

Joint Consolidation of Gains:
A Theoretical Foundation for Joint Doctrinal Codification

A Monograph

by

LTC Dominik Schellenberger
German Army



School of Advanced Military Studies
US Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, KS

2019

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>		
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 23-05-2019		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) JUN 2018 - MAY 2019	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Joint Consolidation of Gains: A Theoretical Foundation for Joint Doctrinal Codification			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) LTC (DEU) Dominik Schellenberger			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301			8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Advanced Military Studies Program.			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT Against the backdrop of the current operating environment, joint concepts and US Army doctrine recognize that successful execution of dominating activities does not automatically lead to the achievement of desired military and political objectives. Thus, for the first time in US Army history, the 2017 Army operations doctrine has codified consolidation of gains. Despite the US Army's initiative, joint doctrine does not yet account for consolidation of gains. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to help close the joint doctrinal gap. Accordingly, the research question asks how can US joint doctrine and campaign planning best account for consolidation of gains. To answer this research question, the study first develops a theory of joint consolidation of gains; second, applies that theory to three historical case studies; and third, suggests a doctrinal definition of joint consolidation of gains. The historical case studies analyzed are the Battle of the Bulge from the German perspective, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the campaign to recapture the Philippines leading into the occupation of Japan. The suggested definition of joint consolidation of gains stemming from that analysis comprises two elements, the first being activities to operationally consolidate tactical military gains, the second being contributions to strategically consolidate political gains. This way, the study attempts to establish the missing link in the inherent relationship between temporary tactical and operational gains, military and political objectives, and strategic aims.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Consolidation of gains, consolidation of gains activities, operational consolidation of military gains, strategic consolidation of political gains, large-scale combat operations, Battle of the Bulge, Operation Iraqi Freedom					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			LTC (DEU) Dominik Schellenberger
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	68	19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)

Monograph Approval Page

Name of Candidate: LTC Dominik Schellenberger

Monograph Title: Joint Consolidation of Gains: A Theoretical Foundation for Joint
Doctrinal Codification

Approved by:

_____, Monograph Director
Bruce E. Stanley, PhD

_____, Seminar Leader
Charles C. Readinger, LtCol

_____, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Kirk C. Dorr, COL

Accepted this 23rd day of May 2019 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, PhD

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

Fair Use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the use of pictures, maps, graphics, and any other works incorporated into the manuscript. This author may be protected by more restrictions in their home countries, in which case further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible.

Abstract

Joint Consolidation of Gains: A Theoretical Foundation for Joint Doctrinal Codification, by Lieutenant Colonel Dominik J. Schellenberger, German Army, 68 pages.

Against the backdrop of the current operating environment, joint concepts and US Army doctrine recognize that successful execution of dominating activities does not automatically lead to the achievement of desired military and political objectives. Thus, for the first time in US Army history, the 2017 Army operations doctrine has codified consolidation of gains. Despite the US Army's initiative, joint doctrine does not yet account for consolidation of gains. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to help close the joint doctrinal gap. Accordingly, the research question asks how can US joint doctrine and campaign planning best account for consolidation of gains. To answer this research question, the study first develops a theory of joint consolidation of gains; second, applies that theory to three historical case studies; and third, suggests a doctrinal definition of joint consolidation of gains. The historical case studies analyzed are the Battle of the Bulge from the German perspective, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the campaign to recapture the Philippines leading into the occupation of Japan. The suggested definition of joint consolidation of gains stemming from that analysis comprises two elements, the first being activities to operationally consolidate tactical military gains, the second being contributions to strategically consolidate political gains. This way, the study attempts to establish the missing link in the inherent relationship between temporary tactical and operational gains, military and political objectives, and strategic aims.

Contents

Acknowledgements	v
Acronyms	vi
Illustrations	viii
Tables	viii
Introduction	1
Literature Review	6
Theoretical	7
Conceptual	10
Empirical	12
Methodology	16
Case Studies	20
Battle of the Bulge (BOTB)	20
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)	28
Philippines Campaign (PHC)	38
Findings and Analysis	48
Summary, Discussion, and Conclusion	54
Summarized Findings along Research Questions	55
Decisive Role of Tempo	55
Need for a Holistic Theory of Joint Consolidation of Gains	56
Appendix A Findings Worksheet	59
Bibliography	64
General	64
Case Studies	67

Acknowledgements

First of all, I thank my loving wife, Jasmin, and my precious children, Sophie and Raphael. Your continuous mental support and patience with me spending so much time on this research project have made this second master thesis within two years possible.

Second, many, many thanks, of course, go to my monograph director, Dr. Bruce Stanley. His trust and confidence, as well as guidance and structure, provided the fundamental pillar for the success of that monograph.

Third, I want to thank four scholars and professionals, who contributed significantly to the focus, direction, and accuracy of this paper. These are my seminar leader, LtCol Charles C. Readinger, Dr. John T. Kuehn (Professor of Military History, US Army Command and General Staff College), COL (Ret) James Scott Wheeler, Ph.D. (former senior military analyst to the Commanding General, US Army Europe, and former Professor of History, US Military Academy), and COL (Ret) Kevin Benson, Ph.D. (CEO Critical Thinking Resources, former Director SAMS, and lead planner OIF CFLCC). Their peer feedback proved invaluable.

Finally, I want to thank the Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair for the Art of War, Dr. Dean Nowowiejski. The participation in the Art of War scholarship program has sparked my intellectual curiosity for the topic and provided priceless initial insights into the case studies utilized as part of this monograph.

Acronyms

ADRP	US Army Doctrine Reference Publication
AO	Area of Operation
BOTB	Battle of the Bulge
CENTCOM	US Central Command
CFLCC	Combined Forces Land Component Command
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
EMS	Electromagnetic Spectrum
FM	US Army Field Manual
GWOT	Global War on Terror
JCIC	Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JP	Joint Publication
LOC	Line of Communication
LOO	Line of Operation
LSCO	Large-Scale Combat Operations
MDO	Multi-Domain Operations
ME	Main Effort
MNC-I	Multi-National Corps–Iraq
MNF-I	Multi-National Force–Iraq
MNSTC-I	Multi National Security Transition Command–Iraq
NDS US	National Defense Strategy
OB WEST	Oberbefehlshaber West (German Army Command in the West)
OE	Operating Environment
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom

OKW	Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (High Command of the Wehrmacht)
ORHA	Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs
PCAU	Philippine Civil Affairs Units
PCG	Philippine Civil Government
PHC	Philippines Campaign
SE	Supporting Effort
ULO	Unified Land Operations
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Illustrations

Figure 1. Consolidation of gains related to military and political objectives.....	2
Figure 2. Joint consolidation of gains activities.....	7
Figure 3. Interrelationship of the key terms.....	10
Figure 4. Methodology and logical flow of the study.....	17
Figure 5. BOTB: German operational approach.....	21
Figure 6. OIF: Operations from March 2003 until May 2003.....	30
Figure 7. PHC: Two-pronged Allied offensive in the Pacific.....	39
Figure 8. PHC: Race for Manila.....	43
Figure 9. Case studies related to joint consolidation of gains activities.....	47
Figure 10. Case studies related to key terms.....	50

Tables

Table 1. Analysis overview.....	53
---------------------------------	----

Introduction

The area left in rear of the advancing forces, an area vital to their existence, is not necessarily covered by the attack, and needs special protection. The act of attack, particularly in strategy, is thus a constant alternation and combination of attack and defense.

—Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 1832

The new focus of the 2018 US National Defense Strategy (NDS) is no longer terrorism but great power competition. The reemergence of the revisionist powers China and Russia as well as the rise of the rogue regimes of Iran and North Korea characterizes that competition. All these adversaries are competing with the United States across all elements of national power. In addition, non-state actors, such as terrorists, trans-national criminal organizations, or cyber hackers, are continuously threatening the security environment.¹ General Joseph F. Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, calls this threat scenario the “4+1 framework.”² Current US joint concepts, such as the *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning* (JCIC), as well as US Army doctrine, such as US Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Operations* and US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* account for the “4+1 framework” by preparing the US military for constant great power competition and large-scale combat operations (LSCO).

In the context of constant competition and LSCO, joint concepts and US Army doctrine recognize “that successful execution of ‘dominating activities’ does not automatically lead to the achievement of desired political objectives.”³ Thus, for the first time in US Army history, the

¹ James N. Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America. Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge,” US Department of Defense, January 19, 2018, accessed August 18, 2018, <https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>, 2-3.

² Fred Dews, “Joint Chiefs Chairman Dunford on the ‘4+1 framework’ and meeting transnational threats,” *Brookings*, February 24, 2018, accessed August 18, 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/02/24/joint-chiefs-chairman-dunford-transnational-threats>.

³ US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2018), 2.

2017 Army operations doctrine has codified consolidation of gains. As figure 1 illustrates, doctrine attempts to establish the missing link in the inherent relationship between temporary tactical and operational gains, military and political objectives, and strategic aims.




Figure 1. Consolidation of gains related to military and political objectives. Created by author.

Army doctrine introduces consolidation of gains as one of the four US Army strategic roles, which conceptually relate to the six joint phases.⁴ The fourth Army strategic role of consolidation of gains relates to the joint phases (IV) stabilize and (V) enable civil authority.⁵ Building on the Army’s understanding of consolidation of gains, the JCIC acknowledges, “the Joint Force must translate military success, whether combat or non-combat, into acceptable and sustainable outcomes.”⁶ Additionally, the JCIC carries the idea of consolidation of gains forward by applying it not only to armed conflict but also to competition below the threshold of such conflict. Despite the Army’s doctrinal and the joint conceptual initiative, joint doctrine does not yet account for consolidation of gains. A seamless integration of consolidation of gains into tactical level Army and operational level joint doctrine is necessary; otherwise, the purpose of consolidation of gains might not manifest into strategic success. This study attempts to help close the joint doctrinal gap and solve the problem of how US joint doctrine and campaign planning can best incorporate consolidation of gains.

⁴ The four US Army strategic roles are (1) shape, (2) prevent, (3) conduct LSCO, and (4) consolidate gains; the six joint phases are (0) shape, (I) deter, (II) seize the initiative, (III) dominate, (IV) stabilize, (V) enable civil authority. For details on the joint phases, see US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), V-7 – V-15. For the alignment of the Army strategic roles with the joint phases, see US Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 1-14.

⁵ US Army, *FM 3-0* (2017), 1-14 – 1-16.

⁶ Joint Staff, *JCIC* (2018), 22.

This study is one of the first to analyze consolidation of gains from a joint perspective using historical case studies. Therefore, the study intends to inform Army, but most importantly, US joint doctrine development. In the context of constant great power competition and possible LSCO against peer or near-peer competitors, policy makers, military leaders, and joint planners must set the necessary conditions for successful consolidation of gains prior to a campaign. A failure to do so leads to unsuccessful and protracted conflicts. Due to the failure to set the necessary conditions, the US struggled to reach lasting favorable results for example in Korea and Vietnam, and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁷ Scholars, military leaders, and US joint and Army doctrine are using the term consolidation of gains without a clear distinction between military and political gains. Such impreciseness ultimately creates confusion particularly with regard to the military role and responsibilities.

To avoid such confusion, this study suggests distinct definitions for the two elements of consolidation of gains. These two elements are “operational consolidation of military gains” on the one hand, and “strategic consolidation of political gains” on the other.⁸ Operational consolidation of military gains mainly consists of consolidation of gains activities as defined by ADRP 3-0 and FM 3-0 and is “essential to retaining the initiative over determined enemies because it ultimately removes both the capability and will for further resistance. It is the final exploitation of tactical success.”⁹ Against that backdrop, the JCIC and Nadia Schadlow, former

⁷ G. Stephen Lauer, “Blue Whales and Tiger Sharks: Politics, Policy, and the Military Operational Artist,” *The Strategy Bridge*, February 20, 2018, accessed August 14, 2018, <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/2/20/blue-whales-and-tiger-sharks-politics-policy-and-the-military-operational-artist>.

⁸ The theoretical subsection of the literature review defines both elements of consolidation of gains in more detail. These two elements both differ from tactical unit consolidation. Tactical unit consolidation is part of an offensive operation’s actions on the objectives and refers to “organizing and strengthening a newly captured position so that it can be used against the enemy.” For details, see US Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 3-7; and, for a more detailed discussion, US Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 3-90-1, Offense and Defense, Volume 1* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), 3-20.

⁹ US Army, *FM 3-0* (2017), 8-1.

deputy assistant to the White House National Security Adviser, suggest a wider, more strategic understanding of consolidation of gains.¹⁰ This wider understanding of strategic consolidation of political gains recognizes that “tactical and operational successes do not possess intrinsic value but are worthwhile only to the extent that they support larger policy aims.”¹¹

ADRP 3-0 defines the purpose of consolidation of gains as “to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities.”¹² First, the manifestation of that purpose requires policy makers to define clear strategic aims and political objectives. Second, it requires military leaders to nest military objectives with those political objectives. Third, based on these political and military objectives, it requires the Joint Force to consolidate temporary tactical and operational military gains. Fourth, it also requires the Joint Force to contribute to consolidation of strategic political gains. That fourth point also entails gains achieved by or through interorganizational cooperation with other governmental agencies.

To test the fourfold thesis, this study relies on four hypotheses. The first and the second hypotheses are closely interrelated. They argue that when there are clear strategic aims as well as political and military objectives, and when these aims and objectives are nested, then the Joint Force can successfully consolidate gains. Similarly, the third and fourth hypotheses also build upon each other. They assert that when the Joint Force consolidates tactical and operational military gains, and when the Joint Force contributes to consolidation of strategic political gains, then the Joint Force is capable of achieving military objectives and enabling political objectives.

To examine the hypothesis, this study applies seven research questions to the presented historic case studies. First, what were the strategic aims? Second, what were the political

¹⁰ Joint Staff, *JCIC* (2018), 23-26; and Nadia Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 1, 272.

¹¹ Joint Staff, *JCIC* (2018), 23-24.

¹² US Army, *ADRP 3-0* (2017), 3-7.

objectives? Third, what were the military objectives? Fourth, were the political and military objectives nested? Fifth, did the Joint Force achieve tactical and operational gains? Sixth, what was the operational approach taken by the Joint Force to consolidate operational military gains and to contribute to consolidation of strategic political gains? Finally, what military means were allocated to achieve the military objectives?

The study seeks to answer these questions given three major limitations. First, this study only utilizes open source and unclassified documents. This limitation particularly applies to the case studies presented and the discussion and analysis of the operational approaches chosen to consolidate gains. Second, the term consolidation of gains as defined above did not exist at the time of the studied cases. Thus, a deliberate methodology is necessary not to conflate historic actions with current terms and understanding. Finally, the use of doctrine as a central source requires careful handling of definitions. Doctrinal definitions are temporal and their underlying concepts change over time. Consolidation of gains, due to its very recent codification in doctrine, is an excellent example for that doctrinal dynamic.

The study also utilizes two major delimitations covering issues, which would reach far beyond the study's scope. First, regarding the competition continuum, this study focuses on the return from armed conflict to competition.¹³ Consequently, this study does not analyze consolidation of gains below the threshold of armed conflict or in the "gray zone."¹⁴ Second, this study particularly centers on consolidation of gains in LSCO. Unconventional warfare, containment strategies, and deterrence theory are not part of this study.

