Architecture of Cloud-based Systems
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DM18-0033
Objectives for This Course

Explain how cloud computing is different from traditional data center deployment

Identify how the controllability and observability of cloud-based systems impacts test and evaluation approaches

Explain how cloud computing promotes and inhibits system quality attributes (including cybersecurity), and how this impacts test and evaluation approaches

Identify potential areas of risk in cloud-based systems
Instructor Introductions

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Agenda – Day 1

Definitions and fundamental concepts
• essential characteristics of cloud computing, cloud delivery service models, deployment approaches (private, community, hybrid), government-specific cloud offerings

Enabling technologies
• virtualization, containerization, infrastructure as code

Cloud native services
• out-of-the-box services from cloud providers for storage and databases, application integration, monitoring, scaling and load balancing, identity and access management, analytics
Agenda – Day 2

Introduction to cybersecurity vulnerabilities in cloud-based systems

Introduction to leading practices for cybersecurity for cloud-based systems

Quality attributes in the cloud

• how cloud computing promotes or inhibits qualities such as availability, performance, scalability, testability, modifiability/ extensibility, and cybersecurity

Distributed systems concepts

• communication/coordination limits in distributed systems, consistency/availability/partition tolerance tradeoffs for distributed state/data, time synchronization

Using the cloud to support test and evaluation

• how to leverage the elasticity and scalability of the cloud to test and evaluate systems
Perspective and Course Scope

The reality is that US government is a small portion of the global cloud market
• And DoD is a part of US government…and US Army is a part of DoD…

Most of the available knowledge is focused on the commercial marketplace
• Trade press and blogosphere coverage
• Documentation
• Books, tutorials, training, etc.

We are going to present a broad view of cloud computing
• Some topics may not be directly applicable for you today (but may become important tomorrow)
• In order to define a boundary, you need to understand what is on both sides of the line

We will try to identify when technologies or concepts are more relevant to commercial organizations than to DoD
• If you have questions, please ask us!
Rules of Engagement

We will be very busy over the next two days. To complete everything and get the most from the course, we will need to follow some rules of engagement:

• Your participation is essential.
• Feel free to ask questions at any time.
• Discussion is good, but we might need to cut some discussions short in the interest of time.
• Please try to limit side discussions during the lectures.
• Please turn off your cell phone ringers and computers.
• Let's try to start on time.
Any Questions So Far?
Definitions and Fundamental Concepts

Architecture of Cloud-based Systems
Definitions and Fundamental Concepts

In this module, we will discuss

- What makes cloud computing different from a typical data center
- Cloud service models
- Cloud delivery models
- Cloud options available for DoD systems
- Security controls
- Service level agreements
Data Center Deployment
Cloud Computing

“A model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.”

Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 2011
Cloud Computing Models and Essential Characteristics

Service Models
- Software as a Service (SaaS)
- Platform as a Service (PaaS)
- Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)

Deployment Models
- Public
- Private
- Hybrid
- Community

Essential Characteristics
- Measured Service
- Resource Pooling
- On-Demand Self Service
- Broad Network Access
- Rapid Elasticity

Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 2011
NIST Cloud Model’s Five Essential Characteristics

On-demand self-service — a consumer can unilaterally provision computing capabilities, such as server time and network storage, as needed automatically without requiring human interaction with each service provider.

Broad network access — capabilities are available over the network and accessed through standard mechanisms that promote use by heterogeneous thin or thick client platforms (e.g., mobile phones, tablets, laptops, and workstations).

Resource pooling — the service provider’s computing resources are pooled to serve multiple consumers using a multi-tenant model, with different physical and virtual resources dynamically assigned and reassigned according to consumer demand.
NIST Cloud Model’s Five Essential Characteristics

**Rapid elasticity** — capabilities can be elastically provisioned and released, in some cases automatically, to scale rapidly outward and inward commensurate with demand.

**Measured service** — cloud systems automatically control and optimize resource use by leveraging a metering capability at some level of abstraction appropriate to the type of service (e.g., storage, processing, bandwidth, and active user accounts).
Deployment Models

Public
- Offered as a service, usually over an Internet connection
- Typically charge a pay-per-use fee
- Users can scale on-demand and do not need to purchase hardware
- Cloud providers manage the infrastructure and pool resources into capacity required by consumers

Private
- Deployed inside the firewall and managed by the user organization
- User organization owns the software and hardware running in the cloud
- User organization manages the cloud and provides cloud resources
- Resources typically not shared outside the organization and full control is retained by the organization

Hybrid
- Combination of public and private cloud and/or community

Community
- Cloud that contains functionality tailored for the industry that it serves
Service Delivery Models

Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)
- CPUs
- Disk drives
- Networks
- Data centers

Platform as a Service (PaaS)
- Development and runtime tools and environment

Software as a Service (SaaS)
- Enterprise apps
- Desktop apps
- Mobile apps
Shared Responsibilities Model
Drivers for Cloud Computing Adoption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Availability</th>
<th>24x7 access to data and applications from anywhere</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Big Data</td>
<td>Public clouds have significantly reduced the cost of entry into big data, machine learning, and artificial intelligence systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity and Scalability</td>
<td>Organizations can request, use, and release as many resources as needed based on changing needs and user demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Infrastructure Costs</td>
<td>The pay-per-use model allows an organization to only pay for the resources they need with basically no investment in the physical resources available in the cloud — there are no infrastructure maintenance or upgrade costs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Reduced Development Times | • Available tools and platforms, in addition to DevOps procedures, can reduce amount of code to write and deployment times  
                           | • Multi-organizational projects can work simultaneously on common data and information |
| Reliability        | In order to support SLAs (service-level agreements), cloud providers have reliability mechanisms that are much more robust than those that could be cost-effectively provided by a single organization |
| Risk Reduction     | Organizations can use the cloud to test ideas and concepts before making major investments in technology |
### Challenges for Cloud Computing Adoption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>A universal set of standards and/or interfaces has not yet been defined, resulting in a significant risk of vendor lock-in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latency</td>
<td>All access to the cloud is done via the internet, introducing latency into every communication between the user and the environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Issues</td>
<td>There are concerns in the cloud computing community over jurisdiction, data protection, data location, fair information practices, international data transfer, and legal access to data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platform or Language Constraints</td>
<td>Some cloud environments provide support for specific platforms and languages only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>The key concern is data privacy: organizations typically do not have control of or know where their data is being stored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills/Knowledge</td>
<td>Different skills are needed to make use of clouds at the different services than a traditional IT center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>Satisfying NIST Special Publication 800-53 security controls and assessment procedures for the program’s appropriate security control level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portability</td>
<td>Cloud service providers provide similar functionality but implement their services differently</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FedRAMP

Government-wide program for unclassified cloud computing that standardizes:

- Security assessment
- Authorization
- Continuous monitoring for cloud products and services
- https://www.fedramp.gov/about-us/about/

There are three main players in the FedRAMP process:

- Agencies
- Cloud service providers (CSPs)
- Third party assessment organizations (3PAOs)

FedRamp Authorization Playbook is the starting point

Relevant Security Documentation for FedRAMP

FIPS Publication 199 Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems

FIPS Publication 200 Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems

NIST 800-53 Security Controls Catalog, revision 4
FIPS Publication 199

Defines three levels of potential impact on organizations or individuals should there be a breach of security (i.e. a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability).

**LOW** impact if the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

**MODERATE** impact if the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

**HIGH** impact if the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

Security Categorization:

\[
SC(system) = \{(\text{confidentiality, impact}), (\text{integrity, impact}), (\text{availability, impact})\}
\]
FIPS Publication 200

Identifies seventeen security-related areas with regard to protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of federal information systems and the information processed, stored, and transmitted by those systems.

1. access control
2. awareness and training
3. audit and accountability
4. certification, accreditation, and security assessments
5. configuration management
6. contingency planning
7. identification and authentication
8. incident response
9. maintenance
10. media protection
11. physical and environmental protection
12. planning
13. personnel security
14. risk assessment
15. systems and services acquisition
16. system and communications protection
17. system and information integrity
### NIST 800-53 Security Controls Catalog, rev 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Control (Major)</th>
<th>Control (Sub-parts)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>FedRAMP Control Selection</th>
<th>DoD Cloud SRG Control Selection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCESS CONTROL</td>
<td>AC-1</td>
<td>AC-1</td>
<td>ACCESS CONTROL POLICY AND PROCEDURES</td>
<td>The organization:</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Level 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Covered in more detail later.
## Examples of FedRAMP Cloud Service Providers (CSPs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider</th>
<th>Service Model Supported</th>
<th>Impact Level</th>
<th>Authorizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AWS US East/West</td>
<td>IaaS</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWS GovCloud</td>
<td>IaaS</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWS GovCloud High</td>
<td>IaaS, PaaS</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Google G Suite</td>
<td>PaaS, SaaS</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Google Services (Google Cloud Platform Products)</td>
<td>IaaS, PaaS, SaaS</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microsoft Commercial Cloud</td>
<td>IaaS, PaaS</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microsoft Azure Government</td>
<td>IaaS, PaaS</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microsoft 365 Multi-Tenant &amp; Supporting Services</td>
<td>SaaS</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IC IT Enterprise (IC ITE) & MILCLOUD – Government Clouds for Classified Computing

Commercial Cloud Services (C2S) – provided by AWS
  • Managed by CIA
  • Utility and compute cloud providing IaaS
  • Two versions (Secret, TS/SCI)

IC GovCloud (government-provided cloud)
  • Managed by NSA
  • Warehouse for big data storage and analytics
  • One version (TS/SCI)

IC applications mall
  • There are roughly 100 applications in the marketplace, with another 70 in the pipeline.

