BETTER FRIENDS THAN RIVALS: CANADA'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE RELATIONSHIPS

BY

DAVID C. MCLEOD, LIEUTENANT COLONEL, RCAF

A PAPER PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF

THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES

AIR UNIVERSITY

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

01 JUNE 2018

APPROVAL PAGE

The undersigned certify that this thesis meets master's-level standard of research, argumentation, and expression.

DERRICK FRAZIER (Date)

JAMES KIRAS (Date)

DRAFT

DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the United States or Canadian Governments, the United States Department of Defense, Canadian Department of National Defence, the United States Air Force, the Royal Canadian Air Force, or Air University.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major David McLeod graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada in 2004 with a bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering. After completing fighter pilot training on the CF-18 Hornet, his assignments have included operational and flight instruction experience at 3 Wing Bagotville, Quebec, and 4 Wing Cold Lake, Alberta. Maj McLeod has deployed to Europe in support of NATO Reassurance measures, as well as to Kuwait as part of the Canadian contribution to Operation Inherent Resolve.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Dr Derrick Frazier for his guidance during this research project, and particularly for his patience and understanding while balancing class work, research work, and family. I would also like to thank Dr James Kiras for his thoughtful critique leading to the completion of this project.

I would especially like to thank my family for their patience and support during this demanding year. It is not easy at the best of times to move away from one's home country, and in this case particularly so given the exigencies of SAASS. I am forever thankful for their love, understanding, and support.

ABSTRACT

The bilateral Canadian-American relationship can be traced back to the end of the War of 1812; however, formal security cooperation between the two neighbors was not initiated until 1940. NATO was officially born out of the result of the Second World War, however the influence of the First World War is hidden just beneath the surface. Today, the threats that instigated these formal security relationships are either no longer present, in the case of Nazi Germany, or potent, in the case of a belligerent Russia. This study applies the three main frameworks from international relations theory to examine the reasons why Canada entered into its two main security relationships, and whether these relationships are sufficient today. The principal finding of this study is that while realist motivations were key drivers in creating the two security relationships in question, liberal and constructivist ideas have held them together over time. Additionally, these two relationships play important roles in how Canada pursues its foreign policy objectives. Bilateral Canadian-American security cooperation provides for Canada's essential national security objectives, while NATO provides Canada with an avenue to pursue human security objectives.

DRAFT

CONTENTS

DISCLAIMER ii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv

ABSTRACT v

INTRODUCTION 1

Part I: Theory and Case Studies 6

Chapter 1 - Assessing Security Relationships in International Relations Theory 6

Chapter 2 - Case Study #1: Canadian-American Security Cooperation 14

Chapter 3 - Case Study #2: Canada and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 35

Part II: Analysis and Evaluation 55

Chapter 4 - Discussion of Issues 55

Chapter 5 - Principal Findings 62

CONCLUSION 67

APPENDIX A - The North Atlantic Treaty, 1949 70

APPENDIX B - GLOSSARY 74

BIBLIOGRAPHY 75

INTRODUCTION

Background

Canada must balance limited resources against the capabilities it requires in order to protect its sovereignty and continue to make a meaningful contribution to its security interests abroad, as well as those of its allies. In order to pursue its security objectives, Canada has established a number of strategic security relationships, the most important of which are the Canadian bilateral relationship with the United States, and Canada's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The world has changed significantly, however, since Canada entered into these relationships. The post-Cold War world is frequently described as increasingly uncertain and complex, and shows no signs of settling down anytime soon. Are Canada's security relationships still sufficient to meet its needs? How do Canada's current strategic defense relationships affect its ability to meet current and future security requirements? This study examines the problem set through the lens of International Relations (IR) theory in an effort to explain whether NATO and the Canadian-American security relationship are sufficient for Canada to pursue its security objectives. This thesis is intended to contribute to the strategic study of Canada's defense relationships, specifically their importance and how Canada might continue to leverage them in order to advance its security interests at home and abroad.

States cooperate in many ways but alliances are one of the most important mechanisms for states to cooperate on security. This study applies the definition of alliances as "formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership."[1] Typically, alliances are formalized with a written agreement or treaty. Defensive alliances are important because, of all the forms of security cooperation, defensive alliances are the most formal, binding, and compelling, with a clear view towards cooperation. Non-aggression pacts pursue a negative objective in the absence of conflict, and ententes are

[1] Gelnn Snyder, as quoted in Thomas S. Wilkins, "'Alignment', Not 'alliance' – the Shifting Paradigm of International Security Cooperation: Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment," *Review of International Studies* 38, no. 1 (January 2012): 53–76, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210511000209, 59.

notoriously informal and easy to break. Coalitions are generally issue-specific and intentionally of short duration, and security communities require a rare confluence of identities and interests. As they are a more robust form of cooperation, alliances transform theoretical concepts such as balancing and bandwagoning into binding agreements between nations in a contractual way. These behaviors are visible in the foreign policies of states as they navigate these relationships.

Canadian foreign security policy can be divided into two broad subsets of objectives: national security and human security objectives. This study uses the definition of human security values as "the practice of dialogue, tolerance and compromise; the commitment to an open, democratic society, to human rights and to social and economic justice; responsibility for solving global environmental problems; working for international peace; and helping to ease poverty and hunger in the developing world."[2] A tangible example of operations in support of this objective would be peacekeeping and humanitarian support operations. Human security objectives therefore focus on the safety of citizens inside sovereign states, whereas national security values focus on "more traditional notions of national interest" such as ensuring a state's survival by protecting its sovereignty.[3] These two sets of objectives, human and national security, play a significant role in Canada's state preferences, and its identity as a middle power.

Limitations and Methodology

This study is conducted in three stages, beginning with a review of pertinent IR literature on security cooperation. Two historical case studies were chosen based on their importance to Canadian foreign policy as it relates to security: the Canadian-American bilateral relationship and Canada's participation in NATO. The case studies seek to explain the reasons Canada entered into security cooperation with the United States and

---

[2] Beatrice Heuser, *Transatlantic Relations: Sharing Ideals and Costs*, Chatham House Papers (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), 37

[3] Patrick James, *Canada and Conflict*, Issues in Canada (Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press, 2012), 6, and Benjamin Zyla, *Sharing the Burden? NATO and Its Second-Tier Powers* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 250.

joined NATO, and compare them to the current situation in order to evaluate the sufficiency of each. Realist, liberal, and constructivist lenses are applied to each case in order to assess the applicability of each framework and to elucidate explanations. The third and last stage of the study analyzes the findings to offer an assessment of Canada's key security partnerships.

Preview

Western IR theory is renowned for its divisions and frequent acrimonious debates, establishing viewpoints that are steeped in partisan tradition. Theory on alliances and security cooperation is caught in the midst of this competitive academic environment. The traditional realist and liberal viewpoints are structured in a way that tends to be mutually exclusive because of how they view states, identities, and interests. Correspondingly, realists contend that alliances form to counter a specific threat, and as a result are usually limited in scope and duration. Liberals claim that states bind themselves together through interdependent institutions, preventing conflict between them and defending against external threats. The constructivist point of view differs from realist and liberal ideas in that states' identities and interests go beyond power and security. What the constructivist point of view offers is a further explanation for events that realist and liberal traditions have difficulty explaining. The security relationships between states are fertile ground for exploring the intersection of the realist, liberal, and constructivist arguments.

The first security relationship examined in this study is Canada's bilateral relationship with the United States. It has been over 200 years since there has been armed conflict between North America's northern neighbors, and nearly 80 years since formal security cooperation started at the beginning of the Second World War. At first glance, the asymmetric appearance of the relationship evokes a famous episode in the Peloponnesian Wars, the Melian dialogue, in which Athenian leaders said where "the

strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must."[4] In short, a realist framework would predict that Canada has little choice but to bandwagon with the United States. The egalitarian nature of Canadian-American relations is at odds with the realist prediction, however, and the liberal and constructivist frameworks help to explain why this is the case.

The second security relationship analyzed in this study is Canada's participation as a member of NATO. When efforts to establish a peaceful international community of nations failed after the First World War, key Allied powers made a concerted effort not to repeat this failure after the Second World War. The realist underpinnings are straightforward in this case. Western powers balanced against the Soviet Union by creating an alliance that would ensure the European powers, weakened in the aftermath of the Second World War, would be able to resist Soviet aggression. Canada's motivations were not as clear-cut, however, as Canadian diplomats insisted on including provisions for economic and political cooperation in the language of the treaty. Moreover, while NATO functioned as a realist defensive alliance throughout the Cold War, the 1990s brought forward liberal and constructivist leanings that were baked into the Alliance from the beginning. Today, NATO reflects the traits of a collective security organization more than those of a traditional security alliance.

Two important insights can be drawn from comparing Canada's bilateral relationship with the United States and Canada's membership in NATO. First, while the realist framework works well to explain why alliances form, it becomes usurped by liberal and constructivist explanations for why alliances endure. Certainly, no alliance has lasted as long as NATO, but language in the Atlantic Charter that supports economic and political cooperation has allowed NATO to adapt to a changing threat landscape over time. That this language was insisted upon by Canada speaks volumes to its desired role in international politics, as well as its identity.

The second important insight gleaned from comparing the case studies is that within Canada's identity exists a tension between national and human security values.

---

[4] Thucydides, Robert B. Strassler, ed, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War,* rev. ed. of the Richard Crawley transl (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), 352.

On one hand, from time to time Canada finds itself in positions requiring the use of force for national security interests. On the other hand, since the end of the First World War, Canada's national interests have increasingly included the pursuit of human security values in the world. That Canada is able to focus more on human security objectives in its foreign policy is largely thanks to its special geopolitical position as the neighbor of the United States, and as a member of the largest military alliance in the world. The challenge going forward is for Canada to effectively balance national and human security objectives to avoid excessive bandwagoning, while pursuing its independent foreign policy objectives without being ignored.

Part I: Theory and Case Studies

Chapter 1

Assessing Security Relationships in International Relations Theory

NATO was created to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.

- Lord Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO

Introduction

Recent history demonstrates that there is more to the formation and maintenance of alliances than the realist mantra of balancing and bandwagoning suggest. The fact that NATO has endured past the end of the Cold War calls into question realist assumptions about threat-based alliances. Questioning realist assumptions does not, however, mean that these ideas are invalidated by the concepts put forward in other theories of international relations. Over the years, IR scholars have tended to form camps from which to attack opposing positions in theoretical debates. These debates are useful for challenging and improving IR theories, however, by excluding useful explanations of events the debates can be counterproductive to applying theory to reality. By examining events from multiple points of view, more meaningful explanations can be elucidated than by restricting oneself to a single frame of reference. In this study, the three main IR frameworks of realism, liberalism, and constructivism are explored in relation to security cooperation in general, and alliances more specifically.

This chapter of the study provides a brief overview of some key IR concepts and debates related to security cooperation that are relevant to Canada's relationship with NATO and the United States. First, I discuss various forms of security cooperation in support of the choice of definition of alliance applied in this study. With definitions set, I examine the three major IR frameworks with respect to alliance formation. Lastly, I provide a brief discussion of what can make an alliance last over time, delving into some of the strengths and weaknesses of the main IR frameworks. These IR concepts are important to understanding why Canada entered into these relationships in the first place, why they endure, and what policymakers and strategists might usefully consider about their future.

Defining Alliances

While alliances have been the most common vernacular over the twentieth century, it is one subset of a greater form of alignment. The IR scholar Thomas Wilkins presents an attempt to wrangle the issue by breaking out the definitions of alliance and alignment, where an alignment refers to "a relationship between two or more states that involves mutual expectations of some degree of policy coordination on security issues under certain conditions in the future."[1] Wilkins enumerates various forms of cooperation, which are described here based on varying degrees of rigidity.

As presented in the introductory chapter, Wilkins applies Snyder's definition of alliances as "formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership."[2] This definition of alliance establishes the most formal and binding form of alignment, characterized by written treaties, carefully chosen partners, and clearly enumerated obligations. Alliances function because a well-constructed treaty establishes clear boundaries and costs for breaking treaty obligations. In this way, there is little room for participating states to bend the rules without creating significant problems for themselves. Of particular interest is the assertion that, with all of their formalized structures, "alliances are not merely aggregation of national power and purpose: they can be security institutions as well."[3] Alliances can range from the simple to the more complex as institutions that are created to manage an alliance grow in size and number. Other forms of alignment tend to be less rigid, and less exclusive.

At the opposite end of the spectrum from alliances are concerts, ententes, and non-aggression pacts. Concerts rely on informal agreements among governing elites, specifically of great powers in a particular region, in order to function. As consensus among the governing great powers wanes, however, concerts can fall apart faster than

---

[1] Thomas S. Wilkins, "'Alignment', Not 'alliance' – the Shifting Paradigm of International Security Cooperation: Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment," *Review of International Studies* 38, no. 1 (January 2012): 53–76, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210511000209, 56.
[2] Glenn Snyder quoted in Wilkins, "Alignment, not alliance," 59.
[3] Celeste A. Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War," *International Organization* 54, no. 4 (2000): 705–735, 705.

they can be created, such as the case of the 19th Century Concert of Europe.[4] Ententes are also more informal because, lacking a formal treaty, states can preserve flexibility and are less antagonistic as a group.[5] Non-aggression pacts are less a form of cooperation, than a means through which rival states can neutralize the threat that they pose to each other.[6] For this study, what is important is that states align in a cooperative and collaborative manner that lasts over time.

Strategic partnerships and coalitions can be categorized closer to alliances, as both demonstrate necessary cooperative characteristics without the strong formal rigidity of a treaty. Coalitions are a more specialized form of security cooperation. They are organized around a specific issue for a specified time, and are not built with a view towards a "commitment to a durable relationship."[7] Wilkins highlights the more general-purpose nature of strategic partnerships compared to threat or task-specific alliances, and that these partnerships tend to extend beyond physical security into economic cooperation.[8] While this alignment type is promising in terms of cooperation, the informal nature of strategic partnerships results in low commitment costs that can make for fragile relationships. Strategic partnerships cover an extremely broad scope, however, and the strength of cooperation between two separate partnerships can easily be very different. For example, the NATO-European Union (EU) strategic partnership is vastly different from that of Israel-Turkey.[9]

Security communities blur the line between collective defense and collective security. Wilkins includes it in his categorization of alignments because a security community is aligned to a common purpose of providing security for its members.[10] In its pure form, a collective security system is more of a security community than an alliance. This distinction is important when one considers that NATO, after the end of the Cold War, re-branded itself as a collective security organization. In reality, as I

---

[4] Wilkins, "Alignment, not alliance," 69.
[5] Ibid., 71.
[6] Ibid., 72.
[7] Andrew Pierre, in Wilkins, "Alignment, not alliance," 63.
[8] Wilkins, "Alignment, not alliance," 68.
[9] Ibid., 67.
[10] Ibid., 65.

discuss with the constructivist approach, the challenges of developing collective identity make security communities difficult to achieve on the international level.

The fact that today NATO is considered a collective security organization makes the issue somewhat more confusing. Since a coalition more closely resembles the role of alliances before the Second World War in their limited scope, duration, and purpose, they are less useful for this study, as are ententes and non-aggression pacts. Wilkins' definition of strategic partnership is sufficiently vague that it may be applied to the Canadian-American relationship, although depending on the level of formality it may not be appropriate. Alliances, therefore, will be used as the main comparative benchmark in this study, while security communities and collective security also will play a role in understanding the case studies in chapters two and three.

Security alliances in IR Theory

Much like Professor Allison's models of organizational behavior, realism gives an important first look at the major components of any theory of alliances in IR. The main assumptions underpinning the realist viewpoint provide the starting point for the analysis of state interactions in international politics by focusing on power, security, and states as unitary actors. Despite the constructivist observation that the anarchic international system is a product of identities and interactions, the fact remains that the use of states as the primary unit of analysis is common across the major theories of IR.[11] Within this anarchic system, realism looks at states as unitary actors whose ultimate interest is either security (defensive realism) or power (offensive realism). These interests produce a threat-based conception of security cooperation by applying the concepts of balancing and bandwagoning to the formation of alliances between states.

