Consolidating Gains in Large-Scale Combat Operations: Operation Husky

A Monograph
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Consolidating Gains in Large-Scale Combat Operations: Operation Husky

Given a renewed emphasis on LSCO, this paper examines how consolidation area operations during Operation Husky added to the cumulative effects required for success in LSCO. This paper will address elements of operational art that were most significantly improved because of effective consolidation area operations: operational reach, tempo, and phasing and transitions. The research and findings from this paper will assist future commanders and operational planners in planning for large-scale combat operations.
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Abstract


Operation Husky remains a significant example of the trials and tribulations of large-scale combat operations (LSCO) during World War II. The Allied force initial assault consisted of more than seven divisions, preceded by two airborne divisions coming ashore simultaneously along a front of one hundred miles. Operation Husky would eventually become the largest and most dispersed amphibious assault with the Seventh Army being the first US field army to fight as a unit in World War II.

The Seventh Army's success in Operation Husky was attributed to the initiative of aggressive commanders and soldiers and the Seventh Army's ability through effective Civil Affairs Officers (CAO) and American Military Government (AMG) operations to quickly consolidate gains. The area security and stability tasks accomplished in the consolidation area contributed significantly to Allied success in Sicily. The Italian Fascist government under Mussolini began to crumble under the weight of Allied pressure. Increased civilian unrest, scattered enemy remnants fighting in the rear area, staggering numbers of prisoners of war, and threats of counterattack penetrations became a concern that General George S. Patton (Seventh Army Commander) and his Division commanders planned for and reduced in execution. The lessons learned during Operation Husky were applied to the follow-up operation in Normandy one year later, and still apply today.

Given a renewed emphasis on LSCO, this paper examines how consolidation area operations during Operation Husky added to the cumulative effects required for success in LSCO. This paper will address elements of operational art that were most significantly improved because of effective consolidation area operations: operational reach, tempo, and phasing and transitions. The research and findings from this paper will assist future commanders and operational planners in planning for large-scale combat operations.
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I would like to thank my wife, Lei-Lani, for her love, support, and patience throughout a career in the Army and throughout this academic year. You have an uncanny ability to provide reason when it seems to allude me, and the intellectual space and time needed to accomplish any task. For this I am always grateful. I would also like to thank Dr. Gregory S. Hospodor for clarifying and increasing my interest in the topic. Lastly, I would like to thank my monograph director, Dr. John M. Curatola, for his support, patience and understanding throughout the process.
**Acronyms**

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<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army Doctrine Publication</td>
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<td>AFHQ</td>
<td>Allied Forces Headquarters</td>
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<td>AMG</td>
<td>American Military Government/Allied Military Government</td>
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<td>CAO</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Officer</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
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<td>FAITC</td>
<td>Fifth Army Invasion Training Center</td>
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<td>LSCO</td>
<td>Large-Scale Combat Operations</td>
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<td>RCT</td>
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Introduction

During the course of this campaign every type of operation, every type of arm – some improvised – was employed, and every sort of obstacle surmounted. As is ever the case, the success was achieved through the untiring efforts of the staff; through the brilliant leadership of our officers from corps and division commanders to platoon leaders – but chiefly and above all, through the discipline heroism and tireless devotion of that incomparable fighting man – the American Soldier.


Operation Husky achieved initial success on the morning of July 10, 1943, as the Italian and German forces on Sicily looked to answer the initial American assault. General Paul Conrath, German Hermann Goering Division Commander, positioned his command northeast of the beach town of Gela. The town served as the American 1st Infantry Division’s objective on D-Day and the objective of the planned German counterattack. The Axis broad-fronted, massive, coordinated push visualized against the southern Sicilian beaches turned out to be a series of uncoordinated thrusts by small units at varying times, and at various places, along the center of the American front.1 Nonetheless, a response to the American invasion was to deny the Allies the ability to project combat power further inland. As the Axis forces scrambled to hinder American success on the beaches, their initial thrust against the American beachhead was thwarted by several independent Seventh Army efforts.

Located directly north of the town of Gela, the Italian Livorno Division, in conjunction with German Hermann Goering Division, planned to conduct a counter attack. The Axis plan consisted of delivering a decisive blow to the American invaders at Gela then eventually wheel eastward to mount a consolidated attack on the British landing sites. Additionally, Italian forces

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were to turn westward to destroy the American beachhead at Licata. Without these beachheads, the American’s ability to project combat power inland and consolidate gains would be disrupted, and a decisive blow achieved. The morning of 11 July, 1943 the Allies were immediately met with resistance as the Axis forces advanced on a three-pronged attack towards Gela. Scattered bands of American paratroopers landed the night prior and slowed the movement of Axis forces. American defenders already occupying Gela (specifically Ranger and engineer elements), assisted by unrelenting artillery and naval bombardment, slowed the Italian Livorno Division to a halt. Meanwhile, the American 26th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) on the east side of Gela bore the brunt of the German Hermann Goering Division attacking from the east. As the German tank division advanced closer to Gela they were continually tested by paratroopers from the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment and the 16th Infantry Regiment. After faltering on his initial push to attack the American’s, General Conrath joined forces with remnants of the Italian Livorno Division. Despite being slowed by resistance, General Conrath decided to send the bulk of his armored forces across the Gela plain to the beaches. This formidable force looked to land a decisive blow only a day after the landing and threaten the 1st Infantry Division beaches.

The beaches of Gela became the scene of a heavy-weight wrestling match. By the afternoon of 11 July, Axis tanks and Panzer Grenadiers had overrun several of the American units, were dangerously close to the heart of the beachhead position, and threatened 1st Division command post. The scene grew rapidly violent and worrisome for the American forces slowly coming ashore. The lead German tanks reach to within two thousand yards of the water and fired at supply dumps and landing craft turning the 1st Infantry Division beach into a flaming inferno.

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2 Garland, Smyth and Blumenson, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, 165.
3 Ibid., 166.
4 Ibid., 169.
of exploding shells, smoke, and fire. Just as it looked like the tide was turning for the German invasion at Gela, the 32nd Field Artillery Battalion came ashore. Offloading from amphibious trucks known as DUKWs and moved directly into firing positions along the edge of the sand dunes, and opened fire on the mass of German armor. Elements from surrounding units noticed the attack and added to the fire needed to repel the German advance. This included engineer shore parties who stopped unloading, medium tanks who finally got off the soft sand, and cannon companies that established a firing line along the dunes. The fighting was so close and intense that naval guns were silenced due to fear of hitting friendly forces. The German threat to 1st Infantry Division’s landing beachhead was neutralized as sixteen German tanks, unable to make it all the way to the beaches, lay burning on the Gela plain.

The German and Italian counterattack on Gela temporarily disrupted the American Seventh Armies ability to consolidate gains and project combat power inland. Additionally, the Seventh Army’s conduct of the complicated amphibious landing drew valuable lessons for future joint operations. On the eve of its success in North Africa the American Army was eager to prove itself a formidable fighting force. The American response to the counterattack at Gela is a starting point for an examination into consolidation area operations.

The Allied 15th Army Group’s fourteen divisions composed of General Bernard Montgomery’s British Eight Army and General George Patton’s American Seventh Army were given the task to execute Operation Husky. General Eisenhower saw the invasion an immense

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8 Ibid., 171.
undertaking writing, “The most gigantic armada in the world’s history was to be assembled in order to launch the invasion of Sicily, which required in all, the movement of some-2,500 ships and landing craft.” Operation Husky would eventually become the largest and most dispersed amphibious assault with the Seventh Army being the first United States field army to fight as a unit in World War II.

As the invasion of Sicily progressed, and combat operations intensified, improvisation, audacity, and maintaining the initiative became key to success. The Seventh Army was successful in maintaining the initiative and preserving combat power because of the efforts of Civil Affairs Officers (CAO) and American Military Government (AMG) operations in the consolidation area. The area security and stability tasks accomplished in the consolidation area contributed significantly to allied success in Sicily. The Seventh Army was able to consolidate gains by transferring security and stability tasks to Civil Affairs Officers (CAO) after every successful assault on the Axis defenders. The deliberate plan to consolidate gains as operations progressed was successful and constituted lessons learned that remain valuable today.

As World War II raged into late 1942, the landings in North Africa created an opportunity to establish bases there and strike at the Axis ‘underbelly’. As the plan to execute Operation Husky was developed, the Combined Chiefs agreed that offensive action would be undertaken in the Mediterranean in 1943 for the conquest of Sicily with the object of securing the line of communication in the Mediterranean. In this action diverting as much German strength from the Russian front as possible, and intensifying the pressure on Italy, hoping that such results might create a situation in which Turkey could be enlisted as an active ally.

