

Policy and the Military Operational Artist: Exploring the Civil-Military Dialogue and Implications for the Art of Large-Scale Military Operations

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

Policy and the Military Operational Artist: Exploring the Civil-Military Dialogue and Implications for the Art of Large-Scale Military Operations, MAJ Jeffery A. Wollenman, US Army, 66 pages.

The need for the military operational artist to recognize the evolving requirement for parallel and corresponding military and political aims is more critical than ever. Within the modern environment, operational artists will operate in conflicts like Carl von Clausewitz's real wars of limited aims. This monograph seeks to answer what is the role of the military operational artist in resolving political and military aims in forming and maintaining a coherent emergent strategy in consonance with the political aim. In these conflicts the operational artist must provide politically aware military advice while in the *policy dialogue*, exhibit flexibility through reframing and discourse during the *military aim and emergent strategy dialogue*, and to be cognizant of the perceptions of victory and defeat while in the *perception dialogue* because these directly influence the policy makers' future decision for the conflict. Operational artists and doctrine must be flexible and account for these political influences and be prepared to operate in conflicts where they cannot pursue an absolute military aim. This regular dialogue with the policy maker will help an operational artist understand the political priorities, constraints, and risks of the policy maker and enable the operational artist to provide the best politically aware military advice. The methodology utilized to demonstrate the role and actions of the military operational artist consists of a case study comparison between General Eisenhower during the Second World War and General MacArthur during the Korean War. The Korea case study demonstrates how divergent aims can have a corrosive effect on a coherent strategy.

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Acronyms and Terms

AEAF	Allied Expeditionary Air Force was the designation for SHAEF's tactical air forces.
AOR	Area of Responsibility is a geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. (Joint Publication 1, c1 (Joint Operations) July 12, 2017, GL-5).
ARCADIA	1 st Washington Inter-Allied Conference which occurred from December 24, 1941 to January 14, 1942.
BOLERO	Operation Bolero was an Allied logistical operation to first concentrate the United States Strategic Air Forces in Great Britain and later ground forces for the Operation Overlord cross-channel attack.
CCS	The Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff formed in 1942.
COSSAC	Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander.
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the communist government of North Korea.
FUSAG	First United States Army Group was a fictitious army group used to deceive the Germans to where a cross-channel attack would occur in 1944.
JCS	Today, the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a body of senior uniformed leaders from all services in the United States Department of Defense who advise the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council on military matters. Though its members were different, it served in this capacity during both the Second World War and the Korean War (Joint Publication 1, c1 (Joint Operations) July 12, 2017, xvi).
MDAP	Mutual Defense Assistant Program from October 6, 1949.
NKPA	North Korean People's Army, the armed forces of the DPRK.
NSC	National Security Council is a governmental body specifically designed to assist the president in integrating all spheres of national security policy and was created in 1947. (Joint Publication 1, c1 (Joint Operations) July 12, 2017, GL-10).
OPCON	Operational Control is the authority to command over subordinate forces to accomplish a mission.

OVERLORD	Overlord was the codename for the Battle of Normandy, the Allied cross-channel attack initiated on June 6, 1944.
QUADRANT	1 st Quebec Inter-Allied Conference which occurred from August 14-24, 1943.
ROK	Republic of Korea, the democratic government of South Korea.
SAF	Strategic Air Force of the Allied nations during World War II composed of the British Bomber Command and the US 8 th Air Force.
SEXTANT/EUREKA	Cairo and Tehran Inter-Allied Conference which occurred from November 22 to December 7, 1943.
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. President Roosevelt appointed General Eisenhower to this position on February 12, 1944.
SYMBOL	Casablanca Inter-Allied Conference which occurred from January 14-23, 1943.
TRIDENT	3 rd Washington Inter-Allied Conference- May 15-25, 1943.
VFW	Veteran of Foreign Wars.

Section 1: Introduction

In *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz first noted “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”¹ This is consistent with the notion political leaders derive the “ends” for a conflict and employ the military as the “means” to achieve those “ends” through a campaign, or “ways.” Clausewitz also demonstrated that once the political “end,” or policy aim, is determined, the military will develop the most appropriate military “end” or military aim to support the policy aim.² From this military aim, military planners can then chart the best course, or “ways” to achieve them. Military and governments’ have generally followed this approach since the time of post-Napoleonic wars first described by Clausewitz in *On War* to modern times. This monograph will focus on the civilian and military relationships in developing both the military aim and the policy aim for a conflict.

In 2001, the United States led a military coalition into Afghanistan to first depose the Taliban regime, and then build a legitimate and pro-western government. The cause of this military intervention, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), was the Afghanistan based al-Qaeda terrorist organization’s attack on September 11th, 2001. Operatives from al-Qaeda hijacked American Airlines flights 11 and 77 and United Airlines flights 175 and 93 and used them to conduct terrorist strikes against the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington DC.³ The initial political aim for OEF was to disrupt or destroy al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and in other states that had granted al-Qaeda sanctuary to include the capture of its

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed and trans Peter Paret and Michael Howard (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

² Ibid., 584.

³ Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004), 1-14.

leader, Osama Bin Laden.⁴ The US military's Central Command (CENTCOM) then created the military aim of deposing the Taliban regime and destroying all the al-Qaeda cells in Afghanistan.⁵

Throughout the next seventeen years, The US Government's strategy, operational focus, and objectives for Afghanistan evolved five times. This was due to the changing domestic political atmosphere in each of the major coalition countries, response to the resurgence of the Taliban and its attempt to regain power in Afghanistan, and the degrading tolerance of foreign security forces by the Afghanistan Government within their borders. In order to adjust to changing political aims, the United States military aims changed across time to include: 1) toppling the Taliban regime with a combination of special operators; 2) nation building with a small contingency force; 3) counter insurgency operations (COIN) and counter-terrorism (CT) operations conducted by a larger coalition of military force; 4) transition of security and stability operations to the Afghanistan security forces; and, 5) train, advise and assist the Afghanistan security forces in preparation for US and partner withdrawal. As of 2019, the US military is still engaged in operations in Afghanistan focused around the train, advise, and assist missions supporting NATO's Operation Resolute Support (ORS) meant to augment the Afghanistan security forces and Operation Freedom Sentinel's (OFS) CT efforts.⁶

The war in Afghanistan highlights the relationship between the policy and military aim and how they normally parallel each other prior to the use of military forces and throughout an

⁴ Donald P. Wright, et al., *A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-September 2005* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 30.

⁵ Ibid., 43.

⁶ Ibid., 30, 43; Beth Bailey and Richard H. Immerman eds., *Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan* (New York: NYU Press, 2015), 321-325; John F. Campbell, "Operation Freedom's Sentinel and our continued security investment in Afghanistan" *US Army*, October 1, 2015, accessed August 11, 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/156517/operation_freedom_sentinels_and_our_continued_security_investment_in_afghanistan; and Jessica L. Garfola-Wright, "Operation Freedom's Sentinel Qualifies for Campaign Medal," *DoD News, Defense Media Activity*, February 19, 2015, accessed August 11, 2018, <https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/604135/>.

operation or campaign. In “Blue Whales and Tiger Sharks: Politics, Policy, and the Military Operational Artist,” Dr. Stephen Lauer outlines a framework to determine when “political and policy aims interact with, and are affected by, military considerations, constraints, and their interaction in operations where the policy encounters the free will of an adversary.”⁷ His model, “The Process and Resolution of Politically-Aware Military Advice,” shows five critical touchpoints military planners interact with policy planners during the formation of policy aims and military aims. His model is not singular with a defined beginning and end. Rather, it is a circular and dynamic loop that requires constant reassessment and adjustment.

This reassessment is based on the perception of how the conflict is progressing both militarily and politically, relevant domestic political and policy risks, changes in the international environment, and perceptions of narrative legitimacy. If this reassessment does not occur, a gap will eventually form between the various evolutions of the policy aim and the lagging military aim driving the conduct of a campaign or operation. As this gap widens, the military resolution of the conflict may become ineffectual or counterproductive to the evolving political aims.⁸ Clausewitz discussed the subordination of the military aim to the political aim in depth in *On War*. Clausewitz provided this context by first describing the extreme manifestation of war, pure war, and distinguished between wars with absolute political aims, and the more likely manifestation of war, real war, or wars of limited political aim.⁹

Clausewitz discussed the theory of wars of absolute political aims as characterized by the maximum exertion of force between belligerents to produce final victory. Two primal instincts

⁷ G. Stephen Lauer, “Blue Whales and Tiger Sharks: Politics, Policy, and the Military Operational Artist,” *The Strategy Bridge* (20 February, 2018).

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 75-77, 579-584.

motivated absolute war: hostile feelings and hostile intentions.¹⁰ Hostile feelings in the extreme became enmity, and this degree of hatred left little room for rational negotiation. Clausewitz described enmity as a “blind natural force.”¹¹ In concert with hostile intentions, enmity influenced political coteries to pursue absolute political aims. Clausewitz clarified the only result that counted in wars of absolute political aim was final victory. Until then, “nothing is decided, nothing won, and nothing lost. In this form of war, we must always keep in mind that it is the end that crowns the work.”¹² To achieve this final victory and unconditional surrender, nations raised the conflict to an absolute form of violence to ensure victory and the complete disarming of a belligerent’s army. From this disarming, the victor unilaterally established the agenda for concluding the conflict and prescribed the conditions for peace afterwards. An absolute political aim demanded that the military aim of final victory included the complete destruction or disarming of a belligerent’s army, justifying the complete mobilization of all the nation’s resources.¹³ In American history, examples included the War of the American Revolution, the Civil War, and the Second World War.¹⁴

One of the differences between conflicts marked by an absolute political aim versus a limited political aim is the existence of logic and the role of the perception of victory. In absolute aims, all actions follow a clear and simple logic to final victory where there is no “intervening neutral void.”¹⁵ In wars with absolute aims, the war is indivisible and all the engagements, battles, and campaigns in a war are logically related to the complete disarming of the belligerent’s

¹⁰ Clausewitz, *On War*, 76.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 89.

¹² *Ibid.*, 582.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 75-77.

¹⁴ Lauer, “Blue Whales and Tiger Sharks.”

¹⁵ Clausewitz, *On War*, 582.

army and the attainment of final victory. Therefore, the political aim and the military aim are in coherence with each other toward these goals and the perception of victory by the political coterie is less prominent than in wars of limited aims.¹⁶

In wars of limited aims, there is no logic or link between engagements, battles, or campaigns. War consists of “separate success each unrelated to the next, as in a match consisting of several games.”¹⁷ Without this logic leading to a final victory, the perception of victory after each individual engagement, battle, or campaign directly influences the political coterie decision to continue a war. In conflicts marked by limited aims, the political coterie that directs policy, “evades all rigorous conclusion proceeding from the nature of war, bothers little about ultimate possibilities and concerns itself only with immediate probabilities.”¹⁸ Thus, the coherence between military and policy aims has a higher probability of divergence due to subjective nature of perception between the military conducting a campaign, the military aim, and the political coterie directing a campaign that achieves the stated political aim.¹⁹

Clausewitz noted that absolute war was rare. Rather, most wars were “like a flaring up of mutual rage, when each party takes up arms in order to defend itself, to overawe its opponent, and occasionally to deal him an actual blow.”²⁰ He further explained that real war was characterized by a “tension between two elements, separate for the time being, which discharge energy in discontinuous, minor shocks.”²¹ Clausewitz argued, “no logical sequence could progress through

¹⁶ Clausewitz, *On War*, 582.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 606.

¹⁹ Ibid., 582-584, 605-610.

²⁰ Ibid., 579.

²¹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 579.

their innumerable twists and turns as though it were a simple thread that linked two deductions.”²²

Limited war lacks the inherent logic of a war of absolute political aims. This lack of logic in wars of limited aims was driven by a multitude of factors to include: a nation’s finite resources, international influences, the threat of interventions by other nations, a nation’s need to balance against other threats, the context of geography, cultural and ideological characteristics of the nation, the nation’s government style, the need to balance war with domestic concerns, the populaces and political coteries’ s willingness to pursue war to its absolute limits, and the ever present and unpredictable elements of luck and chance. Without the presence of significant enmity, these realities constrain and limit the political coteries’ willingness to establish a political aim of final victory. The varying degrees of real war lie within the full range of possible limited political war aims, using only the military effort deemed relevant to the scope and scale of the political end sought.²³

The need for the military operational artist to recognize the evolving requirement for parallel and corresponding military and political aims is critical. The 2018 US *National Defense Strategy* acknowledged that the evolving strategic environment is “an increasingly complex global security environment, characterized by overt challenges to the free and open international order and the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition between nations.”²⁴ Within this turbulent environment, technology and globalization further accelerate the speed in which competition between states and non-state adversaries occur. Civil-military traditionalists, such as Samuel P. Huntington, argued for a military both separate and passive to the formation of policy.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid., 579-584.

