

SHOULD THE ANTIGUA BARBUDA DEFENSE FORCE CONSIDER  
TRANSFORMATION INTO A MARITIME ORIENTED FORCE?

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by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

SHOULD THE ANTIGUA BARBUDA DEFENSE FORCE CONSIDER TRANSFORMATION INTO A MARITIME ORIENTED FORCE? by Major Telbert L.A. Benjamin, 77 pages.

The discussion about the change in orientation of the Antigua Barbuda Defense Force (ABDF) has been ongoing for more than ten years. The argument has centered around the view that, as a nation whose most significant security concerns originate in the maritime domain and as a nation that derives much of its economic benefits from the same environment, consideration should be given to having an organization that has a naval orientation.

This thesis seeks to examine the ABDF's current operating environment and determine if an argument can be made for its transformation from an army to a naval orientation. In conducting this examination consideration is given to the impact that such a transformation might have on the legal mandate of the ABDF. The conclusion arrived at is that based on the complex nature of the operating environment and the economic emphasis on the diversification of the maritime sector, transformation should be considered.

The analysis conducted included an examination of the Defense legislation of the ABDF the Royal Bahamas Defense Force (RBDF), Barbados Defense Force (BDF) and St. Kitts Nevis Defense Force (SKNDF). Additionally, a comparative analysis was conducted using the United States Army's Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPFP) framework to examine the ABDF and the RBDF in order to ascertain the suitability of the ABDF adopting a naval posture.

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Finally, to my wife Mrs. Vernicia Prosper Benjamin, 14 December 1980 to 1 February 2018, I kept my promise. Without your encouragement and love I would not have come here or completed this process. I love you.

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## ACRONYMS

ABDF	Antigua Barbuda Defense Force
ADF	Antigua Defense Force
BDF	Barbados Defense Force
RBDF	Royal Bahamas Defense Force
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
IMPACS	Implementation Agency for Crime and Security
MMAS	Masters of Military Arts and Science
NODS	National Office of Disaster Services
OE	Operating Environment
RSS	Regional Security System
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SKNDF	St Kitts and Nevis Defense Force
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
TOC	Transnational Organized Crime



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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

On 1 September 1981, an act of parliament established the ABDF. As a prelude to gaining political independence from Great Britain, the force was established as the entity with responsibility for the nation's defense and territorial integrity. In addition to its task of national defense, it was determined that the ABDF would play a significant role in the support of civilian law enforcement and support to civil authority (Government of Antigua and Barbuda 2006). In order to accomplish these tasks, the Defense Force was organized based on an Army orientation that included a force headquarters, an infantry company, a service company and a company size reserve.

Over time the roles and responsibilities of the force, and by extension its structure, have changed to reflect changes in the operating environment (OE). In addition to the tasks mentioned earlier, the ABDF now plays a major role in maritime security and protection, national emergency response and regional security. The additional tasks resulted in the addition of the Antigua Barbuda Defense Force Coast Guard in 1994. Today the Antigua Barbuda Defense Force maintains its original army orientation, it is organized into four units. There is now an infantry battalion, which includes, one active duty or regular company and a reserve company; a support and services battalion, with primary responsibilities for logistics and general sustainment of the force; and a Coast Guard, responsible for maritime safety and security. In addition to the professional component, the ABDF plays a role in national development through the ownership of the Antigua Barbuda National Cadet Corp (ABNCC). The ABNCC is charged with the responsibility of supporting youth development and includes high school students

between the ages of 12 and 17 years. It is important to note that they are not members of the ABDF active duty or reserve force.

Figure 1 reflects the ABDF structure in 1981, and Figure 2 reflects the current organizational structure, the noted difference is the inclusion of the Coast Guard and the ABNCC. The Structure of the Antigua Barbuda Defense Force as presented in Figure 1 catered primarily for support to civilian authorities in times of natural disasters, general support to law enforcement and the performance of ceremonial duties. The ABDF functioned as an instrument of national power during Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983, as a member of the Regional Security System (RSS), and again in 1990 following the attempted coup in Trinidad and Tobago (Griffith 1998). Personnel from the ABDF were deployed to Haiti from 1994 through 1995 first, as members of the CARICOM battalion in support of the United States effort to restore democracy and then as a part of the United Nation's security force.

Figure 2 reflects the change that took place in the structure of the ABDF as of 1995. This change reflected the focus of the government on maritime security but more importantly on the efficient use of the nation's limited resources towards the maintenance of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Prior to 1995 the Coast Guard as an entity was a department of the police force. The realigning of the Coast Guard with the ABDF presented an opportunity for the nation to aggressively confront several challenges to the national interest within the maritime domain.




Figure 1. Antigua Barbuda Defense Force Original Structure (1981)

*Source:* Created by the author.

Over the past ten years there has been an ongoing discussion regarding the ABDF Army orientation. The argument has centered around the view that, as a nation whose most significant security concerns originate in the maritime domain and as a nation that derives much of its economic benefits from the same environment, consideration should be given to having a force that has a naval orientation. Supporters of this argument have made reference to the historical records reflecting that throughout the colonial period, the British, and later the United States, maintained the defense of the region principally through the use of naval forces.




Figure 2. Antigua Barbuda Defense Force Structure as of January 2017

*Source:* Created by the author.

With this in mind the paper will attempt to provide evidence and arguments in support of both sides of this discussion. By taking such an approach to the discussion, decision-makers will have a more comprehensive analysis from which to base any future decisions. Making such a large-scale change necessitates taking evidence and arguments from both sides into account. In attempting to do so the following questions will be asked:

1. Should the Antigua Barbuda Defense Force (ABDF) consider transforming into a maritime oriented force? If necessary, will such a transformation negatively impact the ABDF's legal mandate?
2. Has there been a significant change in the operating environment and do those changes necessitate a change in orientation?

3. Is the current force structure adequate based on the assigned roles and responsibilities of the ABDF?
4. Would such a transformation be suitable for similar organizations within the Regional Security System (RSS) subregion?

Arguably an inquiry of this nature will have its supporters as well as those who oppose it. The aim of this paper however is not to choose a side but to present a case regarding what might be suitable and feasible for a Small Island Developing State (SIDS) such as Antigua and Barbuda confronted by an array of developmental and security related challenges. As such, the anticipated outcome will be recommendations to address the challenges of the current and future operating environment.

#### Background

The island Nation of Antigua and Barbuda is located in the Leeward Islands in the northeastern section of the Caribbean archipelago. The nation is comprised of Antigua which is approximately 280 square kilometers (108 square miles), Barbuda which is approximately 161 square kilometers (62 square miles) and Redonda which is 1 square kilometer (0.5 square miles) (O'Marde 2017). The islands are relatively flat with the highest point on Antigua, Mount Obama rising to 450 meters (1,330 feet). Barbuda's highest point is in an area known as the Highlands which rises to only 37.8 meters (124 feet) (O'Marde 2017).



Figure 3. Map of the Islands of Antigua, Barbuda, and Redonda

*Source:* Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA World Fact Book: Central America and Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda,” last updated May 8, 2018, accessed May 12, 2018, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ac.html>.





Figure 4: Map of the Caribbean Sea

Source: Geographic Guide America, “Map of the Caribbean,” accessed May 12, 2018, <http://www.geographicguide.com/caribbean-map.htm>.

Antigua and Barbuda has an estimated population of 97,731 as of July 2017 (CIA 2018). The population is generally homogeneous with 87% being black with the remainder composed of Hispanic, whites and those considered as mixed (CIA 2018). The population is projected to grow to 102,000 by 2025 (O’Marde 2017). Approximately 98%

of the population resides on Antigua while the remaining 2% lives on Barbuda. The Island of Redonda is not populated.

Tourism is the main driver of economic activity for the country's economy. According to the CIA World Fact book, tourism accounts for some 60% of gross domestic product and 40% of investments (CIA 2018). Other sectors include construction that is generally tourism related as well as light manufacturing and financial services. It is noted that the economy is primarily services orientated which contributes to its vulnerability to a number of external shocks including the impact of natural disasters (O'Marde 2017). This point was highlighted in 2017 when the islands were impacted by Hurricanes Maria and Irma resulting in significant damage (CIA 2018) and the evacuation of Barbuda.

The presence of a military organization in Antigua and Barbuda predates the country attaining political independence from Great Britain. Throughout the colonial period the British used its navy to secure the island and its produce, cane sugar, from other European powers. Noted Caribbean Historian Dr. Eric Williams highlights that, within the islands local militias were established to protect the planter class, protect the sugar crop and help to defend the island in case of a threat from a competing colonial power (Williams 1984).

As the Commonwealth Caribbean region transitioned from colonial status to independent states, Griffith notes that a regional force was created (Griffith 1996). The New West India Regiment, comprised soldiers from the islands of the English speaking Caribbean, was trained, assembled, armed and housed by the British in Jamaica during the short lived West Indian Federation between 1958 to 1962 (Meditz and Hanratty

1987). The experiment of creating a regional defense force however failed and most of the soldiers returned to their home countries or remained in Jamaica. The Antiguan returning home would play a central role in the formation of the all-volunteer Antigua Defense Force (ADF).