Two major assumptions support this study. First, the study assumes Unified Land Operations (ULO) as the Army's current and Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) as the Army's

¹³ The three phases on the competition continuum are (1) cooperation, (2) competition below armed conflict, and (3) armed conflict. For details, see Joint Staff, *JCIC* (2018), 7-11.

¹⁴ For a more detailed definition of competition in the gray zone, see James M. Dubik, and Nic Vincent, *America's Global Competitions: The Gray Zone in Context* (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2018).

most likely future operational concept.¹⁵ MDO are going to occur in an OE in which: (1) adversaries contest all domains, the EMS, and the information environment; (2) smaller armies fight on an expanded battlefield that is increasingly lethal and hyperactive; (3) nation-states have more difficulty in imposing their will; and, (4) near-peer states compete below armed conflict.¹⁶ Second, the study assumes the operating environment (OE) as detailed above. This study does not question the feasibility of that OE and the probability of occurrence of LSCO.

Six sections comprise this study. Following this introduction, section two presents a literature review, which includes a more detailed discussion of consolidation of gains and the distinction between operational consolidation of military gains and strategic consolidation of political gains. Section three describes the methodology of this research. Section four discusses the three historical case studies. Section five presents the findings and comparative analysis of these case studies. Finally, section six concludes this study with a suggestion of a definition of joint consolidation of gains.

Literature Review

This section covers the review of relevant literature and provides the fundamental basis for the case study analysis. The literature review comprises three subsections. First, the theoretical subsection lays out the historical and doctrinal backdrop for a theory of joint consolidation of gains in LSCO. Second, the conceptual subsection provides definitions of key terms, which are of vital importance for the hypotheses criteria. Finally, the empirical subsection examines existing empirical evidence related to the hypotheses.

¹⁵ For details on ULO, see US Army, *ADRP 3-0* (2017), chapter 3.

¹⁶ US Army Training and Doctrine Command, *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1: The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*, December 6, 2018, accessed December 10, 2018, https://www.tradoc.army.mil/Portals/14/Documents/MDO/TP525-3-1_30Nov2018.pdf, 6.

Theoretical



Figure 2. Joint consolidation of gains activities. Created by author.

The study examines theory, history, and doctrine through the bifocal lens of joint consolidation of gains and the return from armed conflict to competition. As a starting point, this study must build a theory of joint consolidation of gains during LSCO.¹⁷ The theoretical approach purposefully goes beyond the Army’s land-focus and provides a wider view of how joint planners and decision makers have to understand consolidation of gains. The two-fold purpose of that wider theoretical approach is to clarify what consolidation of gains in a joint sense actually means and, hence, to inform US Army and joint doctrine development. Figure 2 illustrates the suggested necessity for a wider definition of consolidation of gains, differentiating between operational consolidation of military gains on the one hand, and strategic consolidation of political gains on the other. This wider definition provides the backdrop for the more detailed definitions of the following subsection. Based on those definitions, this subsection also details seven evaluation criteria for successful consolidation of gains at the joint level.

¹⁷ Following FM 3-0, the study understands LSCO as “intense, lethal, and brutal,” including “complexity, chaos, fear, violence, fatigue, and uncertainty,” against adversaries employing “conventional tactics, terror, criminal activity, and information warfare to further complicate operations.” For details, see US Army, *FM 3-0* (2017), 1-2.

The 2017 US Army operations doctrine for the first time codified consolidation of gains. According to ADRP 3-0 and FM 3-0, consolidation of gains encompasses four broad activities. Those activities are: To conduct tactical unit consolidation; establish sufficient area and external security; execute minimum-essential or, if necessary, primary stability tasks; and, influence local and regional audiences (when authorized).¹⁸ Figure 2 aligns the first three of those four activities with operational consolidation of military gains. The fourth activity of influencing local and regional audiences is a continuous activity.

Based on the Army's conception, the JCIC provides initial joint ideas of consolidation of gains labeling consolidation of gains as "securing gains" achieved by "following through." Follow through is "an essential aspect of campaigning across the competition continuum, not just in armed conflict . . . The Joint Force must translate military success, whether combat or non-combat, into acceptable and sustainable outcomes."¹⁹ In the same way as ADRP 3-0, the JCIC suggests several activities, which constitute following through in armed conflict. Those activities are the "creation of favorable conditions where the US can effectively bring to bear other elements of national and allied power; . . . developing partnerships to consolidate the new political order; and transition to an enduring commitment to perpetuate our gains and realized advantages."²⁰ Additionally, "commanders and their staffs must account for the changes in the political and public atmosphere that commonly take place in the period between the apparent military victory and a true consolidation of gains."²¹ Figure 2 summarizes those activities and aligns them with strategic consolidation of political gains.

¹⁸ US Army, *ADRP 3-0* (2017), 3-7 – 3-8.

¹⁹ Joint Staff, *JCIC* (2018), 22.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 26.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 24.

Schadlow builds on the Clausewitzian understanding of war as an inherent “political act.”²² Her thesis is that in all significant military interventions in the past, the Army faced the need to shape the political outcome of the war so that Army personnel were essential to the consolidation of combat gains and victory.²³ Nevertheless, “American civilian and military leaders have been reluctant to think through, operationalize, and resource efforts needed to consolidate political gains in war.”²⁴ Schadlow calls that phenomenon a “denial syndrome.”²⁵ The governance role for the US military suggested by Schadlow is the seventh activity aligned with strategic consolidation of political gains (see Figure 2).

Finally, Everett C. Dolman’s distinct separation between tactical and strategic matters in the form of a logical extreme of continuing advantage further supports the differentiation between operational and strategic consolidation of gains as suggested above. According to Dolman, Professor of Strategy at the US Air Force Air Command and Staff College, strategy connects the conduct of war with the intent of politics. The purpose of military strategy is “to link military means with political aims in pursuit of a continuing advantage. It does so through the mediums of applied and potential violence.”²⁶ Dolman realizes that “it is quite possible to win the battle and lose the war. It is moreover possible to win the war and lose the strategic advantage.”²⁷ Dolman’s

²² Clausewitz’s fundamental assertion is that “when whole communities go to war—whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples—the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy.” For details, see Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 86-87.

²³ Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance*, 3.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 272.

²⁵ All in all, Schadlow analyzes four explanations for this “denial syndrome:” (1) democratic discomfort with the idea of military lead in political activities, (2) American concerns about colonialism and governing others, (3) the persistent belief in civilian lead in governance operations, and (4) the Army’s narrow emphasis on the tactical defeat of adversaries. For details, see *Ibid.*, 14-23.

²⁶ Everett Carl Dolman, *Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age* (New York: Frank Cass, 2005), 14-15.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

assertion of strategy as unending process and military strategy as link between military means and political aims provides a direct transition into the following conceptual subsection.

Conceptual

Based on the hypotheses, this study has to define and operationalize three key terms. Those key terms are political objectives, military objectives, and tactical and operational gains. The three key terms at the same time provide the logical thread underlying this study (see Figures 1 and 2). Tactical and operational gains enable the achievement of military objectives, which, if nested, allow the attainment of political objectives, which support the ultimate manifestation of strategic aims. In general, according to JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, an objective is “the clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which an operation is directed.”²⁸ Thus, in the ends, ways, and means equation of strategy, objectives are the ends, ways describe how to get to those ends, and means are the capabilities necessary to execute the ways.




Figure 3. Interrelationship of the key terms. Created by author.²⁹

²⁸ Joint Staff, *Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2017), I-10.

²⁹ The terms in the graphic stem from US Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 1-1, Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), 44-46 and 56-60; and Christopher Bassford, “Policy, Politics, War, and Military Strategy.” The Clausewitz Homepage, 1997, accessed September 6, 2018, <https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/StrategyDraft/index.htm>.

According to Clausewitz, the reason for the subordination of all military operations to the political point of view is that “the supreme standpoint for the conduct of war, the point of view that determines its main lines of action, can only be that of policy.”³⁰ Consequently, it is the responsibility of the politician as the policymaker to determine the political outcome.³¹ Fundamentally, policymakers must achieve two purposes when establishing political objectives. First, they must define survival and victory for all participants in the conflict; second, they must establish whether they are pursuing a limited or unlimited political objective (see Figure 3).³² Christopher Bassford, Professor at the National Defense University, calls the latter high-end political objectives. A high-end political objective ranges from merely deposing a particular set of leaders to the physical extermination of an entire people or culture; a limited political objective is anything short of eliminating the political opponent as a player.³³ For joint doctrine, political objectives are national strategic-level objectives, flowing out of the National Security Strategy, the NDS, and national strategic guidance.³⁴

Political and military objectives are interrelated. While political objectives generally describe where to go, military objectives define what to accomplish militarily in order to get there.³⁵ The combatant commander develops military objectives to aid in focusing the strategy and campaign plan.³⁶ Clausewitz pointed out that “if war is part of policy, policy will determine

³⁰ Clausewitz, *On War*, 607.

³¹ Lauer, “Blue Whales and Tiger Sharks: Politics, Policy, and the Military Operational Artist.”

³² Survival is the continued existence of the political entity that is at war; victory normally means the accomplishment of the specific political aims for which the group went to war. For more details on the challenges of defining survival and victory, see US Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCDP 1-1* (1997), 83-86, 42-46, and 82-83.

³³ Bassford, “Policy, Politics, War, and Military Strategy.” The Clausewitz Homepage, 1997, accessed September 6, 2018, <https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/StrategyDraft/index.htm>.

³⁴ Joint Staff, *JP 5-0* (2017), IV-20 – IV-23.

³⁵ Bassford, “Policy, Politics, War, and Military Strategy;” and Joint Staff, *JP 5-0* (2017), xxii.

³⁶ Joint Staff, *JP 5-0* (2017), xx.

its character.”³⁷ Consequently, the type of political objective drives the type of warfighting strategy, either a strategy of annihilation or a strategy of erosion, which stipulates the selection of military objectives.³⁸ An annihilation strategy aims at incapacitating the enemy by destroying his capability to continue the conflict, which is an unlimited military objective. An erosion strategy aims at the mind of the enemy leadership and the enemy’s will to resist, which is a limited military objective.³⁹ Due to the inherent relationship between political and military objectives, a mutual and “continuing dialogue, a holistic connection, from policymaker to military actor” is necessary to enable the translation of political into military objectives.⁴⁰

Consolidation of gains, in short, are the activities to make enduring any temporary operational success. Such temporary operational success manifests either deliberately through achieving an operation’s purpose and desired outcome as conveyed through commander’s intent, or spontaneously through positions of relative advantage (see Figure 3). A position of relative advantage is a “location or the establishment of a favorable condition within the area of operations that provides the commander with temporary freedom of action to enhance combat power over an enemy or influence the enemy to accept risk and move to a position of disadvantage.”⁴¹ Thus, positions of relative advantage provide the springboard for successful consolidation of gains.

Empirical

A broad set of literature deals with how wars begin and how they end. Particularly the prolonged conflicts in both Afghanistan and Iraq have caused scholars to more closely analyze

³⁷ Clausewitz, *On War*, 607.

³⁸ US Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCDP 1-1* (1997), 83-86.

³⁹ An example for an annihilation strategy is Alfred Thayer Mahan’s control of the sea strategy; an example for an erosion strategy is Sir Basil Liddell Hart’s indirect approach of strategic dislocation. For further details on military strategies, see Bassford, “Policy, Politics, War, and Military Strategy.”

⁴⁰ Lauer, “Blue Whales and Tiger Sharks: Politics, Policy, and the Military Operational Artist.”

⁴¹ US Army, *ADRP 3-0* (2017), 4-38.

the reasons for the protraction or, as some argue, the loss of these conflicts. However, most of the studies analyzing the return from armed conflict to competition solely focus on either joint phase IV-stabilize or joint phase V-enable civil authority. Regarding the latter, war termination in general and termination of joint operations in particular are recurring themes, which specifically deal with the challenges upon completion of LSCO. This study, however, spans its analytical umbrella wider and establishes consolidation of gains as a missing link between temporary military gains, military objectives, permanent political gains, and political objectives.

As introduced in section one, the study analyzes the four underlying hypotheses in pairs. Thesis one and two argue that when there are clear political and military objectives, and when those military objectives are nested with the political objectives, the Joint Force can successfully consolidate gains. Linking those two theses, Bruce Clark, former Director of US National Security Studies, US Army War College, suggests a rational model for conflict termination. According to Clark, an international dispute, which may result in hostilities, requires three critical pieces of guidance:

A clear statement by the political authorities of the desired situation in the post-hostility and settlement phases—a vision of what the area should “look like” following the hostilities, a clear set of political objectives that when achieved will allow the above vision to become reality, and a set of military objectives that will, when achieved, allow/cause the above to happen.⁴²

In his rational model for conflict termination, Clark explicitly provides the option for the United States “to cut its losses and disengage from the conflict.”⁴³

Fred Charles Iklé, a prominent war termination theorist, explores the “intellectual difficulty of connecting military plans with their ultimate purpose.”⁴⁴ Iklé first published his famous work *Every War Must End* after the Vietnam conflict considering a variety of historical

⁴² Bruce B. G. Clarke, *Conflict Termination: A Rational Model* (Carlisle Barracks: United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 23.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁴⁴ Fred C. Iklé, *Every War Must End*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 1.

examples, but specifically exemplifying allied policy after the Second World War in Germany and Japan. His three major lessons from Vietnam are that US forces should not be committed, first, without a clear military strategy; second, for the purpose of demonstrating American resolve; and, third, based on a punishment strategy of destroying targets, which does not serve to defeat the enemy's military forces. In the same way as Schadlow, Iklé identifies the capability to reform the enemy's government in order to transform a former foe into a new friend, as the decisive factor for the long-term outcome of many wars. Thus, military planners might "remain curiously blind in failing to perceive that it is the outcome of the war, not the outcome of the campaigns within it that determines how well their plans serve the nation's interests."⁴⁵

In the same vein, Lieutenant General (Ret.) Daniel P. Bolger, former commander of the Combined Security Transition Command, Afghanistan, blames not just policymakers, but even more important his fellow generals for poor strategic and operational leadership in Afghanistan and in Iraq. In short, his thesis is that "this was our war to lose, and we did it."⁴⁶ Bolger maintains that active duty military leaders either did not contribute to the public discussion or offered bad advice. This led to two lengthy, indecisive counterinsurgency campaigns, based on unrealistic campaign plans and the questionable recommendation for continuous US commitment.⁴⁷

Hypothesis three and four assert that when the Joint Force consolidates operational military gains, and when the Joint Force contributes to consolidation of strategic political gains, then the Joint Force is capable of achieving the military objectives and enabling political objectives. While several war termination theories and studies apply to the first pair of hypotheses, there is much less literature on the more specific second hypotheses pair. Again, Schadlow provides the starting point with her thesis that during every important past conflict, the

⁴⁵ Iklé, *Every War Must End*, xi, xx-xxi, 2.

⁴⁶ Daniel P. Bolger, *Why We Lost. A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2014), XV.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 422, 424.

US Army functioned as the critical operational link shaping the transition from a militarily defeated regime to one more compatible with US interests.⁴⁸ However, her idea of military governance operations mainly seems to apply to the joint phases IV and V, not to phase III, where LSCO still occurs.

