War Without End: A Framework for Successful Conflict Resolution

A Monograph

by

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In US Army doctrine, end state and conditions describe the post-conflict future. End state implies the conclusion of conflict—that wars end. Many modern wars lack the clear delineation of winners and losers which enables the formation of peace agreements and achievement of final status resolution. Military planners therefore require a framework and conditions for successful conflict resolution which enables end state achievement.

This monograph examines how wars end. The case studies include wars which ended in final status resolution, wars which attempted but failed to achieve final status resolution, and wars which continue in frozen conflict. Wars in Northern Ireland and between Israel and Egypt ended in final status resolution after years of negotiations and implementation. Conflict between Israel and the Palestinians failed to achieve final status resolution which resulted in the violent outburst of the second intifada. Frozen conflict exists in Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh, though negotiations continue to reach agreement.

Peace processes are inherently dangerous because both failures and successes lead to increased violence in the subject area. Certain conditions, however, mitigate such danger. This monograph proposes that successful resolution of wars include the following factors in their frameworks: stability forces; conflict localization; engagement of proper parties and elimination of extraneous parties; partition or separation of warring populations; incentives towards peace; and ceasefires.
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Abstract


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## Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOKA</td>
<td>National Organization of Cypriot Fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFA</td>
<td>Good Friday Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFO</td>
<td>Multinational Force and Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organization</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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Introduction


Joint doctrine notes that effective planning requires understanding of the military end state and the conditions which must exist to conclude operations.\footnote{US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, \textit{Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning} (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), IV-20.} This suggests that military forces will transition from fighting to post-conflict operations.\footnote{Ibid.} In US Army doctrine, end state
and conditions describe the post-conflict future. The consideration of end state conditions during planning facilitates integration, unity of effort, initiative, and mitigates risk. End state implies the conclusion of conflict on terms favorable to US strategic aims. The language of doctrine implies that wars end.

Wars end—or violence concludes—in many ways. Some wars end in final status resolution, wherein an agreement dictates the implementation of peace. Some wars end in frozen conflict, lacking final resolution though levels of violence decrease, sometimes dramatically. For other wars, no end comes.

Wars in Northern Ireland and between Israel and Egypt ended in final status resolution after extended conflicts, failed talks, missed opportunities, and violated ceasefires. In both cases, the achievement of peace happened not at once, but slowly. Final status resolution took years to achieve and longer to implement.

Wars which fail to achieve final status resolution pose risks to the subject populations. The case of Israel and the Palestinians is one of ongoing conflict plagued by failed attempts at final status resolution. Without the stabilizing force of a ceasefire, tensions manifested in episodic violence. This case demonstrates the dangers of failed negotiations. Though the conflict’s Oslo process mirrored incremental peace processes such as Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement (GFA), it did not provide viable long-term solutions to community integration or partition, and the framework was too vague for implementation.

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Frozen conflict describes conflicts wherein overt armed engagements ended without achievement of final status resolution. It is implied that frozen conflicts failed in resolution. The cases of Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh, however, are frozen conflicts wherein parties continue to make active attempts final status resolution.

The US Army fights and wins the nation’s wars. Fighting wars, however, is only half of the problem facing military planners. The military seeks to win wars through the achievement of end states which create enduring, favorable peace. War comes first, and peace follows, enabled by a military prepared for a potentially lengthy post-conflict peace implementation.

Final Status Resolution: Northern Ireland and Israel-Egypt

Northern Ireland

The root cause of conflict in Northern Ireland is the existence of conflicting republican and unionist identities in the same territory. Irish identity on the island diverged with Protestant immigration after the Reformation. Not all conflicts on the island centered around the religious divisions; in the 1790s, national movements focused on economic and political reforms.

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9 Ibid.


By the twentieth century, conflict in Ireland focused on religion and the island’s sovereignty.\textsuperscript{14} In 1916, republican forces rebelled against the British government in the Easter Rising. The Rising commanded little public support and failed.\textsuperscript{15} British response to the rebellion, however, aroused popular sympathy for the Irish Republican Army (IRA)-associated political party \textit{Sinn Féin}.\textsuperscript{16}

Between 1919 and 1921, the British government fought the IRA in a cycle of escalating violence and reprisals.\textsuperscript{17} In 1921, the conflict ended in final status resolution and partition of the island.\textsuperscript{18} Despite resolution, violence continued across the island. From July 1920 to July 1922, 550 people died, and Protestant vigilantes displaced 23,000 Belfast Catholics.\textsuperscript{19} The IRA conducted additional ineffective campaigns from 1938 to 1944 and 1956 to 1962 but lacked support among Catholics.\textsuperscript{20}

The modern manifestation of the Irish conflict was a period known as the Troubles, which began in October 1968 with violent protests in Derry.\textsuperscript{21} Rioting spread through 1969; the British Army deployed to Belfast in August.\textsuperscript{22} In 1972 alone, violence in Northern Ireland killed 103 British soldiers.\textsuperscript{23} In what was controversially termed the “acceptable level of violence” by

\textsuperscript{14} Gillen, “Ascendancy Ireland,” 71.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Jonathan Powell, \textit{Terrorists at the Table: Why Negotiating is the Only Way to Peace} (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 253.
\textsuperscript{18} Ben-Porat, \textit{Global Liberalism, Local Populism}, 202.
\textsuperscript{22} Newsinger, \textit{British Counterinsurgency}, 161-63; Cochrane, \textit{Northern Ireland}, 56.
\textsuperscript{23} Newsinger, \textit{British Counterinsurgency}, 169.
British Home Secretary Reginald Maulding, between eighty and one-hundred people died per year in the early- and mid-1970s.24

As civil unrest mounted through 1972, Britain revoked Northern Ireland’s home rule institutions and governed from Westminster. Moderate parties and the Republic of Ireland sought a negotiated settlement to share power, contain violence, and return to home rule.25 The resulting 1973 Sunningdale Agreement created a power-sharing executive but excluded many groups due to the belief that compromise with extremists was impossible.26

Within four weeks, the Ulster Unionist Council rejected the agreement.27 In the February 1974 general elections, all eleven unionist seats for Northern Ireland won on anti-agreement platforms.28 Meanwhile, IRA violence increased following the agreement’s rejection.29 In February 1974, IRA and loyalist attacks caused 12 deaths, and 31 people died in Dublin and Monaghan in May.30 Radical groups outflanked moderate forces.31 Sunningdale collapsed fully in May 1974.32 Violence increased until 1976, and demonstrated the risks of failed negotiations.

24 Mansergh, “The Background to the Peace Process,” 149.


28 Ibid.


In the 1980s, Sinn Féin grew in size and political significance, gaining 38 to 40 percent of the nationalist vote in Northern Ireland. This electoral rise allowed Dublin to base new peace processes on moderate nationalism, which led to intergovernmental talks and the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. The purpose of the Anglo-Irish Agreement was not to achieve final status resolution. It gave the Irish government a consultative role in the governance of Northern Ireland and increased cross-border security cooperation. Both Dublin and the moderate Social Democratic and Labour Party viewed the agreement as a mechanism by which they could engage with unionists while providing nationalist supporters of Sinn Féin a non-violent alternative to

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34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
political change.\textsuperscript{37} The agreement also removed assumptions that London would follow a unionist security agenda.\textsuperscript{38}

The agreement showed that there were areas such as economic cooperation about which both governments and portions of the nationalist community could agree.\textsuperscript{39} The Anglo-Irish Agreement was a departure from prior zero-sum thinking and after 1985, Ireland and Great Britain crafted accords to slowly draw in republican leaders and undermine the case for violence.\textsuperscript{40} In 1986, \textit{Sinn Féin} ended their electoral abstentionism and took their seats in the \textit{Dáil Éireann}.\textsuperscript{41}

![NI Security Statistics 1980 - 1989](image)

**Figure 2.** Northern Ireland Security Statistics 1980–1989. Chart created by author, adapted from data available through the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database,” University of Maryland, accessed October 19, 2018, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.

\textsuperscript{37} Connolly and Doyle, “Ripe Moments for Exiting Political Violence,” 154.

\textsuperscript{38} Ó Dochartaigh, “Northern Ireland since 1920,” 167.

