

United States Military Governance

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

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This monograph contends military governance is an inescapable, crucial aspect of war into which the US military, specifically the Army, must pour effort, resources, and excellence to ensure that our wars are worth winning in the first place. Strategic, competent governance subdues chaos and provides dignity and paths forward to populations reeling from the loss and devastation of war. The monograph reviews how military governance figured in to large-scale combat operations including the American Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, the Dominican Crisis, and contemporary conflict including Iraq and Afghanistan. The monograph utilizes a single case study, the World War II Rhineland Campaign: 1943-1945, to analyze how the US military executed its largest military governance operation. The vast body of research on this topic can be distilled down to this simple yet profound consensus point: the US military must plan and prepare for the execution of military governance duties with the same, or perhaps greater, level of care, forethought, and vision the conflict itself required. Action must be taken in accordance with the DOTMLPF framework to address military governance prior to the next conflict. Ignoring the requirement prior to war would be both consistent with our tradition and to our peril. The United States military has only completed half of the task on the day we proclaim our victories. The other half, the military governance piece, will test our competencies, our patience, and our resolve. A war is not truly won if the communities left in the wake are treated as afterthoughts.

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Acronyms

ASC	Army Specialist Corps
CA	Civil Affairs
CATS	Civil Affairs Training School
IAPF	Inter-American Peace Force
ISIS	Islamic State Iraq and Syria
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
FM	Field Manual
GHQ	General Headquarters
JO	Joint Operations
JP	Joint Publication
LSCO	Large-Scale Combat Operations
MG	Military Government
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS	Organization for American States
OMGUS	Office of Military Government United States
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force

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Introduction

Even though US ground forces have engaged in activities necessary for political consolidation during and following wars for most of the country's 250-year history, the lessons from these experiences remain elusive. Despite the recurring operational challenges associated with shaping the political landscape during and following combat operations, US military and political leaders have consistently failed to devote appropriate attention and resources to organizing for the political requirements of military interventions.

—Nadia Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance*

The potential for large-scale ground combat operations has increased over the last decade. The 2017 National Security Strategy points to China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran as rising peer and near-peer competitors increasingly capable of challenging the United States militarily and economically after nearly three decades of US hegemony as the sole super power in the world.¹ The 2017 National Defense Strategy emphasized the point by stating, “The central challenge to US prosperity and security is the *reemergence of long-term, strategic competition*.”² To that end, the US military has launched a concerted effort to train the force to face a near-peer or peer adversary in the future.

Training for large-scale combat operations has been a significant shift for the military since 2016 as it emerges from an intense decade-and-a-half period of limited contingency operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. While great emphasis and energy are currently placed on training the force to fight and win on the highly lethal battlefield, little effort is expended on what comes following battlefield success. The US military is significantly underplaying its eventual role in administering and enabling governance both during and after large-scale combat operations.

In *Joint Operations (JP) 3-0*, the military depicts a model that describes the phasing of joint combat operations. The phases are to shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable

¹ US Department of Defense, *The 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 2-3.

² US Department of Defense, *The 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), 2.

civilian authority.³ The vast majority of the manual is dedicated to preparing for and executing combat operations. While the manual acknowledges the military's role in stabilizing the environment and enabling civilian authority, it significantly underplays the role the military will have in executing governance operations. In fact, JP 3-0 only mentions the potential requirement for the joint force to execute military governance twice; once during the "dominate" section and once in the "stabilize" section.⁴ Each occurrence casts this situation as a temporary, stopgap measure until US or allied whole-of-government functions are in place or the host nation government is functioning. The American military experience tells us, and my time spent executing local governance operations in Iraq and Afghanistan backs it up, that short-term stopgap governance can easily morph into years. The US military will once again find itself executing military governance at the local, district, regional, and national levels for extended periods following future conflicts, including large-scale combat operations.

The US Army has made great strides in training its soldiers for phase three operations, "dominate," and the training of offense and defense, but there has been little effort to prepare for phase four and five operations, "stabilize," and "enable civilian authority," respectively. Historically, as a result of scale, the Army has been the only service that can decisively acquire and stabilize territory for the purpose of reestablishing political order or enabling US policy objectives.⁵ The Army recognizes this fact today. In the Army's newest operations manual, *Field Manual (FM) 3-0*, the Army defines the four strategic roles the service provides the joint force as "shaping the security environment," "preventing conflict," "prevailing in large-scale combat operations," and "consolidating gains to make temporary success permanent."⁶

³ US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), V-8.

⁴ *Ibid.*, V-10, VIII-19.

⁵ Nadia Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 3.

⁶ US Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), vii.

Consolidation of gains is a new addition to Army doctrine following the counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Opportunities were missed in both campaigns to consolidate political objectives, enable civil authority, and the host nation governance. “Consolidation of Gains are the activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities.”⁷ While the Army is correct to add “consolidation of gains” as one of its strategic roles, it still does not place adequate emphasis on the Army’s future, and primary role among the services, in executing military governance. The only time FM 3-0 addresses military governance is to cast the US Army in a support role to an established host nation military government.⁸ Emphasized are the Army’s “minimum-essential stability tasks of providing security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment”⁹ and providing security to the host nation government. While all valid, Army senior leaders must acknowledge and accept the service will not only support host nation governance but unilaterally execute it, as the American experience has proven in wars past.

Methodology

This monograph will utilize a single, qualitative case study and detailed literature review examining the US experience with and utilization of military governance. This approach will facilitate a structured, detailed examination of military governance that will highlight common best practices. The featured case study offers excellent examples of how the United States executed military governance operations during World War II. In the Rhineland Campaign of 1943-1945, US military governance was executed during combat operations in newly conquered German territory, and in conjunction with German civil authority after Germany’s surrender. The insights revealed by the case study, coupled with

⁷ US Army, FM 3-0 (2017), 8-1.

⁸ Ibid., 8-13.

⁹ Ibid.

the lessons illuminated from the literature review, will provide the basis to make recommendations for the US military's path forward with military governance decisions.

Importance

This monograph highlights several important issues regarding the future of military governance. First, the literature review and examination of military governance since the American Civil War clearly indicate that the US military cannot divorce itself from military governance. The United States military must be prepared to execute military governance operations in both large-scale ground combat operations and limited contingency operations in future conflicts. Governance operations have been an unavoidable component of American military intervention throughout the American experience at war.¹⁰ The execution of military governance operations and combat operations are symbiotic. The two have not been separated in the past, nor will they be in the future. Senior military leaders must make military governance operations a part of the doctrine, training, and American way of war. It matters little whether the military, specifically the Army, wants to do it. It is easy to point to other agencies, like the state department, and say governance is their responsibility. The evidence of this monograph is clear. Military governance cannot be wished away and action must be taken to prepare the force to execute.

Lessons learned from the US military's experience executing governance in the Rhineland, 1943-1945, demonstrate that military governance detachments were critical to the campaign's success. It offers a detailed account of a coordinated effort to train a cadre of professionals in governance and civil administration prior to conflict. It illustrates the necessity of direct-commissioning specialty skilled administrators from the civilian sector to increase capability. Military governance professionals were more successful if governance was their primary duty while alternate efforts to reassign front-line combat soldiers to understaffed military government units following combat operations fell short. The Rhineland events highlight the importance of attaching military government units to Army, Corps, and Division

¹⁰ Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance*, 3.

headquarters during combat operations, to best synchronize operations, and why detaching governance units from tactical headquarters after combat operations end is a must. In this case, command and control was synchronized under a territorial command and control architecture that was closely aligned with the post-surrender German government structure.¹¹ Most importantly, it showed military governance operations must be integrated as part of the plan from the start of campaign planning. Even though the US Army did not desire to execute military governance operations during combat, or the four years following German capitulation, there was no viable alternative.

Research Goal

The research goal of this monograph extracts military governance lessons learned from a blended analysis of both the campaign and literature review and apply them to make nuanced recommendations on how today's military should prepare for governance operations in future large-scale combat operations.

Literature Review:

The questions of military government are among the most subtle and complicated which a commander must solve, for they concern the political life of the people governed and the political objectives of the occupying power. It will be only through close study of past experiences, successful and unsuccessful, orthodox and innovating, that the guidance for the future will be obtained.