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11 Garland, Smyth and Blumenson, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, 417.

With the recent update to its capstone doctrine U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0 Operations, the Army continues its shift away from counterinsurgency operations (COIN) into large-scale combat operations (LSCO). With the amount of experience and resident knowledge limited, an exploration of such operations is warranted. The U.S. Army during Operation Husky was able to rapidly consolidate gains and exploit success as they advanced across Sicily to achieve their objectives. Opposed by an Axis Sixth Army, a force consisting of two corps (six coastal divisions, two coastal brigades, one coastal regiment, and four mobile divisions), the Allied forces fought some of the bitterest battles of the war and were frustrated by an enemy fighting a coordinated withdrawal and what became one of the most dazzling strategic withdrawal in military history. The Axis force would eventually escape Sicily across the strait of Messina back to Italy with significant combat power; achieving a moral victory in the wake of tactical losses.

The Seventh Army's success in Operation Husky was attributed to the initiative of aggressive commanders and soldiers and the Seventh Army's ability through effective CAO and AMG operations to quickly consolidate gains. The Italian Fascist government under Mussolini began to crumble under the weight of Allied pressure. Increased civilian unrest, scattered enemy remnants fighting in the rear area, staggering numbers of prisoners of war, and threats of counterattack penetrations became a concern that General George S. Patton (Seventh Army Commander) and his Division commanders planned for and reduced in execution. The lessons learned during Operation Husky were applied to the follow-up operation in Normandy one year later, and still apply today. The American Seventh Army commanded by Patton was ultimately successful in their assigned task to cover the British Eighth Army's left flank and rear before

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14 Ibid., 551.
conducting a full press towards Palermo and then to Messina chasing the Axis forces off the island.

In order to make connections with the current operational environment, how did the 1941 *Field Manual 100-5 Operations* and 1942 *Field Manual 100-15 Field Service Regulation - Large Units* consider planning for consolidation area operations and how does that doctrine compare to current doctrine? Commanders responsible for Operation Husky were aware of the importance of planning elements of operational art despite the lack of codified language in doctrine. Emphasis on operational reach and basing were apparent as the original Allied two-pronged attack was based largely on logistical considerations and matters of operational reach. Because bases in North Africa restricted operational reach (specifically air cover), seizing initial ports, bridgeheads, airfields, and vital supply routes took priority over a decisive victory.\(^{15}\) Seventh Army's effective rear area consolidation operations during Operation Husky contributed to Allied success in Sicily because of a decisive advantage gained in operational reach, tempo, and phasing and transitions.

Were the consolidation area operation plans during Operation Husky deliberate or ad hoc? Operation Husky was marked with difficulties in the planning process from the start. The Commanders selected for roles in the invasion were actively engaged in Tunisia or scattered on three continents, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the middle east.\(^ {16}\) Because all of the key personnel involved in the ground, sea, and air planning could not be gathered in one place, coordination of some aspects of the operation would be somewhat lacking even on D-Day.\(^ {17}\) Despite many of the difficulties of time and physical distance for the planning of Operation Husky, the political objectives from American President Franklin Roosevelt were clear when he

\(^{15}\) D’Este, *Bitter Victory*, 525.

\(^{16}\) Garland, Smyth and Blumenson, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, 56.

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 57.
demanded ‘unconditional surrender.’ Not only was Roosevelt prepared to demand unconditional surrender, he was also ready to assume responsibility, through military government for the domestic regeneration of the country. These lofty political goals required military planners to pay specific attention to consolidation area operations.

How did the battlefield of Sicily compare to the hybrid threat and rear security necessary in today’s operations? Was there a significant German/Italian threat to the rear area and was that threat significant enough to warrant deliberate operations? Given a renewed emphasis on LSCO, this paper examines how consolidation area operations during Operation Husky added to the cumulative effects required for success in LSCO. This paper will address elements of operational art that were most significantly improved because of effective consolidation area operations: operational reach, tempo, and phasing and transitions. The research and findings from this paper will assist future commanders and operational planners in planning for large-scale combat operations.

This monograph is an attempt to understand the importance of consolidation area operations in large scale combat operations. Its aim is to assist today’s planners and commanders grasp how this battlefield framework has evolved and explore it’s present and future significance amongst a backdrop of operational art. There are four areas of analysis in this monograph. First, the strategic context of Operation Husky is explored. An appreciation and understanding of the strategic variables and key decisions leading into major conflict help shape the future battlefield. The United States involvement in the Mediterranean, the political and military objectives, and the thought of peace after the destruction of war all shape LSCO.

The second area of analysis is doctrine. As Historian Michael D. Doubler points out in his introduction to Closing with the Enemy, “The old saying “live and learn” must be reversed in

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18 Garland, Smyth and Blumenson, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, 19.
war, for there we “learn and live”; otherwise, we die. It is with this learning, in order to live, that
the Army is so vitally concerned.”

Doctrine used in the past and today guide our learning for future problems. The 1941 Field Manual 100-5, Operations and 1942 Field Manual 100-15, Large Units along with established Civil Affairs doctrine will be contrast with the current US Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations. What were the concerns of commanders and planners as they struggled to develop and execute LSCO to defeat Axis forces and consolidate gains?

The third area of analysis concerns planning and execution. The invasion of Sicily, the Seventh Army push to Palermo, and eventually the push to Messina to rid Sicily of German and Italian resistance through LSCO began as an idea that transformed into orders. The rapid advance of the Seventh Army will be described in detail to garner an appreciation for the time, distance, and intensity of the fight. The final area of analysis will describe the actions of CAO’s and AMG operations, engineers and military police to ensure success of the rapid Seventh Army advance across Sicily. An effort will be made to directly link Patton and the Seventh Army’s ability to consolidate gains to improved operational reach, tempo, and phasing and transitions. The conclusion will end with recommendations for further research needed for future LSCO’s.

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Strategic Context

The strategic context for the decision to execute Operation Husky was one that was immediately met with indecision and controversy. Soon after the United States became a belligerent in what had become a global war the British and Americans agreed on their overall war strategy: Germany. Despite the severity and morale motivation to strike back at Japan, Germany became the principle enemy and most decisive area of operations. The Casablanca conference in French Morocco during January 1943 concluded with the decision to focus on the Axis threat in Europe. Expelling the Italo-German forces from North Africa, attacking Sicily as a steppingstone to the Italian mainland, and invading the Italian mainland and eliminating Italy from the war were prominent topics of discussion. These objectives became part of the larger objective of containing and wearing down German forces in Italy as a prelude to the main attack across the English Channel. The Mediterranean strategy would also support the Red Army by drawing German forces away from the Eastern Front. These objectives seemed like a very well-established strategy, however, the decision and strategy devised to conduct Operation Husky met challenges from the start.

The brilliant strategy to enter the war in Europe through the Mediterranean was not as well established as many believed. In fact the Allied strategy in the Mediterranean was a series of ad hoc decisions, each setting forth objectives limited by available resources and the conditions of the time. Months of back and forth discussions between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and

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21 Ibid., 21.
22 Garland, Smyth and Blumenson, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, 1.
25 Ibid., 1.
Prime Minister Winston Churchill and their supporting staffs about which direction the Allies needed to take in Europe rested largely on the feasibility of allocating resources and the level of acceptable risk. Opening a ‘second front’ to alleviate pressure from Russia was agreed upon, but how and where to open that front differed drastically between the Americans and British. By November 1942, British thinking tended to favor continued Mediterranean operations.26 However, the thought of prematurely taking on the Wehrmacht before it had been sufficiently weakened and the risk of opening an offensive front in France that might become an attritional stalemate represented an appalling and unacceptable military risk.27 From an American military perspective ‘Torch’, with its threat of extending the campaign in the Mediterranean theater, was dangerously reflective of a British ‘peripheral’ approach to strategy in contrast to their own propensity for concentrating resources against the principal enemy.28

Two high-level conferences were required between the British and Americans in the first half of 1943 to establish the strategic framework directing resources and efforts to ultimate victory. 29 The result was that by May 1943, the Allies were on course to land armies in Italy. The paramount task to conquer North Africa and use the bases established there to strike at the Axis underbelly was in motion.30 Operation Husky was coming to fruition as General Eisenhower, now the Supreme Commander in Europe, laid out the Combined Chiefs objectives for Sicily:

(a) making our line of communication in the Mediterranean more secure, (b) diverting as much German strength from the Russian front as possible, and (c) intensifying the pressure on Italy, hoping that such results might create a situation in which Turkey could be enlisted as an active ally.31

26 Garland, Smyth and Blumenson, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, 4.
28 Ibid., 27.
29 Ibid., 31.
30 Ibid., 31; Garland, Smyth and Blumenson, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, 4.
31 Eisenhower, *Commander in Chief’s Dispatch*, 2.
The stage was set for the invasion of Sicily, just as frustrating as it was to come up with the decision to strike at the Axis through Italy, it was even more frustrating to come up with detailed plans for Operation Husky.