\textsuperscript{39} Wolff, “The Road to Peace?, 166.


\textsuperscript{41} The \textit{Dáil Éireann} is the lower house of the Irish legislature. See Connolly and Doyle, “Ripe Moments for Exiting Political Violence,” 156.
The Good Friday Agreement

By the 1990s, Sinn Féin realized that violence would not force the British from Northern Ireland. New British Prime Minister John Major was comparatively flexible on Irish affairs so Britain and Ireland recognized opportunities to reduce the stumbling block of Northern Ireland. In 1992, Sinn Féin recognized the legitimacy of Dublin’s government and put it at the center of a potential future peace process. Churches and trade unions turned against paramilitary violence. Conditions were ripe for a political solution.

The changing tides allowed for the 1993 Downing Street Declaration. It outlined the framework for a peace deal and introduced confidence-building measures which led to ceasefires among the major paramilitary groups. The British engaged in official talks with paramilitaries and Sinn Féin participated in the political process. In 1994, the IRA declared a ceasefire. Loyalist ceasefires followed.

The negotiations of the 1990s broke with previously used channels. Sinn Féin represented republicans; the Ulster Democratic and Progressive Unionist Parties represented loyalists. The radical Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) engaged tangentially. The inclusion of many groups gave the negotiations a sense of community, and the United States further altered the dynamics of negotiation with Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Senator George Mitchell. The international mediation of Mitchell as a representative of President Bill Clinton broke the normal

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42 Reeves, “The International Dimension to the Northern Ireland Peace Process,” 115.
43 Ibid.
44 Connolly and Doyle, “Ripe Moments for Exiting Political Violence,” 156.
45 Mansergh, “The Background to the Peace Process,” 150.
46 Wolff, “The Road to Peace?, 68.
47 Ibid.
50 Cochrane, Northern Ireland, 174-75.
51 Ibid., 152.
elitist channels of previous negotiations. Mitchell built credibility over nearly four years in Northern Ireland and was thereafter able to push the process towards agreement.

Negotiations between 1996 and 1998 resulted in the GFA. The agreement focused on non-violence and power-sharing between unionists and republicans. The cornerstone of the agreement repealed Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution, which laid territorial claim to Northern Ireland. The GFA avoided outright self-determination and provided British retention of sovereign dominion over the six northern counties as long as the electoral majority agreed.

Republicans lost many of their desired outcomes—Great Britain maintained sovereignty over a still-divided island—in exchange for government power-sharing. The referenda on GFA resulted in yes votes in both the Republic and in Northern Ireland and marked the successful conclusion of thirteen years of negotiations.

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53 Ibid., 179.
54 Ibid., 177-79.
56 In Northern Ireland, a 91 percent voter turnout resulted in a 71 percent yes vote while in the south a 55 percent voter turnout returned a 95 percent yes rate. The total votes across the island were 2,119,549 yes and 360,627 no. See Cochrane, *Northern Ireland*, 198.
After Good Friday

GFA was a final status resolution, but it was not a final resolution to violence or political instability in Northern Ireland. Its implementation occurred in fits and starts, marked by instability, gradual devolution of the government and police, and relative success in governance until the power-sharing government crumbled.

Police reforms called for by the agreement reoriented the local security perspective. The Police Service of Northern Ireland replaced the Royal Ulster Constabulary in November 2001 and both republican and unionist parties urged young Catholics to join the mostly Protestant police force. The IRA and PIRA ordered ceasefires in 2005, decommissioned their weapons, and

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employed political methods to address grievances.\textsuperscript{59} Violence decreased from 2005 to 2006, but in a reemergent pattern, the overall number of violent incidents rose in 2007 and 2008 after the St. Andrews negotiations, which established the framework for government devolution.\textsuperscript{60}

![NI Security Statistics 2001 - 2010](chart.png)


From 2008 to 2010, police and justice powers transferred to the devolved government. Initiatives to tackle issues such as sectarian parades took place in 2010, 2013, and 2015.\textsuperscript{61} In 2017, however, the government collapsed. The proximate cause of the collapse was a scandal over which \textit{Sinn Féin} Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness resigned in protest. McGuinness’s resignation forced a new election under the GFA power-sharing framework, but snap elections in March 2017 failed. Northern Ireland has gone without an assembly since.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{59} Archick, \textit{Northern Ireland}, 4; Tonge, \textit{Comparative Peace Processes}, 117.

\textsuperscript{60} Archick, \textit{Northern Ireland}, 4.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 5.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 7-8.
Violent incidents decreased overall from 1998 through 2007, but policing and justice reforms made little difference to the immediate security of the populace.\textsuperscript{63} The Police Service of Northern Ireland reported an average of 262 shooting and bombing incidents per year from 1998 to 2011.\textsuperscript{64} Splinter groups continue to play spoiler. In July 2012, republican paramilitary groups merged under the label New IRA.\textsuperscript{65} In January 2019, the New IRA attacked a Derry courthouse with a car bomb; there were no casualties.\textsuperscript{66}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{NI_Security_Statistics_1970-2002.png}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{63} Tonge, \textit{Comparative Peace Processes}, 125; Archick, \textit{Northern Ireland}, 7; Cochrane, \textit{Northern Ireland}, 262-64.
\textsuperscript{64} Tonge, \textit{Comparative Peace Processes}, 124.
Reflections of Conflict in Contemporary Politics

The GFA changed the island in multitude ways. By 2014, the Police Service of Northern Ireland was one-third Catholic, a three-fold increase from 1998. The island, north and south, is interconnected through healthcare, energy, tourism, waterways, and infrastructure. Issues which prevent a non-violent future involve peace barriers and sectarian demonstrations. Peace barriers include the fifty peace walls and over one-hundred other physical barriers such as fences or gates which divide Protestant and Catholic neighborhoods. Militant unionists engage in nearly three thousand parades annually which require large police operations and led to riots in 2012, 2013, and 2015.

Brexit consultations have thrown the future of the province into doubt. Within Northern Ireland, 56 percent of the province voted against leaving the European Union (EU). Meanwhile, the Democratic Union Party opposes ongoing deals. The Democratic Union Party contests the idea that Northern Ireland could remain part of the EU customs union—which would avoid a hard border with the Republic of Ireland—because unionists fear this would cause a drift away from

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69 Tonge, *Comparative Peace Processes*, 130.


the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{74} The Irish backstop has been fundamental to the deals negotiated thus far between Great Britain and the EU, but cannot exist without some kind of trade agreement.\textsuperscript{75}

Moreover, some fear Westminster will assume direct rule over Northern Irish affairs if politicians cannot elect an internal government.\textsuperscript{76} In October 2018, the United Kingdom Parliament approved emergency legislation to deal with the government vacuum and considered the use of an external mediator.\textsuperscript{77} Focus on Brexit, however, limits London’s involvement in breaking the Stormont stalemate. The last serious negotiations to reinstate the government collapsed in February 2018.\textsuperscript{78}

**Conflict Between Israel and Egypt**

The case of final status resolution between Israel and Egypt is one of long-term success between governments but ongoing hostilities between populations. The peace deal struck in 1979 after negotiations at Camp David survived despite President Hosni Mubarak’s chaotic 2011 overthrow and ongoing terrorism in the Sinai.


\textsuperscript{76} Moltmann, *Northern Ireland*, 5.


military forces invaded.\textsuperscript{79} The war formally ended with the Rhodes armistice agreements signed by Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria between February and July 1949, but talks failed to achieve an overall peace settlement.\textsuperscript{80}

In 1956, the Suez Crisis resulted in Israeli victory and occupation of the Sinai.\textsuperscript{81} The United Nations Emergency Force later created a buffer zone under which Israeli forces withdrew from the Sinai, leading to a temporary cooling of hostilities.\textsuperscript{82} The Egyptians, Syrians, and Jordanians used Palestinian \textit{fedayeen} to conduct raids into Israel until 1957.\textsuperscript{83}

Skirmishes and raids escalated in 1966.\textsuperscript{84} By May 1967, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser demanded withdrawal of United Nations Emergency Forces, and both Egypt and Israel mobilized forces.\textsuperscript{85} Israel achieved a swift, overwhelming victory, and a four-fold increase in territory including recapture of Sinai in the 1967 Six Day War.\textsuperscript{86} The War of Attrition began a mere three weeks after the war’s conclusion and lasted until 1970.\textsuperscript{87} Israel, Egypt, and Jordan agreed to a ceasefire promoted by US Secretary of State William Rogers in 1970; Egypt spent 1970 through 1973 in preparation for the next war.\textsuperscript{88}


\textsuperscript{84} Dupuy, \textit{Elusive Victory}, 226.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 229.