MilCloud
  • Managed by DISA
  • Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) solution that leverages a combination of mature Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) and government developed technology to deliver cloud services tailored to needs of the DOD.
Service-Level Agreements

A service level agreement (SLA) is a formal negotiated agreement (contract) between service consumers and providers.

Minimal SLA outline

• Parties in the agreement
• Services provided that are covered by the SLA
• Service performance metrics
• Incident handling — procedures, response times, consequences when response times are not met
• Records/logs to keep
• Performance review and problem management
• Termination arrangements

Each CSP has their own SLA.
Example: Amazon Compute SLA

Amazon Compute Service Level Agreement

Last Updated: December 1, 2017

This Amazon Compute Service Level Agreement (this “SLA”) is a policy governing the use of the Included Products and Services (listed below) by you or the entity you represent (“you”) under the terms of the AWS Customer Agreement (the “AWS Agreement”) between Amazon Web Services, Inc. and its affiliates (“AWS”, “us” or “we”) and you. This SLA applies separately to each account using the Included Products and Services. Unless otherwise provided herein, this SLA is subject to the terms of the AWS Agreement and capitalized terms will have the meaning specified in the AWS Agreement. We reserve the right to change the terms of this SLA in accordance with the AWS Agreement.

Included Products and Services

- Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2)
- Amazon Elastic Block Store (Amazon EBS)
- Amazon Elastic Container Service (Amazon ECS)
- AWS Fargate for Amazon ECS (AWS Fargate)

Service Commitment

AWS will use commercially reasonable efforts to make the Included Products and Services each available with a Monthly Uptime Percentage (defined below) of at least 99.999%, in each case during any monthly billing cycle (the “Service Commitment”). In the event any of the Included Products and Services do not meet the Service Commitment, you will be eligible to receive a Service Credit as described below.

Definitions

- “Monthly Uptime Percentage” is calculated by subtracting from 100% the percentage of minutes during the month in which any of the Included Products and Services, as applicable, was in the state of “Region Unavailable.” Monthly Uptime Percentage measurements exclude downtime resulting directly or indirectly from any Amazon Compute Services SLA Exclusion (defined below).
- “Region Unavailable” and “Region Unavailability” mean that more than one Availability Zone in which you are running an instance or task (one or more containers), as applicable, within the same Region, is “Unavailable” to you.
- “Unavailable” and “Unavailability” mean:
  - For Amazon EC2, Amazon ECS, or AWS Fargate, when all of your running instances or running tasks, as applicable, have no external connectivity.
  - For Amazon EBS, when all of your attached volumes perform zero read write IO, with pending IO in the queue.
- A “Service Credit” is a dollar credit, calculated as set forth below, that we may credit back to an eligible account.

https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/sla/
Definitions and Fundamental Concepts

In this module, we discussed

- What makes cloud computing different from a typical data center
- Cloud service models
- Cloud delivery models
- Cloud options available for DoD systems
- Security controls
- Service level agreements
Enabling Technologies

Architecture of Cloud-based Systems
Enabling Technologies

In this module, we will discuss

• What is virtualization and how it enables cloud computing
• How virtual servers are different from physical servers
• What are containers and how they support cloud computing
• How virtual machines are managed using scripts
Focusing our discussion

For much of the rest of this course, we are going to focus on Amazon’s IaaS technology – Amazon Web Services or AWS

Why IaaS?

• Our experience is that IaaS is the starting point for many system migrations to the cloud
• Understanding IaaS provides the necessary foundation to understand other cloud services - PaaS and SaaS are built on top of IaaS
• Amazon’s IaaS is starting to bleed into PaaS and SaaS

Why Amazon?

• Market leader in commercial and government sectors
• Broad offering, covers diverse capabilities
• Other vendors map their offerings to Amazon’s
How do they do it?

How does a cloud service provider deliver Infrastructure as a Service?
How do they achieve elasticity and on-demand capacity?
How much do you need to care about it?
Virtualization

NIST definition (800-125)

- Virtualization is the simulation of the software and/or hardware upon which other software runs.

Types of virtualization:

- Application – e.g., Java Virtual Machine
- Operating system – e.g., containers like Docker
- Full – One or more operating systems (and their applications) running on top of virtual hardware

We’ll talk about Full Virtualization first, and then come back to Containers
Types of Full Virtualization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bare metal</th>
<th>Hosted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type 1</strong></td>
<td><strong>Type 2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mostly used on Desktop)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NIST 800-125
Virtualization Influences Deployment Partitioning

With physical servers:

- Deploy multiple applications on a physical server – introduces dependency management concerns
- Efficiency → Fill the server’s capacity (while maintaining some reserve headroom)
- Physical failure may be a concern, i.e. don’t deploy the primary and backup to the same physical server

With virtualized servers:

- Simplify dependencies – deploy one application per VM instance
- Efficiency of physical hardware utilization is the cloud provider’s concern
- Physical hardware failure is (mostly) handled by the cloud service provider – we’ll talk later about deployment patterns to improve availability
Virtualization and the Cloud

Cloud Service Providers use Type 1 virtualization

AWS used the Xen hypervisor, now moving to KVM-based implementation*

Physical reboots are a very rare event

Instance = executing guest OS + application (and middleware)

Multi-tenant – Instances on same physical server may belong to different users

* https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/11/07/aws_writes_new_kvm_based_hypervisor_to_make_its_cloud_go_faster/
Images and Instances

An *instance* is a deployed and executing *image*.

- An image can be used to create multiple instances.

How are images created?

- Start with a *base image* – this is a minimal bootable guest OS image
- Deploy and start the base image
- Install more software (middleware, application, etc.) on the running instance
- Configure and tune the running instance (users, firewall, application settings)
- Take a *snapshot* of the instance to create a new image

We’ll talk more this later – Infrastructure as Code
A VM instance is not like a traditional physical server

Storage
- The disk on a physical server retains state from one boot to the next boot
- VM instance always boots from its image – any data that must be retained from boot to boot is stored in a cloud database like DynamoDB or storage service like S3
  - Cloud storage services are sometimes referred to as backing stores
- We don’t back up virtual servers – the image is the backup

Networking
- VM instances are assigned dynamic hostnames and IP addresses – there are no static IP addresses in the cloud
- Architectures must use discovery instead of static configuration

We can pass configuration variables to an instance when we start it. E.g., role=master or role=slave

Your only access is via ssh - you get the instance’s key when you launch it. Don’t Lose That Key!
Instances and Physical Hardware

The cloud service provider manages allocation of instance to physical nodes

Most cloud service providers offer several types of instance profiles

• CPU and memory capabilities
• Hypervisor tuning
• Network and storage

Each profile has a different pay-per-use cost

Profiles change over time as technology evolves
Example – Survey of Instance Types* in Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2)

General Purpose
• 4 subtypes, various sizes (23 total)
• Balance CPU, Memory, I/O

Compute Optimized
• 3 subtypes, 1 w/ SSD (16 total)
• High-end CPUs, variable memory sizes

Memory Optimized
• 4 subtypes, 3 w/ SSD (19 total)
• Up to 3,905GiB memory

Accelerated Computing
• 4 subtypes (11 total)
• GPU and FPGA

Storage Optimized
• 3 subtypes, HDD and SSD (15 total)
• High instance storage for replicated databases

*As of 1 Dec 2017
Containers

A VM image contains a full guest operating system

• May take 30-45 seconds to start, possibly longer depending on the
time to copy the image from storage

What if my application doesn’t need all of the services that the OS
provides? E.g., Microservices or a Function-as-a-Service

An Application Container* is a construct designed to package and run an
application or its components running on a shared Operating System.

Containers are “lightweight” - <50 msec startup time, small enough to
cache locally

• Based on Linux kernel namespaces and cgroups
• Less robust isolation that VM provides, but enough for most use cases

Some similarities to VMs - boot from image, local storage is ephemeral

Some differences – Images can be composed, networking is bridged
through host’s IP address

*From NIST 800-180 Draft
Container vs Full Virtualization

Application Containers:
An Application Container is a construct designed to package and run an application or its components running on a shared Operating System. Application Containers are isolated from other Application Containers and share the resources of the underlying Operating System, allowing for efficient restart, scale-up or scale-out of applications across clouds. Application Containers typically contain Microservices.

System Virtual Machines (S-VM):
A System Virtual Machine (S-VM) is a software implementation of a complete system platform that supports the execution of a complete operating system and corresponding applications in a cloud. Each S-VM serves as an efficient, isolated duplicate of a real machine running on a cluster of physical machines.

Similarities and Differences between S-VMs and Application Containers:
S-VMs abstract the Operating System from the underlying hardware, allowing for multiple Operating Systems and Applications to share a single system's physical compute resources. Application Containers abstract the Application from the underlying Operating System, allowing for multiple Applications to share a single system's Operating System and underlying physical compute resources.

