479>.

Individual Benefit

Many supporters referenced benefits to the individual as motive to enact Universal Military Training. Better citizens led to a better society and inevitably guaranteed a better country. The educational, social, and health advantages of Universal Military Training stood out as imperative and provoked interest. As the United States stepped into a more prominent role in the international community, leaders and the populace wanted to ensure could they sustain their influence. Active citizenship, improved health, and enhanced overall intelligence were three of the main claims advocated as to why Universal Military Training should be implemented at once.²²⁴

The most robust prerogative for individual benefit was for more engaged citizenship. Universal Military Training could provide civic education and foster democracy, but most importantly, it would instill, as Secretary of the Navy William Franklin Knox reminded, “citizenship, the first duty of which is service in defense of his country in case of emergency.”²²⁵ The “gang spirit” or teamwork will prevail from training and lead to harmonious living even after military training.²²⁶ Although principles of citizenship could be taught during one year of training, the focus was primarily military, as opposed to the Fort Knox Experiment that focused on public relations. Senior

²²⁴ Grayson Kirk, “Shall We Have Universal Military Training?” American Historical Association, accessed November 8, 2017, <https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/gi-roundtable-series/pamphlets/shall-we-have-universal-military-training>.

²²⁵ Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training*, 11.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 210.

officials concurred that any gains made would be secondary to that of training men to fight.

A healthier individual was also an ideal many regarded as vital to the nation. After World War II, the selective service and draft board processes made the country glaringly aware of health issues within the United States. Roughly 40 percent of draftees were unable to pass the general examination. The number of men turned away and those released within the first year of service was much higher than anticipated. Many supporters called for Universal Military Training as an answer to improve physical ineptitude. Leaders examined physical fitness standards and determined that one year of military training may increase physical strength to a certain degree, but it could not undo the previous years of a man's life. This assessment did identify each state's responsibility for better physical fitness programs throughout the country.²²⁷

The last individual benefit addressed was the increased overall intelligence of United States citizens. Many advocates also wanted Universal Military Training to incorporate other types of training such as vocational trades. The Army and the Navy both had many specialties that could transfer over to civilian life, but many improbable assertions were made regarding education. Just as with physicality, the Armed Forces would receive a trainee after his general childhood education. Much of the training thought to form good habits, would likely not transfer into civilian life once removed from the training environment. It was believed that the illiterate would benefit the most,

²²⁷ Ibid., 245, 269.

but even then, the training would only amount to functional literacy.²²⁸ Certainly, some small educational advances would occur for the individual trainee but not be to the extent that many promoters of Universal Military Training suggested.

Active citizenship, improved physical health, and smarter individuals were all excellent reasons to implement Universal Military Training. However, none of these could be assured by one year of training, and there was relatively no proof to maintain the assertions. Additionally, many contended that it was the responsibility of the regular educational system to ensure American youth understood their duty and responsibility as a citizen. Claims that Universal Military Training cultivated patriotism, better citizenship, societal cooperation, and character are exaggerated.²²⁹ Even though training would broaden the views of the trainees, it is important to understand that these additional benefits would be mere by-products and not the primary purpose of Universal Military Training.

National Benefit

As previously mentioned, individual benefits ultimately profit the nation, as improved citizens make their nation a better place to live and work. This relationship between the state and its populace was a topic of many debates and establishing accord between them should be the overall goal of each legislation. Universal Military Training strikes a balance and provides for both. The elements of national power work together to project the country's strategic objectives and ability to maintain its' impact on the global

²²⁸ Ibid., 211, 213.

²²⁹ Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training*, 228.

scale. After World War II, the United States could not shrink back into its isolationist mindset; emerging as a dominant world power created many opportunities for allies, but it also painted a target on the country. Universal Military Training strengthens economic, political, and military power within the United States in order to care for friends and discourage foes.²³⁰

It may not be clear on how Universal Military Training boosts economic advantage, as it is viewed by the opposition as a ludicrous and unneeded cost. By playing a “wait and see” type of game concerning future threats to the nation, the United States frequently adjusted spending, which in the long run, costs more. Universal Military Training ensures a standard and fixed cost that the government can depend on for defense spending.²³¹ Strengthening a foreign partner’s economy leads to an improved domestic economy. Ultimately, adopting this policy will likely result in fewer conflicts as hostile nations would be deterred from conducting anything but professional political business.²³²

The Marshall Plan, or the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, paved the way for United States investment in Europe. The United States strategy to deliver economic aid until 1951 promoted “world peace and the general welfare, national interest, and foreign policy of the United States through economic, financial, and other measures necessary” to improve free societies abroad and preserve the strength and stability of the United

²³⁰ Kirk, “Shall We Have Universal Military Training?”

²³¹ Taylor, *Every Citizen A Soldier*, 61-62.

²³² Kirk, “Shall We Have Universal Military Training?”

States.²³³ This legislation demonstrated to European nations that the United States was serious about helping its allies rebuild for the future.

The Truman Doctrine worked hand in hand with the Marshall Plan. President Truman believed it was the duty of the United States to support “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”²³⁴ A substantial military and economic aid package from the United States assisted Turkey and Greece and thwarted Communism’s spread. This rhetoric cemented the American position and was the cornerstone for many future endeavors of the United States and its military.

Universal Military Training, in conjunction with the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, sought to restore balance throughout the world. European economies and that of the United States are tied together by strong alliances. A trained citizen population expresses a commitment to reestablishing peace throughout the world to “quarantine” those repressive, “diseased” nations, such as the Soviet Union, and prevent them from gaining a foothold.²³⁵

²³³ *The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948*, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., Chapter 169, 62 Stat. 137 (1948), accessed December 10, 2017, <http://legisworks.org/congress/80/publaw-472.pdf>.

²³⁴ Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum, “Address of the President to Congress, Recommending Assistance to Greece and Turkey, March 12, 1947,” Elsey Papers, Harry S. Truman Administration, March 12,” accessed February 11, 2018, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/index.php?documentid=5-9&pagenumber=4.

²³⁵ Ivie, “Fire, Flood, and Red Fever,” 582-586.

All great nations make considerations involving the elements of national power and diplomacy is no exception. Politically, no country can become a major world power without a formidable military. Post-World War II, the United States turned to President Truman to carry the nation through, and the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were both integral to his overall Cold War strategy.²³⁶ Each decision and policy President Truman and his successors put forth to advance the United States had to take into account the Soviet Union to preserve a delicate balance and not send the world into nuclear ruin.

Since the title of the policy includes the word military, it is assumed that Universal Military Training most benefits the military posture of the United States. Many passionate about the policy felt “weakness invites aggression,” and it was an ideal way to moderate any weakness.²³⁷ This training program would not only be the insurance policy that President Truman and General Marshall were looking for, but it would also actually protect its citizens in time of war.

Although these reasons for gained community values and influence convinced supporters, senior military officials like Secretary Marshall and President Truman did not want any confusion as to what the primary objective of Universal Military Training was. People made several arguments for why Universal Military Training was necessary, but national defense in time of emergency was the only argument that mattered.²³⁸

²³⁶ Ibid., 582.