²⁴ James N. Mattis, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 2018: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 2.

In his foundational work, *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington argues “the area of military science is subordinate to, and independent of, the area of politics.”²⁵ Other civil-military experts, such as Lauer, believe that there is a dynamic relationship that exist between “the policy aim, its policy formation, and the execution of that policy by the military.”²⁶

This monograph seeks to answer what is the role of the military operational artist in resolving political and military aims in forming and maintaining a coherent emergent strategy in consonance with the political aim: an exploration of the civil-military dialogue. My hypothesis is that in a war of limited political aims, the military operational artist, that officer given both the authority and responsibility for the accomplishment of the political and military aim in a theater of war, continually negotiates the military aim within the dynamic political aim in the context of the civil-military dialogue, and requires an understanding of the political and policy risks associated with war policy.

The methodology utilized to demonstrate the role and actions of the military operational artist consists of a case study comparison. The first case study explores General Eisenhower and the coherence evident in the Allied political aims and overarching military strategy for victory in Europe during the Second World War. The second case study examines the often-incoherent aims that characterized the relationship of General MacArthur and President Truman during the Korean War between June 1950 through April 1951. The Korea case study demonstrates how divergent political and military aims can have a corrosive effect on a coherent strategy. Evaluation criteria focus on how the operational artist prosecuted a war or campaign in relation to the political aim, and how the operational artist presented military advice or options to his

²⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 71. In this section Huntington discusses the difference between subjective civilian and objective civilian control of the military. In his argument, objective civilian control of the military is most effective and requires a military ethic that is independent of the formation of policy.

²⁶ Lauer, “Blue Whales and Tiger Sharks.”

political coterie. The evaluation criteria derive from Lauer's model proposing dialogues that describe the process of the development of the policy aim, the military aim from the policy aim, as well as the political perception of the military outcome against the policy aim. The criteria are: 1) *Policy Dialogue* as the interaction between the policy maker and his coterie to reach agreement on a policy aim, with participation by the military operational artist, anticipating military activity; 2) *Military Aim and Emergent Strategy Dialogue* as the discourse between the policy maker and the military operational artist that brings the military aim and an emergent military strategy into coherence with the policy aim; and, 3) *Perception Dialogue* as the judgment of the policy maker and the perception of the coherence of the military outcome in relation to the policy aim. (See Figure 1)

There are many different models and interpretations to how civil-military relations work in practice and in theory. Key theorists include Samuel Huntington and Peter Feaver, each of whom provide models to describe the workings of the civil military dialogue and its constraints on the military. Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*, published in 1957, is foundational for contemporary civil-military relations theory.²⁷ In it, Huntington defines civil-military relations and civilian control of the military, explains the role and responsibility of the military professional in this relationship, and discusses the evolution of civil-military relations and American military tradition from its roots prior to the Civil War through the beginning of the Cold War. His concept that understanding the role of domestic politics in the formulation of the military aim lies beyond the scope of the military officer responsible for the prosecution of war,²⁸ appears out of step with the current complex environment that the military operational artist finds in the limited wars of the 21 century. If the operational artist is unaware of the constantly evolving domestic political influences on a military-oriented policy decision, the operational artist

²⁷ Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 7.

²⁸ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 71.

may be unable to provide the type and scope of relevant military advice and military options consonant with developing or stated policy constraints.

Alan Lamborn offered a model, “A Set of First Principles About the Politics of Strategic Interaction,”²⁹ that describes the impact of domestic political priorities, constraints, and risks that serve as the core of the policymaker’s overview of political possibilities and policy options.³⁰ Clausewitz noted that the nature of war prevented the development of purely military advice. Because war was a continuation of politics using other means, the violence inherent in the military instrument, commanders required an understanding of domestic political constraints.³¹ Lamborn’s insights into the nature of politics, when combined with Clausewitz’ theoretical placement of the importance of the domestic political underpinnings of military plans, provides the military operational artist a way to effectively advise policy while retaining a sense of the place and function of the military instrument in that policy discussion.

In his work *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, Peter D. Feaver sought to advance an alternative to Huntington’s thesis.³² Published in 2004, Feaver included lessons learned from America’s experience in Vietnam and in the initial phases of OEF and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In it, he advances “agency theory” and applies “principle-agent theory” definitions, such as “shirking” and “working” to civil-military relations. In his theory, he argues the “essence of civil-military relations is a strategic interaction between civilian principals and military agents.”³³ Within this construct, military agents, subordinate to the civilian

²⁹ Alan Lamborn, “Theory and the Politics in World Politics,” *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 2 (June 1997): 190.

³⁰ Lamborn, “Theory and the Politics in World Politics,” 190-197.

³¹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 87-88.

³² Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 2.

³³ Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 2.

principals, have an institutional choice to support, “work,” or oppose, “shirk,” from the policy directions and constraints affecting them. Feaver noted that the essence of the civil-military dialogue is strategic in its place and effect in the national level discourse on institutional goals and competition between the armed services.³⁴ This limits the usefulness of his theory in its application to the military operations in the 21st century. The changes in theater commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001, for example, demonstrate, not examples of commanders shirking their duty in disagreement with the policymaker, but rather a fundamental inability to see and respond to the domestic political imperatives and constraints of the policymaker in the execution of the work of military operations and the presentation of military options.³⁵ This is far more an example of reliance by these commanders on a viewpoint most in line with Huntington’s model than Feaver.

Finally, as noted above in the selection of criteria and in the model below in the modification of the model presented by Lauer, the successful theater commander actually interacts with the policymaker in a continuous dialogue with the responsibility to provide politically aware military advice.³⁶ (See Figure 1) The case studies for this monograph demonstrate both a successful and an unsuccessful result for the theater commander, the military operational artist. In the constant modification of aims and discourse with the policymaker, a principal role of the military operational artist is to engage in the pursuit of coherence between the political and military aims in war.

³⁴ Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 60-61. Feaver specifies these relationships as either “functional” or “relational” Functional relates to the ability of the military to protect the nation from its external enemies while “relational” is the civilian’s direction of its future through funding and oversight.

³⁵ Bailly, Immerman, ed., *Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan*, 126-129, 138-143, 321-325;

³⁶ Lauer, “Blue Whales and Tiger Sharks.”




Figure 1. “The Process and Resolution of Politically-Aware Military Advice.” (Key points added as modifications by author). Lauer, “Blue Whales and Tiger Sharks.”

Primary sources for the Eisenhower case included *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years III*,³⁷ and *A Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force: 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945*,³⁸ as well as the *History of COSSAC: Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander*.³⁹ The *Foreign Relations of the United States*⁴⁰ and the volumes and the papers and

³⁷ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Volume III, The War Years*, ed. Alfred D. Chandler Jr, Stephen E. Ambrose, Joseph P. Hobbs (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1970), 1401.

³⁸ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force: 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945* (Washington DC: Center of Military History US Army, 1993), vi.

³⁹ *History of COSSAC: Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander 1943-1944* (The Historical Sub-Section, Office of Secretary, General Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEP) 1944), i.

⁴⁰ William Slany, and Richardson Dougall ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943* (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1970), xi; and Fredrick Aandahl, William M. Franklin, William Slany ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1958), x.

minutes within the *World War II Inter Allied Conferences*⁴¹ provided the context and proceedings of the meetings within the Joint Allied Conferences wherein Roosevelt and Eisenhower engaged in the process evaluated in the criteria as the *policy dialogues* and in which Eisenhower subsequently engaged in the *military aim and emergent strategy dialogue*. For secondary sources, I relied on Martin Gilbert's *Winston S. Churchill, Volume VII: Road to Victory, 1941-1945*⁴² and Joseph E. Persico's *Roosevelt's Centurions: FDR and the Commanders He led to Victory in World War II*.⁴³

For the MacArthur case study, primary sources included the extensive archival information available in the Truman Presidential Library to include the *Elsey Papers*,⁴⁴ *Acheson Papers*,⁴⁵ and the *Truman Papers, Presidential Secretary Files*.⁴⁶ Truman and his Administration's public proclamations and press statements⁴⁷ provided insight in the criteria for Truman's *policy dialogue* and *perception dialogue*. Primary sources additionally included insight into MacArthur's *military aim and emergent strategy dialogue* from the communiques between the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington DC and MacArthur in two volumes of *Foreign Relations*

⁴¹ *World War II Inter-Allied Conferences: Quadrant Conference, August 1943, Papers and Minutes of Meetings* (Washington DC: Joint History Department, 2003), 1; and *World War II Inter-Allied Conferences: Proceedings of the American-British Joint Chiefs of Staff Conferences Held in Washington D.C. on Twelve Occasions between December 24, 1941 and January 14, 1942* (Washington DC: Joint History Department, 2003), 1.

⁴² Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill, Volume VII: Road to Victory, 1941-1945* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), 1.

⁴³ Joseph E. Persico, *Roosevelt's Centurions: FDR and the Commanders He Led to Victory in World War II* (New York, NY: Random House, 2013), xi.

⁴⁴ *The Korean War and Its Origins Research File: Elsey Papers* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), i.

⁴⁵ *Secretary of State File: Acheson Papers* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), i.

⁴⁶ *The Korean War and Its Origins Research File: Truman Papers, President's Secretary's Files* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), i.

⁴⁷ *Public Papers Harry S. Truman 1945-1953* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), i.

of the United States,⁴⁸ covering 1950-1951 as well as his public press statements, speeches, and letters.⁴⁹ The official *History of the Joint Chiefs Of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: 1950-1951*⁵⁰ allowed further insight into MacArthur's actions on the battlefield in Korea and their coherence, or lack thereof, with Truman's policy aims. Secondary sources provided additional clarity and context to these primary sources, including H.W. Brands extensive work in *The General vs. The President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War*,⁵¹ and Dennis D. Wainstock's *Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War*.⁵²

This monograph contains four sections, including this introduction. The second section consists of analysis of General Eisenhower and the Allies' formulation of their strategy for the invasion of Europe as Operation Overlord and ultimately victory in Europe. The third section consists of analysis of General MacArthur and President Truman's varying strategies for victory on the Korean Peninsula. Finally, this monograph concludes with a series of recommendations designed to show the need for awareness by the military operational artists in the limited wars following 1945 to best resolve political and military aims in forming and maintaining coherent military strategy.

⁴⁸ John P. Glennon ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States (1950), Volume VII, Korea* (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1976), 1; and Fredick Aandahl, ed. et al., *Foreign Relations of the United States (1951), Volume VII, Korea and China Part 1* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1983), 1.

⁴⁹ Edward T. Imparato ed., *General MacArthur: Speech and Reports 1908-1964* (Nashville TN: Turner Publishing Company, 2000), 3.

⁵⁰ James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: 1950-1951, The Korean War Part One* (Washington DC: Office of Joint History, 1998), 1.

⁵¹ H.W. Brands, *General Vs. President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War* (New York, NY: Double Day, 2016), 1.

⁵² Dennis D. Wainstock, *Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 1.

Section 2: Eisenhower, Roosevelt, and Churchill: Symmetry between an Absolute Political Aim and a War with the Military Aim of Final Victory

The United States entered World War II following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 9, 1941. Soon after, President Franklin D. Roosevelt assembled his war advisors, to include Secretary of War Henry Lewis Stimson, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold Rainsford Stark (until March 1942 then Admiral Ernest J. King), and Chief of Army Air Forces, Lieutenant General Henry “Hap” Arnold.⁵³ The Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, the equivalent of the modern Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was Admiral William Daniel Leahy.⁵⁴ Roosevelt conducted a sequence of conferences with the British senior leaders such as Prime Minister Winston Churchill and members of his war council. The first two conferences occurred in Washington DC between December 22, 1941–January 14, 1942 and June 19–25, 1942. During these conferences, the first code named ARCADIA and the second lacking a code name, both war ministries established a multi-national command structure, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). The CCS planned the American-British strategy for the war against Germany, Italy, and Japan and approved all military decisions for the Allied coalition.⁵⁵ Furthermore, Churchill and Roosevelt authored and sponsored the *Declaration of the United Nations*. Roosevelt, Churchill, representatives from China and the USSR, and 22 other dominions, countries, and governments in exile due to Nazi occupation all signed this declaration. The declaration bound the signatories to “employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact,” and to not “make a separate

⁵³ Persico, *Roosevelt’s Centurions*, 118, 120, 163; and *World War II Inter-Allied Conferences: Proceedings of the American-British Joint Chiefs of Staff Conferences Held in Washington D.C. on Twelve Occasions between December 24, 1941 and January 14, 1942*, 18.