Planning for the joint service and multinational fight was difficult because of time, distance, and differences of opinion. ‘Force 141’ (Combined Allied Ground Forces) the British-American planning staff set up at Eisenhower’s Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) in Algiers inherited Operation Husky and quickly realized the in-theatre command team had no time to consider the plan closely as the campaign in Tunisia proved challenging enough.32 ‘Force 343’ (American Task Force) commanded by General George Patton had its own difficulties in the planning process. The Force 343 staff was split into two separated echelons with some troops on the east coast of the United States, others were scattered from Casablanca to Biserte, a distance of over 1,000 miles.33 Eisenhower expressed his frustrations stating, “I was not able to solve satisfactorily one of the major problems of organized planning, namely the physical difficulty of bringing together in one place all the personnel concerned with the various aspects of a complicated major operation involving land, sea and air elements.” 34 The tyranny of time and distance plagued the staff throughout the planning process for Operation Husky.

Much of the planning for Operation Husky focused on logistics, more specifically, how to gain and maintain operational reach from North Africa, then onto Sicily, and eventually onto the Italian mainland. Ports to logistically support operations and air fields to provide air cover were of significant concern for an amphibious assault onto Sicily. Eisenhower considered the first task was getting maximum forces and supplies ashore as quickly as possible and ensuring air

34 Eisenhower, *Commander in Chief's Dispatch*, 5.
cover for forces.\textsuperscript{35} The principle ports on the island of Sicily were Messina, Palermo, Catania, and Syracuse. Messina was out of the question because the strait of Messina was closed to Allied shipping and beyond the range of fighter cover. The plan provided for at least the capture of Syracuse and Catania in the east and Palermo in the west.\textsuperscript{36} After examining the plan it became clear that seizing intermediate objectives (specifically airfields) to extend operational reach and tempo had to be reexamined. Eisenhower came to the realization that without early possession of the Catania – Gela fields the entire plan would be unfeasible; taking the greatest possible insurance for the rapid capture of these fields became the Allied guiding principle."\textsuperscript{37}

As the plan to conduct simultaneous seaborne assaults assisted by airborne landings to seize ports and airfields began to take shape, Seventh Army’s plan became more refined. Eisenhower wrote in his dispatch of the operation:


\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 6.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 8.
US 1st and 45th Infantry Divisions comprising II Corps were to seize the airfields at COMISO, BISCARI, GELA and PONTE OLIVO just West of the British sector, while a special force composed of the US 3rd Infantry Division and one armored Combat Command from the US 2nd Armored Division captured the port and airfield at LICATA, and the remainder of the 2nd Armored remained as floating reserve.38 (see figure 1)

Figure 1. Annex 1 to F.O.#1. Source: Map from the Seventh Army, The Seventh Army in Sicily, After Action Report, The Staff of The Seventh Army, 1943, a -8.

The operational objectives were focused on logistics: ports and airfields. The initial objectives established for the British Eight Army commanded by General Bernard Montgomery and the American Seventh Army commanded by General George Patton were met with the same controversy and friction that plagued the operation from the start, a difference of opinion that had to be met with a compromise between American and British views.

38 Eisenhower, Commander in Chief's Dispatch, 13.
Despite all the back-and-forth and friction in the planning process, operations to consolidate gains within the region were considered and much more straightforward. Operation Husky became famous for its airborne operation, amphibious assault, combined arms maneuver, and superb American leadership. It also become famous for the disunity of command and the rivalry between Patton and Montgomery. The operations behind the front lines to consolidate gains are less known but were made clear prior to execution from Roosevelt himself.

The implicit assumption of the State Department after the 'unconditional surrender' formula was presented became developing a way to deal with Italy and establishing an Allied military government there. A recommendation from the State Department for the removal of the entire Fascist party leadership from local party secretaries to the top showed consideration for stability tasks beyond the immediacy of combat operations. Not only was Roosevelt preparing to demand 'unconditional surrender,' he was ready to assume the responsibility, through military government, for the domestic regeneration of the country. The President’s political aim now had to be incorporated into the developing military objectives for Sicily, and consolidating gains through stability operations (despite not explicated stated in those terms) were now tasks that required implementation in planning and execution.

The Allies overly cautious operational objectives and focus on logistics and operational reach are heavily criticized. The initial plan for Operation Husky never explicitly contemplated a decisive victory against enemy forces defending Sicily. Furthermore, the Allied reaction upon learning of a mass evacuation plan by Axis forces was minimal. Limited efforts were made to stop the mass evacuation or prevent it from the start. Of considerable blame for the Allied

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40 Ibid., 19.
41 Ibid., 19.
43 Ibid., 531.
failure to halt the evacuation of Sicily, and many other failures during the operation, was a total absence of interservice coordination.44 Despite misgivings between services on planning and execution, there were operations behind the glory of fighting that required coordination.

44 D’Este, Bitter Victory, 546.
Doctrine

Current Army doctrine has defined several of the terms discussed pertaining to the strategic context of Operation Husky. Operational reach, tempo, phasing and transitions, consolidation of gains, and stability operations were terms understood in 1942 prior to the execution of Operation Husky, but not codified in doctrine. The 1941 *Field Manual 100-5, Operations* and 1942 *Field Manual 100-15, Large Units* give us a glimpse into the doctrine used to plan and execute Operation Husky. An examination of *Army Service Forces Manual M 353-2, Civil Affairs Handbook Italy -Section 2: Supplement Allied Military Government Manual of Proclamations and Instructions Used in Sicily*, and the Seventh Army plan used for execution of Operation Husky give us additional insight into the concerns of commanders and planners as they struggled to consolidate gains.

In *Field Manual 3-0, Operations*, Operational art is defined as, “the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means.”45 In the 1942 *Field Manual 100-15, Large Units*, a correlation can be drawn to today’s *Field Manual 3-0, Operations* as it describes, “whereas the smaller unit commander may only plan from day to day, or hour to hour, the Army and higher commanders must project themselves days and weeks into the future.” Further, “such commander must visualize the whole campaign; he must carefully evaluate the situations, which may develop as a result of his planned maneuver; he cannot be unduly influenced by local reverses or failures.”46 Clearly visualizing the whole campaign and organizing and employing military forces

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by integrating ends, ways, and means was integral in Army doctrine and in practice leading up to Operation Husky.

General Patton and the Force 343 staff received guidance on May 18, 1943 to adjust their plans to assault the southeastern portion of Sicily in conjunction with the 12th British Army and capture it as a base for further operations. 47 The scheme of maneuver called for a simultaneous assault to capture airfields, the port of Licata and extend the beachhead to prevent hostile interference from the Northwest. 48 The port, airfields, and beachhead were the objectives that dominated the bulk of the invasion plan.

The Force 343 staff utilized both doctrine and recent experiences in North Africa to assist in the planning process for Operation Husky. Planning centered on getting to the fight, then once there sustaining it. The 1941 Field Manual 100-5, Operations focuses heavily on tactical operations and provides principles to follow when conducting tactical operations. When describing the elements needed for success in an offensive action, 1941 Field Manual 100-5, Operations puts forth, “the essential conditions for success are surprise, sufficient fire power, especially combat aviation and artillery, to neutralize the front of penetration, favorable terrain within the hostile position for the advance of the attacking troops, and strength to carry the attack through to its objective.” 49 The latter element of that description: “strength to carry the attack through to its objective,” is in essence operational reach defined. Field Manual 100-5, Operations continues by describing successful march techniques necessary to, “place troops at their destination at the proper time and in effective condition for combat.” 50 Marching or

47 The Seventh Army, The Seventh Army in Sicily, 1943, a -6.
48 Ibid., a-6.
50 Ibid., 69.
shuttling by road, train, or air are all techniques discussed in the 1941 *Field Manual 100-5, Operations* to improve operational reach, although not explicitly.