\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 196-222.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 223.
Egypt and Syria sought a return to 1967’s borders using a surprise offensive on Yom Kippur 1973.\textsuperscript{89} Despite initial Arab territorial gains, Israel mounted counterattacks and compelled a ceasefire.\textsuperscript{90}

Peace Between Israel and Egypt

The conflict between Israel and Egypt officially ended in a peace agreement known as the Camp David Accords, brokered in part by US President Jimmy Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. President Anwar El-Sadat, the first Arab leader to recognize Israel, and Prime Minister Menachem Begin participated.\textsuperscript{91} Sadat and Begin met with Carter at Camp David in September 1978 and negotiated for two weeks.

The 1979 Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty consisted of two separate frameworks for agreement: one bilateral and the other a format for future negotiations. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty was a bilateral arrangement between Israel and Egypt which outlined provisions for full Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and the number of Egyptian forces deployed after the withdrawal.\textsuperscript{92} The treaty created a strategic demilitarized buffer between Egypt and Israel in the Sinai as an alternate to Israeli Defense Force presence, which minimized the risk of a military clash.\textsuperscript{93} The second element of the Treaty provided for negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Palestinian representatives over the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Implementation of this framework never occurred.\textsuperscript{94}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Herzog, \textit{The Arab-Israeli Wars}, 320-21.
\item Tuttle, “Egypt’s War for Peace,” 61.
\item Beinin, “The Cold Peace,” 4.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Though the United Nations General Assembly ruled the treaty invalid due to lack of Palestinian representation during the talks, the Egypt-Israel Treaty was a genuine achievement.95 Both sides benefitted from peace. Egypt recovered its territory and oil fields; Israel turned attention towards threats from Syria.96

Israel completed its withdrawal from the Sinai on April 25, 1982 which coincided with the beginning of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission.97 By 1985, however, the architects of Camp David were out of power. In Israel, Shimon Peres led a precarious coalition and lacked the legitimacy of the far right-wing Begin.98 In Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak assumed power after Sadat’s 1981 assassination. Mubarak did not intend to negotiate autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza with Israel.99 The second framework of Camp David remained incomplete.

The Israel and Egypt Relationship in the Twenty-First Century

The Camp David Accords proved resilient despite shocks to the relationship between the two states. In 2004, the long peaceful era in Sinai ended with a series of car bombs perpetrated by Egyptian Bedouin terrorist group *Tawhid wa Jihad*.100 Their attacks killed seventy people in the tourist city of Sharm el-Sheikh in 2004 and struck MFO elements in 2005 and 2006.101 The primary violent incident between government sanctioned Israeli and Egyptian forces since the

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96 Quandt, “Camp David and Peacemaking in the Middle East,” 364.


98 Quandt, “Camp David and Peacemaking in the Middle East,” 358.

99 Ibid., 367-68.


101 Ibid.


**Assessment of Final Status Resolution**

The treaties in Northern Ireland and between Israel and Egypt arrived after extended conflicts and series of failed talks, missed opportunities, and violated ceasefires. In Northern Ireland, violence persists among republicans, loyalists, and the spoiler groups which resist political participation. Between Israel and Egypt, a single violent incident in forty years of peace and increasing security cooperation demonstrates the success of the Camp David Accords.
Despite a long history of strife, the people of Northern Ireland are culturally similar. Communities differ religiously, but there is close connection among the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, and the rest of the United Kingdom to include shared history and traditions. Major differences between individuals are religious or linguistic, but otherwise the communities are comparable. Israel and Egypt, however, have different cultures, historical backgrounds, and cultural norms.

Despite its cultural connections, an obstacle to lasting harmony in Northern Ireland is proximity. The border is not one border, but dozens of borders. Each gate, fence, or line of wire collects to form hundreds of borders which divide cities and neighborhoods. The GFA did not solve two states in combat, but several groups, each representing a different degree of republicanism or unionism. The GFA established a sufficient system of government. The GFA did not eliminate all violence, and each year an average of fifty violent events related to sectarian tension occur.

The Egyptians and Israelis did not have to find a way for their communities to work and live together. They peacefully coexist, but not in the same neighborhoods. Moreover, the MFO serves as a mechanism to prevent conflict, which further stabilizes the conditions between the two states. Their governments work together, find common ground, and work towards collective security. This continues despite resistance within the Egyptian population.

The sense that after 1973, each side could consider themselves victors partially explains the success of the Israel-Egypt peace. Sadat restored Arab pride and shattered the impression of Israeli invincibility. Israel overcame enormous odds to achieve military victory. Both sides achieved internal objectives, which allowed a cooperative peace process. The GFA, however, was a bare bones solution. The participant groups gave up or softened on their desired outcomes. In Northern Ireland, everyone came out of negotiations losing a bit, with republicans losing every objective.
In both cases, peace arrived not at once, but slowly. Final status resolution took years, both to achieve and then implement. For Israel and Egypt, six years passed between the conclusion of the 1973 war and the adoption of the first framework of the Camp David Accords. Another three years passed until Israeli forces left the Sinai in 1982. MFO troops remain in the Sinai today. In Northern Ireland, the 1985 Anglo-Irish agreement started the path towards negotiation and 1993 Downing Street initiated the process of final status resolution. Incremental agreements followed until the 1995 ceasefires and 1998 GFA. Meanwhile, British forces localized the conflict beginning in 1969 and contributed stabilizing policing functions until 2007. Even after peace, the agreement took nearly a decade to implement.

Attempted Final Status: Israel and the Palestinians

The case of Israel and the Palestinians is one of ongoing conflict plagued by failed attempts at final status resolution. Without a stabilizing force or ceasefire to create a state of frozen conflict, tensions linger, and occasionally flare in episodic violence. No clear winner of territory emerged from periods of conflict and incentives that might encourage a peace process were absent. This case demonstrates the danger of peace processes undertaken without stability mechanisms and how failed attempts in negotiation can amplify violence.

The conflict originated in 1917, when British Foreign Secretary Anthony Balfour stated that Great Britain sought to facilitate the use of Palestine as a homeland for the Jewish people. By 1920, the League of Nations awarded a mandate over Palestine to Britain. Mandate Palestine was prone to fits of violence and British officials decided to remove their forces in

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108 Bose calls a mandate “somewhere between a colony and a protectorate.” See Bose, *Contested Lands*, 216.
December 1946 and turned the mandate over to the UN.109 In November 1947, the UN Special
Commission on Palestine recommended partition of Palestine, a first attempt at final status
resolution.110 The UN Mandate concluded in May 1948 without partition. After the Israeli
declaration of establishment, the Arab League launched a military invasion on May 15, 1948.111
The war formally ended with the Rhodes armistice agreements signed by Israel, Egypt, Lebanon,
Jordan, and Syria between February and July 1949.112 The talks did not achieve a lasting peace
settlement.113

The modern crisis of governability dates to the proximate cause of the first intifada, an
Arabic word meaning the “shaking off.”114 In late 1987, anti-Israeli demonstrations and riots in
Gaza spread to the West Bank.115 The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)—established in
the 1960s as the protector of the Palestinian people—did not foment the intifada, and PLO
leadership absence in the movement spawned new forces outside of PLO influence such as
Hamas and Islamic Jihad.116

In addition to the intifada, the ejection of the PLO from Beirut after the 1982 Israeli
invasion indicated increasing irrelevance for its leadership.117 PLO isolation and financial trouble

109 Bose, Contested Lands, 217-26; Lucy Chester, “Factors Impeding the Effectiveness of Partition
in South Asia and the Palestinian Mandate,” in Order, Conflict, and Violence, ed. Stathis N. Kalyvas, Ian
Shapiro, and Tarek Masoud (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 79; Morris, 1948: A History
of the First Arab-Israeli War, 37.