⁵⁴ Persico, *Roosevelt’s Centurions*, 166.

⁵⁵ Slany and Dougall ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca 1943*, 218-219.

armistice or peace with the enemies.”⁵⁶ The *Declaration of the United Nations* solidified Roosevelt and Churchill’s political narrative which made Operation Overlord possible in 1944, and built the global coalition to oppose Germany, Italy, and Japan.⁵⁷

Part I: Initial Policy Interaction: Inter-Allied Conferences 1941-1943 and the Initial Decision for the Cross-Channel Attack.

The third conference, the Casablanca Conference, code-named SYMBOL, occurred between January 14–24, 1943. This conference is significant for many reasons, but directly affected Overlord for its planning and decision making. First, Roosevelt and Churchill negotiated an absolute political aim to include the “unconditional surrender” of both Germany and Japan and the liberation of France.⁵⁸ Second, Churchill and Roosevelt conducted three formal meetings with the CCS and multiple meetings with their respective joint staffs. In these meetings, they discussed military options in the Pacific, North Africa, the Mediterranean, and Italy as part of the policy negotiations in the *policy dialogue*. Churchill and Roosevelt directed the CCS to prioritize the planning and concentration of a combined striking force for a cross-channel attack into France from England.⁵⁹ Lastly, it set the liberation of France and the establishment of a French Government as one of the priorities for the operation. With an absolute political aim of unconditional surrender, Churchill and Roosevelt escalated the conflict where there was little to no room for negotiation with a belligerent. This absolute aim did not change during the duration of the Second World War. From this, the CCS was able to enter the *military aim and emergent strategy dialogue* with the absolute political aim of unconditional surrender.

⁵⁶ Slany and Dougall ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca 1943*, 26.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, xxxiii-xxxiv, 25-26, 210-212, 218-219.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 727, 730.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 808.

On March 24, 1943, the CCS selected Lieutenant General Sir F. E. Morgan to the post of Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) while the CCS continued to seek the proper candidate for the Supreme Allied Commander. In this position, Morgan served as the operational artist for the development of Operation Overlord until the appointment of Eisenhower and the establishment of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). As COSSAC, the CCS tasked Morgan with assembling a staff and begin planning for a cross-channel attack.⁶⁰ Morgan and the CCS formulated a military aim focused on securing a lodgment and port facilities on the continent that could account for the receipt of 3-5 divisions a month, and from which further offensive operations could be carried out with a target date of May 1, 1944.⁶¹ The military means to do this was initially set for a total of twenty nine divisions for the assault and build-up of the lodgment and enough landing craft to simultaneously load and ferry five divisions in the initial assault.⁶²

Based on these considerations and weighing the risks for multiple options, Morgan selected the Caen area for the cross-channel attack due to its good beaches, proximity to the minor ports at Brittany, and the terrain was suitable for airfield development and expansion of lodgment.⁶³ From this, COSSAC established a military end state of an initial lodgment along the general line of Grandcamp-Bayeux-Caen until a large enough of a buildup allowed the seizure of the Brittany ports. During their planning, Morgan identified three critical conditions for the success of Operation Overlord: first, overall reduction in the strength of the *Luftwaffe* prior to the assault; second, German reserves in France must not exceed twelve divisions with Germany

⁶⁰ *History of COSSAC*, 3.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁶² Eisenhower, *Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force*, 1-2.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 1-2; and *History of COSSAC*, 28.

unable to transfer fifteen division from Russia in the first two months of the operation; and, finally, noted the requirement to overcome the logistical constraint that occurred from the problem of maintaining the landing beaches over prolonged use during the buildup.⁶⁴ By July of 1943, Morgan and the COSSAC staff completed the preliminary outline for Operation Overlord, and prepared to brief it to the CCS, Churchill, and Roosevelt at the Quebec Conference in August of 1943.⁶⁵

Evidence of the operational artist supporting the policy aim while forming his military aim and emergent strategy occurred during the August 14-24, 1943 Quebec Conference. Morgan, via the CCS, presented his outline for Overlord to Roosevelt and Churchill. The CCS specifically discussed Overlord in multiple meetings with both heads of states and negotiated the means for Overlord. During the meetings, both Churchill and Roosevelt acknowledged the three conditions needed for a successful operation and directed the combined bomber offensive, Operation Pointblank, to take precedence to reduce the *Luftwaffe* to levels needed for a successful cross-channel attack. Additionally, Churchill negotiated with the CCS, specifically General Marshall, for a 25% increase of strength in the initial assault force, enlargement of the lodgment area to include the beaches on the Cotentin peninsula, and affirmed the target date of May 1, 1944. Marshall agreed this would increase the likelihood of success for Overlord, but reminded both heads of state that landing craft was the key limiting factor in how many forces were available in the initial assault.⁶⁶ Furthermore, Roosevelt mentioned he had directed a study on converting dry cargo ships into landing craft over the next six months, and possibly requisitioning civilian transportation vessels and employing them as landing craft in Overlord. Churchill reiterated his

⁶⁴ *World War II Inter-Allied Conferences: Quadrant Conference*, 92.

⁶⁵ Eisenhower, *Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force*, 1-2.

⁶⁶ Aandahl, Franklin, and Slany ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*, 896.

government wanted to undertake a cross-channel attack and full-scale invasion of continental Europe as “soon as possible” to alleviate the pressure on the Soviet Union and to end the war as swiftly as possible. Both heads of state also reaffirmed the continuation of the counter U-boat campaign, separate from Morgan’s three conditions but relevant to Overlord, to reduce shipping losses between the United States and Great Britain. Roosevelt and Churchill directed Morgan and the CCS to continue planning and preparations.⁶⁷

Due to these negotiations over the means while in the *military aim and emergent strategy dialogue*, the plan expanded the lodgment area to include beaches on the Cotentin Peninsula, and Morgan tentatively increased the initial assault force from three divisions to 4.5 divisions.⁶⁸ On this basis, COSSAC continued planning for Operation Overlord until the conferences in Cairo and Tehran, in late November and early December, 1943.

Part II: Final Policy Interaction: Inter-Allied Conferences Cairo-Tehran 1943 and the Final Decision for the Cross-Channel Attack

Roosevelt decided Eisenhower would be the SHAEF during the Tehran Inter-Allied conference, code named SEXTANT, between November 28 and December 1, 1943. The most prominent evidence of this decision is a scrap of paper from Roosevelt to Stalin stating, “The immediate appointment of General Eisenhower to command of Overlord operation has been decided upon.”⁶⁹ On December 10, Eisenhower met Roosevelt in Tunis where Roosevelt

⁶⁷ *World War II Inter-Allied Conferences: Quadrant Conference*, 92-97. CCS document 304’s Annex A includes the buildup tables for allied forces in relation to expectant German reinforcements that supported Morgan’s first two considerations, 94. Annex B included the original DIGEST of OPERATION ‘OVERLORD’ on pages 99-106. CCS document 307 on pages 118-122 included the CCS plan to build artificial harbors that would overcome the problem of beach deterioration due to overuse during the buildup of forces in an initial lodgment prior to a breakout and seizure of a permanent port; and Aandahl, Franklin, and Slany ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*, 1123.

⁶⁸ Aandahl, Franklin, and Slany ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*, 942-943, 1123.

⁶⁹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (New York, NY: Da Capo Press, 1977), 208.

personally notified him of his pending appointment to SHAEF.⁷⁰ It was at this point the role of operational artist passed from Morgan to Eisenhower. Before his official appointment, General Eisenhower reviewed the COSSAC draft and began his initial negotiation with the CCS, Eisenhower, and Churchill. Eisenhower's formal appointment to SHAEF occurred on February 12, 1944.⁷¹

Eisenhower was the operational artist during Operation Torch, the 1942 Allied invasion of French North Africa, Operation Husky, the 1943 Allied invasion of Sicily, and the opening portions of the Italy campaign. Eisenhower's memoirs highlight the critical lessons he learned during these operations. These included the operational artist controlling all the formations under his command to including both the strategic and tactical air forces in the air component, an increase of combat power in the initial assault force and the accompanying landing craft provided by the Allies' navies, and the importance of a large frontage of beaches in the initial assaults. Furthermore, Eisenhower and Roosevelt already had a familiar and positive relationship prior to Eisenhower assuming SHAEF.⁷²

Eisenhower established his headquarters in London and continued negotiations and planning for Overlord as the military operational artist as part of the *military aim and emergent strategy dialogue*. Though he worked with his staff to finish the expanded Overlord plan, Eisenhower also continued negotiations on four pivotal areas for the development of Overlord. These included taking over Operation Bolero as the buildup of men and equipment for the Air Forces and the ground combat and service forces in Great Britain, the availability of landing craft

⁷⁰ Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 206-207.

⁷¹ Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Volume III, The War Years*, 1647-1648, 1652-1654, 164-173, 1688-1691, 1713-1715, 1715-1717; and Gordon A. Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack: The United States Army in World War II, The European Theater of Operations*, ed. Kent Greenfield (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1993), 106-137.

⁷² Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Volume III, The War Years*, 1647-1648, 1652-1654, 164-173, 1688-1691, 1713-1715, 1715-1717; and Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack*, 106-137.

and artificial harbors, a military deception plan to retain operational security of the operation and to deceive the German to the location of the cross-channel attack, and gaining authority over the Strategic Air Force composed of the British Bomber Command and the US 8 Air Force.⁷³

Eisenhower, as the operational artist, maintained continuous contact for discourse directly with Churchill and Roosevelt in the *policy dialogue*. Eisenhower met with Roosevelt three times immediately after his nomination for SHAEF in January 1944 during a visit to the United States to see his family.⁷⁴ After returning to London, Eisenhower updated Roosevelt regularly through Roosevelt's Joint Staff, specifically Marshall. Due to his proximity to SHAEF Headquarters and Eisenhower, Churchill conducted "daily probing of all aspects of the preparations."⁷⁵ This continuous discourse and *policy dialogue* between Churchill's office and SHAEF headquarters went far to alleviate any fears Churchill had about the conduct of Overlord. Additionally, Eisenhower personally met with Churchill often to discuss the progress of preparations and resolve any issues associated with the buildup of Overlord's forces in Great Britain.⁷⁶

Naval assets, primarily landing craft for ship to shore operations, was one of the most pressing issues for Overlord while Eisenhower was conducting the *military aim and emergent strategy dialogue*. Eisenhower successfully negotiated with the CCS on January 23 for a further increase from 4.5 to five divisions in the initial assault with two additional follow-on divisions preloaded on landing craft.⁷⁷ To accomplish this, Eisenhower recommended to Roosevelt,

⁷³ Eisenhower, *Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force*, 11-12.

⁷⁴ Persico, *Roosevelt's Centurions*, 347-348.

⁷⁵ Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill, Volume VII: Road to Victory*, 706.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 625, 631, 638, 691-692, 696, 701, 705-706, 717, 725, 737, 751, 769-770, 771-774, 786, 791, 793.

⁷⁷ Eisenhower, *Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force*, 4; Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Volume III, The War Years*, 1673-1676; and Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack*, 168.