—George Benson and Mark Wolfe, *Military Government and Organizational Relationships*

The 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry arrived for a fifteen-month deployment in northeast Kunar and eastern Nuristan provinces in May of 2007. This deployment was unique in that it would span two summer fighting seasons from May 2007 – July of 2008. Leaders of the Squadron had spent the previous year preparing its soldiers, physically and mentally, for intense combat operations. Leaders felt confident they had effectively trained the soldiers to fight and win at the Squad, Platoon, Troop, and Squadron

¹¹ The Rhineland case study will show that military governance units were best utilized under tactical commanders during the combat phase because it gave the commanders authority to synchronize all activities in their Area of Operation. After German government surrender, military governance units reorganized under American territorial command (Office of Military Government in the American Zone, OMGUS) to better align with German civil authority and governance at the village, city, state, and national levels.

levels.¹² When the author walked into the district center of Naray district, northeast Kunar province, for the first time in June 2007, he was confronted with an unprecedented sight: two hundred concerned elders from the surrounding villages had journeyed there to meet him and broker deals to set things off on the right foot. It was quickly realized that while our unparalleled ability to mete out lethal force would prove important over that next fifteen months, the way the Squadron executed governance operations was equally, if not more, important.

Over the next fifteen months, the Squadron would be exposed to an intricate, almost confounding, web of tribal governance and the rich, multi-layered political dynamics that accompany it. The author would learn that in his area, tribal governance, not district or provincial government, mattered most. The personal relationships painstakingly cultivated with each tribal leader, coupled with consistent fairness and transparency in all governance matters, would equal success and unprecedented force protection for our soldiers. The problem was, none of the Squadron leaders were trained for governance operations. They were trained in the intricacies of tactical-level warfare. What we failed to realize at the time was that our monumental skill gap was not unique to our Squadron alone. Battalions across the region were confronting the same unnerving reality that they could not deliver governance operations with any sort of assurance that they were doing it correctly. A common theme emerged from the literature on governance. While our experiences occur in varied geopolitical contexts, the American military leader has continually had to rely upon his or her ingenuity to overcome a lack of training to accomplish missions and enable governance policy objectives.¹³ In Afghanistan, the leaders of the 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry were simply next in a long line of American military leaders, stretching back generations, who would once again build

¹² An Army troop and squadron are cavalry terms and are roughly the equivalent of a company or battalion.

¹³ Carl Friedrich, *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II* (New York: Rinehart and Company Inc., 1948), vi.

governance strategies on the fly, hoping on a wing and a prayer that their efforts would lead to stability and success.¹⁴

This section will provide a common definition of military government, review the major changes in doctrine, recount how the US military has executed military government in Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) over time, and analyze how the concept has evolved over the course of the American experience at war. The LSCO campaigns that will be reviewed are the American Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II. Additionally, limited contingency operations in the Dominican Republic will be reviewed, since enabling governance was part of the primary mission, and contemporary conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The best definition of military government for this study comes from the 1940 basic *Field Manual, 27-10: Rules of Land Warfare*. It stated “Military government is the organization through which a belligerent exercises authority over the territory of the enemy invaded and occupied by him. The necessity for such government arises from the failure or inability of the legitimate government to exercise its functions on account of the military operations or occupation.”¹⁵

Several consistent themes emerge from the literature review. First, there is an ongoing debate, rekindled from one campaign to the next, about what the US military’s proper role should be in the administration of governance. The pre-war debates center around whether the military should execute such a task or if governance should be left to professional bureaucrats. Regardless of the debate, and whether the military does or does not want to execute governance operations, the military finds itself executing out of necessity both during and after conflicts. In most cases, this happens because there is no other government entity present to do the job in the first place. The execution of military government in

¹⁴ A detailed account of how I navigated the 2007-2008 deployment to northeast Kunar and Eastern Nuristan was published in 2014. Nathan Springer, “Implementing a Balanced Counterinsurgency Strategy in Northeast Afghanistan, May 2007-July 2008,” in *Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency*, ed. Thomas Johnson and Barry Zellen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 215-240.

¹⁵ War Department, *Field Manual (FM) 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1940), 75.

every one of the campaigns explored here was impossible to avoid and, as it turned out, critical to success.

While, typically, broad guidance for military governance exists in the context of these campaigns, it grants so much latitude that the range of styles deployed in its execution at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels is as varied as the natures of the conflicts and the personalities of the leaders themselves. The range of execution strategies is a result of both the strengths and weaknesses of the occupying military leaders charged to govern as well as the leadership of the occupied territory at the local, district, provincial, and national levels. Third, there exists a prevailing warning from military officers across these campaigns lamenting their forces' lack of appropriate training and preparation to execute the governance tasks their situations demanded. Finally, the scale required to successfully execute governance operations snaps into focus as officers and leaders from the local to national levels find themselves embroiled in the work. Governance operations consume time, energy, resources, and brain power. Careful consideration and planning for governance operations now can pay dividends to the next generation of military leaders who will face similar challenges. It is paramount the military refine a detailed tactical governance training curriculum of best practices. Our military government lessons have been hard-won. We cannot let them fall silent and forgotten in the annals of history.

American Civil War and Reconstruction

In the American Civil War and Reconstruction period from 1861 to 1877, both during the execution of hostility and post-war reconstruction, governance operations were critical to the success of Union forces.¹⁶ Military governance in the Civil War is best broken down into two distinct time periods. The first period started with President Abraham Lincoln's 1862 appointment of military governors who

¹⁶ Allen Guelzo, *Reconstruction: A Concise History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 1.

were tasked with administering vital southern states' governance and ends at the conclusion of the war.¹⁷

The second period begins at the conclusion of the war and stretches through Reconstruction.

President Lincoln appointed war governors in the occupied territories of North Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Louisiana that coincided with the Union Army's movement south.¹⁸ In the book, *Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction*, James McPherson describes the importance of the wartime military governors and why President Lincoln made the decision to appoint them. Lincoln believed that by creating military governments in these key southern states, he would be providing Union sympathizers in those states a conduit through which they could support the Union and reject the state's decision to join the Confederacy. "Lincoln's policy was based on his theory of the indissoluble Union. Since the states could not legally secede, they were still members of the Union."¹⁹ The majority of the governors appointed were senior military officers serving in dual roles: Governor and Commander of the Army assigned to that geographic area. In other cases, Union military governors were selected based on their civilian expertise and given a direct commission into the Army at the rank of brigadier general.²⁰

In Peter Maslowski's book, *Treason Must Be Made Odious*, there is a good illustration of how military government operated at the local and city levels. Maslowski described how the government ran in Nashville, Tennessee in 1863. "Three masters, an unequal triad, ruled Nashville during the Civil War: the military government; the commanding general of the Department of the Cumberland; and the city administration."²¹ Maslowski goes on to describe how military governance manifested itself throughout the South. In some cities, astute Union military leaders kept components of the original city administration in place while in others, military government took over completely because local leaders

¹⁷ James McPherson, *Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction* (Newark, NJ: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1992), 404.

¹⁸ Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance*, 43.

¹⁹ McPherson, *Ordeal by Fire*, 404.

²⁰ Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance*, 43.

²¹ Peter Maslowski, *Treason Must Be Made Odious* (New York: KTO Press, 1978), 121.

would not cooperate. In the case of Nashville, over time the city government could neither pay for nor sustain city services. Since the military government and governor were the sole remaining options, the occupying Union Army was forced to restore local services like policing, fire, and waste disposal.²² There was simply no escaping it.

While Maslowski described the occupation of Nashville as only a partial success story, it does illustrate the colossal challenge the task of military government and administration represented for the occupying force. In other areas, Union commanders alluded to defensive reasons to justify their controversial decisions to abandon some cities completely. When Major General William Sherman captured Atlanta, Georgia in the summer of 1863, he demanded the city be cleared of all civilians. Sherman realized the obligation his Army would have to the citizens of Atlanta, if they were allowed to remain in the city, and believed that obligation surpassed the skillset and the capacity of his Army. In his book, *The Memoirs of General William T. Sherman*, Sherman features a letter exchange between himself, acting as the mayor of Atlanta, and General John Bell Hood, the commander of the Confederate Army in Tennessee. In it, Sherman dictates the timeline for the evacuation of the city.²³ General Hood found the demand barbaric. In reply to the demand Hood stated, “the unprecedented measure you propose transcends, in studied and ingenious cruelty, all acts ever before brought to my attention in the dark history of war.”²⁴ The important lesson is that Union Army leaders were left to absorb the impact of military governance every day. In the case of Nashville, the Union Army was forced to provide daily services for the people. In the case of Atlanta, Sherman opted to evacuate civilians so he would not have to commit his forces to governance operations. The execution of governance across the occupied South was often messy and took form based on local, regional, and national conditions; however, governance was a significant component of the Union Army’s wartime service and critical to winning the war.

²² Maslowski, *Treason Must Be Made Odious*, 125.

²³ William Sherman, *The Memoirs of General William T. Sherman* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1957), 117-128.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 119.