The following figure depicts the difference between System Virtual Machines and Application Containers:

E.g., Docker

And, of course, you can run your container daemon on a guest OS in a VM

Source: NIST 800-180 Draft
Container Technology

This technology space can be confusing, because containers are being applied for both desktop and server use cases.

Docker was emerging as the leading container engine (docker.org) for both cases, although recent business decisions have created some concerns.

Desktop Use Case
• Don’t install applications or runtimes, instead run software in a container
• Especially useful if you need multiple versions of a runtime

Server Use Case
• Small, fast deployable units
• Fine-grained scalability
Containers on the Desktop
(This is not directly related to cloud computing)

$ sudo apt-get install docker.io

Install Docker Engine

$ docker pull python:2.7
$ docker pull python:3.3
$ docker pull python:3.4

Cache base images*

Execute for each Python version

$ docker run -i -t --rm python:2.7 python -m timeit "[i for i in range(1000)]"
10000 loops, best of 3: 82.2 usec per loop
$ docker run -i -t --rm python:3.3 python -m timeit "[i for i in range(1000)]"
10000 loops, best of 3: 83.0 usec per loop
$ docker run -i -t --rm python:3.4 python -m timeit "[i for i in range(1000)]"
10000 loops, best of 3: 87.7 usec per loop

* Optimization – Docker will automatically pull on first use of an image if it is not cached locally

Example from http://tiborsimko.org/docker-for-python-applications.html
Server-side Containers

Driven by microservices (a small, cohesive, independently deployable distributed service developed by a single team)

Applications have many (i.e. 10s) of microservices, with some executing multiple instances

Concerns
  • Packaging dependencies
  • Deployment efficiency (100s of instances)

Enter containers and container orchestration technology
  • Docker container engine
  • Kubernetes ("K8s"*) container management

Containers enable the function as a service, AKA serverless architecture style

* But only if you are a rock star full stack developer
Creating VM Instances

Amazon Web Service (AWS) homepage has 10-minute Tutorial: Launch a Linux Virtual Machine using Amazon EC2

- Uses the AWS Management Console
- Wizard-driven VM instance creation – step through a few screens to configure and launch the instance
- Console shows the status of your running instances
- Great way to get started with AWS!

But this approach is not viable for more than a few instances

- Manual and error-prone
- Slow

Automate all the things – treat your infrastructure as code
Automate all the Things –
Infrastructure as Code

*Infrastructure as code* is the process and technology to manage and provision computers and networks (physical and/or virtual) through scripts.

Scripts/code provide:

- Scale
- Automation
- Version control
Technology support for infrastructure as code

AWS Command Line Interface

• Wraps the AWS API – use your favorite scripting tools (shell script, Python, Ruby, ...)
• Fine-grained and detailed control
• Can do more than just manage VM instances
  • Manage images, manage storage and snapshots, ad hoc operations on services like DynamoDB and Identity and Access Management (IAM)

DevOps tools like Chef and Puppet use higher-level abstractions, make things easier and more efficient
Chef Script Examples
(Chef scripts use Ruby)

```ruby
httpd_service 'an websites' do
  instance_name 'bob'
  servername 'www.computers.biz'
  version '2.4'
  mpm 'event'
  threadlimit '4096'
  listen_ports ['1234']
  action :create
  action :start
end

mysql_service 'foo' do
  port '3306'
  version '5.5'
  initial_root_password 'change me'
  action [:create, :start]
end
```

Examples from https://github.com/chef-cookbooks/httpd and https://github.com/chef-cookbooks/mysql
Immutable/Versioned Infrastructure

Infrastructure as code promotes an IT operations approach called immutable infrastructure
- Immutable – “write once”
- Don’t update, recreate (or replace)

Don’t patch a running system, instead
- Rework the infrastructure as code scripts that generated the image
- Create a new image
- Test instances of the new image
- Deploy the new image to production

Allows us to version our infrastructure
- Rollback – some large-scale systems can’t be tested outside of the production environment – Infrastructure as Code and versioned infrastructure provide a safety net for testing in these situations
- Parity – test and production environments are identical
Infrastructure as Code - Takeaways

You need to be familiar with both approaches:

- Chef/Puppet/etc. – Fast, easy, default development tools
- AWS Command Line Interface – finer-grained control and visibility for T&E activities

Contractors should deliver their infrastructure as code artifacts

- Treat these like any other software deliverable
- It is code – some up-front design is usually needed to define approach and overall structure
- It is code – some documentation is needed to describe the artifacts

Key to agility

- Versioned infrastructure provides a safety net for rapid exploration and experimentation

Repeatability reduces implementation diversity
One more thing – Network Virtualization and Virtual Private Clouds

VMs provide isolation when sharing physical computer hardware.

What about sharing the network?

A virtual private cloud or VPC uses private subnet addresses and VLAN technology to isolate network traffic between VMs.

- When a VM is launched, it is assigned to a VPC.
- Some CSPs (e.g., AWS) allow you to also purchase physical hardware isolation – VMs deployed to a VPC will not share physical hardware with VMs outside that VPC.

Amazon also allows you to pay to place a VPN endpoint in the VPC.

- Allows extending the enterprise network directly into the cloud for hybrid service delivery.
Enabling Technologies

In this module, we discussed

• What is virtualization and how it enables cloud computing
• How virtual servers are different from physical servers
• What are containers and how they support cloud computing
• How virtual machines are managed using scripts
Cloud Native Services

Architecture of Cloud-based Systems
Cloud Native Services

In this module, we will discuss

• Cloud platforms include many out-of-the-box services
• Architectures can trade off cloud native vs. portable implementations
• Impact on testing approach
Lift and shift to the cloud?

<lift-and-shift>
  1. Package each of your servers into a virtual machine image
  2. Choose a cloud service provider
  3. Select appropriate instance types
  4. Deploy your VM images
</lift-and-shift>

Done? Not quite!

<remediation>
  1. Persistent storage
  2. Static IP addresses
  3. ...
</remediation>
The case for cloud native services

Scalable, secure, and highly-available distributed services are hard
- PostgreSQL has 270 configuration parameters
- Kafka message queue has 140 “top-level” configuration parameters
- How many impact security? performance? availability?

Managing distributed services is hard
- Patching and updating is harder in distributed system
- Monitoring
- Adding capacity to a running system
- ...

Wouldn’t it be nice if this was somebody else’s problem?

Cloud Native Services to the rescue!
AWS Cloud Native Services

Explore Our Products

- Compute
- Storage
- Database
- Migration
- Networking & Content Delivery
- Developer Tools
- Management Tools
- Media Services
- Security, Identity & Compliance
- Analytics
- Machine Learning
- Mobile Services
- AR & VR
- Application Integration
- Customer Engagement
- Business Productivity
- Desktop & App Streaming
- Internet of Things
- Game Development
Cloud Native Services – Annotation Key

Replaces a traditional, portable component (You could build this yourself in the cloud)

Only cloud service provider can feasibly deliver this service

There are some judgement calls here.

Note that we don’t categorize every service offering.
AWS Cloud Native Services – Compute
AWS Cloud Native Services – Storage

Explore Our Products

Amazon S3
Scalable Storage in the Cloud

Amazon Glacier
Low-cost Archive Storage in the Cloud

AWS Snowball Edge
Petabyte-scale Data Transport with On-board Compute

Amazon EBS
Block Storage for EC2

AWS Storage Gateway
Hybrid Storage Integration

AWS Snowmobile
Exabyte-scale Data Transport

Amazon Elastic File System
Managed File Storage for EC2

AWS Snowball
Petabyte-scale Data Transport
Storage – Seems like a lot of options!

Basics:

• EBS – Elastic Block Store – the virtual hard disks for your VM
  - An EBS volume can be mounted by only one VM instance at a time
  - Size limited to 16TB per volume
  - Can be backed up/snapshot’ed in case of application crash

• EFS – Elastic File System – NFS in the cloud
  - Distributed file system, can be mounted by many VMs at a time
  - No size limits
  - Managed by AWS

• S3 – Simple Storage Service – object (blob) storage
  - Access via API or via http (can use to host static web content)
  - Virtually unlimited scale (both objects and buckets/namespaces)
  - Managed by AWS
Storage

“Advanced”:

- Glacier – low cost cold storage
- Storage Gateway – hybrid cloud storage solution
- Snowball and Snowmobile – peta-/exa-scale transport and storage (i.e. sneakernet)
AWS Cloud Native Services – Database

- Amazon Aurora
  High Performance Managed Relational Database

- Amazon RDS
  Managed Relational Database Service for MySQL, PostgreSQL, Oracle, SQL Server, and MariaDB

- Amazon ElastiCache
  In-memory Caching System

- Amazon Redshift
  Fast, Simple, Cost-effective Data Warehousing

- Amazon DynamoDB
  Managed NoSQL Database

- Amazon Neptune
  Fully Managed Graph Database Service

AWS Database Migration Service
Migrate Databases with Minimal Downtime
AWS Cloud Native Services – Networking
AWS Cloud Native Services – Management