²³⁷ Kirk, “Shall We Have Universal Military Training?”

²³⁸ Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training*, vii.

Those Opposed to Universal Military Training

Contrary to the many citizens supporting a policy of Universal Military Training, there were also those strongly opposed. Clergymen, church groups, women's leagues, academics, and several elected officials staked their claim in the opposition. Most argued, at the very least, that more time was needed for a full study. They also wanted to allow servicemembers to cast their votes or to see how the cards would fall with the outcome of World War II. Many Americans naively believed that no future threat would present itself and there would be time to prepare for any conflict. All of these were reasons to delay legislation. Although they understood the importance of national defense, they alleged that Universal Military Training was "impractical and provocative."²³⁹ The harshest critic was Senator Robert Taft, a Republican from Ohio whose eyesight prevented participation in World War I, who claimed that Universal Military Training was "the weapon of a totalitarian state" and against democratic principles of the nation.²⁴⁰ Son of President William Howard Taft and educated at Yale and Harvard, Senator Taft instead worked with a Food and Drug Administration in Paris and saw firsthand the aftermath of the war. This experience formed his opinions and contributed to his stance on many of the Truman administration's proposals.²⁴¹

²³⁹ Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 143.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 142.

²⁴¹ United States Senate, "Robert A. Taft: More than 'Mr. Republican,'" accessed February 23, 2018, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/People_Leaders_Taft.htm.

Furthermore, because much of the training would occur in the South, African-Americans did not support Universal Military Training. They feared it would have severe social implications on the nation by permitting “the continuation of the present racial segregation and discrimination in the armed forces.”²⁴² This endorsement effectually limited the capacity to which they could serve. The lack of representation of African-Americans at Fort Knox did little to ease their minds. Universal Military Training would not, in effect, “contribute to the development of national unity” as their common experience would equate to treatment as an inferior citizen commonly sponsored in the Jim Crow South.²⁴³

Individual Detriment

Just as there were proposed benefits to the individual regarding Universal Military Training, there were also arguments against the idea. As the proponents pushed Universal Military Training and its immediacy, those on the other side of the argument fought hard to contest it. Those who did not support the policy believed that it was too closely aligned with policies of continental Europe and the effect it had on their populace. Since individual and state are tied together within a democracy, it is easy to understand why any negative impact to one would affect the other. The disadvantages to the individual were weakened individual rights, blind obedience to the government, and it would delay a young man’s life.

²⁴² Taylor, *Every Citizen A Soldier*, 133.

²⁴³ Ibid., 134.

The central debate surrounding Universal Military Training always led back to a conversation on individual rights, which were highly regarded in the United States. Any infringement on this was a “departure from democratic principles” and automatically invited comparison to Germany.²⁴⁴ Opponents felt those living under Hitler’s regime became “the wartime extension of a peacetime social concept which reduces the individual to the status of a fraction of the State.”²⁴⁵ Loss of liberty to the government and passing from a free society to a fascist state was what the opposition to Universal Military Training strived to avoid at all costs.²⁴⁶ In their minds, those against the policy protected the individual citizen from overt state bellicosity.

Another argument was the Army, viewed as an authoritarian organization, was not an institution best suited to teach citizenship or democracy and would foster blind obedience instead of education. Major General Edmonds warned:

We do not want a professional military to have complete control of the training of these eighteen-year-olds. We don’t want career soldiers to mold the minds as well as the bodies of our sons, indefinitely into the future. We do not want American history, or “orientation” in Americanism and “democracy,” taught to successive generations of our young men by a centrally controlled military caste—not even by an American brand. We have to see what comes of such systems in other lands.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁴ Kirk, “Shall We Have Universal Military Training?”

²⁴⁵ Herman Beukema, “The Social and Political Aspects of Conscription: Europe’s Experiences,” in *War as a Social Institution*, ed. Jesse D. Clarkson and Thomas C. Cochran (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941), 126-127.

²⁴⁶ Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training*, 241.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 226.

He ardently believed the military would compromise citizens' voices and ability to be heard. Conformism is something that may be necessary within the military, but if subjected to it, society would venture down a path to totalitarianism.

Moreover, taking a year of a man's life from him would put him behind in furthering his education and starting his profession, and military training would not be beneficial to outside civilian life. Dr. Robert Hutchins urged, "it's upon science, labor and industry that the burden should fall" rather than reliance on military training.²⁴⁸ Dr. Arthur Kornhauser expanded on this idea, asserting that Universal Military Training would create "a feeling of futility," leading to slackness and "soldiering on the job."²⁴⁹ Moreover, the "moral and intellectual atmosphere would fall to that of the lowest common denominator in communities away from home where trainees were not known."²⁵⁰ It was because of this non-supporters did not wish to train young men militarily but instead, allow them to immediately advance the United States economically with higher education and trade skills.

Benjamin Franklin once advised that "those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety."²⁵¹ According to the opponents of Universal Military Training, civic obligation should never outweigh

²⁴⁸ John J. McCloy and Robert M. Hutchins, "Do We Want Permanent Conscription?," *Colliers*, June 9, 1945, 14-15.

²⁴⁹ Arthur Kornhauser, ed., "Will Compulsory Military Training Be Good or Bad for Our Boys; Poll of Experts," *American Magazine* 139 (June 1945): 34-35.

²⁵⁰ Harrington, *Universal Military Training*, 9.

²⁵¹ Benjamin Franklin and William Temple Franklin, *Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Benjamin Franklin*, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: T.S. Manning, 1818).

individual freedoms. Diminished individual rights, reduced “freedom of discussion and institutions,” and postponement of a young man’s life could not be overlooked by those against Universal Military Training.²⁵² The opposition within the United States fiercely resisted anything short of independence and self-determination.

National Detriment

As any benefits associated with the individual also mirror state benefits, the negative aspects are tied together as well. One argument against Universal Military Training was too much national government control. For a country founded on the ideals of states and individual rights, the idea of the federal government controlling what seemed like a large, standing military was a hard pill for many to swallow. As a factor in the only Civil War fought in the United States, encroachment of the government was indisputably a controversial and unpopular idea. Additionally, Universal Military Training represented something entirely undemocratic and associated with American adversaries’ forms of government. The disadvantages of this policy on the country were increased government control, the resemblance of fascism, and tempting attacks from other countries.²⁵³

Initially, even President Truman saw Universal Military Training’s flaws. He wanted to present the policy as a means to tackle “educational and physical defects revealed during wartime draft,” rather than militarizing the nation because he did not

²⁵² Kirk, “Shall We Have Universal Military Training?”

²⁵³ Ibid.

want it to lead to outcomes like Germany, Italy, or Russia.²⁵⁴ Even though President Truman came around to the idea of Universal Military Training as a preparedness policy, many did not. Frank L. Wright, a collegiate educator, believed such an act would “grant the government—through prejudiced super-patriotic officers—arbitrary control of the individual thought and conscience.”²⁵⁵ His opinion struck an already deep-rooted fear in American minds.