As General Patton addressed his Soldiers at sea prior to execution, he stated frankly, “In landing operations, retreat is impossible. To surrender is as ignoble as it is foolish.”\(^{51}\) Once on the beaches of Sicily, maintaining tempo of operations through audacious maneuver became a hallmark of Operation Husky. Throughout the planning period for Operation Husky a close-eye remained on current operations in the North African Campaign. Lessons learned and training programs were established by the Force 343 staff to ensure proficiency needed for upcoming operations. Of significant importance was the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center at Port Aux Poules, Algeria (Arsew Area). The movement, training, and staging of major assault units for Operation Husky were centered on the Arsew Area for amphibious operation training and full-scale rehearsals.\(^{52}\) The ability to rapidly conduct amphibious operations and clear minefields to retain tempo became apparent for success in North Africa and became areas of focus for the invasion of Sicily.

In *ADRP 3-0, Operations*, tempo is defined as, “the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy.”\(^{53}\) Tempo is not used in the doctrine leading up to Operation Husky. Instead, speed is constantly used to describe the necessary elements needed for success in the offensive or concentration. The 1942 *Field Manual 100-15, Large Units* describes, “speed and secrecy in concentration, followed by bold, rapid execution of the plan, may be a decisive factor in the defeat of the enemy.”\(^{54}\) Tempo, although not explicitly used in

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\(^{51}\) The Seventh Army, *The Seventh Army in Sicily*, 1943, b-2.

\(^{52}\) Ibid., a-4.


\(^{54}\) *Field Manual 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units*, 16.
doctrine prior to Operation Husky, describes speed as a key element for operations as will become evident in planning for offensive actions in Sicily.

As operational planning for the successful invasion of Sicily focused on the initial invasion, thoughts about what would follow the defeat of Axis forces on Sicily swirled around British and American political circles. British armistice terms totaling forty-five articles (Long Terms) met with differences amongst the American’s who continued to tout the ‘unconditional surrender’ line. Planning the Italian surrender, like the strategic plans to achieve it, had to wait until combat operations on Sicily developed towards a favorable outcome. Nonetheless, planning for the collapse of the Fascist government and the establishment of an Allied Military Government were political objectives that drove military planners to develop contingencies.

The 1942 *Field Manual 100-15, Large Units* describes, “In his planning the army commander must project himself well into the future; his plans must cover considerable periods of operations; and while one operation, which may extend over many days or weeks, is progressing, he must be planning the next.” The ability of the commander to not become stifled by present conditions and to plan for upcoming phases and transitions was viewed in doctrine as the mark of a successful commander. Eisenhower understood the importance of stability operations. Not only were they important to the political postwar objectives, they were important to the immediate military objectives. Consolidating gains as operations progressed on Sicily would require political and economic reconstruction to happen quickly.

President Roosevelt doubted the endurance of public support for American involvement abroad and was convinced there was only limited time to achieve reconstruction conducive to a stable peace. Roosevelt opted for quick political objectives rather than the more complex,

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56 *Field Manual 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units*, 52.
expensive, and time-consuming restricting programs; leaving the rest of the reconstruction process to the new democratic governments the United States would create.\textsuperscript{58} With these political marching orders, translating them into military orders would take considerable study and staff work.

The current \textit{Field Manual 3-0, Operations} updated in the summer of 2017, presents the addition of operations to consolidate gains and a new consolidation area framework. The consolidation area is the portion of the commander’s area of operations that is designated to facilitate the security and stability tasks necessary for freedom of action in the close area and to support the continuous consolidation of gains.\textsuperscript{59} Again, although this definition is new, the concept and principles are not and are seen in the 1942 \textit{Field Manual 100-15, Large Units}.

In \textit{Field Manual 100-15, Large Units} when describing the strategic offensive, it is keen to point out, “For success, the commander engaged in the strategic offensive must not only bring superior forces to bear in the air and on the ground, but he must provide for the security of an ever-lengthening line of communication and all its installations; he must not only operate against the armed forces of the enemy but must protect his forces against a hostile population.”

Consolidating gains through a combination of security and stability operations was codified in doctrine in 1942.

In \textit{Field Manual 100-15, Large Units}, Chapter 5 describes strategic maneuver. In this chapter a direct correlation to the present concept of consolidation area operations can be seen:

The Maintenance of routes of communication in hostile territory presents numerous difficulties. Large reinforcements in personnel, munitions, and equipment must be kept moving forward. It may be necessary to employ considerable forces in investing or containing fortresses or large fortified areas and holding and exploiting the occupied areas of enemy territory. The inhabitants, as well as parachute troops, can be expected to interfere with the gaining and transmitting of information and with the maintenance of supply lines, as well as to engage in guerilla operations. Careful estimate of the situation will enable the commander to foresee many of the difficulties which may be

\textsuperscript{58} Miller, \textit{United States and Italy}, 53.

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Field Manual 3-0, Operations}, 1-158.
encountered and provide for timely measures to meet them effectively, without diminishing unduly the power of, or resources required for, his decisive movements.60

Requiring the need to balance area security and stability tasks, the need to sustain troops as they continue in the offense, maintaining tempo and operational reach, and planning for phases and transitions can all be extrapolated from his paragraph produced prior to the invasion of Sicily.

To describe the area framework, Field Manual 100-15, Large Units differentiates between the combat zone and the communications zone. The communications zone is, “that part of the theater in rear of the combat zone containing the principal establishments of supply and evacuation, lines of communication, communications zone police forces, and other agencies required for the immediate support, maintenance, security, and well-being of the forces. Laterally, it includes sufficient area to provide for the proper operation of supply, evacuation, transportation and for the defense thereof.”61 The framework is consistent with current Field Manual 3-0, Operations. This doctrine and recent experience in North Africa will be what American forces bring with them to planning and execution of Operation Husky.

60 Field Manual 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units, 5.
61 Ibid., 5.
Seventh Army Planning and Execution

If there needs to be a qualifier for a large-scale combat operation, Operation Husky is it. Upon commencement of LSCO on 10 July 1943 in Sicily, the joint force immediately exploited friendly capabilities across multiple domains and the information environment to gain the initiative. As outlined in Field Manual 3-0, Operations, the joint force commander sought a decisive advantage by using all available elements of combat power to exploit the initiative, deny enemy objectives, defeat enemy capabilities to resist, and compel desired behavior.62 Time, distance, and the intensity of fighting are hallmarks of LSCO, Operation Husky was no exception.

Although new in name, the US Seventh Army, was not a new organization. The same commander, staff, and many of the same troops gained valuable experience with the assault on North Africa in November 1942.63 The lessons learned in the ‘Torch’ operations were well learned, mistakes corrected, and the results applied to Operation Husky were believed by the staff to be, “as well planned and as smoothly executed as the uncertain fortunes of war permit.”64 The planning for Operation Husky emerged rapidly as political decisions to invade Sicily continued. Less than three weeks after the end of the Anfa Conference, on February 12, 1943 Planning Instruction No. 1 was issued by General Sir Harold Alexander under Force 141 in Algeria.65

General Eisenhower outlined his immediate plans on June 7, 1943 in a message to the War Department. He described a series of simultaneous seaborne assaults, assisted by airborne landings, to seize the ports of Syracuse and Licata and the airfields within striking distance of the southeastern coastline between the two ports.66 (see figure 2) Once the ports were seized to

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63 The Seventh Army, The Seventh Army in Sicily, a-2.
64 Ibid., a-2.
65 Ibid., a-2.
66 Eisenhower, Commander in Chief's Dispatch, 13.
establish a base of operations, seizing airfields inland would take place to extend operational reach. The developing concept for Operation Husky was grand. Coordination between Army, Navy, and Air forces became just as joint as multinational with the American-British counterparts.