Explore Our Products

- Compute
- Storage
- Database
- Migration
- Networking & Content Delivery
- Developer Tools
- Management Tools
- Media Services
- Security, Identity & Compliance
- Analytics

Amazon CloudWatch
- Monitor Resources and Applications

AWS Config
- Track Resource Inventory and Changes

AWS Systems Manager
- Gain Operational Insights and Take Action

AWS CloudFormation
- Create and Manage Resources with Templates

AWS OpsWorks
- Automate Operations with Chef and Puppet

AWS Trusted Advisor
- Optimize Performance and Security

AWS CloudTrail
- Track User Activity and API Usage

AWS Service Catalog
- Create and Use Standardized Products

AWS Personal Health Dashboard
- Personalized View of AWS Service Health
AWS Cloud Native Services – Security

AWS Identity & Access Management
- Manage User Access and Encryption Keys
- AWS Single Sign-On
- Cloud Single Sign-On (SSO) Service
- Amazon Cloud Directory
- Create Flexible Cloud-native Directories
- Amazon GuardDuty
- Managed Threat Detection Service
- Amazon Inspector
- Analyze Application Security
- AWS Organizations
- Policy-based Management for Multiple AWS Accounts
- AWS CloudHSM
- Hardware-based Key Storage for Regulatory Compliance
- AWS Shield
- DDoS Protection
- AWS Directory Service
- Host and Manage Active Directory
- AWS Certificate Manager
- Provision, Manage, and Deploy SSL/TLS Certificate
- AWS Identity & Access Management for your Apps
- AWS Key Management Service
- Managed Creation and Control of Encryption Keys
- AWS WAF
- Filter Malicious Web Traffic
- Amazon Cognito
- Identity Management for your Apps
- AWS Direct Connect
- Dedicated Network Connection to AWS
AWS Cloud Native Services – Analytics

- Amazon Athena: Query data in S3 using SQL
- Amazon Elasticsearch Service: Run and scale Elasticsearch clusters
- Amazon Kinesis: Work with real-time streaming data
- AWS Data Pipeline: Orchestration service for periodic, data-driven workflows
- Amazon EMR: Hosted Hadoop framework
- Amazon CloudSearch: Managed search service
- Amazon Redshift: Fast, simple, cost-effective data warehousing
- Amazon Quicksight: Fast business analytics service
- AWS Glue: Prepare and load data
AWS Cloud Native Services – Integration
Hey, what about the other CSPs?

Microsoft Azure:
http://aka.ms/awsazureguide maps from AWS services to Microsoft Azure services

Google Compute Platform (GCP):
https://cloud.google.com/free/docs/map-aws-google-cloud-platform maps from AWS services to GCP services
How do you choose whether to implement your own or use a cloud native service?

Development cost
• Probably lower if you start design to use cloud native service
• Obviously higher if you have to rework to use cloud native service

Pay per use cost
• For a given scale, cloud native services are usually more expensive
• Most cloud native services offer autoscaling or easy manual scaling

Service management cost
• Cloud services need no tuning, patching, updating, …
• Harder to quantify – what does it cost to manage your own service?

Security posture
• Cloud native services may be more secure than a self-implemented solution hosted in the cloud
• Cloud native services may already be accredited
• Again, hard to quantify
Implications

1. Understand where cloud native services are being used
   • You need to look at the architecture/design to see this

2. Research the weaknesses, common misuse patterns, and limitations of each native service
   • Netflix engineering blog is one source for AWS
   • Lots of stories in the blogosphere

3. Test autoscaling, failover, access control configuration, …
   • You are more likely to find problems with application’s use of the service than the service implementation
   • We’ll talk more later about testing

4. Test carefully to avoid unintended side-effects
   • See the case studies that follow here
But first, a note on terminology

“Partition” has multiple meanings in the context of cloud computing

Verb, e.g., *network partition*
- Cause the network to split into two or more subnetworks that cannot communicate with each other
- This is the P in CAP

Noun, e.g., *database partition*
- In a distributed database, the complete data set is divided and each division may be copied. Each of these subsets is called a *partition*.
- Partitions are assigned to physical nodes, where they are stored.
Case study* – accidentally triggering performance throttling

System used AWS DynamoDB, a key-value distributed database service

DynamoDB hashes the key to select a partition to store the value
  • Hashing function balances data across storage partitions

Service pricing is based on peak I/O for a partition
  • Service throttles all accesses when you hit your I/O limit in any partition

Test script:

```
for value = 1 to 1000000
  store("key", value)
end
```

What’s wrong with that?

Case study – accidentally triggering performance throttling

Note that the key never varies

• Every write operation is hashed to the same storage partition
• Tight loop in the script quickly saturates I/O for that partition and triggers rate throttling for all partitions

All I/O is throttled and everything slows down

Lessons learned:

1. Design your test cases to be compatible with the service’s architecture
2. If you can’t control the access pattern, then add protection against misuse (in this case, they pre-filtered requests and discarded requests where key=“key”|”ID”|”id”|”key_id”|…).
Case study*–initializing database triggers (nearly) endless partition re-balancing

MongoDB is a document database – each record is a JSON object

Database configuration defines maximum partition size

- When a partition hits that limit, it is split
- A new partition is created, half of the data is moved to the new partition
- This does not interrupt database access

Scenario – loading a database prior to testing

- Empty database has one partition
- Write test data records until the partition size limit is hit, triggers split and re-balance
- Writing continues during re-balance, quickly hits size limit for one of the new partitions, triggers another rebalance before the first one finished…

Case study – initializing database triggers (nearly) endless partition re-balancing

Result:
• It took about 2 hours to write 10 million records
• It took the database about 24 hours to complete all the rounds of re-balancing

Work-arounds:
• Turn off rebalancing during the loading, then turn it on and let it run once
• Snapshot the storage image after the database was loaded (need to be careful with this – data contains write timestamps that may introduce new issues when reused later)
Cloud Native Services

In this module, we discussed

- Cloud platforms include many out-of-the-box services
- Architectures can trade off cloud native vs. portable implementations
- Impact on testing approach
Cloud Vulnerabilities

Architecture of Cloud-based Systems
Cloud Vulnerabilities

In this module, we will discuss

• Threat discussion and infection points
• Examples of different views using AWS
• Hybrid cloud examples
• Cloud unique and cloud/on-premise vulnerabilities/threats
Setting the Context
Threat Terminology

**Threat source** – a method by which a vulnerability is triggered or exploited

**Attack (initial infection vector)** – method used to gain access to system

**Asset** – the object of the attack

**Threat actor** – an entity that is partially or wholly responsible for an incident that impacts or has the potential to impact an organization's security.

**Tool** – e.g., phishing email, remote access Trojan (RAT), SQL injection

**Target** – e.g., personally identifiable information (PII) data, trade secrets, network configuration information
Data Center Threats

The SEI developed a holistic approach when considering attacks on computer systems which is based on the following two questions.

• “How did they get in?”
• “What did they do after they were in?”

To answer the first question, five ways to get into a computer system (infection points) were identified.
Five Infection Points
Cloud Incidents Examples Associated with Infection Points

Social engineering – “How Apple and Amazon Security Flaws Led to my Epic Hacking”, “In the space of one hour, my entire digital life was destroyed.”, (http://www.wired.com/2012/08/apple-amazon-mat-honan-hacking/)

Client exploit – AWS OpenSSL Security Advisory - May 2016; “AWS will appropriately update OpenSSL to improve security for AWS customers who are utilizing outdated web browsers that cannot negotiate the AWS preferred and recommended AES-GCM TLS/SSL cipher suites when interacting with the AWS Management Console.”, (https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/openssl-security-advisory-may-2016/)

Misconfiguration – Amazon ELB Service Event in the US-East Region on December 24, 2012, portion of ELB state data was logically deleted which is used and maintained by the ELB control plane to manage the configuration of the ELB load balancers in the region. (https://aws.amazon.com/message/680587/);
Cloud Incidents Examples Associated with Infection Points

**Server exploit** – AWS CVE-2015-7547 Advisory - ”We have reviewed the issues described in CVE-2015-7547 and have determined that AWS Services are largely not affected. The only exception is customers using Amazon EC2 who’ve modified their configurations to use non-AWS DNS infrastructure should update their Linux environments immediately following directions provided by their Linux distribution. EC2 customers using the AWS DNS infrastructure are unaffected and don’t need to take any action. A fix for CVE-2015-7547 has been pushed to the Amazon Linux AMI repositories, with a severity rating of Critical. Instances launched with the default Amazon Linux configuration on or after 2016/02/16 will automatically include the required fix for this CVE.”


**Physical access/theft** – AWS service event in the Sydney region due to loss of power on June 6, 2016. Unusually long voltage sag caused the loss of both primary and secondary power.

(https://aws.amazon.com/message/4372T8/).
So What Else Do We Need to Understand?

We now have a good grasp of the threat picture which can be applied to data centers, a cell phone, refrigerator, and clouds.

But how do I apply it to do analysis, testing, risk identification, and risk mitigation?

You will need architecture documentation to support these efforts.

