A Look Back to the Romans: Fighting a Hybrid Threat and Applying Operational Art

A Monograph

by

MAJ Richard M. Ezell Jr.
US Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
US Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, KS

2019

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)*
23-05-2019	Master's Thesis	JUNE 2018– MAY 2019

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
A Look Back to the Romans: Fighting a Hybrid Threat and Applying Operational Art		
		5b. GRANT NUMBER
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Richard M. Ezell Jr		5d. PROJECT NUMBER
		5e. TASK NUMBER
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301	

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
Advanced Military Studies Program	
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

The US Army faces an array of threats in today's complex and chaotic environment; the most challenging may be a hybrid threat. To effectively address a hybrid threat, the Army must prepare for both LSCO and COIN operations and require commanders to skillfully employ operational art in both. The problem today is that Army doctrine divorces LSCO and COIN operations. This project examines Roman operations during the Jewish and Bar Kokhba revolts. Research focuses on how the Roman Army successfully conducted operations against a hybrid threat. To address this, the monograph answers several questions: did the Roman Army successfully employ elements of operational art to achieve victory during the revolts, how did the Romans employ operation art, and how did the Romans prepare and fight military threats. The monograph determined the Romans achieved success by not differentiating between COIN and LSCO and incorporating aspects of both in the training, planning, and execution.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Jewish Revolt and Bar Kokhba Revolt.

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON MAJ Richard M. Ezell Jr
a. REPORT	**b. ABSTRACT**	**c. THIS PAGE**	(U)		19b. PHONE NUMBER *(include area code)*
(U)	(U)	(U)			913-758-3300

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

Monograph Approval Page

Name of Candidate: MAJ Richard M. Ezell Jr.

Monograph Title: A Look Back to the Romans: Fighting a Hybrid Threat and Applying
Operational Art

Approved by:

_____, Monograph Director
Jacob A. Stoil, PhD

_____, Seminar Leader
David A. Meyer, COL

_____, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Kirk C. Dorr, COL

Accepted this 23rd day of May 2019 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, PhD

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Abstract

A Look Back to the Romans: Fighting a Hybrid Threat and Applying Operational Art by MAJ Richard M. Ezell Jr., US Army, 49 pages.

The US Army faces an array of threats in today's complex and chaotic environment; the most challenging may be a hybrid threat. To effectively address a hybrid threat, the Army must prepare for both LSCO and COIN operations and require commanders to skillfully employ operational art in both. The problem is that Army doctrine divorces LSCO and COIN operations.

This project examines Roman operations during the Jewish and Bar Kokhba revolts. Research focuses on how the Roman Army successfully conducted operations against a hybrid threat. To address this, the monograph answers several questions: did the Roman Army successfully employ elements of operational art to achieve victory during the revolts, how did the Romans employ operation art, and how did the Romans prepare and fight military threats. The monograph determined the Romans achieved success by not differentiating between COIN and LSCO and incorporating aspects of both in the training, planning, and execution.

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Acknowledgments

Acronyms

AD	Anno Domini
ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
AO	Area of Operations
BC	Before Christ
BCE	Before Common Era
CE	Common Era
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CT	Counterterrorism
FM	Field Manual
JP	Joint Publication
LOO	Line of Operation(s)
LSCO	Large-Scale Combat Operations
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
OE	Operational Environment
US	United States
VEOs	Violent Extremist Organizations

Illustrations

Introduction

> You, Roman, be sure to rule the world (these be your arts), to crown peace with justice, to spare the conquered and overcome the proud in war.

> – Virgil, c.20 BCE.

The US Army faces an array of threats in today's complex and chaotic environment; the most challenging may be a hybrid threat. The National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and National Military Strategy (NMS) specifically mention China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran as challenging US interests.[1] All of these countries can act as a hybrid threat. Hybrid threats combine the characteristics of conventional and unconventional warfare to potentially great effect. The 2018 US Army vision and strategy acknowledged the need to prepare for high intensity conflict (Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO)/conventional warfare) and irregular warfare (counterterrorism, counterinsurgency (COIN), advise and assist).[2] To effectively address a hybrid threat, the Army must prepare for both LSCO and COIN operations and require commanders to skillfully employ operational art in both.

The problem is the divorce between LSCO and COIN operations. Separate manuals govern LSCO and COIN. COIN is rarely mentioned in professional military education as LSCO is the focus. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, the capstone, essentially downplays COIN operations as it focuses on LSCO. FM 3-0 considers irregular warfare in chapter eight but fails to address the potential of a COIN fight and how to secure the COIN fight while conducting LSCO. FM 3-0 states, "When consolidating gains, establishing and sustaining security is the unit's first priority. Without security the accomplishment of many stability tasks becomes problematic.

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[1] Donald Trump, *National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 2–3. For more information on United States competitors, see James Mattis, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 2.

[2] Mark Esper and GEN Mark Milley, "The Army Strategy," 2018, 1–2, accessed February 25, 2019, https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/the_army_strategy_2018.pdf.

Security operations will likely involve combat operations against enemy remnants or irregular forces fighting on or from among the local population and in remote areas, as well as criminal elements taking advantage of the lack of civil control forces in a given area."[3]

The Army must stop bifurcating LSCO and COIN, as focusing solely on either will leave the Army unprepared to deal with hybrid threats. This research focuses on how the Roman Army successfully conducted operations during two revolts against adversaries who demonstrated the characteristics of a hybrid threat. This project seeks to determine what if any lessons the contemporary US Army can learn from Roman success. In order to address this, the monograph answers several questions: did the Roman Army successfully employ elements of operational art to achieve victory during the revolts, how did the Romans employ operation art, and how did the Romans prepare and fight military threats. From answering these questions, the monograph determined the Romans achieved success by not differentiating between COIN and LSCO and incorporating aspects of both in the training, planning, and execution.

FM 3-0 augments the Army's capstone doctrine on unified land operations and describes how Army forces, as part of a joint team, shape operational environments, prevent conflict, conduct LSCO, and consolidate gains against a peer threat. FM 3-0 states, "while the US Army must be manned, equipped, and trained to operate across the range of military operations, large-scale ground combat against a peer threat represents the most significant readiness requirement."[4] FM 3-0 focuses the Army on LSCO, however downplaying COIN operations may prove costly.

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1-02, *Terms and Military Symbols*, defines an insurgency as, "the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region." FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies,* state that "a

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[3] US Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 8-3.

[4] US Army, *FM 3-0* (2017)*,* vii, ix.

counterinsurgency can occur as part of a major combat operation, but it often occurs without a major conflict."[5] ADP 1-02 defines a counterinsurgency as, "comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes."[6] Insurgencies, like LSCO, can be intense, destructive, complex, and full of uncertainty.

This project examines Roman operations through a comparison of two cases, the Jewish revolt of 66-73 Common Era (CE) and the Bar Kokhba revolt of 132-136 CE. Both revolts challenged Rome's military and showed characteristics of LSCO and COIN. The Jewish Rebels that fought the Romans were not a peer threat but were adaptive, lethal, and able to sustain a fight against the Romans for some years. The research supporting this monograph is based on both primary and secondary sources such as Josephus's *The Jewish War,* Goodman's *The Clash of Ancient Civilizations,* Dando-Collins *Caesar's Legion: The Epic Saga of Julius Caesar's Elite Tenth Legion and the Armies of Rome*, Ben-Sasson*'s A History of the Jewish People*, and Goldsworthy's *The Roman Army at War: 100BC- AD 200.*

The research was conducted in three phases. The structure of the monograph, which consists of four sections, reflects these phases. The first phase of research included an exploration of the Jewish Revolt; this phase also constitutes the first section of the monograph. The Jewish Revolt was a rebellion against Roman rule in Palestine from 66-73 CE. The revolt resulted in a series of clashes in which groups of Jewish Rebels resisted Roman rule and dislodged the Romans from Palestine. After years of fighting, the Romans captured Jerusalem and destroyed the temple in 70 CE, which ended the bulk of major combat operations. The revolt officially ended with the capture of Masada in 73 CE.[7]

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[5] US Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 1–2.

[6] US Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), 1-24, 1–52.

[7] Stephen Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2010), 354, 356.

This phase of the project relied on the English translated versions of Josephus work, *The Jewish War*. Josephus provided the only recorded eyewitness account to the Jewish Revolt from 66-70 CE and is, therefore, the sole primary source. Josephus is a controversial figure. He is controversial because questions concerning his loyalty to the rebel cause, questions about his surrender to the Romans, and concerns about him switching to the Roman side, and future ties to the Flavian dynasty of Rome. Furthermore, some scholars suggested that he acted as a propagandist for the Romans, further discrediting his eyewitness account. However, Josephus provided valuable insight into the context and operations of the Jewish Revolt.

Other sources provided a holistic understanding of the revolts. Jonathan Roth published a dissertation in 1993 on *The Logistics of the Roman Army in the Jewish War*. The dissertation provided an understanding of Roman military logistics. Stephen Dando-Collins, an Australian-born researcher/editor/author with three decades of experience studying individual Roman Legions of the late Republic and empire, provided valuable insight into operations conducted by the Roman Legions and their basic structure. Adrian Goldsworthy, a British historian, and author who specializes in ancient Roman history provided insight into the Roman Legions structure and operations. Martin Goodman, a British historian, and Professor at Oxford University specializing in Roman history and the history and literature of the Jews in the Roman period Rome and Jerusalem provided valuable information concerning Jewish and Roman relations. This phase culminated in an analysis of the revolt through the lens of operational art to determine the primary elements utilized by the Roman Army in the conduct of operations in the Jewish Revolt.