Conrad C. Crane, Chief Historical Services, US Army Heritage and Education Center, US Army War College, suggests the term transition operations instead of phase IV and post-conflict operations, because such transition operations start soon after the advent of combat and can comprise significant fighting. Therefore, the planning and execution for phase III-dominate and the later phases must occur simultaneously, not sequentially. Otherwise, a war tactically and operationally “won” can still lead to strategic “loss,” if the military plans and executes transition operations poorly. In accordance with Schadlow and based on historical experience, Crane sees the US Army as the world’s greatest nation-building institution.⁴⁹ Due to a lack of quick response capabilities of civilian agencies and problems coordinating them, the US military has to maintain that role in the foreseeable future.⁵⁰

From the practitioner’s viewpoint, Jay M. Garner supports Schadlow’s and Crane’s argument. As former Director of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) for Iraq, he points out that “we needed to go into immediate reconstruction. That was an incredible problem because we don’t do postwar stuff in the military or in the government.”⁵¹ Garner confirms a lack of clear political objectives as well as a lack of strategy for postwar-Iraq.⁵² Most important for the linked hypotheses pair, Garner concludes that civilian operations “don’t

⁴⁸ Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance*, 3.

⁴⁹ Conrad C. Crane, “Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won,” in *Turning Victory Into Success. Military Operations After the Campaign*, ed. Brian M. De Toy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 1-2.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 15-16.

⁵¹ Jay M. Garner, “Iraq Revisited,” in *Turning Victory Into Success. Military Operations After the Campaign*, ed. Brian M. De Toy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 258.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 266, 272.

start with phase IV. They roll with the operation. We ought to have civilian operations rolling with the operation and have them begin functioning as the territory is occupied.”⁵³

Overall, the literature review has provided a wider definition of consolidation gains, differentiating between operational consolidation of military gains on the one hand, and strategic consolidation of political gains on the other hand. Based on that definition and the hypothesis criteria, this section defined and operationalized political objectives, military objectives, and tactical and operational gains as the study’s key terms. Finally, the literature review linked both hypotheses pairs to two theorists and one practitioner each. Due to the focal points of those theorists and practitioners, this study purposefully spreads its analytical umbrella wider and establishes consolidation of gains as the missing link between temporary military gains, military objectives, permanent political gains, and political objectives. The following methodology chapter provides the details on how this study tests and evaluates the two hypotheses pairs.

Methodology

This section outlines the methodology employed to test the hypotheses, using qualitative analysis. It comprises four subsections detailing the case selection, data collection, data analysis, and a summary. The data analysis subsection also outlines the relevancy of the research questions as well as the expected findings.

⁵³ Jay M. Garner, “Iraq Revisited,” in Brian M. De Toy, 273.




Figure 4. Methodology and logical flow of the study. Created by author.

Overall, the study utilizes theory, history, and doctrine as methodological handrails. In the literature review, this study has built a theory of joint consolidation of gains in LSCO and defined evaluation criteria. In a second step, this study is going to use this theory as a lens for a structured, focused comparison to analyze three historical case studies of successful and failed LSCO to consolidate gains. As described by George and Bennett in *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, the method is structured in that the analysis of the case studies is conducted through a set of guiding questions. Additionally, the method is focused as it analyzes only three defined historical case studies applying narrow questions. The method requires focusing the study through a specific research objective related to the theoretical focus guiding the study.⁵⁴ Then, the structured, focused comparison applies the criteria defined above to

⁵⁴ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 67-72.

each case study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby enabling a systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings and, ultimately, a test of the hypotheses. Finally, in step three, this study is going to draw conclusions from the previous two steps to answer the research question, how US joint doctrine and campaign planning must adjust to appropriately account for consolidation of gains. The final step also includes a proposed definition of joint consolidation of gains.

The examination of three historical case studies allows conclusions across several instead of just one or two cases. The selected three case studies are, first, the Battle of the Bulge (BOTB) from the German perspective; second, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); and, third, the Second World War campaign to recapture the Philippines (PHC), which led to the occupation of Japan. Four reasons guided the selection of those cases. Above all, the three cases were offensive LSCO. Moreover, they are from separate time-periods and display varying levels of success with regard to consolidation of gains. Finally, all three cases followed unlimited political and military objectives. Those four reasons enable the purpose of the study, which is to inform US joint and Army doctrine development.

The study applies seven research questions as part of the comparative analysis to the presented historic case studies in order to test the hypotheses. Questions one through four and five through seven are inherently related. Questions one through four ask, what were the strategic aims, what were the political objectives, what were the military objectives, and were those aims and objectives nested? The purpose of consolidation of gains is to make enduring any temporary operational success. Achieving that purpose requires a link across strategic aims as well as political and military objectives. Therefore, the study expects that if policy makers had established clear strategic aims, and if they had derived and nested feasible political and military objectives, then the Joint Force could successfully consolidate gains. Otherwise, tactical and operational gains dissolved.

Question five asks, whether the Joint Force achieved tactical and operational gains; questions six asks, which operational approach did the Joint Force choose to consolidate these military gains and to contribute to the strategic consolidation of political gains; and question seven asks, what military means were allocated to achieve the objectives? Accordingly, the study expects that: First, if the Joint Force had adequate means available; second, if the Joint Force successfully consolidated tactical and operational military gains; and, third, if the Joint Force successfully contributed to the strategic consolidation of political gains, then the Joint Force was capable of achieving the military and enabling political objectives. This requires the Joint Force either to gain positions of relative advantage or to achieve the operational purpose and, consequently, to link tactical and operational actions with military and political objectives. To operationalize consolidation of gains, this study applies the activities as summarized in the literature review and depicted in Figure 2.

Seminal historical works, complemented by official publications from the US Army Center of Military History, such as the official “Green Books,” provide the necessary data for the analysis of this study. Additionally, personal statements and opinions of the designated strategic and operational leaders, as published in biographies and the above-mentioned historical works, provide insights into the effectiveness of the operation. The data collection itself utilizes a campaign analysis method applying the conceptual definitions from the literature review as well as the developed evaluation criteria (see Figure 4). This analysis then enables the test of the hypotheses.

The methodology section outlined the three methodological steps of the study as well as the structured, focused comparison as the research method. The three methodological steps are to develop a theory, apply it to history, and inform doctrine. Furthermore, this section presented the selected case studies and their significance as well as the research questions and their relevance. Finally, this section introduced the campaign analysis method, which is going to guide the data collection and enable the analysis.

Case Studies

This section analyzes the three selected case studies, i.e. the BOTB, OIF, and the PHC. Each case study follows the same structure. First, an introductory overview outlines the spatial relationships, the key personnel, the chosen operational approach, key assumptions underlying this operational approach, and key events of the respective campaign. Next, utilizing historical context, the study applies and answers the research questions posited in section one and detailed in the previous methodology section. Third, a short summary highlights the main findings of each case study funneling into an overall summary of the case study section at the very end.

Battle of the Bulge (BOTB)

The BOTB itself lasted from 16 December 1944 until 25 January 1945. The period under consideration, however, reaches back to 16 September 1944. On that day, Adolf Hitler, the German Chancellor, Supreme Commander, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, formally announced, “I have just made a momentous decision. I shall go over to the counter-attack, that is to say.”⁵⁵ On 25 September, Hitler issued detailed guidance on the operational approach for that counterattack (see Figure 5). Commander-in-Chief West, Field Marshall Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt, would conduct a single thrust with Field Marshal Walter Model’s Army Group B with two armies abreast and one army echeloned to the rear as flanking protection. The armies would seize Antwerp and encircle and destroy the British and American forces north of the line Bastogne-Brussels-Antwerp. In the north, Sixth Panzer Army under Generaloberst der Waffen-SS Josef “Sepp” Dietrich as the main effort (ME) would attack Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges’ First Army through the Losheim gap on the boundary between Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow’s V Corps and Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton’s VIII Corps. Then, Sixth Army would bypass Liège, cross the Meuse, and turn toward Antwerp. In the center, Fifth Panzer Army under General der

⁵⁵ Hugh M. Cole, *United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of Operations. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1993), 2; Charles MacDonald, *A Time for Trumpets* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1985), 7.

Panzertruppen Hasso-Eccard von Manteuffel as supporting effort (SE) 1 would attack VIII Corps via St. Vith and Bastogne, cross the Meuse in the vicinity of Namur, bypass Brussels, and also converge onto Antwerp. Finally, in the south, Seventh Army under General der Panzertruppen Erich Brandenberger as SE 2 would attack the remainder of VIII Corps on either side of Echternach to protect the flank of the attack wedge as far as the Meuse River. This study focuses on von Manteuffel's attack in the center.




Figure 5. BOTB: German operational approach. Created by author.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ For the figure's base map, see Cole, *United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of Operations. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*, Map I.

The operational approach, known as the “Big Solution” or “Grand Slam,” pushed the three armies through the thickly forested terrain of the Ardennes and the Eifel with the objective of Antwerp only 100 miles away.⁵⁷ Due to severely restricted mobility, towns at road junctions, such as St. Vith, Houffalize, and Bastogne, became major intermediate objectives. That led to an operational “race for Bastogne” as a major road hub in Fifth Army’s area of operation (AO).⁵⁸

The operational approach rested on numerous assumptions and constraints.⁵⁹ Regarding terrain, Hitler assumed that Allied commanders, as in 1940, would assess the Ardennes as ill-suited for a major offensive. Accordingly, a blow along the thinly manned seam between the British forces in the north and US forces in the south would disintegrate the Allies politically and militarily. Moreover, the slow Allied decision-making process would further delay a possible counteroffensive. Additionally, bad weather and a new moon would prevent Allied planes from operating and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, from mounting a counteroffensive. Thus, Fifth Army should reach St. Vith within one day, the Meuse within four days, and Antwerp within seven days.

⁵⁷ Jodl, Rundstedt, Model, and his army commanders opposed Hitler’s “Grand Slam” and, instead, favored a “Small Solution” or “Little Slam.” Based on Rundstedt’s and Model’s alternative plans, that “Little Slam” resembled the plan Jodl presented to Hitler on 11 October 1944.⁵⁷ In the “Little Slam,” Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies would conduct a concentric attack on a narrow front, to achieve a quick breakthrough.⁵⁷ In lieu of Antwerp, the objective of the “Little Slam” would be the seizure of Liège and the envelopment of those enemy forces east of the Meuse in the sector roughly demarcated by Givet (on the Meuse) in the south, and Sittard (twenty miles northeast of Aachen) in the north. For details on the evolution of both approaches, see Cole, *United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of Operations. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*, 25-26; MacDonald, *A Time for Trumpets*, 35.

⁵⁸ For details on the terrain, the population, and the forces available, see Cole, *United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of Operations. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*, chapter III; MacDonald, *A Time for Trumpets*, 22-27.

⁵⁹ Hitler and the OKW expected the armored columns to reach the Meuse within two days; the German army commanders planned on four days for that action. For details on the listed assumptions, see Cole, *United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of Operations. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*, 17, 22, 176-177; Roger Cirillo, *The US Army Campaigns of World War II: Ardennes-Alsace* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1995), 27; MacDonald, *A Time for Trumpets*, 22-23.

The way in which the battle unfolded, proved several of those assumptions wrong.⁶⁰ On 16 December 1944 at 0530 a.m., 21 days later than Hitler originally intended, preparatory artillery fires initiated the battle. However, Fifth Army was not able to seize Clervaux in the south before 18 December and St. Vith in the north before 19 December, putting the Germans more than a day behind the original timeline. Additionally, on the evening of the first day, Eisenhower ordered 7th Armored Division (Ninth Army) and 10th Armored Division (Third Army) to reinforce VIII Corps. Just one day later, on 17 December, he committed the theater reserve, the XVIII Airborne Corps, and called three more divisions forward from England to northern France. Those quick Allied decisions further complicated the German “race for Bastogne.” Around midnight on 18 December, the 101st Airborne Division arrived at Bastogne. On the morning of 19 December, approximately two days behind schedule, Fifth Army reached Bastogne, but could not gain access to the town. Consequently, in order to consolidate his gains, on 20 December, von Manteuffel decided to bypass Bastogne with his panzer divisions towards the Meuse and to contain and reduce the encircled US forces with infantry. On the same day, Model shifted the ME from Sixth to the Fifth Panzer Army. On 26 December, US XII Corps successfully linked up with Bastogne’s defenders, which led to an end of the German siege just one day later. Finally, on 3 January 1945, Eisenhower commenced the counteroffensive to reduce the bulge.

The first four questions used to assess this case are, what were the strategic aims, what were the political objectives, what were the military objectives, and were those objectives nested? Throughout summer 1944, Germany had to realize that the eastern front did not offer any prospects for decisive victory. Instead, the Allied breakout in Normandy posed a more pressing danger.⁶¹ Against that backdrop, Hitler’s strategic aim for the BOTB encompassed the

⁶⁰ For details on the key events, see Cirillo, *The US Army Campaigns of World War II: Ardennes-Alsace*, 26-29; Cole, *United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of Operations. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*, 37, 323-324; MacDonald, *A Time for Trumpets*, 280, and 426-430.

⁶¹ In addition, German combat and economic strength suffered throughout the summer of 1944 from 1,200,000 soldiers dead, wounded, or missing on both fronts, plus severe losses of natural resources.

resumption of the offensive to achieve a decisive enemy military defeat on the Western front in order to enable a shift back to the Eastern front.⁶² The political objective related to the strategic aim was to “smash the Allied coalition, or at least greatly cripple its ground combat capabilities,” in order to enforce a favorable peace treaty with the Western Allies.⁶³ Militarily the operational approach of the “Big Solution” aimed at seizing Antwerp and, by doing that, severing the already stretched Allied supply lines as well as encircling and destroying Allied ground forces north of the line Bastogne-Brussels-Antwerp.⁶⁴ Logically, the strategic aim, political objective, and military objective were nested. Therefore, the decisive question is, whether the chosen operational approach against the backdrop of the given terrain and the allocated means was feasible.

The fifth question used to assess this case is, whether the Joint Force achieved tactical and operational gains? Within Fifth Panzer Army, General der Panzertruppen Heinrich Freiherr von Lüttwitz’s XLVII Panzer Corps achieved the most significant gains. As part of the “race for Bastogne,” during the night of 18 December, the 2d Panzer Division destroyed forty tanks, so that the disintegration of the last defenses east of Bastogne promised quick entry to the city the following day. With the way west thus clearing, “the German mass maneuver behind the armored columns picked up speed on 19 December, this day representing the most rapid movement of the

For details, see Cole, *United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of Operations. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*, 2-3, 12-13.

⁶² To obscure his intent, Hitler greatly emphasized the secrecy of the preparation for that offensive. The most striking example was the operation’s original codename *Wacht am Rhein* (Watch on the Rhine), or commonly called *Abwehrschlacht am Rhein* (Defensive Battle in the West), conveying a defensive connotation. On 2 December, Hitler made an insignificant concession and changed the codename of the operation from *Wacht am Rhein* to *Herbstnebel* (autumn mist). *Herbstnebel* was the original name of Model’s alternate plan. For details, see Cole, *United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of Operations. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*, 21, 26; MacDonald, *A Time for Trumpets*, 31, 37.

⁶³ Cirillo, *The US Army Campaigns of World War II: Ardennes-Alsace*, 5.