The ADF, in a similar vein to the forces of the colonial period, developed and maintained an army structure with an infantry orientation. The ADF was charged primarily with the execution of constabulary type duties of providing support in the maintenance of law and order and supporting the civil authorities. Also assigned to the ADF were a number of ceremonial functions and the poorly defined role of national defense. When one examines the work of Dr. Eric Williams, *From Columbus to Castro*, he notes that by 1969, approximately ten years before Antigua and Barbuda attained political independence, the Caribbean was arguably, “one of the most unstable areas in our unstable world (Williams 1984).” The following summarizes his view of the region leading up to independence and one might suppose part of the argument to support the establishment and maintenance of a military force in any Commonwealth Caribbean island:

A mere catalogue of the instability will suffice: the British invasion of Anguilla (resulting from its secession from the associated state of St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla); anti-police rioting in Montserrat; serious labor disturbances in Curacao; political crisis in Surinam; chronic labor unrest in Antigua; endemic racial tensions in Jamaica; the secessionist movement in the Rupununi in Guyana; the independence movement in Guadeloupe attended by grave disturbances; the unpopular dictatorship in Haiti; the uncertainties of the democratic movement in the Dominican Republic; the United States blockade of Cuba; and the Castro support for Latin American guerillas. (Williams 1984)

Antigua and Barbuda became politically independent from Great Britain on 1 November 1981, in an era punctuated by instability and saturated with ideological

turmoil. On 1 September 1981, the Antigua Barbuda Defense Force was established by an act of parliament. The OE at the time demanded that nation states put systems in place to safeguard their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Antigua and Barbuda was not an exception to this rule. To understand the OE, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of some of the pressing defense and security issues that possibly contributed to the decision to establish a defense force in Antigua and Barbuda. Those issues include: competing sociopolitical ideologies, militarization within the Commonwealth Caribbean region and an unstable economic environment.

### Ideological Struggle

These challenges included ideological clashes between those with Marxist/Leninist beliefs and those with a western construct of democracy and of a free market economy (Griffith 1996). The Marxist/Leninist views coalesced well with an entrenched Black Power movement that was visible throughout the nations of the Commonwealth Caribbean. For many within the political leadership and throughout the region this was a dangerous and destabilizing combination.

This struggle played out in several forms during the latter part of the 1970s and early 1980s. Several well-known regional security events occurred during this period including: a terrorist incident in Barbados that resulted in a Cuban Airliner violently exploding shortly after departing the international airport in October 1976, and several well-known attempts to overthrow governments to include Barbados in 1978, St Vincent and the Grenadines in 1979 and the Commonwealth of Dominica in 1981 (Meditz and Hanratty 1987). However, the most visible manifestation of this clash of ideologies was the coup in Grenada in 1979. The New Jewel Movement's revolutionary activities

resulted in the overthrow of the Eric Matthew Gairy Government. This instability developing throughout the region, prompted governments to begin an examination of options to improve their defense and security posture (Meditz and Hanratty 1987).

### Military Buildup

With such turmoil there were parts of the Eastern Caribbean that witnessed a rise in military capability and an influx of military hardware. The island of Grenada in particular was center stage to much of this military growth. The aligning of the Maurice Bishop led New Jewel Movement Government with those practicing a Marxist/Leninist ideology was the most overt example of this. Grenada's association with the Cuban Socialist Republic resulted in an influx of weapons and equipment originating from the Soviet Union, this was very worrisome for many in the region (Griffith 1996).

As noted earlier the Commonwealth Caribbean region during the late 1970s and early 1980s was a region ripe with instability. Several terrorist incidents captured the attention of the general public; a revolution took place in Grenada and several others were attempted; and subversive elements in a number of countries worked to change the status quo. These events prompted the revival of discussions among regional political leaders about the creation of a regional security mechanism of some form to aid in mutual defense (Meditz and Hanratty 1987). The regional situation also prompted the United States Government to begin a program of training and equipping of regional forces. The vulnerability of countries in the region to threats originating in the maritime environment created much anxiety and opened the door for discussions on ways to support regional governments to meet the perceived threats (Meditz and Hanratty 1987). With some degree of certainty, it can be suggested that this buildup was the impetus for the

formation of professional military organizations in a number of islands of the Eastern Caribbean.

### Weak Economies

It is fair to suggest that the third major challenge to the region was that of weak economies. The international economic difficulties of the 1970's contributed to a reverse of economic gains for and Antigua and Barbuda and by extension the region as it transitioned into the 1980's (Caribbean Development Bank 2018). In Antigua and Barbuda, the problem was further exaggerated by the collapse of the sugar industry on the island, and by a weak tourism product (Williams 1984). One could argue that this situation was emblematic of the remainder of the region. The Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), a regional development bank, had noted that the countries of the region faced many structural problems during this period. According to the CDB, the period of the 1970's was marked by a multiplicity of economic problems among Caribbean states (Caribbean Development Bank 2018). The CDB listed these challenges as, a "lack of diversification of the economic base, lack of intra-sectoral and inter-sectoral linkages, the lack of vitality of the domestic agricultural sector and the worsening of the unemployment situation (Caribbean Development Bank 2018)." This was in spite of the region demonstrating much promise with reasonably high rates of growth in some areas, in particular the tourism sector.

Without doubt the OE for Antigua and Barbuda and by extension the islands of the Eastern Caribbean have experienced significant changes since the late 1970's. In addition, changes to the defense architecture now reflect a more outward look

considering not only the islands but also the country's maritime space and the wider Eastern Caribbean sub-region (Government of Antigua and Barbuda 2006).

The defense and security challenges that confront the Caribbean region today are as wide and varied as the area itself. Economic instability continues to have a significant impact on the region. Arguably the islands are now more vulnerable as they have transitioned from a mono-crop agriculture based system to a, primarily, tourism based economy. In addition, the region continues to be confronted by the illicit trade in narcotics and its associated criminal networks, which have the potential to cripple not only economic development but societal development on a whole (Realuyo 2013). Other destabilizing influence in the region are terrorism and cyber security. Also of note is the current fight for limited maritime resources within the region. Finally, the region is vulnerable to and has been severely impacted by natural disasters of various types (O'Marde 2017). These are the issues that confront Antigua and Barbuda and by extension the islands of the Eastern Caribbean.

### Limitations

Access to primary and some secondary sources has been the most significant challenge in the development of this thesis. This has been an issue due to the researcher's present location at the Command and General Staff College as well as the absence of original literature concerning the ABDF. However, the challenge has been addressed by examining similar organizations and documentation that is available electronically. The challenge of sourcing material was further compounded by the sensitive nature of some issues and the information concerning those issues. This challenge was mitigated by observing appropriate protocols regarding information obtained. Finally, time proved to

be a most significant adversary. Within the academic environment there were a number of competing obligations that have forced the writer to prioritize in order to complete this study.

### Scope and Delimitations

The research will not provide a defined solution to the questions asked but rather, it will make recommendations based on the operating environment, as well as the capabilities required to meet the projected challenges. Further recommendations made will address only those roles and responsibilities as mandated by law or regulations governing the ABDF. Finally, the research will not look at other national organizations or the roles they play, although reference will be made to them throughout the document. Neither will the thesis look at the possible costs associated with a transformation if recommended.



## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

In reviewing the literature, first an examination is done of the concept of military transformation. This is considered necessary in order to shape the general direction of the thesis. Secondly, an examination is conducted of several arguments presented regarding the need for a security force with capabilities beyond those of the local constabulary force. This examination considers the views presented in a number of papers written specifically about defense and security of Commonwealth Caribbean small island developing states.

The next stage in the review of literature considers the nature of the threat environment. Several issues are considered along with their possible impact not only on Antigua and Barbuda but on the wider Commonwealth Caribbean region. Of note is the discussion of what is sometimes called a transnational network encompassing a number of challenges to the stability and security of a small states such as Antigua and Barbuda. This section concludes with a discussion about natural disasters and the threat they pose to SIDS with a focus on Antigua and Barbuda.

To support the analysis, it is considered necessary to discuss and consider the issue of the nation's maritime space as well as the thrust towards the development of the Blue economy. In this section the issues of Maritime domain awareness, the Blue economy and the recent resolution of a long standing maritime dispute with France are presented. As a small island developing nation Antigua and Barbuda depends heavily on activities in the maritime environment. The discussion about the maritime issues noted here is deemed necessary as the ABDF plays a significant role in maritime safety and

security. With the appropriate allocation and use of resources this role can have a significant positive impact on the country's effort to exploit opportunities available within the marine environment. It is anticipated that the matters addressed in this portion of the review will significantly impact the general direction of the analysis and recommendation portion of the thesis.

In support of the analysis portion of the paper it is necessary to briefly examine the concept of force management as used by the United States Army (U.S. Army). Specifically, an examination is done of the processes involved in the development of a synchronized DOTMLPFP. The intent is to use this tool to guide the comparison between the ABDF and the RBDF.

The review concludes with a discussion about the legal framework supporting the ABDF. The 2006 Defense Act of Antigua and Barbuda is reviewed with particular emphasis on the role of the ABDF. To provide a point of reference, consideration is briefly given to the legislation used in three other Commonwealth Caribbean Defense Forces namely, the Barbados Defense Force, The Royal Bahamas Defense Force and the St Kitts and Nevis Defense Force.

### The Concept of Military Transformation

This review will begin with a brief discussion regarding transformation. What does it mean in the military context to transform? The word transformation speaks to the issue of change. In the instances discussed below, transformation is considered systematic, leading to the efficient and effective operation of the institutions addressed. In discussing the possible transformation of the ABDF this is the proposed line of thought. As suggested by practitioners of organizational development and change such

as, John P. Kotter (Kotter 1996) and Donald L. Anderson (Anderson 2013), organizational change requires a continuous process of monitoring and evaluation of performances to determine the level of anchoring achieved by the transformed organization. Successful transformation requires flexibility, adaptation and innovation to meet mission requirements and achievement of long term organizational goals.