Readers of *Seventeen* magazine also firmly expressed their objection: the “military is a fascist instrument, opposed to our democratic traditions and system.”²⁵⁶ Fascism, closely associated with countries such as Germany and Italy, was a principle which directly challenged democracy. American desire to subordinate the military to civilian control is echoed in the Constitution, designed to prevent the military from becoming a tool of any aspiring dictator. As such, Dr. Eduard Lindeman, a professor at Columbia University in 1945, prefaced his arguments against Universal Military Training with an understanding that the Constitution cannot be suspended because of any emergency.²⁵⁷

Antagonists did not support the view that Universal Military Training guaranteed peace by discouraging belligerents from pursuing attack against the United States.

²⁵⁴ Flynn, *Lewis B. Hershey, Mr. Selective Service*, 155-156.

²⁵⁵ Frank L. Wright, “The Case against Conscription,” *The Christian Century* 62 (March 7, 1945): 299-300.

²⁵⁶ “Military Training - Should It Be Compulsory?,” *Seventeen*, August 1945, 35.

²⁵⁷ Eduard C. Lindeman and Joseph C. Grew, “Should the U.S. Have Peacetime Conscription?,” *Christian Science Monitor*, August 25, 1945, 6-7.

American Novelist, Booth Tarkington warned that “any country that increases its peacetime armament becomes thereby a warlike country and always is a case of alarm to other countries.”²⁵⁸ It would not prevent wars but also send a signal of the United States’ “disbelief in the effectiveness of the United Nations Organization.”²⁵⁹ Raising anxiety and apprehension levels in countries opposed to the United States would inevitably lead to more conflict and demonstrate to “neighboring friends or foes,” that the United States has not quite decided to be a “peace-loving” nation.²⁶⁰

Increased government influence, fascism, and provoking other countries restrict the principles that Americans hold dear. Individual liberties, democracy, and world peace were not new concepts recently evoked by the conclusion of World War II, but instead traditions at the heart of the American way of life. The opposition, while wanting sustainable peace for their country, saw too many failings within the policy of Universal Military Training.

Overall Military Effectiveness

The most critical consideration of Universal Military Training is that of its military effectiveness as a policy. As Clausewitz proposed, the strength of the military policy determines the effectiveness of the United States strategic policy and thus the

²⁵⁸ Charles Seymour and Booth Tarkington, “Should We Have Compulsory Military Training? Yes! Says President Charles Seymour of Yale University. No! Says Booth Tarkington,” *Liberty*, April 28, 1945, 72-74.

²⁵⁹ Lindeman and Grew, “Should the U.S. Have Peacetime Conscription?,” 6-7.

²⁶⁰ Dwight L. Bolinger, “Universal Military Training. An Answer to Major General Weible,” *Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors* 31, no. 1 (Spring 1945): 97-102.

political power of the nation. The dilemma the United States has always faced is how to “raise its armies in a matter that was both militarily effective and politically acceptable.”²⁶¹ Many arguments were made to focus this policy on more than just military preparedness, but as it aims to organize the nation against future conflict, this remains the singular concern. Educational and health benefits are secondary thoughts and merely added gains received as a result of military training. Universal Military Training is an adoptable policy if it deters aggression, better prepares the United States in time of emergency, and gives diplomats a more powerful bargaining chip in negotiations²⁶²

Since the outcome of World War II achieved victory with the use of the atomic bomb, all future conflicts would mirror this, and resultingly would not require a large army. Universal Military Training would not prepare the United States for “a technological battle fought with airpower, rockets, atomic bombs.”²⁶³ Additionally, Senator Taft testified before Congress, “I believe the increase in the Air Corps is less expensive and ten times as important” as Universal Military Training.²⁶⁴ Ultimately, President Truman increased funding for nuclear weapons, which directly conflicted with the need for ground troops.²⁶⁵ Consequently, all budgets focused on the Air Force as

²⁶¹ Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 13.

²⁶² Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 125.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, 147.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 141.

²⁶⁵ Millet, Maslowski, and Feis, *For the Common Defense*, 464.

opposed to the Army. Since opponents believed no further ground conflicts would ever occur they argued that Universal Military Training did not prepare the United States.

However, Secretary Marshall referenced the United States ability to honor global commitments by contending that, “we are playing with fire” and “have nothing to put it out.”²⁶⁶ Demobilization of the Army would make it nearly impossible for the United States to honor their international obligations. Ground troops were needed to prevent the spread of communism. Advocates maintained that Universal Military Training assured allies and rivals the United States took the “duties of citizenship . . . seriously enough to stand a year of training.”²⁶⁷ In order to uphold the responsibilities of a global role, American sacrifice was needed.

Those who argued against Universal Military Training felt the United States could not adopt this policy until they knew what future threats would develop. Since it could not be foreseen how conflicts would unfold, the opposition believed it was better not to prepare than prepare incorrectly. Any military “training would be superficial and actually out of date by the time they were called to active duty in a national emergency,” as claimed by Senator Taft.²⁶⁸ Those for the policy contended that the last two World Wars ascertained how unprepared the United States was and that planning now may reduce the loss of human life and save time in training. Colonel John W. Castles, drawing on his personal experience from the wars, cited: “There is no substitute for training, no shortcut

²⁶⁶ Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 144.

²⁶⁷ Ibid., 134, 124.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 141.

to preparedness. Don't let us fool ourselves into thinking that if another emergency should arise, we can create an Army overnight. That way lies madness and national suicide."²⁶⁹ Adopting a reactive defense policy guarantees the United States unpreparedness.

Critics also worried Universal Military Training would provide the United States "a false sense of security, much as the Maginot Line had deluded France," while "provoking another arms race leading to another world war."²⁷⁰ Senator Taft affirmed this suspicion, stating that Universal Military Training was indeed an "obstacle to peace" and would "spur similar initiatives in other countries."²⁷¹ Dr. Clinton N. Howard cemented his thoughts before Congress: "Militarism is not protection, it is provocation; it is not insurance, it is insanity; it is not security, it is suicide; it is not preparedness for peace, it is a guarantee of war."²⁷²

On the other hand, Universal Military Training supporters sensed "total war compelled the integration of civilian and military resources into a program of constant preparedness."²⁷³ It was a symbol of national resolve; "a test of whether the American people could muster the strength of character to lead the free world," and reconcile

²⁶⁹ Abraham J. Muste and John W. Castles, "Shall We Have Universal Military Training?," *Independent Woman*, April 1945, 112.

²⁷⁰ Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 131-132.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 141.

²⁷² Clinton N. Howard, *Compulsory Peacetime Military Training. Extension of Remarks of the Hon. Arthur Capper, of Kansas*, 91 vols. (Washington, DC: Congressional Record, 1945).

²⁷³ Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 120.

national security requirements with a historical set of values.²⁷⁴ As the leader of democracy against communism, Universal Military Training restores American military readiness and equips them to sustain their political objectives.