The second period of military governance to review is the period of Reconstruction. In Allen Guelzo's book, *Reconstruction: A Concise History*, he defines this period as lasting from 1865 to 1877.²⁵ Guelzo describes the sympathetic plan for Reconstruction of the South by Lincoln's successor President Andrew Johnson, his battles with Congress over his policies, and his eventual impeachment, followed by the implementation of more radical Reconstruction policies. In Richard White's *The Republic for Which it Stands*, he discusses the challenge Lincoln's military governors faced as they executed policy, and the simmering dissatisfaction locally-elected governors harbored against the military-appointed government. Many governors petitioned Congress and the US President to dissolve military government or request they not be sent to assist. When appointed military government soldiers did arrive, protests erupted and local citizens demanded the troops leave, to no avail.²⁶

Joseph Dawson provides an in-depth account of the complexity of military governance during reconstruction in his book, *Army Generals and Reconstruction: Louisiana, 1862-1877*. While the book specifically covers military governance in Louisiana, it provides an important portent into the challenges Army leaders had in executing the task across the South. Dawson described the critical role the Army played in the South as the only government entity that could police the area. He described the typical duties Army leaders had to contend with daily including "justice, finance, transportation, education, labor, and charity."²⁷ He also described how significantly the occupying generals formed and shaped policy while the southerners felt challenged by the military occupation and influence over their spaces and laws. Finally, he emphasized the influence Army leadership asserted throughout the Reconstruction years as the force stationing levels declined in the South.²⁸

²⁵ Guelzo, *Reconstruction: A Concise History*, 1.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 786-787.

²⁷ Joseph Dawson, *Army Generals and Reconstruction: Louisiana, 1862-1877* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 1.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

The American Civil War authors paint a familiar picture when describing how the Union Army executed governance operations. Military governance across the South was a necessary but inexplicably unanticipated component of the war effort. While military governance was executed in different ways in cities across the South, leaders consistently dealt with governance related issues. The Union Army's experience with governance in the American Civil War set a clear precedent for future American wars. The military would have to consider how it would support and execute governance operations during and after combat operations as part of its strategy. The American Civil War would remain the Army's most in-depth and encompassing experience until World War II.²⁹

Spanish-American War

The Spanish-American War was fought for five months in 1898, largely over Cuba's desire for independence from Spain. The United States supported Cuban independence and sent the USS *Maine* to the Havana Harbor to send a strong message to Spain and to protect American interests and citizens in Cuba. When the *Maine* exploded, more than 250 American sailors and marines were killed which fueled US resolve.³⁰ The United States quickly defeated the Spanish and used the war as an opportunity to expand its powers and seize Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. The acquisition of the Spanish territories is arguably the best example of American imperialism.³¹

Russell Alger provides the most detailed account of how the combat action in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines were executed and how initial military governance operations were conducted in his book, *The Spanish-American War*. Alger was the US Secretary of War from March 1897 to August 1899 and, as such, he established policy and worked daily with senior US Army leaders during both combat and occupation operations during the war. Alger's account arguably provides the single best narrative of the military struggle to defeat the Spanish and the US Army's initial requirements with governance in

²⁹ Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance*, 51.

³⁰ Daniel Brannen, *Spanish-American War* (Farmington Hills, MI: The Gale Group, Inc., 2003), 3-5.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 65-77.

Puerto Rico, Cuba, Guam, and the Philippines.³² Secretary Alger repeatedly guided his Army generals on military governance decisions, cautioning them against radical policy changes, which he considered dangerous. Alger valued local government control and, in close coordination with President William McKinley, emphasized the importance of maintaining laws the Spanish had in place whenever possible. He was convinced the status quo was an important component to keeping the peace, enabling his Army to be successful in executing military governance, and facilitating the successful transfer of authority.

The book *In the Days of McKinley* provides a detailed overview of President William McKinley's strategy and expectations around how the US military would conduct itself as it executed the occupation and inevitable governance and administration of the new American territories. Speaking to General Rufus Shafter, the the senior Army commander in Cuba, McKinley was clear in his instruction:

The US would proclaim the kindly intensions of the United States toward all peaceful and law-abiding inhabitants. They were to be protected in their persons and property, and in their private rights and relations. The transfer of authority was to occasion a minimal derangement Municipal laws were to remain for the present in force. Existing officials and courts, on accepting American supremacy, were to continue to function under military supervision. "Our occupation," the President wrote, "should be as free from severity as possible."³³

While President McKinley provided good general guidance on how the military was to conduct itself over the course of its occupation of Cuba, the details, interpretation and adaptation of existing policy, and everyday execution of governance and administration would fall to the Army and Secretary Alger.

In a cable to Secretary Alger on May 19th, 1898, President McKinley issued an executive order regarding the occupation of the Philippines and basic guidance for governance to both Alger and the Secretary of the Navy, John Davis Long . It stated "as the levy of all contributions in territory occupied by a belligerent is a military right derived from the law of nations, the collection and distribution of duties and taxes in the Philippines during the military occupation of the United States will be made, under the orders of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, by the military or naval commanders, as the

³² Russell Alexander Alger, *The Spanish-American War* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1901).

³³ Margaret Leech, *In the Days of McKinley* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1959), 272.

case may be, of the ports or places which may be in the possession of our forces.”³⁴ McKinley asked for a review to be completed of the current laws the Spanish had in place. Military leaders at all levels would be responsible to review current policies, make recommendations, implement the new laws, and administer over the newly-won Spanish territories.

Military government would become the mission in Cuba, Guam, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico. “Tactical combat units established city governments, created constitutions, rebuilt sanitation and health services, and established educational systems.”³⁵ Tactical commanders did this without formal training and without established doctrine on military governance.³⁶ Army leaders had to rely on their ingenuity, their sense of fairness, and understanding of the law and the local conditions in the attempt to get it right. In the end, military governance would continue until 1902 and set the conditions for the transfer of authority back to American civilian control in the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico, and host nation control in Cuba.

World War I

American military governance in World War I was executed in the Rhineland following the Armistice signed by Germany in November 1918. The most comprehensive account of governance in World War I was produced by Colonel I. L. Hunt in his report, *American Military Government of Occupied Germany 1918-1920*. Hunt was the Civil Affairs officer of the newly formed Third United States Army, commanded by Major General Joseph Dickman, which was formed four days prior to the signing of the Armistice on 11 November 1918. Third Army would have just over five weeks to prepare itself and its 200,000 soldiers for the occupation and associated military government on German soil. The

³⁴ William McKinley: “Executive Order,” May 19, 1898, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, accessed January 15, 2019, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=69292>.

³⁵ Schadow, *War and the Art of Governance*, 58.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 59.

report covered the period of December 1918 through January 1920.³⁷ The Third Army mission was unique from the start as it was clear to everyone in the formation that their mission would be to enforce the terms of the Armistice.

The US Army would occupy the portions of Rhineland with the absolute authority to govern but with only the broadest guidance on how to do so. “The armistice provided that the supreme governmental power in occupied Germany should be lodged in the military authorities of the occupying Army.”³⁸ Importantly, the Armistice also granted that civil government would continue to be run by Germans. The military government would work in tandem with and monitor and assist German civil government. This was good news for the US Army as it meant there would be competent and capable German leaders continuing to govern as the Army had not had time to prepare and train itself for a full military government operation.³⁹ As in past wars, the Army would have to merge policymaking with the peacekeeping demands inherent to their occupation.

Officers in the Third Army were not well-versed on the German’s system of government. While many possessed a cursory grip of the German government’s autocratic policies and understood their intention of adopting a new democratic-based system as a result of the Armistice, little was understood about how governance systems operated at the local and state levels. The Army headquarters resolutely leaned into the task of providing its leaders a German government crash course in the days prior to occupation of the Rhineland. There was no Army doctrine or manual to guide leaders in the task to come; it had to be created. As Hunt wrote:

A pamphlet entitled “Notes on German Local Government,” was prepared by the Second Section of the General Staff at G. H. Q. This pamphlet contained important notes on the organization of the German governmental system and in addition devoted several pages to German laws on billeting and requisitions. It further contained notes on the German administration of justice. This pamphlet was at that time the only source of information distributed among officers of the army

³⁷ I. L. Hunt, *American Military Government in Occupied Germany 1918-1920* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1943), 25.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 26.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

on the organization, government and laws of the country which they were called upon to govern.⁴⁰

General John Pershing and the overall Allied Commander, Field Marshal Ferdinand Foch of France, issued a joint proclamation alerting the German population that the American military government was in charge and while they would remain in close coordination with the German government at all levels, the Americans would act as the final decision-making authority.⁴¹

As with previous American wars, the US Army found itself supporting society from the village and town level to the state level with personnel not trained for governance operations. Colonel Hunt referred to the frustration felt by the leadership of Third Army on their lack of preparation.

It is extremely unfortunate that the qualifications necessary for a civil administration are not developed among officers in times of peace. The history of the United States offers an uninterrupted series of wars, which demanded as their aftermath, the exercise by its officers of civil governmental functions. Despite the precedents of military governments in Mexico, California, the Southern States, Cuba, Porto Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines and elsewhere, the lesson has seemingly not been learned.⁴²

Throughout the occupation, the US Army would have to trust its leaders at all levels to carry out the duties of military government and to treat the population fairly. The Army issued as much broad guidance and clarification as possible during the mission.