Lieutenant Colonel Scott Stephenson, U.S Army, retired, in an article in *Military Review* in 2006, entitled “Clouds and Arrows: Visualizing the Dynamics of Transformation”, he presents a concept of a triangular trinity in support of military transformation. In his study of historical examples and borrowing from the idea of the Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity, he postures that there is a “trinity of transformation” (Stephenson 2006). The trinity as presented by Stephenson has three interrelated pillars/ingredients; the first is change that happens at the conceptual level. This would involve the development of new military doctrine or even the development of new organizations. The second component would be technological change. This would involve the development or introduction of new technologies to support the execution of the mission. Finally, the third ingredient would be the logistical component (Stephenson 2006). For Stephenson, this would be the provision of additional resources to effect the change.

As noted, the three components as presented are interrelated, having a direct effect on each other. Stephenson further postures that in addition to the effect on each other there are other factors that play an important role in the transformation process. The first noted factor is that of the presence of a threat. In transitioning from the simple triangular relationship he notes that, “the perception of the enemy’s strength, capabilities

and hostile intentions is key to establishing the relationship among the three elements of the adaptive trinity” (Stephenson 2006). The warning in this construct lies where the perceived threat is “seen as real, immediate and dangerous” (Stephenson 2006).

Stephenson warns of the possibility of too simple a solution by placing too great an emphasis on the threat. As has been highlighted throughout the research, the OE does not always provide a clear picture of possible future threats. Beyond that, other factors such as politics and military culture may play an equally significant a role as the threat in the relationship between the conceptual, technological and logistics components of the transformation trinity (Stephenson 2006).

In a non-conflict environment where the focus is on constabulary type missions, Stephenson points out that political factors may play a more significant role in military transformation. Several writers in examining the issue of military transformation during the period between the First and Second World Wars have argued that political factors were critical in either hindering or encouraging the transformation of the major military powers during the inter war period. Stephenson, as well as renowned military historian Williamson Murray, have both noted that political issues in the United States, Germany and the other European nations as well as Russia were critical in the transformation of the respective nation’s military during the period under consideration. The role that politics plays extends even into the realm of the perceived threats. Often what has been viewed as the most significant threats or challenge by the military went counter to the perceived threats of governments (Murray 2004).

There is consensus among Stephenson, Murray and Brett Steele in the latter’s monograph, *Military Reengineering between the World Wars*, that military culture plays

a leading role in enabling military transformation (Steele 2005). A culture that encourages the use of initiative, innovation and critical thinking, and placed emphasis on professional military education had a greater chance of successful transformation. It is noted that the presence of these factors do not guarantee transformation will work but they are important in setting the conditions for success.

#### The Need for a Defense/Security Organization in the Eastern Caribbean

Rocky R. Meade, currently the Chief of Defense Staff of the Jamaica Defense Force, writing in “The Relevance and Optimal Structure of the Military in Jamaica in the Current and Emerging Geo-Security Environment,” identifies a number of arguments for and against a small island developing nation having a military force (2003). His discourse looks at the economic pressures encountered by Jamaica that have resulted in some questioning the purpose of the Jamaica Defense Force in the absence of a conventional military threat. Through the use of case studies, consideration is given to options that might be available to Jamaica. Of particular note is the discussion about the Costa Rican approach of simply maintaining a police organization with military capabilities versus Singapore’s military centric approach. The writers clarify that the decision to pursue/adopt a particular type of defense posture/organization is dependent on a number of factors most notable of which is the operating environment. Meade’s thesis concludes by noting the need for every nation to bear some degree of responsibility for its own defense (Meade 2003). The suggestion is made that when examining the environment, particular attention must be paid to the capability requirements to meet the threats (Meade 2003).

Lieutenant Colonel Colvin W. Bishop, a former member of the Trinidad and Tobago Defense Force, in his work “Caribbean Regional Security: The Challenge to Creating Formal Military Relationships in the English Speaking Caribbean,” examined the need for a regional security force. His presentation includes examples of major events that resulted in the assembly of a regional military force/security force to address a common threat.

Bishop however argues that the force created in each instance was not an exclusively Caribbean creation but came about as a result of external forces exerting their influence (2002). He does however present a compelling argument based on the threat environment for the establishment of a regional force. Bishop makes a case for some level of functional cooperation at the operational level. He suggests that beyond the opportunities for functional cooperation it is anticipated that there will remain continued resistance to the establishment of a regional entity. The point is made that the creation of a regional force might only happen if initiated by an entity external to the region (Bishop 2002).

Lieutenant Commander Aquinas Clarke, former Commanding Officer of the Barbados Coast Guard and presently the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Barbados Defense Force, addressed the issue of the establishment of a regional coast guard. In his work, “The Need for a Regional Security System Multinational Coast Guard Unit in the Eastern Caribbean,” the perceived risks associated with the absence of an entity supporting the collective needs of the member states of the RSS were analyzed (2012). Additionally, consideration was given to the challenges within the operating environment at the time that supported the idea of the perceived challenges. Clarke concluded that the

establishment of such an entity was a means of mitigating the risks but also noted that there were a number of other factors that must be considered (2012).

### The Threat Environment

To gain a better appreciation for the operating environment one must be able to identify the threats that exist and their influence on the environment. Ivelaw L. Griffith has written extensively on the threats that exist within the sub-region. Griffith has distinguished between traditional and non-traditional security threats (Griffith 1996). He has indicated that since the end of the Cold War it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between the two. For Griffith, issues of drug trafficking and its associated activities (corruption, weapons smuggling/trafficking, etc.) cannot be separated from traditional issues such as border security and the maintenance of territorial integrity (Griffith 1996).

Following a similar line of thought as presented by Griffith, the Conference of Defense Ministers of the America's (CDMA) noted that non-traditional threats have emerged as inseparable. In working papers presented in 2017 during the conference in Trinidad and Tobago, reference was made to the role played by the military in matters of citizen security, disaster response and mitigation, cyber defense and support to peace building, and national development (CDMA 2016). In concluding the discussion, it was suggested that a responsible modern military must look beyond the traditional threats that result in the accumulation of arms and consider alternate actions that contribute to the development of the state (CDMA 2016).

In a national document addressing disaster risk reduction the Antigua Barbuda National Office of Disaster Services (NODS) has noted that the islands of Antigua and

Barbuda are exposed and vulnerable to a range of natural hazards. Historically, natural hazards that have impacted the islands include, droughts, earthquakes, floods, storms including hurricanes and tsunami's (O'Marde 2017). Of note is the devastating impact of storms. Historical records indicate that, since records have been kept, the islands have been affected by storms forty nine (49) times with at least 9 impacts each century (O'Marde 2017).

The World Bank has noted that Small Island Developing States (SIDS) such as Antigua and Barbuda are particularly vulnerable to natural disasters (Asha Williams 2013). Factors such as the isolated nature of the SIDS, their relatively small populations, relatively small economies often dependent on tourism, susceptibility to economic and environmental shock often amplifies the vulnerability of SIDS. The NODS reports on disaster risk reduction highlights this vulnerability. The report notes that,

Antigua & Barbuda is among the top five (5) countries most exposed to multiple hazards. The lack of significant topographic variability results in open exposure to the full force of storm hazards. One hundred percent of the land area and one hundred percent of the population is exposed to two or more hydro-meteorological events. Antigua and Barbuda is among the top twenty countries with an estimated 80.4% of GDP at risk from two or more hazards. (O'Marde 2017)

Without doubt Antigua and Barbuda's vulnerability to natural hazards such as hurricanes presents a unique case. As intimated in the CDMA discussion, such vulnerability presents a threat to the national interests on SIDS such as Antigua and Barbuda.

The *Trinidad Guardian* newspaper of 4 and 8 November 2017 highlighted the attention being paid to the emerging issue of terrorism and violent extremism by that country and a key partner in the region, the United States Southern Command (Alexander



2017). These two entities, like others in the region, have recognized the emergence of terrorism and in particular violent extremism as another challenge to the security and stability of not only that island but of the wider Caribbean region. For many proponents of corporative security, the threat presented by violent extremism has the potential to challenge the limited resources of the wider Caribbean. Some have suggested that the perceived solution to this and many of the challenges identified above is the strengthening of corporative security mechanisms.

The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Crime and Security Strategy of 2013, a demonstration of corporative security at work, presents a clear picture of the multidimensional challenges present within the regional environment (IMPACS 2013). It provides an argument from the perspective that the issues that affect one country have the ability to impact all others. This argument is presented considering the proximity of states, the ease of travel, the commonality of culture and the interdependence on each other as a result of limited resources.

The strategy as presented in 2013 argues that transnational organized crime in its various forms presents the greatest challenge to the security and sustainable development of the region (IMPACS 2013). Of note in the report is the fact that the maritime environment is being increasingly exploited as the means for moving many of the products of transnational criminality. According to the report, this reality is masked by the fact that most commercial trade in the region is transmitted via the marine sector (IMPACS 2013). The strategy also identifies threats in the areas of cyber security, natural disasters and public order. Finally, the reports suggest that the region will face significant future challenges in the areas of climate change, migratory pressure and pandemics

(IMPACS 2013). In light of the period when the strategy was developed, one would suggest that those matters considered to be possible future events have already materialized in one form or another.

The report does not distinguish between threats that are related to national defense versus those that might be considered law enforcement matters. One reason for the lack of distinction might be found in the arguments that support a corporative security approach (Griffith 1998). In small countries, such as Antigua and Barbuda and those that make up the Eastern Caribbean, all activities tend to be interconnected with little distinction. Arguably the nexus between criminality and national security matters has resulted in what might be considered an area of uncertainty.