⁶⁴ Cirillo, *The US Army Campaigns of World War II: Ardennes-Alsace*, 5; Cole, *United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of Operations. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*, 22, 27-28.

entire offensive.”⁶⁵ Moreover, the fall of Houffalize on the right flank and Wiltz on the left flank during the night of 19 December enabled the envelopment of and concentric attack on Bastogne. For this reason, on 20 December, Model assigned the Fifth in place of the Sixth Panzer Army the task of exploitation. The withdrawal of US outposts due to continuous German pressure exemplifies von Lüttwitz’s gains. US reports to Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, the US commander at Bastogne, support that notion: “All reserves committed. Situation critical.”⁶⁶

The sixth question used to assess this case is, which operational approach did the Joint Force chose to consolidate operational military gains and to contribute to consolidation of strategic political gains? Before leaving Bastogne on the morning of 19 December, Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton, commander VIII Corps, gave McAuliffe a standing order: “Hold Bastogne.”⁶⁷ From the beginning, Manteuffel knew that if Fifth Army could not take Bastogne swiftly, it would tie down German forces needed elsewhere while at the same time affording the Americans a base from which to launch a counterattack that, as von Manteuffel put it, “could seriously endanger the German attack.”⁶⁸ XLVII Panzer Corps had to take Bastogne before moving on with the bulk of the forces.⁶⁹ However, in winning the race for Bastogne, the Americans forced von Manteuffel to face a critical decision between seizing Bastogne, continuing to the Meuse, or attempting both.⁷⁰ To preserve the momentum and consolidate his gains, Manteuffel went for both. Accordingly, on 20 December, Lüttwitz decided to envelope Bastogne

⁶⁵ Cole, *United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of Operations. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*, 449, 670.

⁶⁶ Cole, *United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of Operations. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*, 455.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 445.

⁶⁸ MacDonald, *A Time for Trumpets*, 280.

⁶⁹ Cole, *United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of Operations. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*, 176-177.

⁷⁰ MacDonald, *A Time for Trumpets*, 297.

from the south and west.⁷¹ He intended to seize Bastogne with the Panzer Lehr Division and the 26th Volksgrenadier Division, while bypassing the city with 2d Panzer Division in the north to free the armored columns and cross the Meuse as quickly as possible. To enable a deep penetration and exploit early gains at the divisional level, commander of the Panzer Lehr Division, Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein, created an advance guard comprising an armored reconnaissance company, two companies of Panzergrenadiers, and a company of Panthers, further reinforced with Mark IV tanks, a company of engineers, and a battery of self-propelled artillery.⁷² Despite those attempts to consolidate gains at the army level and below, Hitler's overall operational approach lacked a plan to establish sufficient area and external security. The plan did not detail how the Germans were going to destroy the more than a million Allied troops, whom the dash to Antwerp attempted to cut off.⁷³ Furthermore, the plan did not foresee how the Army would contribute to consolidation of strategic political gains. There is no evidence of any detailed planning as to what Army Group B should do once Antwerp fell.⁷⁴

The seventh question used to assess this case is, what military means were allocated to achieve the military objectives?⁷⁵ One central assumption was that the offensive would require a minimum of 30 divisions (18 infantry, 12 armored or mechanized), of which the *Oberbefehlshaber WEST* (OB WEST, German Army Commander in the West) itself had to

⁷¹ Cole, *United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of Operations. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*, 458.

⁷² Bayerlein's advance guard displays a very interesting approach for deep operations of armored formations. For details, see MacDonald, *A Time for Trumpets*, 280-281.

⁷³ MacDonald, *A Time for Trumpets*, 31.

⁷⁴ Presumably, Hitler intended to re-integrate the occupied French, Belgium, and Luxembourgian territories into the German Reich through the reestablishment of an adjusted version of the previous Military Administration, which had governed over large parts of France and Belgium. For details on the lack of planning for that phase, see Cole, *United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of Operations. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*, 22.

⁷⁵ Hitler had determined on a military solution in which the means were not adequate to the end desired. For details on this disconnect between end and means, see Cole, *United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of Operations. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*, 21, 35, 474-477, and 671.

contribute three infantry and six panzer divisions.⁷⁶ Thus, from the beginning, Hitler's planning staff was thoroughly aware that the means were not adequate for the military objective of the "Big Solution." Therefore, Hitler's army commanders across all levels had advocated for the "Small Solution," to no avail. Additionally, starting on 17 December, those commanders repeatedly requested reinforcements to account for the changing situation on the battlefield and to further exploit and consolidate the gains of Fifth Panzer Army.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, not before 23 December did Hitler release two fresh divisions (the 9th Panzer and 15th Panzer Grenadier) from the reserve of the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* (OKW, High Command of the Wehrmacht). By then, the Fifth Panzer Army had already lost the "race for Bastogne." Additionally, once Army Group B assumed control over these troops, Model employed them for flanking protection instead of reinforcing at Bastogne. Consequently, Lüttwitz had to conduct his concentric attack on Bastogne with a reinforced division only. Overall, "Hitler . . . failed to recognize that the only real hope of success, after the Sixth Panzer Army's failure, was to reinforce Manteuffel and the Fifth."⁷⁸ As early as 18 December, that is two days into the offensive, von Manteuffel concluded that the German offensive had failed, there was no hope of reaching Antwerp, and even the Meuse River appeared to be out of reach. The OB WEST commander, von Rundstedt, and the chief of the armed forces operations staff, Jodl, shared that estimate.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Consequently, the German Army Commander in the West had to withdraw those divisions from the defense to refit them. Overall, Germany mustered a force with more than 200,000 men in thirteen infantry and seven panzer divisions and with nearly 1,000 tanks and almost 2,000 guns, deployed along a front of 60 miles. For details see, Cirillo, *The US Army Campaigns of World War II: Ardennes-Alsace*, 3; Cole, *United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of Operations. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*, 22; MacDonald, *A Time for Trumpets*, 23.

⁷⁷ Von Rundstedt made his first request for troops from the OKW Reserve on 17 December. Subsequent requests by OB WEST for the release of two armored divisions (the 10th SS Panzer and 11th Panzer) scheduled for early commitment produced no result, either.

⁷⁸ Cole, *United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of Operations. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*, 671.

⁷⁹ MacDonald, *A Time for Trumpets*, 426.

In summary, this case looked at the BOTB from the German perspective, using Hitler's formal announcement from 16 September 1944 as a starting-point and Eisenhower's commencement of the Allied counteroffensive on 3 January 1945 as the ending-point. Based on the introduction of spatial relations, key personnel, the operational approach, underlying key assumptions, and key events of the campaign, the case study provided an inquiry into Fifth Panzer Army's attempt to consolidate gains in the center of the offensive. The evidence suggests that Fifth Panzer Army achieved operational and tactical gains, but could not sufficiently consolidate the gains. The reasons for the failure to consolidate gains are numerous, ranging from over-ambitious strategic aims and political and military objectives to a lack of long-range planning, insufficient means, and a disconnect between Hitler and his commanders in the field. The next subsection introduces OIF as next case study.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

Combat operations for OIF commenced on 19 March 2003. However, a comprehensive analysis of OIF needs to reach back all the way to 1 March 1991, the day after Operation Desert Storm ended.⁸⁰ During the time span from 1991 to 2003, the Army developed crucial infrastructure in Kuwait, such as airfields, seaports, staging facilities, headquarters, and command posts, at a cost of over \$500 million in support of contingency operations. Building on the decisive victory of 1991, the United States committed throughout the 1990s to a dual containment policy trying to box in the influence and ambitions of both Iraq and Iran simultaneously. Against that backdrop, on 11 September 2001, al Qaeda struck at the US mainland, causing President

⁸⁰ For details on the run-up to OIF, see Beth Bailey and Richard H. Immerman, "Introduction," in *Understanding the US Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan*, ed. Beth Bailey and Richard H. Immerman (New York: New York University Press, 2015), 6; Conrad C. Crane, "Military Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq: Learning and Adapting under Fire at Home and in the Field," in *Understanding the US Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan*, ed. Beth Bailey and Richard H. Immerman (New York: New York University Press, 2015), 129; Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), xxiv; and Michael A. Reynolds, "The Wars' Entangled Roots: Regional Realities and Washington's Vision," in *Understanding the US Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan*, ed. Beth Bailey and Richard H. Immerman (New York: New York University Press, 2015), 36 and 47.

Bush to firmly announce, “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”⁸¹ In the context of that declaration of a global war on terror (GWOT), the Bush administration made two crucial claims. First, the administration alleged that there was a link between the al Qaeda leader bin Laden and the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein; and, second, it asserted that Hussein was reconstituting his nuclear program and that he was in possession of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Consequently, ordered by the president, US Central Command (CENTCOM) started planning for a limited objective attack into Iraq soon after 9/11. Half a year later, in July 2002, the US President started forming a coalition of the willing for an invasion, culminating into Bush’s decision on 16 March 2003 actually to launch OIF.

The US injection into these conflicts rested on several key assumptions.⁸² Above all, the Bush administration was convinced that the promotion of democracy and rapid economic privatization and marketization would transform not only Iraq but also the entire Middle East. In that context, policymakers assumed that the Iraqi people in general and the Iraqi Shi’ites in particular, whom Hussein’s regime had abused terribly, would welcome the Allies as liberators. Furthermore, based on the 1991 Kuwait experience, policymakers and planners assumed that Hussein would set fire to the Iraqi oil fields and destroy the oil production infrastructure, which would lead to an ecological and economic disaster. Therefore, the military campaign would have

⁸¹ Just nine days later, on 20 September, Bush reinforced this message stressing, “It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” For details, see, Bailey and Immerman, “Introduction,” in Bailey and Immerman, 6.

⁸² For details on the outlined assumptions, see Kevin Benson, “A War examined: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003.” *Parameters*, no. 43 (Winter 2013-14): 121; Robert K. Brigham, “The Lessons and Legacies of the War in Iraq,” in *Understanding the US Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan*, ed. Beth Bailey and Richard H. Immerman (New York: New York University Press, 2015), 286; Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, 70; Richard W. Stewart, *American Military History Vol II. The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2008* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2010), 483, 487, 490.

to account for a swift penetration to seize the nearby Rumailah Oil Fields. Finally, planners assumed they could recall the Iraqi regular army.⁸³




Figure 6. OIF: Operations from March 2003 until May 2003. Created by author.⁸⁴

These assumptions fed into CENTCOM’s campaign plan 1003V as well as the Combined Forces Land Component Command’s (CFLCC) initial plan for the invasion, Cobra II, and sequel

⁸³ Planners accepted as fact that they could recall the Iraqi regular army. The underlying assumption was that they were acting in accord with policy. Ambassador Bremer’s decision in May 2003 to dissolve the Iraqi army proved this major assumption ultimately wrong. For details on the lack and vagueness of political guidance with regard to this particular issue, see Benson, “A War Examined: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003.” *Parameters*, no. 43 (Winter 2013-14): 120.

⁸⁴ For the figure’s base maps, see The University of Texas at Austin Perry-Castañeda, “Iraq (Shaded Relief),” Library Map Collection, 2009, accessed January 5, 2019, <https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/iraq.html>; US Army Center for Military History, CMH Pub 58-1 “Operation Iraqi Freedom Poster: March-May, 2003,” accessed October 31, 2018, <https://history.army.mil/catalog/browse/title.html>.

plan for post-hostilities operations, Eclipse II. In general, those plans represented a compromise between a “running start” option and a “hybrid” option.⁸⁵ To account for the full conflict spectrum, CENTCOM and the CFLCC developed a four-phase operation.⁸⁶ According to the underlying assumptions, and differing from Operation Desert Storm, OIF ground maneuver began simultaneously with air operations to prevent Saddam Hussein from destroying the oil production infrastructure.⁸⁷ Regarding spatial relations, the ground maneuver had to originate from Kuwait and, therefore, needed to cover 300 miles to Baghdad, and then possibly 200 more miles to the vital oil fields around Mosul.⁸⁸

While phases I and II encompassed 16 days each, phase III commenced on 19 March 2003, three days after the President’s decision, with the air campaign trying to eliminate Saddam Hussein and decapitate the Iraqi regime.⁸⁹ The following day, coalition troops breached the berm on the Kuwait-Iraqi border, and on 21 and 22 March Army’s V Corps, the First Marine Division, and the British First Armored Division began the main assault. Once, the ground maneuver had started, 3d Infantry Division covered 200 of the 300 miles into the vicinity of As Najaf within the first twenty-four hours. The occupation of Baghdad began when the Hussein monument was

⁸⁵ The “running start” intended to commence the invasion with a minimal force and then to deploy forces as needed; the “hybrid” plan intended to increase forces on the ground before the invasion while continuing the deployment cycle of the remainder of the apportioned forces. For details, see Benson, “A War examined: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003.” *Parameters*, no. 43 (Winter 2013-14): 119; Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, 46.

⁸⁶ The four phases were: Phase-I preparations, phase-II shaping the battlefield, phase-III conducting decisive offensive operations, and phase-IV executing post hostilities operations. For details on the options and the four-phase plan, see Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, xxii-xxiii, and 46.

⁸⁷ Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, xxvi.

⁸⁸ After unsuccessful negotiations for an invasion route through Turkey, the 173rd Airborne Brigade was dropped into Kurdish territory in northern Iraq to establish another front, while the 4th Infantry Division was deployed as a follow-on element in the south. For details, see Crane, “Military Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq: Learning and Adapting under Fire at Home and in the Field,” in Bailey and Immerman, 131; Reynolds, “The Wars’ Entangled Roots: Regional Realities and Washington’s Vision,” in Bailey and Immerman, 481.

⁸⁹ For details on the key events of OIF, see Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, 483, 490, 498, 500.

pulled down on 9 April. After approximately two months, on 30 June, CENTCOM re-designated Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-7 as headquarters for the Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I) with two new major subordinate commands: Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC-I) handling the operational and tactical fight and Multi National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I) coordinating the training of Iraqi security forces. Half a year later, on 14 December, US soldiers captured Hussein. In January 2005, the first peaceful and genuinely popular countrywide elections took place. It then took until 20 May 2006 for the regularly elected government under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to assume power. Six months later, on 10 January 2007, President Bush announced a significant increase of US troops in Iraq, the “Surge,” which intended to create “breathing space” for the new government to resolve the numerous internal issues.⁹⁰

The first four questions used to assess this case are, what were the strategic aims, what were the political objectives, what were the military objectives, and were those objectives nested? America’s national security and the stability and prosperity of the Middle East are deeply intertwined.⁹¹ Based on that fundamental fact, the combination of President Clinton’s National Security Strategy of “Engagement and Enlargement” with President Bush’s belief in American global primacy funneled into the strategic aims of stability, democratic rule, and economic prosperity for both Iraq and the Middle East. That overarching strategy necessarily required “the installation of democratic governance under U.S. tutelage . . . to preclude the further incubation and spread of ‘terror and extremism’ in the Muslim world.”⁹² Consequently, President Bush justified the preemptive invasion based on the imminent threat posed by both, terrorism and

⁹⁰ Crane, “Military Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq: Learning and Adapting under Fire at Home and in the Field,” in Bailey and Immerman, 137.

⁹¹ Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, xxii.

⁹² Reynolds, “The Wars’ Entangled Roots: Regional Realities and Washington’s Vision,” in Bailey and Immerman, 48.