The second phase of the research explored the Bar Kokhba Revolt. This phase constitutes the second section of the monograph. The Bar Kokhba revolt was a rebellion against Roman rule Palestine from 132–136 CE. The Jewish Rebels drove the Romans out of most of Palestine in 133 CE and established a new government. After years of fighting, the Romans retook Palestine

ending the rebellion in 136 CE.[8] Notable sources for this phase included Learse's *Israel: A History of the Jewish People*, Schäfer's, *The History of the Jews in the Greco-Roman World*, Meyers and Mark Chancey's *Alexander to Constantine: Archaeology of the Land of the Bible*, and Dando-Collins *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*. Similarly, to the first phase, this phase included an analysis of the revolt through the lens of operational art.

In the third section of this monograph, the project compares the two revolts to determine if Roman success rested on their employment of elements of operational art. The monograph will expand on this to identify the essential elements from both revolts that may be useful in educating future Army leaders. Finally, in the concluding section, the project expands on the findings to provide recommendations and broader conclusions to the contemporary Army.

Several key terms appear throughout the monograph. ADP 1-02 defines a hybrid threat as, "the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting threat effects."[9] LSCO occur in the form of major operations and campaigns aimed at defeating an enemy's armed forces and military capabilities in support of national objectives.[10] Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means.[11]

The analytical framework employed by this project has its basis in four elements of operational art, decisive points linked with LOOs, phasing and transitions, and tempo. Army

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[8] Henry Abramson, Who Was Bar Kochba?, YouTube, 2014, accessed October 30, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O3_Q-pYrbTU.

[9] US Army, *ADP 1-02* (2018), 1–49.

[10] US Army, *FM 3-0* (2017), 1–1.

[11] US Army, *ADP 1-02* (2018), 1–71.

Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Operations*, states, "a decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success." The same publication states, "a line of operations is a line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and links the force with its base of operations and objectives. Lines of operations connect a series of decisive points that lead to control of a geographic or force-oriented objective". ADRP 3-0 states, "a phase is a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity." The same document states, "transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel." ADRP 3-0 defines tempo which "is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy. It reflects the rate of military action".[12]

The terms seize, secure, control, defeat, and destroy will appear throughout the monograph. ADP 1-02 defines seize as, "a tactical mission task that involves taking possession of a designated area using overwhelming force." The same document defines secure as, "a tactical mission task that involves preventing a unit, facility, or geographical location from being damaged or destroyed as a result of enemy action." ADP 1-02 defines control as, "a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations." The same doctrine defines defeat as, "the enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight." ADP 1-02 defines destroy as the "enemy force is physically rendered combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted."[13]

This project chooses to apply the term Palestine, instead of Israel throughout its analysis when discussing operations during both revolts. The decision to use this term does not confirm or

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[12] US Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 2–5-2-7.

[13] US Army, *ADP 1-02* (2018), 1-23. 1-29, 1-30, 1-85, 1–86.

deny any claims to the territory described or deny the existence of alternative names present in other languages. The choice in vocabulary is solely to add clarity and uniformity of the information provided in both text and maps.

General Background

Roman Intervention in Palestine and Administration Before Jewish Revolt

Roman military intervention in Palestine started in 63 Before Common Era (BCE) when Syria became a Roman province after two Jewish leaders, Aristobulus and Hyrcanus bid for Roman general Pompey's support in their quest for power in Palestine.[14] Pompey intervened on behalf of Hyrcanus in 63 BCE and marched on Jerusalem. The Romans restored Hyrcanus to the High Priesthood with reduced powers and exiled Aristobulus to Rome.[15]

Roman governors of Syria frequently circumvented Hyrcanus's power during the early half of the first century BCE because of the insurrections led by Aristobulus and his sons.[16] The insurrections resulted from a continuous hostility to Roman influence and were an ongoing problem eventually leading to the first revolt in 66 CE. The rebellions did not stem from events in Palestine alone; rather they reflected the influence of Parthia, a near-peer adversary of Rome. For example, in 40 BCE, Mattathias Antigonus challenged Roman power by attempting to restore the former glory of the Hasmonean dynasty.[17]

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[14] Michael Rodkinson, *The Babylonian Talmud,* 1918, 12, accessed August 29, 2018, https://holybooks-lichtenbergpress.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/Babylonian-Talmud.pdf. For more information on Rome's intervention in Palestine, see Flavius Josephus, *Josephus II: The Jewish War, Books I-III*, trans. H. ST. J. Thackeray (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 61.

[15] Flavius Josephus, *Josephus II: The Jewish War, Books I-III*, trans. H. ST. J. Thackeray (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 61, 71.

[16] Martin Goodman, *Rome and Jerusalem: The Clash of Ancient Civilizations* (New York: Borzoi Books, n.d.), 53.

[17] American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, "Ancient Jewish History: Roman Rule (63 BCE - 313 CE)," Jewish Virtual Library, last modified 2018, accessed December 10, 2018, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/roman-rule-63bce-313ce. The Hasmonean Dynasty was a Jewish dynasty that took power in Palestine after the collapse of the Seleucid kingdom (129 BCE. Under the Hasmonean dynasty, which lasted about 80 years, the kingdom regained boundaries not far short of Solomon's realm, political consolidation under Jewish rule was attained and Jewish life flourished.

Parthia, the rival power to Rome, encouraged Antigonus to march on Jerusalem to claim

the throne of Palestine. Roman forces defeated Antigonus in 37 BCE with the assistance of

Herod.[18] Herod's connections to Hyrcanus and intervention paved the way for his rise to power.

Herod ruled Palestine from 37 BCE to 4 BCE.[19] He placated both the Romans and Jews to further

his legitimacy and maintain stability. For example, Herod placated the Jews by remodeling the

Temple and at the same time placated the Romans by building the Antonia Fortress.[20] His death

in 4 BCE, meant the Romans and Jews lost a critical mediator and led to the decrease in stability

in Palestine.

After the death of his father, Herod, Archelaus took over Palestine in 4 BCE but Antipas

and Philp, Herod's other sons, challenged Archelaus. The Roman Emperor divided Herod's

kingdom among his three sons, which lasted until 6 CE.[21] After 6 CE, Rome placed Palestine

under the administration of a procurator of equestrian rank and the overall control of the governor

of Syria.[22] The Herodian dynasty continued to exercise influence and carry out Roman policy up

until the Jewish Revolt.[23]

The Roman Army

The Roman Army had a widely known track record as a fighting organization. This

record encompassed years of warfare enabling the expansion of the Roman Empire. According to

Josephus, Agrippa acknowledged Roman prowess in his appeal to the Jewish Rebels before the

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[18] Goodman, *Rome and Jerusalem: The Clash of Ancient Civilizations*, 53.

[19] Peter Schäfer, *The History of the Jews in the Greco-Roman World* (New York: Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005), 88–89.

[20] Rufus Learsi, *Israel: A History of the Jewish People* (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1949), 149.

[21] Josephus, *Josephus II: The Jewish War, Books I-III*, 323, 357, 367.

[22] Schäfer, *The History of the Jews in the Greco-Roman World*, 135.

[23] American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, "Ancient Jewish History: Roman Rule (63 BCE - 313 CE)."

outbreak of the Revolt. Part way through his appeal, Agrippa mentioned the Gauls and stated, "they fought for eighty years to save their liberty but because they are overawed by the might of Rome and still more by her destiny, which wins her more victories than do her arms. So Gaul is kept in order by 1,200 soldiers- hardly more men than she has cities!"[24]

The legion was the backbone of the Roman Army. The legion number consisted of roughly 5,248 men. Each legion was composed of ten cohorts of infantry Soldiers, the 1st cohort was larger than the other cohorts with 800 men charged with the protection of the legion's commander and eagle standard, and the other nine cohorts consisted of 480 men.[25] The cohort was primarily a tactical unit.[26]

The Roman cohort system offered flexibility by being able to detach cohorts to form a reserve element for exploiting battlefield success while still retaining the ability to engage in large-scale battle. They could divide it to operate in smaller engagements and irregular warfare. Roman soldiers could fight on different scales because of the carefully nurtured bonds with their fellow soldiers that started with their initial integration in the unit. Through the training and bonding, the legion would form a collective discipline that emphasized separation of the unit from the rest of the world and developed the collective fighting spirit.[27] In contrast to the US Army of today, soldiers of the Roman Legion stayed with the unit for the term of their service (twenty-twenty-five years), unless they were killed or medically discharged.

The Roman Army possessed a cavalry contingent of 120 men and numerous engines for long-range fires and siege purposes. Furthermore, the Romans maintained flexibility by using

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[24] Flavius Josephus, *Josephus: The Jewish War*, trans. G. A. Williamson (New York: Penguin Books, 1981), 151.

[25] Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*, 60.

[26] Adrian Goldsworthy, *The Roman Army at War: 100BC- AD 200* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 15.