Celina B. Realuyo, a professor at the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, and noted author on issues relating to transnational organized crime (TOC), in addressing the issue of illicit networks, has highlighted this area of uncertainty as noted earlier. In her examination of efforts to combat illicit networks, she presents the argument that the reach of transnational criminal organizations has impacted all levels of global commerce and governance. As a result, governments, including the United States of America, have been forced to adopt an interagency, multisector approach in an attempt to combat this threat (Realuyo 2013). The adoption of this strategy is a recognition and acknowledgement of the impact that illicit networks and transnational criminal organizations are having on the national security of nations throughout the hemisphere and globally (Realuyo 2013).

Table 2 summarizes the list of threats, perceived threats and or vulnerabilities relating to Antigua and Barbuda. In addition to the information contained above, the

matters of TOC, vulnerability to natural hazards, and maritime boundary related matters are further subdivided. Included in the table as well are the possible areas impacted, and the agencies or government entities that are expected to play a role in either responding or mitigation.

### Maritime Boundaries

Antigua and Barbuda and France came to a resolution in 2017 regarding a long standing maritime boundary dispute. Under the auspices of the Commonwealth Secretariat a negotiated settlement was arrived at. “The recent agreement settles the country’s exclusive economic zone limits with France under international law, and will provide certainty over fishing and mineral rights” (Commonwealth Secretariat 2017). The agreement specifically establishes the maritime boundaries between the French department of Guadeloupe, the French Dependence of St. Barthelemy and Antigua and Barbuda. Antigua and Barbuda also share maritime boundaries with the islands of St Kitts and Nevis and the British dependencies of Anguilla and Monserrat. The matter of the maritime boundary delimitation with Britain and St Kitts and Nevis are yet to be resolved (Commonwealth Secretariat 2017).

As a small developing island nation the ocean plays a significant role both culturally and economically in the lives of the people of Antigua and Barbuda. Successive governments have recognized the value derived from the ocean as a principal component of the island’s tourism product and a significant source of food. Antigua and Barbuda exclusive economic zone covers a total “area of approximately 107,939 square km, which is approximately 240 times greater than its” land area (Roberts 2016). This fact coupled with the threat identified earlier demands that greater attention be paid to the

sustainable use of the country’s maritime space. Additionally, there is a need to pay greater attention to protection of that maritime space.



Figure 4. Map Denoting Maritime Area

Source: Wikimedia Commons, “Maritime Boundaries between UK and France in Antilles,” accessed June 1, 2018, [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Maritime\\_boundaries\\_between\\_UK\\_and\\_France\\_in\\_Antilles-fr.svg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Maritime_boundaries_between_UK_and_France_in_Antilles-fr.svg).

### The Blue Economy

There has been much discussion about the blue economy and the potential benefits that can be derived from it. As a Small Island Developing State (SIDS) with an economy highly dependent on tourism, the sustainable use of maritime resources and the

maritime environment is critical to national development. Without doubt the ABDF has a role to play in protecting this environment and ensuring that the resources are not exploited by external parties. The Commonwealth secretariat has noted that the concept of a blue economy is an evolving one (Roberts 2016). The concept was first presented at the United Nations Conference on sustainable development hosted in 2012 in Rio, Brazil. The concept as presented makes a case for “the improvement of human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities” (Roberts 2016). In a World Bank Document entitled “*Toward a Blue Economy: A Promise for Sustainable Growth in the Caribbean*”, the Blue Economy as a concept has been defined as, “a lens by which to view and develop policy agendas that simultaneously enhance ocean health and economic growth, in a manner consistent with principles of social equity and inclusion (Patil, Pawan G., John Virdin, Sylvia Michele Diez, Julian Roberts, and Asha Singh 2016).

According to the World Bank “the need to balance the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development in relation to oceans is a key component of the blue economy” (NODS 2017). Each country will have to find the appropriate balance for its circumstances. Developing the formula that considers the country’s current situation, its issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity, the economic environment and the possibilities for further development inclusive of social and cultural issues will all be important blue economy policy formulation (NODS 2017). The following activities were identified by the World Bank as components of the blue economy:

Firstly, the harvesting and trade of living marine resources. This would include the extraction and trade of seafood and related products. Secondly, the extraction and use of non-living, non-renewable resources such as minerals and hydrocarbons. The harvesting of sea water for the production of fresh water is included in this category. Thirdly, the use of the forces generated by the ocean for the generation of renewable energy. This category includes the use of tide and wave energy. Fourthly, oceans have been used for global trade and commerce from time immemorial. It is expected that with the global growth in tourism and coastal urbanization this use will continue. Finally, the World Bank suggests that in addition to the activities identified, there will be a number of indirect uses based on human action. (NODS 2017)

With specific focus on the Caribbean, the World Bank has noted that “perhaps nowhere is the ocean economy more relevant than in the Caribbean Sea, where many states and territories are defined by the ocean” (Patil, et al. 2016). The World Bank report has indicated that in 2012 the gross revenues generated by the ocean economies of the Caribbean were between 14 and 27 percent of the estimated global economy (Patil, et al. 2016). This point was amplified among the island nations of the Caribbean region. The report further noted that among the small islands states, “the gross revenues generated in 2012 are estimated on the order of some US\$53 billion, equivalent to over 18 percent of the total GDP for all Island States and Territories” (Patil, et al. 2016).

In the Antigua and Barbuda context, successive governments have endeavored to gain the greatest benefit from the marine environment. In addition to the growth of the country’s tourism sector and the traditional harvesting of seafood, Antigua and Barbuda has developed a competitive shipping registry (Roberts 2016).. Recent efforts to resolve the long standing maritime boundary dispute with France has cleared the way for the possible future use of the maritime resources to support national development (Commonwealth Secretariat 2017). Finally, with the thrust towards the use of renewable

resources for energy production the government has verbalized its desire to capitalize on the potential of the country's vast maritime resources.

### Maritime Domain Awareness

The maritime domain has played a significant role in the history and economic development of Antigua and Barbuda (Williams 1984). The historical records reflect that, as an island nation, maritime domain awareness presents the opportunity for stability and growth. The converse is also true, the maritime space has been used not only to support economic development and recreation but also as a bridge to support “the flow of illegal commerce and other illicit activities” (CARICOM 2010).

The islands of the Caribbean are recognized as a region caught in the cross fires between the world's biggest cocaine producers and the biggest consumers in North America and Europe (Griffith 1996). Our porous borders are not only penetrated by the illegal trafficking of narcotics, but also arms, ammunition and, to some extent, persons (Caricom.org 2010). The Caribbean Community has recognized that Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is a first step in improving maritime security.

Transport Canada, a department of the Ministry of Transport in Canada, has defined MDA as, “having true and timely information about everything on, under, related to, adjacent to, or bordering a sea, ocean or other navigable waterway. This includes all related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, vessels, or other means of transport” (Transport Canada 2012). Transport Canada further notes that, for marine security, it means maintaining an awareness of anything that can negatively impact/threaten national security (Transport Canada 2012).

The United States Navy in a document labelled, “Navy Maritime Domain Concept 2007,” outlined the purpose of MDA according to the United States National plan. It is suggested that it “facilitates timely and accurate decision making that enables actions to neutralize threats to U.S national security interests” (“Navy Maritime Domain Awareness Concept” 2007). It is further noted that in order for this to happen there must be situational awareness as well as threat awareness. These complementary concepts should provide decision makers with the necessary information and intelligence to support the decision making process.

There is consensus in the literature that MDA requires a collaborative effort among all stakeholders. A cross sectoral approach, as adopted by the United States, Canada, and CARICOM, emphasizes the removal of all impediments to information sharing at the policy or agency level (U.S. Department of the Navy 2007). Additionally, consideration is given not only to the stakeholders within the domestic environment but also those at the regional and international level. The integration further considers the use of multiple means to gain and maintain awareness (U.S. Department of the Navy 2007).

The concepts of Situational Awareness and Threat Awareness are critical in gaining MDA. The compiling of data from multiple sources as well as the anticipation of actions within the maritime domain are central. The integration of vessels, with sensors, aircraft, and unmanned systems can help to build a common operating picture necessary in gaining and maintaining MDA (U.S. Department of the Navy 2007).

#### Force Management Concepts

For the purpose of this study we will adopt the analytical tool employed by the U.S. Army planners to support capability development. Specifically, an examination is done



of the processes involved in the development of a synchronized DOTMLPFP. The Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) is a capabilities based approach designed to identify gaps in current and future capabilities within the context of the future joint operating environment allowing the force to satisfy its warfighting missions and functions. The underlying objective is the development of a balanced and synchronized DOTMLPFP solution (U.S Army War College 2015). The utility of the solution is measured by its affordability, military usefulness, operational effectiveness, its supportability, and based on mature technology that is demonstrated in a laboratory, or relevant operational environment. The JCIDS process supports the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council in advising the Secretary of Defense in identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military needs (U.S Army War College 2015).

The key inputs into the process include the current force structure, identified capability gaps and the Capabilities Based Assessment. The key outputs include required capabilities based on the DOTMLPFP, a concept capability plans and a capabilities development document. The key players in this process includes the Combatant Commanders, Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, Direct Reporting Units, Battle Labs / Centers of Excellence, School / Proponents (U.S Army War College 2015).

The capabilities based assessment (CBA) is a process used to determine doctrinal, training, organizational and material requirements, and translating those requirements into organizational models. It is an analytical basis used to identify and determine capability requirements and associated gaps. The three phases of the CBA include the

Functional Area Analysis (FAA), the Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) and the Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA) (U.S Army War College 2015). All capabilities must be nested within the Joint Capabilities and Development System. By this means, all requirements can be traced back to national strategies, concepts, and policies, thus helping to eliminate redundant capabilities within the Army and DOD.