Hussein's striving for WMD.⁹³ Accordingly, CENTCOM's campaign plan 1003V plainly stated both the political and military objectives of the campaign. Politically, the coalition aimed for "a stable Iraq, with its territorial integrity intact; a broad-based government that renounces WMD development and use, and no longer supports terrorism or threatens its neighbors; and success in Iraq leveraged to convince or compel other countries to cease support to terrorists and to deny them access to WMD."⁹⁴ Militarily, the aim was to "destabilize, isolate, and overthrow the Iraqi regime and provide support to a new, broad-based government; destroy Iraqi WMD capability and infrastructure; protect allies and supporters from Iraqi threats and attacks; destroy terrorist networks in Iraq; gather intelligence on global terrorism; detain terrorists and war criminals and free individuals unjustly detained under the Iraqi regime; and support international efforts to set conditions for long-term stability in Iraq and the region."⁹⁵ As in the previous case study, the objectives are generally nested, but appear too broad, too ambitious, and disconnected from the realities inside Iraq. Consequently, the campaign saw what the military calls "mission creep," morphing from warfighting and liberation to more difficult nation building and occupation. That transformation of the mission, mainly triggered by a downward spiral of violence, ultimately turned the nested objectives upside down. Instead of a national security strategy defining how the "Surge" and counterinsurgency operations would contribute to political objectives, and a national military strategy defining military objectives for these operations, the process worked backward. Counterinsurgency indirectly became the national strategy.⁹⁶

⁹³ For details on the justification of the preemptive attack, see Bailey and Immerman, "Introduction," in Bailey and Immerman, 6.

⁹⁴ Benson, "A War examined: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003." *Parameters*, no. 43 (Winter 2013-14): 119-120.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 120.

⁹⁶ Crane, "Military Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq: Learning and Adapting under Fire at Home and in the Field," in Bailey and Immerman, 136.

The fifth question used to assess this case is, whether the Joint Force achieved tactical and operational gains? US Army historian Conrad C. Crane excellently brings the coalition's impressive initial gains to the point:

The British quickly secured the major city of Basra in the south, while the 173rd Airborne Brigade liberated Kirkuk in the north. Elements of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions cleared An Najaf and As Samawah, and secured the V Corps flanks so the 3rd Infantry Division could burst through the Karbala Gap to reach Baghdad. Airpower and ground assaults destroyed enemy forces that tried to resist. American psychological operations advised Iraqi soldiers to go home to avoid being bombed into oblivion; many did.⁹⁷

Supported by the famous "Thunder Runs," Baghdad was isolated on 7 April and final resistance inside the city completely collapsed only three days later on 10 April 2003. Thus, within three weeks, the Allies had driven Saddam Hussein and his regime from Baghdad.⁹⁸ To understand how the coalition attempted to consolidate those gains and what impeded this consolidation of gains, a quick examination of the problem the Allies were facing is necessary.⁹⁹ Coalescing with the abrupt collapse of Saddam Hussein's security apparatus, uncontrolled looting erupted in Baghdad. The small number of Allied forces inside Iraq were incapable of addressing that security threat. Additionally, the majority of former Iraqi soldiers had not surrendered, but simply vanished into their villages to become the pillars of resistance movements. Many of these

⁹⁷ Crane, "Military Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq: Learning and Adapting under Fire at Home and in the Field," in Bailey and Immerman, 131-132.

⁹⁸ Brigham, "The Lessons and Legacies of the War in Iraq," in Bailey and Immerman, 286.

⁹⁹ For details on the complex Iraqi security situation during the transition from phase III-decisive offensive operations to phase IV-post hostilities operations, see Bailey and Immerman, "Introduction," in Bailey and Immerman, 7; Brigham, "The Lessons and Legacies of the War in Iraq," in Bailey and Immerman, 288; Crane, 132-133; Stewart, *American Military History Vol II. The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2008*, 494, 499.

former soldiers were Sunni Muslims, Saddam loyalists, or former members of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party. Another group fighting both the Sunnis as well as the Allies were the Shi'ite Muslims, who at the same time received support from Iran. Consequently, deposed Ba'athists, Shi'ite militias, Sunni tribes, and foreign militants supporting al Qaeda caused an escalation of sectarian violence amongst each other and against the Allies. Overall, "more than ninety named insurgent organizations fought the U.S.-led coalition and the new Iraqi government."¹⁰⁰

The sixth question used to assess this case is, which operational approach did the Joint Force chose to consolidate operational military gains and to contribute to consolidation of strategic political gains? Lieutenant General William Wallace, commander V Corps, consolidated early tactical and operational gains, owed to the "running start," through tasking follow-on forces with area security in order to enable the leading armored elements to continue their attack. For instance, on 29 March, the 82d Airborne Division relieved the 3d Infantry Division at As Samawah; on 4 April, the 101st Airborne Division secured As Najaf; and, on 10 April, the 173d Airborne Brigade air-landed and secured Kirkuk in the north.¹⁰¹ Due to the escalating violence, by mid-2004 CENTCOM stood up MNF-I with MNC-I and MNSTC-I as subordinate commands. One of MNF-I's first missions was to eliminate emerging insurgent safe havens. Immediate success, such as against Shi'a militias in As Najaf and the Sadr City area of Baghdad or against Sunni militias in Samarra, were crucial steps on the way to sufficient area and external security and enabled the peaceful elections in January 2005.¹⁰² Despite these and other successful operations to consolidate operational gains, from 2005 until 2006 "the insurgency grew unabated,

¹⁰⁰ Crane, "Military Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq: Learning and Adapting under Fire at Home and in the Field," in Bailey and Immerman, 133.

¹⁰¹ Stewart, *American Military History Vol II. The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2008*, 486-487, 489.

¹⁰² Crane, "Military Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq: Learning and Adapting under Fire at Home and in the Field," in Bailey and Immerman, 134.

matched only by Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi army's deadly attacks on Sunnis."¹⁰³ The election had not united the country, but reinforced sectarian divides.

Therefore, consolidation of strategic political gains became even more complicated. Initially, Secretary Rumsfeld established the ORHA under Lieutenant General (ret.) Jay Garner. Garner's intent was to commence immediate reconstruction, conduct a "gentle de-Baathification," bring back the Iraqi Army, and re-install an indigenous government as quickly as possible.¹⁰⁴ However, only after approximately three weeks in country, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) replaced Garner and the ORHA. Bremer decided, first, to execute a de-Baathification of the Iraqi government excluding the top four levels of the ruling Ba'ath Party; second, to disband the Iraqi Army; and, third, to assume governmental responsibilities.¹⁰⁵ According to Garner, due to Bremer's decision, "on Saturday morning when we woke up, we had somewhere between 150,000 and 300,000 enemies we didn't have on Wednesday morning."¹⁰⁶ The consolidation of strategic political gains further suffered from poor civil-military coordination, manifested in a dysfunctional relationship between Bremer and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, V Corps commander at that time. Sanchez, for instance, opposed the decision to remove all Ba'athist Party members from the Iraqi army.¹⁰⁷

The seventh question used to assess this case is, what military means were allocated to achieve the military objectives? The invasion commenced with about 145,000 US soldiers due to Rumsfeld's insistence, although one of CENTCOM's initial plans from February 2002 envisioned 275,000, almost twice as many. Additionally, in February 2003, one month prior to the invasion,

¹⁰³ Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi army was a Shi'ite militia with ties to the government. For details, see Brigham, "The Lessons and Legacies of the War in Iraq," in Bailey and Immerman, 291.

¹⁰⁴ Garner, "Iraq Revisited," in De Toy, 258-260.

¹⁰⁵ Garner, "Iraq Revisited," in De Toy, 265; Crane, "Military Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq: Learning and Adapting under Fire at Home and in the Field," in Bailey and Immerman, 132-133.

¹⁰⁶ Garner, "Iraq Revisited," in De Toy, 265.

¹⁰⁷ Brigham, "The Lessons and Legacies of the War in Iraq," in Bailey and Immerman, 290.

Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki proposed during congressional hearings that “several hundred thousand” troops would be needed to restore Iraq.¹⁰⁸ According to Crane, the secretary was “unable to envision that it might take more troops to secure the peace than to win the war,” which led to constant political pressure on CENTCOM to reduce the troop numbers as much as possible and, once deployed, to withdraw and redeploy the forces as rapidly as possible.¹⁰⁹ For that reason, General John P. Abizaid, the CENTCOM commander in 2003, ordered Allied ground forces “to slowly withdraw from the cities into more easily defensible base camps with the goal of turning over more security functions, and even the administration of whole provinces, as quickly as possible to a slowly growing Iraqi government and army.”¹¹⁰ In the same vein, General George Casey, commander MNF-I, planned for a draw-down of US troops in early 2006, despite the deteriorating security situation. COL (ret.) Kevin Benson, former CFLCC plans director at the beginning of OIF, assesses the apportioned force of 145,000 as “appropriate to execute the invasion successfully and . . . conclude the campaign through phase IV,” had the entire force been committed for the expected 125 days of phase III and six months to a year for phase IV.¹¹¹

This case looked at OIF starting with the day after Operation Desert Storm concluded, 1 March 1991, and ending with the execution of the Surge from January until September 2007. OIF formally concluded with the total withdrawal of American forces in December 2011. In total, OIF cost the lives of 4,500 American service members and approximately one trillion dollars. It left behind serious international doubts in US strategy and intelligence capabilities and a weakened

¹⁰⁸ Crane, “Military Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq: Learning and Adapting under Fire at Home and in the Field,” in Bailey and Immerman, 129-130.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 130.

¹¹⁰ Stewart, *American Military History Vol II. The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2008*, 502.

¹¹¹ The CENTCOM campaign plan 1003V envisioned 16 days for phase I, another 16 days for phase II, up to 125 days for phase III, and a condition-based duration for phase IV, which should last until CENTCOM transitioned control. For details, see Kevin Benson, “A War examined: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003.” *Parameters*, no. 43 (Winter 2013-14): 122.

Iraq under the growing influence of Iran and ISIS.¹¹² The case study provided an inquiry into the coalition's operational approach for offensive operations in phase III as well as the operational approach to consolidate gains in the transition to phase IV. The evidence suggests that the coalition could achieve and consolidate early tactical and operational gains, but was not able to consolidate strategic political gains. The reasons for that failure range from over-ambitious objectives, via conflicting or missing political guidance, to inadequate ways and means. The next subsection introduces the PHC as final case study.

Philippines Campaign (PHC)

The PHC was the largest joint campaign in the Pacific phase of the Second World War, only exceeded by the Allied drive across Northern France. Accordingly, the military historian Ronald Spector concludes, “never before had such great armies been projected across hundreds, even thousands of miles of ocean . . .”¹¹³ Due to the enormous size of the campaign, this case study focuses on the operations to seize the island of Luzon. The very close US ties to the Philippines reach all the way back to the Spanish-American War and the resulting Treaty of Paris in 1898, which ceded the Philippines to the US. Of equal importance are the Philippine-American War, just one year later (4 February 1899 - 2 July 1902), and the Philippine Independence Act (24 March 1934), which created the Commonwealth of the Philippines. From the Spanish-American War forward, the US maintained a military presence in the Philippines. Thus, the Japanese invasion on 10 December 1941 led to a withdrawal under pressure of all US forces, including General Douglas MacArthur's Headquarters United States Armed Forces in the Far East.

¹¹² For significant outcomes and results of OIF, see Bailey and Immerman, “Introduction,” in Bailey and Immerman, 6; and Reynolds, “The Wars’ Entangled Roots: Regional Realities and Washington’s Vision,” in Bailey and Immerman, 21.

¹¹³ Ronald H Spector, *Eagle against the Sun. The American War with Japan* (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), xi.

In March 1943, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff directed a two-prong advance across the Pacific to stop the Japanese offensive and secure Japan's unconditional surrender.¹¹⁴ As Figure 7 illustrates, the two prongs consisted of MacArthur commanding the Southwest Pacific Area and Admiral Nimitz commanding the Pacific Ocean Areas, the Pacific Fleet, and the Central Pacific sub-theater. MacArthur's lines of operation (LOO) along the Solomons, New Guinea, to the Philippines, and Nimitz's LOO along the Gilberts, Marshalls, Marianas, to the Palau Islands converged at the Philippines as one of the final "steppingstones" to the Japanese mainland.




Figure 7. PHC: Two-pronged Allied offensive in the Pacific. Created by author.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ For details on the directive for the establishment of the two theaters of operations and the friction caused by a lack of unity of command, see D. Clayton James, "American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 726; Robert R. Smith, *United States Army in World War II. The War in the Pacific: Triumph in the Philippines* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1993), 4; Spector, *Eagle against the Sun. The American War with Japan*, xiii.

¹¹⁵ For the figure's base map, see The National WWII Museum, "The Pacific Strategy, 1941-1944," accessed December 10, 2018, <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/pacific-strategy-1941-1944>.

Along with those advances went a year and a half of debate over the relative priority of Luzon versus Formosa as the primary objective of an Allied drive into the western Pacific.¹¹⁶ The debate climaxed in September 1944 and resulted in the reaffirmation of the decision to strike into the southern or central Philippines before further advancing. The operational approach evolved over time from originally four to then three phases. Those three phases were (1) a move into the central Philippines establishing major air and supply bases on Leyte, (2) the advance to Luzon, and (3) the recapture of the bypassed islands in the southern Philippines. On 15 September, MacArthur canceled the original first phase, which comprised the seizure of a foothold in the southern Philippines, on southeastern Mindanao.¹¹⁷ Several key assumptions supported both, the “Luzon first” strategy as well as the three-phased operational approach. Five of those key assumptions are relevant for this case study. These are, first, aerial bombing and a naval blockade would not suffice to force Japan’s surrender; second, reoccupying the Philippines was a major American war aim; third, the “Luzon first” strategy would cost less time, men, and money; fourth, the Japanese would make the decisive stand at Luzon; and, fifth, a large number of loyal Filipinos would support US operations.¹¹⁸

Three crucial events paved the road for operations on Luzon. Both, the Battle of the Philippine Sea (19-20 June 1944) and the Battle of Leyte Gulf (24-25 October 1944), the latter being the largest naval battle in history, deprived the Japanese of the capability to conduct carrier-

¹¹⁶ For details on the strategic “Formosa first” versus “Luzon first” debate, see Andradé Dale, *The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II: Luzon* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1996), 30; James, “American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War,” in Paret, 727; Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, 3-10.

¹¹⁷ For details on the operational approach and its evolution from four to three phases, see M. Hamlin Cannon, *United States Army in World War II. The War in the Pacific. Leyte: The Return to the Philippines* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1993), 6; Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, 11, 18; Christopher M. Rein, *Multi-Domain Battle in the Southwest Pacific Theater of World War II* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2017), 104-105.