The Seventh Army plan for the initial phases of Operation Husky were nothing short of a grandiose script from an action movie. Operation “Mincemeat”, a deception operation to convince the enemy high command that the objectives of impending Allied offensive in the Mediterranean were Sardinia and the Peloponnesus, rather than Sicily, took place. The British dropped the body of a Soldier into the ocean carrying information in a briefcase. As planned, the body and information made their way to the Germans who accepted it as authentic and on 12

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67 Garland, Smyth and Blumenson, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, 64.
May, 1943 the OKW directed that measures be taken in Sardinia and the Peloponnesus over any others.\(^{68}\)

Clearly this deception operation was creative and imaginative. The airborne operation that proceeded the planned invasion was just as creative. Sicily was to be the scene of the first Allied employment of an airborne division to support larger bodies of combat troops in conventional ground warfare.\(^{69}\) Between 2330 hours on D-1 and 0006 hours on D-Day, 220 C-47’s dropped paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division about 4 miles inland and about six miles east of Gela to capture the high ground and road junctions controlling exit from the beaches where the 1st Infantry Division was to land.\(^{70}\) As the aircraft left Tunisia, a complicated route, high winds, unfamiliar pilots, and enemy flak caused initial difficulties. Paratroopers were scattered all along the coast and inline, some as far as 50-60 miles from east to west.\(^{71}\) Despite the dismal odds after being attacked by tanks, the paratroopers accomplished their mission of seizing and holding the high ground to prevent enemy reinforcements from reaching the landing beaches.\(^{72}\) The second planned airborne operation to support Gela would not be so successful.

H-Hour was set for 0245 on July 10, 1943. II Corps had been assigned a sector covering 57 miles of beach.\(^{73}\) The 45th Division went ashore on its right covering beaches from Scoglitti to Fiume Agata, 10 miles southeast of Gela; the 1st Infantry Division (minus the 18th Regimental Combat Team) landed between Fiume Agata and Gela, with the Ranger force on its left assaulting Gela frontally.\(^{74}\) The 3rd Infantry Division, reinforced by a Combat Command A of the 2nd

\(^{68}\) Garland, Smyth and Blumenson, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, 65.

\(^{69}\) Ibid., 92.

\(^{70}\) Eisenhower, *Commander in Chief's Dispatch*, 20.

\(^{71}\) Ibid., 21.

\(^{72}\) Ibid., 21.

\(^{73}\) The Seventh Army, *The Seventh Army in Sicily*, b-4.

\(^{74}\) Ibid., b-4.
Armored Division, attacked from six miles east to six miles west of Licata.\(^75\) (see figure 3) Not without extreme amounts of friction, however, all landings were successful by 0600 of D-Day, with the reserve force landing on the beaches of Gela that afternoon.\(^76\) By the end of D-Day all beachheads were secured and the two distinct Seventh Army beachheads extended two to four miles inland.\(^77\) The strong enemy resistance expected upon arrival was yet to come, but the Seventh Army already captured 4,265 prisoners of war (POW) on the first day of the invasion.\(^78\)


On 11 July (D-Day +1), the German and Italian counterattack towards II Corps and the 1st Infantry Division at Gela as discussed in the introduction was in full swing. As the Seventh

\(^{75}\) The Seventh Army, *The Seventh Army in Sicily*, b-4.

\(^{76}\) Ibid., b-4.

\(^{77}\) Ibid., b-4.

\(^{78}\) Ibid., b-4.
Army fought fiercely to repulse the strong enemy counterattack in the center of their landing site, the 3rd Infantry Division on the left flank in the Licata sector extended its beachhead to the Palma di Montechiaro – Naro – Campobello – Riesi line (Line Yellow).\textsuperscript{79} The 45th Division in the extreme right flank was able to repulse enemy attacks and extend their line to Comiso and Ragusa.\textsuperscript{80} Despite constant enemy air attacks on the beaches and determined counterattacks, American losses were minimal. Enemy prisoners of war continued to stack up and in the afternoon of the second day of the invasion, POWs were being gathered on the Gela beaches awaiting evacuation by sea to Africa.\textsuperscript{81}

On 12 July (D-Day + 2), the Seventh Army foothold on Sicily extended from eight miles deep at Gela in the center to 15 miles on each flank by the end of the day.\textsuperscript{82} The initial phase designed to extend Seventh Army beachheads to line ‘Yellow’ to deny the enemies long range artillery from effecting the airfields and ports was complete. Just as the operation seemed to be proceeding favorably, the second airborne operation designed to reinforce Gela met with tragedy. As the battle raged on all across the beaches of Sicily, antiaircraft gunners remained busy warding off large amounts of German sorties. On 11 July, German and Italian air forces launched almost 500 sorties, most of them in the Seventh Army area.\textsuperscript{83} Of the 144 plans and 2000 men that departed Tunisia, 23 planes and nearly 100 men would not return due to friendly antiaircraft fire.\textsuperscript{84} The successes of the invasion were met with difficult friction as General Eisenhower and General Patton attempted to sort out the tragedy.

\textsuperscript{79} The Seventh Army, \textit{The Seventh Army in Sicily}, b-4.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., b-4.
\textsuperscript{81} The Seventh Army, \textit{The Seventh Army in Sicily}, b-4.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., b-6.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 282.
In order to maintain tempo in the offensive the Seventh Army needed a new directive. General Patton knew this and began working requests to continue his drive. There had been no prepared plan for the maneuver of the American and British Armies after the seizure of initial objectives.\textsuperscript{85} The offensive now divulged into rapid assessments on the ground, by commanders and staff, as to how best to continue the drive inland.

Patton pushed the Seventh Army to keep up the pressure on the retreating German and Italian formations. After pleading his case to Alexander, Patton received a new directive on 18 July, allowing him to push northwest to ‘mop up’ the western half of Sicily.\textsuperscript{86} In order to accomplish this drive he established a Provisional Corps. With the 3rd Infantry Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, and a regiment of the 9th Division, Patton would have two corps operating on two routes – Major General Omar Bradley (II Corps) moving towards the northern shore of Sicily, and Major General Geoffrey Keys (Provisional Corps) moving towards Palermo, 2nd Armored Division remained near Licata in reserve.\textsuperscript{87} (see figures 4 and 5)

\textsuperscript{85} Garland, Smyth and Blumenson, \textit{Sicily and the Surrender of Italy}, 210.


\textsuperscript{87} Blumenson, \textit{The Patton Papers}, 287.

The British Eighth Army ran into enemy resistance at Catania slowing them considerably, but Patton persisted, and the Seventh Army overran the entire western half of Sicily in the last ten days of July.\(^88\) Patton pushed the Seventh Army to the point of over extending its supply lines. Supplies were now being shuttled from the southern ports, which caused a delay. After the capture of Palermo and the surrounding isolated ports and towns in the vicinity, the Provisional Corps transitioned out of combat operations and began focusing on support operations and garrisoning western Sicily. Palermo became the center of Seventh Army operations as the deep-water port capable of handling ships direct from the United States and received its first ships on 28 July.\(^89\) This was the victory Patton longed for and the facility that would solve some internal problems with operational reach.

Constant pressure and the desire to beat the British to Messina fueled Patton and the Seventh Army. The Axis defenses along the Etna line were well established in Tronia along the American front and Adrano along the British front.\(^90\) After several days of fighting in mountainous terrain the Axis defense bought enough time to continue its planned evacuations and abandoned Catania, Tronia, and Adrano to the Allied advance. Patton planned and executed a series of additional amphibious assaults in the northern coast to attack the enemy in the rear as he continued to advance. The road to Messina was fraught with resistance and delaying actions by the enemy, but what Patton considered to be the ‘horse race’ to Messina concluded with the first United States field Army to fight as a unit in the war accomplishing its mission. The fall of Messina was the fall of Sicily itself.\(^91\)

\(^88\) Pack, *Operation Husky*, 152.


\(^91\) The Seventh Army, *The Seventh Army in Sicily*, b-22.
Seventh Army Consolidation Area Operations

*Field Manual 3-0, Operations* places emphasis on the ability of the Army to consolidate gains, specifically in the consolidation area, to “make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities.” As pointed out by General Eisenhower in a telegraph to General Marshall dated 8 February 1943, Operation Husky would be the first United States operation involving the invasion and occupation of enemy territory, and the first British operation involving the occupation of any but colonial enemy territories. Eisenhower’s intent to remove the Fascist government of Italy was clear. Installing a military government to do so and establishing conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to new legitimate authorities would be a new enterprise.