“American ingenuity and ability have always heretofore succeeded in proving their sufficiency,” therefore many citizens felt the United States could always rely on this “to cope with whatever may arise in the future” instead of preparing ahead of time.²⁷⁵ Waiting until war is upon the United States is not an effective nor efficient plan. A deliberate policy ensures properly trained soldiers and their resiliency during conflict. An emergency plan, such as the draft of selective service, intends to “make specialists out of laymen” in short order.²⁷⁶ One cannot glean that because the United States was successful before without preparation, that they should or could rely on this as a future plan.

Universal Military Training can “lend authority to our voice in international affairs, reassure allies, and discourage aggression.”²⁷⁷ Despite the benefits of an Air Force, the United States should not put all their eggs in the basket of airpower. “A large, well-trained citizen-army might furnish the United States with real bargaining power at the peace table,” advocated Mr. Jimmy Jones, the Director of the New Bureau of the

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Arthur Eymann, “Compulsory Military Training?,” *Rotarian* 67 (July 1945): 51-53, cited in Janice B. Harrington, *Universal Military Training: A Selected and Annotated List of References* (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress: General Reference and Bibliography Division, 1945), 5.

²⁷⁶ Kirk, “Shall We Have Universal Military Training?”

²⁷⁷ Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 136.

University of Georgia.²⁷⁸ Also, Universal Military Training allowed the United States “to assume its new identity as the global leader of democracy, without undermining the principle with a large, professional army.”²⁷⁹ The United States cannot isolate itself and will preserve rapport by reinforcing alliances. Finally, goals to provide education in citizenship or improve health equal a reduction in combat focus and training. These ideas should not detract from the emphasis of Universal Military Training: military preparedness.

Summary

Just as with World War I, arguments both for and against took many forms following World War II. In the end, the American people were left to determine:

whether UMT amounted to a dangerous and wrongheaded departure from the nation’s traditional antipathy toward a large, standing army, as critics were inclined to argue, or whether it squared with both practical necessity and the tradition of the citizen soldier, as the administration liked to believe.²⁸⁰

President Roosevelt’s preliminary remarks suggested allowing assets built and acquired during the war to remain idle and unused was careless. Nevertheless, his later statements on the topic moved towards the direction of military necessity. President Truman and Secretary Marshall, with the help of World War I veterans like Brigadier General Palmer, drove the movement for adoption of Universal Military Training. They understood that by establishing Universal Military Training and essentially a citizen force, it would re-

²⁷⁸ Jimmy Jones, “A Year in Uniform for Every Man?,” *Atlanta Journal Magazine*, May 20, 1945.

²⁷⁹ Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 156-157.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 19.

enforce the United States' national defense posture and safeguard the country against unpreparedness, which plagued the country in wars past. "Timely preparation for the Nation's long-range security," was at the forefront of President Truman's mind as the Korean War began.²⁸¹

In addition to military necessity, many supporters were encouraged by benefits rendered by Universal Military Training both to the individual and the nation. Although greater civic awareness and enhanced health serve an important purpose, they took focus away from the military readiness objective. The "contrast between two plans produced by the Special Planning Division of the General Staff," significant differences between the Army and Navy, and the promotion of Universal Military Training "as not so much a defense measure as a general welfare program" distracted from a unified case.²⁸² The "difficulties in maintaining a unified administration position on UMT" were a contributing factor in policy rejection.²⁸³

The War Department attempted to continue to build upon the success of the Plattsburg Camps before World War I by initiating the Fort Knox Experiment. Their initiation was contrary to their previous stance on Universal Military Training before World War I. Unfortunately, the trial run resulted in transposing the concept of citizen-

²⁸¹ Harry S. Truman, *Outline of Plans Made for the Reconversion Period* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1945).

²⁸² James M. Gerhardt, *The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower Procurement, 1945-1970* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971), 12-14.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, 12.

soldier by “now trying to make every soldier a citizen.”²⁸⁴ In addition, it perpetuated segregation which alienated an entire group of United States citizens. However, it led to President Truman’s Executive Order 9981 and “equality of treatment and opportunity for all those who serve in our country’s defense” in 1948.²⁸⁵

Two manpower policies became central to the debate: Universal Military Training, or providing “a large and stable pool of trained manpower available for recruitment into the organized reserves and for quick mobilization in any future crisis” and extending Selective Service “to meet immediate needs for large number of new men in the active forces following the wholesale release of wartime veterans.”²⁸⁶ The first, lending itself to permanent strategy and the later, focused on the transition between peacetime and wartime. Those for and against could agree better preparation was necessary, but they could not agree on how to get there. Lawmakers opted for the draft instead of Universal Military Training because it seemed more in line with what had been done in the past, “accommodating an older political culture” who without a doubt “influenced the process of state making.”²⁸⁷ Furthermore, it “seemed more in line with traditional notions of the citizen-soldier.”²⁸⁸ Lastly, real-world events such as the Korean War required an immediate manpower policy, something Universal Military Training

²⁸⁴ Taylor, *Every Citizen A Soldier*, 17.

²⁸⁵ Harry S. Truman, “Executive Order 9981.”

²⁸⁶ Gerhardt, *The Draft and Public Policy*, 3.

²⁸⁷ Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 158.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

could not provide. Ultimately, the division and lack of agreement caused damage to the proposal and prevented it from cementing itself into United States military history.

There were several reasons the Universal Military Training proposal after World War II failed. First, was simply because of a shift in focus from social benefits over military utility. This “metamorphosis,” as suggested by William A. Taylor, backfired and created additional obstacles to their plan.²⁸⁹ Second, the traditional pacifist mentality returned following World War II, which deterred support for anything military or defense-related. Two World Wars in thirty years’ time had not eliminated the conviction of “we could be secure by minding our own business.”²⁹⁰ Conscription and compulsory training just did not fit with American ideals at the time. Third, was the immediate need for manpower instead of creating a long-term strategy. In the end, the United States was not willing to commit to Universal Military Training.

Brigadier General Palmer concluded that:

no nation is fully prepared for war unless it is organized to deploy all or any necessary part of its manpower to meet any possible military emergency. From this flows the corollary that no nation can be fully prepared for sudden military emergency unless of its able-bodied young men are trained in peace time to do their several parts in the military defense of their country and interests.²⁹¹

His assertions reflected all he learned throughout both Universal Military Training campaigns. During both World War I and World War II similar arguments endured. Despite unprepared entry into two country encompassing conflicts within less than thirty

²⁸⁹ Taylor, *Every Citizen A Soldier*, 169.

²⁹⁰ Gerhardt, *The Draft and Public Policy*, 16.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 9.

years, the Universal Military Training activists could not persuade non-advocates of the importance of readiness. The absence of agreement in the United States resulted in the continuation of selective service and the draft, but only once hostilities were underway. As the author transitions to present day, it should be noted that the military's number one priority is readiness.