¹¹⁸ For details on the first assumption, see James, “American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War,” in Paret, 723; for the second assumption, see Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, 9 and 15; for the third assumption, see Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, 8; for the fourth assumption, see Rein, *Multi-Domain Battle in the Southwest Pacific Theater of World War II*, 104; Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, 27; for the fifth assumption, see Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, 12.

operations. Despite those losses, the Japanese committed significant land-based air support and reinforcements from Formosa and mainland Japan, continuously contesting the air domain. The Battle of Leyte (20 October 1944 - 26 December 1944) concluded the first phase of the campaign and put strong US forces into a comfortable Napoleonic central position on the Japanese-held Philippine Archipelago.¹¹⁹ Accordingly, Spector summarizes, “The Japanese decision to make Leyte [instead of Luzon] the scene of the ‘decisive battle’ had cost them their fleet and most of their remaining airpower; it doomed the remaining Japanese forces in the Philippines—now isolated, unsupported, and drained by the Leyte campaign—to certain defeat.”¹²⁰

The first four questions used to assess this case are, what were the strategic aims, what were the political objectives, what were the military objectives, and were those objectives nested? The major Allied strategic aim in the Pacific was to attain unconditional Japanese surrender. Subsequent strategic aims were to keep China in the war, to encourage the Soviet Union to open hostilities against Japan, and to maintain the strong relationships with Australia and New Zealand.¹²¹ The political objective for the PHC built on the strong US-Filipino relationship and aimed at re-establishing the lawful Philippine Civil Government (PCG). The two-fold military objective, as stated by MacArthur, was “to cut the enemy's communications to the south and to secure a base for our further advance.”¹²² For operations on Luzon, those objectives translated into the military mission to secure and protect a beachhead at the Lingayen Gulf area, and to seize and secure the Central Plains-Manila Bay area in four to six weeks.¹²³ Overall, the strategic aims as well as the political and military objectives were nested. The

¹¹⁹ For the significance of the seizure of the island of Leyte, see Cannon, *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines*, ix; Spector, *Eagle against the Sun. The American War with Japan*, 511-512.

¹²⁰ Spector, *Eagle against the Sun. The American War with Japan*, 517.

¹²¹ For details on both the main and the subsequent strategic aims in the Pacific, see James, “American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War,” in Paret, 720.

¹²² Cannon, *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines*, 4.

¹²³ For details on the military mission, see Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, 29.

strategic aim resulted from a thorough civil-military discourse, the political and military objectives stemmed from a compromise-based decision making process.¹²⁴ However, beyond purely political and military factors, psychological considerations also influenced Allied decision-making. MacArthur best explained it by saying, “Moreover, if the United States should deliberately bypass the Philippines, leaving our prisoners, nationals, and loyal Filipinos in enemy hands without an effort to retrieve them at earliest moment, we would incur the gravest psychological reaction . . . We would probably suffer such loss of prestige among all the peoples of the Far East that it would adversely affect the United States for many years.”¹²⁵

The fifth question used to assess this case is, whether the Joint Force achieved tactical and operational gains? The campaign offers two noteworthy situations where the Joint Force achieved such gains. Those two situations were the seizure of Leyte, providing a Napoleonic central position on the Philippine Archipelago, and the race for Manila on Luzon, including the subsequent “mop-up” of the capital city.¹²⁶ First, the direct jump to and seizure of Leyte, bypassing Mindanao, created multiple effects for further-on exploitation and consolidation. The commanding position of Leyte provided excellent anchorage for Allied naval assets; enabled the establishment of bases; extended operational reach across the Philippines, to the coast of China, and to Formosa; divided Japanese forces in the Philippines; and cut Japanese LOCs to the oil-rich Netherlands Indies. Second, after the successful assault at the Lingayen Gulf on 9 January and intense enemy contact with the Kembu Group on 23 January in the vicinity of Clark Field, Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, commander Sixth Army, favored a deliberate approach, protecting his flank

¹²⁴ In lieu of the opinion conveyed by some of his biographers, MacArthur did not establish the outlined aims and objectives unilaterally. For details, see James, “American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War,” in Paret, 731.

¹²⁵ Cannon, *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines*, 4.

¹²⁶ World War I and II scholars and participants use the term to “mop-up” to describe tactical tasks associated with aggressively searching, finding, and destroying or capturing by-passed enemy units or elements thereof that are cut off from their main body.

against possible counterattacks.¹²⁷ Instead, MacArthur wanted to consolidate the early success and urged Krueger to push on toward Manila immediately (see Figure 8).¹²⁸ Accordingly, during a visit to the First Cavalry Division on 30 January, MacArthur ordered its commander, Major General Verne D. Mudge, to “go to Manila, go around the nips, bounce off the nips, but go to Manila.”¹²⁹ The following race for Manila enabled the successful completion of the encirclement of Manila on the night of 12 February, creating the condition for the subsequent seizure and “mop-up” of the city itself.




Figure 8. PHC: Race for Manila. Created by author.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ The Kembu group was one of three groups created by General Tomoyuki Yamashita, commander of Japanese land forces in the Philippines, for the defense of Luzon. For details, see Figure 8.

¹²⁸ Spector, *Eagle against the Sun. The American War with Japan*, 520.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 521.

¹³⁰ For the figure’s base map, see Dale, *The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II: Luzon*, 8.

The sixth question used to assess this case is, which operational approach did the Joint Force chose to consolidate operational military gains and to contribute to consolidation of strategic political gains? Operations to consolidate military gains on Luzon and Leyte are closely linked to each other. Immediately prior to its assault on Luzon, Krueger's Sixth Army conducted large-scale "mop-up" operations to find, fix, and destroy numerous pockets of enemy resistance on Leyte in order to establish sufficient area security.¹³¹ Upon unit consolidation and relief in place by General Eichelberger's Eighth Army, Krueger and his army transferred that experience from Leyte to Luzon.

Sixth Army's progress after MacArthur's interference on 30 January, and the successful landing of the 11th Airborne Division on 29 and 30 January, caused Krueger to order Lieutenant General Oscar W. Griswold's XIV Corps on 2 February to advance toward Manila as quickly as possible. Thus, the 1st Cavalry Division and the 37th Infantry Division raced for Manila from the north, while the 11th Airborne Division closed in from the south.¹³² To gain and maintain momentum, the 1st Cavalry Division formed two mechanized task forces. Those task forces, called "flying column," consisted of a motorized cavalry squadron each, a company of tanks, a 105-mm howitzer battery, and enough trucks and tanks to carry all the troops. The "flying column" rushed toward Manila while the rest of the division followed to consolidate tactical gains. Advancing at up to fifty miles per hour, just one day later, on the evening of 3 February, the leading element of the 1st Cavalry Division passed through the northern suburbs and into the city itself.¹³³ Beyond those efforts to seize Manila and establish area security, Sixth Army also

¹³¹ 7th Infantry Division's actions along Leyte's west coast area are typical examples for such area security operations. For details on these area security operations on Leyte, see Cannon, *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines*, 365.

¹³² For the circumstances leading to the race for Manila, see Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, 217.

¹³³ For details on the formation and advance of the "flying column," see Dale, *The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II: Luzon*, 11-12; Spector, *Eagle against the Sun. The American War with Japan*, 521.

executed minimum-essential stability tasks. Bearing resemblance to military government units employed in Europe, thirteen Philippine Civil Affairs Units (PCAU), staffed by expatriate Filipinos from the US, followed combat operations. Those PCAUs supervised the distribution of relief supplies, set price ceilings, directed the retailing of consumer goods, re-established schools and medical facilities, and reconstituted local governments.¹³⁴

Those immediate civil administration and relief efforts led to the Joint Force's approach to contribute to consolidation of strategic political gains. Zooming out to the bigger Pacific picture, planners at Washington interpreted the strategic aim of unconditional surrender, proclaimed by President Roosevelt at Casablanca in early 1943, relatively flexible. Unbeknownst to the Japanese, those liberal interpretations translated into a plan for an overall benevolent occupation.¹³⁵ Against that backdrop, the Philippines provide a special case. First, a large, organized guerrilla force, backed by a generally loyal population, waited for the US return to the Philippines, willing to contribute to the defeat of the Japanese. That loyalty translated into an abundance of intelligence as well as considerable guerrilla resistance, both American-led and Filipino-led. Second, the exile PCG under President Sergio Osmeña was equally eager to return home.¹³⁶ In this context, MacArthur strived to create favorable conditions for the immediate re-establishment of the PCG. Unlike the previous two case studies, not US-led but US-supported civilian and military governance and administration efforts were required. Filipinos actively contributed services of all types as railroad men, truck drivers, engineers, clerks, government officials and employees, guides, spies, and carriers. They often risked their lives hand-carrying supplies to the front lines.¹³⁷ Thus, on 23 October 1944, MacArthur announced the establishment

¹³⁴ For details on the structure, responsibilities, and efforts of the PCAUs, see Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, 40-41.

¹³⁵ For details on the plans for a benevolent occupation and administration of Japan, see James, "American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War," in Paret, 724-725.

¹³⁶ For details on the role of the guerrilla force, see Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, 26, 657.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 657.

of the PCG with President Osmeña as its head at Tacloban on Leyte. Four months later, on 27 February 1945, MacArthur held a formal ceremony at Manila on Luzon, which restored Osmeña as the head of all of the Philippines.¹³⁸ Although Japanese resistance continued in parts of the islands until the end of the war, the Allies controlled all the critical infrastructure at that time.

The seventh question used to assess this case is, what military means were allocated to achieve the military objectives? The final estimate of MacArthur's chief intelligence officer prior to the assault anticipated 152,500 Japanese troops on Luzon.¹³⁹ Because of the size of the enemy formation, for the first time during the Pacific war, the US deployed troops in field army strength. Two armies, Sixth and Eighth, consisting of ten divisions, five regimental combat teams, and numerous supporting units deployed to Luzon, adding up to 203,000 soldiers, of whom were 131,000 combat troops. In addition, one well-organized Filipino guerrilla unit approximated the size and effectiveness of a US division.¹⁴⁰

This case looked at the seizure of Luzon as part of the larger PHC. The campaign itself commenced on 9 January 1945 with an amphibious assault at the Lingayen Gulf and lasted until the end of the war in mid-August 1945. Despite ongoing operations to establish area and external security, MacArthur re-introduced the PCG in Luzon on 27 February 1945, just seven weeks after the campaign's beginning. On 15 August 1945, almost 115,000 Japanese, including noncombatant civilians, were still at large on Luzon and the central and southern islands, fixing the equivalent of three and two-thirds US divisions in combat operations.¹⁴¹ Nevertheless, the campaign yielded three significant strategic implications. The Allies had destroyed the equivalent

¹³⁸ For details on the re-establishment of the PCG on both, Leyte and Luzon, see Cannon, *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines*, 152; Rein, *Multi-Domain Battle in the Southwest Pacific Theater of World War II*, 107; Spector, *Eagle against the Sun. The American War with Japan*, 527.

¹³⁹ Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, 28.

¹⁴⁰ For more details on the military means deployed, see Dale, *The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II: Luzon*, 30; Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, 29-30; Spector, *Eagle against the Sun. The American War with Japan*, 518.

¹⁴¹ Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, 651.

of 15 Japanese divisions, of which nine belonged to their very best. Thus, the campaign rendered over 380,000 Japanese unavailable for the defense of the homeland. Consequently, the inability to retain the Philippines made the Japanese defeat certain.¹⁴² The evidence suggests that the Allies could achieve and consolidate both operational military as well as strategic political gains. The reasons for that success range from aggressive exploitations of early gains, via loyal Filipino support, to a well-prepared political post-hostility order.

This section applied and answered the research questions posited in section one to the three selected case studies. Those case studies were the BOTB from the German perspective, OIF, and the PHC. In the first case, the evidence suggests that the German army achieved early operational military gains, but could not sufficiently consolidate these. In the second case, the evidence suggests that the coalition could achieve and consolidate operational military gains, but was not able to consolidate strategic political gains. Finally, in the third case, the evidence suggests that the Allies could achieve and consolidate both operational military as well as strategic political gains. Figure 9 illustrates these varying degrees of success.




Figure 9. Case studies related to joint consolidation of gains activities. Created by author.

¹⁴² For details on the listed strategic implications, see Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, 651-652.

Although the reasons for those varying degrees of success are manifold, they center on the relation between ends, ways, and means for and beyond LSCO. Thus, the overarching evidence supports Clausewitz, who pointed out, “To bring a war or one of its campaigns to a successful close requires a thorough grasp of national policy. On that level strategy and policy coalesce.”¹⁴³ The following findings and analysis section will assess whether that evidence supports or does not support the hypothesis.

Findings and Analysis

Peace is not sought in order to provoke war, but war is waged in order to attain peace. Be a peacemaker, then, even by fighting, so that through your victory you might bring those whom you defeat to the advantages of peace.

—Augustine, *Letter 189, to Boniface*

The findings and analysis section comprises two major subsections. The findings subsection reviews the data from the three case studies; the analysis subsection examines these data to indicate whether they support or do not support the hypothesis. The findings subsection applies the structured, focused comparison method using the set of guiding questions to examine the empirical findings from the three case studies. This first subsection clusters the inherently related questions in the same way as the case studies did before.¹⁴⁴

The first four questions asked, what were the strategic aims, what were the political objectives, what were the military objectives, and were those aims and objectives nested? The purpose of consolidation of gains is to make enduring any temporary operational success. Achieving that purpose requires a link across aims and objectives. The study expected that if policy makers had established clear strategic aims, and if they had derived and nested feasible political and military objectives, then the Joint Force could successfully consolidate gains.

¹⁴³ Clausewitz, *On War*, 111.

¹⁴⁴ Appendix A summarizes all major findings.

The strategic aim of the BOTB was to defeat the Western Allies decisively in order to enable a shift back to the Eastern front. Politically, Hitler wanted to drive a wedge between the Western Allies in order to enforce a favorable peace treaty with them; militarily, he wanted to seize Antwerp, sever the Allied supply lines, and encircle and destroy Allied ground forces north of the line Bastogne-Brussels-Antwerp. Logically, these aims and objectives were clear and nested, but they appeared too broad, too ambitious, and disconnected from the realities on the Western front, thus, impairing any consolidation efforts.

OIF aimed strategically at establishing stability, democratic rule, and economic prosperity under U.S. tutelage for Iraq and the Middle East to preclude the further incubation and spread of terror and extremism in the Muslim world. OIF's political objective was a stable, territorially sovereign Iraq with a broad-based government. The military objective was to destabilize, isolate, and overthrow the Iraqi regime; to destroy Iraqi WMD capability and infrastructure; and to destroy terrorist networks in Iraq. As with the BOTB case study before, the aims and objectives were logically nested, but too vague, too ambitious, and disconnected from the sectarian realities on the Iraqi ground, thus, preventing the strategic consolidation of the achieved operational military gains.

On the contrary, the PHC established the necessary link from the activities on the battlefield all the way up to the strategic aims. Strategically, the United States aimed at unconditional Japanese surrender with the subsequent strategic aims to keep China in the war, to encourage the Soviet Union to open hostilities against Japan, and to maintain the strong relationships with Australia and New Zealand. Politically, the Allies successfully re-established the lawful government of the Philippine Commonwealth. Militarily, they cut Japanese LOCs to the south and secured a base for further advances. The strategic aims as well as the political and military objectives were clear, feasible, and nested. The strategic aim resulted from a civil-military discourse over many years, the political and military objectives stemmed from a compromise-based decision making process by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.




Figure 10. Case studies related to key terms. Created by author.

Overall, as introduced by the Literature Review and illustrated by Figure 10, all three campaigns had unlimited political and military objectives, pursued by military strategies of annihilation. The unlimited nature of the aims and objectives in all three cases facilitated the inherent nesting, but leaves the question unanswered why the respective Joint Force succeeded or failed in consolidating gains. That leads to the second set of questions.

The fifth question asked, whether the Joint Force achieved tactical and operational gains; the sixth question asked, which operational approach did the Joint Force chose to consolidate these operational military gains and to contribute to consolidation of strategic political gains; and the seventh question asked, what military means were allocated to achieve the objectives. Accordingly, the study expected that, first, if the Joint Force had adequate means available; second, if the Joint Force successfully consolidated tactical and operational military gains; and, third, if the Joint Force successfully contributed to the consolidation of strategic political gains, then the Joint Force was capable of achieving the military and enabling political objectives.