Military government is simply military authority exercised in accordance with the laws and usages of war. Military oppression is not military government; it is an abuse of the power which the law of war confers. As military government is carried on by military force, it is incumbent upon those who administer it to be strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor and humanity-virtues adorning a soldier even more than other men, for the very reason that he possesses the power of his arms against the unarmed.⁴³

There was a clear understanding that the US Army had to be disciplined and just to positively influence the perceptions of the local German population. With general guidance, the US Army would prove in the Rhineland occupation what it had continually proved throughout the American wartime experience; it

⁴⁰ Hunt, *American Military Government*, 29-30.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 30-34.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 64.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 329.

would find a way to accomplish the mission and achieve success. Hunt's report detailing the challenges the Army faced, the solutions they created, and the peace it enforced should be considered the premier document and ideal starting place to begin study of American military governance.

Major General Joseph Dickman, commander of the Third Army and in charge of the US Army occupation of the Rhineland in 1918, also wrote an account of the war, *The Great Crusade*. Students of military government should review chapters nine and ten to benefit from the author's thoughts on the Armistice with Germany, the near simultaneous formulation of the Third Army, the advance west through Luxemburg, the initial guidance he provided his soldiers, and the march to the Rhine river during occupation.⁴⁴ Dickman had taken command of Third Army after commanding the US I Corps during intense combat operations in the Meuse-Argonne just weeks earlier.⁴⁵ Major General Dickman's sheer mental agility, demonstrated by his ability to switch from the savvy, tactical thinking required to maneuver a Corps commander in large-scale combat operations to the strategic finesse of an astute statesman whose efforts rose to the task of crafting governance policy for an occupied territory, is worthy of further study.

Another account of the occupation of the Rhineland in World War I and the US Army's military governance efforts is by Major General Henry Allen, *The Rhineland Occupation*. Allen followed Major General Dickman as commander of American forces in Germany in July 1919. Allen focused on the Treaty of Versailles, signed in June of 1919, and the end of formal American military government. Additionally, he analyzes the transition of power back to the German government in January 1920 and the withdrawal of US soldiers from Germany in 1923. Allen highlights the importance of the lessons the US Army learned from both the British and French military governments and how they administered their portions of occupied territory.⁴⁶ Allen also underscores the US Army's lack of planning and foresight in

⁴⁴ Joseph Dickman, *The Great Crusade: A Narrative of the World War* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1927), 196-222.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 162-194.

⁴⁶ Henry Allen, *The Rhineland Occupation* (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1927), 91-100.

assigning officers with experience in government, and the dearth of helpful guidance from the American government regarding governance policy. General Allen's observations were consistent with the US experience in both the Civil War and the Spanish-American War. Commanders consistently found themselves creating governance policy out of necessity as they were the available resource on the ground.

The World War I authors were instrumental in advancing the necessity and importance of military government strategy planning for future conflict, especially World War II. Colonel I.L. Hunt emphasized that the US military, since the American Civil War, had continually disregarded the critical lessons of military governance it had learned. He emphasized how unfortunate it was that the US military continued to miscalculate and vastly underestimate the necessity of military governance training for officers and soldiers tasked with such responsibility. Throughout the occupation of the Rhineland in World War I, General Dickman, in close coordination with his appointed civil affairs officer, Colonel Hunt, created governance policy for the Rhineland based on very little guidance; however, the policy they created was sound. Third Army policies in the Rhineland like the importance of local German governmental control and aligning American military governance with the German government structure would be used as blueprints for the US military governance strategy in World War II. Finally, the warning cries from both General Dickman and Colonel Hunt on the criticality of formally training military government professionals were heeded in World War II with the most comprehensive military governance training in American history.

World War II

The American experience with military governance during World War II was executed on a massive scale. Unlike the three previous wars reviewed, significant doctrine emerged that established the basic parameters for the governance of occupied territory. Military government would be a necessary component of the war in the Pacific and European theaters both during the fighting and after surrender agreements were signed. American military government and the occupation of Axis nations would be critical to re-establishing normalcy, rebuilding those nations, and the peaceful transition of power back to

the governments of Germany, Japan, and Italy. Since the end of American occupation following World War II, American military forces have remained in all three countries as allies and partners.

The most influential manual for governance in World War II was the FM 27-5 series,⁴⁷ *Military Government*, published in July 1940. The manual discussed both the basic policy and legality of military government in occupied territory.⁴⁸ It defined phases of military government in newly acquired enemy territory during the fight and following it, when the time came to execute government operations.⁴⁹ It established the parameters for Commanders and their staff to use as a basic template if they had to reorganize their unit to execute military governance. The manual recognized the unique requirement for unit training as well as the need to requisition specially trained personnel with language and governance experience. Additionally, it established the authority of military governance, placing the sole responsibility on the commanding general of the corresponding theater of war.⁵⁰

An updated version of FM 27-5 was published in 1943, during the war. The 1943 manual added a key component that was missing from the 1940 version. It formally discussed the underlying reasons for and the object of control of military governance. The manual stated that military governance in occupied territory was an extension of US government policy. It was a recognition that military governance was an unavoidable necessity of the war:

The object of civil affairs control through military government is to assist military operations, to further national politics, and to fulfill the obligation of the occupying forces under international law. This assistance is rendered by maintaining order, promoting security of the occupying forces, preventing interference with military operations, reducing active or passive sabotage, relieving combat troops of civil administration, and mobilizing local resources in aid of military objectives and carrying out governmental policies of the United States which usually are predetermined.⁵¹

⁴⁷ An updated version of FM 27-5 was published in 1943.

⁴⁸ War Department, *Field Manual (FM) 27-5, Military Government* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940), 1-2.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 32-33.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁵¹ War Department, *Field Manual (FM) 27-5, Military Government* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1943), 3.

The other important clarification of the updated manual was the recommendation to keep existing governance in place in occupied territory if possible.⁵² While the occupying military government has final say and absolute control, it was clearly understood by the US military, based on the US Army's experience during the World War I occupation of the Rhineland, that the true government expertise resided with the officials of the occupied territory.

Field Manual 27-10, *Rules of Land Warfare*, published in October of 1940, must also be mentioned as a critical document that provided guidance to US military personnel prior to World War II. While FM 27-10 provided the guidelines for the conduct of US servicemen during war in accordance with international law, it also had a detailed chapter on the military government in occupied enemy territory.⁵³ This was the second formal reference to the execution of military governance following the July 1940 publishing of FM 27-5, *Military Government*. While many commonalities exist within the language of the two manuals, FM 27-10 provided a more detailed analysis of the laws and authorities granted by international law surrounding military governance. The manual explained how new laws are put in place, the suspension of existing or the promulgation of new laws, and the rights of the occupying military government to adapt local law.⁵⁴

Hajo Holborn's book, *American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies*, published in 1947, provided an insightful account of the planning for and execution of American military governance in occupied Italy and Germany, as well as in the Far East including Japan, Korea, and Okinawa. Holborn pointed to the American Army's experience with military governance the century before, including the campaigns already discussed in the Civil War, The Spanish-American War, and World War I.⁵⁵ Holborn articulated that World War II was different than any other American experience

⁵² War Department, FM 27-5 (1943), 8.

⁵³ War Department, *Rules of Land Warfare*, 73-85.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 75-77.

⁵⁵ Hajo Holborn, *American Military Government: Its Organizations and Policies* (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), 2.

because of the scale at which the American military would be required to execute governance operations. “If in addition to military government all civil affairs, i.e., army operations concerned with civilian populations overseas, are taken into consideration, it may be said that the lives of more than 300 million people in various parts of the globe were vitally affected by the civil affairs operations of the American Army.”⁵⁶ Importantly, American military leaders appropriately anticipated the requirement for US governance operations following the war and established a school of military government in May, 1942 in Charlottesville, Virginia.⁵⁷ While this vitally important school produced valuable graduates, the numbers of trained governance administrators it produced fell appallingly short of the requirement.

While the scale of military governance was unlike anything before seen in the American military experience, there were many similarities to past efforts. US military governance became the primary tool by which our government could influence the development of the occupied nations.⁵⁸ The US possessed a military with the vast majority of leaders untrained in governance operations. While the requirement for formalized training was an imperative, much of the military would be forced to establish governance in occupied nations with the forces they had.⁵⁹ A combination of learning on the job and formal training in real time was reality. Holborn also describes the difficulty of coordinating military governance activities with allies, also in occupation, to ensure a unified, coordinated approach.