The Army governed civilians in Mexico in 1847; in the Confederacy during and after the Civil War; in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War; and in the German Rhineland after World War I, however regardless of these examples neither the Army nor the Government accepted civil affairs as a legitimate military activity. The Secretary of War did not establish the ‘School of Military Government’ until April 1942 and even then emphasis on its merits were often over looked. The Allied Military Government (AMG) in Sicily would be planned and stood up largely by officers that received very minimal training for the jobs they were to undertake, some of which had no military experience at all. The primary purpose of the military government was the preservation of public order with the least possible diversion of military manpower; its

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92 *Field Manual 3-0, Operations*, 8-1


first objective: get and keep a local government working smoothly to relieve the Commander-in-
Chief of all trouble and anxiety as to the civil population.95 Detailed planning by Civil Affairs
Officers (CAO) newly assigned to assist Force 141 and the Seventh and Eight Army staffs
intensified in May and June 1943 to correspond with ‘Husky’ operational planning. The AMG
had a large part in consolidating gains on Sicily and the amount of effort and detail in planning
would eventually lead to initial success for Operation Husky.

In Sicily there were nine provinces and seventy-two towns with more than 10,000
inhabitants, of which three contained more than 100,000.96 The AMG plan placed General
Alexander as the Military Governor of Sicily, a Senior Civil Affairs Officer (SCOA) in charge of
each province and CAO’s responsible for several municipals given their size.97 Civil Affairs
Police Officers (CAPO) would accompany CAO’s. The plan called for CAO’s and CAPO’s to
serve with assaulting troops, attached to army, corps, and divisions.

As the assaulting elements entered and occupied a town, the CAO’s would make contact
with local authorities, instruct them to remain in their post, establish an office, and post the first
three proclamations.98 The first three proclamations established the military government, of the
Commander-in-Chief, detailed war crimes, and established the currency used by Allied force and
rates of exchange.99 Proclamations were established in planning for: currency and exchange;
allied military courts; closing of financial institutions and establishment of moratorium; control of
property; dissolution of Fascist organizations and repeal of laws, rationing, price fixing, wages,

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95 Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy*, 5, 10.
96 Ibid., 3.
97 Ibid., 4.
98 Ibid., 5, 20.
99 Ibid., 5, 20.
and agriculture; the gazette (newspaper); financial regulations; general police and security regulations; Allied military Lira notes; legal rights of Italian people.\textsuperscript{100}

The CAPO’s function initially was to persuade the local Carabinieri (national police force) to cooperate with the invading forces in keeping public order.\textsuperscript{101} Many AMG initial preoccupations upon entering town became feeding the population and battling the spread of disease amongst the numerous other responsibilities bestowed upon it. The AMG organized into six division: legal, financial, civilian supply, public health, public safety and enemy property. All responsible for administering their field of government immediately as assaulting elements advanced across the island.

The functions and objectives of AMG were clearly laid out in the plan and later in the Civil Affairs Handbook Italy:

(a) To insure the security of the occupying forces and their lines of communication; and to facilitate this operation. (b) To restore law and order and normal conditions among the civil population as soon as possible, procure the necessary food supplies for them and where necessary provide relief and maintenance for destitutes with available resources. (c) To relieve combat troops of the necessity of providing for civil administration. (d) To assist in making available to the occupying forces the economic resources of the occupied territory. Though efficient government of the territory and the application of the policies toward the civil population laid down by the Commander-in-Chief, to promote political and military objectives of the Allied Forces in connection with future operations.\textsuperscript{102}

These functions made clear that the AMG, despite its importance to the overall operation, was subordinate to the immediate military objectives during the assault phase and initial phases of the operation. Preserving combat power for the Task Force Commanders to continue offensive operations was paramount and the AMG would assist immediately and directly in that function.


\textsuperscript{101} \textit{M 353-2: Civil Affairs Handbook Italy Section2}, 5, 21.

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 20.
The method of administering the AMG would be through a combination of direct and indirect controls over the civilian populations.\textsuperscript{103} Direct controls through the issuance of a series of proclamations were used to define war crimes and crimes against the military government, create Allied military courts, annul Fascist laws, dissolve the Fascist party, and promulgate general police and security regulations.\textsuperscript{104} The AMG used indirect control by utilizing existing Italian law and retaining as much as possible the existing local administration supervised by Civil Affairs authorities.\textsuperscript{105} This indirect rule would enable the AMG to place as many combat troops into action as they anticipated major offensive operations.

Planning for execution of the AMG was detailed. The AMG requisitioned stockpiles of food and supplies, planned for sustain the civilian population, and mapped out a financial structure that would alleviate the stress of an invasion by revising the tax system, price control, supplemental currency, and wages. Planners utilized the limited time and expertise to prepare extensively for what had never been done by the United States. Despite the success the AMG achieved initially in fulfilling their function, the new enterprise of establishing an AMG was not without its difficulties.

On 10 July, seventeen civil affairs officers under Col. Charles A Poletti, Senior Civil Affairs Officer of Seventh Army, came ashore on D Day with the assault forces.\textsuperscript{106} These officers accompanied tactical units and were assigned areas as they advanced. It was not until 28 July did the first reinforcement of sixty-two civil affairs officers join the

\textsuperscript{103} Robert W. Komer \textit{Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater.} (Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. 1950), Chap II -13.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., Cha II -13.

\textsuperscript{105} Komer, \textit{Civil Affairs}, Chap II -14.

Seventh Army. 107 Once Sicily was in Allied hands by 17 August, AMG gradually assumed responsibility for administering the entire island; more than 250 civil affair officers were in Sicily when the campaign ended. 108 These CAO’s, although limited in quantity, provided exponentially in allowing tactical commanders to continue offensive operations during Operation Husky. However, this conclusion would come as an afterthought to commanders as they were allowed to focus on the offensive matters at hand.

At all levels, there had been inadequate cooperation and coordination between AMG and combat commanders. 109 During the initial phases of the occupation of Sicily, insufficient civil affairs personnel made establishing immediate control difficult. Combat commanders did not start requesting CAOs until the alleviating effects of administering occupied areas of Sicily became apparent. 110 Because the concept of establishing the AMG was so new, many commanders and Soldiers didn’t understand fully its capabilities or purpose. Often combat troops interfered with and even disarmed members of the Carabinieri who had been given tasks by CAO’s. Some even emptied prisons upon liberating towns not understanding the ‘follow up’ operations of the CAOs. 111 The AMG could not rely on tactical formations for transportation, thus had to at times procure civilian transport. Without transportation, the AMG would fall short of its initial functions of supplying food to civilians.

Allied government was initially very successful in alleviating numerous problems, largely because it was not faced with a hostile population, but there was a

107 Komer, Civil Affairs, Chap II – 34.
108 Ibid., Chap II -37.
109 Komer, Civil Affairs, Chap II -42.
110 Ibid., Chap II-42.
111 Ibid., Chap II-43.
tendency for AMG to rely too little on indigenous officials. As operations progressed it became apparent that reliance upon Italian officials as stated in the plan was the more successful route to local administration because it economized combat forces to continue operations. As assault forces advanced across Sicily the grim scene of war and the AMG situation was expressed in a letter on 18 August 1943:

In many towns there had been so much destruction by bombardment and shell fires and the people so frightened and paralyzed that no local administration existed. In fact in many cases all of the machinery of modern life had ceased to exist: there was no government, no police, no food supply, no water, no electric light, no transportation and no organized medical service. All of these things had to be reorganized from the ground up, the dead buried, the streets cleaned of debris, water and food brought in, etc.

Operation Husky concluded in 38 days of fighting in large part because of the enormous efforts taken on by CAO in establishing the AMG. As proof of success in Sicily, affirmation was received from both Army Commanders (7th and 8th) that the only criticism received had been that there were not enough CAOs.

Transitioning from tactical commanders to provincial authorities is beyond the scope of this paper, however, failures at the provincial level of AMG well after combat action on the mainland of Italy drew numerous lessons learned. The chain of command on Sicily ran directly from the Military Governor (General Alexander) through the tactical units to CAO’s; this was to prevail until such time as the CCAO was ordered to assume control of the AMG. As soon after operations as possible the plan was for the tactical basis of civil affairs to change to the provincial organization, under the SCAO in each province.

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112 Coles and Weinberg, *United States Army in World War II Special Studies*, 189.
113 Ibid., 198.
114 Ibid., 203.
Thomas Fisher in *Allied Military Government in Italy* criticizes the true stabilizing effect the AMG had on Italy. Most of his criticism comes from the second phase (stabilization and help of the civilian population) as opposed the first phase (direct military government in the armies). Fisher suggests that a lack of clear-cut policy, lack of practical plans, faulty training for officers, poor quality of officers permitted to enter the AMG, and the types of civilians assigned to the Control Commission after the Army had gone forward as the reason for failure.\(^{116}\) However, Fisher asserts that directives to secure the Army’s lines of communication and control the liberated population were successful under direct Army military government.\(^{117}\) The immediate impact on military operations during Operation Husky were realized through the use of the AMG.