CHAPTER 5

UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND ITS CONSEQUENCE FOR TODAY

I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation (under God), indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

—*The Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag*

The primary objective of this thesis was to analyze the case study of Universal Military Training as an applicable theme for National Service within the United States. By comparing the Universal Military Training movements before World War I and after World War II, the author intended to discover any emerging themes and how those ideas fit in the context of today's environment. This chapter addresses those themes, their implications, how both of the Universal Military Training movements are a basis to which the United States could begin preparedness, what else constitutes National Service, any further research needed, and finally, a closing statement.

Emergent Themes

Many of the themes found in these two case studies are issues debated from the Founding Fathers and still today. They are topics and issues inherent to democracy that must remain balanced in order for the United States to thrive. Civic responsibility versus individual liberties and protecting citizens versus defending the government are the main threads tugged upon throughout this thesis. Because these questions are not new, it is merely a matter of how to best enact them for the stability of the United States.

Janowitz defined a citizen as “a person who owes allegiance to a specific government and is entitled to protection from that government and to the enjoyment of

certain rights.”²⁹² However, “Americans’ views of a citizen’s obligations to government have shrunk dramatically,” and their “expectations of government’s obligations to its citizens have increased in reverse proportion.”²⁹³ The military-civilian relationship requires a give and take, but currently the United States’ citizens believe more is owed to them than they must devote in return. In fact, the idea of each citizen a soldier resonates about as much as preferring lobster or crab for someone with a shellfish allergy.

“The Spirit of 1920,” as William A. Taylor describes the mentality of the United States after World War I, meant that it was the war to end all wars and there would never be another like it.²⁹⁴ Until 1939, that is. Once World War II ended, America demonstrated once again her reactionary instead of precautionary nature by believing that another ground war was not possible because of atomic weapons. Then, the Korean War kicked off in 1950. In all instances, the United States chose the temporary, band-aid fix of selective service and draft over long-term manning and readiness solutions such as Universal Military Training.

Each of these conflicts required immediate action regarding military manpower, and so the United States chose one solution over the other instead of implementing a combination of both. Military leaders proposed the eventual phasing out of selective service and the draft once enough universally trained manpower was available.²⁹⁵

²⁹² Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism*, ix.

²⁹³ Taylor, *Every Citizen A Soldier*, xv.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 13.

²⁹⁵ Wood, *Universal Military Training*, 113; Gerhardt, *The Draft and Public Policy*, 9-10.

Nonetheless, the outbreak of military action in Korea stifled the debate and solidified Selective Service as the only realistic policy going forward.²⁹⁶

Through the comparison of these case studies, it is clear not everyone was thinking along the same lines. While the administration of President Wilson did not support the idea of preparedness through Universal Military Training, President Truman's did. Both men were Democrats but because of the world events during their time and the effect of various election years, their ideas clashed. Furthermore, the research indicates that each president held diverse interpretations of what Universal Military Training entailed. Both sides of the argument claimed they were more democratic and more in tune with the nation's forefathers' ideas for the military.

Because of the relationship between the citizens, the government, and the military, it is important to discern their positions concerning Universal Military Training. The two case studies portray the citizens of the United States with overall support for preparedness. Gallup polls and other public opinion surveys conducted during each timeframe suggests this.²⁹⁷ Additionally, the increase of attendance and support of the Plattsburg Camp and others organized by the Military Training Camp Association offer evidence that American public support was on the rise leading up to World War I.

²⁹⁶ Gerhardt, *The Draft and Public Policy*, 353.

²⁹⁷ Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training*, 29; Harrington, *Universal Military Training*, 14; Taylor, *Every Citizen A Soldier*, 157.

Remarkably, polls conducted during these periods, specifically addressing national service, also indicate a high level of support.²⁹⁸

For those who were against Universal Military Training, both civilians within the government and citizens at large believed preparation was unnecessary and provocative as opposed to peacekeeping. United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliances contributed to lack of support after World War II just as proposed involvement in the League of Nations after World War I contributed to this pacifist mindset within the United States.²⁹⁹ A fear of despotism strongly dominated these individuals' positions.

Throughout these periods, there was a divide within the Armed Forces and specifically within the Army during World War I. Major General Wood committed himself to Universal Military Training, however, those inside in the National Guard opposed. Amongst the services after World War II, the Army led the charge on policy change and support. However, the Navy was indifferent and the Air Force dissented.³⁰⁰ These disagreements made the War Department seem disjointed and took away from the argument, leading to Universal Military Training's collapse in both instances.

Lastly, the convolution of the policy and lack of agreement on what Universal Military Training was and how it should be implemented caused considerable confusion to all Americans. Without specifics, even those in favor could not move the policy

²⁹⁸ Tom W. Smith, "A Report: National Service," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 54, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 277-285.

²⁹⁹ Harrington, *Universal Military Training*, 15.

³⁰⁰ Gerhardt, *The Draft and Public Policy*, 350.

forward.³⁰¹ Military experts were adamant that the policy was a military solution and any additional benefits received were secondary factors. However, a substantial opinion from many politicians focused on the civic advantages that Universal Military Training provided. Some believed that presenting the policy in this manner would make it easier for the public to back and Congress to approve. However, in reality, this launched more criticism as the claims of individual and national benefit were not unanimously accepted.³⁰² Although civic instruction is in fact needed within the United States, Universal Military Training should not be relied upon to do anything other than provide national defense, as that is the military's primary focus.

Implications for Today

In order to discuss whether or not the United States should implement national service today, the state of the country, national security policy, view of preparedness, and why it did not work before should first be analyzed. It should be understood how the United States came to this conclusion previously and if there are any analogies with today's environment. Pre-World War I and post-World War II analysis of the Universal Military Training movement provides valuable insight into another era in which United States leaders thought it necessary to implement military training across the country.

The Universal Military Training movement delivers an excellent case study for implications of national service. It illustrates how difficult military planning can be. It

³⁰¹ Julian P. Bretz, "Compulsory Military Training in Peacetime: Is It Necessary? Is It Wise?," *Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors* 31, no. 4 (Winter 1945): 574-575.

³⁰² Taylor, *Every Citizen A Soldier*, 131.

also validates how any creation of policy must consider social implications as well.

Lastly, the debate illustrates that “the balance between freedom and security is a delicate one.”³⁰³ Though there were certainly differences between each campaign, these three principles echoed throughout the country.

Traditionally, the United States focused internally and maintained a pacifist mindset. It was well-documented that this was the case throughout United States history. Additionally, Americans felt it was best to wait and see, a tactic of delay seemed commonplace. This uncertainty in place of strategy inevitably contributed to Universal Military training’s downfall.³⁰⁴ However, leaders within the United States must not let this fear of the unknown impede them from moving forward with policies that will better the country.

The current United States Army manning document explains today’s situation: “Current operational requirements and personnel authorizations exceed the distributable inventory in the Active Army. This friction precludes U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) from manning all units to 100% fill with the correct skill and grade.”³⁰⁵ Moreover, changes to the Sustainable Readiness Model management cycle of personnel and organizations within the Army demonstrate they are overtasked and overburdened. Increased readiness efforts will ensure ground forces are *always* ready to deploy and win

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ Ibid., 171.