110 Bose, Contested Lands, 226-27.


112 Ibid., 375.

113 Hughes and Seligmann, Does Peace Lead to War?, 91.

114 Adrian Guelke, “The Peace Process in South Africa, Israel and Northern Ireland: A Farewell to

115 Ibid.

116 Bose, Contested Lands, 226-27; Guelke, “The Peace process in South Africa, Israel and
Northern Ireland,” 245.

117 Rex Brynen, “PLO Policy in Lebanon: Legacies and Lessons,” Journal of Palestine Studies 18,
only increased in the aftermath of their decision to support Saddam Hussein in 1991.\textsuperscript{118} By the early 1990s, Chairman Yasser Arafat and other PLO leaders were the old guard.\textsuperscript{119} In the post-Gulf War climate, conditions proved ripe for negotiations as the PLO sought influence and the United States pressured Israel to seek common ground.

**Peace Negotiations**

In 1991, the United States and Israel initiated serious attempts to achieve final status resolution. The resulting Madrid Peace Conference was historic on many fronts: Syria participated, and Palestinians spoke for themselves (under a Jordanian umbrella) in an international forum for the first time.\textsuperscript{120} The conference led to ten rounds of peace talks between 1991 and 1993, but no discernible progress.\textsuperscript{121} Violence continued amid the negotiations. From December 1992 to February 1993, fifty Palestinians and ten Israelis died in clashes. In March 1993 alone, twelve Israelis and twenty-three Palestinians died.\textsuperscript{122}

Leadership of the involved parties changed in the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{123} In 1992, Bill Clinton won the US presidential election. The rhetoric and behavior of the early Clinton administration portrayed it as the most Israel-friendly administration ever.\textsuperscript{124} Clinton and newly elected Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin more closely shared a strategic vision than previous

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{118} Bose, *Contested Lands*, 245.
\item \textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 246.
\item \textsuperscript{120} George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations since 1776* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 923; Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 8th ed. (Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2013), 421.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Bose, *Contested Lands*, 247.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 422.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 379-80.
\end{itemize}
administrations. Yet Clinton’s approach towards Israel diminished PLO desire to negotiate through the US.

In August 1993, talks under the Madrid framework ceased upon the disclosure that Israeli and PLO representatives had conducted meetings through back channels in Oslo since January. The Norwegian foreign minister facilitated the meetings and reached agreement with the assent of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. The resulting Oslo Accords were a series of interim agreements for the West Bank and Gaza Strip until the achievement of final status resolution.

The foundation of the Oslo Accords was the concept that interim steps would serve as confidence-building measures. Many of the agreements were historic. In the September 1993 letters of mutual recognition, Arafat wrote that the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist and denounced terrorism. In turn, Rabin recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of Palestinian Arabs. The letters ignored some contributing factors to conflict, such as Arafat’s concept that Israel’s right to exist ended at the pre-1967 borders. Likewise, Rabin’s letter did not acknowledge the Palestinian aspiration for sovereignty.

The accords grew on September 13, when Peres and Mahmoud Abbas signed the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, otherwise known as

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125 Telhami, “From Camp David to Wye,” 383.
126 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
Oslo I. The agreement offered Palestinians participation in Jerusalem elections, established a military withdrawal from Jericho in the West Bank and most of the Gaza Strip, renounced terror, and provided official recognition between Israel and the PLO.

Despite its significance, the declaration’s ambiguities created serious hurdles for future negotiations. The declaration never explicitly mentioned the establishment of a Palestinian state, nor referenced refugees or settlements. It did not provide a timeline for the Israeli evacuation of the West Bank or how those territories might revert to Arab rule. The declaration also postponed decisions on Jerusalem’s final status.

The Declaration of Principles established a five-year interim period during which Palestinians gained partial powers over some of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Final status resolution negotiations would take place at the end of the interim period. Elections were scheduled for July 13, 1994, and negotiations for July 1997. Final status negotiations planned to cover issues of refugees, settlements, Jerusalem’s status, security arrangements, and border issues left unresolved by the Declaration of Principles.

Elements of the declaration took place, all behind schedule. The Gaza and Jericho agreements did not conclude until May 1994 and the Palestinian council elections moved to January 1996. In September 1995, the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank

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136 Bose, Contested Lands, 249.
137 Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, 575.
138 Ibid.
140 Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 440-41.
141 Ibid., 441.
142 Bose, Contested Lands, 251.
and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II) pushed the negotiations process problematically forward.\textsuperscript{143} Oslo II made a “cartographic cheeseboard” of the West Bank.\textsuperscript{144} The agreement created noncontiguous areas labeled A, B, and C. In Area A, the Palestinian Authority exercised both security control and civil powers.\textsuperscript{145} In Area B, the Palestinian Authority held civil powers while security control fell under the Israelis. In Area C, Israel remained in control.\textsuperscript{146} The resulting territorial patchwork had no parallel in any other historical transition from war to peace.\textsuperscript{147}

The cheeseboard failed to include partition or stability mechanisms. Measures to de-link Palestinian and Israeli territory resulted in non-viable systems for road networks and water supplies. In the long term, the measures proved unsustainable. By 1995, the confidence-building measures of the Oslo process began to degrade faith in the process.\textsuperscript{148}

Increasingly frequent episodes of violence further troubled negotiations. In February 1994, an American emigre to Israel killed twenty-nine Arabs at the Mosque of Abraham holy site in Hebron, sacred also to Jews for the Tomb of the Patriarchs.\textsuperscript{149} Protests followed the massacre during which Israeli troops killed twenty-five Palestinians.\textsuperscript{150} Hamas sought to dismantle the peace process and in October 1994 kidnapped, tortured, and murdered an Israeli soldier.\textsuperscript{151} Also in October, a suicide bomber killed twenty-two and wounded fifty in an attack in Tel Aviv. Under pressure to quell the violence, Palestinian police opened fire on Palestinian protestors in

\textsuperscript{143} Hassan, “Oslo Accords,” 68.
\textsuperscript{144} Bose, \textit{Contested Lands}, 252.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{147} Brynen, “Palestine: Building Neither Peace Nor State,” 219.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 220-21.
\textsuperscript{149} Smith, \textit{Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict}, 451.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 448.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.
November which wounded over two hundred people. In January 1995, suicide bombers targeted military transit points and killed nineteen Israeli soldiers.\textsuperscript{152}

As violence escalated amid negotiations, ultra-Orthodox and extremist settler communities vilified Rabin. Social preferences shifted towards the right-wing \textit{Likud} party led by Oslo-oppositionist Binyamin Netanyahu.\textsuperscript{153} Among the discord, an Israeli extremist assassinated Rabin in 1995 to spoil the peace process.\textsuperscript{154} Shimon Peres succeeded Rabin and implemented terms of Oslo II including the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Areas A and B.\textsuperscript{155} Though Peres attempted to maintain momentum, persistent bombings—including four suicide bombings in the nine days preceding the May 1996 Israeli elections—plagued his efforts.\textsuperscript{156} Frustrated by the violence, Peres blamed Arafat for the bombings and suspended negotiations.\textsuperscript{157} Netanyahu overcame Peres in the election, and the Oslo process stagnated.\textsuperscript{158} Netanyahu did not believe the US was in a position to pressure Israel, and the peace process failed to provide tangible benefits for either side to incentivize continued negotiations.\textsuperscript{159}

Minimal progress on Oslo occurred under Netanyahu and the Palestinian Authority suffered from factional leadership. Clinton increased his involvement and persuaded Netanyahu to turn over more of the West Bank to the Palestinians. Staunch opposition from Netanyahu’s base prompted him to renege on the deal.\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{152} Smith, \textit{Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict}, 448.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., 449-53.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., 454.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., 457.
\textsuperscript{156} Oren, \textit{Power, Faith, and Fantasy}, 577; Bose, \textit{Contested Lands}, 255.
\textsuperscript{157} Smith, \textit{Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict}, 457-58.
\textsuperscript{158} Telhami, “From Camp David to Wye,” 383.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{160} Oren, \textit{Power, Faith, and Fantasy}, 577; Herring, \textit{From Colony to Superpower}, 935.
Labor leader Ehud Barak beat Netanyahu in Israel’s 1999 elections. Barak fulfilled an election promise and withdrew Israeli forces from Lebanon in May 2000 after which he turned his attention toward the Palestinians. Barak’s government coalition was fragile and he sought a decisive meeting with Arafat. The increase in violence since 1996 further prompted the need to rapidly reach final status resolution. At Camp David in July 2000, Clinton engaged with Barak and Arafat in a last-chance effort to revive the peace process. The summit convened hastily, and confidence-building measures did not precede it.