After nearly a month of fighting on Sicily, Patton enters into his diary on 5 August, “inspected all the rear echelon sections and told the soldier… that although they are not doing very romantic work, they are doing work of great importance and without their efforts, the more romantic aspects of war would be impossible.”\(^{118}\) It is unclear if Patton’s diary entry was a genuine expression of his admiration of the work being done in the consolidation area, however, Patton’s doctrine of continuous attack was clear and without efforts in the rear to extend operational reach and increase tempo, even the most attuned commander could fail.

As the Seventh Army sped through Sicily toward Messina the consolidation area expanded. The distance from the primary port of Gela to Palermo is nearly 200 kilometers. From Palermo to Messina the Seventh Army looked at an additional 200 kilometers. Many of the routes to and from ports were over the few primary roads available and were often congested with military and civilian transports. As Patton pushed the Seventh Army forward, his command post moved forward too. His famous occupation of a Fascist palace in Palermo was the stage for

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Patton’s transition from Palermo to Messina. In Patton’s first letter to his wife Beatrice since the invasion of Sicily he explains, “The people are just on the verge of starving and look utterly hopeless, but don’t like us and there is a lot of sniping which is bad for us but worse for the snipers.”\(^{119}\) Patton was concerned with two apparent issues he identifies to his wife: area security and stability.

The Sicilians were tired of war, resentful of German overlordship and demoralized by the Fascist regime; Planners believed they would be responsive to a just and efficient military government.\(^{120}\) There were threats of rear area attacks (Germany eventually deployed airborne forces to reinforce the Etna line which could have been used in the rear area), threats to lines of communication, even stories of German’s bypassed in the rear that disguised themselves as local police to threaten Allied forces. However, these threats remained minimal, not warranting large diversions of combat power. A protracted insurgency never materialized. Was the lack of complexity in the environment of Sicily a reflection of its geography, history, or Allied efforts to shape it favorably? Did a protracted insurgency not materialize because of preinvasion information operations tied to AMG efforts (Sicilian’s were paroled after becoming POWs)? Or was it a matter of timing, the Sicilian people at the intersection of pressure between the Axis and Allied forces? Nevertheless, the downfall of Mussolini coincided with Operation Husky, a potentiality that was forecast, assisted along by the AMG, and responded to through detailed planning and execution. Something that cannot be said about past US military ventures.

The AMG was fortunate it did not have to encounter the most difficult of all the problems facing the military government, that of dealing with a hostile civilian population.\(^{121}\) This is especially true during the initial phases of the operation. There is little doubt that a hostile

\(^{119}\) Blumenson, \textit{The Patton Papers}, 289.

\(^{120}\) Komer, \textit{Civil Affairs}, Chap II -23.

\(^{121}\) Charles R.S. Harris, \textit{Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943-1945} (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1957), 36.
civilian population would have slowed tempo, operational reach, and increased the deliberate transitions required in LSCO. Two additional areas of emphasis that are easily overlooked were the incredible efforts undertaken by the engineers and military police, in relatively small numbers, to provide for increased tempo and operational reach.

As the Seventh Army settled into Palermo and started to plan for advancement to Messina on 23 July 1943, the island was cut into two and the second phase of its operations was complete. Seventh Army entered into a transition period that marked the first-time deliberate efforts were executed for consolidation area operations. Immediate repair of roads, railroads, and public utilities throughout the area to include the clearing of the Palermo harbor of sunken ships, demolished quays, and mines were undertaken. Six days after the fall of Palermo the first cargo ships arrived for unloading in the harbor and a day later the first train along the northern Sicilian coast railway was operating between Palermo and Cefalu. The main axis of supply shifted from Gela in the south to Palermo in the north and the Seventh Army’s ability to rapidly strike Messina increased exponentially.

What was the plan for POWs? In the ‘Military Police Plan’ annex of the Force 343 order issued on 15 June, 1943 guarding and disposition of military prisoners of war and civilian internees fell to the 504th Military Police Battalion. This single battalion was not only responsible for POWs but several other important tasks that had a significant effect on tempo throughout the operation. These tasks included: traffic control at the beachheads and along the lines of communication thereto, maintenance of law and order, coordination with Civil Affairs personnel, cooperation with Counter Intelligence Corps, evacuation of civilian populations, and protection of vital installations. Each of the organic military police forces within the sub-task

122 The Seventh Army, *The Seventh Army in Sicily*, b-10.
123 Ibid., b-12.
124 Ibid., d-47.
125 Ibid., d-47.
forces would be required to handle normal military police functions, working with companies of the 504th MP battalion to alleviate tasks.

Evacuation of POWs to North Africa was directed to the Navy to accomplish until a 15,000 POW enclosure facility was established. The estimated daily rate of flow of POWs based on the G-2 estimate as published in the order was a maximum of 2,500 by D+5, 8,000 by between D+5 and D+15, and an additional 8,000 after D+15. The total estimated POW’s to D+30 was 30,000, clearly an underestimation as operations across Sicily progressed for the American Seventh Army. The total actual number of captured and evacuated POWs as reported was nearly 103,000. This number of POWs quickly overwhelmed the minimal number of military police designated to process and escort them.

A need to keep combat forces free to conduct combat operations was clearly a concern for commanders. The plan for military police activities was designed to minimize the amount of combat forces used in consolidation area operations. Force 343’s plan for any additional military police to be received was to hold them as reserve, make available to the sub-task Force Commander on request for use as aid to Civil Affairs officers, and as security police in captured towns and areas. Engineers were responsible for creating the POW enclosure by D+10 and the Civil Affairs section worked closely with the Provost Marshalls of Force 343. Each of the sub-task Forces took responsibility of each of the previously described military police tasks.

The conquest of Palermo also marked the largest influx of Seventh Army POWs on 24 July, 1943 as 11,540 mostly Italian remnants were mopped up by the Provisional Corps in the west. As the Seventh Army continued to mop up western Sicily the total number of prisoners increased to an estimated 52,000 plus 7,000 enemy dead and wounded. By 30 July the number

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126 The Seventh Army, *The Seventh Army in Sicily*, d-47.
127 Ibid., B-7.
128 Ibid., d-47.
129 Ibid., b-12.
would increase to 100,000 prisoners and 12,000 enemy dead and wounded by final day of operations on 17 August. As units advanced there was little provision for prisoners of war. The Second Armored Division reported its procedure of passing POWs to the ‘line of communication’ troops to take over guard and process captured POWs and material, in soon cases leaving POWs with insufficient guard considerable distance behind the division.

Prisoner of War Interrogation (PWI) teams consisting of officers, soldiers, and Italian and German interpreters followed along evacuation routes gathering intelligence from the numerous amounts of prisoners of war. A PWI attached to the 30th RCT, 3rd Infantry Division was among the first ashore and obtained information that enabled the unit to immediately out-flank an enemy strong point and take its position without difficulty. The efforts in the consolidation area, whether at the immediate rear of fighting combat units or further back, were being felt operationally.

Engineer efforts to repair roads, bridges, and airfields was exceptional. Despite Axis forces destroying 130 highway bridges and cratering roads in 40 places, Engineer units managed to maintain the Seventh Army’s limited road network and contributed largely to successful ground operations. Military police of the Seventh Army, also operating with a limited number of units, contributed to the operational reach and tempo by accomplishing their myriad of tasks and relieving combat units of staggering prisoners of war. The Allied plan to secure Sicily was cautious and the approach depended heavily on a continuous offensive push to rid the island

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130 The Seventh Army, *The Seventh Army in Sicily*, b-12 and b-22.
131 Hugh J. Gaffey, Historical Record – Operations of U.S. Second Armored Division (Kool Force): Operations 2d Armored Division for period April 22 to July 25th, 5 August 1953, 11.
133 Garland, Smyth and Blumenson, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, 419.
134 Ibid., 419.
of Axis forces. The military police and engineer effort during Operation Husky was successful in providing Allied forces with the operational reach and tempo needed for its continuous attack.

In *Field Manual 3-0, Operations* consolidation area activities, “require a balancing of area security and stability tasks. A unit assigned the responsibility for a consolidation area may not simultaneously perform all types of tasks.”135 Rather a shift in focus in dealing with tasks is described from maximizing security tasks and minimizing essential stability tasks until the threat and environment is more favorable. Operation Husky is a great case study in how to achieve that balance. Preserving the tempo of operations by economizing combat forces through the use of an initial Allied Military Government, CAOs, and CAPOs could have implications for future LSCO.