Architecture documentation will need to be developed that provides multiple views of the system to satisfy different stakeholders.
Cloud Deployment View of a Web Application Which Supports NIST Compliance

https://aws.amazon.com/quickstart/architecture/accelerator-nist/
Identity and Access Management (IAM) Service View for Modeling Threat Events
Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) View for Modeling Threat Events
Hybrid Cloud
Customer’s Administrator’s View
AWS IaaS
Customer’s Administrator’s View
Microsoft SaaS
Customer’s Security Operations Center (SOC) View

On-Premise
- Network information
- User logs
- Private cloud logs and alerts
- Cyber Protection Systems
- Analysis tools
- CDM sensors
- Storage
- User logs

Microsoft Azure
- Services
  - Office 365 Admin Center
  - Security and Compliance Tool – Audit Logs and Reports
  - Analysis tools

US East
- AWS
  - S3 – Logs (services, configuration, alerts) and data
  - Glacier – Archived logs and data
  - SNS - notifications
  - Analysis tools

SOC
- Tier 1 Alert Analyst
- Tier 2 Incident Responder
- Tier 3 SME Hunter
- SOC Manager
Customer’s On-Premise View
## Cloud Vulnerabilities/Threats

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<td>6. Stealing Credentials</td>
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<td>5. Secure Data Deletion</td>
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<td>11. Supply Chain</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
#1 Reduced Visibility & Control

When transitioning assets/operations to the cloud, agencies will lose some visibility and control over the assets/operations because the CSP is now handling aspects via its infrastructure and policies. Paradigm shift is needed by agencies to focus on attaining monitoring and logging information about applications, services, data and users, rather than the network focus of on-premise IT.

- As the CSP assumes more responsibilities, an agency will need to find different ways to attain the information to successfully monitor IT operations and satisfy security and compliance requirements.
- Agency must work jointly (can’t direct) with CSP via their service level agreement (SLA).
#2 Ability to Self Provision Resources & Services

Self provisioning capabilities of cloud enable agency personnel to:

- Provision extra services not originally planned for with the agency’s CSP and that don’t have IT consent.
- Individually use SaaS products (Dropbox, iCloud, OneDrive, …) independent of IT.

These services are unknown risks to an agency. (cloud scope creep)

- Due to the lower costs and ease of implementing PaaS and SaaS products, the probability increases.
### #3 Management API Compromise

CSPs expose a set of application programming interfaces (APIs) that customers use to manage and interact with cloud services. Agencies use these APIs via the internet to provision, manage, orchestrate and monitor their assets and users. The vulnerability is that these APIs have the same software vulnerabilities that an API for an operating system, library, etc. could have.

- Threat actor is looking for vulnerabilities in management APIs.
- If vulnerability can be turned into an attack, then this could be used against other customers of the CSP.
- Vulnerability focus more on configuration/provisioning.
#4 Multi-Tenancy Security

System and software vulnerabilities within a CSP’s infrastructure, platforms or applications which supports multi-tenancy can lead to isolation failure where an attacker exploits the vulnerability to access to another user’s or agency’s assets/data.

- Different than vulnerability #3 because this focuses on how the CSP implements the agency’s desired capabilities.
- Examples:
  - IaaS – VMs, OS’s
  - PaaS – app servers, Java VM
  - SaaS – databases, business logic, workflow, user interface
#5 Secure Data Deletion

CSP’s ability to securely delete and verify when an agency deletes data. This is a concern due to the data being spread over a number of different storage devices within the CSP’s infrastructure in a multi-tenancy environment.

- Vulnerability increases as an agency uses more CSP services.
#6 Stealing Credentials

If an attacker gains access to your cloud credentials, the additional vulnerability in the cloud is that the attacker would have access to the CSP’s services to provision additional resources, as well as target agency’s assets. The attackers could leverage cloud computing resources to target users, organizations or other cloud providers.

- Admin roles vary between CSP and agency.
- CSP admin would address more than one customer and probably handle all the CSP’s services offered.
- Vetting processes for becoming a CSP admin may be different than the process used for an agency’s admin. Need to be aware of the differences and assess their impact.
#7 Vendor lock-in

This vulnerability could occur when an agency considers moving its assets/operations from one CSP to another CSP. The agency finds out that the cost/effort/schedule time necessary for the transition is much higher than initially considered due to non-standard data formats, non-standard APIs, high cost charged to remove presence with original CSP, inability to transfer large amounts of data out of a CSP in a timely manner, reliance on one CSP’s proprietary tools, and CSP’s unique APIs.

- Vulnerability increases as the CSP takes more responsibility. As more features/services/APIs are used, there is increased exposure to CSP’s unique implementations.
- If selected CSP goes out of business, it becomes a major problem.
#8 Increased Complexity Strains IT Staff

This vulnerability is concerned with an existing agency’s IT staff having the capacity and skill level to manage, integrate and maintain the transition of assets and data to the cloud in addition to their current responsibilities for on-premise IT. The services/techniques/tools available to log and monitor them typically vary across CSPs, further increasing complexity. Also, there may be emergent vulnerabilities/risks in hybrid cloud implementations due to technology, policies, implementation methods add complexity.

- Increased potential for coverage gaps between the layers.
- Probability increases if agency pursuing hybrid cloud implementation.
#9 Insider Threat

A malicious insider is defined as a current or former employee, contractor, or business partner who meets the following criteria:

- has or had authorized access to an organization’s network, system, or data
- has intentionally exceeded or intentionally used that access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization’s information or information systems

This applies to staff and administrators for both agencies and CSPs.

- Likely worse for IaaS because of the ability to provision resources or possibly perform nefarious activities that will require forensics that may not be available with cloud resources vis-a-vis on-premise resources.
- CSPs’ users threat impact will depend upon their organization’s employee vetting process (background checks) and controls implementation.
#10 Data Recovery

Data stored in the cloud can be lost for reasons other than malicious attacks. An accidental deletion by the cloud service provider or worse, a physical catastrophe such as a fire or earthquake, can lead to the permanent loss of customer data. The burden of avoiding data loss does not fall solely on the provider’s shoulder. If a customer encrypts his or her data before uploading it to the cloud but loses the encryption key, the data will be lost as well.

- Vulnerability increases as an agency uses more CSP services.
- Data recovery for a CSP is may be better than that of an agency due to SLA designating availability/uptime percentages.
#11 Supply Chain

This vulnerability is concerned with the supply chain that a CSP uses to support its services. If the CSP outsources parts of its supply chain, then these third parties may not satisfy/support the requirements that the CSP is contracted to support with an agency. An agency would need to check to see if the CSP flows its own requirements down to their third party and see how it enforces compliance. If the requirements are not being flowed down, then there is an increased threat to the agency.

- **Vulnerability increases as an agency uses more CSP services.**
- **This is very dependent on individual CSPs and their supply chain policies.**
Cloud Vulnerabilities

In this module, we discussed

- Threat discussion and infection points
- Examples of different views using AWS
- Hybrid cloud example and its associated different views
- Cloud unique and cloud/on-premise threats
- Cloud unique and cloud/on-premise threats/vulnerabilities
Leading Practices for Cloud Security

Architecture of Cloud-based Systems
Leading Practices for Cloud Security

In this module, we will discuss

• Cloud vulnerability/threat examples
• Four key practices
• Recommendations mapped to security control categories
• Conclusions
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When transitioning assets/operations to the cloud, agencies will lose some visibility and control over the assets/operations because the CSP is now handling aspects via its infrastructure and policies. Paradigm shift is needed by agencies to focus on attaining monitoring and logging information about applications, services, data and users, rather than the network focus of on-premise IT.

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- Vulnerability focus more on configuration/provisioning.
Access Management Shared Responsibilities
Monitoring Responsibilities
#5 Secure Data Deletion

CSP’s ability to securely delete and verify when an agency deletes data. This is a concern due to the data being spread over a number of different storage devices within the CSP’s infrastructure in a multi-tenancy environment.

- Vulnerability increases as an agency uses more CSP services.
Auto-scalable Web Application
Sensitive Data in a Typical Cloud Web Application
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A malicious insider is defined as a current or former employee, contractor, or business partner who meets the following criteria:

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- CSPs’ users threat impact will depend upon their organization’s employee vetting process (background checks) and controls implementation.
Deep dive example – Insider Threat CSP mitigations

AWS

Can enforce MFA authentication for AWS service APIs to provide another layer of protection (add MFA-authentication requirement to an IAM access policy which can be applied to IAM users, IAM groups or resources that support Access Control Lists (ACLs)

Use of CloudWatch to monitor resource utilization, operational performance and demand patterns.

Use of IAM to control which services users have permission to perform based on roles.

Implement controls to prevent unauthorized access to logs. (CloudTrail, IAM, S3 bucket policies, MFA)

Implement controls to ensure access to log records is role-based. (CloudTrail & IAM)

Log of changes to system components (including creation and deletion of system-level objects) (CloudTrail)

API call logging provides the data and context required to analyze user behavior and understand certain events.

API calls and IT resource change logs can also be used to demonstrate that only authorized users have performed certain tasks.
Deep dive example – Insider Threat CSP mitigations

Google

Google has the option of 2-factor authentication and token based authentication.

Google encrypts all data at rest and in transit.

Google allows for granular user permissions and authorizations.

All user access and actions are logged.

CSP employee access is limited, logged, and actively monitored.

Google implements the principle of least privilege and separation of duties for its employees.
  • Some administrative actions require two party approval.