Political scientist Carl Friedrich’s book, *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II*, published in 1948, details the formulation and execution of American policy in the Pacific, European, and Mediterranean Theaters of Operation. Friedrich, like COL I.L. Hunt expressed during World War I, explored a common theme in his book, that the mistakes and policy miscalculations the US military made executing governance operations came down to a simple factor: lack of training. Friedrich

⁵⁶ Holborn, *American Military Government*, xi.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, forward.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, xi-xiii.

stated there was “a need on the part of key personnel of our armed forces for a political training as comprehensive as that required of the members of the foreign service.”⁶⁰ The importance of Friedrich’s account is evident in the military governance planning across each theater in World War II. For the first time in the American experience at war, military governance was regarded and planned for as if it were on par with actual combat. The realization was that the fair, judicious, and complicated aftermath of combat operations, military governance operations, if executed appropriately, leads to victory.

The book *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952*, proffers fantastic insight into the struggle of implementing military government in each Theater of Operation. The book was the result of a collaboration of authors who all served in occupying military governments during the war. They describe the planning that went into post-war Europe, occupation, and military government, and demonstrate there was significant analysis of past efforts with the hope of not repeating history’s mistakes.⁶¹ While lessons from the American experience in the Rhineland during World War I were considered and implemented, the lesson that emerged was that the scale of the military governance requirement was underestimated. The US Army would fail to train even half the military government force it would need for the war.

Another important book to review in the study of World War II governance, specifically the European theater, is the *Military Government Journal: Normandy to Berlin*. It describes the challenges the US Army faced in its execution of military governance from the local to the national level from the invasion of Normandy through the advance east and the occupation of Berlin. The author, a retired major general, detailed the training he received at the civil affairs training school he attended in 1943. He describes his civil affairs and governance duties during the war in France, Belgium, and Germany.⁶² As

⁶⁰ Friedrich, *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II*, vii.

⁶¹ Robert Wolfe, ed., *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 3-52.

⁶² John Maginnis, *Military Government Journal: Normandy to Berlin* (Cambridge, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1971), ix-x.

the war progressed, the author's duties and responsibilities within the military governance wheelhouse grew. The book is unique because it was derived from the author's journal and provides a day-to-day account of his experiences and revelations. Most sources reviewed in this literature review are written at the macro level, often synthesizing governance lessons learned. Maginnis's book provides an account of what it took to be successful in the field and what it took to operationalize governance at the tactical level.

Finally, there are important manuscripts and US Department of the Army reviews of World War II governance. The historical manuscript file, *United States Military Governance in Germany: Operations during the Rhineland Campaign*, was produced by the historical division of European command in 1950. The manuscript details the struggle US military governance detachments confronted due to the scope of duties they were charged to perform. The scope was vast while military governance detachments were small. The manuscript provided insight into the basic governance training American leaders received, how they organized police forces, established policy, enforced laws, navigated denazification, and created the conditions to provide basic services for the local population.⁶³ This manuscript was the most important resource on World War II governance found in describing military governance detachment training, execution of military governance during and immediately after combat operations, and lessons learned.

World War II advanced the concept, requirement, proficiency, and necessity of military governance more than any other war in the American experience. Governance doctrine, formal government detachment and administration training, coordination with other Allied government administered areas, and the scale required to achieve success were realized. The governance lessons learned from World War II, in what stands as the single largest military government effort in US history, can be applied to future conflict and provide the foundation to what must be considered in the next peer or near-peer large-scale combat operation.

⁶³ Joseph Starr, "U.S. Military Government in Germany: Operations during the Rhineland Campaign" (Historical Division, European Command, Karlsruhe, Germany, 1950), 77-108.

The Dominican Crisis

Following World War II, the emergence of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as global super powers in a bi-polar international system, changed US military governance policy. Military governance was utilized as a component of the US strategy to counter communism during the Cold War.⁶⁴ Military advisors in both Korea and Vietnam and the US partnership with the governments of South Korea and the South Vietnam were critical components of the US effort to prevent the spread of communism during both the Korean and Vietnam wars.⁶⁵ The case of the US intervention in the Dominican Republic is another good example of this phenomenon. Fearing the Dominican Republic would fall to communism in 1965 after an uprising against the government, the US sent in combat forces to prevent it. In this case, military governance in the Dominican Republic became a dominant mission requirement of the US Army.

Bruce Palmer's book, *Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965*, is arguably the best account of that crisis. General Palmer was in command of US forces as the Eighteenth Airborne Corps Commander in the Dominican Republic at the time and he detailed the challenges with initially stabilizing the situation and establishing a provincial government. Initially, American forces were sent to protect Americans on the island from the communist uprising. General Palmer was to gain control of the tactical situation and be prepared to evacuate American citizens. Palmer knew, though, that if the uprising gained momentum, his mission would be expanded to prevent the fall of the government to communism.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ The Cold War is generally considered to have started from the emergence of both the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic as a global super power following victory in World War II to the collapse of the USSR in 1991.

⁶⁵ A good discussion of governance and impact of military advisors in the Korean War can be found in William Stueck's, *The Korean War: An International History*. For Vietnam I would refer the reader to two books. First, read George Herring's, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975*, which covers the entirety of the war from a policy perspective. Also read Jeffrey Race's, *War Comes to LONG AN*, which gives a great account of governance in a single province and the associated military, political, and social situation.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

In the beginning of the crisis, Palmer commanded a force drawn from the Marine Corps and Army. Throughout the crisis, the 82nd Airborne Division was the primary military unit on the ground after the Marines redeployed. Palmer's chapters on establishing the government and his assessment of the performance of US forces are critical to understanding the crisis.⁶⁷ Palmer discussed the role of the 82nd Airborne Division and how the mission it was prepared for the most, the fighting and combat operations, while important, grew less important as operations in the Dominican Republic progressed. Leaders in the 82nd quickly discovered military governance was unavoidable and increasingly important. "Army personnel addressed longer-term problems such as sanitation, health care reform, and the medical system."⁶⁸ The 82nd also assisted in the organization and implementation of the national police force in the capital city of Santo Domingo. While the 82nd handled military governance at the local to provincial level, General Palmer assisted in the creation of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) that called on soldiers from both the United States as well as other nations in the Organization for American States (OAS). While Palmer served as the Deputy Commander for the IAPF, it was a critical political move to introduce other Latin American forces into the crisis. This set the conditions for the US military to pull out of the Dominican Republic by September 1965 and the IAPF in 1966 after the country held successful elections and the new government got its democratic footing.⁶⁹

There were numerous military governance lessons learned that emerged from the crisis. The US military was highly trained to execute combat operations but lacked formal governance training. Palmer pointed to the difficulty of highly lethal combat troops adjusting to the role of peacekeeping.⁷⁰ Governance operations were an inescapable component of the strategy in the Dominican Republic. When reflecting on the lessons learned from the crisis, Palmer stated that "the most profound overall lesson of

⁶⁷ Bruce Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965*, (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1989), 86-100 and 139-161.

⁶⁸ Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance*, 193.

⁶⁹ Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean*, 69-75.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 150.

such an undertaking is the necessity for a complete integration of effort: political, military, psychological, socioeconomic, public affairs, and information.”⁷¹ Palmer also pointed to the criticality of preparing soldiers for peacekeeping operations. Soldiers must understand the guiding political objectives and be prepared to execute tasks to achieve those objectives. He highlighted that soldiers’ duties include, “distributing food and water, providing medical care, and ensuring the uninterrupted operation of the city’s utilities.”⁷² The 82nd Airborne Division even found itself running the abandoned Santo Domingo Zoo for a couple months.⁷³ Finally, Palmer would point to the creation of the IAPF as the key political and security apparatus that would enable US forces to redeploy as soon as the government was secure from communist influence. Countering communist influence around the world would remain a key US policy objective until 1991.

The disintegration of the USSR in 1991 left the United States as the world’s sole superpower and global hegemon for three decades. US intervention in foreign conflicts increased, including US involvement in Bosnia, 1994-1995, and Kosovo in 1999. In these conflicts the United States deployed its forces to prevent ethnic cleansing, provide humanitarian intervention, and serve as peacekeeping forces. As peacekeepers, the US military advised the military and government, and maintains forces in both countries as of 2019. In every conflict, military governance has been a component of US military strategy in some way.

Contemporary Conflict

Since September 11, 2001, and the destruction of the US World Trade Center by the global terrorist organization al-Qaeda, the US military has been embroiled in the longest war in its history, the Global War on Terrorism. After ousting the Taliban government from Afghanistan in 2001, the US military established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) comprised of all member nations

⁷¹ Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean*, 155.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 160.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other allies to help choose what should come next.⁷⁴ These nations stayed in Afghanistan to support the new, and fragile, Afghan government. US military forces in Afghanistan have executed a wide array of actions across the range of military operations from peacekeeping to counterinsurgency operations, support of host nation governance from the tribal level to the national level, humanitarian assistance and infrastructure development, training of security forces, and daily combat operations. The conflict in Afghanistan is entering its eighteenth year as of 2019. Negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Taliban to reconcile their differences and end the conflict are ongoing.