Churchill, and the CCS on January 23 for a postponement of Overlord from May 1 to no later than May 31 to allow for the additional buildup. They approved Eisenhower's recommendation on February 1. On May 17, Eisenhower pushed the date again to June 5, to account for optimal tidal and light conditions for the assault.⁷⁸

This negotiation occurred during the debate for Operation Anvil which was an additional two division amphibious landing in Southern France. The British and American leadership did not agree on the necessity of this operation. Roosevelt and Marshall believed Overlord and Anvil were parts of a single operation with Anvil supporting Overlord as a diversion to fix German forces away from Normandy during Overlord. Churchill and the British opposed Anvil due to the increased requirements needed for the ongoing Italy campaign to include landing craft and aircraft.⁷⁹ On March 21, Eisenhower cancelled Anvil due to the scarcity of landing craft and the CCS split Anvil's resources between the Mediterranean and Overlord.⁸⁰

Eisenhower's negotiation for landing craft during this period provided evidence of Eisenhower's military aim supporting Churchill's policy aims. Specifically, Churchill championed Operation Shingle, an amphibious landing by American VI CORPS at a beachhead near Anzio, Italy. The intent of this operation was to compel the German forces defending against the American 5 Army and British 8 Army to withdraw and thus create an opening to Rome. Rather, the Germans simultaneously defended against both armies while also attacking the small beachhead at Anzio. On February 22, 1944, Shingle was still ongoing and the VI Corps's landing craft and crews were overdue their redistribution to Great Britain as part of the buildup for Overlord. Churchill argued these craft were critical for the sustainment of the beachhead and

⁷⁸ Eisenhower, *Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force*, 4-5.

⁷⁹ Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack*, 165-169.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 173.

transfer would seriously jeopardize the Italy campaign. Without the ongoing Italy campaign, Germany could transfer military forces from Italy to Northern France to oppose any cross-channel attack. Eisenhower compromised by leaving specific group of tank landing crafts and their experienced crews in the Mediterranean for use in the Italy campaign while redirecting craft from the United States and their inexperienced crews to Overlord. Churchill “warmly endorsed,”⁸¹ this proposal.⁸²

Further evidence of Eisenhower negotiating for military means while in the conducting *military aim and emergent strategy dialogue* included identifying the need for additional naval assets to support the increased number of beachheads for five divisions. These additional assets included more escort ships to protect the assault force from U-boats and additional battleships for sea-to-shore bombardment on the additional beachheads. Eisenhower negotiated for these additional assets separately between the British and Americans. These included requesting six battleships, two monitors, twenty two cruisers, and ninety three destroyers from March 20 through mid-April.⁸³ He was successful in this endeavor because he raised his concerns directly to the CCS, Roosevelt, and Churchill.⁸⁴ By late April, Eisenhower’s maritime component was resourced properly for their tasks during Overlord.⁸⁵

Also, while conducting the *military aim and emergent strategy dialogue*, Eisenhower displayed coherence with the Allied policy aim by supporting a massive strategic deception plan prior to Overlord. During the Tehran Conference in December 1943, Churchill, Roosevelt, and

⁸¹ Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill, Volume VII: Road to Victory*, 696.

⁸² Ibid., 691-692, 696; and Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack*, 169-171.

⁸³ Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Volume III, The War Years, 1773-1774*, 1835.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 1774.

⁸⁵ Eisenhower, *Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force*, 8-9.

Stalin agreed on Operation Jael, a strategic deception plan involving the intelligence agencies of all three nations to deceive Hitler to the time and location of a cross-channel attack.⁸⁶ Eisenhower supported this initiative by establishing the fictitious First US Army Group (FUSAG) composed of over 100,000 men, tanks, artillery, and truck, and led by Lieutenant General George S. Patton. The FUSAG concentrated in the South East Corner of England directly opposite the Pas-de-Calais, where Hitler believed the cross-channel attack would occur. To further sell the deception, Eisenhower employed large numbers of dummy vehicles and tanks to deceive German spies and aerial reconnaissance. Additionally, Eisenhower directed teams to manufacture phony radio traffic originating from FUSAG headquarters in easily breakable cyphers to confuse German code breakers. Lastly, Patton gave many public speeches in south and east England to American soldiers posing as the FUSAG and British civilians to further sell the deception.⁸⁷

Eisenhower also negotiated the role of the Strategic Air Force (SAF) and the selection of targets attacked by both the SAF and Eisenhower's Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF). Eisenhower believed he should control all the air assets used in the European theater and he wanted his AEAF commander, Air Marshall Trafford Leigh-Mallory, to serve as the single air component commander. This included directing the British bombers in the British Bomber Command, commanded by Air Chief Marshal Arthur Harris, and American bombers in the US Eight Air Force, commanded by General Carl A. Spaatz. Churchill opposed this on two accounts. First, Leigh-Mallory was a fighter pilot and had no experience directing bomber fleets in strategic attacks.⁸⁸ Second, Harris, Spaatz, and Churchill believed Operation Pointblank, the strategic bombing of Germany's war industry and cities, had priority above Overlord. Therefore, Churchill

⁸⁶ Anthony Brown, *Bodyguards of Lies: The Classic History of the War of Deception that Kept D-Day Secret From Hitler And Sealed The Allied Victory* (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1975), 388-390.

⁸⁷ Persico, *Roosevelt's Centurions*, 359-361.

⁸⁸ Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Volume III, The War Years, 1755-1756*.

was not willing to subordinate the SAF to Eisenhower. Harris and Spaatz both believed the strategic bombing had the potential to end the war separately and remove the requirement for a cross-channel attack.⁸⁹

During negotiations in the *policy dialogue* between Churchill and Eisenhower, they compromised on a command structure where the bombers of the SAF would fall under operational control (OPCON) of SHAEF's Deputy Commander, Air Chief Marshall Arthur Tedder. This compromise placed Harris, Spaatz, and Leigh-Mallory as equals in the command structure to jointly develop the air plan with Tedder acting as the "de facto Commander-in Chief of Air"⁹⁰ in addition to his primary duties as the SHAEF Deputy Commander. The SAF formally became OPCON to SHAEF on April 14, 1944.⁹¹

Eisenhower's final major negotiation during the *military aim and emergent strategy dialogue* occurred with Churchill over Tedder's initial air plan. In it, the SAF and AEF would split their bombings along three primary areas: first, aircraft production in Germany; second, oil reserves and production centers in Germany and France; and finally, lines of communication targets. These targets included infrastructure, railway centers, tunnels, and bridges in France, anticipating the need for German forces to move tactically and to provide supplies to reinforce the Normandy beaches and surrounding areas.⁹² Churchill first aired his disagreement with the air plan on April 3 at a lunch with Eisenhower and later in a letter to Eisenhower after meeting with his cabinet. During this cabinet meeting, Churchill's Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshall

⁸⁹ Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Volume III, The War Years*, 1715, 1717.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 1758,

⁹¹ Ibid., 1758-1759; Eisenhower, *Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force*, 14; and Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack*, 162.

⁹² Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Volume III, The War Years*, 1736-1740; and Eisenhower, *Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force*, 15.

Charles Portal estimated the French casualties from air attacks would range from 20,000 to 40,000.⁹³ Churchill felt this would alienate the French people from the United Nations and would jeopardize any follow-on operations after Overlord. Eisenhower believed it was a matter of military necessity to sever these logistical links to allow time for the initial assault forces to establish lodgment and a buildup of follow-on forces prior to attempting a breakout from the Normandy beaches. This disagreement between Eisenhower and Churchill continued in the *policy dialogue* even after the railway center bombardment began in mid-April. This disagreement only ended when Roosevelt refused to intervene into the debate on behalf of Churchill.⁹⁴ The actual civilian casualties from the air attacks was much higher and ranged from 60,000-70,000 civilian casualties with over 12,000 civilian casualties occurring during the two-day cross-channel attack.⁹⁵

D-Day was originally set for June 5, 1944, but Eisenhower delayed the assault 24 hours due to the weather. During June of 1944, the English Channel and the landing beaches saw the highest winds and the roughest seas it had experienced in the previous 20 years. Eisenhower's meteorologist predicted a small window of calm seas and low wind beginning the night of the June 5 into the morning of June 6. After this, the weather would once again make any assault untenable. Thus, Eisenhower shifted D-Day to June 6 with preparatory aerial bombings beginning shortly after midnight on June 5 and ship to shore fire of the beaches and surrounding area beginning at first light on June 6.⁹⁶

⁹³ Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill, Volume VII*, 727.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 727, 751; Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Volume III, The War Years, 1661-1845*; and Persico, *Roosevelt's Centurions*, 366-367.

⁹⁵ Stephen Bourque, *Beyond the Beach: The Allied War Against France* (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press 2018), 261.

⁹⁶ Eisenhower, *Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force*, 19.

During this preparatory fire period, the German *Luftwaffe* could muster only fifty sorties to counter the 5,309 sorties from the SAF and 5,276 sorties from the AEAF during the twenty four hours of June 6.⁹⁷ The Allied strategic air campaign severely reduced the German *Luftwaffe*, causing its repositioning to protect German industry and cities during the two-year campaign that began in 1942. The German navy was in port due to the severe weather conditions and their assumption the Allies would not launch an assault in such adverse sea state. Because of this and the reduction of U-boat activity in the channel, the assault forces experienced no U-boat attacks during the approach to Normandy from England and during ship-to-shore operations. Further, the German 15 Army, partly responsible for the defense of France from a cross-channel attack, was not in the vicinity of Normandy but rather in the Pas-de-Calais area awaiting to repel an assault by the FUSAG led by Patton. Hitler believed the assault on the Normandy beaches was a diversion up until August 3 when he finally released the 15 Army.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Eisenhower, *Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force*, 19-20.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 13; and Persico, *Roosevelt's Centurions*, 374.




Figure 2. A map of the final Overlord plan on June 6, 1944. Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack*, Map II.

The ground assault began with an airborne insertion of three divisions inland of the beach fortifications to seize critical bridge and crossroads leading from the beach in the early morning darkness of D-Day. (See Figure 2) At 0630, the first troops from the sea-borne assault force disembarked and began their assault onto the beaches.⁹⁹ The extensive preparatory fires caused massive damage to field works inland from the beaches but only minor damage to the hardened coastal defenses and their garrisons directly overlooking the beaches.¹⁰⁰ At Omaha beach, there was an additional, and unexpected, German infantry division to defend the beach against elements of the 1 Infantry Division and the 29 Infantry Division, whose actions in defense created the largest number of casualties of any of the attacking divisions on D-Day. Despite this, the seaborne assault troops seized all the beaches, and by the end of the day, the assault forces

⁹⁹ Eisenhower, *Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force*, 22.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

established bridgeheads on all five beaches allowing 132,450 Allied soldiers to land in Normandy. By June 11, the Allied forces secured a continuous lodgment consisting of artificial harbors and inner anchorages to allow a steady stream of over 54,186 vehicles, 104,428 tons of equipment, and 326,547 men to come ashore. Operation Overlord was a success.¹⁰¹

Part III: Assessment and Perception

Roosevelt and Churchill decided on the absolute political aim of unconditional surrender at the Casablanca conference in January 1943. This allowed Eisenhower flexibility to frame his military aim as an absolute military aim for final victory and allowed him access to the totality of both nation's assets and means to assist him in Overlord. Both aims did not change throughout Overlord or the remainder of the conflict until Germany capitulated in 1945.

Additionally, the formation of both absolute aims and the subsequent negotiations by Eisenhower and Morgan during the *policy dialogue* and the *military aim and emergent strategy dialogue* followed Clausewitz' logic governing absolute political aims and war.¹⁰² This included Morgan's conditions needed for a successful cross-channel attack, such as reducing the *Luftwaffe*, and Eisenhower expanding the initial landing force and beachheads, requesting more landing craft and naval assets, and creating an expansive air plan targeting French infrastructure. Because the political and military aims were so close together as to appear joined, the *perception dialogue*, here used as a criterion, between Eisenhower and Roosevelt and Churchill, remained consistent and co-joined. To them, nothing short of unconditional political and military surrender mattered. The Allies would remain in the conflict until final victory despite any battlefield setbacks.

These fit within Clausewitz' logic for a war of absolute political aim and military as final victory in the aim of unconditional surrender by Germany. Therefore, the political aim and the

¹⁰¹ Persico, *Roosevelt's Centurions*, 371-373; and Eisenhower, *Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force*, 22-25.

¹⁰² Clausewitz, *On War*, 582.

military aim were coherent with each other and the perception of victory by both Roosevelt and Eisenhower was consonant throughout the negotiations. As Clausewitz noted in *On War*, one step from the beginning of the campaign for Overlord logically followed upon the next, despite the changes of perceptions of battlefield success and failure, to arrive at an inevitable conclusion of either victory or defeat.¹⁰³ Clausewitz explained:

The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war, the more they affect the belligerent nations and the fiercer the tensions that precede the outbreak, the closer will war approach its abstract concept, the more important will be the destruction of the enemy, the more closely will the military aim and the political objects coincide, and the more military and less political will war appear to be.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Clausewitz, *On War*, 582; and Lauer, “Blue Whales and Tiger Sharks.”