Figure 5. Capabilities-Based Assessment Process

*Source:* Modified by author using data from U.S Army War College, *How the Army Runs. A Senior Leaders Reference Book. 2015 – 2016*, ed. Louis G. Yengert, 30th ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S.Army War College, August 28, 2015).

The FAA provides the framework to assess the required capabilities in the follow-on FNA. The input to the FAA is an approved joint capabilities area, or concept of operations that describes how the force will operate, the timeframe and environment in which it must operate, its required capabilities, and its defining physical and operational

characteristics. The output is a list of required capabilities and associated tasks and attributes (U.S Army War College 2015).

The FNA assesses the ability of current and programmed Army capabilities to accomplish the tasks identified in the FAA, in the manner prescribed by the concept, under the full range of operating conditions, and to the prescribed standards. The FNA will identify any gaps and overlaps in capabilities and the risk posed by those gaps. It must provide decision makers a clear understanding of the operational effects of the identified gaps at all levels (U.S Army War College 2015).

The FSA is an operationally based assessment of potential non-materiel Doctrine, Operational, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy and/or materiel approaches to solving or mitigating one or more of the capability needs determined from the FNA. The outputs of the FSA are the potential materiel and/or nonmaterial approaches to resolve capability needs (U.S Army War College 2015).

#### Defense Legislation

The Antigua Barbuda Defense Act of 2006 section 4 states:

There shall be established and maintained in Antigua and Barbuda a body of military forces styled the Antigua and Barbuda Defense Force comprising

a regular force and

a reserve force to be known as the Antigua Barbuda Defense Force Reserve; and

such other units as the Governor General may from time to time think fit to be formed, and styled by such designation as the Governor General shall prescribe by order. (Government of Antigua and Barbuda 2006)

The Act further identifies the primary duties of the force in section 6 subsections 1 and 2. In those sections it is noted that the force shall be “responsible for the defense of

Antigua and Barbuda and such other duties as the Defense Board determines” (Government of Antigua and Barbuda 2006). It continues to indicate that in cases of a “public emergency the Governor General may, on the advice of the Prime Minister by proclamation direct that the Antigua and Barbuda Defense Force or part thereof be employed in the aid of the civil community” (Government of Antigua and Barbuda 2006).

The legislation establishing the ABDF speaks to a military styled organization with specific duties. There is no indication given as to the orientation of the force, that is, if it should be styled as an army or navy. Section 4, subsection c of the act does however indicate that the Governor General can direct the formation of units (Government of Antigua and Barbuda 2006). An almost identical arrangement is seen when one examines the defense legislation of Barbados, St. Christopher and Nevis, also called St. Kitts and Nevis, and the Bahamas. In the case of the first three countries mentioned there is no specific reference to the type of force. The exception might be the Bahamas where the legislation speaks to the powers of officer as customs officers, section 5, subsection 1, and section 4 subsection b, c and d speaks specifically to functions that can be interpreted as naval responsibilities (Government of the Bahamas 1979).

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Over the past ten years there has been an ongoing discussion regarding the ABDF's Army orientation. The argument has centered around the view that, as a nation whose most significant security concerns originate in the maritime domain and as a nation that derives much of its economic benefits from the same environment, consideration should be given to having a force that has a naval orientation.

The ABDF has to date been unable to proceed with a complete study of the problem. The reasons for this stall in the process has been/includes, an absence of expertise within the organization, a lack of consensus on a concept, and limited direction from governments about a way forward. This study therefore addresses this issue by answering the following questions:

1. Should the Antigua Barbuda Defense Force consider transforming into a maritime oriented force? If necessary, will such a transformation negatively impact the ABDF's legal mandate?
2. Has there been a significant change in the operating environment and do those changes necessitate a change in orientation?
3. Is the current force structure adequate based on the assigned roles and responsibilities?
4. Would such a transformation be suitable for similar organizations within the RSS sub region?

The target audience for this research is, those at the executive level of the Antigua and Barbuda Defense Force and the Defense Board that is responsible for the

administration of the Defense Force. It is the researcher's view that the information contained could prove to be a valuable resource to begin the process of a strategic review. It is anticipated that through a detailed study of the legislative framework of the ABDF and a comparative analysis of similar legislation and other relevant documents of selected similar organizations within the English speaking Caribbean, the researcher would be able to find answers to the questions presented. Such an approach was chosen with the intent to directly address and mitigate the underlying reasons why the ABDF has been unable to complete a comprehensive study of the decision under discussion.

The researcher intends to answer the research questions by using a qualitative methodology. Sharan Merriam indicates that "qualitative researchers are interested in understanding how people interpret their experiences, how they construct their worlds, and what meaning they attribute to their experiences" (2009). With this in mind, this approach is being adopted as it is the intention of the writer to gain a greater understanding of the operating environment of these organizations as well as a better appreciation for the structure of the forces and how this aids in accomplishing the assigned duties and responsibilities. As noted by Merriam the researcher will be the primary instrument of data collection and analysis.

A review of both primary and secondary material will be done and document analysis will be conducted. Key to this will be a comparative study of the Royal Bahamas Defense Force and the Antigua Barbuda Defense Force. Particular emphasis will be placed on the legal mandate of the forces as outlined in their respective Defense Acts, the structure of the organization, a discussion regarding the threats impacting the operating environment and a discussion of the ability of the forces to satisfy their respective legal

mandates. As noted earlier, this approach will be used to gain a greater understanding of the issues and challenges associated with the proposed questions.

The source material will come primarily from information available online. The researcher has been able to secure the defense legislation from Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, St. Christopher and Nevis (St. Kitts and Nevis) and the Bahamas. It is intended that information mined from these documents will form the basis of a comparative analysis geared at examining the mandates of each Defense Force and any directions given regarding organizational structure. In addition, information concerning the nature of the operating environment will be secured from sources considered subject matter experts. This information will be used to guide the discussion concerning the evolution of the threat environment. Source material has been gathered from several United Nations organizations, The CARICOM Implementation agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), the William J Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, a number of regional subject matter experts such as Ivelaw Griffith, from a number of relevant master's of military art and science thesis and other areas relevant to the development of the topic.



## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was to examine if the transformation of the ABDF into a maritime unit would in any way negatively impact its legal mandate as given in the Antigua Barbuda Defense Act of 2006. The aim of this chapter therefore is to answer the proposed research questions through an analysis of the information presented in earlier chapters. This process will begin with a comparative analysis of the RBDF and the ABDF using parameters drawn from the U.S. Army's DOTMILPFP process. Specifically, an analysis will be conducted based on their organization, training (including professional military education), materiel, and policy that support the execution of their legally mandated functions. Additionally, consideration will be given to each country's maritime space and a brief examination of budgets allocated to each organization. This will be followed by a discussion of the earlier mentioned questions and any supporting questions. The intent is that these question will provide a basis for answering the primary research question.

#### The Royal Bahamas Defense Force

The RBDF, like the ABDF, was established prior to that country attaining its political independence from Great Britain (Government of the Bahamas 1979). The RBDF was structured based on a naval organization with a marine special operations unit (Badri-Maharaj 2016). This orientation was adopted considering the Bahamas extensive maritime space and the country's dependence on that space for its future economic prosperity. In addition, the government of the Bahamas recognized the potential

vulnerabilities that existed within the maritime domain (The Royal Bahamas Defense Force 2017). The creation of a naval force was viewed as a means for addressing the challenges and securing its territorial integrity.

According to Dr. Sanjay Badri-Maharaj, an independent defense analyst and attorney-at-law based in Trinidad and Tobago, in “The Royal Bahamas Defense Force: Poised for Capability Growth,” the Bahamas Defense Force is the exception to the rule for military organizations in the Caribbean (2016). As an archipelagic state the RBDF from its formation adopted a naval posture versus an army structure used by its Caribbean neighbors. In spite of this the force is able to execute an identical legal mandate as the other defense forces (Badri-Maharaj 2016).

According the RBDF Strategic plan for the period 2011 to 2015 the Force is organized into three principal departments. The departments are the Force Headquarters (FHQ), the Administration Department (Admin), and the Operations Department (Ops) (Royal Bahamas Defense Force 2011). The following is an overview of each department:

#### FHQ

This entity is responsible for the efficient management and development of the force. Under the FHQ are entities responsible for Planning and Development, Intelligence, the Force Reserves component, Accounts, Information Technology, Public Affairs, Legal Affairs, Human Resource, Welfare and the force’s youth development program referred to as the Rangers (Royal Bahamas Defense Force 2011).

## Admin Department

The admin department is responsible for supporting the operations of the force and ensuring that manpower requirements are satisfied. Under the Admin department are entities responsible for Human Resources, Military Police and Force Protection, Medical, Training, Chaplaincy, facilities maintenance, supply, and the Band (Royal Bahamas Defense Force 2011).

## Operations

This section, as the name suggests, focusses on the integration of land, maritime and air assets to support the accomplishment of the force's mandate. Entities that fall under this department include, the Commando Squadron, the Air Wing, the Harbor Patrol Unit, a number of regional commands and a number of satellite bases and the Engineering and Maintenance branch (Royal Bahamas Defense Force 2011).

When examining the ABDF and the RBDF based on the criteria established earlier there are a number of notable similarities. Table 3 provides a comparison based on the mentioned criteria. In the area of policy, the Defense legislation of the ABDF and RBDF directs both organizations as the entity responsible for territorial defense. Additionally, they both are required to support law enforcement in the execution of constabulary functions and assist in times of natural disasters. Though the latter point has not been explicitly stated, in the Antigua Barbuda Defense Act, providing support to the Antigua and Barbuda NODS in times of natural disasters has been the accepted practice (O'Marde 2017). Similarities are also noted in the area of training and professional military education.