After fourteen days of negotiations, the summit ended without a deal. Clinton and Barak publicly held Arafat responsible for the failure, though Arafat returned to his constituency as a champion of Palestinian rights. Talks resumed in Israel in September 2000, but were derailed by Ariel Sharon’s visit to Temple Mount, which was the proximate cause of the violent outbreak of the second intifada. Between Sharon’s visit and autumn 2005, four thousand Palestinians and eleven hundred Israelis died in the resulting violence. The failure of the peace process resulted in greater violence.

The Collapse of a Peace Process

The Oslo Accords intended to implement a phased peace process to build confidence among the parties and facilitate a piecemeal achievement of final status resolution. The interim agreements avoided or delayed sensitive issues until easily agreed-upon measures proved successful. While this approach mirrored other incremental peace processes—such as the approach in Northern Ireland—it diverged in several important ways.

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162 Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, 578.
163 Bose, Contested Lands, 488.
164 Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 494.
165 Ibid., 495.
166 Bose, Contested Lands, 264; Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 936.
First, the agreements did not address the issue of Palestinian sovereignty with the creation of a sustainable partition. Oslo II attempted to separate Israeli and Palestinian populations, but without viable long-term solutions. The partition isolated Palestinian communities, which amplified feelings of oppression. Meanwhile, territorial concessions inflamed the Israeli right. Second, the agreements failed to implement either incentives or stability mechanisms. Peacekeeping forces were absent and joint Israeli and Palestinian security patrols were strained, particularly after the September 1996 Western Wall tunnel riots during which Palestinian police fired upon Israeli soldiers while they held protestors at bay.¹⁶⁷

The Oslo process also struggled to overcome violence caused by spoiler groups. Hamas and Islamic Jihad perpetrated thirty-one attacks between September 1993 and September 2000.¹⁶⁸ As violence escalated, populations began to doubt the benefits of peace. Increases in violence also required further negotiations within the peace process. Failed negotiations then spawned further violence. As security progressively deteriorated, popular sentiment reflected the lack of incentivized efforts towards peace. The peace process collapsed within an unending cycle of violence.

Frozen Conflict: Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh

Conflict in Cyprus

Through Ottoman occupation of Cyprus from 1571 to 1878, both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities existed peacefully, though largely separately.¹⁶⁹ When the British assumed administration, colonial policy exacerbated ethnic tensions, particularly with the 1935


¹⁶⁸ Bose, Contested Lands, 267.

implementation of intercommunal education standards. British World War II recruiting influenced Greek Cypriot emphasis on enosis (joining with Greece) with the use of the slogan, “Fight for Freedom and Greece.” Composition of civil servant populations also aggravated ethnic tensions. Though Turkish Cypriots comprised 20 percent of the population, they made up over half of the Cypriot police forces in 1919. Such policies decreased prospects for a common Cypriot identity.

In 1954, Greece raised the notion of self-determination in the UN and by April 1955, the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) revolted against British rule. The British response to the insurgency emphasized the ethnonational divide. Auxiliary troops and reserves used by the British to fight—and torture—suspected EOKA members consisted primarily of Turkish Cypriots.

In 1956, Turkish Cypriots formed a counter to EOKA called Volkan, which became the Turkish Resistance Organization in 1958. The Turkish Resistance Organization’s slogan was taksim (partition) or death. EOKA and Turkish Resistance Organization violence left six

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171 Lindley, “Historical, Tactical and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of Cyprus,” 229.

172 Ibid.

173 Ibid.


175 Bose, Contested Lands, 67-68.

176 Ibid., 68.

177 Bose, Contested Lands, 69; Lindley, “Historical, Tactical and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of Cyprus,” 230.
hundred people dead—a large number given the small population of the island.\textsuperscript{178} Meanwhile, the British bore the burden of separating the groups.\textsuperscript{179}

Cyprus gained independence in 1960. Theconstitution of the island developed from the London-Zurich agreements and was a final status resolution with a complex power-sharing arrangement.\textsuperscript{180} The constitution recognized the binational reality of Cyprus while incorporating the international dimensions of its existence.\textsuperscript{181} Cyprus formed a bicameral legislature with a Greek Cypriot president and Turkish Cypriot vice president who both held limited veto power.\textsuperscript{182} The agreement stipulated a seventy-thirty Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot breakdown of the civil service, police, and gendarmerie; a sixty-forty composition for the two-thousand-member military; and co-official languages.\textsuperscript{183}

Treaties which resulted from the agreement addressed the regional and international nature of the island’s conflict. The Treaty of Guarantee expressly forbade either \textit{enosis} or \textit{taksim}, and specified that Britain, Greece, and Turkey were guarantor powers of independence and unity of Cyprus. This ensured the involvement of Greece and Turkey in future conflict.\textsuperscript{184} The Treaty of Establishment allowed the retention of British sovereign bases. The Treaty of Alliance allowed nine hundred fifty Greek soldiers and six hundred fifty Turkish Soldiers to garrison on Cyprus and established a tripartite military command among Greece, Turkey, and the Republic of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{185}

\textsuperscript{178} In 1960, the population of Cyprus was six hundred thousand. Six hundred deaths from this population would be the equivalent of three hundred thousand dead US citizens. See Lindley, “Historical, Tactical and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of Cyprus,” 230.

\textsuperscript{179} Bose, \textit{Contested Lands}, 70.

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid., 71-72

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid., 73.

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., 71-72.

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{184} Lindley, “Historical, Tactical and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of Cyprus,” 230.

\textsuperscript{185} Lindley, “Historical, Tactical and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of Cyprus,” 228-30; Bose, \textit{Contested Lands}, 73.
Turkish Cypriots viewed the settlement and constitution satisfactorily while Greek Cypriots viewed them as a denial of the island’s Hellenic character and a violation of majority rule. The situation unraveled as the resolution entered implementation. Turkish Cypriots struggled to fill civil service employment requirements while the president and vice president feuded over tax sharing and the formation of a military. In 1963, Greek Cypriot President Makarios III proposed constitutional amendments to Vice President Fazil Kuchuk including partial abolition of vice presidential veto power. Before Kuchuk formalized his negative response to Makarios, violence broke out in Nicosia. Bands of Greek Cypriot extremists slaughtered hundreds of Turkish Cypriots and destroyed property.

Cyprus’s final status resolution did not survive implementation. Renewed conflict prompted the March 1964 creation of the UN Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) mission. Between 1963 and 1974, violence forced Turkish Cypriots north and Greek Cypriots south. Protective measures in the constitution became inoperative and Turkish Cypriots retreated to impoverished enclaves. Communal violence rose and fell as the population shifted rapidly; between 1960 and 1973, the number of mixed villages on the island fell from 114 to 42.