In 2003, the US launched offensive operations in Iraq to oust dictator Saddam Hussein and the Baathist government. After the Hussein regime was toppled, the US military again stayed in the country to assist in the creation of the new government and enable it until 2011. The US military found itself supporting operations across the range of military operations including the training of host national security forces, advising the government at the tribal, district, provincial, and national level, humanitarian assistance, nation building, and assisting in the fight against insurgent forces. Once the US military pulled out of Iraq in 2011, the Iraqi government functioned well until 2014. In 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) took over large parts of northwest and north central Iraq. The US military was called upon for action in both Iraq and Syria. The US military has now been in Iraq, apart from the interlude from late 2011 to mid-2014, since 2003.

Over the course of the last eighteen years of limited contingency operations including stability operations and counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, traditional near-peer and peer adversaries have been modernizing their forces. For the first time in three decades, US status as the sole superpower is being challenged by rising, or re-emerging, powers including China and Russia.⁷⁵ The chance for Large

⁷⁴ At its largest in 2011-2012, ISAF consisted of forty-seven nations, including all twenty-nine current NATO member countries and had a combined force of 160,000 soldiers.

⁷⁵ US Department of Defense, *The 2017 National Security Strategy*, 3.

Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) against a near-peer or peer adversary is rising. To that end, the literature review has highlighted that military governance is a key component of LSCO, as it has been in every type of conflict the US military has been involved with across the conflict continuum in the American wartime experience since the civil war. Military governance must be viewed as something the US military will do in all future conflict; therefore, action must be taken to address it prior to the next conflict. Ignoring the requirement prior to war would both be consistent with our tradition and to our peril.

Military Governance in the Rhineland Campaign, World War II

In the philosophy of war there is no principle more sound than this: that the permanence of peace depends, in large degree, upon the magnanimity of the victor.

—Colonel I.L. Hunt, Civil Affairs Officer, Third US Army, World War I

This three-part section will analyze American military government operations during the Rhineland Campaign in World War II. Part one focuses on the military governance unit training for the Rhineland invasion, including detachment task organization and forces available. Part two covers the Rhineland occupation's combat phase and how military government detachments executed their duties directly behind the lines of frontline combat soldiers during the invasion. Part three examines the surrender of German forces, establishing Allied control, and how military governance guided the initial stages of rebuilding the German government. Most importantly, this section underscores what a crucial and undeniably needle-moving component military government is within the context of large-scale combat operations. Without it, everything suffers.

The section contrasts the preparations made by the US Army to carry out military governance against the enormous scale the campaign demanded. It highlights several issues the US military will need to consider in the face of future conflicts, particularly the complexities that arise when the occupying force fails to anticipate tactical challenges on the ground. It demonstrates that, whenever possible, the soldiers and leaders tasked to execute military governance should hold themselves separate and apart from those who experienced the horror of close combat operations with the enemy. It underscores the

importance of enabling local indigenous control and working within the confines of existing government at all levels. While made difficult by the Allied policy of denazification,⁷⁶ finding and empowering German leaders willing to take responsibility for their communities, cities, or regions, better enabled normalcy for the German population and, in turn, decreased violence and increased cooperation. This was extremely difficult during the combat phase as German men were committed to fighting the war. In most cases, the only German citizens found in villages, towns, and cities during the combat phase were women, children. The environment demands leaders at all levels clearly understand US policy and national objectives and internalize that they will make decisions in the pursuit of those objectives using their ingenuity, sense of justice, and morality, with very little guidance. Finally, the reader should take away the inescapable lesson of the war. The success or failure of military governance rides heavily on the quality of the leaders and soldiers tasked with executing it. Anything less than our best jeopardizes the operation.

Training Governance Detachments, Forces Available, and Task Organization

Shortly after the United States entered World War II, the War Department researched the prospect of needing specially trained men for military governance. Interestingly, one of the main documents reviewed was the report written by I.L. Hunt, the civil affairs officer responsible for military governance for Third US Army in World War I, previously mentioned, during the occupation of the Rhineland in 1918.⁷⁷ As a result of the War Department review, described in the literature review, the school for military government was established in May 1942. The Provost Marshal General, tasked to train the US Army for military governance, estimated the Army would need 6,000 officers for the task by the end of 1944.⁷⁸ The plan was to train the senior leaders at the school for military government and mid-

⁷⁶ Denazification was the Allied directive to rid all aspects of German society and government from the ideology of National Socialism.

⁷⁷ The General Board, *Civil Affairs and Military Government Organizations and Operations* (US Forces European Theater, Study Number 32, 1945), 11.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 14.

grade and specialty officers at the Provost Marshal General's company officer school. These schools would be referred to as Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS).

At the school for military government, officers rotated through a three to four-month curriculum focused on the theater of operation in which they would serve. Selection was rigorous within the Army for the school of military government, yielding a formidable group with extensive backgrounds in government, local language, policy, law, education, and public works.⁷⁹ Upon graduation, these officers would be entrusted "to rebuild vital services in foreign countries and to translate future policies of the United States into workable plans of administration."⁸⁰ Officers selected for more specialized roles completed a thirty day curriculum at the Provost Marshal General school, followed by a three-month in-depth course at a civilian university⁸¹ renowned for subject matter expertise in the area of focus.⁸² Additionally, the requisition of 2500 experts from the civilian workforce directly commissioned into the Army of the United States as officers in the military government was requested. Many of the officers were commissioned at senior ranks, such as lieutenant colonel, to attract the right applicants.⁸³ Approval to commission officers into the newly formed Army Specialist Corps (ASC) was granted in October 1942.⁸⁴ The two-year effort to develop a corps of military government experts, while not numerically sufficient, was successful.

As of 22 April 1944, when the last Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS) for North Africa and European Theaters were closed, 3700 officers had been selected and trained for these areas. Except for a comparatively small number of CA officers remaining in the Mediterranean Theater,

⁷⁹ Holborn, *American Military Government*, 3.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁸¹ Civilian universities were utilized as partnership universities. This was a mutually beneficial relationship and provided a level of education, within specific government specialties, that could not be taught with the same level of rigor in military schools.

⁸² The General Board, *Civil Affairs and Military Government Organizations and Operations*, 16.

⁸³ Benson and Howe, "Military Government Organizational Relationships," 69.

⁸⁴ The General Board, *Civil Affairs and Military Government Organizations and Operations*, 16.

all of these officers came to the ETO, either directly from the US, or by redeployment to the European Theater from the Mediterranean.⁸⁵

While the military government cadre would be spread thin throughout the Rhineland, there was at least a base of trained experts able to kick off the occupation.⁸⁶

American military governance units in Europe were broken down into detachments of varying sizes and attached to the US tactical headquarters at the army, corps, and division level for the initial invasion.⁸⁷ The detachments were created based on the size of the military unit they would support or the area in which they would operate. Initially they were designated as civil affairs detachments. They ranged in size from “A” detachments, set to cover down on regional capitals, through “D” detachments, organized for local, district, or city levels.

Table 1. Civil Affairs Detachments

<u>Detachment</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Warrant Os</u>	<u>EN</u>	<u>Total</u>
A	16	3	20	39
B	9	2	14	25
C	6	1	7	14
D	4	0	5	9

Source: The General Board, *Civil Affairs and Military Government Organizations and Operations* (US Forces, European Theater, Study Number 32, 1945), 29. The composition of each CA detachment is listed above. Detachments were placed at all governmental levels, “A” detachments being intended for regional capitals, “B” detachments for departmental capitals, and “C” and “D” detachments for arrondissement and city levels.

By October 1944, the Civil Affairs (CA) detachments were reorganized into military governance detachments. Total personnel were increased over the previous CA detachments and were better organized for operation at specific levels of German society and governance. The reorganization was to

⁸⁵ The General Board, *Civil Affairs and Military Government Organizations and Operations*, 15.

⁸⁶ Holborn, *American Military Government*, 47.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 48.

align with the phases of governance operations as they related to the occupation of the Rhineland, the amount of German territory conquered, and the eventual surrender of all German forces. These phases coincided with the “Carpet Plan,” “Plan Eclipse,” and the “Static Plan.”⁸⁸ The “Carpet Plan” was the initial deployment of the governance detachments during the combat phase.⁸⁹ “Plan Eclipse” was the plan on how US governance forces would restructure, gain manpower, and align with German governance at the time of surrender.⁹⁰ Plan Eclipse would later be referred to as the “First Static Plan.” “Plan Static” was the plan for governance in occupied Germany after surrender.⁹¹

Military governance detachments ranged in size from “E” detachments being the largest, to “I” the smallest. The “E” detachments “were designed to take over the government of entire German states (Lander) and supervise the other detachments, designated “F” to “I” installed within them... Their assignments were to be in the rural districts and lesser municipalities.”⁹² This structure would serve as the baseline for governance detachments through combat operations up until the German surrender. The size of each could be augmented based on local conditions and at the discretion of the tactical commanders. The table below shows the task organization of the military governance detachments.