The threat-based viewpoint assumes that states will react to a security threat that has a specific duration, and a specific source. A specific state or group of states provides the source of the threat, which will endure so long as it is more powerful than the opposing state or group of states. Realism predicts that once a threat has ceased to exist,

[11]Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 384–96, https://doi.org/10.2307/2944711, 385.

so will the alliances that were created to defend against it. The unifying threat that creates an alliance need not only threaten the physical security of one or more members of the alliance. The threat may also hold alliance members' power at risk, which gives some explanation to the importance of the Korean War to NATO, where no European nation was threatened directly but American power was. Realist alignment in the face of threats can also be described in terms of balancing and bandwagoning.

Balancing has been the predominant behavior as weaker states look to band together against their most prominent threat.[12] NATO is a prime example of a balancing alliance that formed in opposition to the threat posed by the Soviet Union to Western Europe. Bandwagoning occurs to a lesser extent as weaker states face the choice of cooperating or being overtaken by a stronger state when potential balancers are unable or unwilling to help, and the threatening state is an immediate and overwhelming threat.[13] To bandwagon, therefore, would imply joining the most prominent threat. Examples of bandwagoning include Stalin's decision to ally with Hitler and Nazi Germany in 1939, and Mussolini's declaration of war on France.[14] Another perspective describes balancing as an act of rivalry, whereas bandwagoning is more akin to an act of submission, or followership.[15] Realist, threat-based explanations for alliance formation make strong initial arguments but they provide limited explanatory power in the absence of an immediate and specific threat.

Liberal theorists rely more on ideology and institutions to form the basis of alliances. The idea that liberal democracies do not go to war with each other is more than idle conjecture and is supported empirically.[16] The common values and ideology inherent in these democratic states suggest that there is an impetus for cooperation on any number of issues to include security and trade. The reality, however, is that like-mindedness

---

[12] Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9, no. 4 (1985): 3-43, https://doi.org/10.2307/2538540, 15.
[13] Ibid., 16-17.
[14] Ibid., 8. Walt describes the presence of two bandwagoning traits: the desire to appease in Stalin's case, and the desire to share in the spoils of victory in the case of Mussolini.
[15] Benjamin Zyla, *Sharing the Burden? NATO and Its Second-Tier Powers* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 24.
[16] Randolph M. Siverson and Juliann Emmons, "Birds of a Feather: Democratic Political Systems and Alliance Choices in the Twentieth Century," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, no. 2 (1991): 285–306, 287.

alone does not correlate to a strong independent cause for alliance formation and tends to be more useful as a secondary factor[17]. Institutions provide a stronger argument as states bind themselves into economic and security institutions that provide mutual constraints[18]. The core idea is the interdependence created by these institutions will restrain states from attacking each other and provide other avenues for dispute resolution outside of armed conflict. While some international institutions that produce these effects come from realist foundations, like NATO, others are more firmly rooted in liberalism such as the EU and ASEAN.[19] These liberal ideas ease the restrictions of the realist point of view, however they downplay the role of individual state interests and identities.

Some contemporary scholarship takes the position of challenging the more traditional rationalist assumptions that lead to the exogenously attributed identities and interests of states that pervade the realist and liberal theories in IR. Rationalism is an important part of IR theory, however, as Alexander Wendt describes: "its conceptual tool kit is not designed to explain identities and interests, the reproduction and/or transformation of which is a key determinant of structural change."[20] The role of identities and interests is an important point to consider when examining the causes of collective action, which depend on self-interests or collective interests that are generated by an actor's social identity.[21] Whereas an alliance is based on materialism and self-interest, a collective security system reflects collective interests, "generalized principles of conduct, and diffuse reciprocity."[22] Of particular interest in this study are the ideas that collective security systems are not threat or time specific, and that identity and interests are not necessarily fixed and exogenous. These ideas will form an important part of the qualitative analysis of the formation and continuance of NATO and the bilateral relationship between Canada and the United States.

---

[17] Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 26.
[18] G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2011), 183.
[19] Both the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are built around economic cooperation, rather than security cooperation.
[20] Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," 394.
[21] Ibid., 384.
[22] Ibid., 386.

The reasons why these security relationships endure are not necessarily linked to the reasons that they initially formed. Certainly if the threat that precipitated the formation of an alliance like NATO persists, it is reasonable to assume that there are still strong realist motivations for it to continue. NATO, however, is also a great example of how an alliance may continue after this threat is reduced, or all but removed. Scholarship in this area seems to focus on the ability of alliances to maintain a certain amount of flexibility. One such work, by Celeste Wallander, discusses what mix of specific and general assets supports the ability of an alliance to adapt to changing threats, where assets refer to the norms, rules, and procedures of an organization.[23] An example of general assets would be those assets that govern the organization, such as the North Atlantic Council and norms of transparency and interoperability in the case of NATO.[24] Specific assets would refer to those that address specific tasks such as collective defense and command and control architecture. Wallander posits that NATO's general assets are largely responsible for its ability to adapt to the post-Cold War environment.[25] The importance of norms, rules, and procedures speaks to the greater role of institutions and identities.

Heavily institutionalized arrangements also are likely to support continuing alliances, as will situations where there exists a strong sense of common identity.[26] NATO demonstrates a deeply institutionalized structure of both a political side, exhibited by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), and a military side, exhibited by the deeply interconnected military command and control structure, of the alliance. The idea that breaking these institutions may cost more than maintaining them presents one possible motivation for keeping NATO active.[27] Shared interests, values, and other traits also contribute to creating a collective identity that supports continuing membership in an alliance. Collective identity is a possible means for extending the life of alliances, however, it is also challenged by the tension between egoistic and collective identities,

---

[23] Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability," 706.
[24] Ibid., 731.
[25] Ibid., 731.
[26] Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," *Survival* 39, no. 1 (March 1997): 156–79, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339708442901, 166 and 168.
[27] Ibid., 166.

the specific relationship in question, and the reason for its creation.[28] Above all, self-restraint and trust are the more significant limiting factors in collective identity formation.[29]

Trust, or the lack thereof, reaches to one of the key differences between the Hobbesian-Lockean-Kantian frameworks. The Hobbesian culture is a "kill or be killed" state of affairs where states "cannot count on each other for help or even to observe basic self-restraint," and military power is the ultimate means of survival.[30] Lockean culture shifts from the enmity of a Hobbesian culture to rivalry with a "live and let live" logic where states recognize sovereignty as a right.[31] In the Lockean culture, there is still an expectation that states may use violence to settle disputes. These two frameworks tend to fit well with realist arguments. The Kantian culture introduces friendship as the prevailing role, where states follow rules of non-violence towards each other and mutual aid when the security of a member is threated.[32] Speaking to identity, the transition from a Lockean to a Kantian model involves increasing trust and self-restraint to effectively create a collective identity. Therefore, trust-building institutions and shared identities are critical components to creating enduring alliances.

The theoretical treatment of security cooperation in this section remains a collection of various theories that must now be employed to understand reality. The intent of this study is not to question any one particular branch of IR theory, but rather to incorporate various IR theories in a manner that helps to explain the sufficiency of two of Canada's strategic defense relationships: with NATO and with the United States. Identifying where threats, ideas, values, institutions, and identities have influenced these two relationships will draw out the reasons for entering into these relationships and maintaining them. Applying a blended model of alliances from each of the realist, liberal, and constructivist frameworks, should help to avoid missing particular explanations that may be both pertinent and insightful to these purposes.

---

[28] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 67 (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 337.
[29] Ibid., 357-8.
[30] Ibid., 265.
[31] Ibid., 279.
[32] Ibid., 298-9.

Chapter 2

Case Study #1: Canadian-American Security Cooperation

But while an asymmetrical undertaking, North American strategic relations have been far from simply a matter of a United States pre-occupied with questions of national security dictating to a reluctant Canadian ally the terms and conditions of North American defense.

- Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel

Introduction

Canadian-American relations are unsurprisingly complex and trace back through the history of the British and French colonization of North America. This long and storied history is the subject of a great number of scholarly studies across multiple disciplines, a selection of which has informed this case study. Within these bounds, the aim is to ascertain why the Canadian-American security partnership was created to begin with, and then to determine its current shape in the early 21st century. Although it is also informed by the influence of diplomatic and economic relations to a large degree, this case study focuses on the security aspect of the bilateral relationship between Canada and the United States. Tracing the history of bilateral Canadian-American security cooperation from the early 19th century to present, realist, liberal, and constructivist lenses will be applied in order to ascertain why the relationship was formalized when it was, how it is characterized, and why it endures in its present form today.

The peaceful relationship between Canada and the United States is often taken for granted both from within North America, and from without. Theories as to why this relationship works so well, despite enduring tensions, vary from a traditional realist viewpoint on balancing and bandwagoning, to liberal institutional interdependence and even social constructivist idea of a security community. Canadian IR Scholar Stéphane Roussel has proposed a bilateral framework of Democratic Peace Theory in order to explain not only the peaceful coexistence between Canada and the United States, but also the egalitarian nature of much of the cooperation between the two allies. Aspects of each of these theories help to explain why intentional Canadian-American security cooperation began when it did in the 1930s, and why it continues today.

History of the Canadian-American relationship

Many claim that the bilateral relationship between Canada and the United States is unique in modern international relations. The duration and scope of the Canadian-American peaceful relationship stand out because of the apparent contradictions that are brought out by its very existence. A strictly realist viewpoint would suggest that Canada would have been absorbed by the United States, or in the very least that Canada would be forced to bandwagon and act as a strategic puppet of the United States. Reality is not so simple, of course, and both the liberal and social constructivist viewpoints add depth to understanding Canada's most important strategic international relationship. Delving into the details beyond the realist framework helps to explain certain decisions, as well as how Canada and the United States handle their asymmetric characteristics. The beginnings of the relationship share realist and liberal motivations, largely inherited from the Anglo-American relationship that came before. As the Canadian-American relationship developed, however, it began to exhibit an alternating pattern of confidence and mistrust that continues today. With the beginning of the Second World War, formal Canadian-American security cooperation began in earnest, providing for a continued measure of stability in an otherwise hot-and-cold bilateral relationship. The roots of Canadian-American relations begin well before the formal creation of Canada in 1867.

The last armed conflict between the United States and its northern neighbor was the War of 1812, after which the numerous disputes between the United States and what would become Canada have been resolved diplomatically.[1] Even before the War of 1812, the Jay Treaty of 1794 created a number of commissions, one of which was responsible for determining the boundaries between the United States and the British colonies to the north.[2] The Jay Treaty set out the foundations of employing joint commissions and

[1] While non-state actors, such as the Fenian Brotherhood, were involved in cross-border conflicts, there was no further state-level armed conflict between the United States and what would become Canada.
[2] Stéphane Roussel, *The North American Democratic Peace: Absence of War and Security Institution-Building in Canada-US Relations, 1867-1958* (Montreal: Published for the School of Policy Studies and the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, by McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 134.

arbitration in order to resolve differences between the British and the Americans.[3] These non-violent dispute resolution mechanisms did not prevent the British colonies in North America from being drawn into the War of 1812 but it did have an influence in the aftermath. The spirit of conflict resolution established in the Jay Treaty was repeated in the Treaty of Ghent in 1814, in which Article 6 created a commission for resolving the border in the Niagara region.[4] The American commissioner, Peter Buell Porter, effectively depoliticized the commission process by setting a standard of "negotiation and agreement, where technical considerations would mix with pragmatism and diplomacy."[5] Porter's precedent setting approach to the commissions has largely been upheld ever since. Canadian confederation in 1867, and the entente created by the Washington Treaty of 1871, established a peaceful, albeit trilateral, path forward.[6] Despite heavy involvement in Canadian-American relations at the former's creation as a sovereign entity, the British would slowly begin to extricate themselves from North American affairs where it suited them.

Gradually decreasing British involvement in colonial affairs presented Canadian leaders with a dilemma in terms of their relationship with the United States, and the notion of a strategic choice. The increasing costs of defending colonies contrasted with their decreasing value, and forced a reduction in British military presence in Canada at a time when Britain was facing challenges elsewhere in its empire. The first reductions of military presence came in the form of a gradual withdrawal of army forces.[7] Over a period of 30 years, British military presence reduced to garrisons on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts in Halifax and Esquimalt, respectively.[8] By 1906, all permanently garrisoned British forces had been withdrawn from Canadian territory.[9] The peaceful nature of North American international relations allowed Britain the freedom of

---

[3] John W. Holmes, *Life with Uncle: The Canadian-American Relationship*, Canadian University Paperbacks 275 (Toronto ; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 43.
[4] Roussel, *The North American Democratic Peace*, 134.
[5] Ibid., 134.
[6] Holmes, *Life with Uncle*, 10.
[7] Roussel, *The North American Democratic Peace*, 115-116.
[8] Ibid., 115.
[9] Ibid., 115.

maneuver to reduce its military presence without any substantial fear. On one hand, the Dominion of Canada gained greater amounts of independence in self-governance, in domestic affairs, and in its relations with the United States. On the other hand, Canada was slowly losing defensive power in the form of its military support from Britain, which many viewed as a necessary counterweight to rising American power.[10] The lack of a distinct threat to North America at the time did not force the issue, however, and changes in Canada's international relationships proceeded slowly, and diplomatically.

Politically, despite a reducing British military presence, Canada was beholden to Great Britain and these ties played an important role in the development of Canadian-American relations. Confederation in 1867 had two important distinctions from American independence in 1776. First, this was a peaceful installation of self-governance as opposed to America's violent break from Great Britain. While the peaceful transition of power ensured a continued positive relationship with Great Britain, it also meant that Canadian identity was not immediately distinct from the British. Second, Confederation created a parliamentary democracy based on the British system, which maintained British involvement in Canadian domestic politics. This fact in particular undermined the initial American perception of the democratic quality of Canada's government. To that effect, President Ulysses S. Grant described Canada as a colonial extension of Great Britain, and American elites generally viewed with disdain a government that was led by a "partisan autocrat."[11]

Canadian elites were no less inclined to trust the American version of democratic government, however relations remained peaceful. Canadian elites scorned American democracy as being "too pure, and prone to majoritarian excesses."[12] The scale of violence brought about by the American Civil War warded off any notion of joining the American union, and encouraged avoiding annexation by the United States.[13] As one might expect, anti-American sentiment was typically found in the more conservative

---

[10] David G. Haglund and Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.), eds., *What NATO for Canada?*, Martello Papers 23 (Kingston, Ont: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 2000), 4.
[11] Roussel, *The North American Democratic Peace*, 123.
[12] Ibid., 125.
[13] Ibid., 125.

domestic political parties in Canada, as was American mistrust of Canada.[14] There was no desire for armed conflict between the two nations, and after the American Civil War, there were no military designs on annexing Canada. The invitation to incorporate with the United States was extended based on peaceful intentions.[15] As the United States came to trust the British democracy, so too did it begin to trust the Canadian democracy, and by the end of the 19th century the foundations were in place for the continued evolution of Canadian-American relations.[16] While the relationship remained peaceful, however, it was not without its difficulties.