On July 15, 1974, EOKA-B—formed in 1972 by right-wing military officers—staged a violent coup against President Makarios with support from the Greek military regime. Turkey

186 Bose, *Contested Lands*, 74-75.
187 Ibid., 76.
188 Ibid., 77.
190 Bray, “Long Division,” 75.
191 Bose, *Contested Lands*, 78.
192 Bray, “Long Division,” 75.
194 Bose, *Contested Lands*, 84; Bray, “Long Division,” 75.
responded to the upheaval with a July 20 invasion based on the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.\footnote{Bray, “Long Division,” 75; Lindley, “Historical, Tactical and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of Cyprus,” 230.} Turkish forces expelled one hundred seventy thousand Greek Cypriots from their homes in northern Cyprus, and thousands of Turkish Cypriots living in the south fled or were forcibly transferred north.\footnote{Bray, “Long Division,” 75.} The fighting displaced nearly half of the island’s population.\footnote{Kirschner, Trust and Fear in Civil Wars, 131.}

After Violence

A fragile peace took hold though Turkish troops remained on the island. Turkish Cypriots sought a solution to the conflict that would keep the two communities separate in two states under a government of confederation, or a stronger central federal government. In 1983, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash declared the northern part of the island the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.\footnote{Vincent L. Morelli, R41136, Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive (Washington, DC: US Congressional Research Service, 2018), 1, accessed December 30, 2018, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41136.pdf.} UN resolutions condemned the declaration of independence and only Turkey recognized the breakaway state.\footnote{Bray, “Long Division,” 76.}

Between 1975 and 1995, the international community engaged in eleven attempts to achieve final status resolution, with several more between 1995 and 2002.\footnote{Murray J.M. Swan, “Peacekeeping in Cyprus,” in The Savage Wars of Peace: Toward a New Paradigm of Peace Operations, ed. John T. Fishel (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 24-25.} In 1977 and 1979, Greek and Turkish Cypriots agreed to principles of bizonality and bicommmunality as essential to peace and coexistence on the island.\footnote{Bose, Contested Lands, 88.} The Greek and Turkish Cypriot mayors of divided Nicosia agreed on a joint sewer system in the 1970s.\footnote{Ibid., 89.} Attempts at resolution foundered on ways to implement a federal solution to the conflict.
Meanwhile, UNFICYP forces served as a stability mechanism which kept the communities separate and limited violence. The UN Secretary General, both Cypriot communities, and the guarantee powers accepted and legitimized UNFICYP forces, which remain on the island today and maintain a buffer zone, facilitate intercommunal contacts, and maintain normal conditions.203

The 220-kilometer Green Line forms the buffer zone.204 Established in Nicosia amidst EOKA violence in 1955, the Green Line was heavily fortified and monitored by UN peacekeepers after the 1974 invasion.205 Crossing restrictions eased in 2003 and millions of crossings were made from 2003 to 2004.206 The border opening and the Republic of Cyprus’s bid for EU accession bolstered a new attempt at final status resolution sponsored by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.

The Annan Plan

Annan introduced the draft of “The Basis for Agreement on Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem” on November 11, 2002. The plan called for a common state government with a single international legal personality to participate in foreign and EU relations while two politically equal component states addressed daily responsibilities in their respective communities.207 What became known as the Annan Plan proposed a confederation that gave constituent territories maximum autonomy. The settlement addressed incremental implementation of relocation and compensation for displaced persons and bore similarities to both the Dayton

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204 Bose, Contested Lands, 55.
206 Calame and Charlesworth, Divided Cities, 123; Bose, Contested Lands, 57.
207 Morelli, Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive, 3.
Accords and the GFA. After sixteen months of negotiations, Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the plan while Greek Cypriots opposed it. The plan failed in April 2004. In May 2004, the EU admitted the 67 percent of the island composing the Republic of Cyprus.

Assessment

After the failure of the Annan Plan in 2004 and the accession of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU, attempts to resolve the conflict continued with varying levels of success. Serious negotiations took place in 2008 and continued despite leadership changes on both sides. The most recent UN-brokered round of talks on final status resolution concluded in July 2017 without success. After the collapse of negotiations, nationalist demonstrators from both communities faced each other at the Ledra Street crossing point on the Green Line in Nicosia. The protestors burned flags, threw projectiles, and attempted to dismantle fences. Meanwhile, UNFICYP presence increased from 860 to 888 in 2016; UNFICYP originally decreased its troop strength in 2004 after the border softening.

Despite the lack of resolution, Cyprus is peaceful, even compared to locations which achieved final status resolution, such as Northern Ireland. Only ten people have died due to intercommunal violence since 1974; the 1996 deaths of two Greek Cypriots in violent

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208 Bose, *Contested Lands*, 96-100.
209 Morelli, *Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive*, 3; Bray, “Long Division,” 76.
210 Bose, *Contested Lands*, 60.
214 Ibid., 2/14.
demonstrations along the Green Line are the only reported violent events in over twenty years.\textsuperscript{215} To achieve final status resolution, however, parties to the conflict must overcome complex issues of identity, property, and community.

The issue of property adds to the ongoing debate.\textsuperscript{216} The migration of mainland Turks to northern Cyprus further complicates the issues of territory and property.\textsuperscript{217} Turkey’s continued military presence is another obstacle for negotiations. Greek Cypriots argue that Turkish military forces should leave immediately upon the adoption of a final status resolution, but Turkish Cypriots oppose the idea based on the island’s history of ethnic violence.\textsuperscript{218} Issues over energy—including plans for pipelines proposed by Israel, Greece, and Italy—further complicate prospects for agreement.\textsuperscript{219}

For Cyprus, the partition of the island and ongoing UNFICYP presence keep the conflict frozen. The partition lessened conflict between two communities, and current tensions along the buffer zone relate to civilian activities such as farming rather than military issues.\textsuperscript{220} A stabilizing mechanism reinforces the effectiveness of the partition. More than one thousand armed soldiers from either community deploy along the ceasefire line each day in addition to UNFICYP forces.\textsuperscript{221}


\textsuperscript{216} Morelli, \textit{Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive}, 27.


\textsuperscript{218} Morelli, \textit{Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive}, 30.

\textsuperscript{219} Ibid., 33.


Violence in Nagorno-Karabakh

Nagorno-Karabakh is an autonomous region on the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan with an ethnic Armenian majority. Joseph Stalin assigned administration of the province to Soviet Azerbaijan in 1921.222 In February 1988, the regional parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region of Azerbaijan petitioned Moscow to join Nagorno-Karabakh with Soviet Armenia.223 Protests accompanied the petition and were met with counter-protests in support of the 25 percent of Nagorno-Karabakh composed of ethnic Azerbaijanis. The protests became violent, particularly once the Kremlin dispatched delegations to reason with demonstrators.224


When Armenia and Azerbaijan gained independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh also declared independence, triggering a war during which Armenian-backed Nagorno-Karabakh forces gained control over most of the autonomous region plus seven


224 Ibid., 13-18.

225 Ibid., 23-30.

226 Ibid., 60-63.

227 Ibid., 63.

228 Ibid., 90-94.

229 Ibid., 118-19.
additional provinces that accounted for 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s geographic area.\textsuperscript{230} Despite Azerbaijani offensives in 1992, Armenian forces regained most of Nagorno-Karabakh’s territory in 1993.\textsuperscript{231} When Turkey and Iran moved forces to their borders, the UN Security Council called for a ceasefire.\textsuperscript{232}

From 1988 until 1992, there were ten thousand deaths due to the conflict, averaging about two thousand per year.\textsuperscript{233} Conventional fighting among Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Nagorno-Karabakh troops began in April 1993.\textsuperscript{234} From April 1993 through May 1994, fifteen thousand people died in the war, which progressed to stalemate.\textsuperscript{235} The fighting between 1988 and 1994 displaced one million people.\textsuperscript{236}

Armenia achieved a defensible front line that included Nagorno-Karabakh and 14 percent of previously-Azerbaijani territory.\textsuperscript{237} The territory was also ethnically Armenian: ethnic cleansing during the war purged Azeris from Nagorno-Karabakh.\textsuperscript{238} On May 12, 1994, the parties reached a ceasefire which reflected the exhaustion and losses on both sides. The ceasefire ended overt combat but suspended resolution of the political dispute.\textsuperscript{239} Armenia, Azerbaijan, and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{232} Ibid., 87-95.
\item \textsuperscript{233} Mooradian and Druckman, “Hurting Stalemate or Mediation?,” 713.
\item \textsuperscript{234} De Waal, \textit{Black Garden}, 181.
\item \textsuperscript{235} Mooradian and Druckman, “Hurting Stalemate or Mediation?,” 712-24.
\item \textsuperscript{237} De Waal, \textit{Black Garden}, 251.
\item \textsuperscript{238} Ibid., 184.
\item \textsuperscript{239} Ibid., 262-64.
\end{itemize}
Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, along with mediators from Russia and Kyrgyzstan signed the ceasefire in July 1994.\textsuperscript{240}

Attempts at Resolution

Between 1990 and 1995, there were six major attempts to mediate the conflict. In February 1992, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) intervened and conducted negotiations through December 1994.\textsuperscript{241} The CSCE created the Minsk Group to negotiate a resolution, but distrust from Baku, issues with timetables, and resistance to international peacekeepers thwarted its early efforts.\textsuperscript{242} In 1995, the CSCE became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which retained the Minsk Group, co-chaired by the United States, France, and Russia, as the primary mediator in the conflict.\textsuperscript{243} Today, the Minsk Group includes participants from Belarus, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland, and Turkey.\textsuperscript{244} The original objectives of the Minsk Group were to provide a framework for conflict resolution; obtain agreement on the cessation of armed conflict; and to promote the peace process by deploying OSCE multinational peacekeeping forces.\textsuperscript{245}

After the 1995 transition, the Minsk Group developed three proposals. The first, in July 1997, sought to solve all aspects of the conflict simultaneously, including the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia rejected it due to pressure from Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians.\textsuperscript{246} The


\textsuperscript{241} Mooradian and Druckman, “Hurting Stalemate or Mediation?,” 710.

