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
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Coordination Communication Topologies




Common network topologies

Single Vendor Vulnerability Report

Reporter Identifies a Vulnerability
Reporter contacts Vendor
Vendor responds (or ignores)
Reporter


Reporter requests assistance:

- Reporter contacts CERT/CC
- CERT/CC confirms VUL
- CERT/CC communicates with Reporter
- CERT/CC contacts Vendor



Point to Point

Multiple Vendor Vulnerability Report



Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure

Problems with Multi-Vendor Coordination:

Hub & Spoke does not scale

Who do we notify?

Who did we miss?

More effort happens after Disclosure

Vendors must contact us for updating the vul note.

Balancing conflicting vendor disclosure policies.

Examples:


VU#484891 (the vul that enabled SQL Slammer)

VU#228519 (KRACK)

Is there a better solution? **Improving Coordination PSIRT: Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure**

Collaborative Vulnerability Disclosure

A Better Solution?



Microsoft's response to Congressional Letter


In less complicated scenarios, the CVD protocol calls for a **hub-and-spoke** model of communication through which a vulnerability owner communicates individually with each affected vendor.

In more complicated scenarios—like the one presented by Meltdown and Spectre—a "shared-bus" model can be required, to ensure affected companies can coordinate directly "through the use of conference calls, group meetings, and private mailing lists."

https://energycommerce.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/MSFT-Spectre-Response-to-EC-Committee-.pdf


Communications

- Private shared venue
- Vendors are invited in.
- Shared file space
- Track threaded discussions
- Vendors can be added, immediate access to history




Coordinator/Coordination

- Sets target dates and milestones
- Identifies and invites affected vendors
- Invites additional vendors as identified




Reporter

- Identifies the vulnerability
- May/may not contact vendor(s)
- Contacts Coordinator



Vendors

- Vendors post statements, links to patches, etc.
- Possible Multiple vulnerability reports (separate venues)



Challenges

Coordination	Collaboration
Tracking threaded communications	
Secure Communications	
Contact Management	Account Management?
Disclosure Timing	Disclosure Timing – Everyone agrees?
Publishing	Publishing
Updating Reports	Updating Reports

Alternate Disclosure

Pre-Disclosure:

Group effort

Open comms within the group

Add new vendors

Discussion threads/ scheduling disclosure Disclosure:

Artifacts (publishable docs) Post – Disclosure:

Find new vendors

Update references

Refine Content

Who does Multi-Vendor Coordination? More organizations than expected...

Who does Multi-Vendor Coordination?

Microsoft Intel Google CERT/CC Other CERTs **PSIRTs**

Microsoft

Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure

https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/dn467923.aspx

Minimizing cybersecurity risk through coordinated vulnerability disclosure

https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/cybersecurity/content-hub/minimizing-cybersecurity-risk-through-coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure

A Call for Better Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure

https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/msrc/2015/01/11/a-call-for-better-coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure/

Intel

Product Security at Intel

https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/corporate-responsibility/product-security.html

Bug Bounty Program

https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/bug-bounty-program.html

Vulnerability handling Guidelines

https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/vulnerability-handling-guidelines.html

Google

Google Vulnerability Reward Program (VRP) Rules

https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/reward-program/

HackerOne – bug bounty program

https://hackerone.com/google

https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/reward-program/

How Google handles security vulnerabilities

https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/

Dell

Report a Potential Vulnerability in Dell Products or Software

https://www.dell.com/learn/us/en/04/campaigns/report-vulnerability

HackOne

https://hackerone.com/dellsecureworks

HP

Report a potential security vulnerability to HP (reporting form)

https://ssl.www8.hp.com/h41268/live/index.aspx?qid=25434

HackerOne

https://hackerone.com/hp

HP Enterprise Product Security Vulnerability Alerts

https://www.hpe.com/us/en/services/security-vulnerability.html



The CERT® Guide to Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure

https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/SpecialReport/2017_003_001_5 03340.pdf

Report a vulnerability (form) https://vulcoord.cert.org/VulReport/

Guidelines for Requesting Coordination Assistance

https://vuls.cert.org/confluence/display/Wiki/Guidelines+for+Requesting+Coordination+Assistance

Vulnerability Notes Database

https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/

CERT Vulnerability Data Archive & Tools

https://vuls.cert.org/confluence/display/tools/CERT+Vulnerability+Data+Archive+and+Tools



Cybersecurity Tech Accord

34 companies committed to:

- Stronger Defense
- 2. No offense
- Capacity building
- 4. Collective action

Background

https://cybertechaccord.org/

Agreement

https://cybertechaccord.org/accord/

...... Collective Action

"The companies will build on existing relationships and together establish new formal and informal partnerships with industry, civil society and security researchers to improve technical collaboration, coordinate vulnerability disclosures, share threats and minimize the potential for malicious code to be introduced into cyberspace."

SIGNATORIES

ABB FACEBOOK NIELSEN

ARM FASTLY NOKIA

AVAST FIREEYE ORACLE

BITDEFENDER F-SECURE RSA

BT GITHUB SAP

CA TECHNOLOGIES GUARDTIME STRIPE

CARBON BLACK HP INC SYMANTEC

CISCO HPE TEELFONICA

CLOUDFLARE INTUIT TENABLE

DATASTAX JUNIPER NETWORKS TRENDMICRO

DELL LINKEDIN VMWARE

DOCUSIGN MICROSOFT

What can you do today?

- 1. Provide current contact information for vulnerability reports.
 - generic email address
 - group that monitors incoming messages
- 2. Maintain PGP key(s).
- 3. Share this information with CERT organizations.

What are your thoughts?

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Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure
Team Lead