The Canadian-American relationship exhibited an alternating pattern of confidence and mistrust that, depending on the issue area, either drew together or pushed apart the neighboring countries. Disagreements on fisheries and borders remained contentious issues that caused significant friction in the developing bilateral relationship between Canada and the United States.[17] Continued British involvement in Canadian affairs became more counterproductive than not, as British participation in the various commissions that were convened to resolve issues often ran counter to Canadian interests. The dispute over the border with Alaska is one such issue area where the British member of the special commission prioritized Anglo-American relations, resulting in a less than satisfactory agreement from the Canadian perspective.[18] Long-term dissatisfaction with the results of the Washington Treaty of 1871 also contributed to the growing opposition to British involvement in Canadian affairs.[19]

The early 20th century marked a distinct change in character in the relationship between Canada and the United States, as direct British involvement in North American

---

[14] Roussel, *The North American Democratic Peace*., 125-126.
[15] Ibid., 124.
[16] Ibid., 124, 127.
[17] Ibid., 133.
[18] Ibid., 135. When the US purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867, they inherited a longstanding border dispute between Russia and Great Britain. Canada's position in the border claim would have provided important access to the sea for the Yukon Territory's gold rush. At the beginning of the 20th century, GB still technically controlled Canada's foreign relations. GB's involvement in the arbitration process favored the US position. Canadian anger over the result of the arbitration was directed at GB's continued interference in Canadian affairs.
[19] Ibid., 137. The Washington Treaty of 1871 allowed rights for Americans to fish in certain Canadian waters, and the Canadian Prime Minister's objections were ignored by his British "superiors."

affairs was left behind. The acrimonious settlement of the Alaskan border issue left lasting resentment over British interference in Canadian affairs. A "slate-clearing era in bilateral relations" from 1905-1909 culminated in the Boundary Waters Commission where there was no British representation.[20] The main outcome of the Boundary Waters Commission was the creation of the first permanent bilateral Canadian-American institution: the International Joint Commission (IJC). The IJC was charged with a wide range of recommendatory, supervisory, investigatory, and regulatory functions, and it was the first forward-looking bilateral commission. Whereas previous commissions were charged with resolving current standing issues, the IJC began a proactive process of dispute resolution. Of particular note is the egalitarian nature of the IJC: it operates by consensus and each country appoints three commissioners, including one chair each.[21] This egalitarian relationship took hold because of shared values.

Each country's respect for the rule of law played a significant role in the foundation of friendly relations, allowing each country to accept the decisions and recommendations of bilateral commissions more easily. The establishment of the IJC also was groundbreaking in the sense that it finally entrenched cooperative bilateral relations in a formal agreement. By appointing non-partisan subject matter experts from various fields, the IJC focused on technical solutions that satisfied legal and constitutional requirements for both sides in an egalitarian manner.[22] While some issues still caused conflict between the political leadership of both Canada and the United States, the IJC and follow-on commissions built a trusting and collaborative relationship at lower levels.[23] This trust and collaboration was foundational as global conflict transformed international relations.

Progress made during the opening years of the 20th century was interrupted by the First World War and the Great Depression. Canada, remaining true to its British heritage, was involved in the war from the outset. What is nationally regarded as the

---

[20] Roussel, *The North American Democratic Peace*, 135.
[21] Kal J. Holsti and Thomas Allen Levy, "Bilateral Institutions and Transgovernmental Relations between Canada and the United States," *International Organization* 28, no. 4 (1974): 875–901, 879.
[22] Ibid., 879-80.
[23] Roussel, *The North American Democratic Peace*, 136.

coming of age of the Canadian Army occurred in the battle of Vimy Ridge, when Canadian forces operated as a unified Canadian Corps for the first time – an event of which Canadians are fiercely proud even today.[24] Americans, however, generally view that the allied countries were victorious only because of American involvement beginning in 1917.[25] Unsurprisingly, this view caused consternation among the British, Commonwealth, and other European nations that were engaged for several years, and suffered tremendous losses, on the Western Front. The lack of support for the Treaty of Versailles and for the League of Nations also drew the ire of many Canadians who were strongly in favor and understood the importance of American participation to the success of the League.[26] Additionally, there was a sense that Canada's misfortunes in the Great Depression were mostly due to the interconnectedness between the Canadian and American economies.[27] To a Canadian population that was fiercely defensive of its identity these issues soured relations between Canada and the United States to a certain degree. Importantly, however, the IJC continued to function throughout these tensions.

Changes in the threat landscape of the 1930s had a direct impact on the Canadian-American relationship. Increasing tensions between the United States and Imperial Japan caused the former to focus on defensive preparations on the Pacific coast, and to look towards Canada as a necessary participant in continental defense. Early bilateral defense initiatives focused on aerial navigation, a land highway from the continental United States to Alaska, and reinforcing Canadian defenses on the Pacific coast.[28] In 1938, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) committed the United States to defend Canada in a public statement that caught Prime Minister William Lyon MacKenzie-King (King) quite off guard. "The Dominion of Canada is part of the sisterhood of the British Empire. I give to you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if

[24] Patrick James, *Canada and Conflict*, Issues in Canada (Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press, 2012), 62-3.
[25] Roussel, *The North American Democratic Peace*, 153.
[26] Ibid., 153.
[27] Ibid., 154
[28] Ibid., 168.

domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire."[29] The message in the speech was clear that the United States was committed to defending itself, and that would include involving Canada one way or another. King reciprocated FDR's public commitment two days later.[30] These statements set-off an important series of negotiations to determine how Canada and the United States should organize their planned security cooperation.

As Canada became involved in the Second World War, it became increasingly important that Canadian officials increase security cooperation with the United States. King knew that this had to be accomplished tactfully, however, as FDR was facing re-election and the Americans had not yet entered the war.[31] Months of work through the individual relationships of various diplomats on both sides of the border prepared the ground for formal talks. The US State Department and the Canadian Department of External Affairs began working closely together, and by early July 1940, secret bilateral military talks were held in Washington.[32] King was ready, waiting for the right moment to seek a formal agreement with FDR. Rather than dragging their feet, Canadian leadership was faced with a clear threat, from Nazi Germany and Japan, as well as clear American objectives, and chose to use the now traditional methods of negotiation in order to reach agreements that respected their own priorities as much as possible.

Desire for formal negotiations grew as the situation in Europe deteriorated. The fall of France in the spring of 1940 propelled Canada and the United States to conclude their first formal security agreement, marking the beginning of formal bilateral security cooperation. FDR and King met for a two-day summit in mid-August, 1940, negotiating an agreement that is widely known as the Ogdensburg Agreement.[33] The Canadian-

---

[29] Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Address at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada.," August 18, 1938. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15525

[30] James, *Canada and Conflict*, 70.

[31] J.L. Granatstein, "Mackenzie King and Canada at Ogdensburg, August 1940," in Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel, eds., *Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation: The Road from Ogdensburg* (Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press, 1992), 18.

[32] Ibid., 15.

[33] Sokolsky and Jockel, "Introduction: The Road from Ogdensburg" in Sokolsky and Jockel, *Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation*, 2.

American relationship was not an alliance in the formal sense, in part because the United States had yet to be drawn in to the Second World War. The most important outcome at Ogdensburg was the creation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD). This formal body was mandated to conduct "immediate studies relating to sea, air, and land problems of continental defense," and served as a vehicle for consultation and negotiation.[34] Conclusions reached by the PJBD were submitted to Ottawa and Washington in the form of recommendations, of which 21 had been issued by the time the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December of 1941.[35] Debates in the PJBD remained largely technical, as opposed to national, in character, and the problem-solving approach of the PBJD's equal membership resulted in consensus on nearly every recommendation it produced.[36] The PBJD set the stage for future formalized Canadian-American security cooperation.

The post-war settlement revealed a world that had vastly changed from the 1930s, and Canadian-American security cooperation continued to grow. Canadian frustration at being marginalized despite its important participation in the creation of the United Nations (UN) and NATO was offset by some smaller gains in cooperation with the United States. Immediately following the war, the Canada-US Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) was created and the two nations publicly declared that they were committed to further security cooperation. The Joint Military Studies Group (MSG) followed in 1953, focusing on shared military projects and the exchange of technical information.[37] When the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) stood up in 1958, it was the last of the major formal bilateral defense institutions that would be created between the two countries. Given Canada's traditional reticence of becoming too closely interconnected with the United States, NORAD's approval is a notable outlier.

Canada's concerns since Pearl Harbor revolved around three key issues: American command of Canadian forces on Canadian territory; the size of American military presence in Canada; and, the implications of American military presence on

---

[34] Roussel, *The North American Democratic Peace*, 171.
[35] Ibid., 178.
[36] Ibid., 173.
[37] Ibid., 194.

Canadian territorial claims in the Arctic.[38] At the military level, however, there was a strong desire to move forward with an integrated air defense command. Shortly after elections placed a new Conservative government in power, the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Minister of National Defence (MND) managed to convince Prime Minister John Diefenbaker that the new agreement was only a minor defense accord.[39] What began as an organization under the Commander in Chief of the Air Defense of Canada and the United States (CINCADCADUS) in August of 1957, gave birth to the first evolution of NORAD.[40] While Canadian leadership was alarmed at the levels of interdependence and authorities involved, NORAD became the exemplar of Canadian-American bilateral security cooperation. The fact that this created the Diefenbaker government's first major political crisis is a testament to the seriousness with which issues of sovereignty and independence are taken in Canada.

What began as a trilateral relationship between Great Britain, the United States, and Canada, evolved slowly into a deep bilateral relationship between Canada and the United States. Domestic politics, personality conflicts between leaders, and minor disagreements between the two nations have swung the relationship like a pendulum between confidence and mistrust. Realist notions of security requirements and liberal institutionalist ideas of interdependence gradually shaped the institutions that form Canadian-American security cooperation today. The specific Canadian and American preferences for peaceful liberal democratic relations of an egalitarian nature, however, underpin the character of this relationship. The ebb and flow of Canadian-American relations have been present since before Canadian confederation in 1867, and continue to the present day. The influence of the spirit of cooperation that is maintained by important bilateral institutions such as the IJC, PJBD, and NORAD, has provided a steadying influence in Canadian-American relations that offsets the swings of an otherwise asymmetric relationship.

---

[38] Roussel, *The North American Democratic Peace*, 178.
[39] Ibid., 216.
[40] Joseph T. Jockel, *Canada in NORAD, 1957 - 2007: A History*, Queen's Policy Studies (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), 24.

Current State of Affairs and Assessment

The Canadian-American security partnership has been evolving continually, and from the late 1950s to the early 21st century there have been many significant events affecting this partnership, whose study could serve as the basis for their own research project. The more recent events that most influence the current state of bilateral relations begin with the end of the Cold War, however. The follow-on effects of the rapid and unexpected demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact propelled North American security cooperation into complacence. The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 (9/11), however, served as a wake-up call that brought the Canadian-American relationship back into sharp focus. Today, bilateral security cooperation continues relatively unimpeded by the apparently schizophrenic nature of diplomatic relations between Canada and the United States that is exemplified most notably by their leaders. Both Canadian and American reactions to the major events surrounding the turn of the century belie the true proclivities of each nation with respect to security interests and bilateral security cooperation.

The end of the Cold War affected the political landscape on a global scale, particularly in Europe, and to a lesser degree in North America. Within the span of a few years, the Soviet Union collapsed, and the Warsaw Pact went with it. Russia was on the verge of falling down an economic abyss, and the threat that had provided the impetus for the formation of both NATO and NORAD had essentially ceased to exist. Realists predicted the demise of NORAD as much as NATO. Canada and the United States began to reevaluate their defensive commitments in light of the new strategic reality. The PJBD, which had been so useful during the Second World War and its immediate aftermath, had largely receded from relevance since the 1950s.[41] As successive presidents and prime ministers relied less and less on the PJBD, the board's activities took on a more symbolic role.[42] Without the threat from the Soviets, Canada's long-

[41] Conliffe in David G. Haglund, Joel J. Sokolsky, and Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.), eds., *The U.S.-Canada Security Relationship: The Politics, Strategy, and Technology of Defense*, Studies in Global Security (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1989), 163.
[42] Ibid., 149.

standing desire to reduce defense spending had few obstacles. Cuts to Canada's defense budgets and manning levels were so drastic that today the 1990s are known as the "decade of darkness" in Canadian defense circles.[43] While Canada maintained a token force in Europe for a short period, by the late 1990s the portion of Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel and equipment that remained permanently stationed in Europe was only a shadow of its former commitment.

As Canadian politicians saw a reduced need for national security commitments abroad, they reoriented their security policy towards human security endeavors in the form of peacekeeping missions. What has come to be viewed in Canada as a peacekeeping tradition began with Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson's Nobel Peace Prize-winning initiatives of the 1950s.[44] The lack of a major security threat allowed a clear shift in focus towards endeavors like peacekeeping that focus on projecting liberal democratic values. Unfortunately, this shift in focus resulted in a force that was dedicated to "peacekeeping as its overarching mission."[45] The Canadian government spent money on reducing military capability, in the form of $478 million (CAD) for cancelling a contract for new helicopters.[46]

On the heels of success in Operation Desert Storm (ODS), the Canadian government committed its airborne regiment to a peacekeeping mission in Somalia in 1993. This mission ended in disaster when troops tortured and killed a Somali teenager that they had caught stealing from their camp.[47] The responsible soldiers were prosecuted, however the damage to domestic reputation and public opinion was irreparable. Canada and the United States learned vastly different lessons from their experiences in Somalia, where the US operation transformed from a humanitarian relief

[43] David T. Jones, "US-Canada Security: The Long Polar Watch and Canada's Changing Defence Policy 1957-1963," *International Journal* 66, no. 2 (2011): 451–461, 455.
[44] Pierre Martin and Michel Fortmann, "Canadian Public Opinion and Peacekeeping in a Turbulent World," *International Journal* 50, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 370–400, 380.
[45] James, *Canada and Conflict*, 7.
[46] Ibid., 8.
[47] Martin and Fortmann, "Canadian Public Opinion and Peacekeeping," 374.

operation to a manhunt and a "battle against one of Somalia's warring factions."[48] The United States learned not to engage in human security missions, whereas Canada tried to shake off their problems and try again in Rwanda (1994) and Kosovo (1999). Canada's commitment to human security objectives, however, was not without obstacles.

Years of reductions in defense spending began to take their toll, and Canada struggled to find ways to remain relevant in security matters. Reductions in spending with some cuts as much as 30% in the early 1990s, left the Canadian military with equipment that quickly was becoming obsolete.[49] Downsizing and restructuring meant that planned NORAD modernizations were never completed, including radar and forward operating location updates in Canada's north.[50] American and Canadian complements of fighter aircraft assigned for NORAD alert duties were reduced, and a proposed role in America's war on drugs was short-lived.[51] Continental ballistic missile defense (BMD) became a source of tension in the 1980s when Canada refused to participate, and this tension continued to simmer through the 1990s, as Canada remained ambiguous about committing to the program.[52] After 1996, cooperation within NORAD revolved around missile warning and defense discussion, with no resolution on BMD forthcoming.[53] Critics accused the Canadian government, rather ironically, of "turning the responsibility for defending Canada and its national interests over to the Americans."[54] The cumulative effect of both the focus on peacekeeping and the reduction in spending and capabilities was that Canada exhibited a free-rider profile in security cooperation.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks shocked Canada out of the complacency characteristic of its security policy. In addition to sending hundreds of first responders to New York to help with the immediate aftermath of the attacks, Canada was quick to condemn the

---

[48] Michael F. Beech, "'Mission Creep': A Case Study in U.S. Involvement in Somalia," (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1996), 1.
[49] James, *Canada and Conflict*, 11.
[50] Jockel, *Canada in NORAD, 1957 - 2007*, 145.
[51] Ibid., 146-147.
[52] James, *Canada and Conflict*, 85.
[53] Jockel, *Canada in NORAD*, 154.
[54] James, *Canada and Conflict*, 10-11.

attacks and publicly declare support for the United States.[55] Invoking NATO's Article 5 for self-defense for the first time in the history of the organization, the United States received broad support for its decision to pursue Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.[56] Canada was actually one of the first allies to send forces to Afghanistan in support of counter-terrorism goals and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).[57] Domestically, this commitment threw a spotlight on the years of neglect of Canadian military capabilities, but it also reinvigorated the Canadian-American security partnership in a way that may not have been possible otherwise.