Differences are immediately noticeable when one examines the organizational structure, materiel and budgetary allocations of each organization. The initial impression is that this can be attributed to other factors not included in Table 3 such as population size, and size of the respective economies. The RBDF unlike the ABDF has a naval orientation. Historical evidence suggests that during the formation of the RBDF a deliberate effort was made to create a Defense Force to address the dominant issues within the operational environment (The Royal Bahamas Defense Force 2017). This is contrary to the thoughts postured by Eric Williams who indicated that the military was used to perform constabulary duties and protect the interest of the planter class during the colonial period (1984). Badri-Maharaj supports the argument that the RBDF was created to address the operational issues that were affecting the Bahamas at the time. As a result the RBDF has been able to focus on the maritime environment to address issues of transnational criminality, protection of maritime resources and issues of illegal immigration (Badri-Maharaj 2016). It is notable that prior to the formation of the RBDF the Country was confronted by similar challenges as the other countries of the Commonwealth and wider Caribbean. Issues of significance during that time included trafficking in illegal drugs and illegal migration from neighboring islands (The Royal Bahamas Defense Force 2017).

As noted earlier the RBDF is structured into departments geared towards greater operational efficiency. The operational arm of the RBDF includes a fleet of 23 offshore and inshore patrol vessels that facilitates seamless movement throughout the operational area (The Military Balance 2018). There is also an air component to the force that includes 3 light aircraft used for transport and to support maritime security and counter

narcotics operations. The journal *Military Balance* notes that the force has 1 amphibious maneuver unit of company size that supports internal security, and force protection operations (The Military Balance 2018). The operation component is supported by the administrative department of the force that caters for the human resource, logistics and developmental needs of the RBDF. It should be noted that the RBDF made a deliberate effort to strengthen its ability to support the civil authority as mandated by its guiding legislation. Additionally, they have with the support of the U.S. Northern Command worked to develop the forces maritime security and counter terrorism capability (The Military Balance 2018). The efforts to develop the capability of the RBDF is being complimented by the development of the necessary support infrastructure via the Sandy Bottom project at the main base at Coral Harbor and at forward locations within the Bahamas (Sanchez 2016).

#### The Antigua Barbuda Defense Force

As noted before, the ABDF is organized as an Army with a Coast Guard component. The ABDF is a single military entity organized with an infantry battalion with one company and a battalion headquarters, a Service battalion with one company and a battalion headquarters and there is a Coast Guard. Additionally, there is the Antigua and Barbuda National Cadet Corps (ABNCC), this is a voluntary youth program for secondary school students. Finally, there is the Army Reserves that include personnel that supports both the army and coast guard components of the force (Jane's Information Group 2017). Though organized in this manner the ABDF is a relatively small force with an authorized regular force strength of 450 personnel (Government of Antigua and Barbuda 2015). Figure 2 provides a graphical depiction of the noted structure.

The infantry battalion includes an infantry company and a battalion headquarters. The unit is tasked with supporting law enforcement, support to the NODs in times of natural disasters, securing key government facilities, and counter terrorism. As noted above, the unit also supports the Coast Guard when required with its maritime security tasks (Jane's Information Group 2017).

The service battalion, or Combat Service Support Group as it is called in *Military Balance*, includes engineering and medical components (The Military Balance 2018). This unit is tasked with supporting the other units of the ABDF with engineering, medical and other logistics related requirement to ensure mission accomplishment. As with the infantry unit, the service battalion also plays a role in the execution of the force's mandate to support law enforcement and the civil authority.

Within the current organization structure the preponderance of the ABDF's personnel and material resources are a part of the land component, that is, the infantry and service battalions. This is the most significant difference between the ABDF and the RBDF. According to *Military Balance*, the ABDF Coast Guard is comprised of 50 personnel, and a compliment of 2 Dauntless Swift Boats (The Military Balance 2018). *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment Report—Central America and the Caribbean*, has suggested that, in view of the extensive territorial waters of Antigua and Barbuda the resources available to the ABDF are inadequate. This case is presented in spite of the ABDF committing components of the land force to support the efforts of the Coast Guard (Jane's Information Group 2017).

The challenge for the ABDF as highlighted in *Jane's Security Sentinel Assessment* of the Caribbean is not in its legal mandate but in the sheer size of its

maritime space and therefore its operational area. The assessment indicates that ABDF is too small to provide adequate security throughout Antigua and Barbuda (Jane's Information Group 2017). This challenge is further exaggerated when one considers the role that the ABDF plays as a member of the RSS.

Table 1 presents an opportunity for a further comparison to be done between the ABDF and the RBDF using available information about their respective budgets and the extent of each country's maritime space. These factors are obviously outside of the control of each organization, but they impact both the operational approach as well as the resourcing of the organizations to achieve the desired operational effect. One might suggest at this juncture that the orientation of each organization, that is Army versus Naval orientation, is a significant factor in determining the operational approach. Additionally, the strength of each country's economy will significantly impact its ability to resource the organization.

The primary research question as noted earlier is, should the ABDF consider transforming into a maritime oriented force? If deemed necessary, will such a transformation negatively impact the organization's legal mandate? In order to adequately address this, question one will first address the second question as it is considered not only complimentary to the first but one is of the view that it will inform and support the answer to the first question. The discussion about changes in the OE are essential to answering question one.

This now leads to addressing the second question, has there been a significant change in the OE and do those changes necessitate a change in orientation? One might suggest that the simple answer to the first part of this question is yes. Tables 2 and 3

provide a summary of the major challenges within the OE at the time of independence and the issues within the current OE. The present OE comparatively appears to be more stable but is confronted by different challenges and one might argue more complex challenges.

The current OE for Antigua and Barbuda has several distinct differences to that which existed prior to and at the point when the nation gained its political independence.

1. Transnational organized crime is the predominant threat to the security of Antigua and Barbuda. This is the consensus not only among the authors reviewed earlier but also *Janes Security Sentinel* in its assessment, listed specifically the threat of drug trafficking, money laundering, illegal drug gangs and the threat of human trafficking as challenges to Antigua and Barbuda's security (Jane's Information Group 2017). Realuyo and Griffith have both highlighted that the region's geographic location between the cocaine producing region of South America and the major consumer markets of North America and Europe, as the significant factor contributing to its vulnerability (Realuyo 2013; Griffith 1996).
2. As noted earlier, terrorism and in particular violent extremism is viewed as an emerging threat to Antigua and Barbuda and by extension the entire region (Alexander 2017). CARICOM IMPACS in its 2013 strategy noted the vulnerability of the region to a terrorist threat taking into consideration the high dependence of many countries on tourism, particularly from North America.
3. The Antigua and Barbuda NOD's has noted that the islands are among the most vulnerable to several natural hazards. The NOD's in its 2016 document of Disaster Risk Reduction, it highlighted the fact that, "Antigua and Barbuda is



among the top 5 countries most exposed to multiple hazards” (O’Marde 2017). In spite of natural hazards being present prior to independence it has been suggested in the NOD’s assessment that the impact of climate change may affect the frequency and severity of future natural hazards with particular emphasis on meteorological events. The severity of these events has the potential to negatively impact multiple sectors of the economy (O’Marde 2017).

4. Noticeably absent from the current list of threats is the issue of ideology. As noted earlier, ideological issues were a dominant feature of the Commonwealth Caribbean operating environment during the period leading to and shortly after attaining political independence. The period prior to 1981 and immediately following the attainment of political independence bore witness to the Grenada revolution and subsequent joint operation to remove the revolutionary government in Grenada. The operating environment at the time was ripe with allegations of attempted coups, Black Power protests and Rastafarianism. As a result Eric Williams in his seminal work on the Caribbean referred to the region as one of the most unstable places in the world at that time (Williams 1984).
5. In addition to the challenges noted above, the IMPACS strategy document of 2013 notes a number of threats that were either emerging or were not considered critical at the time. Today one might suggest that some among them are equally important as those listed above. These threats include cyber security, infectious diseases, illegal fishing and the exploitation of marine resources, and border disputes (IMPACS 2013). Not included in the list above is the threat of crime and violence. One is of the view that the challenge of crime and violence and the

threat it poses are beyond the scope of this thesis requiring greater depth of analysis and discussion.

The second part of the question asks if the observed changes in the operating environment necessitate a change in orientation of the Defense Force? In considering this part of the question several issues should be examined. Those issues are as follows:

1. What is the origin of the threat? Of the threats listed above they either have the origins in the maritime environment or they originate outside of Antigua and Barbuda. The exception to this statement might be in the areas of cyber security and terrorism. Though the likelihood of terrorism remains low the possibility still exists whether from a domestic or foreign source. Additionally, with the proliferation of the internet and the expansion of services a source of disruption can originate from inside or outside of the state. Based on the information provided in table 3, one can reasonably conclude that the source/origin of the threat must be considered in answering this part of the question.
2. What other factors should be considered? The main driver of the Antiguan and Barbudan economy is tourism. The point has been noted earlier that there is an ongoing effort to diversify the tourism sector by placing greater emphasis on the development of the Blue Economy (Roberts 2016). Additionally, the resolution of the maritime boundaries dispute with France (Commonwealth Secretariat 2017) presents an opportunity for the government to proceed with further development within the marine environment. As the entity responsible for defending the territorial integrity of the state it is reasonably expected that the ABDF's operations within this domain would increase over time.