Google employees undergo security background checks and security training.

Google uses the same software and infrastructure for their production environment, in which protecting of data is the main design criteria.

Google offers a security report that identifies suspicious data access and user behavior.
Four Important Cloud Security Practices

1. Perform due diligence
2. Manage access
3. Protect data
4. Monitor and defend
Cloud Security Practices

1) Perform due diligence

Encourages cloud consumers to fully understand their current network and applications to better appreciate the functionality, resilience, and security of cloud services before migrating to cloud-deployed application and system.

2) Manage access

Describes the different categories of users in a cloud-based IT environment and explains the responsibilities of both CSP and cloud consumers in managing these user’s access to resources.
Cloud Security Practices

3) Protect data

Describes the two consumer challenges of preventing the accidental disclosure of data that was supposedly deleted and ensuring continued access to critical data in the event of errors, failures, and compromise.

4) Monitor and defend

Describes the shared responsibility of the CSP and cloud consumer in monitoring the cloud-based system and applications to detect unauthorized access to data or unauthorized use of resources.
### Recommendations Mapped to Security Control Categories (NIST SP 800-53, Rev. 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Control Category</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Access Control</strong></td>
<td>Use role based access control (RBAC) to control access to services. Review the roles on a periodic basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implement the principle of least privilege when granting authorizations to services, applications, and users accessing the management API.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employ access controls to implement principle of least privilege and separation of duties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Move root capabilities to a role and monitor/log/profile its use to support behavioral analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use bastion hosts to enforce control and visibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limit access to data backups through use of roles to know who has access to the data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure different credentials are required to access the agency’s network and the management APIs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Awareness and Training</strong></td>
<td>Include time for training on CSP management tools and services in implementation schedules.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<td>Audit and Accountability</td>
<td>Log all user actions and actively monitor logs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Log all data access and actively monitor logs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Log application programming interface (API) calls and actively monitor the logs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use security information and event management (SIEM) application to monitor and manage the logs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Make use of CSP’s security monitoring capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Set up logging and alerting with CSP for new service provisioning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use CSP’s alerting capability for user actions, data access and API calls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review available security reporting from cloud providers. Configure advanced reporting features such as behavior profiling if available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analyze enterprise firewall logs and proxy logs to identify enterprise access to/from CSPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Check the billing of services to identify what services are being used.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Recommendations Mapped to Security Control Categories (NIST SP 800-53, Rev. 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Control Category</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Assessment and Authorization</td>
<td>Ensure cloud provider performs regular penetration testing and vulnerability analysis of processes, services, and APIs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If using IaaS or PaaS service, determine methods used by CSP to ensure hypervisor is regularly tested for vulnerabilities and updated when vulnerabilities are found.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Configuration Management</td>
<td>Treat the infrastructure as source code and configuration manage it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Configuration manage the access controls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review configuration management tools features and documentation prior to selecting a CSP to ensure management tools are sufficient for IT staff.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Recommendations Mapped to Security Control Categories (NIST SP 800-53, Rev. 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Control Category</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contingency Planning</strong></td>
<td>Review data deletion and recovery process of CSP to ensure it meets agency needs. Ensure IT staff is familiar with the policy once cloud services are deployed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consider recovery of data stored in the cloud when developing Agency business continuity planning (BCP)/disaster recovery planning (DRP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consider impacts of possible vendor lock in on agency business continuity planning (BCP) and disaster recovery planning (DRP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review SLA documents for availability and recovery time objective (RTO) numbers. Ensure they meet agency availability and RTO needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identification and Authentication</strong></td>
<td>Enable multi-factor authentication for cloud user accounts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use a federated IAM approach for cloud and on-premise to minimize the attack surface.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Control Category</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media Protection</td>
<td>Review CSP’s policies and SLAs on data deletion to ensure they have a procedure that effectively deletes data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Encrypt all stored data so that data remnants will be unreadable. (crypto erasure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review CSP’s policies on how data is restored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review CSP’s policies on data replication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review CSP’s policies and procedures on sanitizing disks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use data loss prevention applications to provide technical and policy controls to prevent the exfiltration of data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Make sure to understand your organization’s data architecture, data implementation, data redundancy, data backup, and resilience planning processes to know where your data is located.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Recommendations Mapped to Security Control Categories (NIST SP 800-53, Rev. 4)

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning (continued)</td>
<td>Data portability is of most concern in a SaaS because the content data, schemas, and storage formats are under control of the CSP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When developing cloud native applications, need to consider application lock-in due to making use of CSP’s APIs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agencies need to take into account that reconfiguring and maintaining systems and applications require a considerable amount of expertise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agencies should map existing security policies and procedures to those available from the CSP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identify current assets, capabilities, licenses used and work with cloud experts to assess what would be good fits to transition to the cloud based on best practices.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Control Category</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning (continued)</td>
<td>Check CSP’s ability to interface with other CSPs and use standard data formats prior to selecting a CSP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Investigate CSP’s support for standard interfaces and open APIs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perform risk management on data migrating to the cloud. Implement security controls based on this assessment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review how CSP’s services use and store your data to know where the data will need to be deleted from.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop a checks and balances process which provides protection that reflects and supports the agency’s IT staff size and skill level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The security policy should specify that data, as well as functions, process flow, architecture, configuration, and controls that when assembled represent application processes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Recommendations Mapped to Security Control Categories (NIST SP 800-53, Rev. 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Control Category</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Security</td>
<td>Vetting processes for becoming a CSP administrator may be different than the process used for an agency’s administrator. Need to be aware of the differences and assess their impact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systems and Services Acquisition</td>
<td>Ensure cloud provider agreement does not allow for users outside of the designated IT representative to provision service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review the security practices of the specific CSP in regards to software development and vulnerability testing. Ensure that CSP follows best practices including performing code reviews and regular vulnerability testing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review CSP’s FedRamp Control Implementation Summary (CIS) document for security controls related to the management API.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Check CSP’s ability to interface with other CSPs.</td>
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Recommendations Mapped to Security Control Categories (NIST SP 800-53, Rev. 4)

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<th>Security Control Category</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Systems and Services Acquisition (continued)</td>
<td>Investigated CSP’s support for standard interfaces and open APIs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vetting processes for becoming a CSP administrator may be different than the process used for an agency’s administrator. Need to be aware of the differences and assess their impact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review CSPs supply chain practices. Ensure that suppliers are vetted and held to the same security practices as the CSP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Work with CSPs to understand their SLAs, shared responsibility model, pricing and support structure, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CS&amp;C develop a cloud adoption plan as a best practice and consider providing the plan to the FedRAMP program.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Recommendations Mapped to Security Control Categories (NIST SP 800-53, Rev. 4)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Control Category</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>System and Communications Protection</td>
<td>Block access or set up log alerts for access to cloud services that can be individually provisioned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure services and applications are configured with user level permissions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ask cloud providers how they prevent users from hopping virtual local area networks (VLANs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employ secure key management processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System and Information Integrity</td>
<td>Ensure data is encrypted at rest and in transit.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusions

1. While potential cloud consumers often worry about the security risk of trusting a CSP to perform some security functions, experience has shown that security incidents are more often the result of consumer failing to use the security tools provided.

2. The need to cloud consumers to develop a deep understanding of the services they are buying and to use the security tools provided by the CSP.

3. Like any new technology or approach, using it effectively and securely requires knowledge and practice. Use of well-established, mature CSPs will help reduce risk associated with transitioning application and data to the cloud.
Leading Practices for Cloud Security

In this module, we discussed

• Cloud vulnerability/threat examples
• Four key practices
• Recommendations mapped to security control categories
• Conclusions
Quality Attributes in the Cloud

Architecture of Cloud-based Systems
Quality Attributes in the Cloud

In this module, we will discuss

- How cloud-based architectures promote and inhibit quality attributes
- What are the test and evaluation considerations for several quality attributes
What is a quality attribute?

Quality attributes are properties of work products or goods by which stakeholders judge their quality.

Some examples of quality attributes by which stakeholders judge the quality of software systems are

- performance
- security
- modifiability
- reliability
- usability
- calibrateability
- availability
- throughput
- configurability
- subsetability
- reusability
- scalability
Quality attributes in cloud-based systems

In cloud-based systems, some quality attributes are promoted, some are inhibited, and some are unaffected.

We’ll assess the cloud’s impact on several quality attributes.

These are sweeping generalities:
- With most architecture decisions, the real answer is “it depends”.

Easier in the cloud
Unchanged
Harder in the cloud
Quality Attributes for Discussion

Security – we’ll cover this separately in the next module
Scalability
Performance
Availability
Maintainability/Sustainability
Scalability

What do we mean?

• Add capacity or deliver very high capacity
  - Processing
  - Storage
  - Interactions

Storage scalability is easiest to achieve – essentially built-in

Processing and interaction scalability is relatively easy

• Cloud native autoscaling and load balancing services
• Does require some software architecture support to allow workload to be partitioned
  - Approaches include: Stateless, limited coordination or synchronization, dynamic cluster membership and leader election
Scalability – Test and Evaluation

Primary concern is processing/interactions

What are the scalability mechanisms used by the system?
• What are the triggers to scale up? Scale down?
• Test that scaling works correctly when it should, and doesn’t happen when it shouldn’t (see earlier case study)

What are the scalability limits imposed by cloud service provider?
• AWS has hard limits – see http://docs.aws.amazon.com/general/latest/gr/aws_service_limits.html
• E.g., default is 20 VM reserved instances, 1-20 VM spot instances
• How close is the system to the limits? How does the system handle hitting a limit? Can separate parts of the system combine to hit a limit?
Performance (Separate from Scalability)

What do we mean?