Undoubtedly, some of the motivation behind Canadian support may have been more self-serving than it appeared on the surface. Because the United States is Canada's largest trading partner, any protectionist actions that are taken by the United States have a significant impact on Canada. Immediately following the 9/11 attacks the border was nearly closed when the United States put its border guards on the highest state of alert. Lines of commercial trucks waiting to enter the Unites States stretched over 34km and a crossing that normally took a few minutes took between 10-15 hours, jeopardizing $1.3 billion (CAD) worth of goods.[58] Realist notions of bandwagoning can be traced to Canada's need to maintain trade by actively helping to secure its borders. However, participation in OEF and later in NATO's International Stabilization Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) also continued to reflect Canada's more traditional idealist notions of contributing to peace and stability in the world. Canada's increased commitment to security in North America with NORAD's Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) and supporting American-led efforts abroad shored up its security partnership with the United States.

Canada's lack of participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) once again tested the Canadian-American security partnership as more of the traditional tensions in the relationship resurfaced. Notably, Canadian support for military action abroad centered on the kind of multilateral legitimacy that comes from organizations like the UN and

---

[55] James, *Canada and Conflict*, 17.
[56] Ibid., 18.
[57] Ibid., 18.
[58] Ibid., 81.

NATO.[59] Many Canadians viewed the American-led coalition that was forming to invade Iraq with suspicion, and saw it largely as American unilateralism under the auspices of a president that was universally disliked by Canadians.[60] Canadians remained reticent of integrating in national security matters too much with the United States and without support from the UN or NATO. Such sentiment were evident in the behavior of a large portion of the Canadian public, which was staunchly against joining OIF. Anti-war protests in Canada at the time were some of the largest public demonstrations in recent memory.[61] While it was not feasible for Canada to participate outright in OIF, its leaders nevertheless found ways to placate their southern neighbor.

While the US Capitol began serving "Freedom Fries" in a kind of cheeky jab at the very vocal French opposition to OIF, Canadian efforts ensured there was no "Freedom Bacon." The Canadian government endured harsh domestic criticism and maintained that military personnel serving on exchange with American and British combat units were authorized to participate in OIF. Similarly, support for the reconstruction mission flowed in the form of police officers and election officials and limited personnel to support the training mission in Iraq after the fall of Baghdad.[62] Canada stepped up its participation in Afghanistan, taking on a risky combat mission in Kandahar province, and covered off naval tasks in the Persian Gulf that freed up US naval assets to support OIF.[63] While President Bush was reportedly disappointed with the Canadian refusal to join OIF, Canada's actions sent two important messages. First, it served as a reminder of the primacy of domestic politics in the decision-making process of Canada as a sovereign and independent nation. Second, Canada showed that it was committed to supporting the United States where its interests were aligned. Like with OIF, there are other important issue areas where bilateral interests cause friction.

Longstanding issues on Arctic sovereignty and BMD have continued to contribute to tensions in the Canadian-American security relationship. In the 1990s, Americans

---

[59] James, *Canada and Conflict*, 127.
[60] Ibid., 92.
[61] Ibid., 89.
[62] Ibid., 91.
[63] Ibid., 91.

were well founded in their assessment that Canada had little power to back up its claims to Arctic territories.[64] A second order effect of Canada increasing its military contributions abroad was also an improved ability to deploy hard power assets in support of its Arctic claims.[65] Canada's ambiguous messaging about BMD was simmering quietly below the surface while OEF and OIF were center-stage. When BMD did come to the foreground in bilateral discussions, however, American leaders continued to be baffled by Canada's refusal to participate.[66] The United States was offering participation in BMD at zero financial cost, however domestic opposition was too strong to overcome. These tensions have never been strong enough to have a lasting negative impact on the Canadian-American relationship.

The Canadian-American security partnership has continued to grow since 9/11, increasing in breadth and depth. Canada has maintained relevance with significant participation in Operation Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector against Libya, rapid support to NATO Reassurance measures, sending a training mission to Ukraine after Russia annexed Crimea, and participation in Operation Inherent Resolve. The Tri-Command of NORAD, NORTHCOM, and CANCOM (Canada Command, now Canadian Joint Operations Command – CJOC) have bypassed the tensions surrounding BMD and pressed ahead with defense integration.[67] Some scholarship suggests that these initiatives may indicate a move from joint defense towards establishing a security perimeter given the highly integrated nature of Canadian-American continental defense.[68] Tensions and ambiguity at the political level have had a subdued effect on the continued security cooperation between Canada and the United States due to long-standing non-partisan, technically-oriented security institutions like NORAD and the PJBD.

There is perhaps no better example of the confusing dynamic at the political level than between Canada under the current Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, contrasted against

---

[64] James, *Canada and Conflict*, 77.
[65] Ibid., 123.
[66] Ibid., 95.
[67] Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, "Ten Years into Forever: NORAD's Place in Canada-US Defence Relations," in James G Fergusson and Francis Joseph Furtado, eds., *Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security Agenda for Canada* (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2016), 117.
[68] Roussel, *The North American Democratic Peace*, 239.

the United States under the current President Donald Trump. Trudeau, much like his father when he was Prime Minister, presses a liberal idealist agenda with a focus on human security endeavors such as peacekeeping.[69] While he has been unwilling to sabotage Canadian-American relations outright by cancelling participation in Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), he did symbolically end the contribution of fighter aircraft to OIR shortly after he was elected.[70] Despite renewed attention to BMD caused by Kim Jong-un's North Korean regime, Canada has been predictably coy about joining. The Trudeau government's recent contentious decision to settle a lawsuit, at a cost of $10 million (CAD), from a Canadian citizen who was a former detainee at the controversial Guantanamo Bay detention facility has done nothing to improve tensions.[71]

President Trump, for his part, has railed against NATO allies that refuse to allocate a minimum 2% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to their defense budgets. While Germany seems to be a favorite target of his, Canada has not come close to the 2% mark since before the Berlin Wall fell.[72] The two governments are at opposite ends of the domestic political spectrum and friction abounds on issues from foreign policy to trade. Recent efforts to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), under threats from Trump that he will cancel it, have been antagonistic to the American relationships with Canada and Mexico. The Trump administration appears to value a bilateral approach over a multilateral one, which conflicts with Canada's traditional desire for multilateral cooperation. While anti-American sentiment had appeared to peak during the Bush presidency post-9/11, it may peak again before Trump completes his first term in office.

Approaching mid-term elections, it is clear that Canadian-American relations, in general, are entering a phase of increased tensions. It is also clear, however, that

---

[69] Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's father, Pierre Eliot Trudeau, was Prime Minister of Canada from 1968-79 and again from 1980-84 (https://lop.parl.ca/About/Parliament/senatoreugeneforsey/book/prime_ministers-e.html).
[70] Ken Pole, "Canadian Hornets to Withdraw from Op Impact," *Skies Magazine*, February 10, 2016, https://www.skiesmag.com/news/canadian-hornets-to-withdraw-from-op-impact/.
[71] Evan Soloman, "Omar Khadr: A Political Inkblot Test," *MacLean's*, July 15, 2017, https://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/omar-khadr-a-political-inkblot-test/.
[72] Alexander, John, "Canada's Commitment to NATO: Are We Pulling Our Weight?," *Canadian Military Journal* 15, no. 4 (Autumn 2015): 4–11, 6.

Canadian-American security cooperation has never been as strong as it is today. The 1990s were most challenging from the Canadian perspective as the United States watched its partner's capabilities atrophy. The terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, reminded Canadians of important realist security considerations, and affected a kind of reboot of Canadian military capabilities. The reinvigorated Canadian security establishment bolstered the Canadian-American security relationship, increasing integration and therefore interdependence. While Canadian foreign policy tends towards liberal ideals and human security, American foreign policy tends to be firmly rooted in national security and economic interests. These tendencies play out in the tensions that exist in the Canadian-American relationship. Importantly, the bilateral security institutions have been largely shielded from partisan politics in their day-to-day operations, maintaining a normalizing influence on an otherwise rocky relationship.

Preliminary Conclusions

Former Canadian diplomat John W. Holmes, reflecting on the Canadian-American relationship, wrote that "the first principle to accept is that crisis is normal and more often than not, therefore, no crisis."[73] Tensions over borders, resources, trade, and security have strained the bilateral relationship over the years but never broken it. Peaceful Canadian-American relations can be traced back to the end of the War of 1812. British-American practices of settling their differences through negotiation and arbitration carried forward after Canadian confederation in 1867. It was not until the eve of the Second World War, however, that Canada and the United States began to cooperate on matters of defense. After the fall of France in 1940, the two neighbors initiated formal security cooperation that has endured ever since. The reasons for this cooperation appear staunchly realist on the surface, however liberal and constructivist views inform a deeper understanding of a relationship that defies expectations in its character.

[73] Holmes, *Life with Uncle*, 3.

The changing balance of power in the trilateral arena of North American affairs set up a realist dilemma for Canada as it viewed a choice of remaining closely tied to Britain, or shifting to a closer relationship with the United States. Balancing against rising American power would have necessitated maintaining a strong military relationship with Great Britain, despite the latter's gradual decline. Conversely, pure bandwagoning with the United States would have involved acquiescence to American policies. The increase in American power and the decline in British power were both quite independent of their relationship with Canada, however, and so the notion of a choice is at odds with the reality that geography places on the relationship. Being neighbors, Canada could not avoid having a relationship with the United States and so the choice became more about the quality of that relationship. Critically, the lack of any serious physical threat to Canadian security between 1867 and the Second World War did not force Canada to make a distinct choice between Great Britain and the United States. Canada was therefore able to focus less on its security relationships and more on its diplomatic dealings.

The Second World War brought with it the kind of threat that turned American attention towards Canada in the area of defense. The United States took a very practical approach towards its national security and it was clear that it would defend itself with or without Canada's assistance. FDR's public pledge to defend Canada can be seen as both a sincere neighborly statement and a directed message to the Canadian leadership of the day. Canada needed to be an active participant in continental defense in order to protect its interests, or simply roll over and bandwagon outright. Canada chose to get involved, and to try to influence the relationship in a way that was compatible with its interests. This realist reaction to the threat from the axis powers can be seen as a form of bandwagoning, however the character and history of the Canadian-American relationship to that point influenced the character of the budding security partnership.

The institutional history of the bilateral Canadian-American relationship had established a standard with which to begin security cooperation in a liberal manner. From earlier trilateral relations that included Great Britain in the use of commissions, the Canadian-American relationship to this point had been marked positively by the successful efforts of institutions like the Boundary Waters Commission and its offspring

in the IJC. As Roussel points out, the egalitarian character of the commissions is remarkable given the asymmetric nature of the relationship.[74] The egalitarian setup of the PJBD therefore reflects an established tradition in Canadian-American diplomacy. Even NORAD was created in a manner that ensured a Canadian deputy commander at Colorado Springs and an American deputy commander at Canadian NORAD Region Headquarters in Winnipeg. This egalitarian character of the institutional relationship enabled Canada to better protect its interests in terms of independence and sovereignty when the United States may have otherwise disregarded both in the name of security. However, more than the institutional history influenced the character of the relationship.

Societal values that emphasize peace, human rights, and democracy have their mark in the beginnings of the Canadian-American security relationship as well. The failed attempt at coaxing the United States into engaging fully with the League of Nations and general American isolationism was something that Canadian diplomats had tangled with following the First World War. Mistrust of the American version of democracy had given way to confidence, and the Canadian political elite knew that American participation in world affairs would be a necessary component in achieving a lasting peace. Initiating formal security cooperation was not necessarily a means to this end, however it did give Canada a stronger voice with the United States. Canada used this voice during and after the Second World War in its efforts contributing to the creation of the UN and NATO.

Cycles of trust and mistrust have endured throughout the Canadian-American relationship, however security cooperation has helped to provide a stable baseline in bilateral relations. Canadian sensitivities towards maintaining an independent identity and sovereignty persist; yet have allowed a gradual deepening of the security relationship over time. Pragmatic American national security interests have more often than not dealt gingerly with these Canadian sensitivities, showing restraint and patience for two primary reasons. First, issues with North American defense have generally been a lower priority than other international security issues for the United States, and second, economic and

---

[74] Roussel, *The North American Democratic Peace*, 136.

commercial issues have always ranked higher on the bilateral agenda than defense.[75] The bilateral institutions themselves have served as a non-partisan backbone of balance and continued progress despite cyclical setbacks that are mostly rooted in domestic politics on both sides of the border. Understanding the domestic issues faced on both sides of the border continues to be an important factor in maintaining good relations.[76]

Today's crises appear to exhibit few differences in nature from those of the past and the interests of both Canada and the United States with respect to security cooperation are similarly unchanged. The "lower level" institutions have a moderating effect and tend to mitigate any damage that is incurred from the "higher level" political maneuvering that goes on. The United States is likely to continue to try to bring Canada along on its foreign policy ventures, but it is equally likely that they will not base any plans on Canadian participation. Canada, for its part, will likely continue to walk a fine line between pushing its human security agenda and satisfying national security interests. To date, this has been what has best served Canada's interests overall in maintaining policy independence from the United States in areas where it wishes to do so, and support from the United States where desired. How to maintain this delicate balance depends on the domestic political situation in both the Canada and the United States.

[75] Sokolsky and Jockel, *Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation*, 3-4.
[76] Holmes, *Life with Uncle*, 8.

Chapter 3

Case Study #2: Canada and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

> *The Atlantic Alliance…was formed by states that saw themselves not as territorial rivals but as defenders of shared democratic ideals. The creation of an integrated force under centralized command reflected desire to move beyond the short-lived coalitions of the past in favor of collective effort that could be sustained indefinitely. Pre-1945 alliances were decentralized and brittle; their members were in essence co-conspirators to whom cooperation meant little more than fighting separate wars against the same enemy. The Atlantic Alliance was to be both permanent and integrated; its members would pool their resources and consult continually on the direction the collective effort should take.*
>
> *- Wallace J. Thies*

Introduction

The story of Canada's involvement in NATO is necessarily intertwined with Canada's security partnership with the United States. Great Britain and the United States played a significant role in Canada's security as discussed in chapter two. What some scholars have referred to as the original "Atlantic Triangle" included Canada, Great Britain, and the United States, and this group of three nations took the first concrete steps that led to the creation of NATO. NATO has often been described as the counterweight that replaced Great Britain in the Canadian-American relationship, reflecting a common realist IR approach with respect to balancing behavior. There is also the liberal argument in favor of institution building as a means to create interdependence, and therefore a peaceful, more secure, international environment. Spreading liberal democratic ideas and values, however, played a role in NATO's creation as well. This case study will look at the influences of each of the realist, liberal, and constructivist frames, and compare the motivations that influenced Canada to join NATO with how Canada sees its role in NATO today.

Today, Canada only wields a fraction of the military power that it had in the aftermath of the Second World War, when it played an important role in the foundation of the most important military alliance in the Western hemisphere. Canada's accession to NATO marked the first time that Canada entered into a military alliance in peacetime.[1] Critically, NATO provided Canada, a self-regarded middle power, with a seat at the great-power table. This case study is not intended to be an encompassing history of NATO, with its myriad crises and other issues, but rather to examine Canada's participation in NATO. For the purpose of evaluating Canada's strategic security partnerships, this more narrow scope focuses on Canada's role in the creation of NATO, its objectives in joining the Atlantic Alliance, and comparing these motivations to the environment of the 21st century.

Of the wide variety of sources dedicated to the academic study of NATO, a number of them discuss the North American pillar of the alliance as a single block. Many more sources disregard Canada altogether and focus solely on the European-American relationship. This study uses a selection of academic journal articles and books in order to discern the finer points of Canada's role in NATO. For ease of reference, a transposed copy of the text of the North Atlantic Treaty is provided in Appendix A. As with the previous case study on the Canadian-American relationship, this study will necessarily skip otherwise important events in an effort to maintain a manageable scope but is not intended to undermine their importance.