[27] Josh Levithan, *Roman Siege Warfare* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2013), 26.

vexillations. Vexillations, equivalent to a task force, were a detachment operating independently; it might consist of a few men to several thousand drawn from several units.[28]

To supplement the legion, the Romans relied upon allied or auxiliary soldiers. The numbers and types of these soldiers depended on the local situation and availability. The auxiliary forces held several roles in serving alongside the Roman Legion. The cavalry made up for the shortage of internal Roman Cavalry and could skirmish and perform shock action. Archers and slingers provided a valuable missile capability. Furthermore, auxiliary troops operated in close order with the infantry, using the traditional sword-fighting techniques.[29] Auxiliary forces made the legion more lethal and versatile.

Once a legion began offensive operations, they emphasized the offensive in all forms of warfare to dominate the enemy's collective willpower and suggested the inevitability of Roman victory. Militarily, the Romans aim was usually to defeat and destroy the enemy army. The strategy to do this was to outflank or penetrate the enemy and destroy the remaining forces in pursuit.[30] The collection of these factors and task organization made the Roman Army a formidable force.

The Jewish People

The Jewish people's history predated the Roman Empire. The Jewish people had deep connections to Palestine. Jewish tradition links the Jews with the land of Palestine dating back around four thousand years to when God told Abraham to leave his homeland and go to a land

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[28] Adrian Goldsworthy, *In the Name of Rome: The Men Who Won the Roman Empire* (London: Orion Publishing Group, 2003), 16, 394. *ADP 1-02*, page 4-25 defines task force as- a temporary grouping of units under one commander formed to carry out a specific operation or mission, or a semi-permanent organization of units under one commander formed to carry out a continuing specified task.

[29] Ibid., 19-20.

[30] Ibid., 114, 227.

that he was going to show him.[31] According to Jewish tradition, the Jewish people conquered the land of Canaan (Palestine) after the exodus from Egypt and wandered the desert for forty years.[32] The First and Second Temple periods frame the remainder of the Jewish occupation of Palestine.

The First Temple period was approximately from 10th Century BCE to 587 BCE. After inhabiting Palestine for some years, the Jewish people had a line of kings under Saul, David, and Solomon starting around 1080 BCE.[33] Solomon constructed the First Temple in 957 CE.[34] The temple was important because it was the center of worship for the Jewish people and became the national identity of Israel. After the death of Solomon in 931 BCE, the kingdom divided into Israel (the northern kingdom) and Judah (southern kingdom).[35]

Israel's enemies exploited the divided kingdom. The Assyrians destroyed the Northern Kingdom in 722 BCE and the Babylonians destroyed Judah and the Temple in 586 BCE.[36] The fall of Israel and Judah resulted in the exile of many Jews from the land. The importance of Temple worship declined during the Babylonian exile. The Temple's destruction gave rise to the synagogue, which sprang up in Babylonia.[37] The synagogue served as an instrument to keep

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[31] Rabbi Yechiel Eckstein, "Ancient Jewish History: The Bible On Jewish Links To The Holy Land," Jewish Virtual Library, last modified 2018, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-bible-on-jewish-links-to-the-holy-land.

[32] Henry Abramson, "Jews and Judaism in the Year Zero (Essential Lectures in Jewish History)," YouTube, 2013, accessed December 20, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O0O4fK0Xwh0&index=3&list=PLdiAQwLyKa8Lnfv7WLEohwn0N2PwtRvQs.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Britannica Academic, "Temple of Jerusalem," n.d., accessed February 3, 2019, https://academic.eb.com/levels/collegiate/article/Temple-of-Jerusalem/43565.

[35] Abramson, "Jews and Judaism in the Year Zero (Essential Lectures in Jewish History)."

[36] Ibid.

[37] Learsi, *Israel: A History of the Jewish People*, 103. Synagogue, in Judaism, a community house of worship that serves as a place not only for liturgical services but also for assembly and study. There is not a common agreement amongst scholars on the exact establishment on the synagogue. The oldest dated evidence of a synagogue is from the 3rd century BCE, but synagogues doubtless have an older history. (Britannica Academic, s.v. "Synagogue," accessed February 7, 2019, https://academic.eb.com/levels/collegiate/article/synagogue/70734).

Jewish tradition and faith alive and continued alternative center of religious practice into the Second Temple period.[38]

The Second Temple period is from 515 BCE- 70 CE. Cyrus II, the ruler of the Persian Empire, allowed exiled Jews to return to Palestine in 538 CE and rebuild the Temple. The Persians and Greeks generally respected the Temple during the 4th–3rd century BCE periods. After the Romans took charge in Palestine, they offended the Jewish populace by desecrating the Temple. First, Pompey entered the Temple's Holy of Holies in 63 BCE. Second, Crassus plundered the Temple treasury in 54 BCE for his invasion of Parthia.[39]

Herod the Great started a Temple rebuilding project in 20 BCE to go beyond the splendor of Solomon's time, which took forty-six years to complete. The Herodian Temple was the focus of religious ritual, the repository of the Holy Scriptures and other national literature and the meeting place of the Sanhedrin, the highest court of Jewish law during the Roman period.[40] While the Temple retained importance, the focus of religious life largely shifted to the synagogue, to Torah study, to the observance of the commandments and charity, and the influence of the High Priesthood and Sanhedrin declined.[41] The Roman destruction of the Temple in 70 CE during the Jewish Revolt, ended Temple worship and paved the way for the dominance of Rabbinic Judaism.[42]

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[38] H. H. Ben-Sasson, *A History of the Jewish People* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 285.

[39] Britannica Academic, "Temple of Jerusalem," n.d., accessed February 3, 2019, https://academic.eb.com/levels/collegiate/article/Temple-of-Jerusalem/43565.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ben-Sasson, *A History of the Jewish People*, 317. The Sanhedrin was the supreme council and tribunal of the Jews during postexilic times headed by a High Priest and having religious, civil, and criminal jurisdiction.

[42] Britannica Academic, "Rabbinic Judaism," 2019, accessed February 6, 2019, https://academic.eb.com/levels/collegiate/article/Rabbinic-Judaism/62345.

Geography

Geography is a key consideration for US Army planners when conducting LSCO and COIN operations. Concerning LSCO, Army planners collect information on climate, terrain, and endemic diseases to understand mission requirements.[43] In COIN operations, Commanders and staffs must understand the nature of an insurgency, which requires understanding the insurgent strategy and dynamics. There are eight dynamics in FM 3-24, and the fourth is the environment and geography.[44]

The Roman Army like the US Army today, accounted for geography when planning and conducting military operations in Palestine. Palestinian geography was diverse and challenged the Romans during operations. Palestine was over 9,650 square km. The Roman campaign took place primarily in two key areas. In the north eastern portion of Palestine (Galilee), it was hilly, fertile, and received plenty of rainfall. The southern area, which consisted of the Judaean desert, Idumaea, and Peraea was dry and stony.[45]

Topographically there are two regions in Galilee with most falling under the province of Judaea and the east region by the Sea of Galilee under Agrippa II's kingdom before the Jewish Revolt. Upper Galilee had relatively poor soil conditions, rocky terrain, and cliffs. Lower Galilee consisted of some mountainous terrain within the central area but had numerous streams for a source of water.[46]

There are two regions of Samaria, Western Samaria and Eastern Samaria. Samaria's land mass around 1,800 square km with a population of 140,000. Western Samaria was mostly flat

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[43] US Army, *FM 3-0* (2017)*, 4–8.

[44] US Army, *FM 3-24* (2014), 4–8.

[45] Jonathan Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army in the Jewish War* (Ann Arbor: Bell and Howell Company, 1993), 39.

[46] Ibid., 68, 72, 73.

except the hilly eastern corner, and it provided a good source of water in all seasons minus the summer. Eastern Samaria consisted of rolling hills and numerous wadis running northwest.[47]

Judaea consisted of mostly small villages except for Jerusalem. Judaea was approximately 9,600 square km with a population of 925,000. Jerusalem and Jericho were the two main cities of importance in Judaea. The population estimates for Jerusalem was 220,000 people. Jerusalem was important for the Jewish people because it was the religious center of Judaism. Jericho hosted a population of roughly 80,000 and was home to two fortresses, Alexandrion and Cypros. Cypros was important because it guarded the east to west route to Jerusalem.[48]

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[47] Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army in the Jewish War*, 79, 83, 84.

[48] Ibid., 84, 89.

Figure 1. Palestine in the 1st Century CE, Map courtesy of American-Israeli Cooperative
Enterprise, "Map of Pre-1948 Palestine: The Land of Israel (1st Century C.E.)," 2019, accessed
January 31, 2019, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/map-of-the-land-of-israel-1st-century-ce

Causes of the Revolt

The Jewish Revolt was not a spontaneous event that erupted overnight but was in the making for years. Three major causes of the revolt were poor Roman governance, cultural tensions between Jews and Romans, and internal class tension amongst the Jews.[49] Poor Roman governance was a point of contention since Roman intervention in 63 BCE. First, Pompey caused a stir when he entered the Temple and walked into the "Holy of Holies" in 63 BCE.[50] Second, during Pilate's governorship from 26-36 CE, he used military force to quell some disturbances that might have been resolved by listening to the complaints of the populace.[51] Third, Palestinian society disintegrated under Felix's rule from 52-60 CE. During his administration, the extremist freedom-fighters increased their activity and became a permanent element of life in Palestine.[52]

By the end of Felix's rule, Roman control in the villages and country towns and on the mountain paths of Palestine collapsed entirely. These conditions continued under the last three procurators-Festus, Albinus and Florus. The extremist freedom-fighters operated unhindered, and Jerusalem was not secure. People of influence hired guards for protection as lawlessness took hold in Jerusalem. Lastly, a fight for political and economic power developed between the party of High Priests and the rank and file of the priestly caste.[53] Overall, poor Roman governance created tension amongst the Roman administration and populace, which was a contributing factor to the revolt.