\textsuperscript{242} Mooradian and Druckman, “Hurting Stalemate or Mediation?,” 710; Croissant, 	extit{The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict}, 85-86.

\textsuperscript{243} Mooradian and Druckman, “Hurting Stalemate or Mediation?,” 711.

\textsuperscript{244} Nichol, 	extit{Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia}, 19.


\textsuperscript{246} Ibid., 147.
second, in September 1997, proposed a two-stage solution. First, military forces of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh would withdraw to the 1988 boundaries while roads, rails, power, and communication links reopened. Second, the parties would negotiate the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. While Armenia and Azerbaijan accepted the proposal in principle, Nagorno-Karabakh rejected the two-stage solution. The Minsk Group introduced another proposal in November 1998 which aimed to give Nagorno-Karabakh republic status within the borders of Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh would gain its own constitution, flag, legislature, executive and judicial institutions, National Guard, and police force. Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh supported this solution, but Azerbaijan viewed it as a threat to its sovereignty and rejected it. After the failure of the third Minsk Group proposal, Azerbaijani President Heidar Aliyev and Armenian President Robert Kocharian committed to settlement negotiations in 1999, and conducted meetings in Washington, Geneva, Yalta, and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. They agreed on enforcement of the ceasefire, confidence-building, and prevention of border incidents.

In 2002, the Minsk Group introduced the Prague Process. It involved no agenda, no commitment, and no negotiation, but encouraged free discussion and initially increased optimism on settlement prospects. The status of Nagorno-Karabakh once again stunted talks. In 2007, the Madrid Principles succeeded the Prague Process, but talks deadlocked over Nagorno-Karabakh’s

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248 Ibid.
249 Ibid., 149-50.
250 Ibid., 151.
251 Ibid.
252 Ibid., 153.
status.\textsuperscript{253} The Minsk Group updated the Madrid Principles in July 2009 but ceasefire violations minimized progress.\textsuperscript{254}

According to the OSCE, an average of thirty troops and civilians die each year along the 137-mile “line of contact.”\textsuperscript{255} Violent flare-ups in April 2016 threatened to revive the war, and interference by Turkey and Russia exacerbates existing obstacles to negotiation. The April 2016 clashes lasted four days and caused three hundred fifty casualties including more than one hundred military and civilian deaths.\textsuperscript{256} A Moscow-brokered ceasefire ended the outburst during which Azerbaijan regained territory lost in 1994.\textsuperscript{257} Though the Minsk Group halted the violence with diplomacy, the peace process remained dormant.\textsuperscript{258}

Current State of Conflict and Negotiations

Prospects for resolution face several obstacles, including heavy militarization, interference by third-parties, and political upheaval. Ceasefire violations occurred almost daily from April 2016 through 2017.\textsuperscript{259} Azerbaijan’s military expenditures expanded $2-3 billion annually with arms imports twenty times higher than those of Armenia from 2012 to 2016.\textsuperscript{260} Though unable to match Baku’s spending, Armenia attained heavy weapons and missile systems from Russia.\textsuperscript{261} Armenia hosts Russian bases in Erebuni and Gyumri with five thousand Russian

\textsuperscript{253} Abilov, “OSCE Minsk Group,” 154.
\textsuperscript{254} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{255} Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 19.
\textsuperscript{256} Cavanaugh, “Renewed Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh,” 1.
\textsuperscript{258} Cavanaugh, “Renewed Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh,” 1.
\textsuperscript{260} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{261} Ibid.
troops in the country.262 The OSCE monitoring group is a mere six observers, and no peacekeepers separate opposing forces.263 Though both states made some transitions from military to police and border service patrols along the line of contact, each conducted large-scale military exercises and increased defense budgets in 2018.264

In January 2019, the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers met alongside the Minsk Group and agreed to take concrete measures to restart negotiations.265 Despite renewed optimism for talks, the conflict has the potential to flare in unlikely ways due to the interaction of third parties and continued ethnic tensions. There are twenty thousand troops still present along the line of contact.266

Assessment of Frozen Conflict

While the term frozen conflict implies a war on pause, the cases of both Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh demonstrate that frozen conflict is a viable technique to use alongside attempts to reach to final status resolution. The frozen aspect of the conflict serves as a mechanism to decrease violence and avoid escalation while negotiations attempt to reach a solution. The Northern Ireland and Israel-Egypt cases demonstrated that war termination is a long process, and in a frozen conflict, a ceasefire or other temporary solution serves as a mechanism to prevent flares of violence while populations return to a sense of normalcy.


263 Cavanaugh, “Renewed Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh,” 2.


266 Cengel, “Dispatch from Armenia,” 57-63.
In Cyprus, memories of both ethnic violence and the 1974 invasion prevent agreement between the parties that could result in final status resolution and unification of the island. There seems to be little incentive to concede on important issues, however, because the conflict is now entirely non-violent. Furthermore, the softening of the border brought some benefits of EU membership to residents of the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which further reduces willingness to compromise.

In Nagorno-Karabakh, the conflict is comparatively active. Deadly ceasefire violations and the April 2016 four-day war are stumbling blocks along the path to final status resolution. Without an enduring stability force, like UNFICYP in Cyprus, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is prone to flares of violence. Moreover, Azerbaijan serves in a revisionist role and does not accept Armenian territory gains in the war as legitimate.

The study of cases in final status resolution revealed that parties involved in negotiations must reach a point wherein they are willing to make concessions and view peace talks as the only viable way to resolve conflict. Until parties reach this point, frozen conflict is a mechanism to prevent death and establish an environment for subsequent negotiations. Buying time is an important aspect of the peace process, as final status resolution can be reached incrementally.

Furthermore, flaws in peace frameworks may prevent solutions. A vague framework may allow confidence-building measures during incremental peace building, but in Nagorno-Karabakh the agenda-free Prague Process proved unproductive. Additionally, a peace framework which tries to solve all problems at once may be counterproductive. At talks in 2016, Turkish Cypriot representatives overstepped the planned agenda to introduce proposed security guarantees. This reduced Greek Cypriot willingness to review territory adjustment.\textsuperscript{267} Negotiations fell apart from proposal-overload.

\textsuperscript{267} Morelli, \textit{Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive}, 17.
Conflict Resolution Analysis and Recommendations

Wars must end. To successfully conclude wars, it is essential that planners understand the conditions required for enduring peace. A lack of understanding dooms the US military to a cycle of unending violence. Peace necessarily follows combat, and doctrine provides the initial framework to understand peace, known as end state.

Commanders include a clearly-defined end state in planning guidance to maintain the focus of their operations, which is the successful conclusion of combat and a transition to stability. US operational planners set conditions that enable the withdrawal of military forces from a theater, which include conflict resolution and peace. In large-scale combat operations, the termination of fighting results in rapid transition to consolidation of gains activities. This may include a lengthy post-conflict period. In concert with diplomacy as part of a whole-of-government approach, post-conflict activities include the negotiations of peace agreements to achieve end states.

The negotiation of peace agreements is a project with a long timeline and multiple dangers. These dangers include continued instability; spoilers; and failures in peace frameworks. Ceasefire violations contribute to continued violence along the Nagorno-Karabakh line of contact. Repeated violent outbursts during the Oslo process diminished prospects for final resolution between Israel and the Palestinians. Short, ineffective ceasefires delayed peace efforts in 1980s Northern Ireland. Violence later prolonged implementation of the GFA.