History of Canada's involvement in NATO

NATO is widely accepted as a significant departure from the history of traditional defensive alliances. Historically, defensive alliances were explicitly oriented towards a particular threat, and dissolved rapidly after the threat was removed or otherwise changed. Critics are correct, to a certain degree, when they refer to the alliance as an

[1] Paul Létourneau, "Canada and the Security of Western Europe (1948-1950)" in Norbert Theodor Wiggershaus and Roland G. Foerster, eds., *The Western Security Community, 1948-1950: Common Problems and Conflicting National Interests during the Foundation Phase of the North Atlantic Alliance*, Studies in Military History (Oxford [England] ; Providence, RI, USA: BERG, 1993), 77.

anti-communist pact designed to counter the Soviet Union.[2] The text of the North Atlantic Treaty, however, makes no mention of a specific threat for which the alliance was created. The broad language used in the treaty leaves the duration and threat orientation intentionally open-ended, binding member states to a cooperative structure that maximizes national sovereignty and policy independence.[3] The reasons for this broad approach to alliance building can be found in the aftermath of the First and Second World Wars and not simply with the emergence of the Soviet Union as an existential threat. For Canada in particular, creating NATO was about political and economic motivations as much or more than the Soviet threat. An often-overlooked fact is Canada's important role in building the alliance, contributing to the importance of NATO in Canadian foreign policy over the years. Since its inception, NATO has been about much more than a simple realist defensive alliance against the Soviet Union: it exemplifies liberal institutionalism and even social constructivist forces in IR theory.

Before the idea of an Atlantic Alliance took shape, the First World War created the recognition the political elite of a need for greater international engagement and the spread of liberal democratic ideas and values. The grand experiment of the League of Nations is a testament to the notion that nation-states and their citizens recognized a need for change in order to avoid the catastrophe of another World War.[4] Growing dissatisfaction with the League and the post-war American return towards isolationism, however, highlighted the need for the United States to be engaged in the process.[5] There was a tension between isolation and engagement that the US government had to navigate carefully. As one of the preeminent powers after the First World War, the United States

---

[2] One such critic, Robert Teigrob, outlines this criticism in Robert Teigrob, *Warming up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States' Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea* (Toronto ; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 127.
[3] Douglas Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 1947 to 1985* (Kingston, Ont., Canada: R.P. Frye, 1987), 18.
[4] Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," *World Politics* 38, no. 1 (October 1985): 58–79, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010351, 65. The League of Nations was intended to provide sufficient international cooperation that future wars could be avoided, assuming that such cooperation would lead to non-violent conflict resolution between member states.
[5] Stéphane Roussel, *The North American Democratic Peace: Absence of War and Security Institution-Building in Canada-US Relations, 1867-1958* (Montreal: Published for the School of Policy Studies and the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, by McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 153.

had the opportunity to step into a leadership role, but chose to keep its distance from European problems. On the other hand, Canada's unique position meant that it maintained significant ties to Great Britain, and to Europe.

While Canada drifted towards its own version of isolationism, some Canadian leaders tried to use Canada's position to encourage engagement and the spread of democracy. Britain was an important part of Canadian identity with strong influences on foreign and military policy.[6] Building on the dynamics of the First World War, Canadian leaders such as Prime Minister Borden wanted to continue to position themselves as a kind of "transatlantic bridge" between the United States and Great Britain. Canadian leaders saw themselves acting as mediators, interpreters, and honest brokers.[7] Reality was somewhat short of this goal, however, as British-American cooperation did not really need Canadian support to grow during the interwar years. For a brief period before the Second World War, the isolationists won and Canada took a step back, despite its ties to Great Britain.[8] While the League of Nations floundered and no significant new alliance structure emerged, efforts in search of engagement stalled until a new catalyst arrived.

The Second World War brought the notions of international engagement and the spread of democracy into sharp focus.[9] The defense triad of Canada, Great Britain, and the United States was solidified by the conflict, giving shape to what is often referred to as the Atlantic Triangle.[10] The Allied powers renewed their efforts to keep the United States engaged, this time more urgently in rebuilding Europe but also in defending it at a time of deep vulnerability. American interests in this regard were purely economic from the outset, however Canada and Great Britain both used their influence to sway American thinking towards being more amenable to a security alliance. Critically, the United States

---

[6] Beatrice Heuser, *Transatlantic Relations: Sharing Ideals and Costs*, Chatham House Papers (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), 35.
[7] Roussel, *The North American Democratic Peace*, 159.
[8] David G. Haglund and Stéphane Roussel, "Is the Democratic Alliance a Ticket to (Free) Ride? Canada's 'imperial Commitments,' from the Interwar Period to the Present," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 5, no. 1 (2007): 1–24, 12.
[9] Canada contributed a significant amount of blood and treasure to both World Wars. In the First World War, some 650,000 Canadians volunteered to serve (approximately, 8% of the population), and in the Second World War the volunteers numbered over one million. Tim Dunne, "Canada and the 'New NATO,'" *Canadian Military Journal* 12, no. 4 (2012): 70–74, 70.
[10] Heuser, *Transatlantic Relations*, 35.

had no desire to deal with each European country on an individual basis and this kind of approach would have quickly ended internal alliance discussions. The Western European countries had to come together as a group before the United States would entertain discussions of an alliance. When the Treaty of Brussels was signed on 17 March 1948, Western powers took an important step towards a transatlantic union by setting up the possibility of an American-European union.[11]

One of the principal lessons that Canada took from the Second World War was that it had to dismiss isolationism permanently and remain engaged in the world. Importantly, through the Second World War Canada had earned a place on the international stage, emerging as one of the world's top tier military powers.[12] Canada also recognized that in order to keep its place, it would need to contribute to international security decisions.[13] Canada's post-war defense policy included the more traditional goals of defense against aggression and aid to civil power, however the policy also explicitly outlined a role for Canada in the world. The third role that Canada's 1947 defense policy established was "to carry out any undertakings which by our own voluntary act we may assume in co-operation with friendly nations or under any effective plan of collective action under the United Nations."[14] The Canadian military scholar Douglas Bland saw in this strategy a commitment to the ideas of preventive war as well as the ideas of deterrence and forward defense, notably before NATO existed.[15] From this viewpoint, Canada's post-war defense policy therefore presented a rejection of bandwagoning and isolationism, focusing instead on supporting multilateral institutions and the spread of democracy. Realist motivations, however, were still present.

Canada's underlying motivations to advocate for and join NATO reflect a range of IR theory positions, beginning with prestige in the desire to assume a leading role in

---

[11] Wichard Woyke, "Foundation and History of NATO, 1948-1950" in Wiggershaus and Foerster, *The Western Security Community, 1948-1950*, 253.
[12] Michael J. Lawless, "Canada and NATO: A Starving Fish in an Expanding Pond" 7, no. 2 (Summer 2006), http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo7/no2/lawless-anarchiq-eng.asp#, 10.
[13] Douglas L. Bland, ed., *Defence Policy*, Canada's National Defence, ed. by Douglas L. Bland ; Vol. 1 (Kingston, Ont: School of Policy Studies, Queen's Univ, 1997), 2.
[14] Ibid., 3.
[15] Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 1947 to 1985*, 2.

the world. Canadian leaders, among those of other countries, recognized that after two World Wars, there was an important need for peace and that Canada had a direct role in achieving and maintaining it.[16] Canada's 1947 defense policy relied not only on Canada's increased military power, but its increased economic position as well. Canada's support for the Marshall Plan, and the exceptions within it that allowed Canada to benefit from it, was partly because Canada had already lent significant amounts of money to Great Britain and other European partners.[17] No other Western country, besides the United States, was in an economic position to provide badly needed financial support to Europe after the Second World War. That Canada could move away from isolationism was aided significantly by this newfound economic position, and led to a desire "to play a political role commensurate with [Canada's] new economic power."[18] More than prestige, influences beyond economic recovery played a role in Canada's drive for NATO.

Realist theories regarding physical security and balance of power explain more of the motivations for Canada's interest in NATO. That there was a real threat from Stalin's Soviet Union is obvious as the Cold War began to take shape in the form of growing tensions between the West and the Soviet Union.[19] A deeper look into a realist framework, however, draws out the notion of using NATO to replace Great Britain as an offshore balancing power in Canada's relationship with the United States. For those who viewed the United States as a long-term threat to Canadian independence, NATO offered a vehicle to exercise more control over Canada's relations with the United States.[20] The idea of NATO serving as a counterweight in Canadian-American relations is a long-standing realist assertion.[21] The imbalance of power that characterizes the Canadian-American relationship could certainly have been affected by using the NATO forum as a

---

[16] Létourneau, Canada and the Security of Western Europe (1948-1950)," in Wiggershaus and Foerster, *The Western Security Community, 1948-1950*, 77.
[17] Dunne, "Canada and the 'New NATO,'" 71.
[18] Létourneau, Canada and the Security of Western Europe (1948-1950)," in Wiggershaus and Foerster, *The Western Security Community, 1948-1950*, 78.
[19] Ibid., 79.
[20] Ibid., 73.
[21] Roussel, *The North American Democratic Peace*, 235.

vehicle for dispute resolution of bilateral issues.[22] The egalitarian nature of Canadian-American relations, however, undermines the perceived need for an outside balancing influence. In reality, internal North American issues are not debated in the NATO forum.[23] Rather, NATO provided a forum for Canada to pursue its independent foreign policy objectives.

The idea of Canada as a so-called "middle power" implies that there is a constant need to assure an avenue for Canada to pursue its foreign policy objectives. Relying on the sponsorship of a single foreign power is one way to address this challenge, such as using the United States or Great Britain as an avenue to pursue foreign policy objectives. This approach, however, is contingent on the point to which Canada's objectives are congruent with those of its sponsors, and it does not leave much room for independent policymaking. In this vein, the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, Louis Saint-Laurent, and Canadian diplomat Lester B. Pearson "wanted to ensure that a middle power like Canada could make her voice heard in the concert of the Atlantic states," and NATO provided such an opportunity.[24] In 1964, author and journalist John Gellner wrote: "What is important to Canada is that her association on an equal footing with all the NATO countries gives her the degree of independence vis-a-vis the United States which she considers essential; and that her political position between the United States and Britain saves her from having to make an "agonizing choice" between the two."[25] While Gellner's assessment fits well within a realist framework, Saint-Laurent and Pearson were looking at the issue from a different viewpoint.

Above all, Canada's drive to establish the Atlantic Alliance was based on political and economic motivations, and liberal democratic ideals. More than physical defense, in order to secure peace, post-war Europe required a regime that would encourage long-term economic and political cooperation, with the view that this cooperation would help avoid future war. A defensive pact in isolation would be no different than previous alliances.

---

[22] Ibid., 48.
[23] Roussel, *The North American Democratic Peace*, 48.
[24] Létourneau in *The Western Security Community*, 76. Notably, Saint-Laurent succeeded King as Prime Minister and Pearson was elected Prime Minister in the 1960s.
[25] John Gellner, *North America and NATO*, Behind the Headlines, v. 24, No. 1. (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1964), 13.

Here the argument of liberal institutionalism as a motivation for creating NATO runs into a chicken-and-egg problem with the spread of democratic ideals. Arguably, the declaratory policy in key speeches combined with the manner with which Canada pursued its goals indicates that a more constructivist approach took precedence here. Beyond the support of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, Western Europe needed a framework upon which to rebuild and re-establish strong liberal democracies. Pearson expressed that "this Treaty must lead to positive social, economic and political achievements if it is to live."[26] NATO, therefore, was planned as a military alliance and as an avenue for developing a political and economic community.[27] The policymakers that drafted the NATO treaty understood that the longevity of the alliance depended less on the military capabilities and interests of its members, and more on their shared democratic ideals.[28] While military security concerns were major considerations, the political and economic underpinnings of NATO are reflected in how it began as a political entity with the NAC.

One of the main roles that Canada played in building the alliance is reflected in Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, promoting the spread of peace through liberal democratic ideals. As a break from traditional defensive alliances, including this type of article is as notable as the lack of a declared common enemy in the Treaty. The United States and Great Britain wanted NATO to be a purely military alliance.[29] Canada's insistence on the inclusion of social, political, and economic issues leaves no doubt as to the level of importance that these issues were accorded in the Canadian decision-making process. Some foreign diplomats considered Canada's persistence in the matter to have bordered on the fanatical, however some senior American diplomats and Senators, along with Dutch, Belgian, and French representatives, were supportive.[30] Importantly, the ideas put forth in Article 2 are closely related to the character of the 1941 Atlantic

---

[26] Gellner, *North America and NATO*, 4.
[27] Létourneau, Canada and the Security of Western Europe (1948-1950)," in Wiggershaus and Foerster, *The Western Security Community, 1948-1950*, 74.
[28] Wallace J. Thies, *Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO* (London: Routledge, 2003), 5.
[29] Gellner, *North America and NATO*, 5.
[30] Thies, *Friendly Rivals*, 46.

Charter, which had been part of a liberal internationalist order-building project initiated by FDR.[31]

Canadian leaders took the matter so seriously that they threatened to withdraw from negotiations and refused to sign the Treaty without an article that addressed non-military cooperation.[32] For their efforts, Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty is also referred to as "the Canadian article."[33]

> Article 2: The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.[34]

Canadian policymakers did not get their desired solution in Article 2, as the final wording was a compromise between opposing positions on the matter. Critics argued that Article 2 was "feebly worded and vague," with no real support for political cooperation and only basic encouragement for economic cooperation.[35] Article 2 left the structure of such future cooperation open-ended, with no framework on how it might be accomplished and no priorities for this new community.[36] Canadian idealism did not completely survive against American and British realist motivations in this case. The unifying threat of the Soviet Union ensured that, as the Cold War began in earnest, military considerations remained at the forefront of NATO business.

Despite healthy criticism, Article 2 of the Treaty is not a total failure because it laid the foundation for part of NATO's ability to endure beyond the threat of the Cold War. Through the 1950s and 60s, Pearson continued to press that more be done with

---

[31] G. John Ikenberry, in Mark D. Ducasse, ed., *The Transatlantic Bargain*, NDC Forum Paper 20 (Rome, Italy: Research Division, NATO Defense College, 2012), 83.
[32] Thies, *Friendly Rivals*, 46.
[33] Gellner, *North America and NATO*, 5.
[34] The North Atlantic Treaty, 1949, refer to Appendix A for the full text of the Treaty.
[35] Gellner, *North America and NATO*, 5.
[36] Thies, *Friendly Rivals*, 47.

respect to Article 2 cooperation.[37] Addressing the NAC as Prime Minister of Canada in 1963, Pearson argued that "harmonization of economic policies is indispensable for political and defense collaboration."[38] Implementation of economic cooperation eventually was accomplished by other organizations and trade agreements such as the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the UN Economic and Social Council, and the organizations that would later become the European Union.[39] At the end of the Cold War, however, political and economic ideas returned to the forefront in NATO with the disappearance of the Soviet Threat.[40] A return to the idealism of the late 1940s helped inform NATO's need to transform in the 1990s. Canada's greater role influencing its strategic partners in forming the Alliance was more effective than its campaign for robust non-military cooperation.