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[49] Shayna Sheinfeld, "Crises of Leadership in the Post-Destruction Apocalypses 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch" (McGill University, 2015), 51.

[50] Steven Johnson, "The Jewish Revolt, AD 66-73," *Strategy and Tactics*, June 2013, 33.

[51] Goodman, *Rome and Jerusalem: The Clash of Ancient Civilizations*, 385.

[52] Ben-Sasson, *A History of the Jewish People*, 258.

[53] Ibid., 258-260.

Cultural tensions were a point of contention between the Romans and Jews. There were differences in identity, communities, perspectives, lifestyles, and politics. These differences extended to the nature of temporal power, the structure and destination of history, as well as all areas of law, morality, and basic theology. This resulted in fundamentally different conceptions of power. Roman political status derived primarily from wealth, noble age and (above all) military glory. In Jerusalem, what mattered was priestly or royal, learning in the law and occasionally a claim to divine inspiration.[54] The cultural tensions presented are just a snapshot but highlight significant differences between the Romans and Jews, ultimately contributing to a military confrontation.

The Jewish population was sharply divided among a number of mutually opposed sects and factions that made it hard for the Romans to govern. For example, the Sadducees, Pharisees, and Essenes were the three main religious sects that exercised power in Palestine. The Sadducees represented the new priestly oligarchy that developed under Herod and the Roman governors, which had the confidence of the wealthy.[55] The Pharisees were local communal leaders, teachers of young and old, and included many priests that influenced the masses and common townfolk.[56] The Essenes traced their roots back to Hasmonean times and were committed to a communal lifestyle that separated them from the rest of the Jewish populace.[57] Tim Miller, the author of *Roman Revenge* in the Military Heritage Magazine, captures the division amongst the sects. He

[54] Goodman, Rome and Jerusalem: *The Clash of Ancient Civilizations*, 186, 352. Roman society generally assumed that Rome and the empire would be around forever. Jewish society generally held that the world would come to an end at a time of God's choosing. The Romans did not conceive sexual acts as sinful, while the Jews took a firmer stance on sexual acts committed outside of marriage. Romans at large were polytheists and practicing Jews monotheistic.

[55] Ben-Sasson, *A History of the Jewish People*, 271. For more information on the Sadducees, see Goodman, *Rome and Jerusalem: The Clash of Ancient Civilizations*, 343.

[56] Learsi, *Israel: A History of the Jewish People*, 141. For more information on the Pharisees, see Ben-Sasson, *A History of the Jewish People*, 272; Goodman, *Rome and Jerusalem: The Clash of Ancient Civilizations*, 343.

[57] Ben-Sasson, *A History of the Jewish People*, 273. For more information on the Essenes, see Goodman, *Rome and Jerusalem: The Clash of Ancient Civilizations*, 343.

stated, "those in power oppressed the masses, and the masses were eager to destroy the powerful." He further stated, "to the oppressed masses, who supported the more popular fundamentalism of the Pharisees, the great enemies were the Temple elites and the largest landowners, the Sadducees. There was also the ascetic and apocalyptic Essenes, but they lived away from the city and considered Temple life irredeemably corrupt".[58] The divisions within the Jewish populace combined with poor Roman governance and cultural tensions made Palestine a powder keg.

Strategic Context

Roman

Strategic context covers the Roman worldview, policy, strategic aim, political objective and military objective leading up to and during the Jewish Revolt. Virgil's quote in 20 BCE best describes the Roman worldview, "You, Roman, be sure to rule the world (these be your arts), to crown peace with justice, to spare the conquered and overcome the proud in war." The Romans viewed themselves as the sole power in the known world. The closest near-peer threat to the Romans was the Parthians. The Romans did not consider the Parthians as equals, and no Roman emperor ever met a Parthian king in person. Rome believed their influence extended beyond their physical borders and that the Parthians were allies who submitted to Roman authority.[59]

Hew Strachan, a British Military Historian and Professor of International Relations at the University of Saint Andrew defined policy as being a unilateral statement of a governments intent.[60] Roman policy tolerated Jewish customs and Judaism in Palestine. The one exception is

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[58] Tim Miller, "Roman Revenge," *Military Heritage*, July 2018, 34.

[59] Adrian Goldsworthy, *Pax Romana: War, Peace and Conquest in the Roman World* (London: Yale University Press, 2016), 162, 333, 385. Imperium is defined as the power of military command held by magistrates and pro-magistrates during their term of office.

[60] Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 13.

that the priests were required to offer a customary sacrifice to the Jewish God on behalf of the Roman Emperor. The Roman Empire consisted of a multitude of cultures, which led it to embrace an array of cultures and religions. Roman governance understood religious practices were specific to the locality and that individuals were free to subscribe independently to elective cults, provided that those cults not encourage anti-social behavior.[61]

The strategic aim of the Roman Empire was to keep the provincial communities stable, prosperous enough to pay taxes in the long term, at peace with each other and content with imperial rule.[62] Martin Goodman, a British historian and academic states, "Roman concerns were the promotion of the image of the Emperor, preservation of peace in the provinces, extraction of wealth, both for consumption in the city of Rome and for payment of the huge military force required to ensure the power of the emperor."[63]

ADP 1-02 defines an objective as, "the clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed."[64] Research yielded no clear political objective or military objective. It is reasonable to assume the political objective was to reinstate Roman control of Palestine. The assumed military objective was to defeat rebel forces to reinstate Roman control of Palestine.

Joint Doctrine Note 1-7 defines strategy as, "a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and multinational objectives."[65] The Roman strategy was not synchronized until

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[61] Martin Goodman, "Trajan and the Origins of Roman Hostility to the Jews," *Past and Present*, no. 182 (February 2004): 11, 16.

[62] Goldsworthy, *Pax Romana: War, Peace and Conquest in the Roman World*, 259.

[63] Goodman, "Trajan and the Origins of Roman Hostility to the Jews,": 11.

[64] US Army, *ADP 1-02* (2018), 1–70.

[65] Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-18, Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), GL-2.

Vespasian took charge of operations in early 67 CE. Vespasian's strategy was to isolate Jerusalem by seizing other regions of Palestine and then seize Jerusalem after it had been isolated. Jewish

The Jewish strategic context was complicated and fluid with an array of factions and interests. For the purposes of simplicity, there were two parties, the war and peace parties. The war party won out. The war party (Jewish Rebels) consisted of different factions with different objectives, but all wanted to fight against Roman authorities. The unifying political objective was independence and national freedom.[66] The assumed military objective was to defeat Roman forces within Palestine to ensure independence from Rome.

Operations

Once Vespasian took over in early 67 CE, the revolt provided an illustration in the application of operational art elements such as LOOs linked with decisive points, phasing and transitions, and tempo. The Jewish populace lost confidence in the Roman administration's ability to deal satisfactorily with complaints. The revolt started in late spring of 66 CE. Eleazar, a Captain of the Temple, precipitated the first event by persuading his fellow priests to stop offering sacrifices on behalf of the emperor.[67] This act symbolized open rebellion against Roman authority. Subsequently following the cessation of sacrifices, Jewish Rebels seized the Antonia Fortress and Jaffa Gate Fortress.[68] Roman authorities mobilized to re-assert Roman governance.

With a full-fledged rebellion on hand, Gallus led the 12th Legion into Palestine to crush the revolt in 66 CE. Gallus failed to understand the operational environment and took the direct approach towards Jerusalem. He focused solely on LSCO and did not secure the COIN fight to his rear. The 12th Legion engaged in skirmishes along the way the Jerusalem and lost 500 men.

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[66] Goodman, *Rome and Jerusalem: The Clash of Ancient Civilizations*, 8, 14.

[67] Ibid., 403.

[68] Johnson, "The Jewish Revolt, AD 66-73," 37.

Eventually, the Romans made it to Jerusalem and occupied the suburbs and attacked into Jerusalem towards the Temple. Gallus pulled back from besieging Jerusalem after hearing that enemy forces were gathering to his rear. Pulling back proved to be fatal for Roman forces. The Jewish Rebels killed approximately 6,000 men of the 12th Legion near the pass of Beth-Horon, which nearly destroyed the legion.[69] Although temporarily defeated, Rome responded to the setback.

Vespasian took command of the war in 67 CE after the Gallus failed to quell the revolt.[70] Vespasian's objective was to defeat rebel forces to re-establish Roman authority in Palestine. Learning from the setback of Gallus and relying on his previous experience, Vespasian took an indirect approach towards Jerusalem. Furthermore, he planned to seize and secure towns along his approach to Jerusalem consolidating his gains and securing towns against an insurgency.