³⁰⁵ Department of the Army, “HQDA EXORD 093-18 ISO FY18-19 Active Component Manning Guidance (ACMG)” (Message sent by Pentagon Telecommunications Center on Behalf of HQDA DCS G-4, Washington, DC, February 23, 2018), 2.

the nation's wars, implying zero time for rest, reset/refit, or restoration/replenishment/recharge. When does current manpower run/tap/drain out? Soldiers are not an infinite resource. When will the burden of those currently serving become too much? It is not a matter of if, it is a matter of when. However, a policy like National Service can prevent this from happening.³⁰⁶

During both World Wars, the United States adopted selective service and the draft as its military manpower strategy. The “transmutation” replaced by “extirpation,” as described by sociologist Samuel Huntington, or a dramatic increase of military manpower during war, followed by its immediate elimination during peacetime, has been the trend throughout history for fear of a large standing Army and its effects on democracy.³⁰⁷ Since 1973, the manning strategy transitioned to the All-Volunteer Force. Under this policy, the United States has been relatively successful. One cannot forget, however, that voluntary recruitment failed the country in all its previous engagements when enlistments were not filled to maximum, and drafts or substitutes were needed to fill the ranks.³⁰⁸ As author James M. Gerhardt summarized, “military manpower procurement is important to military security policy because without men the machines of war are useless.”³⁰⁹ Soldiers are the Army's most important resource.

³⁰⁶ Michael W. Sherraden and Donald J. Eberly, eds., *National Service: Social, Economic, and Military Impacts* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), 161.

³⁰⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1957), 155-156.

³⁰⁸ Wood, *Universal Military Training*, 149-150.

³⁰⁹ Gerhardt, *The Draft and Public Policy*, xvii.

“Union is strength . . . a house divided against itself cannot stand.”³¹⁰ These famous words made by Abraham Lincoln register even truer now. The number of engagements does not seem to be decreasing over time, but alternatively, it is on the rise. The United States has utilized the military in thirty-four engagements since 1945, as depicted in the table below. Ensuring everyone contributes will prevent exhaustion of the current finite number of manpower resources. The nation as a whole will benefit from national service because as influential military sociologist Charles Moskos stated, “shared civic duties become the social glue that holds society together.”³¹¹ A heterogeneous population, exposure to socioeconomic realities, and team and cooperative endeavors produce positive outcomes and create a leveling experience. Each of these three things are found within National Service.³¹²

³¹⁰ Abraham Lincoln, *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, ed. Roy P. Basler, vol. 1 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 315.

³¹¹ Charles C. Moskos, *A Call to Civic Service: National Service for Country and Community* (New York: The Free Press, 1988), 1.

³¹² Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism*, 199.

Table 1. Military Engagements, 1945-2000

<i>Campaign or Expedition</i>	<i>Inclusive Dates</i>
Navy Occupation of Trieste	May 1945 to October 1954
Navy Occupation of Austria	May 1945 to October 1955
Army Occupation of Austria	May 1945 to July 1955
Army Occupation of Germany (exclusive of Berlin)	May 1945 to May 1955
Army Occupation of Berlin	May 1945 to October 1990
Units of the Sixth Fleet (Navy)	May 1945 to October 1955
Army Occupation of Japan	September 1945 to April 1952
Chinese Service Medal	September 1945 to April 1957
Korean Service	June 1950 to July 1954
Lebanon	July 1958 to November 1958
Vietnam (including Thailand)	July 1958 to July 1965
Quemoy and Matsu Islands	August 1958 to June 1963
Taiwan Straits	August 1958 to June 1959
Congo	July 1960 to September 1962
Laos	April 1961 to October 1962
Berlin	August 1961 to June 1963
Thailand	May 1962 to August 1962
Cuba	October 1962 to June 1963
Congo	November 1964
Korea	June 1950 to July 1954
Vietnam Service	July 1965 to March 1973
Cambodia	March 1973 to August 1973
Cambodia Evacuation	April 1975
Mayaguez Operation	May 15, 1975
Iranian/Yemen/Indian Ocean	December 1978 to June 1979
Indian Ocean/Iran (N/MC)	November 1979 to October 1981
Panama	April 1980 to December 1986
El Salvador	January 1981 to February 1992
Lebanon	August 1982 to December 1987
Grenada (Operation Urgent Fury)	October 1983 to November 1983
(Northern Watch)	January 1997–
Persian Gulf (Desert Thunder)	November 1998 to December 1998
(Desert Fox)	December 1998
Kosovo/Various Operations	March 1999 to November 1999

Source: Henry C. Dethloff and Gerald E. Shenk, *Citizen and Soldier: A Sourcebook on Military Service and National Defense from Colonial America to the Present* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2010), 156.

National service is needed for three basic reasons. First and foremost is to produce additional trained manpower to face the enemies of the United States at home or abroad. The next reason is to increase civic responsibility. The third reason is to bridge the military-civilian divide that exists within the country.

Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Violent Extremist Organizations present threats to American security around the world.³¹³ Each of the aforementioned countries possess a strong military and utilize conscription to fill their ranks.³¹⁴ To neutralize these threats, the United States must aggressively counterbalance their strengths, foster alliances, and maintain a readiness posture which will stretch the military to its limits. National Service can increase trained military personnel and aid domestic defense so that regular military forces may concentrate overseas.

Increasing civic responsibility will assist in not only bridging the military-civilian divide but liberal-conservative and other types of divide within the United States as well. Civic training starts with a “‘meaningful integration’ of military and civilian values.”³¹⁵ Wider perspective of civic understanding comes as one matures and understands “fundamental values, practices, and interpersonal relations in a democratic society.” Civic education has declined because Americans cannot agree on what it means and what scope it should be taught. This conflict, related to bipartisan nature of the political atmosphere, has weakened the United States.³¹⁶ The country wants to put America first,

³¹³ Department of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy*, 1-4.

³¹⁴ Christopher Woody, “The Most Powerful Militaries in the World,” *Business Insider*, last modified February 26, 2018, accessed April 28, 2018, <http://www.businessinsider.com/most-powerful-militaries-in-the-world-ranked-2018-2>; Central Intelligence Agency, “Military Service Age and Obligation,” *The World Factbook*, accessed April 28, 2018, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html>.

³¹⁵ Mackubin Thomas Owens, *US Civil-Military Relations After 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain* (New York: Continuum, 2011), 25.

³¹⁶ Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism*, 13.

but it is a national attitude such as this that promotes similar individual attitudes. The government must set the example to balance “what is in it for me” with building partnerships and selfless outlook. The me versus us frame of mind perpetuates divide within the United States.