As a facilitator in building NATO, Canada's main success was in its influence on the United States. Without Canada's involvement, NATO would likely still have come about. While the United States was lukewarm towards the idea, Great Britain, France, and the Benelux countries were certainly keen on building an alliance of some sort. The Brussels Treaty coalesced these European countries into a single unit for the sake of making negotiations with the United States smoother and more palatable.[41] Great Britain's close relationship with the United States would have enabled it to negotiate an arrangement without Canada if required. Canada provided a much-needed perspective, however, that balanced between the European and American viewpoints. NATO

[37] Gellner, *North America and NATO*, 5-6.
[38] Ibid., 6.
[39] Alan K. Hendrikson, "Ottawa, Washington, and the Founding of NATO," in Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel, eds., *Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation: The Road from Ogdensburg* (Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press, 1992), 112.
[40] David G. Haglund and Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.), eds., *What NATO for Canada?*, Martello Papers 23 (Kingston, Ont: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 2000), 4.
[41] Denis Stairs, "Way Back Then and Now: NATO and the Canadian Interest," in James G Fergusson and Francis Joseph Furtado, eds., *Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security Agenda for Canada* (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2016), 9.

negotiations in all stages of the process benefited from Canada's honest broker role championing international law and stability.[42]

Canada's influence in the United States helped to move along key parts of the process for creating the Alliance. In particular, Canadian influence in the US Congress and Senate helped to shape attitudes in Washington to be more favorable to joining an alliance with European countries.[43] One way that this influence was exerted was through an ardent public speaking campaign by Saint-Laurent and Pearson, among others. Steadfast public support for an alliance from Canadian leaders provided support for the Vandenburg Resolution (S.Res. 239), which was key to changing US law in order to allow it to join an alliance. Canadian influence in the Senate, through Senator Arthur Vandenburg, helped them to overcome Secretary of State Dean Acheson's initial misgivings about creating a military alliance with European countries so quickly after the war.[44] Critically, Canadian leaders helped their counterparts in the United States to see NATO as a cooperative arrangement and not simply a military version of the Marshall Plan.[45] The United States had to be drawn in to NATO and its collective security arrangement, and Canadian influence was key in making that happen.[46]

Current State of Affairs and Assessment

NATO has suffered so many crises over the years that the term "crisis" has become a kind of hallmark for NATO as an institution. A cynic might suggest that if NATO ever found itself without a crisis it may not know what to do. While NATO's ability to persevere and adapt have been researched in detail in other projects, an examination of the current state of affairs must necessarily begin with the biggest change in the Alliance's history: the end of the Cold War. Significant changes in Canadian defense policy followed the end of the Cold War just as NATO sought to re-invent itself without its primary threat. NATO and Canadian soul-searching in the 1990s was

---

[42] Heuser, *Transatlantic Relations*, 37.
[43] Gellner, *North America and NATO*, 3.
[44] Hendrikson, "Ottawa, Washington, and the Founding of NATO," 111.
[45] Gellner, *North America and NATO*, 8.
[46] Haglund and Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.), *What NATO for Canada?*, 2-3.

replaced in the 21st century with laser-like focus on counter-terrorism and out of area operations aimed at stabilizing Europe and neighboring countries. Today it appears that NATO may come full circle back to its focus on Russian aggression and expansion, placing Canada at a crossroads of national security and human security objectives. While future predictions contain much uncertainty, Canada's continued participation in NATO is not in doubt but the size and shape of its contribution to the Alliance is.

The end of the Cold War exacerbated a trend in Canadian defense policy that had been growing since the mid-1960s. Increasingly resource limited, Canada's 1964 defense white paper outlined a need for Canada to focus on its position as a middle power and set the stage for a gradually reducing defense budget over time.[47] The end of the Cold War, however, opened up a wholesale reorganization of defense priorities in Canada. The result was a massive reduction in Canada's contribution to NATO.[48] For the first time since 1947, the Canadian defense policy released in 1994 listed no priorities or objectives, causing confusion while adding flexibility to politicians looking to exploit bureaucratic loopholes for their benefit.[49] Completing the shift from national security objectives towards human security objectives that began under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in the 1970s, the 1994 policy categorically rejected the characteristics that defined the Cold War era.[50] Interstate conflict, with the correspondingly high price tag for the military capabilities needed to defeat the Soviet threat, was replaced with a focus on low-end conflict and human security issues such as failed states and arms control. The most visible outcome of this policy shift was the associated cuts to defense spending: a planned reduction below 60% of the 1987 policy plan by the year 2000, closing bases and headquarters, and cancelling programs.[51] Canadian commitments in Europe, and therefore its contributions to NATO, suffered immensely under these cuts. Seeing NATO as a traditional military alliance, this decline in contributions was consistent with realist

---

[47] Department of National Defence, *White Paper on Defence*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, Office of the Minister of National Defence, March 1964), 7.
[48] David T. Jones, "US-Canada Security: The Long Polar Watch and Canada's Changing Defence Policy 1957-1963," *International Journal* 66, no. 2 (2011): 451–461, 455.
[49] Bland, *Defence Policy*, 284-5.
[50] Ibid., 283.
[51] Ibid., 284.

predictions that the Atlantic Alliance would fade away. The realist predictions would not come true.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO "reinvented" itself with a lack of a singular threat to its security. The Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union were officially no longer classified as adversaries.[52] However, this reinvention was more of a return to NATO's origins than a re-write of its purpose. Without the Cold War, NATO's foundations as a political community were laid bare for all to see and NATO was recognized as a security institution.[53] NATO announced its "new" focus would be on collective security, and it began to properly imagine a world without conflict with Russia.[54] These were not new ideas; this "new" direction matched the social, political, and economic goals touted by the likes of Pearson and Saint-Laurent at NATO's founding. The London Declaration, issued at the close of the 1990 NATO Summit, explicitly calls for strengthening the political component of the Alliance in line with Article 2 of the Treaty.[55] There is a palpable irony in that just as Canada was drawing back from NATO, the Alliance was moving towards the very kind of human security values that Canada espouses.

Canada's foreign policy initiatives in the 1990s remained largely in line with NATO despite an apparent desire to reduce commitment to the Alliance. A resurgence of peacekeeping initiatives ended in abject failure with significant institutional repercussions in the case of Somalia in 1993, and a lack of broader international support for Rwanda in 1994. On the other hand, peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia (SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR) combined the human security objectives of both Canada and NATO.[56] Canada's 1994 defense white paper touted a commitment to the UN and collective security.[57] NATO's transformation demonstrated that its general assets, such as its

---

[52] Celeste A. Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War," *International Organization* 54, no. 4 (2000): 705–735, 717.
[53] Ibid., 705.
[54] Stairs, "Way Back Then and Now," in Fergusson and Furtado, *Beyond Afghanistan*, 24.
[55] NATO, "Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance," paragraph 2, 12 July 2010, accessed 26 April 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23693.htm.
[56] Dunne, "Canada and the 'New NATO'", 71-2.
[57] Bland, *Defence Policy*, 284.

centralized military command structure, adapted well to the changes in the strategic environment in the post-Cold War world.[58] NATO's security operations took shape under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). By the end of the decade, Operation Allied Force (OAF) signaled that NATO, on its 50th anniversary, was committed to collective security. Canada's participation in OAF demonstrated that despite massive cutbacks, Canada was still committed to being an active member of NATO.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks focused Western attention, including Canadian, on counter-terrorism operations, and increased the importance of national security objectives that had been largely ignored since the early 1990s. Article 5 of the Treaty was invoked for the first time in the history of the Alliance and the United States acted against Afghanistan through OEF with a coalition that included key members of NATO. Canada's participation in these events exposed the depth to which it had cut its military capabilities. Canada's contribution to OEF and later to NATO's efforts in Afghanistan with ISAF, however, was a catalyst to a certain measure of defense reform and modernization in Canada, as mentioned in chapter two. The Canadian Forces experienced its first combat deaths since the Korean War in OEF.[59] Participation in OEF and ISAF completed the rehabilitation of the Canadian military's domestic image that had been so tarnished by its failed peacekeeping mission to Somalia in 1993. Most importantly, Canadian involvement in Afghanistan reengaged the Canadian public with its national security apparatus in a manner that had not been accomplished since the height of the Cold War.[60] Sending soldiers into combat reconnected the Canadian public more superficially to the national security debate.

National security objectives continued to weave together with human security objectives in a characteristically Canadian way, as Canadian foreign policy broadened past Afghanistan. NATO's Operation Unified Protector (OUP) represents the largest

---

[58] Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability," 731.
[59] James, *Canada and Conflict*, 20. While Canadian soldiers did experience combat conditions in the Medak Pocket, Coratia, while participating in the KFOR mission, there were no casualties.
[60] Ibid., 83.

application to date of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P).[61] In one sense, applying R2P in Libya was the culmination of years of efforts by Canadian diplomats to operationalize human security objectives, haunted by the failures of other human security interventions of the past such as Rwanda (1994), in which Canada played a visible and impotent role. Importantly, OUP was supported by two key UNSC resolutions that provided UN legitimacy for the use of force, without which Canadian participation would have been less likely to garner domestic support.[62] With ISAF and OUP, Canada had a near-ideal mix of national security and human security objectives that fit its foreign policy. NATO had returned to relevance for Canada as a vehicle for pursuing its social, political, and economic objectives once again.

The current strategic situation suggests that NATO, and Canada, may see a return to some of the same dilemmas that they faced in the early years of the Alliance. As Canada overextends itself with military commitments, it will find that it does not have the resources to support these efforts over the long term. At the same time, NATO reoriented itself back towards viewing Russia as a threat, calling for significant increases in members' commitments to defense spending. A resurgent Russia has resulted in a major reinvestment of Canadian military forces in Europe after Russia seized the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine in 2014. As an immediate response, Canada sent fighter jets to perform bilateral training with NATO partners and enhanced NATO air policing missions. Canadian army deployments to Europe include an advisory mission to Ukraine, a training mission in Poland for a brief period, and leading a multinational battlegroup in Latvia as part of NATO's enhanced forward presence initiatives.[63] These contributions reflect national security objectives that are destined to run in conflict to the traditional importance of human security objectives in Canadian foreign policy.

The conflict between national security objectives and human security objectives is likely to be exacerbated by two factors in Canadian domestic politics. First, the current

---

[61] Karl P. Mueller, ed., *Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War*, Research Report, RR-676-AF (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2015), 248-9.
[62] Mueller, *Precision and Purpose*, 245-6.
[63] NATO, "Boosting NATO's presence in the east and southeast," accessed May 10, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm?selectedLocale=en.

government has demonstrated that it places a higher priority on human security objectives. This priority can be seen in the government's removal of fighter jets from Canada's contribution to OIR and its highly touted commitment to return to UN peacekeeping operations. The second aggravating factor is a lack of funding for defense. Canadian defense budgets have been in a steady overall decline since the 1960s, with the only major increase occurring after 9/11 when Canadian politicians realized that the Canadian Forces would not have been able to accomplish their missions without serious reinvestment.[64] Canadian governments have a long history of prioritizing human security objectives over national security objectives, resulting in chronically underfunding the Canadian military. The tension between national and human security objectives has become a hallmark of Canadian identity, whereby Canada seeks to accomplish the former at the lowest cost, in order to pursue the latter.

NATO, and Canada in particular, have been on a roller-coaster ride since the end of the Cold War. Massive changes in the post-Cold War strategic environment wreaked havoc in Canadian defense spending and organization, while NATO attempted to transform itself away from the Cold War monolith it had become. The uncertainty of the 1990s was replaced by an intense focus in the 21st century on counter-terrorism and national security objectives. As the strategic environment continues to evolve, national security and human security objectives are increasingly in conflict with one another. The extent to which Canada will be able to pursue its human security objectives through the alliance structure, and the resources that Canada is able to commit to NATO operations, will shape Canada's involvement in NATO.

Preliminary Conclusions

Canada needs NATO more than NATO needs Canada. To be sure, the hypothetical loss of Canada, one of the founding members of the Alliance, would certainly be of crisis proportions and would rock the political foundations of NATO. Canada undertakes risky mission sets and contributes where it can within its financial

[64] Lawless, "Canada and NATO", 11.

constraints, however, it is not in a position to be indispensable to the Alliance in the same way as the United Kingdom. Nonetheless, NATO provides two critical foundations for Canadian foreign policy. First, conducting operations through NATO provides legitimacy to Canadian foreign policy objectives and even more so when those NATO actions are supported by the UNSC. Second, NATO remains an unparalleled avenue for Canada to pursue its foreign policy objectives in an independent fashion. NATO provides Canada with a privileged platform because of the equalizing nature of the NAC that results from NATO's consensus decision-making model. Considering that Canada is not really considered a Great Power by IR theory standards, NATO provides Canada a means for influencing Great Power politics and providing critical defensive assurances.[65] Canada's military and economic positions have changed significantly since NATO was created; however, Canada's strategic interests have mostly remained the same. The single largest challenge for Canada's continued involvement in NATO likely will be how to balance national security and human security objectives both domestically and internationally. Regardless of the many successes and failures in the relationship between Canada and NATO, Canada's participation in the Alliance is unlikely to change in the near term.

At the end of the Second World War, Canada's economic and military power ranked in the global top five. Canada's former position as the fifth most powerful military in the world in 1945 is likely never to be repeated – today there is little value in assigning a position other than to rank Canada's military as being in a kind of second tier in the world.[66] Economically speaking, Canada still ranks high enough to participate in the G7, although this designation is misleading when one considers that countries such as Russia are generally excluded due to their perpetration of various "mischievous" acts in the international arena. The result is that any advantages that Canada could have wielded, both economically and militarily, have been drastically reduced since the late 1940s. Canada, therefore, seeks to exert influence in other ways.

---

[65] Heuser, *Transatlantic Relations*, 35.
[66] Lawless, "Canada and NATO," 10.

Canada's self-styled identity as a middle power continues to inform its foreign policy actions in much the same way as it did half a century ago. Multilateralism and international legitimacy factor strongly in all Canadian foreign policy decisions. Particular significance continues to be placed on the UN, and Canada sees itself as an "honest broker" in the UN and the broader international stage, championing international law and stability.[67] Canadian efforts towards arms control are a strong example here, particularly Canada's use of the Commonwealth forum to achieve compromise that eventually helped lead to the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.[68] Where NATO is concerned, however, Canada's success as an intermediary has been more as a translator. Due to the CAFs' close integration with the US military services, the CAF is often helping to integrate other European alliance members into US-led training and operations.[69] At the grand strategic level, the results of the honest broker approach are more ambivalent.

Canada's cultural identity is still strongly tied to Europe in many ways, although perhaps less so now than in the late 1940s. Canada's ability to act as a "bridge" between the United States and Europe remains an important, albeit usually elusive, aspiration.[70] Pearson's important work helping to establish NATO in the first place is a perfect example of this idea, however Europeans tend to cut out the intermediary in their dealings with the United States wherever possible. In the past, Canada's strong cultural ties to Europe helped to temper the misperceptions that would rise in American-European relations. The United States' violent divorce from Great Britain necessarily affected their identity in ways that the Canadian identity was not, given Canada's peaceful independence. Canadian leaders felt that they better understood the Europeans than did the Americans. Domestically, Canadian leaders have a common understanding in the area of defense spending.

---

[67] Heuser, *Transatlantic Relations*., 37.
[68] Ibid., 37.
[69] Captain (N) Peter Avis, "Seductive Hegemon: Why NATO Is Still Important to Canada" 5, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 15–22, 20.
[70] Heuser, *Transatlantic Relations*., 37.

The most glaring similarity between Canadian defense and foreign policy at NATO's founding and today is the constant desire for defense on the cheap. While Minister of Defence Brooke Claxton's 1947 white paper resulted in a substantial increase in defense funding in Canada, he also followed Prime Minister King's desire to maintain a military that was just strong enough to meet its commitments and no more.[71] This policy trait over time became known as the "commitment-capabilities gap" and has been a part of every Canadian defense policy since 1947.[72] Consecutive white papers in 1964 and 1971 continue the trend for spending the bare minimum on defense and even for reducing commitments commensurate with Canada's status as a "middle power."[73] Relief from cuts was brief, as the 1987 white paper on defense outlines government spending that arrested the fall.[74] The 1994 white paper is, without a doubt, the most ruthless in cutting defense spending and reducing commitments in a large-scale shift away from national security objectives.[75] Today, despite widespread agreement within NATO that every member state should aim for defense spending to reach a minimum 2% of national GDP, Canada has routinely shirked this benchmark.[76] Although there have been increases in Canadian defense spending and recapitalization of capabilities in the post-9/11 strategic environment, Canada's long-standing trend of spending "just enough" on defense has shown no signs of changing. These spending priorities are also related to Canada's foreign policy objectives.