All three Joint Forces achieved initial tactical gains. That requires the Joint Force either to gain positions of relative advantage or to attain the operational purpose. During the BOTB, the Joint Force first caused the disintegration of the last defenses east of Bastogne on 18 December

and then seized Houffalize on the right flank and Wiltz on the left flank on 19 December 1944. These gains enabled both the envelopment of and concentric attack on Bastogne as well as the continuation of the race for the Meuse. During OIF, the British quickly secured Basra in the south, while the 173rd Airborne Brigade liberated Kirkuk in the north. Elements of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions cleared As Najaf and As Samawah, and secured the V Corps flanks so that the 3rd Infantry Division could burst through the Karbala Gap and race for Baghdad. During the PHC, the Joint Force first seized Leyte providing a Napoleonic central position, and then, after a successful amphibious assault onto Luzon, raced for Manila enabling the successful completion of the encirclement of Manila on the night of 12 February 1945. While the Germans gained a temporary position of relative advantage around Bastogne, V Corps in Iraq and Sixth Army on Luzon attacked according to commander's intent. The common element of operational art, which ties all three case studies together, was the crucial role of tempo to penetrate, overcome, and clear enemy resistance. Tempo manifested itself in the races for Bastogne and the Meuse, for Bagdad, and for Manila.

The significance of tempo leads to the operational approaches for the consolidation of gains. To free the armored columns of the XLVII Panzer Corps for the dash to the Meuse, Lüttwitz decided on 20 December to seize Bastogne with the 26th Volksgrenadier Division and parts of the Panzer Lehr Division, while bypassing the city with the 2d Panzer Division and remainders of the Panzer Lehr Division. To enable a deep penetration and exploit early gains, the commander of the Panzer Lehr Division created a combined arms advance guard. Following this attack, however, the Germans did not have a plan for the establishment of sufficient area and external security. Even more significant, they also did not have a plan for the destruction of the more than a million Allied troops, whom the original dash to Antwerp attempted to isolate. To free his armored elements for the continuation of the race for Bagdad, Wallace tasked follow-on forces with area security. For instance, on 29 March, the 82d Airborne Division relieved the 3d Infantry Division at As Samawah. Having advanced to Bagdad, the 3d Infantry Division's

“Thunder Runs” played a crucial role for the collapse of the resistance inside the city on 10 April 2003. However, sectarian violence, de-Baathification, disbanding the Iraqi army, and providing governmental authority overstretched allied capabilities and prevented the transition from operational military to strategic political gains. To gain and maintain momentum for the race for Manila, the commander 1st Cavalry Division created a combined arms “flying column” while the rest of the division followed to consolidate tactical gains. Following the combat units, the PCAUs executed minimum-essential stability tasks. The successful consolidation of tactical and operational gains paved the road for the ultimate consolidation of the strategic political gains through the restoration of PCG on 27 February 1945. In all three approaches to consolidate gains, tempo manifested itself in a twofold way. First, Panzer Lehr Division’s advance guard, 3d Infantry Division’s “Thunder Runs,” and 1st Cavalry Division’s “flying column” display the application of tempo at the tactical level. Second, the quick restoration of the PCG as the only case of successful strategic consolidation of political gains illustrates the importance of tempo at the strategic level. These tactical similarities and strategic differences lead to the question of the allocated means.

For the BOTB, OB WEST should have had 30 divisions available. The problem was that three infantry and six panzer divisions had to come from OB WEST itself. Despite an enormous mobilization effort, the allocated means were not adequate for both, the military objective of the “Big Solution” as well as the consolidation of the initial tactical gains by the Fifth Army. In lieu of these obvious shortfalls, Hitler answered repeated requests for reinforcements too late, not reinforcing Manteuffel’s initial success. OIF commenced with 145,000 US soldiers, which was about half the number CENTCOM’s initial plans from February 2002 had envisioned (275,000). Constant political pressure caused CENTCOM to reduce the troop numbers as much as possible and, once deployed, to redeploy forces as quickly as possible. Thus, the allocated means were too little and left too soon to transform the operational military gains into strategic political success. During the PHC, two armies, adding up to 203,000 soldiers, consisting of ten divisions, five

regimental combat teams, and numerous supporting units saw action on Luzon. The allocated means were adequate to consolidate operational military gains and to set the conditions for the consolidation of strategic political gains, although the fighting on Luzon dragged on until Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945.¹⁴⁵

The first and the second hypotheses are closely interrelated. They argue that when there are clear strategic aims as well as political and military objectives, and when these aims and objectives are nested, then the Joint Force can successfully consolidate gains. Based on the empirical evidence, the findings suggest a mixed outcome for both hypotheses. Cases one and two do not support the hypotheses, while case three supports both (see Table 1). Regarding the BOTB and OIF, the aims and objectives were logically nested, but too vague, too ambitious, and disconnected from the realities on ground, thus, preventing consolidation efforts beyond operational military gains. Regarding the PHC, the strategic aims as well as the political and military objectives were also ambitious, but sufficiently clear, feasible, and nested to enable the successful consolidation of both operational military and strategic political gains.

Table 1. Analysis overview

No.	Hypothesis	Case 1 Battle of the Bulge	Case 2 Operation Iraqi Freedom	Case 3 Philippines Campaign	Overall
1.	When there are clear strategic aims as well as political and military objectives, then the Joint Force can successfully consolidate gains.	-	-	+	o
2.	When these aims and objectives are feasible and nested, then the Joint Force can successfully consolidate gains.	-	-	+	o
3.	When the Joint Force consolidates tactical and operational military gains, then the Joint Force is capable of achieving the military objectives and enabling political objectives.	-	+	+	o
4.	When the Joint Force contributes to consolidation of strategic political gains, then the Joint Force is capable of achieving the military objectives and enabling political objectives.	-	-	+	o
<p style="text-align: center;"> = Not supported = Mixed = Supported </p>					

Source: Created by author.

¹⁴⁵ Another common element, which emerges from these observations and which ties all three campaigns together, is tense civil-military relationships. These tense relationships included Hitler-von Rundstedt/Manteuffel (BOTB), Bremer-Sanchez (OIF), and Truman-MacArthur (PHC).

Similarly, the third and fourth hypotheses also build upon each other. They assert that when the Joint Force consolidates tactical and operational military gains, and when the Joint Force contributes to consolidation of strategic political gains, then the Joint Force is capable of achieving the military objectives and enabling political objectives. The findings suggest a mixed outcome for both hypotheses. Case one does not support any of the hypotheses; case two supports the third, but does not support the fourth hypothesis; and case three supports both hypotheses (see Table 1). During the BOTB, the Joint force could consolidate neither operational military, nor strategic political gains. During OIF, the Joint Force could achieve operational military gains, but was not able to consolidate strategic political gains. Finally, during the PHC, the Joint Force could consolidate operational military gains as well as contribute to the consolidation of strategic political gains. While the Joint Force in case three achieved the political and military objectives, the Joint Forces in cases one and two did not.

Overall, the analysis has yielded mixed outcomes across all four hypothesis. These mixed outcomes fully support the thesis statement as framed as part of the study's purpose during section one. Moreover, the examination and analysis of the findings has revealed two specific aspects, which the following conclusion further pursues. These aspects are tempo as the decisive factor for, as well as the need for a holistic theory of joint consolidation of gains.

Summary, Discussion, and Conclusion

Five subsections comprise the final section. It summarizes the study, discusses the major findings, highlights implications for practice, indicates recommendations for further research, and provides final conclusions.

The study utilized theory, history, and doctrine as three major methodological steps. Step one spanned the introduction and the literature review. Throughout these two sections, the study developed a theory of joint consolidation of gains, provided the relevant theoretical background, and defined the necessary key terms. Step two covered the historical case study section and the findings and analysis section. During these two sections, the study applied the theory to the three

selected case studies, and answered the four hypotheses. Based on the previous two steps, this final section as the third step, doctrine, utilizes the major findings to propose a definition for joint consolidation of gains.

Summarized Findings along Research Questions

The study applied seven research questions as evaluation criteria to the three selected case studies. Regarding questions one through four, the study found that all three campaigns had unlimited political and military objectives, pursued by military strategies of annihilation. The unlimited nature of the aims and objectives in all three cases facilitated the inherent nesting. Concerning question five, the study discovered that all three Joint Forces achieved initial operational military gains: During the BOTB in the form of a position of relative advantage, during OIF and the PHC according to the operational intent. The findings with regard to question six are more complex. All three Joint Forces attempted to consolidate tactical and operational gains through the acceleration of operational tempo with the help of the Panzer Lehr Division's advance guard (BOTB), 3d Infantry Division's "Thunder Runs" (OIF), and 1st Cavalry Division's "flying column" (PHC). Despite these initial successes, only during the PHC did the Joint force have a feasible approach to contribute to the strategic consolidation of political gains, which enabled the immediate restoration of the PCG. During the BOTB, the Joint Force had no such plan at all; during OIF, the Joint Force won the race for Bagdad, but could not translate these operational into strategic gains. Regarding question seven, the study found that the allocated means for the BOTB and OIF were insufficient; the allocated means for the PHC, however, were adequate to consolidate tactical and operational gains and to set the conditions for the strategic consolidation of political gains.

Decisive Role of Tempo

In all three cases and for both types of joint consolidation of gains, tempo was decisive. Current doctrine defines tempo as "the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time

with respect to the enemy.”¹⁴⁶ More precisely, according to Robert R. Leonhard, time as the fourth dimension spans the length, width, and height of the battlespace and comprises duration, frequency, sequence, and opportunity as major characteristics.¹⁴⁷ In all three cases, the Joint Force increased the tactical frequency raising the tempo of significant events and, hence, creating time-sensitive decision points or opportunities.¹⁴⁸ The accelerated tempo or high-frequency combat with a spatial focus on destruction of the physical enemy manifested itself in the races for Bastogne and the Meuse, for Bagdad, and for Manila. During OIF and PHC, the enemy ultimately disintegrated, during the BOTB the tempo, length, and width of the penetration was not sufficient to cause an Allied collapse.

Need for a Holistic Theory of Joint Consolidation of Gains

The case studies indicate that high-frequency combat is one tool for operational consolidation of military gains, but it is not sufficient for strategic consolidation of political gains. The case studies also indicate that the Joint Force requires the capability to transition from high- to low-frequency combat with a temporal focus to carry the operational military gains over to strategic and political gains.¹⁴⁹ Such a holistic understanding concurrently accomplishes manifold aspects raised throughout the theoretical and empirical subsection of the literature review. It overcomes the denial syndrome and operationalizes efforts needed to consolidate political gains in war (Schadlow); it bridges the distinct separation between tactical and strategic matters (Dolman); it accounts for transition instead of post-conflict operations (Crane); it connects

¹⁴⁶ US Army, *ADRP 3-0* (2017), 2-7.

¹⁴⁷ Robert R. Leonhard, *Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War*, 2nd ed. (Lexington, KY: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2017), 4, 14-15.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, chapter 5.

¹⁴⁹ Leonhard associates low-frequency-combat with insurgency/counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, combatting terrorism, and peacetime contingency operations. The activities this study aligns with strategic consolidation of political gains fit into that same category. For details on Leonhard’s understanding of low-frequency combat, see Leonhard, *Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War*, 2nd ed., 108-113.

military plans with their ultimate purpose (Iklé); and it enables immediate efforts for reconstruction as would have been vital during OIF (Garner).

The need for a holistic theory of joint consolidation of gains must mount into an equally holistic, but at the same time practical, definition. Therefore, the study's theoretical approach purposefully went beyond the Army's land-focus and provided a wider view of how joint planners and decision makers have to understand consolidation of gains. Accordingly, this study suggests the following definition for joint consolidation of gains:

Joint consolidation of gains comprises activities to operationally consolidate tactical military gains and contributions to strategically consolidate political gains. Operational consolidation of military gains encompasses activities (1) to conduct tactical unit consolidation; (2) to establish sufficient area and external security; and, (3) to execute minimum-essential or, if necessary, primary stability tasks. Strategic consolidation of political gains comprises contributions to (4) the creation of favorable conditions for and support to other US Government agencies; (5) if necessary, the transition to enduring commitment; (6) if necessary, the provision of temporary military governance or parts thereof; and (7) the transition of control to legitimate authorities.

The recommendations for further research spring from the study's delimitations. The study focused on consolidation of gains in LSCO while returning from armed conflict to competition. Consequently, future studies could further analyze the ends, ways, and means necessary for joint consolidation of gains in competition, i.e. below the threshold of armed conflict or in the "gray zone." Such an attempt would have to include aspects of unconventional warfare, containment strategies, and deterrence theory.

In summary, the wider theoretical approach and definition of joint consolidation of gains had the two-fold purpose of clarifying the understanding of consolidation of gains in a joint sense, and, hence, to inform US Army and joint doctrine development. The suggested definition helps to establish the missing link in the inherent relationship between temporary operational military gains, military objectives, permanent strategic political gains, political objectives, and strategic

aims. Thus, the study has laid a theoretical foundation for the codification of joint consolidation of gains in joint doctrine.

Appendix A Findings Worksheet

No.	Criteria	Expected Findings	Actual Findings		
			Case 1 Battle of the Bulge	Case 2 Operation Iraqi Freedom	Case 3 Philippines Campaign
1.	Strategic aims	The purpose of consolidation of gains is to make enduring any temporary operational success. Achieving that purpose requires a link between strategic aims as well as political and military objectives.	- Resume the offensive to achieve a decisive military defeat on the Western front in order to enable a shift back to the Eastern front.	- Establish stability, democratic rule, and economic prosperity under U.S. tutelage for both Iraq and the Middle East to preclude the further incubation and spread of ‘terror and extremism’ in the Muslim world.	- Attain unconditional Japanese surrender. - Subsequent strategic aims: To keep China in the war, to encourage the Soviet Union to open hostilities against Japan, and to maintain the strong relationships with Australia and New Zealand.
2.	Political objectives	Therefore, the study expects that if policy makers had established clear strategic aims, and derived and nested feasible political and military objectives, then the Joint Force could successfully consolidate gains.	- Smash the Allied coalition, or at least greatly cripple its ground combat capabilities, in order to enforce a favorable peace treaty with the Western Allies.	- Create a stable Iraq, with its territorial integrity intact; a broad-based government that renounces WMD development and use, and no longer supports terrorism or threatens its neighbors; and success in Iraq leveraged to convince or compel other countries to cease support to terrorists and to deny them access to WMD.	- Re-establish the lawful government of the Philippine Commonwealth.
3.	Military objectives		- Seize Antwerp, sever the already stretched Allied supply lines, and encircle and destroy Allied ground forces north of the line Bastogne-Brussels-Antwerp.	- Destabilize, isolate, and overthrow the Iraqi regime and provide support to a new, broad-based government; destroy Iraqi WMD capability and infrastructure; protect allies and supporters from Iraqi threats and attacks; destroy terrorist networks in Iraq; gather intelligence on global terrorism;	- Cut Japanese lines of communication to the south and secure a base for the further advance.