As new opinions surface, on the divide between the military and their civilian counterparts it is easy to fall into the trap of thinking that they are unrelated and too dissimilar. However, national service would shed light on the military establishment for many, providing a perspective of more than apathy and less than delusions of grandeur.³¹⁷ Machiavelli pointed out in *On the Art of War* that:

Many are now of the opinion that no two things are more discordant and incongruous than a civil and military life. But if we consider the nature of government, we shall find a very strict and intimate relation betwixt these two conditions; and that they are not only compatible and consistent with each other, but necessarily connected and united together.³¹⁸

Part of what unites the two together comes from the notions of the citizen-soldier. Many will argue that the all-volunteer force is more in line with the democratic virtues of the nation but “while a volunteer force may help democracies maximize individual freedom at home,” it can have negative implications for those who serve when not all serve, raising concerns about equality and social justice.³¹⁹

³¹⁷ Lloyd Green, “Does General Kelly Feud Mean It’s Time for National Service or a Draft?,” *Fox News*, last modified October 23, 2017, accessed November 8, 2017, <http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2017/10/23/does-general-kelly-feud-mean-its-time-for-national-service-or-draft.html>.

³¹⁸ Fitzpatrick, *Universal Military Training*, 274.

³¹⁹ Joseph Paul Vasquez III, “Shouldering the Soldiering: Democracy, Conscription, and Military Casualties,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 6 (December 2005): 871.

Universal Military Training as a Starting Point for National Service

Janowitz views military service as the fundamental conditioning of citizenship. He declares, “the strongest test of citizen obligation is performance of military service in defense of the nation-state,” and if unqualified for military service, then serving the country in another capacity must occur.³²⁰ Even though everyone in the military is considered a warfighter, everyone is not combat arms. Many soldiers are technicians and specialists in their fields of support. This support demonstrates the linkage between national service and the military in that everyone has a part to play in order to accomplish a greater goal even within the military. Since everyone is not qualified or best suited to perform certain functions within the military, the same is true of those not capable /able to serve militarily but may be better matched undertaking some other type of service.

The military leaders within the United States missed several opportunities upon which to capitalize. First, advocates did not plainly state that the primary goal of Universal Military Training was national security and national security alone. Previous efforts failed to define the purpose of Universal Military Training by attempting to do too much. It was clear, even during the first half of the twentieth century, that there existed a disconnect between military and civilian populations. Second, policy supporters within the military alienated an entire population amongst the National Guard that they could have built their policy around. Brigadier General Palmer recognized the need to develop

³²⁰ Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism*, 14.

this capacity, recounting the “patriotic young men of the national guard are the real founders of the American army of trained citizenry,” but was unable to do so.³²¹

When Brigadier General Palmer presented his argument for Universal Military Training before the House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy in 1945, he made clear a principle that is as valid today as it was then and even still in 1790: “men have been, are and will be liable to compulsory military service in wartime whether they are trained or not. The primary purpose of universal military training is to see to it that, hereafter, America’s young men are to be trained before they become subject to compulsory military service.”³²² Today, the United States still requires males to register with the Selective Service System once they turn eighteen-years-old. It is not enough to simply register for selective service—citizens must be trained in order to be effective should combat be needed. Without training, conflicts drag on, and the goal is to end swiftly to limit unnecessary loss of life and destruction of property. To guarantee trained citizens, the United States needs to develop a “series of experimental exercises,” as proposed by Janowitz, to foster support to grow from voluntary service to obligatory service similar to the Plattsburg camps.³²³ As the Plattsburg Camps did just before World War I, these new camps would also instill comradery and a sense of purpose into the men and women of the United States with knowledge they are performing their civic duty. For those unable to meet requirements for military service, another option such as Civilian

³²¹ Palmer, *The Army of the People*, 155.

³²² Gerhardt, *The Draft and Public Policy*, 9-10.

³²³ Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism*, 198.

Conservation Corps should be offered to ensure each citizen has the opportunity to partake in such a broadening experience. By assisting in public works, citizens invest in their country which inevitably leads to pride and overall patriotic sentiments.

Additional National Service Measures

Should citizens not qualify for military service, there must be alternatives for them to contribute. Within the last century, many American Presidents called upon citizens to do just that. The Civilian Conservation Corps, Volunteers in Service to America, Job Corps, Peace Corps, AmeriCorps, Freedom Corps, and others are some of the only times both Democrats and Republicans came together to agree, making national service a truly bipartisan goal.³²⁴

When President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Civilian Conservation Corps, it was associated with a solid record of accomplishment that others were unable to replicate. It operated from 1933 to 1942 and boasted both the respect of public and satisfaction by participants, delivering the feeling “he was doing something worthwhile not only for himself but for the country.” It employed over one million citizens and encompassed cooperation from several agencies within the government to build approximately 1,500 camps, situated out West. Each camp was small, consisting of 200 men with supervision by a junior grade officer from the Army. The essential lesson of the Civilian Conservation Corps further described as “meaningful work on behalf of the

³²⁴ Ibid., 175.

needs of the larger collectivity was the basis of success and the means of reinforcing the social and moral meaning of work.”³²⁵

A “simplicity of goals” accounted for much of the Civilian Conservation Corps success unlike Universal Military Training, which suffered from a lack of agreement on what the focus should be.³²⁶ Its success demonstrated that “the toughness of a society should not have to depend on preparation for war or war itself.” Universal work programs could substitute for Military service which provided a broader scope in terms of jobs performed and those filling those roles.³²⁷ The United States should continue to strive to emulate this success.




Figure 5. Civilian Conservation Corps Poster 1

³²⁵ Ibid., 172-175.

³²⁶ Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism*, 177.

³²⁷ Ibid., 185.

Source: Al Hester, "The Civilian Conservation Corps," University of South Carolina, Institute for Southern Studies, April 15, 2016, accessed March 17, 2018.
<http://www.scencyclopedia.org/sce/entries/civilian-conservation-corps/>.



Figure 6. Civilian Conservation Corps Poster 2

Source: James F. Justin Museum, "CCC Papers," accessed March 17, 2018,
<http://www.justinmuseum.com/cccpapers/3544p3.jpg>.

However, in order for this to remain successful and relevant, the government must prioritize it as such. It must be an infectious cause that trickles down to each and every citizen of the United States. It cannot lose momentum or importance like it did in 1941 and 1966. Initially, it may need to be incentivized. Over time, the hope is that the incentive would simply be selfless-service and the desire to give back to the nation. American society should want to be known for these traits.³²⁸ Replacing extrinsic with

³²⁸ Sherraden and Eberly, *National Service: Social, Economic, and Military Impacts*, 221.

intrinsic motivation for serving others is an example of how citizens develop a love or pride in something that they are involved. The same can be true of the country in which they live. Today, most are apathetic towards the military and even politics. Both are something other people do and does not affect them, or they feel helpless to affect it.³²⁹ Suddenly, something changes inside someone, or policy directly affects them or someone they love. Healthcare, women's equality, gun laws, etcetera are just a few of the current hot ticket items in the United States. In addition to these, conservation, education, social services, health, housing, transportation, libraries, and recreation need public support and assistance.³³⁰ The United States needs to get back to the roots and historical beginnings of balancing individual liberties over collective obligations; selflessness over selfishness because "as soon as public service ceases to be the chief business of the citizens," Rousseau wrote in *The Social Contract*, "the State is not far from its fall."³³¹

Further Research Needed

As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, discussion of economic influence on this topic was not presented. There seems to be plenty of information regarding this,

³²⁹ Andrew J. Bacevich, "8 Reasons Americans Can't Shake Their Indifference to War," *The Nation*, October 10, 2017, accessed April 29, 2018, <https://www.thenation.com/article/8-reasons-americans-cant-shake-their-indifference-to-war/>; Amy Schafer, "The War on Apathy," *Slate*, October 31, 2017, accessed April 29, 2018, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2017/10/the_prospect_of_a_reinstated_draft_could_force_congress_to_rein_in_america.html.