Canada's continued prioritization of human security objectives over national security objectives remains as important today as it was after the Second World War. Support for these values in the 21st century echo Pearson and Saint-Laurent's advocacy for NATO in the late 1940s and into the 1950s. Pearson's legacy of peacekeeping, for

---

[71] Bland, *Defence Policy*, 6.
[72] Ibid., 6.
[73] Department of National Defence, *White Paper on Defence*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, Office of the Minister of National Defence, March 1964), 7, and Department of National Defence, *Defence in the 70s: White Paper on Defence* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, Information Canada, 1971), 6 and 32.
[74] Department of National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada* (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1987), 44.
[75] Bland, *Defence Policy*, 286.
[76] John Alexander, "Canada's Commitment to NATO: Are We Pulling Our Weight?" *Canadian Military Journa*l 15, No. 4 (Autumn 2015), 6.

which he earned a Nobel Prize, is constantly being reconciled against Canada's post-9/11 military actions in OEF, ISAF, OUP, and now OIR. The current Canadian government has made a concerted effort to reinvigorate Canada's human security objectives by committing to a UN peacekeeping mission in Mali. Canada's ability to transition back to an overall greater emphasis on human security objectives, however, will be contingent on how well it can balance its national security requirements with the United States as well as with NATO. This balance will be of the utmost importance to Canadian policymakers as Canada is heavily reliant on NATO and the UN in its pursuit of human security objectives.

Part II: Analysis and Evaluation

Chapter 4

Discussion of Issues

The two case studies present historical information on the formation of Canada's two most important security relationships. While the preliminary conclusions hint at a broad range of ideas, this chapter will distill the pertinent issues as they relate to the purpose of this study. First, the cases are set against the three main IR frameworks in order to discern how the cases fit with the theory as presented in chapter one. Of particular interest is the way that liberal and constructivist views apply to the current and future prospects of Canada's involvement with NATO and with the United States. Second, Canada's strategic interests in terms of national and human security objectives, and the tension between the two, are examined. Importantly, how this tension is resolved is directly tied to constructivist notions of identity.

Application of IR Theory

There are clear realist foundations in both the bilateral Canadian-American security relationship and NATO. From a threat-based perspective, each relationship was instigated by clear national security motivations. The Canadian-American relationship had been growing slowly over time. The drive for formal, lasting security cooperation, however, did not arrive until the beginning of the Second World War. The threat of possible attack from Nazi Germany, and the possibility of the fall of Great Britain, drove an important need for pro-active coordination between Canada and the United States. The emergence of the Soviet threat against a weakened Europe after the war motivated deepening bilateral defense relations and was the main driver behind the creation of NATO. While other institutional and economic motivations to create a formal Atlantic community existed, it took the threat of communism and the Soviet Union to overcome any misgivings the treaty nations, particularly the United States, may have had regarding the idea of an alliance. Security and power were primary drivers in establishing alliances and these two cases do not refute this point.

The realist framework argues that, as a middle power, Canada will constantly be balancing against threats and bandwagoning with the United States. Canada's role in NATO and bilateral defense relations poses an interesting mix of both behaviors. On the surface, Canada's membership in NATO is clear balancing behavior against the Soviet Union/Russia, and one might say that Canada's relationship with the United States is a form of bandwagoning. Some also view Canada's involvement in a multilateral alliance–NATO–as external balancing to the power asymmetry of Canada with the United States.[1] However, there is little evidence that Canada uses NATO as a forum to oppose American policies in North America, and both nations keep North American affairs separate from their dealings within NATO.[2] The evidence does not support the idea of NATO purely as a balance or counterweight against the United States.

There is equally little evidence of outright bandwagoning in the Canadian-American relationship. In terms of hard power, the United States has not posed a physical threat to Canada since the mid-19th century and does not use force or threat of force to influence Canadian policy. With soft power, there is no denying some reciprocal influence in policies. Some key differences, however, make soft power bandwagoning less applicable. The Canadian refusal to join the American coalition in OIF, reticence regarding BMD lasting decades, and Canadian stubbornness about Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty are all examples of Canadian policy that has been distinctly at odds with their American counterparts to some degree. Since the United States does not threaten Canada, bandwagoning does not adequately explain the Canadian-American bilateral relationship either.

While the realist framework provides a broad description of the security relationships examined in this study, this framework does not offer a deep explanation for why these relationships continue with their present characteristics. Threat-based reasoning is undermined by the fact that, in the post-Cold War world, there are no

---

[1] Canadian IR scholars Sokolsky and Jockel, as well as the historian Granatstein, and former diplomat John Holmes all support this idea of NATO being a counterweight to the United States in bilateral Canadian-American relations.

[2] Stéphane Roussel, *The North American Democratic Peace: Absence of War and Security Institution-Building in Canada-US Relations, 1867-1958* (Montreal: Published for the School of Policy Studies and the Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, by McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 48.

specific threats to Canada's sovereignty. Terrorism and other general threats would not normally be considered sufficient cause to form an alliance in the realist sense because the threat is generally dispersed with an extended time horizon. Terrorism, however, is not a sufficient pretext to maintain an alliance. The 9/11 attacks reinvigorated NORAD and bilateral defense, as well as NATO solidarity and out of area initiatives. Balancing behavior is an act of rivalry against a specific threat, not a general one, and bandwagoning would have to be redefined in a threat-agnostic way for it to apply to the bilateral relationship. Notably, some scholarship does redefine bandwagoning in a way that makes it akin to simply joining a larger, more powerful state or bloc but this does not follow the traditional realist viewpoint.[3] Explanations beyond realism must be applied to get a more meaningful understanding of the security relationships in question.

Liberal institutionalism explains much of the staying power point of the two cases studied in this project. Wallander's argument about NATO's ability to adapt refers to its assets as shared norms, values, and procedures.[4] Wallander identifies the important general assets for NATO as the NAC, principles of transparency, interoperability, and the consultation and cooperation encompassed by Articles 2 and 4 of the Treaty.[5] These general assets allowed it to adapt to a rapidly changing environment, while shedding specific assets that could not adapt – those geared solely towards the Soviet threat – and adjusting those that could, such as the military command and control structure. Combined, these assets contribute to the institutional 'stickiness' that has held NATO together through various crises over the years, including the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks. Because of her definition of assets, Wallander's concepts regarding general and specific assets can also be applied to the Canadian-American relationship.

The general and specific assets of the Canadian-American relationship contribute to the stability and longevity of the relationship. The IJC and PJBD can be considered general assets that provide information as well as procedures for deliberation, decision-

---

[3] Benjamin Zyla, *Sharing the Burden? NATO and Its Second-Tier Powers* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 24.
[4] Celeste A. Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War," *International Organization* 54, no. 4 (2000): 705–735, 706.
[5] Ibid., 731.

making, and implementation. The egalitarian nature of bilateral relations is captured through these general assets. NORAD, the MCC, and the various economic mechanisms that are applied to the bilateral relationship represent specific assets that address internal issues or specific threats. Despite a decline in the 1990s, NORAD adapted well post-9/11 to the changing nature of the relationship. While the PJBD has operated in the background for many years, it has enabled significant flexibility in the bilateral defense relationship. Institutions demonstrably influenced the longevity and resilience of both cases examined in this study. Liberal institutionalism provides the first part of an explanation.

Liberal ideas and values further explain the foundations of Canada's participation in NATO and the Canadian-American relationship. Canada's preference bias towards multilateral organizations can be traced to the First World War, and was a major factor in its support of the United Nations and the genesis of NATO. The transparent and consensus-oriented nature of NAC proceedings is aligned with Canada's liberal democratic values. Former Canadian diplomat John Holmes indicated that the drive for Article 2 was less about building more institutions than it was about shaping attitudes towards certain ideals and values.[6] The relevance of Article 2 in the post-Cold War context supports this assertion as NATO declared itself a collective security institution. The structure of the alliance reflects the ideas of democratic peace theory, where common liberal norms and values tend to draw reciprocal cooperative responses from other liberal states. The bilateral relationship, on the other hand, could be qualified as a kind of strategic partnership, using Wilkins' taxonomy, because the relationship clearly extends beyond security cooperation to economic and diplomatic domains.[7] Yet, there is still a deeper aspect to the relationships involved, particularly in the case of the Canadian-American relationship.

In line with the constructivist point of view, a state's identity provides the foundation for the values and ideas that it espouses, and this identity evolves over time

---

[6] Alan K. Hendrikson, "Ottawa, Washington, and the Founding of NATO," in Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel, eds., *Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation: The Road from Ogdensburg* (Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press, 1992), 111.

[7] See the discussion on defining alliances in chapter one of this study.

through complex interactions with other states. Canada's identity grew from its original British and French origins, into its own distinct identity that could act, for a time, as a kind of bridge between the United States and Great Britain, as well as Western Europe. This was useful to some extent during the creation of NATO. Importantly, over the course of the century that spanned the War of 1812 to the First World War, the Canadian identity drifted away from its British tendencies and closer to its American neighbor. Self-identifying as a liberal democratic state, Canada treated the United States in kind, although not without suspicion from both states at first. As trust built up between the two nations, cooperative, egalitarian bilateral relations became entrenched as a norm. That the bilateral relations continued to follow these norms through the Cold War and even today speaks to the shared ideas, values, and norms that have been reinforced by identities that see these traits reflected back through their interactions.

Of the types of alignment discussed in chapter one of this study, the ones that best fit the current state of the bilateral Canadian-American relationship are collective security and security community. Bilateral defense is no longer organized around a single threat; rather both countries see their security as being inexorably linked. Canada and the United States have long since done away with physical violence as a means to settle their disputes, which are instead handled through negotiation, arbitration, and legal means. Trade, fishing, and even boundary disputes in the Arctic continue to be addressed through established diplomatic means. Both countries are members of bilateral (NORAD) and multilateral (NATO) security arrangements to protect their "community." Constructivist scholar Alexander Wendt discusses another name that could well be used to describe this: friendship.[8] Wendt describes, "friends may of course have a falling out, but their expectation up front is that the relationship will continue."[9] This description seems apt for the Canadian-American relationship, where despite their differences the shared aspects of their identities endure and reinforce each other.

Strategic Interests

[8] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 67 (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 298-300.
[9] Ibid., 299.

Since the end of the Second World War, Canada's strategic interests have exhibited a growing tension between human security objectives and national security objectives. Pearson's legacy of peacekeeping planted an idea that has grown over the ensuing decades to the point where today, warranted or not, a significant portion of the Canadian public has internalized peacekeeping into the Canadian identity. Unfortunately, this peacekeeping identity also comes at the expense of a rich traditional military history that, until recent operations in Afghanistan, had been fading away. By the time Canadian soldiers deployed to Afghanistan, the last time the Canadian Army had deployed in a non-peacekeeping role was the Korean War.[10] In practical terms, through heuristics the lack of major combat operations has increased the profile of human security objectives for Canadian policymakers, as images of Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo remain relevant. One reason that national security objectives are in tension with human security objectives comes from the bilateral Canadian-American relationship.

Canada enjoys the luxury of a very special geopolitical situation that allows considerable policy freedom. Proximity to the United States comes with the benefit of being well-protected, as well as the risk of being caught up in any attack on the United States. The bilateral security cooperation that has been built since FDR and King first pledged mutual defense in 1938 has meant that Canada's immediate national security is looked after by long-standing agreements and organizations that show no signs of disappearing. With national security objectives easily addressed, Canadian policy makers are therefore able to spend more time focusing on a human security agenda. Just how far this emphasis can go was demonstrated in the 1990s with the Canadian government's focus on peacekeeping and concurrent reductions to its defense budget. Conversely, the bilateral national security mechanisms are designed to take over quickly in a crisis, as happened following 9/11.

The trend of the tension between national and human security objectives is to cycle between which one has more priority. During the Cold War, national security objectives were prioritized, even as Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's government began

[10] Canadian combat forces deployed for ODS and OAF were from the Navy and Air Force only.

to swing policy towards human security objectives. Following the Cold War, human security objectives were clearly front and center, whereas in the decade or so following 9/11 national security objectives were prioritized. Importantly, even when national security objectives are prioritized, human security initiatives are a close second as identified by the work performed by the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan. While a Canadian Army battlegroup was working to instill some physical security, the Canadian PRT was working to build infrastructure and provide humanitarian assistance to the Afghan population. The challenge, as scholar Patrick James puts it, is to work towards the right balance of both national and human security objectives in order to maintain a military that is capable of executing Canada's foreign policy.[11]

[11] Patrick James, *Canada and Conflict*, Issues in Canada (Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press, 2012), 137.

Chapter 5

Principal Findings

Applying IR theory to the study of the Canadian-American security relationship and Canada's membership in NATO has yielded three relevant findings. The first main finding relates to the formation and perpetuation of international security cooperation. While realist impulses may bring states together, they do not appear to be what keeps them together. Secondly, the evidence presented supports the constructivist link between a state's identity and preference formation. Canada's preference formation with respect to national or human security objectives appears to be directly related to its identity. Lastly, in light of the first two main findings, Canada's current strategic relationships are likely more than sufficient for its security requirements as they relate to national foreign policy objectives. While this finding is expected, it is also not trivial in today's tumultuous context of international politics.

IR Theory

Classifying the Canadian-American security relationship is not as simple as it may seem. Lacking a formal governing treaty, it cannot be classified as an alliance by the definition used in this study. The particular geopolitical position that Canada possesses affords it the ability to subordinate certain national security objectives to foreign policies that are more oriented around human security values. Canada's physical security is underwritten by its relationship with the United States. To say that this security is wholly reliant on the bilateral relationship would be to take this notion too far. Rather than being forced to constantly bandwagon with the United States, Canada exhibits distinctive foreign policy that is sometimes at odds with its neighbor. The egalitarian nature of Canadian-American relations defies realist, and in some respects liberal, explanations. Instead, this relationship displays constructivist notions of identity and the idea of friendship between two states that have grown up alongside each other. While a strategic partnership may be too formal a designation, describing the Canadian-American relationship as a security community captures the situation well.

NATO, on the other hand, dances between an alliance focused on collective defense and collective security. Despite its realist beginnings, NATO has adapted well in the post-Cold War environment without the Soviet threat. The norms, values, and procedures built up over decades of multilateral security cooperation – particularly transparency, consensus building, and collaboration – have enabled NATO to transition towards collective security. The realist underpinnings are never far, however, as the complex post-9/11 world constantly reminds us. While Canada has long desired to be able to use the ideas behind Article 2 to move NATO towards a security community, Americans still tend to see NATO as a collective defense organization while the Europeans seek to achieve a security community via the EU. The formation and longevity of these relationships develops the first main finding of this project.

Realism explains how and why alliances and alignments form. Liberalism and constructivism, however, are required in order to understand why these relationships endure. Specific threats were present at the creation of both relationships examined in this study. The ideas and values of democratic peace theory, and the interaction of identities that contributes to the formation of a security community complement Wallander's scholarship on the liberal institutional influence in NATO. Without these influences, both NATO and the Canadian-American relationship may have fallen into disarray on numerous occasions. That they have not, in some ways speaks to particular Canadian characteristics.

Canadian identity is linked to foreign policy preferences, as demonstrated through the tension between national security and human security objectives. Recognizing the importance of national security objectives, Canada has tended to react correspondingly to various crises such as the World Wars, the Cold War, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Its preference, however, lies elsewhere. Before the World Wars, Canada was fairly isolationist. The damage wrought by the World Wars through the first half of the 20th century created an understanding in Canadian policymakers of the need to pursue peace and security in a proactive manner. That Canadian diplomats sought the beginnings of a security community in NATO, and began to favor peacekeeping activities and multilateral initiatives, speaks to values of human rights and human security. The more Canada participated in these types of activities, the more it became an important part of

the Canadian identity, reinforcing the policy preferences established by the likes of St Laurent, Pearson, and P.E. Trudeau.