⁸⁸ The General Board, *Civil Affairs and Military Government Organizations and Operations*, 91-98.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 91.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 95.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 97.

⁹² Earl Ziemke, “Improvising Stability and Change in Postwar Germany,” in *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952*, ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 53.

Table 2. Military Governance Detachments

<u>Detachment:</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Warrant Os</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total</u>
E	26	3	35	64
F	16	2	25	43
G	9	2	15	26
H	5	1	10	16
I	4	0	6	10

Source: The General Board, *Civil Affairs and Military Government Organizations and Operations* (US Forces European Theater, Study Number 32, 1945), 30. The composition of MG detachments is depicted above. The types of MG detachments were lettered “E”, “F”, “G”, “H”, and “I”. They were organized to take over all of the political sub-divisions of Germany, namely: Provinz or Land, Regierungsbezirk, Stadtkreis, and Gemeinde. These detachments were destined for localities under the so-called “Carpet Plan.”

Prior to Allied soldiers entering Germany territory, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) issued a handbook for military governance. The manual described how Allied forces would execute military governance prior to the defeat of Germany. It designated that the Commander of SHAEF would control the legislative, executive, and judicial rights of Germany and Austria as the occupying power. The Supreme Allied Commander directed that military governance was a command responsibility and delegated execution of his authority to his Army Group commanders.⁹³ Army group commanders disbursed the governance detachments throughout their formations from brigade to corps. The governance handbook, along with pre-existing doctrine on military government, would serve as baseline guidance for both tactical combat units and military government detachments during the combat phase.⁹⁴

⁹³ Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, *Handbook for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender* (Washington DC: The Army Library, 1944), paragraph 1-14.

⁹⁴ *FM 27-5: Military Government*, and *FM 27-10: Rules of Land Warfare*, as mentioned in the literature review, were two other manuals not specific to the European theater for which leaders could reference.

The Combat Phase of the Occupation of the Rhineland

As military government detachments were integrated under the command of the tactical commanders, they followed the trace of frontline combat soldiers. With an initial strength of around 7500 US soldiers, military governance detachments were sufficient in strength for the initial phases of occupation. As more German territory was occupied and the number of towns and cities under Allied control increased, military governance detachments were stretched beyond the limits of their capacity.⁹⁵ Immediately upon Germany territory being occupied, detachments were put in place. At the time, the German government had implemented an evacuation policy designed to remove residents just as frontline US soldiers entered each village. In most cases, the only local people remaining in the villages were women and children, the sick, and those who ignored the evacuation order. Military governance detachments found themselves “finding shelter for the homeless, organizing distribution of food, caring for the injured and sick, and re-establishing civil administration.”⁹⁶ Further, these detachments registered the local populations, organized local citizens for the clean-up of the communities, restored utilities to the best of their ability, and collected weapons and contraband.⁹⁷

The other responsibility that fell on tactical commanders and initially delegated in large measure to military governance detachments, was that of the repatriation of displaced persons.⁹⁸ While there were intelligence reports estimating the numbers of foreign nationals taken for slave labor from occupied European nations by the Nazi regime, they were drastically underestimated.⁹⁹ The repatriation of foreign

⁹⁵ Holborn, *American Military Government*, 34.

⁹⁶ Joseph Starr, *US Military Government in Germany: Operations during the Rhineland Campaign* (Karlsruhe, Germany: Historical Division European Command, 1950), 30.

⁹⁷ Ziemke, “Improvising Stability and Change in Postwar Germany,” 55.

⁹⁸ The scale of the German slave labor policy was massive but not surprising. It fit within the concept of the German theory of their superior race. It was accepted that people considered of inferior race should be enslaved to work at the discretion of the Nazi party. Many of these displaced citizens served years as slaves to the Reich prior to being liberated by the Allies. 12 million displaced personnel would be discovered in occupied Nazi Germany. That is not counting prisoner of war camps of Allied soldiers or concentration camps.

⁹⁹ The General Board, *Displaced Persons, Refugees and Recovered Allied Military Personnel* (US Forces European Theater, Study Number 35, 1945), 1.

citizens was a monumental task to achieve as Allied forces advanced east. In the American sector alone, the number of displaced people was initially estimated in the tens of thousands and by the surrender of Germany in May 1945, that number had ballooned to over five million.¹⁰⁰

Another difficulty the military government detachments encountered as they worked to re-establish civilian control was the policy of denazification. The policy was a unilateral, all-encompassing one. While the disintegration of the Nazi party and all subsidiaries, leaders, and sympathizers was both valid and necessary, US governance leaders soon discovered that membership in the Nazi party was mandatory, even for the lowest-level community leaders.¹⁰¹ US officers diverged wildly in their understanding of their authority to operationalize the strict policy. Some officers, using their initiative and best judgement, re-empowered German civil authority quickly, resulting in the rapid restoration of basic services and functioning communities. Other officers, who interpreted the policy of denazification literally, failed to re-establish civil administration because, in their minds, there were no able-bodied citizens qualified to appoint.¹⁰² The lesson learned is that policy should not be black and white. If a policy is transmitted as black and white, leaders may interpret the policy differently based on the challenges they face in their areas of operation developing vastly different solutions to similar problem sets that can either enable or detract from policy objectives.

The denazification policy made re-establishing German local policing as difficult as empowering civil administration for military governance units. The inherent lack of able-bodied German men in remaining in the communities made this an especially difficult task. Through the first five months of 1945, cobbling together German police forces in towns and cities was a huge problem.¹⁰³ The US Army established a school in Belgium to both retrain former, and to train new, German policemen from Allied

¹⁰⁰ Ziemke, "Improvising Stability and Change in Postwar Germany," 57.

¹⁰¹ Starr, *US Military Government in Germany*, 103.

¹⁰² Friedrich, *American Experiences in Military Government*, 243-244.

¹⁰³ Starr, *US Military Government in Germany*, 81.

prisoner of war camps. Once trained, they would be sent into Germany, usually to their home regions, where they became cadre for the local police force. As the US Army captured more and more territory throughout the first three months of 1945, military governance detachments established police training sites in cities all over Allied Occupied Germany. The occupying military governance detachment armed German police only with clubs or night sticks and issued each a single arm band to signify their roles. It was not until the after the German surrender in May of 1945 that the first German policeman were permitted handguns.¹⁰⁴ The arming of German police was enabled at different times across the country based on their training levels and the trust established with the occupying American governance detachments.

As American forces entered Berlin in July of 1945, military governance detachments, augmented by G5 sections and soldiers from the group, corps, and divisions, were involved in all aspects of German society and administration. Many of the leaders and soldiers that were assigned to bolster the military governance numbers were not previously trained and would have to learn on the job to be successful. Still, it was becoming clear military government would soon be a primary mission for the Army so the increase in personnel, trained or not trained, was a necessity. “By 30 April 1945, deployment of military government detachments had progressed to the point where 207 such detachments were actually functioning in Germany.”¹⁰⁵ It was clear that German collapse was quickly approaching. While the preponderance of military government detachments were in occupied Germany, many were not yet correctly aligned. Military government detachments were in control of all aspects of German life in Allied Occupied Territory. Military governments were organizing, supervising, and in some cases personally executing delivery of all basic services and functions of US occupied Germany including policing, fire

¹⁰⁴ Starr, *US Military Government in Germany*, 82-83.

¹⁰⁵ The General Board, *Civil Affairs and Military Government Organizations and Operations*, 96.

operations, public health, public works, law, prisons, food rationing, reopening of banks, public finance, property control, communication, and the processing of displaced people.¹⁰⁶

Military Governance After German Surrender

Germany surrendered on 7 May 1945, with the end of all hostilities effective 8 May.¹⁰⁷ The US Army had been planning the “Initial Static Plan,” the emplacement of all governance detachments in American occupied Germany for months. The plan called for military governance units to be bolstered with both new military government (MG) detachments and combat troops. “The “First Static Plan” proposed the deployment of 250 type “E”, “F”, “G”, “H”, and “I” MG detachments, 16 administrative company headquarters, and two regimental headquarters with service units.”¹⁰⁸ By the time the plan had been executed in July 1945, 280 military governance detachments were deployed to cover the demands of government operations from the local to national levels of German governance.¹⁰⁹ This more than tripled the number of American officers and soldiers assigned to governance detachments. While great progress was made, an effort to better align the military government with that of the Germany government was necessary once the American Army of occupation was established.