¹⁰⁴ Clausewitz, *On War*, 87-88.

Section 3: MacArthur and Truman during the Korean War: The Asymmetry Inherent between Limited Political Aims and Limited Military Means

Part I: History of the Korean Peninsula and the Story of Two Koreas

Understanding the context of Truman and MacArthur's ultimately divergent political and military aims in Korea requires exposition of the immediate history leading up to the division of the peninsula and the origins of the conflict. Korea was a Japanese colony from 1910 until the conclusion of the Second World War in 1945. During the Cairo conference from November 22-26, Roosevelt, Churchill and China's anti-communist leader Chiang Kai-Shek tentatively agreed to the Cairo Declaration declaring they sought no territorial expansion into Korea and were "determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."¹⁰⁵ Later, during the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Roosevelt, Churchill, Chiang Kai-shek and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin tentatively agreed to administer Korea on a Four-Partner Trusteeship until it was ready to self-rule.¹⁰⁶ At the Potsdam conference in July 1945, President Harry Truman agreed with Stalin to a joint American-Soviet occupation of Korea as part of the Four-Partner Trusteeship and the Cairo Declaration.¹⁰⁷ On August 15, 1945, the Pentagon issued a directive stating Japanese forces south of the 38 parallel must surrender to American forces, while Japanese north of the 38 parallel must surrender to Soviet forces. Stalin accepted this and the 38

¹⁰⁵ Richardson Dougall ed. et al., *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume I* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1960), 309.

¹⁰⁶ Bryton Barron, William M. Franklin, and G. Bernard Noble, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences of Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1955), 770; and Richardson Dougall ed. et al., *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume I* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1960), 311-312.

¹⁰⁷ Dougall ed. et al., *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume I*, 928-929; and Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 3-4.

parallel became the dividing line between the northern Soviet-occupied Korea, and the southern American-occupied Korea.¹⁰⁸

After the Second World War, two leading Korean political leaders stood out with very different views about the future national government of Korea. The United States backed Syngman Rhee and the democratic South Korean Interim Government while the Soviets backed Kim Il Sung and the communist Interim People's Committee. Due to differences in the competing vision of Korea, four joint commissions between the Four Partner Trusteeship members failed to determine the best path forward for unifying Korea. On October 16, 1947, the United States appealed to the UN with a proposal to hold a UN supervised election throughout Korea, and the UN approved this and scheduled general elections for May 10, 1948.¹⁰⁹ A contingent of both North and South Korean delegates met in Pyongyang for a unification conference, and issued a joint statement expressing concern the UN elections would only exacerbate the divisions in Korea. The conference called for an immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops and boycotted the election in North Korea. These actions did not stop the UN sponsored elections, and Rhee won the elections in May 1948.¹¹⁰ Rhee then established the Republic of Korea (ROK) and claimed the entire Korean Peninsula.¹¹¹

Kim Il Sung responded on September 9, 1948, by first criticizing the elections as illegitimate and proclaiming the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).¹¹² Kim Il Sung

¹⁰⁸ Wainstock, *Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War*, 3; and Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 1-6.

¹⁰⁹ Wainstock, *Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War*, 5; and Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 8-9;

¹¹⁰ Wainstock, *Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War*, 5; and Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 8-9.

¹¹¹ Wainstock, *Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War*, 4-7; and Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 4-9.

¹¹² Wainstock, *Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War*, 5-6; and Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 9.

also claimed the entire Korean Peninsula as part of the DPRK. With the formation of the DPRK, Soviet forces withdrew from North Korea on December 25, 1948. The Soviets left behind 3,000 military advisors and massive amounts of heavy weapons to include artillery, fighter aircraft, and T-34 tanks to modernize their new ally's North Korean People's Army (NKPA). Beginning in May 1949, A series of hit-and run-raids and guerilla actions occurred on both sides of the 38th parallel creating a tense situation between the two hostile governments.¹¹³

Truman's policy for the Korean peninsula was to establish a self-governing and democratic government which represented the will of the people of Korea.¹¹⁴ Truman based his policy aim primarily from his National Security Council (NSC) Report 8/1 dated March 16, 1949. NSC report 8/1 also stated, "preparation should be made for the withdrawal of remaining US occupation forces from Korea, such withdraw completed on or about June 30, 1949."¹¹⁵ After the UN-sponsored general elections in South Korea and the establishment of the ROK, Truman and his NSC believed a smaller military advisor force and economic and military aid to the ROK would offset any threat from the USSR. Truman adopted this policy and the United States began a phased withdraw of its military occupation forces from the Republic of Korea, completed on June 29, 1949.¹¹⁶ To help modernize the ROK Army, the United States left 500 military advisors under the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). The United States also continued to provide

¹¹³ Wainstock, *Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War*, 5-7; and Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 9-12.

¹¹⁴ *National Security Council (NSC) Report 8-1: A Report to the National Security Council on United States Courses of Action with Respect to Korea*, March 16, 1949 (Washington, DC: National Security Council, 1949), 1.

¹¹⁵ *National Security Council (NSC) Report 8-1*, 17.

¹¹⁶ Wainstock, *Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War*, 7.

monetary support and some military aid in the form of ammunition under the Mutual Defense Assistant Program (MDAP) to the ROK military.¹¹⁷

On January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson spoke at the National Press Club. There he defined the United States' defensive perimeter in the Pacific as far west as the Aleutian Islands, Japan, and the Philippines Islands. Acheson also stated:

So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack... Should such an attack come - one hesitates to say where such an attack would come from - the initial reliance must be on people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations...¹¹⁸

This included the Korean Peninsula. Pacific nations excluded from Acheson's defensive perimeter would have to look to the United Nations for their collective defense.¹¹⁹

Part II: Policy Interaction I- Restore the 38 Parallel

Truman and his senior military leaders entered the *policy dialogue* on June 25, 1950, after the NKPA crossed the 38 parallel in force and quickly overwhelmed ROK forces. The invasion was a complete surprise to both the ROK and the United States. At the onset of the conflict, Truman met with his NSC, consisting of Secretary of State Acheson, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, the three service secretaries, Frank Pace for the Army, Francis Matthews for the Navy, and Thomas Finletter for the Air Force, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Omar Bradley, General J. Lawton Collins for the Army, Admiral Forrest Sherman for the Navy, and General Hoyt Vandenberg for the Air Force. The NSC presented mixed diplomatic and military options to Truman. Truman decided upon an initial effort limiting the military response to supporting ROK forces with only air and naval strikes, while diplomatically refuting the invasion

¹¹⁷ Wainstock, *Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War*, 4-7; *National Security Council (NSC) Report 8/1*, 13-19, and Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 9-13.

¹¹⁸ Remarks by Dean Acheson Before the National Press Club, 1950," *The Korean War and Its Origins Research File: Elsey Papers* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 2.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

and the DPRK through the United Nations.¹²⁰ This option posed the least risk of escalation to a general war with the USSR and its communist ally China, while still supporting the ROK.

General Douglas MacArthur was the United States' Commander in Chief of the Far East, based in Tokyo, Japan, during the onset of the conflict.¹²¹

On June 27, 1950, Truman issued an initial press statement condemning the invasion and stating "communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war."¹²² In the same press statement, Truman declared his first policy aim and his intent to intervene in the conflict on behalf of the UN:

The security council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdrawal to the 38th parallel. This they have not done but on the contrary have pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in execution of this resolution. In these circumstances, I have ordered the United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.¹²³

Still in the *policy dialogue*, Truman met with his NSC for a second time on June 29, 1950, where he further refined his first policy aim. At this meeting, Truman declared he only wanted to restore the 38 parallel. He constrained the policy, stating he did not want anything north of it except to "keep the North Koreans from killing the people we are trying to save."¹²⁴ Truman directed this policy aim to reestablish the border along the 38 parallel, while keeping the war limited to Korea. Truman imposed restrictions on Macarthur, including a directive restraining the UN air force. North of the 38 parallel, the UN air force could only attack airbases and

¹²⁰ Brands, *General vs. President*, 73-82; and "Memo of Conversation, June 25, 1950" *Secretary of State File: Acheson Papers* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 1-6.

¹²¹ Brands, *General vs. President*, 47-49.

¹²² "June 27, 1950 Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea," *Public Papers: Harry S. Truman 1945-1953* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 1.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ "Notes Regarding President Truman's June 29, 1950 Meeting" *The Korean War and Its Origins Research File: Elsey Papers* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 2.

logistical nodes and could only target those on the Korean peninsula.¹²⁵ This was to prevent an escalation of conflict directly with the Soviet Union or China. Truman thus stated, “I do not want any implication...that we are going to war with Russia at this time...We must be damn careful. We must not say that we are anticipating a war with the Soviet Union.”¹²⁶ On June 30, Truman authorized the use of limited ground forces. First was a regimental combat team to reinforce the Pusan Airbase and port, followed by two additional infantry divisions. MacArthur was not present at this pivotal discourse and thus unable to influence it or directly translate the policy aim into a military aim. MacArthur predominantly worked through the joint chiefs of staff in developing his military aim and interpreting Truman’s policy aim. With this declaration, MacArthur moved from the *policy dialogue* to the *military aim and emergent strategy dialogue* where he formulated his first military aim.¹²⁷

MacArthur’s initial military aim was to delay the NKPA attack, while the UN command and coalition established and reinforced its forces around the vital port of Pusan. He planned for the primary UN ground force, the US 8 Army to conduct offensive operations to clear NKPA forces south of the 38 parallel.¹²⁸ MacArthur’s first military and emergent strategy was fully nested and supported Truman’s policy aim, despite MacArthur not being present during the *policy dialogue* in Washington.

A lack of coherence between MacArthur’s military aim and Truman’s policy aim and the friction associated within a limited war first began to show nearly a thousand miles away from

¹²⁵ Glennon ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States (1950), Volume VII, Korea*, 240-241.

¹²⁶ “Notes Regarding President Truman’s June 29, 1950 Meeting” *The Korean War and Its Origins Research File: Elsey Papers* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 1.

¹²⁷ Glennon ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States (1950), Volume VII, Korea*, 250-251; and “Press Release, June 30, 1950,” *The Korean War and Its Origins Research File: Elsey Papers* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 1.

¹²⁸ Imparato ed., *General MacArthur: Speech and Reports 1908-1964*, 156-157; and “Note by George Elsey Along with Copy of June 30, 1950 Telegram from Douglas MacArthur to Walton Walker” *The Korean War and Its Origins Research File: Elsey Papers* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 2.

Korea on the island of Formosa. In late July, Johnson and the Joint Chiefs began to worry the Communist Chinese would launch an invasion of Formosa, while the United States conducted operations in Korea. They recommended Truman dispatch MacArthur to ascertain its defensibility and engage with Chiang Kai-Shek over Formosa's defense preparations. After the conference, MacArthur released a statement to the New York Times stating any attack on the island would "stand little chance of success."¹²⁹ Chiang Kai-Shek also released a statement that constituted a significant divergence from Truman's policy aim to keep the current fight limited to Korea. In it, he stated, "an agreement was reached between General MacArthur and myself on all the problems discussed in the series of conferences held in the last two days. The foundation for a point defense of Formosa and for Sino-American military cooperation has thus been laid."¹³⁰ This statement insinuated MacArthur had openly discussed the United States' defense of Formosa contrary to Truman's policy to resolve the Communist China and Formosa issue diplomatically through the United Nations and do nothing which would precipitate a war with the Soviet Union or Communist China.¹³¹

On the day of the NKPA attack, on August 25, 1950, UN Ambassador Warren Austin delivered Truman's policy proclamation in relation to Formosa to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Specifically, Truman outlined seven points which stated the United States did not wish to encroach upon the Chinese Communist government on the mainland or enter in any conflict which would threaten the UN mission in Korea. "We believe that the United Nations'

¹²⁹ New York Times, "General MacArthur's Statement on His Trip to Formosa, August 1, 1950," August 1st, 1950, *New York Times Clippings Collection* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 1.

¹³⁰ Richard Lowitt, ed., *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy* (Chicago IL: Rand McNally, 1967), 6.