				detain terrorists and war criminals and free individuals unjustly detained under the Iraqi regime; and support international efforts to set conditions for long-term stability in Iraq and the region.	
4.	Nesting of objectives		- Logically and generally nested, but too broad, too ambitious, and disconnected from the realities on the ground.	- Logically and generally nested, but too broad, too ambitious, and disconnected from the realities on the ground.	- The strategic aims as well as the political and military objectives are nested. The strategic aim resulted from a civil-military discourse over many years, the political and military objectives stemmed from a compromise-based decision making process by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
5.	Achieved tactical and operational gains	To achieve temporary operational gains, requires the Joint Force either to gain positions of relative advantage or to attain the operational purpose. This study expects that; first, if the Joint Force had adequate means available; second, if the Joint Force successfully consolidated these tactical and operational military gains; and, third, if the Joint Force successfully contributed to consolidation of strategic political gains, then the Joint Force was capable of achieving the military and enabling political objectives. This way the	- Within Fifth Panzer Army, Lüttwitz's XLVII Panzer Corps achieved the most significant gains. - During the night of 18 December, as part of the race for Bastogne , the 2d Panzer Division destroyed forty tanks, so that the disintegration of the last defenses east of Bastogne promised quick entry to the city the following day. - During the night of 19 December, the fall of Houffalize in the right flank and Wiltz in the left flank enabled the envelopment of and concentric attack on Bastogne to make the road center available for the support of the Fifth Panzer Army over the Meuse.	- The British quickly secured the major city of Basra in the south, while the 173rd Airborne Brigade liberated Kirkuk in the north. Elements of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions cleared An Najaf and As Samawah, and secured the V Corps flanks so the 3rd Infantry Division could burst through the Karbala Gap to reach Baghdad . Airpower and ground assaults destroyed enemy forces that tried to resist. American psychological operations advised Iraqi soldiers to go home to avoid being bombed into oblivion; many did.	- First, the direct jump to and seizure of Leyte, bypassing Mindanao, provided a Napoleonic central position on the Philippine Archipelago and created multiple effects for further-on exploitation and consolidation. The commanding position of Leyte provided excellent anchorage for Allied naval assets; enabled the establishment of bases; extended operational reach across the Philippines, to the coast of China, and to Formosa; portioned Japanese forces in the Philippines; and cut Japanese lines of communication (LOC) to the oil-rich Netherlands Indies. - Second, the race for Manila enabled the successful completion of the encirclement of Manila on the night of 12 February, creating

		Joint Force linked tactical activities to consolidate operational gains with military and political objectives.			the condition for the subsequent seizure and “mop-up” of the city itself.
6.	Operational approach to consolidate gains		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To preserve the momentum and consolidate his gains, Manteuffel decided to seize Bastogne and continue to the Meuse simultaneously. - Accordingly, on 20 December, Lüttwitz decided to envelope Bastogne from the south and west. He intended to seize Bastogne with parts of the Panzer Lehr Division and the 26th Volksgrenadier Division, while bypassing the city with 2d Panzer Division in the north to cross the Meuse as quickly as possible. Both, Lüttwitz and Manteuffel, wanted to free the armored columns of the XLVII Panzer Corps for the dash to the Meuse. - To enable a deep penetration and exploit early gains at the divisional level, commander of the Panzer Lehr Division, Bayerlein, had created an advance guard comprising an armored reconnaissance company, two companies of Panzergrenadiers, and a company of Panthers, further reinforced with Mark IV tanks, a company of engineers, and a battery of self-propelled artillery. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Wallace, commander V corps, consolidated early tactical and operational gains, owed to the “running start,” through tasking follow-on forces with area security in order to enable the leading armored elements to continue their attack. For instance, on 29 March, the 82d Airborne Division relieved the 3d Infantry Division at As Samawah; on 4 April, the 101st Airborne Division secured An Najaf; and, on 10 April, the 173d Airborne Brigade air-landed and secured Kirkuk in the north. - Supported by the famous “Thunder Runs,” Baghdad was isolated on 7 April and final resistance inside the city completely collapsed only three days later on 10 April 2003. Thus, within three weeks, the Allies had driven Saddam Hussein and his regime from Baghdad. - Due to the escalating violence, by mid-2004 CENTCOM stood up MNF-I with MNC-I and MNSTC-I as subordinate commands. One of MNF-I’s first missions was to eliminate emerging insurgent safe havens. Immediate success, such as against Shi’a militias in An Najaf 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - On 2 February, Krueger ordered Griswold’s XIV Corps to advance toward Manila as quickly as possible. Thus, the 1st Cavalry Division and the 37th Infantry Division raced for Manila from the north, while the 11th Airborne Division closed in from the south - To gain and maintain momentum, Mudge, commander 1st Cavalry Division, formed two mechanized task forces. Those task forces, called “flying column,” consisted of a motorized cavalry squadron each, a company of tanks, a 105-mm howitzer battery, and enough trucks and tanks to carry all the troops. The “flying column” rushed toward Manila while the rest of the division followed to consolidate tactical gains. - Sixth Army also executed minimum-essential stability tasks. Bearing resemblance to military government units employed in Europe, thirteen Philippine Civil Affairs Units (PCAU), staffed by expatriate Filipinos from the US, followed combat operations. - On 23 October 1944, MacArthur announced the establishment of the Philippine Civil Government with President Osmeña as its head at

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No plan how to establish sufficient area and external security. - No plan how to destroy the more than a million Allied troops, whom the dash to Antwerp attempted to cut off. 	<p>and the Sadr City area of Baghdad or against Sunni militias in Samarra, were crucial steps on the way to sufficient area and external security and enabled the peaceful elections on 30 January 2005.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bremer decided, first, to execute a de-Baathification of the Iraqi government excluding the top four levels of the ruling Ba'ath Party (vs. "gentle de-Baathification"); second, to disband the Iraqi Army (vs. bringing back the Iraqi Army); and, third, to assume governmental responsibilities (vs. reinstalling indigenous government as quickly as possible). 	<p>Tacloban on Leyte. Four months later, on 27 February 1945, MacArthur held a formal ceremony at Manila on Luzon, which restored Osmeña as the head of all of the Philippines.</p>
7.	Allocated military means	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Allocated combat strength: 30 divisions (18 infantry, 12 armored or mechanized). - Problem: Three infantry and six panzer divisions had to come from OB West itself. Consequently, OB West had to withdraw those divisions from the defense to refit them. Thus, Germany mustered a force with more than 200,000 men in thirteen infantry and seven panzer divisions and with nearly 1,000 tanks and almost 2,000 guns, deployed along a front of 60 miles. - Assessment: From the beginning, the allocated means were not adequate for both, the grandiose object of the "Big Solution" as well as the consolidation of the initial 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Allocated combat strength: 145,000 US soldiers. - Problem: The invasion commenced with about half the number of soldiers CENTCOM's initial plans from February 2002 had envisioned (275,000). Additionally, constant political pressure by Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz caused CENTCOM to reduce the troop numbers as much as possible and, once deployed, to withdraw and redeploy the forces as rapidly as possible. - Assessment: The allocated means were too little and on the ground for too short to carry the tactical 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Allocated combat strength: Two armies, Sixth and Eighth, consisting of ten divisions, five regimental combat teams, and numerous supporting units deployed to Luzon, adding up to 203,000 soldiers. - Assessment: The allocated means were adequate to consolidate tactical and operational gains and to set the conditions for the consolidation of strategic and political gains.

			tactical gains by Fifth Army. Despite the shortfalls, Hitler answered repeated requests for reinforcements too late. Once Hitler had released these reinforcements, he did not deploy them to reinforce Manteuffel's initial success.	and operational success over to strategic and political gains.	
--	--	--	---	--	--

Bibliography

General

- Bassford, Christopher. "Policy, Politics, War, and Military Strategy." The Clausewitz Homepage, 1997. Accessed 06 September 2018.
<https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/StrategyDraft/index.htm>.
- . "The Primacy of Policy and the 'Trinity' in Clausewitz's Mature Thought." In *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, 74-90, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bolger, Daniel P. *Why We Lost. A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2014.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Clarke, Bruce B. G. *Conflict Termination: A Rational Model*. Carlisle Barracks: United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 01 May 1992.
- Cordesman, Anthony H. "Losing by 'Winning': America's Wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria." Center for Strategic & International Studies, 13 August 2018. Accessed 27 August 2018.
<https://www.csis.org/analysis/losing-winning-americas-wars-afghanistan-iraq-and-syria>.
- Crane, Conrad C. "Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won." In *Turning Victory Into Success. Military Operations After the Campaign*, edited by Brian M. De Toy, 1-22. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004.
- Dews, Fred. "Joint Chiefs Chairman Dunford on the '4+1 framework' and meeting transnational threats." Brookings, 24 February 2018. Accessed 18 August 2018.
<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/02/24/joint-chiefs-chairman-dunford-transnational-threats>.
- Dolman, Everett Carl. *Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age*. New York: Frank Cass, 2005.
- Dubik, James M. *Operational Art in Counterinsurgency: A View from the Inside*. Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, May 2012.
- Dubik, James M., and Nic Vincent. *America's Global Competitions: The Gray Zone in Context*. Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2018.
- Garner, Jay M. "Iraq Revisited." In *Turning Victory Into Success. Military Operations After the Campaign*, edited by Brian M. De Toy, 253-273. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004.
- George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005.

- Ikenberry, G. John. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
- Iklé, Fred Charles. *Every War Must End*. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.
- Jomini, Henri Antoine. *The Art of War*. Translated by G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill. Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippencott & Co., 1862.
- Kretchik, Walter E. *US Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011.
- Lauer, G. Stephen, "Blue Whales and Tiger Sharks: Politics, Policy, and the Military Operational Artist." *The Strategy Bridge*, 20 February 2018. Accessed 14 August 2018. <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/2/20/blue-whales-and-tiger-sharks-politics-policy-and-the-military-operational-artist>.
- Leonhard, Robert R. *Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War*. 2nd ed. Lexington, KY: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2017.
- Lundy, Lt. Gen. Mike, and Col. Rich Creed. "The Return of US Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations." *Military Review* 97, no. 6 (November-December 2017): 14-21.
- Mattis, James N. "Remarks by Secretary Mattis on the National Defense Strategy." US Department of Defense, 19 January 2018. Accessed 18 August 2018. <https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1420042/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-on-the-national-defense-strategy>.
- . "Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America. Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge." US Department of Defense, 19 January 2018. Accessed 18 August 2018. <https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.
- McCreedy, Doug. "Ending the War Right: Jus Post Bellum and the Just War Tradition." *Journal of Military Ethics*, 8, no. 1: 66-78.
- Perkins, GEN. David G. "Multi-Domain Battle, The Advent of Twenty-First Century War." *Military Review* 97, no. 6 (November-December 2017): 8-13.
- Perkins, GEN. David G., and GEN. James M. Holmes. "Multidomain Battle, Converging Concepts Toward a Joint Solution." *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 88 (1st Quarter 2018): 54-57.
- Rose, Gideon. *How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010.
- Schadlow, Nadia. *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017.

- Strachan, Hew. *The Direction of War. Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Turabian, Kate L. *A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations: Chicago Style for Students and Researchers*. 8th ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.
- US Army Training and Doctrine Command. *Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century, 2025-2040. Version 1.0*. Training and Doctrine Command, December 2017. Accessed August 14, 2018.
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/MultiDomainOps/docs/MDB_Evolutionfor21st.pdf.
- . *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1. The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*. Training and Doctrine Command, December 6, 2018. Accessed December 10, 2018.
https://www.tradoc.army.mil/Portals/14/Documents/MDO/TP525-3-1_30Nov2018.pdf.
- US Department of Defense. *Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)*. Homeland Security Digital Library, 28 November 2005. Accessed 14 August 2018.
<https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=464196>.
- . *Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations*. Executive Service Directorate, 16 September 2009, incorporating change 1 from 29 June 2017. Accessed 14 August 2018.
<http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/300005p.pdf>.
- US Department of Defense, Joint Staff. *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2018.
- . *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2017.
- . *Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, Stability*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2016.
- . *Joint Publication (JP) 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 2010.
- . *Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Civil-Military Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 2018.
- . *Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Planning*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2017.
- US Department of the Army. *Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 1-01, Doctrine Primer*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2014.
- . *Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-0, Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 2016.
- . *Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 5-0, The Operations Process*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2012.

- . *Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2017.
- . *Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2017.
- . *Field Manual (FM) 3-90, Offense and Defense*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2018.
- . *Field Manual (FM) 3-90, Offense and Defense*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2018.
- . *Field Manual (FM) 3-90-1, Offense and Defense, Volume 1*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2013.
- . *Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014.
- US Headquarters Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 1-1, Strategy*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997.

Worley, Robert. *Orchestrating the Instruments of Power. A Critical Examination of the U.S. National Security System*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015.

Case Studies

Battle of the Bulge

- Cirillo, Roger. *The US Army Campaigns of World War II: Ardennes-Alsace*. Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1995.
- Cole, Hugh M. *United States Army in World War II. The European Theater of Operations. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*. Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1993.

MacDonald, Charles. *A Time for Trumpets*. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1985.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

- Anderson, Terry H. "9/11: Bush's Response." In *Understanding the US Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan*, edited by Beth Bailey and Richard H. Immerman, 54-74. New York: New York University Press, 2015.
- Bailey, Beth, and Richard H. Immerman. "Introduction." In *Understanding the US Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan*, edited by Beth Bailey and Richard H. Immerman, 1-17. New York: New York University Press, 2015.
- Benson, Kevin. "A War Examined: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003." *Parameters*, no. 43 (Winter 2013-14): 119-123.

- Bolger, Daniel P. *Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014.
- Brigham, Robert K. "The Lessons and Legacies of the War in Iraq." In *Understanding the US Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan*, edited by Beth Bailey and Richard H. Immerman, 286-307. New York: New York University Press, 2015.
- Cordesman, Anthony H. "Losing by 'Winning': America's Wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria." Center for Strategic & International Studies, 13 August 2018. Accessed 27 August 2018. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/losing-winning-americas-wars-afghanistan-iraq-and-syria>.
- Crane, Conrad C. "Military Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq: Learning and Adapting under Fire at Home and in the Field." In *Understanding the US Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan*, edited by Beth Bailey and Richard H. Immerman, 124-146. New York: New York University Press, 2015.
- Fontenot, Gregory, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn. *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004.
- Gates, Robert M. *Duty. Memoirs of a Secretary at War*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014.
- Reynolds, Michael A. "The Wars' Entangled Roots: Regional Realities and Washington's Vision." In *Understanding the US Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan*, edited by Beth Bailey and Richard H. Immerman, 21-53. New York: New York University Press, 2015.
- Stewart, Richard W. *American Military History Vol II. The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2008*. Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2010.
- Philippines Campaign
- Cannon, M. Hamlin. *United States Army in World War II. The War in the Pacific. Leyte: The Return to the Philippines*. Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1993.
- Dale, Andrada. *The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II: Luzon*. Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1996.
- James, D. Clayton. "American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War." In *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret, 703-732. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Lofgren, Stephen J. *The US Army Campaigns of World War II: Southern Philippines*. US Army Center of Military History, 5 May 2011. Accessed 05 September 2018. <https://history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-40/index.html>.
- Murray, Williamson, and Allan R. Millett. *A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001.
- Rein, Christopher M. *Multi-Domain Battle in the Southwest Pacific Theater of World War II*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2017.

Smith, Robert R. *United States Army in World War II. The War in the Pacific. The Approach to the Philippines*. Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1996.

Smith, Robert R. *United States Army in World War II. The War in the Pacific: Triumph in the Philippines*. Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1993.

Spector, Ronald H. *Eagle against the Sun. The American War with Japan*. New York: Vintage Books, 1985.