3. Finally, will or can such a change be cost prohibitive? The issue for the ABDF as highlighted by the *Janes Security Sentinels* assessment is the absence of assets to monitor and patrol the extent of Antigua and Barbuda's maritime area. The obvious question then is what are the cost implications for the government of Antigua and Barbuda to make such a transition? A detailed analysis and discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis. One might suggest that in examining cost some areas to be examined include, cost of personnel, to include recruiting, remuneration, administration cost, pension and gratuities, basing and ground transportation, the purchase and operational maintenance and servicing of offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), and the purchase maintenance and servicing of complimentary systems such as radars and unmanned systems. If one is to accept in its entirety the suggestion made in the *Jane's Security Sentinel Assessment*, the issue for the ABDF will be the resources to pursue its mission in a vast operational, area taking into consideration the extent of the country's marine area (Jane's Information Group 2017).

With these perspectives considered, it can be concluded that the changes in the operating environment lend to the argument for a change in orientation. It can be suggested that as seen in the comparison with the RBDF, having a naval orientation does not diminish the ability of the organization from supporting law enforcement or supporting the civil authority in times of natural disasters.

Considering the information provided above, question number one can now be addressed. In examining transformation as an option, attention turns to the concept as proposed earlier by Stephenson, that is, a triangular trinity (2006). Adoption of the

concept as proposed by Stephenson as a basis for analysis suggests that for the ABDF to transform there will need to be a change in the three areas noted; a change in doctrine or organization with greater emphasis on the maritime domain; there will need to be an introduction of relevant technology, not only to facilitate the transformation but to support the operational effectiveness and efficiency of the ABDF; and finally there will need to be an infusion of resources to support transformation.

Important in the consideration of transformation will be a number of other critical factors mentioned by Stephenson and corroborated by Williamson Murray, and Brett Steele. The factors considered here are, firstly, the presence or perceived presence of a threat, secondly a military culture that supports the idea of transformation, and finally, a political environment willing to support transformation. The evidence provided suggests that not only is there a threat but, the threat has evolved over time to become more complex. In spite of the warning by Stephenson regarding how the threat is seen by the two groups, the political and military leadership, arguably there is some consensus that the predominant issues left unchecked will have a devastating impact on the nation (IMPACS 2013). With regard to a supportive military culture, it can be suggested that, the fact that the ABDF is having a discussion about the way forward indicates a culture receptive to change.

This now leads to an answer to the primary question. In view of the changes in the OE and the complexities of those threats, the research would suggest that transformation in the orientation of the ABDF should be considered. Regarding the second part of the question, how would it impact the legal mandate of the force? The answer based on the information collected and in particular based on the comparative analysis between the

ABDF and the RBDF and suggests that a change in orientation would not negatively impact the legislative mandate of the force.

The next questions attempt to address the issue of the ABDF organizational structure. The question is in two parts and firstly asks, Is the current force structure adequate based on the assigned roles and responsibilities of the ABDF? The second part of the question asks, how might the force be structured? In addressing this question the intent is to answer the first part in this chapter and provide the answer for the second part in chapter five with the conclusions and recommendations.

Figure 2 provides a pictorial view of how the ABDF is currently structured. There is a force headquarters which includes the force commander and the general staff. Provision is made in the headquarters for a deputy commander, a Staff Judge Advocate and other staff necessary to administer the organization. The force is then divided into four main units with assigned missions as noted above. The current force structure and the assigned tasks to each unit meet the mandate as outlined in the Antigua Barbuda Defense Act 2006 (Government of Antigua and Barbuda 2006). What is not reflected in the structure outlined in figure 2 is where the Reserve component of the organization fits into the structure. Beyond the issue of the organization's reserve component it is clear that the current organizational structure supports the legal mandate of the ABDF.

The challenge anticipated is that, based on the thrust of respective governments to increase the utilization of the resources within the marine environment, consideration needs to be given to the manner in which the preponderance of the ABDF resources are distributed and the issues related to the threat environment. It is reasonable to suggest that the transnational threats identified earlier, to include illegal trafficking of drugs,

small arms and light weapons, and even human trafficking and or smuggling will remain a threat into the foreseeable future. Additionally, as a SIDS, Antigua and Barbuda relies on the marine sector not only as a component of its tourism sector but as a source of food. The thrust towards a Blue Economy implies that an integrated approach must be identified not only to develop the marine environment but mechanisms need to be strengthened to secure the resources within that environment over time (Roberts 2016). The intent has to be ensuring availability and accessibility to the resources of the Blue Economy.

The final question attempts to answer the question of, would such a transformation be suitable for similar organizations within the RSS sub region? Once again the simple answer would be yes, but as suggested earlier there are a number of questions that would have to be answered in order to make a final determination. Rocky Meade has suggested in his writing on the appropriate security arrangement for Jamaica argued that each nation needs to make its own decision as to what is most appropriate for them (Meade 2003). Meade's argument was clear that each country bears responsibility for its own defense. The suggestion is, although there exist regional arrangements for cooperative security within the Commonwealth Caribbean region (Griffith 1996), each country is ultimately responsible for developing and operationalizing a system of territorial defense.

### Chapter Summary

The comparative analysis of the ABDF and the RBDF have identified no significant differences between these organization using the U.S. Army's DOTMLPFP as a mechanism for comparison and analysis. The use of the additional factors such as the

size of each country's maritime area and the budget allocation for a specific fiscal year provided some clarity as to what would be required to improve the ABDF's ability to manage its operational area with particular emphasis on the country's maritime space.

In answering the primary question as well as the supporting questions what has emerged is a case for the further development and growth of the ABDF with a focus on the strengthening of its maritime security capability. The first question suggests that a transformation in orientation does not take away from the ABDF mandate or reduce its ability to satisfy that mandate. Addressed as well were the changes in the OE and their impact of the ABDF. The discussion also considered the ABDF's organizational structure. The discussion however concluded by suggesting that the current structure allows the force to meet its legal mandate. Recommendations as to how to improve the current structure to enhance operation efficiencies and improve command, control and communication will be presented in the next chapter. The final question briefly examined if transformation would be suitable for other SIDS within the RSS sub region. It is suggested that such a determination has to be made by individual nations. The point is however made that each country must consider factors such as the current and future OE among other factors in making that determination.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Conclusions

For the past ten years the leadership of the ABDF has been discussing the direction of the organization with specific emphasis on transformation. The discussion has centered around the argument that the OE is evolving with threats becoming more complex and the demands on the organization to play a greater role in responding to those threats are becoming more frequent. This study has attempted to provide some focus for the discussion.

The analysis and discussion have examined the concept of military transformation, with a view to providing a theoretical foundation for conclusions and recommendations. Additionally, an assessment has been conducted of the threats in the OE prior to the establishment of the ABDF in 1981, as well as assessing the current OE. Further, an assessment of issues that could impact the operations of the ABDF such as, MDA, the Blue Economy concept, and the extent of Antigua and Barbuda marine space was conducted. The expectation is that these associated issues will inform the analysis, conclusions and recommendations. An examination of the Antigua and Barbuda Defense Act was done with a view to determining if it is still relevant in light of the changes in the OE. In considering the issues above, a comparative study was done between the ABDF and the RBDF with the intention of determining if a naval orientation is workable in the OE. This approach provided sufficient analysis to answer the proposed research question.

The proposed research question was in two parts, firstly, should the Antigua Barbuda Defense Force consider transforming into a maritime oriented force? Secondly,



if necessary, will such a transformation negatively impact the ABDF's legal mandate? To support the development of the proposed question the following supporting questions were answered:

1. Supporting question 1: Has there been a significant change in the operating environment and do those changes necessitate a change in orientation?
2. Supporting question 2: Is the current force structure adequate based on the assigned roles and responsibilities and how might the force be structured?
3. Supporting question 3: Would such a transformation be suitable for similar organizations within the Regional Security System (RSS) sub region?

The following are the conclusions based on the questions asked:

1. The primary question: Transformation to a naval oriented organization should be considered. As it relates to the second part of the question, the ABDF can maintain its ability to support its legal mandate by adopting a structure similar to that of the RBDF. That is, maintaining an organizational structure that includes a naval infantry. This will cater to section 6 sub section 2 which indicates that, "In the event of public emergency the Governor-General may, on the advice of the Prime Minister by proclamation, direct that the Antigua and Barbuda Defense Force or part thereof be employed in aid of the civil community" (Government of Antigua and Barbuda 2006).
2. Supporting question 1: The consensus is that there have been significant changes in the operating environment. Beyond that however it has been suggested that the threats within the OE have become more complex. A case has been presented that proposes that threats are interconnected, for example, Realuyo has presented an

argument suggesting that there is a nexus between TCO and terrorism (Realuyo 2013).

1. Supporting question 2: The current organization structure for the ABDF has allowed it to execute its mandate. The point has however been made that the problem ABDF faces is not necessarily one of structure but one of size. The *Jane's Security Sentinel* Assessment has suggested that the ABDF is too small and under resourced to effectively secure its OE (Jane's Information Group 2017).
2. Supporting question 3: the final question attempts to determine if transformation would be a viable option for military organizations within the RSS sub region. The conclusion however suggests that although there may be similar features throughout the RSS OE, each country has to make its own determination. Just as there were similar factors present at the time of independence to support the structures adopted, there remain issues unique to each country that will justify the structure it adopts.