Assessment of Canada's security partnerships

Canada's national security needs have become deeply interconnected with those of the United States since the beginning of formal defense cooperation in 1940. Additionally, the lack of distinct, immediate threats to Canada's national security has translated into less emphasis on national security as a strategic interest. The IJC and PJBD continue to serve their advisory purposes, while NORAD remains the banner example for military cooperation and interoperability. Individual instances, such as Canada's refusal to participate directly in OIF, have not shaken this relationship because Canada continued to provide indirect support and to strengthen military cooperation in other ways. Canada has had no need, therefore, to alter the current relationship with the United States or build equivalent new security partnerships beyond what already exists. The current course has been equally beneficial for another relationship.

NATO has proven itself a useful means through which to pursue human security objectives in conjunction with Canada's allies. To this end, and despite reduced emphasis in the early 1990s, Canada's participation in recent NATO operations favors human security objectives. Peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo, air strikes as part of OAF and OUP, all had underlying human security objectives. Canada's contribution to ISAF also had distinct human security objectives through the PRT. The fact that NATO has worked to transform into more of a collective security organization has aided Canada's use of NATO as a vehicle for its foreign policy in a legitimized, multilateral forum.

Within NATO and the bilateral Canadian-American relationship, Canada behaves largely as it is predicted to in the context of IR theory. Scholars argue that Canada's behavior is largely the behavior that should be expected: free-riding tendencies and burden shifting. "It is quite natural for bigger allies to bear a disproportionately higher share of collective burden," and therefore the United States is caught in the position of

perpetually contributing more than Canada, in absolute terms, giving the perception that Canada is freeriding.[1] Furthermore, when analyzing Canadian contributions to NATO outside of a financial cost formula, and in relative terms, it becomes apparent that Canada's contribution to operations tends to make up for its low levels of defense spending.[2]

Both the Canadian-American relationship and NATO have demonstrated remarkable resiliency over the years. Despite a near complete military withdrawal from Europe in the early 1990s, Canada increased participation in the Alliance by deploying forces in support of multiple NATO operations and initiatives. What could have been interpreted as a snub to the United States in 2003 turned into an opportunity for Canada to both maintain support for the United States in indirect ways while maintaining and independent foreign policy. These two examples, among many others, showcase the durability and resiliency of Canada's strategic relationships.

Future prospects for Canada's security partnerships

The Canadian-American bilateral relationship continues to yield benefits for both countries, and its resilient nature bodes well for the future. While this may not be a surprising finding, it is nonetheless an important one given that there are difficulties ongoing, such as NAFTA renegotiations, continued BMD sensitivities, and very different political leaders in both countries. While Prime Minister Justin Trudeau pursues a human security oriented foreign policy agenda, President Trump pursues a national security oriented policy centered on great power competition. It is quite likely that, much like the 2003 conflict over OIF, there will be friction in the bilateral relationship. Much like in 2003, however, the resiliency of the relationship will carry the day as general and specific assets such as the PJBD and NORAD exert their influence.

Despite challenges, bilateral security cooperation continues unabated. In fact, with NORAD now a permanent agreement rather than requiring constant renewal,

---

[1] Ivan Dinev Ivanov, *Transforming NATO: New Allies, Missions, and Capabilities* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011), *xx*.
[2] Benjamin Zyla, *Sharing the Burden? NATO and Its Second-Tier Powers* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 268.

incorporating a maritime aspect, there is evidence that bilateral security cooperation between Canada and the United States continues to deepen.[3] Deepening ties will continue to contribute towards collective identity and the strength of the North American security community. The historical resiliency of the Canadian-American relationship appears to be a strong indicator that regardless of differences both Canada and the United States can be expected to maintain a strong partnership in the future.

Canada's participation in NATO will continue to be significant as the Alliance continues to grant legitimacy to Canada's human security objectives. The multilateral nature of NATO, and its tendency to follow UNSC resolutions wherever possible, is a strong fit with Canada's identity and foreign policy. Combined with current efforts for further economic integration with Europe Canada's desire to take leadership roles within the Alliance, such as the one it currently holds with NATO's forward presence in Latvia, demonstrate commitment. Given its geographical separation from Europe, and its lack of a seat at the UNSC, Canada's participation in NATO maintains a prominent position for Canada in Europe. It is unlikely that some other arrangement could be created in the near term to replace this value to Canadian foreign policy.

The future, therefore, holds more of the same with respect to Canada's strategic security relationships. The resilient nature of Canada's interactions with the United States and NATO provide a solid foundation for future challenges. In a world that is constantly uncertain, violent, complex, and asymmetrical, keeping hold of these partnerships is a small victory of its own.

[3] Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, "Ten Years into Forever: NOARD's Place in Canada-US Defence Relations," in James G Fergusson and Francis Joseph Furtado, eds., *Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security Agenda for Canada* (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2016), 111.

CONCLUSION

Summary

The purpose of this project is to determine the sufficiency of Canada's main strategic security relationships. By understanding whether the bilateral Canadian-American relationship and Canada's membership in NATO are sufficient to meet Canada's foreign policy objectives, this thesis has attempted to contribute to the overall study of Canada's strategic defense relationships, their importance, and how Canada may continue to leverage them in support of its domestic and international security interests. An examination of pertinent IR theory established the three viewpoints through which this study examined the Canadian-American security relationship and NATO. Case studies of each relationship were cast against realist, liberal, and constructivist frameworks, elucidating important, although unsurprising, results with respect to each case.

The bilateral Canadian-American security relationship's formal origins lie in the joint 1940 Ogdensburg Declaration by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie-King. As the North American countries began to feel more threatened, they recognized the need to cooperate formally in order to secure their defense. Before this, however, the relationship can be traced back to the end of the War of 1812 as the genesis of cooperative relations between the United States and what would become Canada. Despite a number of bumps in the road, from border disagreements to complicated issues such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the relationship between Canada and the United States has grown to be resilient. Over time, shared norms, values, and ideas have created what can effectively be called a security community between the two states where, despite the asymmetric appearance, the two nations deal with each other in a primarily egalitarian manner. Importantly, the bilateral relationship helps Canada to meet critical national security objectives that it might otherwise not be able to achieve. Barring an event that would cause the identities of Canada and the United States to rapidly diverge, the close relationship is unlikely to change. In today's complex, uncertain environment, this stability is a good thing.

Canada's motivations for working to create NATO stem from a recognition that national security objectives alone are generally not enough to ensure a secure and peaceful world. The struggle to include Article 2 in the Treaty speaks to the understanding that an alliance based purely on defense would not prove durable over time. Despite this effort, however, NATO remained primarily a collective defense alliance for the duration of the Cold War while other institutions took on cooperative economic and political relationships. The end of the Cold War brought a significant change, however, as NATO began a deliberate transformation into a collective security institution. This shift aligned well with the Canadian preference for the pursuit of human security objectives in foreign policy. Canada's participation in NATO operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Libya, and Afghanistan, has supported human security objectives. The cooperative, multilateral nature of NATO provides Canada the support and legitimacy it needs to pursue some of its key human security objectives in its foreign policy.

Throughout both case studies, I have found that while each relationship was formed with some component of realist threat considerations, the enduring nature of the relationships suggests other factors at play. Liberal and constructivist ideas of common institutions, ideas, values, and identities have contributed to resilient security relationships that have lasted many decades. While realism brought the countries together, liberalism and constructivism has kept them together.

Conclusion

Canada's bilateral security relationship with the United States and its participation in NATO are both used to enable Canada's foreign policy preferences in distinct ways. The Canadian-American relationship helps Canada achieve its basic national security objectives in securing its sovereignty. Canada's physical security is underwritten by its relationship with the United States. To say that this security is wholly reliant on the bilateral relationship, however, would be to take this notion too far. Rather than being forced to constantly bandwagon with the United States, Canada exhibits distinctive foreign policy that is sometimes at odds with its neighbor. The egalitarian nature of Canadian-American relations defies realist, and in some respects liberal, explanations. Instead, this relationship displays constructivist notions of common identities and the idea

of friendship between two states that have grown up alongside each other. The Canadian-American security relationship therefore provides for national security objectives in a cooperative, collaborative, and enduring fashion.

NATO provides Canada with a means to pursue foreign policy separate from specific national security objectives. The particular geopolitical position that Canada possesses affords it the luxury of subordinating certain national security objectives to foreign policies that are more oriented around human security values. Efforts to improve human rights, peace, security, and democratic norms and values have been pursued through the multilateral legitimacy of NATO operations. Where Canada would not otherwise have been able to pursue these human security objectives, NATO has provided the means to do so. To continue to achieve these objectives, Canada must work to keep the appropriate balance between its national and human security objectives, and to maintain its current strategic defense relationships as best it can. Canada is unlikely to find any better opportunities than the ones it already has.

APPENDIX A

The North Atlantic Treaty, 1949

Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate con ict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6 (1)

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France (2), on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications. (3)

Article 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

1. The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951.

2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.

3. The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of the ratifications of all signatory states.

The text of the North Atlantic Treaty is transposed from https://www.nato.int/cps/en /natohq/official_texts_17120.htm?

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY

ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations (asean.org)

BMD – Ballistic Missile Defense

CAF – Canadian Armed Forces

CF – Canadian Forces

CJOC – Canadian Joint Operations Command (Formerly CANCOM)

CDS – Chief of Defence Staff (Canada)

EU – European Union

GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

IJC – International Joint Commission

ISAF – International Stabilization Force in Afghanistan

MCC – Military Cooperation Committee

MND – Minister of National Defence (Canada)

MSG – Joint Military Studies Group

NAFTA – North American Free Trade Agreement

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NORAD – North American Aerospace Defense Command

ODS – Operation Desert Storm

OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom

OIR – Operation Inherent Resolve

ONE – Operation Noble Eagle

OUP – Operation Unified Protector

PJBD – Permanent Joint Board on Defense

R2P – Responsibility to Protect doctrine (UN)

RCAF – Royal Canadian Air Force

USAF – United States Air Force

UN – United Nations

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

USNORTHCOM – US North American Command

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexander, John. "Canada's Commitment to NATO: Are We Pulling Our Weight?" *Canadian Military Journal* 15, no. 4 (Autumn 2015): 4–11.

Avis, Captain (N) Peter. "Seductive Hegemon: Why NATO Is Still Important to Canada." *Canadian Military Journal* 5, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 15–22.

Bland, Douglas. *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 1947 to 1985*. Kingston, Ont., Canada: R.P. Frye, 1987.

Bland, Douglas L., ed. *Defence Policy*. Canada's National Defence, ed. by Douglas L. Bland ; Vol. 1. Kingston, Ont: School of Policy Studies, Queen's Univ, 1997.

Ducasse, Mark D., ed. *The Transatlantic Bargain*. NDC Forum Paper 20. Rome, Italy: Research Division, NATO Defense College, 2012.

Dunne, Tim. "Canada and the 'New NATO.'" *Canadian Military Journal* 12, no. 4 (2012): 70–74.

Fergusson, James G, and Francis Joseph Furtado, eds. *Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security Agenda for Canada*. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2016.

Gellner, John. *North America and NATO*. Behind the Headlines, v. 24, No. 1. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1964.

Haglund, David G., and Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.), eds. *What NATO for Canada?* Martello Papers 23. Kingston, Ont: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 2000.

Haglund, David G., and Stéphane Roussel. "Is the Democratic Alliance a Ticket to (Free) Ride? Canada's 'imperial Commitments,' from the Interwar Period to the Present." *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 5, no. 1 (2007): 1–24.

Haglund, David G., Joel J. Sokolsky, and Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.), eds. *The U.S.-Canada Security Relationship: The Politics, Strategy, and Technology of Defense*. Studies in Global Security. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1989.

Heuser, Beatrice. *Transatlantic Relations: Sharing Ideals and Costs*. Chatham House Papers. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996.

Holmes, John W. *Life with Uncle: The Canadian-American Relationship*. Canadian University Paperbacks 275. Toronto ; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1981.

Holsti, Kal J., and Thomas Allen Levy. "Bilateral Institutions and Transgovernmental Relations between Canada and the United States." *International Organization* 28, no. 4 (1974): 875–901.

Ikenberry, G. John. *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2011.

Ivanov, Ivan Dinev. *Transforming NATO: New Allies, Missions, and Capabilities*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011.

James, Patrick. *Canada and Conflict*. Issues in Canada. Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Jervis, Robert. "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation." *World Politics* 38, no. 1 (October 1985): 58–79. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010351.

Jockel, Joseph T. *Canada in NORAD, 1957 - 2007: A History*. Queen's Policy Studies. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007.

Jones, David T. “US-Canada Security: The Long Polar Watch and Canada’s Changing Defence Policy 1957-1963.” *International Journal* 66, no. 2 (2011): 451–461.

Lawless, Michael J. “Canada and NATO: A Starving Fish in an Expanding Pond” 7, no. 2 (Summer 2006). http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo7/no2/lawless-anarchiq-eng.asp#.

NATO. “Boosting NATO’s presence in the east and southeast.” March 02, 2018, accessed May 10, 2018. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm ?selectedLocale=en.

NATO. “Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance.” Paragraph 2. July12 2010, accessed April 26 2018. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_ texts_23693.htm.

Martin, Pierre, and Michel Fortmann. “Canadian Public Opinion and Peacekeeping in a Turbulent World.” *International Journal* 50, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 370–400.

Mueller, Karl P., ed. *Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War*. Research Report, RR-676-AF. Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2015.

Pole, Ken. “Canadian Hornets to Withdraw from Op Impact.” *Skies Magazine*, February 10, 2016. https://www.skiesmag.com/news/canadian-hornets-to-withdraw-from-op-impact/.

Roussel, Stéphane. *The North American Democratic Peace: Absence of War and Security Institution-Building in Canada-US Relations, 1867-1958*. Montreal: Published for the School of Policy Studies and the Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University, by McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004.

Siverson, Randolph M., and Juliann Emmons. “Birds of a Feather: Democratic Political Systems and Alliance Choices in the Twentieth Century.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, no. 2 (1991): 285–306.

Sokolsky, Joel J., and Joseph T. Jockel, eds. *Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation: The Road from Ogdensburg*. Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press, 1992.

Soloman, Evan. “Omar Khadr: A Political Inkblot Test.” *MacLean’s*, July 15, 2017. https://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/omar-khadr-a-political-inkblot-test/.

Teigrob, Robert. *Warming up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States’ Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea*. Toronto ; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2009.

Thies, Wallace J. *Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO*. London: Routledge, 2015.

Wallander, Celeste A. “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War.” *International Organization* 54, no. 4 (2000): 705–735.

Walt, Stephen M. “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power.” *International Security* 9, no. 4 (1985): 3. https://doi.org/10.2307/2538540.

———. “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse.” *Survival* 39, no. 1 (March 1997): 156–79. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339708442901.

Wendt, Alexander. “Collective Identity Formation and the International State.” *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 384–96. https://doi.org/10.2307/2944711.

———. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations 67. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Wiggershaus, Norbert Theodor, and Roland G. Foerster, eds. *The Western Security Community, 1948-1950: Common Problems and Conflicting National Interests during the Foundation Phase of the North Atlantic Alliance*. Studies in Military History. Oxford [England] ; Providence, RI, USA: BERG, 1993.

Wilkins, Thomas S. "'Alignment', Not 'alliance' – the Shifting Paradigm of International Security Cooperation: Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment." *Review of International Studies* 38, no. 1 (January 2012): 53–76. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210511000209.

Zyla, Benjamin. *Sharing the Burden? NATO and Its Second-Tier Powers*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015.