¹³¹ Brands, *General vs. President*, 121-122; and "Notes Regarding General MacArthur's Message on Formosa, August 26, 1950," *Secretary of State File: Acheson Papers* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 1-5.

consideration would contribute to a peaceful, rather than a forceable solution to that problem.”¹³²

Truman wanted a diplomatic, not a military solution, to the Formosa-China question of sovereignty.

As a first example of a problematic *perception dialogue*, Truman immediately dispatched one of his most trusted agents, Averell Harriman, as a special envoy to Tokyo to discuss the matter personally with MacArthur. Upon arriving in Tokyo, Harriman met with MacArthur and reminded him that Truman did not want Chiang Kai-Shek to be the cause of a war with Communist China. Harriman further outlined that Truman believed the consequence of such action might escalate to a general war with the Soviet Union in support of Communist China. Truman refused to countenance a counter invasion of Communist China to restore Chiang Kai-Shek to power. Invading Communist China risked UN unity among friendly countries, such as Great Britain, and might erode the collective security the United States sought in both the Pacific and Europe.¹³³ Truman felt Chiang Kai-Shek was more of a liability than an asset in the region and would not risk a general war to come to his defense.¹³⁴

MacArthur reacted to resolve the perception of his conflict with policy, treating Harriman with respect, and stating his concurrence with policy direction from the president. MacArthur later reflected in his *Reminiscences* that he privately continued to disagree with Truman’s policy aim to contain the spread of communism in Europe and that Chiang Kai-Shek was a liability. MacArthur privately viewed Formosa as strategically significant and worth

¹³² Lowitt, ed., *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy*, 12.

¹³³ Brands, *General vs. President*, 122-124; and Lowitt, ed., *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy*, 6-7.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 6-8.

defending with American assets if attacked.¹³⁵ These views became problematic for Truman's perception of MacArthur's concurrence with policy.

MacArthur again created a problem for Truman in the *perception dialogue*, when MacArthur publicly outlined his opinions on the importance of Formosa in a written statement to the commander-in-chief of the Veteran of Foreign Wars (VFW) for use at the VFW's 51st National Encampment on August 27, 1950. MacArthur's VFW statement argued the importance of Formosa to any defense to the Pacific and he cited recent history. "Historically, Formosa has been used as a springboard for just such military aggression directed against areas to the South. The most notable and recent examples was the utilization of it by the Japanese in World War II."¹³⁶ He warned "Should Formosa fall into the hands of a hostile power, history would repeat itself. Its military potential would again be exploited as the means to breach and neutralize out Western Pacific defense system and mount a war of conquest against the free nations of the Pacific Basin."¹³⁷

Appearing to once again question Truman's policy on the Formosa question after cessation of hostilities in Korea, MacArthur wrote:

Nothing could be more fallacious than the thread bare argument by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia...They do not grasp that it is in the pattern of Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute, and dynamic leadership - to quickly turn from a leadership characterized by timidity or vacillation - and they underestimate the Oriental mentality.¹³⁸

As both the American Far East Commander and the UN Commander, his comments to the VFW constituted a sharp break from stated US policy concerning Formosa as sent to the

¹³⁵ Lowitt, ed., *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy*, 7.

¹³⁶ Imperato ed., *General MacArthur: Speech and Reports 1908-1964*, 158.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 159.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

United Nations. Linking the defense of Korea and Formosa denied Truman's policy aim to keep the conflict limited to Korea.¹³⁹ Truman, by way of Secretary of Defense Johnson, ordered MacArthur to withdraw the statement and again forwarded his policy statement to the UN in regards to Formosa. Truman later reminisced that this was the first point with which he should have fired MacArthur.¹⁴⁰

Part III: Policy Interaction II: Drive to the Yalu River and Unify Korea

Victory at Inchon-Seoul and the destruction of the NKPA caused Truman to again enter the *perception dialogue* in late September of 1950, convincing Truman to assume more political risk due to the perception of an impending complete victory. Emboldened with the immediate tactical success and willing to assume more political and risk, Truman assembled his NSC to engage in a *policy dialogue* for expanded military options.

Truman acted upon the recommendation of his advisor's NSC Report 81, dated September 1 1950, and NSC Report 81/1, dated September 9, 1950. These reports outlined military and diplomatic options for Korea and argued the UN force had a "legal basis for conducting operations north of the 38th parallel to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean Forces behind this line or to defeat these forces."¹⁴¹ Unfortunately for Truman, both reports also specified that Truman must elicit approval from the UN General Assembly or Security Council to unify all of Korea under a single government.¹⁴² Throughout September, 1950, Truman

¹³⁹ "Dean Acheson to James Webb, August 27, 1950," *Secretary of State File: Acheson Papers* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 1-3.

¹⁴⁰ "Louis Johnson to Douglas MacArthur, August 26, 1950," *The Korean War and Its Origins Research File: Truman Papers, President's Secretary's Files* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 1; and Brands, *General vs. President*, 143.

¹⁴¹ *National Security Council (NSC) Report 81: A Report to the National Security Council on United States Courses of Action With Respect to Korea*, September 1, 1950 (Washington DC: National Security Council, 1950), 6.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 4-5.

attempted to seek a UN Security Council resolution but the USSR repeatedly blocked these attempts. Truman eventually secured approval through the UN General Assembly on October 7, 1950 under the legal auspices of “all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea”¹⁴³ With this purposely ambiguous statement, Truman was able to legally pursue his policy aim of unifying all of Korea in order to ensure stability on the peninsula.¹⁴⁴ Despite this change in the policy aim, Truman remained committed to limit military operations to the Korean Peninsula to continue to avoid either Soviet or Communist Chinese intervention and general war.

On September 27, the JCS forwarded a September 28 directive to MacArthur summarizing NSC 81 and NSC 81/1’s interpretation that the UN force was legally able to pursue NKPA forces north of the 38 parallel as long as the destruction of the North Korean armed forces was the main objective.¹⁴⁵ In reference to the ongoing UN General Assembly negotiations for a unified Korea, the directives simply mentions, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand the instructions are now being formulated on the governmental level regarding...activities to be undertaken during the post-hostilities period.” This policy authorized MacArthur to conduct military operations north of the 38 parallel in Korea but with a policy constraint to halt operations if major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces entered North Korea. Further constraints included restricting MacArthur’s air forces from crossing the Chinese-Manchurian or USSR borders, and “as a matter of policy, no non-Korean ground forces will be used in the northeast province

¹⁴³ Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 104.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 102-107.

¹⁴⁵ “George C. Marshall to Harry S. Truman, With Attached Directive to Commander of United Nations Forces in Korea, September 27, 1950,” *Truman Papers, President's Secretary's Files* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 1-4. In this directive, Marshall summarizes the NSC’s military recommendations from NSC 81 published on September 1, 1950 and updated in NSC 81/1 on September 9, 1950. Truman accepted the NSC’s recommendations in NSC 81/1.

bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border.”¹⁴⁶ Marshall sent a separate communique stating MacArthur should “feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38 parallel.”¹⁴⁷ MacArthur’s response was, “I regard all of Korea open for our mil[itary] operations.”¹⁴⁸

With this new policy and its constraints, MacArthur reentered the *military aim and emergent strategy dialogue* and modified his military aim a second time. His emergent strategy included operations to seize Pyongyang, the capital of DPRK with the 8 Army and ROK forces in the west, while ROK-only forces attacked in the center to Chungjo-Yongwon-Hungnam, and X CORPS conducted a second amphibious landing in the east near Wonsan to disrupt the NKPA’s retreat. He further planned a general offensive, after the seizure of Pyongyang 8 Army and ROK forces would seize a final objective line north of Pyongyang and short of the Yalu River. From there the ROK forces would continue to the Yalu River and the border. All in line with the policy.¹⁴⁹

After the success of Inchon and the expectation of nearing closure to the conflict, Truman decided to meet MacArthur face to face. Truman wanted to discuss a wide range of topics concerning the Pacific to include the Korean conflict and the plan for post conflict, and appraise the possibilities of China entering the conflict.¹⁵⁰ Specifically, he intended to emphasize that “We

¹⁴⁶ “George C. Marshall to Harry S. Truman, With Attached Directive to Commander of United Nations Forces in Korea, September 27, 1950,” 2.

¹⁴⁷ “George C. Marshall to Douglas MacArthur, September 29, 1950,” *The Korean War and Its Origins Research File: Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 1.

¹⁴⁸ “Douglas MacArthur to Joint Chiefs of Staff. September 30, 1950,” *The Korean War and Its Origins Research File: Truman Papers, Naval Aide Files* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 1.

¹⁴⁹ “MacArthur to Joint Chiefs Of Staff, September 28, 1950,” *The Korean War and Its Origins Research File: Truman Papers, President's Secretary's Files* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 1-2; and Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 117.

¹⁵⁰ “Notes on the Wake Island Conference, October 13, 1950,” *The Korean War and Its Origins Research File: Elsey Papers* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 1-2.

must do everything to localize the conflict in Korea...prevent incidents involving United Nations forces and Chinese or Soviet forces or territories.”¹⁵¹

Truman met MacArthur at Wake Island on October 15, 1950. This meeting allowed both Truman and MacArthur to engage in the *policy dialogue* in person instead of over communiques and telegraphs. This was also both the first joint planning conference for the Korean conflict, and the first time the operational artist physically met the president. Once Truman arrived at Wake Island, MacArthur and Truman met privately in Truman’s limousine for an hour taking measure of each other. It was during this private meeting that Truman remembered MacArthur apologizing for the VFW statement, discussing the future for Korea, and Truman’s policy toward Formosa.¹⁵²

After the private meeting, Truman and MacArthur met with the rest of the conference to include John Muccio, the Ambassador to the ROK, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Chief of Staff of the Army, Omar Bradley, the Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Radford, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Truman’s personal envoy Mr. Harriman, who previously met with MacArthur at Truman’s direction in Tokyo in August 1950. MacArthur initiated the conference by updating everyone on the progress of offensive operations on the Korean Peninsula and his expectation the UN force would win the conflict no later than Thanksgiving. Further, MacArthur explained his hope to withdraw the 8 Army back to Japan soon after the conflict while keeping X CORPS in place in Korea to assist with the occupation and to help oversee the UN sponsored elections. He pointed out he would only use ROK soldiers within twenty miles of the Yalu River during the occupation to prevent an escalation with the Soviets or Communist China.

¹⁵¹ “Notes on the Wake Island Conference, October 13, 1950,” *The Korean War and Its Origins Research File: Elsey Papers* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 2.

¹⁵² Brands, *General vs. President*, 177-178.

Once a new round of general elections in the unified Korea were over, all occupying troops would then leave Korea. Truman agreed with this military aim for post conflict.¹⁵³

After the Wake Conference, Truman returned to Washington and let MacArthur conduct the campaign. For the rest of the period, Truman's *perception dialogue* focused on the progress MacArthur made toward unifying Korea. MacArthur's assessment was there was little chance of either Soviet or Chinese interference, influencing Truman's perception of pending victory. MacArthur argued during the Wake Conference the Chinese were a limited threat due to the primitive nature of the Chinese army and its small air force. The Soviets had a large air force available in the Far East, but lacked a ground contingent they could mobilize and transport to Korea prior to the winter. MacArthur assessed the coordination between the Communist Chinese and the Soviets was so poor that they would not venture a combined operation against the UN forces in Korea.¹⁵⁴

Following the conference at Wake Island, and based on this assessment of the DPRK capitulating soon, MacArthur violated Truman's restriction with regards to US forces arrayed along the Yalu river. First, on October 17, MacArthur dispatched an order establishing a new objective line for non-ROK forces thirty miles north of the previous objective line agreed by Truman and the JCS.¹⁵⁵ Then on October 24, MacArthur removed all restraints on his forces when he authorized 8th Army and X CORPS "to use any and all ground forces ... as necessary to secure all of North Korea."¹⁵⁶ This included seizing objectives along the Yalu River. MacArthur reasoned the ROK forces were insufficient to accomplish their task and lifting the restrictions was

¹⁵³ "Substance of Statements made at Wake Island Conference on 15 October 1950," *The Korean War and Its Origins Research File: Elsey Papers* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 1-4, 21-22.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, 10-12.

¹⁵⁵ Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 17-118.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 118.

a “matter of military necessity.”¹⁵⁷ This complete departure from Truman’s policy restrictions demonstrated growing incoherence between the political and military aims despite the cooperation created at the Wake Conference.¹⁵⁸ (See Figure 3)




Figure 3. Map of MacArthur’s Limit of Advance and Objective lines up until the Chinese Counter Attack in November 1950. Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 105.