As noted throughout the discussion the concept of transformation is a complicated one involving multiple factors and multiple interests. In addition to the factors considered by Stephenson it is suggested that the economic interest of Antigua and Barbuda would be critical in determining if military transformation will take place and the extent of such a transformation. One would suggest that factors such as the extent of the nation's maritime space and the thrust towards the blue economy would be taken into consideration in any decision taken. Finally, the writer is of the view that the suggestion of Major Rocky Meade in his thesis, "The Relevance and Optimal Structure of the Military in Jamaica in the Current and Emerging Geo-Security Environment," each

country must determine the nature and extent of the institution it uses for its national defense. Taking these issues into consideration, the recommendation remains as above, the transformation of the ABDF into a maritime oriented organization.

### Recommendations

The author makes the following recommendations in support of the conclusion.

1. The ABDF needs to begin the process of a strategic analysis to determine the utility of transformation or expansion of the maritime capability of the organization.
2. In support of the strategic analysis the ABDF should conduct a detailed capability assessment to determine resource requirements to support operations throughout its OE.
3. Consideration needs to be given to begin a process of developing an integrated capability to maintain MDA. In order for the ABDF to maintain MDA it will be necessary to build a common operating picture through the use of not only vessels but by integrating Aerial systems, radars, unmanned platforms and sensors (U.S. Department of the Navy 2007).
4. Where it is accepted by the appropriate authorities that transformation is a viable option, the ABDF needs to begin a process of reorganization. The emphasis of the process would be to provide greater support to maritime operations. This, and the other recommendations above, would have implications for personnel allocation and training, basing, funding and possibly even organizational doctrine.

### Recommendations for Further Research

As would have been observed, there are several questions that would have been beyond the scope of this paper. As such the following recommendations are made for further and future study:

1. What are the cost implications for the ABDF transforming into a maritime oriented force?
2. What is the appropriate size and organization structure for the ABDF?
3. Should consideration be given to the adoption of an alternate approach to national defense?

### Personal Reflection

The efforts made in the preparation of this thesis has not only provided an opportunity to consider military transformation but also an initial study of the threat environment, and important concepts such as MDA, defense legislation, and the extent of Antigua and Barbuda maritime space. In view of the issues noted, the writer acknowledges that a discussion on transformation is a complex one and there is no simplistic answer to the questions asked. Additionally, the research does suggest that there is an inadequacy in the allocation of resources to address challenges in the OE. As a steward of the profession it must be acknowledge and one might even conclude that there has to be a continuation of the discussion began in the preparation of this thesis. The final suggestion or recommendation is for those that follow the writer to continue the academic discourse regarding the defense and security environment of Antigua and Barbuda.

## GLOSSARY

The Regional Security System. “The Regional Security System (RSS) was created out of a need for a collective response to security threats, which were impacting on the stability of the region in the late 70's and 80's. In October, 1982 four members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), (Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines), signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Barbados to provide for mutual assistance on request. This gave rise to the birth of the RSS. St. Kitts and Nevis became a signatory in February 1984, and Grenada in January 1985. The Treaty establishing the RSS was signed at St. George's, Grenada on 5 March 1996 replacing the MOU. The System has the status of an international organization and enjoys legal personality.” (The Regional Security System 2017). The members of the Regional Security System are Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia and St Vincent, and the Grenadines.

CARICOM. According to [www.caricom.org](http://www.caricom.org), “the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is a grouping of twenty countries: fifteen Member States and five Associate Members.” The member states are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Lucia, St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago. Associate states are, Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Island, Cayman Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands. The extent of the CARICOM area stretches from the Bahamas in the north to Suriname and Guyana in South America. Noted also is the membership of Belize, the only English speaking country in Central America. The CARICOM region has a population of 16 million people of diverse ethnicity and ancestry. The region is multilingual, languages used include, English, French, and Dutch (CARICOM 2010).

The Commonwealth Caribbean. The Commonwealth Caribbean States is comprised of a group of states that form a voluntary association of independent and equally sovereign states. These states were formerly colonies of the United Kingdom are part of the larger Commonwealth which includes 53 nations with a population of over 2.4 billion people (Commonwealth Secretariat 2018)

Defense Force. An organization created in Antigua and Barbuda and a number of other Caribbean islands (Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, St Kitts and Nevis and the Bahamas) through the Defense act for the purpose of territorial defense (Defense Act of countries listed).

Operational Environment. “A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2017).

Defense Act. The legislation used to establish the Defense Force in a number of English-speaking Caribbean countries.

## APPENDIX A

### TABLES WITH SUMMARY OF THREATS

Table 1. Summary of the Threat Environment during the Independence Period

<b>Threat</b>	<b>Origin</b>	<b>Impact</b>
Ideological challenges	External to the region. Arguments can however be made that the Rastafarian movement and the Black power movement though influenced by external forces have their beginnings in the region.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Marxist/Leninist challenge-1979 Grenada Revolution</li> <li>• Coup plots in Antigua Barbuda, Barbados and Dominica.</li> <li>• Black Power Movement</li> <li>• Rastafarianism-Union Island uprising</li> </ul>
Terrorism	Influenced by factors external to the region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Blowing up of Cuban DC-8</li> </ul>
Cuban Military and Subversive Activity	Influenced by factors external to the region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Attack of the RBDF Patrol Vessel by Cuban aircraft</li> <li>• Expulsion of Cuban Diplomat from Jamaica</li> <li>• Cuban personnel supporting the NJM Government in Grenada.</li> </ul>
Natural Disasters	The natural environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hurricane David Impacts Dominica</li> <li>• 1979 Antigua Earthquake</li> </ul>
Border Disputes	Influenced by factors external to the region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A number of border issues emerged after countries gained political independence.</li> <li>• Antigua &amp; Barbuda had a dispute with France regarding its maritime boundaries</li> </ul>

*Source:* Created by author.

Table 2. Summary of Current Threats

Threat	Origin	Potential Impact	Response Agencies
Transnational Organized Crime, Drugs, SALW, Ammunition, Human Trafficking and Smuggling, Corruption	External: Access via maritime and air routes. Though they may occur in isolation there is consensus regarding a nexus.	Crime and violence Social challenges Economic Instability	Law Enforcement Military Government (Cabinet)
Natural Disasters (primarily hurricanes, earthquakes, and the threat of Tsunamis)	The Natural Environment	Displaced persons Economic Disruption Insecurity	Disaster Response Mechanism (NODS, Military, Police, Health, Public Utilities, Public Works) Government (Cabinet)
Terrorism (Violent extremism)	External. The threat is perceived to be external as there is no known connection to terrorist organization	Uncertainty Panic Instability	Military Law Enforcement Government (Cabinet)
Illegal Fishing	External	Food insecurity/ instability	Military (Coast Guard) Fisheries Department Government (Cabinet)
Crime and Violence	Internal and External	Economic instability Social instability Insecurity	Law Enforcement Military Government (Cabinet)
Border Dispute	External	Economic disruption	Government (Cabinet) Military
Infectious Disease Avian Influenza Chikungunya virus Ebola disease	External	Health insecurity Economic Disruption Social instability	Ministry of Health Disaster Response Mechanism (as above) Government (Cabinet)
Cyber Security	Internal and External	Economic and Social Disruption	Government (Cabinet) Ministry of Technology

Source: Created by author.



APPENDIX B

DOTMLPFP COMPARISON

Table 3. ABDF and RBDF Organizational Comparison

<b>Criteria/Entity</b>	<b>ABDF</b>	<b>RBDF</b>
<b>Policy</b>	Defense Act 2006. Responsible for national defense, maritime Law Enforcement and Security. Support the Civil Authority (law enforcement, disaster/emergency management) Ceremonial duties (Government of Antigua and Barbuda 2006)	Defense Act CHP 211 of 1980 Defense of The Bahamas; Protection of the territorial integrity of The Bahamas; Assistance and relief in times of disaster; Maintenance of order ICW law enforcement; other duties determined by the Security Council. (Government of the Bahamas 1979)
<b>Training</b>	New Entry Training, NCO Development, Technical training: US & UK (Navigation, engineering, ship husbandry, logistics, Weapon etc.). Young Officer: US, UK, Guyana. Staff & Command and PME: Canada, Guyana, Jamaica, US & UK	New Entry Training, NCO Development Technical training: US & UK (Navigation, engineering, ship husbandry, logistics, Weapon etc.) Young Officer: US & UK. Staff & Command and PME: Jamaica, US & UK
<b>Organization</b>	Army Oriented with Coast Guard Infantry battalion, Service & Support battalion, Coast Guard, & Reserve	Naval Oriented with Marine Special Ops unit. Operations command, Engineering, Regional Command and Satellite bases, & Administration (Royal Bahamas Defense Force 2011)
<b>Materiel</b>	2 x Defender class 33 ft. 1 x Zodiac Hurricane H920 1 x Sea Ark-Dauntless V. 40 ft.	2 x 60 m OPV 4 x Stan Patrol 4207 PV, 4 x Stan Patrol 3007 PV 1 x Stan Lander 5612 landing craft 1 x Beech King Air 1 x Cessna 208 (Badri-Maharaj 2016)
<b>Geography</b>	Multi-island nation. 3 Islands 2 inhabited. Maritime space of 108,000 KM square (41,699.03 Square miles) (Business Focus Antigua.com 2016).	Multi-island nation. 700 islands 40 inhabited Maritime space of 100,000 square miles (258,998 KM square) (Royal Bahamas Defense Force 2011).
<b>Budget</b>	Recurrent Expenditure 2017. 18,232,393.00 Capital expenditure 7,411,457.00 Amounts in Eastern Caribbean Dollars (G. o. GOAB 2017)	Approved estimates 2016/17 53,875,560 Capital expenditure 30,000,000 Amounts in Bahamian Dollars (GOB 2017)

Source: Created by author.

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