The 10th Legion marched out of Cvrrhus and headed south to Ptolemais on the Mediterranean coast, just north of Palestine.[71] Vespasian received good news upon the march to Ptolemais. A delegation from Sepphoris, a city inside Galilee, requested a Roman contingent to garrison the town against Jewish Rebels. Vespasian sent Tribune Placidus with 1,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry to secure Sepphoris.[72] Titus, his eldest son, came from Greece and sailed down to Alexandria to gather two cohorts from the 15th Legion. As the 10th Legion arrived at the assembly point in Ptolemais, Titus brought the 15th up the coast from Egypt. Additionally, six cohorts of the 3rd Augusta came up from Caesarea, and the 5th Legion came down from its base

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[69] Steven Johnson, "The Jewish Revolt, AD 66-73," 37.

[70] Goldsworthy, *In the Name of Rome: The Men Who Won the Roman Empire*, 295.

[71] Dando-Collins, *Caesar's Legion: The Epic Saga of Julius Caesar's Elite Tenth Legion and the Armies of Rome*, 223.

[72] Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army in the Jewish War*, 414. A tribune is an officer in the Roman Legion.

in Pontus. Vespasian's army consisted of 60,000 men, including auxiliaries and troops from allied kings in the region by the end of spring in 67 CE.[73]

The first phase of Vespasian's operation was to re-take Galilee. A successful operation would move him closer to Jerusalem, the main rebel stronghold. Additionally, Galilee would give access to a seaport in Caesarea extending his operational reach inland and give him the ability to establish inland supply nodes to prevent the culmination of his forces. The Galilee phase consisted of three sub-phases: reduction of Western Galilee through a series of search and destroy operations and sieges, strike into Eastern Galilee, and mop-up operations.[74] Some members of Vespasian's staff disagreed with the plan and urged him to march on Jerusalem. Vespasian's experience from Germany and Britain led him to stay the course by taking an indirect approach towards Jerusalem. Vespasian believed that the Jewish factions in Jerusalem would exhaust themselves before taking the city, plus there was a possibility that one of the factions could defect to the Romans if he exercised patience.[75] Vespasian moved along his LOO south from Ptolemais in June 67 CE to conduct a full-scale invasion of Galilee, planning to seize towns that did not surrender.[76]

The Jewish Rebel force prepared for the Roman attack into Galilee. The rebels had an army of 60,000 men and fortified sixteen towns to defend against the Romans.[77] Furthermore, the rebel army was disciplined, trained in tactics, and had a supporting military hierarchy.[78]

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[73] Dando-Collins, *Caesar's Legion: The Epic Saga of Julius Caesar's Elite Tenth Legion and the Armies of Rome*, 223.

[74] Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army in the Jewish War*, 419.

[75] Dando-Collins, *Caesar's Legion: The Epic Saga of Julius Caesar's Elite Tenth Legion and the Armies of Rome*, 224.

[76] Goldsworthy, *In the Name of Rome: The Men Who Won the Roman Empire*, 296.

[77] Johnson, "The Jewish Revolt, AD 66-73," 38.

[78] Mireille Hadas-Lebel, *Flavius Josephus: Eyewitness to Rome's First-Century Conquest of Judea*, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), 71.

The first sub-phase reduced Western Galilee through a series of search and destroy operations and sieges. Vespasian focused on seizing and securing terrain, setting conditions for future success, and stabilizing the area to prevent an insurgency. First, Placidus swept the countryside of rebels and unsuccessfully tried to capture Jotapata.[79] Second, the Romans seized Gabara, in southwestern Galilee. Third, Vespasian increased his tempo and advanced towards the decisive point of Jotapata. Seizing Jotapata would give Vespasian a marked advantage over the enemy by taking key terrain and by defeating a large contingent of rebels. Jotapata was geographically challenging because it was built on precipitous cliffs and surrounded on all three sides by deep ravines and fortified with a wall on the main avenue of approach.[80] Vespasian conducted general assaults against the town for the first five days but was unsuccessful. Vespasian transitioned to siege operations after the assaults failed to achieve success.[81] While conducting siege operations, Vespasian conducted two other operations simultaneously. First, he sent Trajan, commander of the 10th Legion to capture Japha, which succeeded.[82] Second, he sent Vettulenus, a legate in the 10th Legion to besiege Mt. Gezarim, which succeeded.[83] Vespasian continued operations against Jotapata and seized it after forty-seven days. Jotapata was a significant loss for the rebels. The battle resulted in 40,000 Jews deaths and Josephus being captured. Afterward, Josephus switched sides to the Romans.[84]

After the fall of Jotapata, Vespasian took up winter quarters for most of his army in the cities of Caesarea and Scythopolis.[85] Vespasian managed his tempo and transitioned to resting the

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[79] Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army in the Jewish War*, 419.

[80] Josephus, *Josephus II: The Jewish War, Books I-III*, 617, 619, 625.

[81] Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army in the Jewish War*, 420.

[82] Josephus, *Josephus II: The Jewish War, Books I-III*, 659.

[83] Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army in the Jewish War*, 422. A Legate is a Roman Army Officer.

[84] Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*, 111.

[85] Josephus Flavius, *Josephus II: The Jewish War, Books I-III*, 691.

bulk of his army after numerous days of combat operations. However, all operations did not cease during winter quarters as Vespasian understood the need to pressure the rebels. Vespasian sent a force to seize Joppa, which was a coastal city used by rebel pirates to attack Roman shipping. Furthermore, Joppa was important because it was a sea line of communication for grain delivery from Egypt to Caesarea. Vespasian's force seized Joppa and secured the city in a matter of days, which prevented its future use by the Jewish Rebels.[86] The Romans controlled Western Galilee after Joppa was seized.

During the second sub-phase, Vespasian's Army moved along the LOO east to strike into Eastern Galilee. Much like the previous phase, Vespasian would seize and secure towns along his LOO. The first objective, Tiberias was seized in a matter of days, but many defenders escaped to Tarichaeae. Roman forces advanced towards the second objective, Tarichaeae, and Titus seized the town with a contingent of cavalry in mid-August of 67 CE.[87] While Roman forces were seizing Tarichaeae, Vespasian built rafts and cleared the Sea of Galilee of rebel forces.[88] Gamla was the third objective, with geographic features that favored the Jewish Rebel defense. Gamla was built on the side of a steep slope on a rugged mountain with deep ravines on two sides and a precipice at the rear. During the initial fighting that lasted for days, the rebels killed approximately 4,000 Romans in intense street fighting. However, the Romans demonstrated resiliency and seized Gamla, killing 9,000 rebels and residents.[89] The final objective in Eastern Galilee was Gischala. Titus led a cavalry force against the town and captured it within days. Titus killed 6,000 people and took 3,000 prisoners.[90] Unfortunately for the Romans, John of Gischala, a

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[86] Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army in the Jewish War*, 424.

[87] Dando-Collins, *Caesar's Legion: The Epic Saga of Julius Caesar's Elite Tenth Legion and the Armies of Rome*, 227.

[88] Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army in the Jewish War*, 426.

[89] Steven Johnson, "The Jewish Revolt, AD 66-73," 39-40.

[90] Dando-Collins, *Caesar's Legion: The Epic Saga of Julius Caesar's Elite Tenth Legion and the Armies of Rome*, 227.

Jewish Rebel Commander, escaped to Jerusalem.[91] After the seizure of Gischala in late 67 CE, the Romans controlled the whole of Galilee.

The third sub-phase was mop-up operations. Again, Vespasian managed his tempo and transitioned to resting his troops in winter quarters until March 68 CE. During this time, Roman forces secured the villages and towns across Galilee consolidating their gains, which prevented their use by the Jewish Rebels.[92] Furthermore, they secured the COIN fight as the remainder of Roman forces moved south towards isolating Jerusalem.

The second phase of Vespasian's operation was to re-take Peraea. On 21 March 68 CE, Vespasian oriented his LOO southeast on Gadara, the capital of Peraea and seized the city.[93] Vespasian, perhaps lacking fodder, sent his main force back to Caesarea. Regardless of the main force heading to Caesarea, Vespasian maintained tempo by sending Placidus to pursue rebels who escaped from Gadara. Placidus killed some rebels and captured 2,200.[94] Placidus continued operations in Peraea and seized numerous towns across Peraea. Afterward, he secured many of the towns, denying their future use to the Jewish Rebels and securing the COIN fight.[95] The Romans controlled Peraea in the spring of 68 CE.

The third phase of Vespasian's operation lacked details, but it was to establish order in Samaria. Vespasian advanced from Caesarea to Antipatis in the spring of 68 CE, which is on the border with Samaria.[96] Vespasian restored order in Antipatis after two days and ravaged the

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[91] Johnson, "The Jewish Revolt, AD 66-73," 40.

[92] Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army in the Jewish War*, 427.

[93] Josephus, *Josephus III: The Jewish War, Books IV-VII*, 121.

[94] Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army in the Jewish War*, 429. Fodder is food, especially dried hay or feed, for cattle and other livestock.

[95] Josephus, *Josephus III: The Jewish War, Books IV-VII*, 129.

[96] Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army in the Jewish War*, 430.

surrounding countryside on the third day.[97] Vespasian controlled Samaria, which prevented its use by the Jewish Rebels and transitioned focus south towards Judaea and Idumaea.