¹⁵⁷ Glennon ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States (1950)*, Volume VII, Korea, 995-996.

¹⁵⁸ Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 117-119.

On or about October 19, 1950, six Communist Chinese armies totaling 180,000 men crossed the Yalu River.¹⁵⁹ The Chinese armies first attacked ROK forces near Unsan on October 25. Chinese forces quickly overwhelmed ROK forces and forced Walker to intervene with US units to stabilize his eastern flank. On November 1, elements of the 1 Cavalry Division responded and attacked the Chinese near Unsan. By nightfall on November 1, the Communist Armies isolated the 8 Cavalry Regiment of the 1 Cavalry Division, and within two days had effectively destroyed it.¹⁶⁰ With his eastern flank collapsing despite the 1 Cavalry Division's intervention, Walker ordered the 8 army to retrograde south of the Chongchon River to prevent its annihilation. By November 7, the 8 Army was south of the Chongchon River, 70-80 miles south of the Yalu River. On November 7, the Communist Chinese Armies disengaged and disappeared from the front leaving the NKPA to oppose the UN forces.¹⁶¹

ROK forces captured Chinese soldiers during this engagement and confirmed their nationality and the presence of large formations of Chinese soldiers in North Korea as early as October 25. Despite this, MacArthur's staff reported through October 31 that "there is no positive evidence that Chinese Communist units, as such, have entered Korea."¹⁶² Beginning in November with the destruction of the 8 Cavalry Regiment and 8 Army's forced withdraw to the Chongchon River, the extent of the Chinese intervention became apparent to MacArthur and the JCS. MacArthur's assessment of the Chinese intervention radically changed from one of caution from drawing "hasty conclusions which might be premature"¹⁶³ just prior to the 8 Cavalry

¹⁵⁹ Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 121.

¹⁶⁰ Wainstock, *Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War*, 77.

¹⁶¹ Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 121; and Wainstock, *Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War*, 75-80.

¹⁶² Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 121.

¹⁶³ Glennon ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States (1950), Volume VII, Korea*, 1024.

Regiment's destruction, to one of the "disastrous effect"¹⁶⁴ to the UN force after the regiment's destruction.¹⁶⁵ On November 6, MacArthur argued for air attacks on Chinese bridge crossings over the Yalu river stating, "Men and material in large force are pouring across all bridges over the Yalu from Manchuria. This movement not only jeopardizes but threatens the ultimate destruction of the forces under my command."¹⁶⁶ The following day, MacArthur again emphasized the bombings as essential to preserve the UN forces from defeat.¹⁶⁷ The sudden reversals and utterly devastating perception of defeat characterized Truman's subjective interpretation in his perception of the direction of the conflict after the first Chinese intervention.

The unexpected presence of large Chinese forces operating in Korea, and their withdrawal by 6 November, created operational and policy confusion in response by both MacArthur and the JCS. Neither NSC 81 nor NSC 81/1 specified what the US forces should do in the case of a what appeared a limited military intervention by the Chinese. The presence of Chinese forces calling themselves volunteers and wearing NKPA uniforms further created confusion in the US response. Given MacArthur's stated intent, the JCS chose not to intervene while the 8 moved back behind the Chongchon River. MacArthur then prepared to restore the 8 Army and resume his advance to the Yalu River with American forces in the lead.¹⁶⁸

Beginning November 9, The NCS engaged in a *perception dialogue* on behalf of Truman focused on how the apparent limited Chinese intervention affected Truman's policy aim to unify Korea. Truman, between 9-21 November, offered no new constraints on MacArthur's conduct of

¹⁶⁴ Glennon ed., "Foreign Relations of the United States (1950), Volume VII, Korea, 1058.

¹⁶⁵ Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 124-128.

¹⁶⁶ Glennon ed., "Foreign Relations of the United States (1950), Volume VII, Korea, 1057-1058.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 1076-1077.

¹⁶⁸ Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 123-125; and Wainstock, *Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War*, 76-77.

operations. The JCS recommended that Truman let MacArthur fight in Korea with the current assets he had, while the administration focused on preventing an expansion into a general war with Communist China or the Soviet Union in Europe. To this end, the JCS did not rescind the restrictions on attacking targets in Communist China.¹⁶⁹

During this time, 8 Army consolidated south of the Chongchon River and prepared to renew the offensive on November 15. Supply difficulties necessitated postponement until November 24.¹⁷⁰ X CORPS continued its attack to the North and by November 21, the 17 Regiment of 7 Infantry Division reached the Yalu River at Hyesnjin.¹⁷¹ The tactical pause by 8 Army from November 9-21 allowed over ten days of shaping actions by the UN air force. MacArthur believed that the air attacks had “been largely successful in isolating the battle area from added reinforcement and has greatly diminished the enemy flow of supply.”¹⁷² On the morning of November 24, 1950, 8 Army resumed its attack north of the Chongchon River.¹⁷³

On the evening of November 24, the Communist Chinese counterattacked the UN force first targeting the weakened ROK forces flanking 8 Army. Upon destroying the ROK forces, they then attacked 8 Army directly. MacArthur and his command believed 8th Army and X Corps faced a force of 83,000 NKPA and between 40,000-70,935 Chinese. However, with the addition of the Communist Chinese’s IX Army Group,¹⁷⁴ the Chinese force totaled over 300,000 men.¹⁷⁵ By 28

¹⁶⁹ “Memorandum of Conversation Regarding National Security Council Meeting, November 28, 1950,” *Secretary of State File: Acheson Papers* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 1-5.

¹⁷⁰ Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 141; and Wainstock, *Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War*, 87-88.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 89.

¹⁷² Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 141.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 147; and Wainstock, *Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War*, 91.

¹⁷⁴ Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 147.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 147-148; and Wainstock, *Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War*, 88-89.

November, 8 Army's second offensive stalled. 8th Army began its second withdrawal under pressure back to the Chongchon River.¹⁷⁶

After the 8 Army's second failed offensive, MacArthur updated the JCS in a communique which stated:

All hope of localization of the Korean conflict to enemy forces composed of North Korean troops with alien token elements can now be completely abandoned. The Chinese military forces are committed in North Korea in great and ever increasing strength. No pretext of minor support under the guise of volunteerism or other subterfuge now has the slightest validity. We face an entirely new war.¹⁷⁷

MacArthur then specified he had modified his military aim due to the scope of the Chinese intervention. Beginning November 28, 1950, MacArthur's military aim and emergent strategy was to "pass from the offensive to the defensive with such local adjustments as may be required by a constantly fluid situation."¹⁷⁸ Over the next two months, the Chinese forced the 8 Army to retrograde south of the 38 parallel and forced X CORPS to evacuate at Wonsan. The Communist Chinese and NKPA forces entered Pyongyang on December 6, 1950, and seized Seoul on January 7, 1951. By the end of January and due to the incoming Korean winter, the front stabilized thirty miles south of Seoul. (See Figure 4) These events further influenced the perception of defeat by Truman.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 148; and Wainstock, *Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War*, 92-95.

¹⁷⁷ Glennon ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States (1950), Volume VII, Korea*, 1237.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 1238.

¹⁷⁹ Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 123-187.




Figure 4. Map of the Korean Conflict from in June 1950-November 1950 showing the extent of MacArthur's advance to the Yalu River and the Communist Chinese offensive. Russell Holloway, "In-Depth Study of the Korean War," *Learn Korean Language*, 2007, accessed March 13, 2019, <http://www.learnkoreanlanguage.com/korean-war-detailed.html>.

Part IV Policy Iteration III: Negotiated Settlement for the Conflict

Discouraged by the tactical failures first at Unsan and later with the 8th Army's failed attempt to resume its attack to the Yalu, Truman again entered the *policy dialogue* in December, 1950 to discuss new military options to deescalate the conflict and seek a limited victory. On December 15, 1950, Truman gave a radio broadcast, both declaring he was actively seeking a diplomatic solution to hostilities in Korea, and a four-step general mobilization for war against

the Soviet Union as a deterrent in case it failed and the conflict escalated to a general war.¹⁸⁰ The next day, Truman signed a national emergency declaring a general mobilization to include federalizing portions of the economy to include railroads.¹⁸¹ On December 29, the JCS issued a directive to MacArthur encapsulating Truman's new perception of the military reality on the ground. The directive stated to continue to "inflict such damage to hostile forces in Korea as possible,"¹⁸² but also prepare for the possibility of withdrawing the 8 Army to Japan.¹⁸³ Truman's policy aim was now simply to preserve the 8 Army so he could pursue a diplomatic solution to end the conflict and lower the risk of general war.

MacArthur immediately entered a *military aim and emergent strategy dialogue* a third time and responded on December 30, 1950, with his proposed military aim to widen the conflict beyond the Korean Peninsula in direct contradiction to Truman's policy aim. MacArthur assessed the Communist Chinese attacked with their, "maximum efforts against the United Nations Command."¹⁸⁴ Because of this concentration, Communist China was vulnerable elsewhere to include in the vicinity of Formosa, and MacArthur outlined military options consistent with this assumption. These entailed blockading the coast of Communist China, destroying Communist China's industrial capacity to wage war through naval and air bombardment, utilizing detachments of Nationalist Chinese troops from Formosa to reinforce Korea, and conduct a counter invasion from Formosa into the Communist Chinese mainland as a diversionary action or

¹⁸⁰ "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the National Emergency, Dec 15, 1950," *Public Papers Harry S. Truman 1945-1953* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 1-4.

¹⁸¹ "Proclamation 2914: Proclaiming the Existence of a National Emergency," *Proclamations Harry S. Truman 1945-1953* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 1.

¹⁸² Glennon ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States (1950), Volume VII, Korea*, 1625.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 1625-1626.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 1631.

a possible counter invasion.¹⁸⁵ MacArthur's military aim was to widen the conflict outside the Korean peninsula in order to assure victory on the peninsula. This Truman was not prepared to risk. The JCS responded on January 9, denying all four options and reiterated their guidance in the December 29 directive.

MacArthur surprised Truman with his expansive military aims and sent a personal letter to MacArthur explaining the logic behind his policy aim.¹⁸⁶ In the letter, Truman outlined that he considered continued resistance in Korea to aid in a negotiated diplomatic solution to the conflict, while also gaining time for other Asian countries to organize defenses against communist aggression. He highlighted his expectation that resistance against communist aggression in Korea might embolden other nations to join the UN against the Soviet Union in both Asia and Europe. Truman noted the importance of the 8 Army to the defense of Japan from invasion, if Korea fell.¹⁸⁷ Truman expected MacArthur to preserve the 8 Army. MacArthur responded simply with, "We shall do our best."¹⁸⁸ After sending this letter, Truman continued to monitor the situation with *perception dialogues* with his NSC and JCS based on the daily and weekly reports from Korea.

Further incoherence between MacArthur's and Truman's aims occurred in late March of 1951. Truman sought a ceasefire and diplomatic solution beginning in December 1950, waiting, however, for the military situation to improve before offering it to the DPRK. On March 7, 1950, General Ridgway now commanded 8 Army since late December 1945 after General Walker died

¹⁸⁵ Glennon ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States (1950), Volume VII, Korea*, 1631.

¹⁸⁶ "Harry S. Truman to Douglas MacArthur, January 13, 1951," *The Korean War and Its Origins Research File: Truman Papers, President's Secretary's Files* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 1-2.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 1-4.

¹⁸⁸ Aandahl, Glennon Schwar and Claussen ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States (1951), Volume VII, Korea and China Part I*, 79.

in a jeep accident on December 23, 1945.¹⁸⁹ Instigating a new spirit in the 8 Army in the long retreat and loss of Seoul, he initiated a series of tactical offensives from January to March 1951 to recover Seoul and to destroy Chinese forces south of the 38 parallel. These offensives culminated in Operation Ripper from March 7 to April 4, 1951. Operation Ripper was wildly successful and by late March, 8 Army had and regained the majority of southern Korea to include liberating Seoul. On March 27, some elements of the ROK Capital Division, had even crossed the 38 parallel was able to establish positions five miles north of the 38 parallel. The remainder of the 8 Army would advance to positions north of the 38 parallel in Ridgway's subsequent offensive, Operation Rugged, slated to begin on April 5, 1951.¹⁹⁰

With the 8 Army now in an improved military situation in Korea, Truman prepared to offer a diplomatic solution through negotiation to the DPRK based on a cessation of hostilities along the 38 parallel and the former border between the ROK and DPRK. On March 20, 1951, The JCS issued a communique to MacArthur, stating the president's intent to announce conditions for a negotiated settlement in Korea to the UN, and directing a halt to any further offensives north of the 38 parallel, such as Operation Rugged.¹⁹¹ MacArthur's response was to both deny any new restrictions imposed on him and to state the current restrictions made it "completely impractical to attempt to clear North Korea or to make any appreciable effort to that end."¹⁹² MacArthur still sought to achieve the unification of Korea and defeat of Chinese military forces.¹⁹³

¹⁸⁹ Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 175.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 195, 211-212, 215-216.