³³⁰ Sherraden and Eberly, *National Service: Social, Economic, and Military Impacts*, 216.

³³¹ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract: And, The Discourses*, trans. G.D.H. Cole (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1913), 262.

but the scope of this paper could not investigate beyond what is mentioned. A further look into Conscientious Objection and other disqualifying aspects to military service would also benefit the study. It should detail which traits immediately disqualify a citizen or which would delineate a choice.

Further evaluation of the Civilian Conservation Corps and other like programs for those citizens ineligible for military service is not addressed fully in this paper. Each of these civic service organizations may also provide an excellent case study for research and writing. The plan of implementation by the government might be clearer through this lens.

Research and comparison to other countries with conscription and mandatory service for its citizens would assist the study of Universal Military Training as well. Information on why certain countries removed conscription as a policy and why many countries continue to implement it may also be advantageous. A study on the type of government each country has who persisted with compulsory service should also be considered.

Although this paper primarily focuses on males and their Universal Military Training before World War I and after World War II, a fascinating aspect of research could be done on women's contributions during this time and what that means for women's National Service. Recently, the debate occurred over whether women should register for selective service. To maintain equal footing with male colleagues, it is imperative that women contribute both to the nation's defense and its overall welfare too. National Service is not just the male burden to shoulder.

Additional time at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri would be useful to further research. Travel to The George C. Marshall Foundation Research Library in Lexington, Virginia, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library in Hyde Park, New York, and Library of Congress or National Archives in Washington DC would also add depth and richness to this project. Each library would provide additional documents related to Universal Military Training, including personal papers and accounts of what transpired. Finally, visiting the locations where the military camps were held such as Plattsburg, New York and Fort Knox, Kentucky would be valuable to discover additional archives, photos, or simply see the terrain and camp layout.

Closing Statement

National Service serves as a bridge across all walks of life and a “means to strengthen the ties that bind us as a nation.”³³² One thing the military exposes soldiers to are individuals, cultures, and ways of life that they would not have normally known or had the opportunity to know, especially growing up in a small town in mid-Michigan. Midwesterners have their own unique viewpoints, characterized and influenced by their upbringing and environment, which may be unlike those growing up in the rural South, big cities of the Northeast, or sunshine dominated, ocean coasts of the West. However, when someone works side by side with individuals from each of these distinctive locations and get to know their ideas and opinions one can only develop an inclination

³³² E. J. Dionne Jr. and Kayla Meltzer Drogosz, “United We Serve? The Promise of National Service,” in *United We Serve*, ed. E. J. Dionne Jr, Kayla Metzer Drogosz, and Robert E. Litan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 6.

towards open-mindedness and acceptance of all the United States has to offer. National service offers a way to “parallel the social mixing” found in the military.³³³

Should the United States implement National Service? Absolutely. As Moskos reasoned, “it would make public service an essential part of growing up in America.”³³⁴ Change is scary, but Americans cannot wait and see what will happen, they must prepare now. Instead of simple criticism, citizens need to think through and convey hard solutions. Democracy is not always easy but protecting individual liberties must never get in the way of preparedness and civic responsibility. Although, “the military format is particularly influenced by prevailing attitudes about the relationship of the citizen to the national community, to the State,” that societal imperative must never outweigh its protection.³³⁵ It is all about balance.

Moreover, national service poses the questions, what ideals are worth your sacrifice and also, “how do you think you can best serve your country”?³³⁶ It is critical to inculcate selfless-service from a young age, and the government must take the first step by conveying to the youth of America that help is needed and asking them to step forward and lend a hand. It is imperative that this help involves something beneficial to both the individual and the nation because “only if participants are engaged in genuinely

³³³ Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism*, 187.

³³⁴ Charles C. Moskos Jr., “The All-Volunteer Military: Calling, Profession, or Occupation?,” *Parameters* 40, no. 4 (Winter 2011/2010): 31.

³³⁵ Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 261.

³³⁶ Sherraden and Eberly, *National Service: Social, Economic, and Military Impacts*, 219.

productive work can they reap the benefits of the service experience.”³³⁷ Likewise, recruitment and service must explicitly be equal and universal across the country. This collective and nationwide aspect instills confidence and fidelity. Trust is not a one-sided coin; it goes both ways; you must give it to receive it and vice versa. Therefore, “a country that undertakes a national service compact with its young people will demonstrate faith in itself, faith in young people and faith in the future.”³³⁸

Throughout history one perceives intelligent, highly regarded military and civilian leaders advocating the same thing—a small regular Army with a citizen-soldier reserve. Washington, Pershing, Wood, Palmer, Stimson, Marshall supported by Root, Clark, Roosevelt, Truman, FDR, and countless other military and civilian counterparts all advocated their opinion for Universal Military Training and the responsibility each citizen has to their country. Even more contemporary civic leaders such as Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. preached at his corps values, “Life's most persistent and urgent question is, ‘what are you doing for others?’”³³⁹ To this day, it is only his federal holiday which carries the distinction of a day of service.³⁴⁰

³³⁷ Sherraden and Eberly, *National Service: Social, Economic, and Military Impacts*, 222-223.

³³⁸ Ibid., 223.

³³⁹ King Center, “MLK Quote of the Week: ‘Life’s Most Persistent and Urgent Question,’” March 26, 2013, accessed May 3, 2018, <http://www.thekingcenter.org/blog/mlk-quote-week-lifes-most-persistent-and-urgent-question>.

³⁴⁰ American Association of State Colleges and Universities, “Martin Luther King Day of Service,” accessed May 3, 2018, <http://www.aascu.org/programs/ADP/MLKDay/>.

Although most felt military preparedness was the most important objective, each acknowledged the kinship and “civic consciousness” that universal service, whether military or not, presented.³⁴¹ Because the citizen-soldier is the cornerstone of the nation’s framework, it has withstood the test of time and is consistently revisited, especially in a time of peril. It is at the heart of who Americans are and what they stand for and believe in. The United States and its citizens must never lose sight of this despite disagreement on other happenings throughout the country. The country must balance their approach by urging citizens to “Ask what your country can do for you *and* what you can do for your country.”³⁴² The nation must come together as one - United States of America.




Figure 7. JFK Cross-Stitch

Source: Author’s cross stitch, quote by John F. Kennedy.

³⁴¹ Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism*, 8.

³⁴² Moskos, *A Call to Civic Service*, 181.

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