Lieutenant General Lucius Clay was appointed as both the Deputy Commander of US Forces in Europe and the Office of Military Government United States (OMGUS) in the American Zone to command and control all governance operations.¹¹⁰ This was done to get the territorial governance structure in place and secure the military government detachments under the new command and control structure. “Military District Commanders will command and control Military Government activities in their Districts through a Territorial Military Government Detachment chain of command which will

¹⁰⁶ Starr, *US Military Government in Germany*, 122-150.

¹⁰⁷ Maginnis, *Military Government Journal*, 246.

¹⁰⁸ The General Board, *Civil Affairs and Military Government Organizations and Operations*, 116.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 117.

¹¹⁰ Holborn, *American Military Government*, 49.

parallel the German civil administration chain of command within the District.”¹¹¹ While American military governance detachments were well aligned with the German system, General Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander of the Expeditionary Force, emphasized it was a temporary solution and the transfer of complete control of German administration back to German civil authority should be completed by June 1946 in all American occupation zones.¹¹² This emphasized the importance of getting German civil authority back in control and relieving the US Army as soon as possible.

The transfer of command and control of the military governance detachments from the tactical units to OMGUS was not immediate upon its creation. The timeliness of transfer of control varied by unit across the American zone. This lack of timeliness was one of the biggest mistakes starting on Victory-Europe Day. Victory-Europe Day should have been a clear transition point for the way American military governance was being executed. The big lesson here was that during combat operations, the military governance structure was rightly under the control of the senior American commanders. Once the Germans surrendered, this should have triggered a change in the authorities and US command relationship for military governance.¹¹³ In many cases, the military government structure, under the Army, Corps, and Division commanders, remained in place for months after the German surrender. Division and Corps headquarters did not have the right structure or capacity to deal with civil authority or with the emerging issues of re-establishing economy, trade, or exports. “From Corps on down there was a recurring tendency for tactical troop commanders to overlook the special tasks of military government officers.”¹¹⁴ This was not efficient and slowed down both decision-making and the lateral communication between military governance units. In the case of occupied Germany, the faster military governance

¹¹¹ The General Board, *Civil Affairs and Military Government Organizations and Operations*, 121.

¹¹² Holborn, *American Military Government*, 50.

¹¹³ *Ibid.* 49.

¹¹⁴ Friedrich, *American Experiences in Military Government*, 65.

detachments were transferred from division, corps, and army headquarters to OMGUS, aligned with the German government structure, the better.

Another challenge was the governance detachment integration of the Allied soldiers and leaders who had previously fought as combat soldiers against the Germans. Whether assigned to detachment security roles or governance positions within the detachment, shifting gears and accepting their new roles was challenging. Many of these soldiers and leaders had spent months, even years, fighting the Germans in close combat and the cognitive dissonance was deafening. After being conditioned to kill Germans, it was extremely challenging for those assigned to turn off their feelings of animosity and activate the sense of empathy and understanding required to do the work of administering German governance and working with community leaders to rebuild. Governance officers struggled mightily with the soldiers reassigned from combat units. More surprisingly, they even had a hard time with new soldiers who had entered the theater after combat operations and did not get a chance to fight. These soldiers and leaders had been indoctrinated for one thing, but they arrived in Germany to experience the opposite of what they had mentally prepared themselves for. Instead of battling the Germans, they were to collaborate and assist in the rebuilding of German communities, some from the ashes.¹¹⁵

In the coming months, American military governance officers spent a lot of their time redoubling denazification efforts and working with the German civil administration to create the democratic foundations of the new German government.¹¹⁶ The Army wanted out of the business of military governance as soon as possible. “The United States Army did not want to administer a failure; to preside over hunger, cold, chaos, confusion, and possible revolution in Germany.”¹¹⁷ After the Potsdam

¹¹⁵ Friedrich, *American Experiences in Military Government*, 249.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 248.

¹¹⁷ John Gimbel, “Governing the American Zone of Germany,” in *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952*, ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), 92.

conference¹¹⁸ American leaders in OMGUS worked hard and fast to replace their staff with vetted German civil administration officials. General Clay cut his military staff from “12000 to 6000 by February 1, 1946.”¹¹⁹ Getting Germans back in power from the local to national levels was key to getting the US Army out of the governance business. By November of 1945, elections at the local level were taking place in German society.¹²⁰ These were followed “by elections in the counties (Landkreise), the cities (Stadtkreis), and the states (Lander), all during 1946.”¹²¹

American military government would continue in the American zone of Germany as “the executive arm in the occupation” in decreasing numbers until 1949.¹²² The experience imparted several crucial lessons. The case study validated that military governance detachments should be attached to Army, Corps, and Division headquarters during the combat phase, but not during the post-surrender phase. Once military governance detachments were under the control of the post-surrender territorial command and control structure of OMGUS, governance efforts were better streamlined and coordinated. Finally, there was an absolute realization that military governance planning in large-scale combat operations must be a component of the operations planning process from the plan’s inception. Governance operations must be viewed as an unavoidable, critical mission requirement for the Army. It cannot be an afterthought or a secondary planning priority.¹²³

Conclusion

This monograph argues military government is an inescapable necessity of the American experience in war. The study highlights that whether executing large-scale combat operations or limited

¹¹⁸ The conference was held from 17 July to 2 August between the three heads of state of the USSR, UK, and USA to establish the postwar rules, regulations, and peace treaty arrangements.

¹¹⁹ Gimbel, “Governing the American Zone of Germany,” 94.

¹²⁰ Friedrich, *American Experiences in Military Government*, 248.

¹²¹ Gimbel, “Governing the American Zone of Germany,” 94.

¹²² Ziemke, “Improvising Stability and Change in Postwar Germany,” 66.

¹²³ The General Board, *Civil Affairs and Military Government Organizations and Operations*, 138-139.

contingency operations, the US military, led by the US Army because of its size, will execute military governance operations across the conflict continuum. While the execution of military governance is a near certainty, close examination of military governance in the Civil War, Spanish-American War, World War I, Dominican Republic, and contemporary operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, highlight a common theme. From war to war, the US military executes military governance operations despite inadequate training, limited guidance, and an unrealistic faith in individual leaders' ingenuity and will to connect policy objectives with operations on the ground. It would be easy to fall into a similar trap in future warfare. The study argues that while the US military did better to prepare a bench of military governance professionals in World War II, it did not produce enough. Thousands of soldiers and leaders found themselves part of the combat forces one day and transferred to military government detachments the next. While the scale of trained governance professionals was not achieved, the foresight to anticipate the requirement and necessity for military governance was. Valuable lessons emerged from the effort to prepare the US Army to execute governance operations in World War II. The featured case study, Operations in the Rhineland Campaign, offered both positive and negative lessons to be heeded, carried forward, and implemented for future combat operations.

The study makes plain several concepts from which to draw recommendations for military governance operations in the future. Governance operations must be part of the operational plan from the beginning. It cannot be considered a secondary effort to the combat phase and must be planned simultaneously, as an equal component. Failure to do so, the study argues, places the military at a disadvantage and forces leaders to make critical decisions planning and executing governance operations during, not prior to, the effort. Next, while it is not fiscally responsible or feasible to create new formations in the Army today based on the budget and Army end-strength, it is feasible to establish triggers to initiate the growth. As a part of war plans, the US military should create triggers to initiate governance structure, training, and personnel requirements once it is determined that hostility is imminent. The trigger could initiate a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and

Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) approach to expand military governance readiness. The DOTMLPF analysis is commonly used by the US military to analyze future programs and determine resourcing requirements across the seven categories.

Many of the DOTMLPF requirements that would be initiated based off standing triggers can be anticipated and determined now. Specially trained governance personnel within the current military including the Active, Reserve, and National Guard force for repurposing into military governance units, can be identified now. As was executed in World War II, a direct commissioning program could draw senior civilian governance professionals with critical skills into the military's reserve corps. Expanding government civilian corps authorizations also accomplishes this aim. The trigger to approve new authorizations and increase the Army's end strength must be determined. Once determined, the program should be carefully analyzed and pre-approved, taking into account new governance functions, like the cyber and space domains, that have emerged. The framework of governance units, not unlike the government detachments created in World War II, beginning with the size and scale of each, needs to be analyzed for how military government units will augment Divisions, Corps, and Theater Army headquarters in future combat operations, and how they operate after the enemy's surrender.

The US military must better prepare and position itself for the reality it faces in the execution of military governance operations in the future. As the military pivots from nearly eighteen years of limited-contingency operations to training and preparing for large-scale combat operations, we must recognize that military governance is inextricably bound to future conflict. Failure to adequately prepare our military for the missions it must accomplish is simply obtuse. The US military has the time now to build a framework, think through triggers for implementation, and develop a broad-strokes concept for execution. We should not allow ourselves to be caught flat-footed the next time we are forced as a military to execute the daunting task of governance because we know how this works. Governance falls to us. To pretend otherwise is to be disconnected from reality.

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