¹⁹¹ Aandahl, Glennon Schwar and Claussen ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States (1951)*, Volume VII, *Korea and China Part I*, 251.

¹⁹² Ibid., 257.

¹⁹³ Ibid., 256-257.

Further evidence of incoherence occurred between both military and policy aims occurred a few days later when MacArthur released a press statement emphasizing the success of UN forces. This press statement was meant for the Communist China and stated that a decision by the UN to expand the conflict to include China would, “doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.”¹⁹⁴ MacArthur stated the certainty of a UN victory in Korea without, “being burdened by extractions or matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa or China’s seat in the United Nations.”¹⁹⁵ These statements created grave political concern in Washington and at the UN. Allies wondered if MacArthur’s statement was a change in US policy. JCS sent another communique ordering MacArthur to refrain from press announcements without the JCS’s prior approval.¹⁹⁶

On March 20, 1951, MacArthur replied to a letter from Congressman Joseph W. Martin Jr. A Republican, Martin was the minority leader of the House of Representatives and one of the Truman Administration’s most ardent critics. Martin wrote MacArthur on March 8 asking him his views on transferring Chinese Nationalist Forces from Formosa to Korea and their employment with the UN force. MacArthur replied on March 20, arguing for an escalation of the war. He noted that Martin’s view of employing the Chinese Nationalist forces on Formosa “is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition.”¹⁹⁷ MacArthur continued, “It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their

¹⁹⁴ “Statement of General Douglas MacArthur, March 25, 1951,” *The Korean War and Its Origins Research File: Truman Papers, President's Secretary's Files* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 2; and Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 242

¹⁹⁵ “Statement of General Douglas MacArthur, March 25, 1951,” 2.

¹⁹⁶ Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 242-243.

¹⁹⁷ “Joint Chiefs of Staff to Douglas MacArthur, attached to copy of letter from Douglas MacArthur to Joe Martin, March 20, 1951,” *The Korean War and Its Origins Research File: Truman Papers, President's Secretary's Files* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 2.

play for global conquest...that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words."¹⁹⁸

On April 5, 1951, Martin read this letter on the floor of House of Representatives. Truman viewed this as an act of insubordination and made the decision to relieve MacArthur. On April 6, Truman convened his NSC to notify them of his decision and seek their advice. Over the next three days, the NSC and JCS analyzed the military and political risks of relieving MacArthur who was both the UN Commander and the Far East Commander. The JCS recommended relief as both the best and most appropriate option, relaying this advice to Truman on April 9.¹⁹⁹ On April 11, 1951, Truman made a statement publicly relieving MacArthur. He concluded "General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties."²⁰⁰

Part V: Assessment and Perception

Truman decided on a limited political aim for the Korean conflict to include keeping the conflict localized to Korea. Truman intended to prevent Korea from escalating into a general war and was in a constant balancing act with the primary foreign policy objectives of the United States in a Europe threatened by the Soviets and Asia threatened by Communist China. This constrained MacArthur and forced him to frame a limited military aim for his emergent strategy during the conflict.

The formation of both limited aims during the negotiations by MacArthur and Truman during the *policy dialogues* and the *military aim and emergent strategy dialogues* followed

¹⁹⁸ "Joint Chiefs of Staff to Douglas MacArthur, attached to copy of letter from Douglas MacArthur to Joe Martin, March 20, 1951," 2; and Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 243, 246; and Brands, *General Vs. President*, 280-283.

¹⁹⁹ Brands, *General Vs. President*, 293-295; and Schnabel and Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 246-249.

²⁰⁰ "Statement and Order by the President on Relieving General MacArthur of His Commands, April 11, 1951," *Public Papers Harry S. Truman 1945-1953* (Independence, MO: Truman Library), 1.

Clausewitz's logic governing limited political aims and war.²⁰¹ In limited conflicts, the *perception dialogue* becomes most prominent and policy makers conduct it after each major battle, campaign, or engagement. MacArthur, instead of seeking clarification or engaging in a *perception dialogue* with Truman or attempting to influence Truman's policy aims through discourse, chose to either ignore Truman's constraints or publicly criticize them through press releases and speeches. This created an environment of animosity between MacArthur and Truman and fostered the conditions needed for his military aim to diverge significantly from the stated policy aim.

These fit within Clausewitz's inherent lack of logic in real wars. In wars of limited aims, there is no logic or link between battles or campaigns with each success unrelated to the next. Without a logic leading to a final victory, the perception of victory or defeat after each individual engagement, battle, or campaign is imperative and influences the political coterie's decision to continue the direction of a war.²⁰² Clausewitz explained:

On the other hand, the less intense the motives, the less will the military element's natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives. As a result, war will be driven further from its natural course, the political object will be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem increasingly *political* in character. (emphasis added by Clausewitz)²⁰³

²⁰¹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 582.

²⁰² Ibid.; and Lauer, "Blue Whales and Tiger Sharks."

²⁰³ Clausewitz, *On War*, 87-88.

Conclusion

As Clausewitz first noted during the 19 century, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”²⁰⁴ This monograph demonstrated this insight is as true today as it was then while seeking to answer what is the role of the military operational artist in resolving political and military aims in forming and maintaining a coherent emergent strategy in consonance with the political aim: an exploration of the civil-military dialogue. In a war of limited political aim, the military operational artist continually negotiates the military aim within the dynamic political aim in the context of the civil-military dialogue. This requires an understanding of the political and policy risks associated with war policy. Both case studies showed how this civil-military dialogue unfolded in Clausewitz’s wars of absolute aims and wars of limited aims.

The key factors of these case studies were the presence of logic in conflicts marked by an absolute political aim versus the lack of logic in conflicts marked by a limited political aim. In the Second World War case study in Section 2, Roosevelt and Churchill’s absolute aim, one of unconditional surrender or final victory, allowed Eisenhower to develop a military aim and emergent strategy where all actions followed a clear and simple logic to final victory. There was no “intervening neutral void”²⁰⁵ as described by Clausewitz in *On War* between Roosevelt and Churchill’s policy aim and Eisenhower’s military aim and emergent strategy. Furthermore, both the policy aim and the military aim were in coherence with each other throughout the conflict. Therefore, the perception of victory by the policy maker was less prominent than in wars of limited aims.²⁰⁶ In the Korean War case study in Section 3, Truman pursued a limited policy aim and modified it three times based on his perception of victory or defeat. His initial policy aim of

²⁰⁴ Clausewitz, *On War*, 87.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 582.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

restoring the 38 parallel was due to the NKPA attack.²⁰⁷ The second was due to the perception of victory after the success of the Inchon landing and re-capture of Seoul in September, 1950.²⁰⁸ The third was due to the perception of defeat after the Chinese intervention in November 1950.²⁰⁹ In this war of limited aims, there was no inherent logic or link between outcomes of each of MacArthur's operations. Rather, each operation consisted of "separate success each unrelated to the next, as in a match consisting of several games."²¹⁰ Without the logic leading to a final victory, Truman's perception of victory after each individual engagement, battle, or campaign directly influenced his decision on how to continue the war. The coherence between the policy aim and the military aim had a higher probability of divergence due to the subjective nature of perception between MacArthur conducting the emergent strategy and Truman directing the conflict to achieve his stated political aim.²¹¹ MacArthur appeared unwilling to accept the Truman's perception of the conflict, the political nature of his guidance for the conflict, and the importance of the *perception dialogue*. Because of this unwillingness, MacArthur does not try to achieve a common understanding of the conflict nor engage in the *perception dialogue* outside his meeting with Truman during the Wake Island conference. Truman did attempt to achieve a common understanding of his political aim with MacArthur both indirectly through his JCS in

²⁰⁷ "June 27, 1950 Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea," 1; Glennon ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States (1950), Volume VII, Korea*, 250-251; and "Press Release, June 30, 1950," 1.

²⁰⁸ *National Security Council (NSC) Report 81: A Report to the National Security Council on United States Courses of Action With Respect to Korea*, 11-12; and "George C. Marshall to Harry S. Truman, With Attached Directive to Commander of United Nations Forces in Korea, September 27, 1950," 2-4.

²⁰⁹ "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the National Emergency, Dec 15, 1950," *Public Papers Harry S. Truman 1945-1953*, 1-4; and Glennon, ed. *Foreign Relations of the United States (1950), Volume VII, Korea*, 1625-1626

²¹⁰ Clausewitz, *On War*, 582.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 582-584, 605-610.

numerous communiques and directly with a personal correspondence with MacArthur.²¹²

MacArthur's unwillingness to engage in the *perception dialogue* exasperated the tendency of both the military aim and the policy aim to diverge and create incoherence at the detriment of the overall strategy for the conflict.

Both case studies also demonstrated the role of the various dialogues in the civil-military relationship between the policy maker and the military operational artist. The *policy dialogue* and the *military aim and emergent strategy dialogue* occurred in both conflicts similarly, though more often in the Korean War case study. This was due to the frequency Truman modified his policy aim between June and December 1950. The *perception dialogue*, or the judgment of the policy maker and the perception of the coherence of the military outcome in relation to the policy aim, was the most prominent and important dialogue in the Korean case study and by extension, wars of limited aims. The perception of victory or defeat confirmed Clausewitz's lack of inherent logic governing limited political aims. The incoherence between both aims grew more divergent as the conflict progressed and influenced MacArthur and Truman's later negotiations of the *policy dialogues* and the *military aim and emergent strategy dialogues* during November and December 1950. In these later dialogues and because of the depth of the incoherence between aims, MacArthur was unwilling to accept constraints to his emergent strategy or modify his military aim from unifying all the Korean peninsula.²¹³ Because of MacArthur's inability to appropriately support Truman's policy aim, namely to keep the conflict limited in Korea to prevent an escalation, Truman relieved MacArthur on April 11, 1950.²¹⁴ This all stems from MacArthur's

²¹² "Harry S. Truman to Douglas MacArthur, January 13, 1951," 1-4.

²¹³ Clausewitz, *On War*, 582.

²¹⁴ "Statement and Order by the President on Relieving General MacArthur of His Commands, April 11, 1951," 1.

unwillingness to appreciate the importance of Truman's perception of victory and defeat and thus prioritize Truman's *perception dialogue*.

This matters to future operational artist because they will likely find themselves developing an emergent strategy and military aim for large scale military operations, such as Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) or Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), to support limited policy aims. Succinctly, future operational artist will more likely find themselves operating in the MacArthur scenario of limited aims opposed to the Eisenhower scenario of absolute aims. Therefore, the MacArthur case study serves as a warning of the difficulties and pitfalls of the civil-military dialogue in limited conflicts. Because of this, the need for the military operational artist to recognize the evolving requirement for parallel and corresponding military and political aims is critical to succeed in large scale military operations. Conflicts in the future will also occur in an increasingly complex global security environment with strategic competition between nations.²¹⁵ Within this complex environment, operational artists will operate in further limited conflicts where policy makers are more likely to employ a balancing act and purposeful constraining of a conflict to prevent escalation, much like how Truman did during the Korean War. To best develop a coherent emergent strategy, operational artists must continually negotiate the military aim within the dynamic political aim in the context of the civil-military dialogue. This includes negotiating the *policy dialogue*, the *military aim and emergent strategy dialogue* and the *perception dialogue* inherent within a civil-military dialogue. This regular dialogue with the policy maker will help an operational artist understand the political priorities, constraints, and risks of the policy maker and enable the operational artist to provide the best politically aware military advice. Otherwise, the operational artist will continually be surprised by policy changes

²¹⁵ Mattis, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 2018: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge*, 2.

and will constantly be reacting to the strategic environment instead of proactively shaping it for a military advantage.²¹⁶

²¹⁶ Lamborn, “Theory and the Politics in World Politics,” 191.

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