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135 *Field Manual 3-0, Operations*, 8-5.
Conclusion

As the invasion of Sicily progressed, and combat operations intensified, improvisation, audacity, and maintaining the initiative became key to success. The Seventh Army was successful in maintaining the initiative and preserving combat power because of the efforts of Civil Affairs Officers (CAO) and American Military Government (AMG) operations in the consolidation area. Despite the overall success of Operation Husky, there were numerous shortfalls and lessons that were learned and carried over to the cross-channel invasion of France. The Army was successful because of the initiative of aggressive commanders and Soldiers and its ability to plan, execute, and learn.

In the final analysis Operation Husky received criticism for being too cautious and conservative. The committee command structure for Operation Husky was criticized for being ineffective and the joint plan focused more on logistical considerations opposed to preventing the enemy from evacuating the island. Despite the many flaws of the operation, the Seventh Army—the first United States field army to fight as a unit in World War II—conducted a successful operation.\(^ {136}\) Much of the success can to attributed to deliberate efforts in the consolidation area to gain operational reach and tempo and keep constant pressure on the defending Axis forces.

\textit{Were the consolidation area operation plans during Operation Husky deliberate or ad hoc?}

Planning for Operation Husky was less than ideal with commanders and staffs focused on on-going operations in Africa and the physical separation of multinational and joint staffs conflicting with coordination. The final approval to conduct operations on Sicily came with only months to spare and the conduct of the American and British assault did not come to complete agreement until less than two months from execution. The objective of knocking Italy out of the

\(^ {136}\) Garland, Smyth and Blumenson, \textit{Sicily and the Surrender of Italy}, 417.
war gave rise to what actions needed to be taken after Sicily. Roosevelt’s terms of ‘unconditional surrender’ drove planning for the collapse of the Fascist government and the establishment of an Allied Military Government as political objectives which forced military planners to develop contingencies.

A school of military government was established only a year prior to Operation Husky and planning, training, and manning intensified once objectives were set. The AMG would be involved in every aspect of Sicilian lives and were prepared through planning for the task. As the operation drew near and military objectives became solidified the plan for the consolidation area took shape. Detailed planning by specialist in each of the six divisions (legal, financial, civilian supply, public health, public safety and enemy property) outlined with relative accuracy what problems would be encountered and how to alleviate them. Each proclamation outlined in detail how the AMG would assist in governing.

Despite shortfalls, consolidate area operations were deliberate in planning. The insufficient amount of transportation provided the AMG personnel and insufficient coordination and cooperation between AMG and combat commanders topped the list of shortfalls that caused issues in execution. By 3 September 1943, when the mainland of Italy was invaded, AMG in Sicily had solved most of the problems involved in military government.137 The detailed planning to administer the AMG contributed to its success and helped accomplish its primary task of the preservation of public order with the least possible diversion of military manpower.

Successful information operations before and during the operation yielded both favorable and unfavorable results. The failure of the Allies to fulfill the hope built up by pre-invasion propaganda saw public moral decrease and resentment appear at what many Sicilian’s felt were false promises.138 The importance of information operations coupled with planning to target the

137 Komer, Civil Affairs, Chap II -41.
138 Ibid., Chap II -44.
Sicilian population helped in the execution of the AMG. The information operations of Operation Husky may have been pivotal in seizing, retaining, and exploiting opportunities to subdue the population and preventing the difficulties of a hostile population.

Those information operations were deliberately planned and is a recommended topic for further research. Did a protracted insurgency not materialize on Sicily because of pre-invasion information operations tied to AMG efforts? The conditions, circumstances and influences on Sicily during Operation Husky were unique. Like much of history, it is worth further exploration not into replicating the conditions of Operation Husky but identifying consistencies that will allow us opportunities to exploit in the future. If future LSCO consists of an enemy that closely integrates information warfare, unconventional warfare, and conventional forces on an increasingly complex battlefield, does the consolidation area in such multi-domain fight require synchronizing efforts before the escalation of armed conflict? Does deterrence begin by conducting consolidation of gains activities pre-conflict?

Deliberate signal, engineer, and military police efforts contributed significantly to consolidating gains during Operation Husky. Many of the units responsible for those efforts were independent (becoming assigned to Seventh Army based on need) and were task organized to each of the Corps and Divisions. *Field Manual 3-0, Operations* suggests that the theater army should provide the joint task force (JTF) with troops specifically task-organized to focus on area security and stability tasks as part of force tailoring. There is also a suggestion for subordinate divisions to commit one of more Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) to conducting consolidation of gains in the consolidation area. The environment and intensity of fighting will have an impact on the priority of combat power. Based on the current force structure, further research should be conducted to determine the feasibility of committing whole combat BCTs to the consolidation area and if those BCT’s are efficiently force tailored to conduct area security and stability tasks.

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The Army’s Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept for 2028 suggests, “The ability of the Joint Force to rapidly and unpredictably present an adversary with different combinations of forces and capabilities expands the competitive space for the United States and helps deter aggression by complicating an adversary’s ability to achieve local superiority.”140 Having the appropriate array of forces and capabilities, to include forces to consolidate gains, will have an exponential effect on future battlefield.

How did the battlefield of Sicily compare to the hybrid threat and rear security necessary in today’s operations? Was there a significant German/Italian threat to the rear area and was that threat significant enough to warrant deliberate operations?

Sicily is an island. An invasion force of two Armies had an undeniable effect on the Sicilian operational environment. However, the rather benign environment of Sicily 1943 is different in comparison to the Philippines, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq or any other environment we examine today. An extensive comparison of the political, economic, military, and social aspects of each to Sicily is outside the scope of this paper, however, a floundering Fascist political party aligned to Nazi German, a declining economy due to continuous war, a demoralized military with continued distrust of German allies, and the mafia were a few variables to consider when examining the complexity of the environment faced by Allied forces prior to the invasion of Sicily. Add in the need to establish a new Allied Military Government and fight a determined and experienced German and Italian enemy and Operation Husky becomes comparatively complex as past ventures or potential new ventures.

Field Manual 27-5, United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs published after Operation Husky on 22 December, 1943 presented several principles and polices in the conduct of civil affairs. The principles of economy of personnel and flexibility

remind us of the significance civil affairs has on combat power and the importance of understanding the environment. *Field Manual 27-5* suggests efficient control of the civilian population and mobilization of local civilian manpower will lessen the need for garrison forces, therefore, all plans and practices of military government should provide the requisite number of civil affairs personnel.141 Economizing combat power has a direct impact on tempo of offensive operations. Environmental factors impact military operations as well in relation to the effectiveness of implementing a military government.

Many factors will impact the administration of civil affairs, including military forces present and disposition, the structure of the native government, the geography, economic institutions, character of the people and officials, the degree of destruction of local resources, personnel available, the basic policies to be followed, including the post-war position of the territory.142 Because administering military government will vary widely even in the same territory from one time to another based on the combat situation, it follows that flexibility must be provided for in plans.143 The Sicilian environment in 1943 may have been rather benign in comparison to the Philippines, Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Iraq in the history of American warfare. However, the efforts to plan and execute the massive undertaking that was the Allied Military Government of Sicily had a direct impact on the success of the Seventh Army. Furthermore, the lessons learned from Operation Husky had an impact on allied success in World War II and continue to remain valuable in operations today.

The Army should continue to explore capabilities to enhance and apply greater emphasis on consolidation area operations. Consolidating gains through the use of the AMG and through effort of military police, engineers, and others proved valuable during Operation Husky in

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142 Ibid., 6.
143 Ibid., 6.
increasing operational reach and tempo by preserving combat power. Future conflict is expected to be increasingly complex and lethal, requiring properly trained, manned, and equipped formations that can win against a peer or near-peer adversary. The Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept for 2028 has described how Army forces contributing to the Joint Force will deter and defeat Chinese and Russian aggression in both competition and conflict. The combination of three tenets proposed to solve the problems outlined for MDO are: calibrated force posture, multi-domain formations, and convergence. Each of these tenets underscore the importance of synchronized effort across the spectrum of armed conflict. Consolidating gains will remain an important aspect to plan and execute in future LSCO. It will create windows of superiority to enable friendly exploitation of the initiative much in the same way General Patton and the Seventh Army were able to exploit their success on the front lines of Sicily.

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144 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operation 2028, 17.
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