• Throughput – ability to process a quantity incoming events (requests, messages, targets, …)
• Latency – time needed to respond to an event

Easy to deliver and manage very large systems

• Infrastructure as code to create and deploy VM instances
• Very capable instance types available (see https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/instance-types/)
• Cloud native services for coordination and integration of instances
• Cloud native services for high performance architecture models (e.g., MapReduce)
Performance – Test and Evaluation

We’ll cover testing at scale in more detail later.

Challenges:

• Usual performance testing concerns – e.g., defining the workload, defining the background
• Executing the workload at scale
• Generating test data sets at scale (and getting that data into the cloud)
• Observing, collecting results, and verifying results at scale

(Continuous) verification of QoS of cloud provider services

• E.g., benchmark found twin-peak distribution on AWS VM performance – traced to physical hardware was some AMD, some Intel processors*

* D. Bermbach, “Quality of Cloud Services: Expect the Unexpected,” IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 68-72, Jan 2017, doi: 10.1109/MIC.2017.1
Case Study* - Capacity Planning
What does “moderate” really mean?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTANCE TYPE</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>MIN</th>
<th>MAX</th>
<th>AVG</th>
<th>STDDEV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>m3.medium</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AWS measured network I/O (Gbps)

Case Study* - Capacity Planning
What does “high” really mean?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTANCE TYPE</th>
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<th>MIN</th>
<th>MAX</th>
<th>AVG</th>
<th>STDDEV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>4.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>m4.xlarge</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>m4.4xlarge</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AWS measured network I/O (Gbps)

Availability

What do we mean?

• System can detect, isolate, and mask or recover from faults, so that service delivery is uninterrupted

We are calling this “unchanged” for cloud-based systems, with a couple of caveats

• Not considering that Security, e.g., DOS attack, is linked to availability and performance (this concern is better in the cloud)

• Limiting ourselves to provider offerings from FedRAMP High Impact Level, which are generally single cloud regions
What is a cloud region?

Terminology and definition varies somewhat across cloud service providers, but most have this construct

E.g., “An **AWS Region** is a geographical location with a collection of availability zones mapped to physical data centers in that region. Every Region is physically isolated from and independent of every other Region in terms of location, power, water supply, etc…An **Availability Zone** is a logical data center in a Region available for use by any AWS customer. Each zone in a Region has redundant and separate power, networking and connectivity to reduce the likelihood of two zones failing simultaneously. A *common misconception is that a single zone equals a single data center. In fact, each zone is backed by one or more physical data centers, with the largest backed by five.”*

Regions and Availability Zones

AWS GovCloud is (currently) a single region
You must choose a region when launching a VM instance and most cloud native services
  • Choosing an availability zone is usually optional
Elastic Load Balancer – Distribute requests across availability zones *within a region*
Route 53 DNS – use to balance across regions
Building cross-region systems is hard, see e.g., R. Meshenberg, N. Gopalani, and L. Kosewski. *Active-Active for Multi-Regional Resiliency* [Online]. http://techblog.netflix.com/2013/12/active-active-for-multi-regional.html
Availability is about Faults – Faults in the Cloud

Root causes of unplanned outages*:
  • infrastructure or software failures
  • planning mistakes
  • human error
  • external attacks

Cloud infrastructure does fail, e.g.,
  • After AWS physical reboot, Netflix had 22 out of 218 servers fail to restart (D. Harris. Netflix lost 218 database servers during AWS reboot and stayed online [Online]. https://gigaom.com/2014/10/03/netflix-lost-218-database-servers-during-aws-reboot-and-stayed-online/)
  • Christmas Eve 2012 (https://medium.com/netflix-techblog/a-closer-look-at-the-christmas-eve-outage-d7b409a529ee)

Mitigation Approaches*

Monitoring
  • In the cloud, verification is never finished

Geo-distributed Storage and Redundancy
  • Can achieve some geo-distribution within a region
  • Requires careful design and configuration (opening the door to human error)

Disaster Recovery
  • Cross-region failover – not (currently) an option for government cloud deployments

Availability – Test and Evaluation

Certain types of faults cannot be directly induced

• E.g., you can’t pull out a network cable – need to use intrusive tools like *netem* ([https://wiki.linuxfoundation.org/networking/netem](https://wiki.linuxfoundation.org/networking/netem)) to simulate network failures

• Generally, cloud testing relies more on simulated faults – need to assess the quality of the simulation → quality of the evidence

Need for practices and procedures that bridge between cloud provider’s QoS guarantees and evidence that you collect directly

* Intrusive Tools = Install on target system or change configuration
Maintainability/Sustainability

What does it mean?

• Required changes can be made to the software to keep the system secure and operating

We’re calling this worse in the cloud (for the DoD context)

• From a purely technical perspective, some things are better, some worse
• No real experience with long-lived static systems deployed to the cloud
• Test and Evaluation is never finished – this is a big change in mindset, policy, funding, …
Maintainability/Sustainability

Easier:

- Infrastructure as code practices improve the repeatability of deployment
- Virtualization allows development environment to be identical to production environment
- Cloud should impose higher degree of uniformity of deployment configurations (IaaS)
- No infrastructure patching or management concerns at all (PaaS and SaaS)

Harder:

- Cloud provider can change the infrastructure in ways that impact your system but still satisfy QoS guarantees
- Cloud provider offerings evolve over time – issue for cloud native services, PaaS, and SaaS
- Tempo difference between DoD and cloud providers – there is no experience with long-lived static systems deployed to the cloud
Case Study* – Newer may not be better

We have measured the network performance daily with the iperf3 network benchmark tool in EU (Ireland) from November 30th to December 18th.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTANCE TYPE</th>
<th>M3 FAMILY</th>
<th>M4 FAMILY</th>
<th>M5 FAMILY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>medium</td>
<td>0.31 Gbit/s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>large</td>
<td>0.70 Gbit/s</td>
<td>0.47 Gbit/s</td>
<td>10.04 Gbit/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xlarge</td>
<td>1.02 Gbit/s</td>
<td>0.81 Gbit/s</td>
<td>10.04 Gbit/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2xlarge</td>
<td>1.01 Gbit/s</td>
<td>1.01 Gbit/s</td>
<td>10.04 Gbit/s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Andreas Wittig, https://cloudonaut.io/evolution-of-the-ec2-network-performance-m3-m4-m5/
Maintainability/Sustainability – Test and Evaluation

In the cloud, Test and Evaluation is never finished

- Continuous assessment that QoS guarantees are being met
  - Monitoring and trending
  - Within a system and across systems

- Continuous assessment that the delivered infrastructure remains compatible with your systems
  - E.g., Netflix’s Chaos Engineering (more about this later)

- Working with cloud service providers to understand their roadmaps and assess impact on systems in production AND in development
Take-aways

The cloud makes some things better, some things worse.

Some of these impacts are intrinsic to any cloud computing (i.e. performance)

Other impacts are more specific to government and DoD context (i.e. availability, maintainability)
Quality Attributes in the Cloud

In this module, we discussed

• How cloud-based architectures promote and inhibit quality attributes
• What are the test and evaluation considerations for several quality attributes
Distributed Systems Concepts

Architecture of Cloud-based Systems
Distributed Systems Concepts

In this module, we will discuss

• Clouds are distributed software systems
• The “laws of physics” that limit the visibility and capabilities of distributed software systems
• Impact on testing approach
Deutsch’s Fallacies of Distributed Computing

1. The network is reliable.
2. Latency is zero.
3. Bandwidth is infinite.
4. The network is secure.
5. Topology doesn’t change.
6. There is one administrator.
7. Transport cost is zero.
8. The network is homogeneous.

See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallacies_of_distributed_computing
Deutsch’s Fallacies of Distributed Computing

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8. The network is homogeneous.

See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallacies_of_distributed_computing
Communication and Coordination

The “FLP” result


Conclusions (in an asynchronous environment – no timeouts)

- You can’t distinguish a crashed process from a broken network link
- You can’t distinguish a broken link from a really slow link
Communication and Coordination –
Practical Implications

Guaranteed message delivery is impossible
  • Does the system impose timeouts? In one layer? Multiple layers? How long is the timeout?
  • Does the system design assume that messages are never lost?
  • Does the system design assume that messages will arrive in-order?

Exactly-once delivery is tricky but possible
  • What happens if a message is repeated?

Atomic broadcast (think “guaranteed one-to-many”) is impossible without application-level cooperation
  • If a system design claims this feature, it warrants some testing
Replicated State

If we have more than one copy of a data element in our system, we have to be concerned about whether they are consistent.