The fourth phase of the operation was to subdue Judaea and Idumaea. Vespasian oriented his LOO south towards Judaea and Idumaea. First, Vespasian moved to Lydda and Jamina and secured those towns. Second, Vespasian moved towards Emmaus, built a large fortification with the 5th Legion in charge to block the coastal approach to Jerusalem.[98] Vespasian then proceeded to Idumaea, seized and secured the towns of Betogabris and Caphartobas, and killed upwards of 10,000 people. After ravaging Idumaea, Vespasian moved towards Samaria and passed through Mabartha and Corea to link up with Trajan, General for the 10th Legion, outside of the abandoned city of Jericho.[99] Vespasian controlled Idumaea and isolated Jerusalem after the fourth phase.

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[97] Josephus, *Josephus III: The Jewish War, Books IV-VII*, 131.

[98] Dando-Collins, *Caesar's Legion: The Epic Saga of Julius Caesar's Elite Tenth Legion and the Armies of Rome*, 229.

[99] Josephus, *Josephus III: The Jewish War, Books IV-VII*, 131, 133.

Figure 2. The First Jewish Revolt, Roman Operations through Palestine 66-68 CE, Map courtesy of Map Archive: "The First Jewish Revolt, 66-68 CE," 2019, accessed February 20, 2019, https://www.themaparchive.com/downloadable/download/link/id/MC42MzY5NTkwMCAxNTUwNzE2Mjk1MTEwOTEzMTExMTE5/.

Before the commencement of the fifth phase, three important events happened. First, Vindex, Governor of Gaul (a Roman Province), rebelled against Roman Emperor Nero. Vindex was defeated and committed suicide in May 68 CE.[100] Second, two three-way struggles happened between the Jewish Rebel factions in Jerusalem. Menahem, Sicarii leader, showed up at the temple and the Zealots killed him. The Sicarii subsequently fled the city. The Zealots invited 20,000 Idumaean soldiers into the city and motivated the Idumaean soldiers to kill upwards of 8,500 people to include the high priest, Ananus. The Idumaean soldiers found out that the Zealots lied to them and 15,000 soldiers left Jerusalem to return home. Next, a three-way struggle involved Eleazar of the Zealots, John Gischala, and Simon Bar Giora for control of the Temple. The struggle resulted in thousands dead and provisions lost.[101] Third, there was another rebellion against Nero by Galba.[102] In June 68 CE, Vespasian learned that Nero committed suicide and Galba was emperor.[103] Otho supplanted Galba in January 69 CE and was immediately challenged by Vitellius for control of the Roman Empire. Vespasian halted the siege on Jerusalem during this period of turmoil but utilized the 15th Legion to seize Hebron and the hills north of Jerusalem. Vitellius defeated Otho's forces in April 69 CE, and he became emperor. Vespasian decided to challenge Vitellius for control of the empire.[104] Vespasian handed operations over to Titus in the winter of 69 CE. Vespasian defeated Vitellius in December 69 CE and became the Roman Emperor.

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[100] Dando-Collins, *Caesar's Legion: The Epic Saga of Julius Caesar's Elite Tenth Legion and the Armies of Rome*, 230.

[101] Steven Johnson, "The Jewish Revolt, AD 66-73," 40.

[102] Dando-Collins, *Caesar's Legion: The Epic Saga of Julius Caesar's Elite Tenth Legion and the Armies of Rome*, 230.

[103] Josephus, *Josephus III: The Jewish War, Books IV-VII*, 147.

[104] Dando-Collins, *Caesar's Legion: The Epic Saga of Julius Caesar's Elite Tenth Legion and the Armies of Rome*, 231.

The fifth phase of the operation was to seize Jerusalem. Titus, the new commander, oriented his LOO towards the decisive point of Jerusalem. Jerusalem was a decisive point because of its historical significance to the Jewish people, it contained the Temple that still represented a religious connection to Judaism, and it contained a sizeable rebel force estimated around 23,400 men. Jerusalem was divided into three parts: the 100-acre upper and lower cities in the south, the 150-acre new city in the north, and the 50-acre Temple Mount in the east. The Temple Mount was like a rock that connected the northern and southern sections of the city and contained a formidable fortress, the Antonia Fortress.[105]

Titus advanced on Jerusalem in April 70 CE with the 12th Legion, 15th Legion, the 3rd Legion, and cohorts from the 18th Legion. Upon arriving in Jerusalem, Titus took a contingent of cavalry close to the wall to conduct a reconnaissance after noticing no defenders along the wall. Suddenly, thousands of rebels poured out the gate towards Titus and his soldiers. Titus along with some of his soldiers managed to escape after intense fighting. The next day, General Lepidus, the 10th Legions new commander, who had not witnessed Titus's near death, put his legion to work building entrenchments on the Mount of Olives without setting appropriate guard measures. The ramparts of the city walls were deceptively empty as the legion dug entrenchments in the afternoon. Suddenly thousands of armed Jewish Rebels swarmed out of the Lower City across the Kidron towards the working legionnaires. Titus witnessed the event and prevented the 10th Legion from being overrun by responding with a contingent of soldiers.[106] Titus learned quickly that the Jewish Rebels would seize the initiative to exploit Roman weaknesses by adopting practices of a hybrid threat. In the meantime, Titus prepared for the upcoming assault on Jerusalem.

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[105] Tim Miller, "Roman Revenge," 37.

[106] Dando-Collins, *Caesar's Legion: The Epic Saga of Julius Caesar's Elite Tenth Legion and the Armies of Rome*, 235.

Titus's plan for Jerusalem was to conduct a massive assault at several different parts of the city to overwhelm the defenders quicker than they could respond. Titus broke down the fifth phase into five sub-phases. The first sub-phase was to break through the third wall. Titus managed the tempo of his forces and prepared for the assault for several weeks. Titus was ready for the assault on 10 May 70 CE. Titus transitioned from preparation to assaulting the third wall. Titus force fought the Jewish Rebels for fifteen days and seized the third wall on 25 May.[107]

Titus moved into the second sub-phase, which was to seize the second wall. Titus maintained the tempo to exploit the success of the previous sub-phase. Titus immediately transitioned to assaulting the 2nd wall. Fighting for the second wall was intense, which the Romans seized on 2 June. After taking the second wall, Titus transitioned from siege operations and destroyed buildings between the two walls and conducted psychological warfare against the inhabitants of Jerusalem. There were three things the Romans did psychologically. First, the Romans dressed in full decorations and received their pay in front of the city. Second, the Romans sent Josephus to reason with the people to surrender or defect to the Romans. Third, the Romans cooked food around the walls so that the starving people inside the city would smell the aroma of the food.[108] Roman psychological warfare was designed to erode the will and morale of the rebels and civilians inside Jerusalem. With the conclusion of the second sub-phase, Titus planned operations against the first wall.

The third sub-phase focused on seizing the Temple Mount. The Romans prepared for days by building siege ramps to assault the Antonia Fortress in July 70 CE. During preparations, Roman forces were constantly under attack from Jewish rebels, which caused the loss of many men and siege equipment. Titus, seeing the setbacks, transitioned his forces towards building a

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[107] Dando-Collins, *Caesar's Legion: The Epic Saga of Julius Caesar's Elite Tenth Legion and the Armies of Rome*, 236.

[108] Ibid., 240-242.

wall of circumvallation.[109] Circumvallation, like modern-day encirclements, would cut the Jewish

Rebels off from outside reinforcements. Titus made the wall building a competition amongst his

legions to expedite its completion. The Romans completed the wall in thirteen days, which was

four and a half miles long and strengthened in intervals with thirteen forts.[110] After completing

the wall, Titus transitioned to rebuilding siege works geared towards seizing the Antonia Fortress

and the upper city. After twenty-one days of preparing siege works, followed by multiple days of

fighting, the Romans were able to get inside the Antonia Fortress and made initial incursions

towards the Temple.[111] Titus understood that he needed to maintain tempo to exploit past success,

and he quickly transitioned into the fourth sub-phase.

The fourth sub-phase focused towards seizing the Temple in August 70 CE. The fight for

the Temple last multiple days and involved intense fighting, which the Romans caught a huge

break. The break came about when the Temple gates and the Temple caught fire, thus distracting

the rebels. The Romans capitalized on the opportunity and seized the Temple on 10 August and

destroyed it.[112] The loss of the Temple was a significant blow to the Jewish Rebels and eroded

their morale.

The fifth sub-phase consisted of occupying the lower city to consolidate gains and

attacking into the upper city. Titus transitioned to preparing siege works and his assault force for

the pending attack into the upper city. The final attack took place on 8 September 70 CE, which

the Romans defeated the remaining Jewish Rebels in the upper city.[113]

After the fall of Jerusalem, the Romans secured Jerusalem and the surrounding

countryside thus consolidating their gains. Major combat operations were over except two rebel-

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[109] Steven Johnson, "The Jewish Revolt, AD 66-73," 44.

[110] Levithan, *Roman Siege Warfare*, 63–65, 161.

[111] Steven Johnson, "The Jewish Revolt, AD 66-73," 44-45.

[112] Ibid., 45.