Such violence may be the creation of spoiler groups. Hamas and Islamic Jihad stunted negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. This created discord between Arafat and US and Israeli leaders. In Northern Ireland, groups such as the New IRA continue to play spoiler long after GFA’s implementation.

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Flawed peace frameworks contribute to negotiation failures. Numerous negotiation provisions hindered talks for both Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh. Attempting negotiations without confidence-building measures hampered the peace attempt at Camp David. Vague frameworks without definitive steps hindered negotiations for Cyprus, Nagorno-Karabakh, and in Israel. Successful frameworks may occur in stages, such as in Northern Ireland, but require confidence-building, ceasefires, and respect for the incremental process.

When attempts to achieve final status resolution fail, involved populations are at risk. In Israel, the second intifada began two months after the breakdown of talks at Camp David and more than five thousand people died over the next five years.\textsuperscript{270} In Cyprus, failure to resolve the civil war of the 1950s and 1960s prompted international intervention which contributed to further loss of life. The 2016 clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh caused three hundred fifty casualties and arrested peace talks.\textsuperscript{271} Violence then increases hostilities among parties, and further delays prospects for peace.

Certain conditions mitigate the factors which endanger peace processes. Specific activities encourage settlement: stability mechanisms; conflict localization; engagement of proper parties and elimination of extraneous parties; partition or separation of warring populations; incentives towards peace; and ceasefires.

A robust stability mechanism is a precondition for successful negotiation and implementation of peace frameworks. Traditional peacekeeping missions used forces as a buffer to enforce security during a peace agreement’s implementation.\textsuperscript{272} In both Northern Ireland and Cyprus, British military presence began as a representation of colonial rule but evolved to serve as a force which localized violence and separated warring populations. In Northern Ireland, the

\textsuperscript{270} Bose, \textit{Contested Lands}, 264; Herring, \textit{From Colony to Superpower}, 936.
\textsuperscript{271} Cavanaugh, “Renewed Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh,” 1.
British policing function in the Troubles evolved to a stabilizing function which prevented crisis escalation. In Cyprus, both British military and UNFICYP forces contributed to the containment of violence. Without a final status resolution in Cyprus, UNFICYP prevents the outbreak of violence on the island and responds to protests and disputes between the communities.

The enduring peace between Israel and Egypt built upon a stability concept with the MFO. The multi-national construct of the group, like UNFICYP, represents the long-term investment of the international community in the peace process. The third-party nature of the MFO resolved concerns about occupation of the Sinai Peninsula by either Israel or Egypt.

In Nagorno-Karabakh, the Minsk Group’s six observers do not match the character of the aforementioned stability forces. Unlike the Minsk Group, modern international peacekeeping efforts involve heavily armed military forces with expanded mandates that ensure compliance with a ceasefire or agreement.273 Likewise, the internal efforts to create joint Israeli-Palestinian stability patrols during the Oslo Process contributed to conflict instead of stability.

Localization of conflict is another precondition for peace. Despite the large Irish diaspora across the United Kingdom, limited violence occurred in England during the Troubles, and the conflict localized to the island. Israel and Egypt localized their conflict by isolating it from other aspects of the larger Arab/Israeli struggle and concentrating on Sinai. Conflicts which have not reached final status resolution struggle with localization. In Nagorno-Karabakh, heavy involvement from Russia and Turkey add international actors which prevents conflict localization. Cyprus’s conflict also involves international actors with Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Additional actors create obstacles for peace processes as surplus concerns require attention during negotiations.

Engaging the appropriate parties in negotiations while eliminating extraneous ones contributes to conflict localization and is necessary to final status resolution. For Israel and Egypt,

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the Camp David Accord’s success resulted in part from the legitimacy a right-wing Menachem Begin brought to the process. Likewise, the successful years of the Oslo process benefitted from the authority of right-winger Yitzhak Rabin. The 1973 Sunningdale Agreement failed due to the participation of only moderate parties, but political extremists Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness later lent credibility to the GFA.

Partition of warring populations, where applicable, creates conditions for long-term stability or peace. Partition is not straightforward and may destabilize situations. Effective partition, however, reduces violence and contributes to resolution. In Israel and Egypt, populations are separate and the MFO serves as another barrier, which allows for security cooperation. Conversely, attempted partition of Israeli and Palestinian neighborhoods was unsustainable and isolating, especially given the interwoven nature of the communities. In Northern Ireland, parties in conflict continue life in proximity, though they separate into opposing neighborhoods with unofficial peace barriers. In Cyprus, a soft Green Line separates Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. Though partition occurred forcibly, it reduced violence. The partition is now an obstacle to final status resolution, however, as negotiations tend to fail on points of repatriation and property.

Successful peace processes include incentives for peace for all parties. Sinn Féin gained increased political influence as the IRA drew down its violent campaign in the 1990s. Ceasefires and arms destruction allowed legitimization of the parties in the eyes of oppositionists. The accession of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU was an incentive for minimized violence despite lack of final status resolution. Meanwhile, the Israel-Palestinian negotiations lacked incentives for reaching milestones in the framework, and the international community did not recognize concessions made on either side.

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274 Chester, “Factors Impeding the Effectiveness of Partition in South Asia and the Palestinian Mandate,” 90-93.
275 Ibid., 75.
Ceasefires are necessary for the achievement of final status resolution. Pauses in fighting allow time and space for negotiations while drastically reducing death and destruction. A pause in fighting may even allow antagonism to decrease.\textsuperscript{276} Ceasefires among paramilitary groups played roles in the confidence-building measures which preceded the GFA, and Israel and Egypt were not in active conflict in the years between the 1973 war and the 1979 accords. The Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire created time and space for ongoing negotiations.

The establishment of clear winners and losers of wars enables peace processes, but is not readily apparent in many modern conflicts. The GFA reflected republican acceptance of overall losses in Northern Ireland. This acceptance allowed movement towards final status resolution. In the unique case of Israel and Egypt, both parties met their war objectives and therefore considered themselves victors. Conflicts in Cyprus and with Israel and the Palestinians lack clear winners, which contribute to the absence of final status resolutions. In Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan refuses to recognize the winning nature of the Armenian war efforts.

Peace talks in Afghanistan are a potential break in the eighteen-year stalemate. For this war, and for future conflicts, progress towards peace requires that military planners understand the framework required to terminate conflict. First, making and implementing peace agreements requires time and a stabilizing force such as the US military. Commitment to enduring peace therefore excludes rapid withdrawal from a theater. Planning withdrawal from Afghanistan or any future theater of war requires a long view, wherein stability forces ensure the implementation of peace deals. Long-term peace requires long-term commitment. This especially applies to planning considerations for large-scale combat operations, during which extensive combat and disruption to civil life may require lengthy planning horizons.

Second, violence increases both when peace talks succeed and when they falter. The metric of violence is important for planners of a potential withdrawal from a theater of war. Even successful peace processes include increases in violence. Planners who use patterns of violence as measures of performance or effectiveness may inaccurately judge the success of peace implementation. Furthermore, ongoing operations may face increased opposition during negotiations and implementation, for which planners need prepare.

Third, ceasefires require commitment from involved parties, and cooperation may require incentives such as increased political influence by paramilitary or formerly-terrorist organizations. This is a difficult hurdle for military planners because it requires facing the enemy as a peer. Bringing extreme parties into negotiations aids the peace process and gives it legitimacy. Conversely, extraneous parties involved in talks hinder negotiations.

Fourth, even a final status resolution may not prove resilient over time. Failures elongate planning timelines and require additional military and diplomatic inputs before the process can conclude. A robust peace agreement, however, can weather shocks.

Finally, reaching a peace agreement with an enemy may reveal the emergence of spoiler groups. Spoiler groups may overturn a peace process, but stability forces, police reform, and incremental implementation mitigate their effect. The creation of resilient peace turns spoilers into nuisances rather than true threats.

The US Army fights and wins the nation’s wars, but winning wars requires conclusion. Concluding wars requires a commitment to a peaceful post-conflict future. Planners must understand the conditions required for peace, whether in large-scale combat operations or counterinsurgency. Without an understanding of this framework, the United States will remain trapped in a cycle of wars without end.
Bibliography