- Simple state – Who is the current master? What mode are we in?
- Complex state – a distributed database or file system
- Distributed caching to improve performance

The CAP Theorem


Tradeoff among **Consistency, Availability, Partition-tolerance**
CAP

Consistent - All requests will return the same value (note that this is different from the “C” in SQL ACID transactions)

Available – All requests return some value

Partition-tolerant – System continues to operate when there is a network partition between stateful nodes

Possibilities:

• CP – Sacrifice availability – e.g., most SQL implementations
• AP – Sacrifice consistency – e.g., many NoSQL data stores
• CA – Sacrifice partition-tolerance - e.g., single node or single point of failure (SPOF) routing
CAP Implications

Recognize when this tradeoff is relevant – is there replicated state in a distributed software system?

What does the design accommodate? Is that reasonable?

Testing to validate the edge cases is REALLY hard

• Kyle Kingsbury, aka Aphyr, has made a career of this
• [http://jepsen.io](http://jepsen.io) (We’ll talk about this in more detail later)
• Worth studying his approaches and results
Time in Distributed Systems

Operating system-level clock synchronization is not achievable for cloud applications

Cloud Service Providers CAN provide atomic/GPS clock synchronization for some nodes in their data centers
  • E.g., Google’s Spanner distributed database relies on GPS clocks
  • Applications can leverage cloud services that depend on tight time synchronization

Many distributed systems use software “clocks” (i.e. counters) to order events – this is usually good enough
  • Lamport clocks or timestamps
  • Vector clocks
Time Synchronization Implications

Be wary of systems that get time directly from the operating system to order or synchronize events

• E.g., comparing file timestamps across nodes

Log correlation across nodes is difficult without message IDs or similar tactics

A related issue: You can’t set the clock of a cloud server

• Testing cases like leap second handling gets tricky
• Designs that introduce a time abstraction layer to separate application time from OS time are more testable
Distributed Systems Concepts

In this module, we discussed

• Clouds are distributed software systems
• The “laws of physics” that limit the visibility and capabilities of distributed software systems
• Impact on testing approach
Testing at Scale in the Cloud

Architecture of Cloud-based Systems

Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
Testing at Scale in the Cloud

In this module, we will discuss

• Challenges of testing cloud-based software
• Examples of commercial leading practices for cloud testing
You have to test cloud software in the cloud

“… asking to boot a cloud on a dev machine is equivalent to becoming multi-substrate, supporting more than one cloud provider, but one of them is the worst you’ve ever seen”

- Fred Hébert*

* Quoted in https://medium.com/@copyconstruct/testing-microservices-the-sane-way-9bb31d158c16
Definition of Testing

In this section, we take a broad view – *testing* is the collection of evidence about the quality of a system. Encompasses both cyber assurance and operational effectiveness activities. Test activities usually involve making compromises due to constraints on *controllability* and *observability*. 
How does the cloud affect testing practices?

Controllability:
+ Easy to exactly reproduce environment (infrastructure as code)
+ Easy and affordable to scale up workload (requests and data sets)
- Time-consuming to transfer big test sets into the cloud – try to generate in the cloud
- Hard/impossible to break some things for testing (e.g., network, power, …) – need to simulate these
+/- “Automate all the things” – can add complexity

Observability:
+ Easy and affordable to save everything
- Expensive and time-consuming to get big result sets out of the cloud – need to summarize/analyze in the cloud
+ There are cloud-based tools to help summarize and analyze
- Cloud native services are opaque black-boxes – may need to test for longer periods or multiple times to adequately characterize
What have we said already about testing

Infrastructure as code, versioned environments
- For deploying the target system
- For deploying the test and data analysis environment

Cloud-based software is a distributed system
- All the principles of testing distributed systems still apply, even though the control mechanisms may change

Consider unintended side effects during testing (e.g., triggering autoscaling)
- Impacts fidelity
- May impact testing cost

Fault simulation instead of fault creation
- Usually intrusive – impacts fidelity
Common Infrastructure → Reuse Test and Assurance Evidence

Within a particular cloud provider environment (e.g., Amazon EC2), you can reuse some test results and evidence related to cloud native services

• E.g., everyone is using the *same* S3 Simple Storage Service, so results about performance, availability, etc. should be reusable across systems

Validate service configuration instead of runtime behavior
Test Data Sets

It is time-consuming to get big test sets into the cloud, so if you have to upload a data set, plan to do it only once

Avoid uploading:

• Generate and save the data set in the cloud
• Generate the data set on-the-fly (compute resources are cheap)

Strategies to save data sets

• In block storage (e.g., AWS S3), and read into VM instance (slower, cheaper, scalable)
• As snapshot’d read-only volume attached to VM instance file system (faster, more expensive, attach to single VM)
Test clients/workload driver connectivity

Connect Within Cloud

Connect through WAN
Which client configuration should I use?

**Connect Within Cloud**

Use for when real client will be in the same cloud as the system-under-test (duh!)

Use to stress performance

- Scale up clients
- Optimal network capacity

**Connect through WAN**

Use when the real client will access the system-under-test over the WAN (duh!)

Use when it is not feasible to host the test client in the cloud (e.g., hardware-in-the-loop)

Can require careful configuration if the client is in the same cloud

- CSPs try to optimize to keep traffic off the WAN
- Consider putting test clients in another cloud (e.g., test AWS system using Azure clients)
Example of Commercial Testing Practice “Chaos Engineering”

Chaos Engineering is the discipline of experimenting on a distributed system in order to build confidence in the system’s capability to withstand turbulent conditions in production.

- http://principlesofchaos.org

Closed loop – develop, test, refactor…

Originated at Netflix – Chaos Monkey and the Simian Army
- Test in production
- Randomly select and crash servers
- Use robust observability framework to assess impact
Chaos Engineering Principles*

Start by defining ‘steady state’ as some measurable output of a system that indicates normal behavior.

• Note that this depends on having a well-instrumented system-under-test

Hypothesize that this steady state will continue in both the control group and the experimental group.

Introduce variables that reflect real world events like servers that crash, hard drives that malfunction, network connections that are severed, etc.

• In the cloud, we will have to simulate much of this

Try to disprove the hypothesis by looking for a difference in steady state between the control group and the experimental group.

* http://principlesofchaos.org
Example of Commercial Testing Practice “Jepsen”

Jepsen is an effort to improve the safety of distributed databases, queues, consensus systems, etc.

- https://jepsen.io

Focused on properties of distributed storage systems
  • Durability, atomic writes, replica consistency

Applies knowledge of where the edge cases are and how you get there
  • E.g, faulty networks, unsynchronized clocks, and partial failure

Code at https://github.com/jepsen-io/jepsen
  • Control node
  • Clients that generate workload (write and read)
  • “Nemesis” - inject (simulate) faults under control of Control node
  • Checker
Comments on Jepsen

Included as an example

- This is how experts are testing software in the cloud
- Use the cloud to test the cloud - cost-effective elastic capacity to generate scalable workloads
- Open source
- Applies domain knowledge of both
  - cloud (what are the possible faults?) and
  - system-under-test (what are the edge cases?)

We don’t expect that you would ever use the tool directly
And one more time…

We’re never finished saying that testing cloud-based software is never finished

• Cloud services evolve independently of your systems
• Cloud services can evolve silently
• Cloud infrastructure evolves – networks, ingress/egress, performance

Assurance is not a one-time event
Testing at Scale in the Cloud

In this module, we discussed

- Challenges of testing cloud-based software
- Examples of commercial leading practices for cloud testing
Wrap-Up

Architecture of Cloud-based Systems
Perspectives on Cloud-based Systems

There are useful perspectives that can provide insights when considering cloud-based systems

• Cloud as COTS
• Cloud as Common Platform
• Cloud as System of Systems

Adapting existing practices, processes, and knowledge can help us in the cloud
Cloud as COTS

Adopting cloud computing introduces many of the concerns that we are familiar with from COTS

• Supply chain integrity
• Vendor lock-in
• Lack of transparency
• Mismatch between vendor’s evolution direction and system evolution direction
• Mismatch between vendor’s evolution cadence and system evolution cadence
• Need for vendor-specific skills for development and test
Cloud as Common Platform

DoD seems to view this as a benefit of cloud adoption

Common platform concerns:

• Cost/benefit of system-optimized platform vs. common platform
• Establishing and maintaining common baseline across programs
• Sharing knowledge and experience about the platform across programs
• Migration from system-unique to common platform, short-term or long-term use of hybrid deployment
Cloud as System of Systems

Partly inherent in any cloud-based system, but also due to the type of data-intensive systems that we deploy to the cloud (e.g., situational awareness, decision support, business analytics)

Sources evolve independently
User workloads change over time
• New uses
• New mix of operations
Cloud quality of service varies
Cloud as System of Systems

Concerns:

• Definition of system boundary for design and for T&E
• Ongoing monitoring of deployed system – is it operating within its design envelope?
  - Initial T&E of that monitoring
  - Who is responsible for watching the deployed system?
• Coordination of evolution (similar to common platform concern)
Final Take-aways

We covered:

• How cloud computing is different from traditional data center system deployment
  • Virtualization, cloud-native services
• Controllability and observability in the cloud impacts test and evaluation
• Cloud computing improves some system qualities while inhibiting others – this affects test and evaluation
• Cloud-based systems introduce some new cybersecurity risks
Questions and Discussion