[113] Ibid., 46.

held fortresses: Machaerus and Masada.[114] Titus left Palestine in 70 CE and turned over control to Colonel Rufus. The 10th Legion remained in Jerusalem to restore order and Rome converted Palestine into an independent province under the administration of a governor of praetorian rank.[115] The Jewish Revolt ended with the capture of Masada in 73 CE.[116] The final statistics of the revolt highlight the intensity of the conflict. After years of fighting an estimated 97,000 prisoners were taken, and 1,100,000 died, not to mention the devastation to the land.[117]

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[114] Ben-Sasson, *A History of the Jewish People*, 303.

[115] Dando-Collins, *Caesar's Legion: The Epic Saga of Julius Caesar's Elite Tenth Legion and the Armies of Rome*, 135. For more information on the change in province status for Palestine, see Peter Schäfer, The History of the Jews in the Greco-Roman World, 135.

[116] Miller, "Roman Revenge," 39.

[117] Josephus, *Josephus: The Jewish War*, 359.

Figure 3. The First Jewish Revolt, Roman Operations through Palestine 69-70 CE, Map courtesy of Map Archive: "The First Jewish Revolt, 69-70 CE," 2019, accessed February 20, 2019, https://www.themaparchive.com/downloadable/download/link/id/MC42Mzg1NTUwMCAxNTUwNzE2Mjk1MTExMDEzMTIxMTIw/.

Analysis

During the revolt, Vespasian and Titus successfully applied elements of operational art to defeat the Jewish Rebels. Vespasian showed the ability to link decisive points along his LOO that worked towards isolating Jerusalem. He controlled the tempo of his operations that enabled him to present multiple dilemmas to the Jewish Rebels. Lastly, he properly phased his operation which allowed him to consolidate gains before the commencement of operations in Jerusalem. Upon taking over, Titus, successfully phased his operations and utilized tempo to transition into the next phase based upon opportunities presented in the operational environment.

Furthermore, both commanders understood that they were facing a hybrid threat capable of using both conventional and unconventional tactics. As Vespasian defeated the conventional Jewish Rebel forces in the cities across Palestine, he never lost sight of the potential counterinsurgency fight to his rear. Thus, he secured towns enabling him to control the various regions of Palestine in his approach towards Jerusalem, which secured the COIN fight.

The Bar Kokhba Revolt

Changes Between Jewish Revolt and Bar Kokhba Revolt

Roman

The Roman Empire made strategic changes in the years following the Jewish Revolt. First, Emperor Vespasian shifted Rome's strategic focus to a mobile strategy of imperial defense to stabilize the empire.[118] Second, the Romans changed the way they administered Palestine. Rome made Palestine a consular province in 120 CE, with a governor of consular rank, and stationed an additional legion in Palestine.[119]

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[118] Edward Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 57.

[119] Schäfer, *The History of the Jews in the Greco-Roman World*, 135, 146.

Jewish

The Palestinian Jewish populace underwent dramatic changes after the conclusion of the Jewish Revolt. First, Roman forces destroyed entire communities, with estimated casualty figures topping one-third of the Jewish population causing severe economic problems.[120] Second, the emperor took land that belonged to the populace and the royal family, and many became tenant farmers, though private ownership occurred in some cases.[121] Third, there was a significant upheaval in Jewish religious life. The Temple cult was the focal point of Jewish religious life for centuries, but it now re-orientated itself without a Temple. The Temple cult was in decline before the Jewish Revolt, but its destruction demanded a new beginning.[122] With a new beginning, the synagogue replaced the Temple and prayer replaced Temple sacrifice.[123]

Causes of the Revolt

Much like the Jewish Revolt, poor Roman governance was a point of contention leading up to the Bar Kokhba Revolt. First, banditry was a problem in Palestine, which the Roman government did not adequately quell.[124] Second, Rufus, the Governor, excessively taxed the population.[125] The banditry and excessive taxes built further animosity towards Roman governance and pushed the populace towards a revolt.

Cultural tension was the second major cause of the revolt. Rabbinic tradition (Genesis Rabbah 64:10) attributed Hadrian's change of heart about rebuilding the Jerusalem Temple as a point of contention. Pseudo-Spartianus, in his Historia Augusta, mentions Hadrian's ban on

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[120] Schäfer, *The History of the Jews in the Greco-Roman World*, 135.

[121] Eric Meyers and Mark Chancey, *Alexander to Constantine: Archaeology of the Land of the Bible*, vol. 3 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 164.

[122] Schäfer, *The History of the Jews in the Greco-Roman World*, 136.

[123] Meyers and Chancey, *Alexander to Constatine: Archaeology of the Land of the Bible*, 3:164.

[124] Abramson, "Who Was Bar Kochba? "

[125] Monroe Rosenthal and Keith Gunderson, *Wars of the Jews: A Military History from Biblical to Modern Times* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1990), 128.

circumcision (Vita Hadr. 14.2) enraged the Jewish community, which contributed to the revolt. Cassius Dio, a Roman historian, in his Roman History (69.12) mentioned Hadrian's plan to re-make Jerusalem as a Roman colony, establishing a pagan temple, and calling it Aelia Capitolina as the precipitating cause.[126] It is reasonable to assume that any one of these causes or a combination of these causes pushed the Jewish populace towards a revolt.

Strategic Context

Roman

Roman strategic aims through the military objective were the same as the Jewish Revolt. When Severus took charge of operations in 133 CE, he provided a coherent and synchronized strategy. Severus's strategy was to isolate Bethar by seizing other regions of Palestine and then to seize Bethar after it had been isolated.

Jewish

The Jewish strategic context was less complex than in the Jewish Revolt. Bar Kokhba was the primary leader of the Jewish Rebels. The political objective was independence and national freedom from Rome.[127] The assumed military objective was to defeat Roman forces within Palestine to ensure independence from Rome.

Operations

The revolt provided an illustration in the application of operational art elements such as LOOs linked with decisive points, phasing and transitions, and tempo once Severus took over in early 133 CE. The Roman governance inflamed the Jewish populace's feelings due to the various affronts, as mentioned in the causes section. Jewish Rebels secretly prepared for war by building fortifications, collecting arms, and committing acts of terrorism. The Jews did not openly revolt

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[126] Meyers and Chancey, *Alexander to Constantine: Archaeology of the Land of the Bible*, 3:167.

[127] Werner Eck, "The Bar Kokhba Revolt: The Roman Point of View," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 89 (1999): 76.

while Emperor Hadrian was near Palestine, as he was from 128-132 CE.[128] Once Hadrian left the region, the Jews openly revolted in the spring of 132 CE.

Bar Kokhba, a messianic and charismatic leader, led the Jewish Rebels against Roman forces. A noticeable difference in this revolt from the Jewish Revolt was the rebel military strategy. During the Jewish Revolt, Josephus noted that the rebels chose a largely passive defense and shut themselves up in the neatly meshed network fortifications that covered the country. The Jewish Rebels learned from defeat in the Jewish Revolt. They adopted flexible deployments and an offensive attitude and refrained from shutting themselves up behind permanent defenses. Additionally, they used extensive cave systems in Palestine to conduct surprise attacks and to cover retreating forces.[129]

The first major battle was on the plain of Rimmon, which the Jewish Rebels won. The rebels transitioned to fortifying Cabul to cut off Roman reinforcements from the north. Next, they destroyed Roman garrisons in the cities of Emmaus and Nablus and destroyed Caesarea.[130] Bar Kokhba continued offensive operations throughout Palestine and eventually controlled the region of Judea and much of Palestine.[131] Tineus Rufus, the Provincial Governor, was unable to defeat the Jewish Rebels and withdrew from Palestine.[132] Although Roman forces in Palestine were defeated, Rome contained forces in the region to respond. Publius Marcellus, Governor of Syria, attempted to quell the revolt and was defeated. To make matters worse, the 22nd Legion from Egypt was destroyed.[133]

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[128] Ben-Sasson, *A History of the Jewish People*, 331.

[129] Mordechai Gichon, "New Insight into the Bar Kokhba War and a Reappraisal of Dio Cassius 69," *The Jewish Quarterly* 77, no. 1 (1986): 20-28.

[130] Rosenthal and Gunderson, *Wars of the Jews: A Military History from Biblical to Modern Times*, 130.

[131] Ben-Sasson, *A History of the Jewish People*, 332.

[132] Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*, 431.

[133] Ben-Sasson, *A History of the Jewish People*, 332.

Hadrian heard about the revolt while visiting Greece and that Parthia was looking to capitalize on the situation. Hadrian dispatched Sextus Julius Severus, current Governor in Britain, against the Jewish Rebels.[134] Emperor Hadrian constrained Severus from using legions in the western-half of the empire; Severus would have to make do with forces in the east. Although constrained, Hadrian gave Severus powers that placed him above provincial governors in the east, which allowed him to bring in units from outside of Palestine.[135] The move gave Severus the ability to build his combat power for upcoming operations.

Severus arrived in Palestine around the summer of 133 CE. The combat strength is unknown concerning the existing two legions in the area before Severus's arrival. However, it is likely that both legions in Palestine, particularly the 10th suffered heavy casualties. Severus granted Roman citizenship to some sailors and marines crewing the ships that brought him to Palestine and transferred them to the ranks of the 10th Legion. Next, he brought in two legions from outside provinces, the 3rd Cyrenaica from Arabia and the 3rd Gallica from Raphanaea. Lastly, Severus used vexillations from other eastern based legions to supplement his force.[136] Severus obtained the combat power needed to conduct operations.

Severus demonstrated an understanding of the operational environment before developing his operational approach towards re-capturing Palestine. Jewish Rebels outnumbered Severus by hundreds of thousands, so he devised a plan to counter their numerical superiority. Severus broke down some of his units into wide-ranging smaller groups with the goal of defeating Jewish Rebels in small groups. Additionally, he employed his cavalry against multiple Jewish outposts. His objective was to deny the enemy shelter by destroying villages and cities.[137]

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[134] Werner Eck, "The Bar Kokhba Revolt: The Roman Point of View," 78.

[135] Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*, 431.

[136] Ibid., 432-434.

[137] Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*, 434-435.

The first phase of Severus's operation was to re-take Galilee, which would move him closer to Bethar, the main rebel stronghold. Galilee would also extend his operational reach and prevent culmination of his forces through the utilization of inland supply nodes, and it would give him access to seaports along the western coast. There are little details on operations in Galilee, but Severus seized towns quickly in the campaign across Galilee and controlled the region, which secured the COIN fight.[138]

The second phase of Severus's operation was to re-take the remainder of Palestine. Severus's Palestinian campaign lasted for two to three years.[139] After fifty battles, Roman forces seized and controlled most of Palestine.[140] By the winter of 134-135 CE, Bethar was the last rebel-held city, which was Bar Kokhba's headquarters. Severus oriented his LOO on the decisive point of Bethar. Bethar was a well-fortified city with deep canyons on three sides and other natural terrain features that supported the rebel defense. Additionally, Bethar contained 200,000 Jews, with an unknown disposition of rebel combatants. After marching on Bethar, Severus transitioned to preparing for siege operations. Severus's force built a 4,000 yard long siege wall with two camps around the city to cut the rebels off from reinforcements. Upon completion of the wall, Severus transitioned to conducting siege operations. The siege lasted some months and Roman forces seized the city around September 135 CE. Furthermore, Bar Kokhba died during the seizure.[141]

After the fall of Bethar, the Romans secured Bethar and the surrounding countryside, thus consolidating their gains. Major combat operations were over beside mop-up operations in the Judean desert.[142] The destruction of the revolt was immense with 985 villages destroyed and

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[138] Ben-Sasson, *A History of the Jewish People*, 333.

[139] Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*, 436.

[140] Learsi, *Israel: A History of the Jewish People*, 192.

[141] Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*, 437.

[142] Ben-Sasson, *A History of the Jewish People*, 333.

580,000 Jewish men killed. After the victory, Hadrian banned Jews from entering Jerusalem and changed the name of the province to Syria Palestina.[143]

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[143] Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*, 436-437.

Figure 4. Bar Kokhba's Revolt, 132-135 CE, Map courtesy of Map Archive: "Bar Kokhba's Revolt, 132-135 CE," 2019, accessed February 20, 2019, https://www.themaparchive.com/downloadable/download/link/id/MC42MzA2NDQwMCAxNTUwNzE2Mjk1MTEwNzEzMDkxMDEx/.

Analysis

During the revolt, Severus successfully applied elements of operational art to defeat the Jewish Rebels. Severus displayed the ability to link decisive points along his LOO, particularly in his advance on Bethar. Severus understood the operational environment, which informed his operational approach towards re-taking Palestine. Additionally, his understanding enabled him to control the tempo of operations by utilizing smaller groups of men to defeat Jewish Rebels, thus denying them the ability to reconsolidate. Lastly, he phased operations which allowed for consolidation of gains in Galilee before operations commencing throughout the rest of Palestine. While consolidating gains, Severus secured the COIN fight by garrisoning towns across Palestine to prevent an insurgency from happening that would inhibit the Roman forces from achieving their desired end state.

Comparison of Revolts

The Jewish and Bar Kokhba Revolts shared several similarities. During both revolts, Roman forces prepared for and defeated a hybrid threat, the Jewish Rebels. Additionally, Vespasian, Titus, and Severus successfully utilized operational art in their approach to operations in Palestine.

Roman force structure and training were the same for both revolts. The number of legions and auxiliaries changed, but the structure of the legion did not change. The modularity of the Roman Legion due to the cohort-based system enabled the Roman Legion to handle a variety of threats. Roman forces trained and prepared for an array of threats by not differentiating between COIN and LSCO; essentially it was all warfare to them. The Romans owed their victory against the Jewish Rebels to their mindset; they did not divorce LSCO and COIN. With the combination of the force structure and training, the Roman Legion was prepared to handle both conventional and unconventional threats.

Vespasian, Titus, and Severus successfully employed operational art during operations in Palestine that contributed to the defeat of the Jewish Rebels. Through operational art, they combined art and science and developed a plan to defeat the Jewish Rebels with their current forces, the Roman Legions augmented with auxiliaries and allies. During both revolts, the commanders employed an indirect approach, instead of going straight after the enemy's source of strength, Jerusalem (Jewish Revolt) and Bethar (Bar Kokhba Revolt). The four primary elements of operational art: LOOs linked with decisive points, phasing and transitions, and tempo approach enhanced the Roman approach. All three commanders fought the COIN fight through LSCO. As they advanced, they engaged in stability operations, leaving elements in seized towns and villages to prevent an insurgency and act in a COIN capacity. Due to the net effect of these actions, the Romans were not only able to defeat the hybrid threat posed by the Jewish Rebels but establish stability in the region as well.

Conclusion

The Jewish and Bar Kokhba Revolts provide two examples of how the Romans addressed a hybrid threat. The Romans prepared for near-peer threats in the conventional realm and guerilla forces in the unconventional realm. This was possible because the Romans did not separate the COIN and LSCO fight, which enabled them to defeat an array of threats. Additionally, not divorcing the COIN and LSCO fights enabled the Romans to better employ operational art in both revolts.

Operational planners can take a page from the playbook of the Romans when planning operations. Regardless of the current environment, operational planners should build plans that account for a COIN fight while planning for LSCO. During LSCO, planners need to ensure plans dedicate resources to the COIN fight. Ignoring COIN operations may prove dangerous and can negatively affect the achievement of the desired end state of the operation. A prime example for operational planners is the 2003 combat operations in Iraq. After the conclusion of major combat operations, US forces wound up fighting a protracted insurgency for multiple years. US forces

failed to secure the COIN fight while consolidating gains in LSCO, which created a vulnerability for a subsequent insurgency and left the US forces ill-prepared when the insurgency emerged.[144]

As the strategic environment changes, the Army must be able to fight and win across the spectrum of conflicts. China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran are currently challenging US interests and will continue to do so in the future. Furthermore, all four countries can act as a hybrid threat. Given the current zeitgeist, the United States Army will be ill-prepared to address a hybrid threat due to the bifurcation COIN and LSCO. The Army will face future operational problems if its primary focus is on LSCO as adversaries can conduct irregular warfare to mitigate US military strengths.

The US Army is not pre-destined for failure and can make a course correction by addressing doctrine and training. Current doctrine, particularly FM 3-0 limits the discussion of COIN and focuses primarily on LSCO. Even though FM 3-0 mentions irregular warfare in chapter 8, the doctrine downplays COIN, which may drive the force towards forgetting the lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, the manual may nudge the Army towards not adequately training for a hybrid threat. The Army needs to revise FM 3-0 to address how forces will secure the COIN fight as part of LSCO.

The Jewish and Bar Kokhba Revolts create a picture of what future US Army forces must consider for training. Hybrid threats may become more prevalent as competitors adapt to defeat US military forces. Balanced training across the full spectrum of combat operations is essential. A pendulum swing to any one side can be dangerous and give adversaries a chance to exploit vulnerabilities within the Army. The Army must revise home-station training and Combat Training Center rotations to account for hybrid threats and not become overly-focused on LSCO. Training the future force for conflicts across the spectrum of operations requires Army soldiers to

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[144] Anthony Joes, *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency* (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 256. For more information on events unfolding in Iraq after the 2003 invasion, see David Ucko, *The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), vii.

be fluent in all manners of warfare. Training and readiness must be the priority and take precedence over competing requirements if the Army is to be successful in the future.

Lieutenant General Lundy, commanding general of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, stated in the September-October 2018 *Military Review* that, "Large-scale ground combat is more likely today than at any point since the end of the Cold War. And the risk of great power conflict will likely persist into the distant future. While the last seventeen years of limited contingency and counterinsurgency operations were necessarily brigade-centric, conflict with peer and near-peer threats requires a continued culture shift as well as the optimization of EABs into highly capable divisions, corps, field armies, and theater armies."[145]

Although there is a focus on LSCO today and in the future, those operations might not come to fruition. Carl von Clausewitz, Prussian General and military theorist stated, "in war, everything is uncertain."[146] Our competitors have the potential to adapt and change by what they observed during operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans. Additionally, it is safe to assume that they are aware of the current paradigm shift towards LSCO within the Army and they are looking for ways to mitigate the strengths of the US military. As the Army prepares for potential conflicts in the future, it is crucial to incorporate the lessons from the Romans to prepare for a potential hybrid threat.

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[145] Michael Lundy, "Meeting the Challenge of Large-Scale Combat Operations Today and Tomorrow," *Military Review*, (September 2018), accessed March 10, 2019, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2018/Lundy-LSCO/.

[146] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans., Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 156.

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