Decisions Based on Experience in the Absence of Doctrine: The Risk with Allied Partners

A Monograph

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2019

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*	**2. REPORT TYPE**	**3. DATES COVERED** *(From - To)*
23-05-2019	MASTER'S THESIS	JUNE 18-MAY 19

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Decisions Based on Experience in the Absence of Doctrine: The Risk with Allied Partners

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)

MAJ Randy S. Desjardin Jr., USA

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
CGSC

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

General Dwight D. Eisenhower commanded one of the largest multinational amphibious operations during World War Two, Operation Overlord. While Eisenhower identified operational risks, there were also unknown risks that came from conducting the operation with allies. General Norman Schwarzkopf faced a similar situation of competing risks for Operation Desert Storm. Schwarzkopf had amassed a coalition of thirty-three allies, and needed to weigh the risk of the alliance against the many dangers of Iraq, including the use of tactical ballistic missiles. To add to Schwarzkopf's challenges, he faced the risk of the alliance dissolving with the threat of Israel's entrance into the war against Iraq.

Commanders must identify and assess risk for all operations. However, during multinational operations, the US Army and joint doctrine are silent in their discussion of how to assess and mitigate risk for operations involving allied partners. Therefore, a commander must identify, assess, and mitigate risk another way when including allies as part of a multinational operation. By examining Operations Overlord and Desert Storm through a methodology of structured focused comparison, this study examined how these two commanders understood coalition risk, and what steps they took to mitigate it. It examined the relationship between education and experiences that shaped their ability to influence the planning of their operations.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Decision-making; Risk, Eisenhower; Schwarzkopf; Operation Overlord; Operation Desert Storm; Operation Desert Shield; Alliances; Experience

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			**17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**	**18. NUMBER OF PAGES**	**19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**
				54	MAJ Randy S. Desjardin Jr.
a. REPORT	**b. ABSTRACT**	**c. THIS PAGE**			**19b. PHONE NUMBER** *(include area code)*
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)		913 758-3302

Monograph Approval Page

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Monograph Title: Decisions Based on Experience in the Absence of Doctrine: The Risk with Allied Partners

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Abstract

Decisions Based on Experience in the Absence of Doctrine: The Risk with Allied Partners, by MAJ Randy S. Desjardin Jr., US Army, 54 Pages.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower commanded one of the largest multinational amphibious operations during World War Two, Operation Overlord. While Eisenhower identified operational risks, there were also unknown risks that came from conducting the operation with allies. General Norman Schwarzkopf, faced a similar situation of competing risks for Operation Desert Storm. Schwarzkopf had amassed a coalition of thirty-three allies, and needed to weigh the risk of the alliance against the many dangers of Iraq, including the use of tactical ballistic missiles. To add to Schwarzkopf's challenges, he faced the risk of the alliance dissolving with the threat of Israel's entrance into the war against Iraq.

Commanders must identify and assess risk for all operations. However, during multinational operations, the US Army and joint doctrine are silent in their discussion of how to assess and mitigate risk for operations involving allied partners. Therefore, a commander must identify, assess, and mitigate risk another way when including allies as part of a multinational operation. By examining Operations Overlord and Desert Storm through a methodology of structured focused comparison, this study examined how these two commanders understood coalition risk, and what steps they took to mitigate it. It examined the relationship between education and experiences that shaped their ability to influence the planning of their operations.

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Acknowledgment

I want to thank Dr. Justin Kidd for providing me with the guidance, direction, and motivation in answering this tough research question. I would also like to thank Colonel Michael Manner for providing the mentorship and the needed tough love leadership to push me throughout the monograph process. Additionally, I would not have been able to complete this monograph without the camaraderie of my peers in Seminar 5 during SAMS. They have made this experience more manageable by providing honest feedback, constructive criticism, and brother-in-arms friendship you can only find in the military. I want to thank my previous thesis advisor at National Defense University, Dr. Spencer Meredith, who taught me how to truly conduct research and professionally write. Last, and most importantly, I would like to sincerely thank my wife Katie and our two sons, Scott and Charlie. Through the years, they have allowed me to seek and accomplish all my professional goals. You have been my cornerstone through this monograph. I can never thank you enough for I could have never gotten where I am today without you. You have my unwavering love.

Acronyms

ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
AR	Army Regulation
ATP	Army Techniques Publication
CENTCOM	Central Command
COA	Course of Action
FM	Field Manual
JP	Joint Publication
MDMP	Military Decision-Making Process
NDM	Natural Decision Making
RDSP	Rapid Decision-Making Process

Introduction

When Operation Overlord began on June 6, 1944, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, gave the "green light" to one of the US military's largest amphibious operations in its history. Other allied countries included in the operation were Canada, Britain, and France. Knowing that failure of the operation risked losing the war, Eisenhower had to weigh the risks of the operation and the alliance. He had to ensure he had reduced the risks enough to accomplish the coalition's objectives for Operation Overlord, and not jeopardize follow-on operations or the war. While Eisenhower identified operational risks, there were also unknown risks that came from conducting the operation with allies as part of a coalition.

When Operation Desert Storm began on January 17, 1991, General Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., Commander-in-Chief of US Central Command (CENTCOM), faced a similar situation of competing risks in the Middle East. Schwarzkopf had amassed a coalition of thirty-three allies from around the world that included many non-Western nations. He needed to weigh the risk of the alliance against the many dangers of Saddam Hussein and his large military, including the use of tactical ballistic missiles. To add to Schwarzkopf's challenges, he faced the risk of the alliance dissolving with the threat of Israel's entrance into the war against Iraq.

Both men faced enemies that were battle tested, and well dug into their defensive positions. Both men faced high casualties, allies with competing political demands, the potential loss of their militaries, and the loss of civilian support if their operations failed. In addressing this risk, both men relied on a mixture of education and experience to overcome an uncertain situation.

The element of risk is one of the significant elements of operational art that commanders assess when making decisions for military operations. Even after known operational risks are identified, assessed, and mitigated as prescribed by doctrine, commanders still face the

uncertainty of unknown risks. These risks include the element of chance on the battlefield, especially when conducting operations with allies. Commanders must rely on their education, training, experiences, and their staff's estimates to examine the cost-benefit of risk versus reward to these uncertainties. In the end, these decisions rest solely with the commander along with the outcome of the operation.

Statement of the Problem

As commanders and their staffs prepare for operations, they must identify and assess risk before completing the planning phase of an operation. This step is an essential part of operational planning, including being a step inside the Army's Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), and the Joint Planning Process. However, during multinational operations, both the US Army and joint doctrine are silent in their discussion of how to assess and mitigate risk for operations involving allied partners.[1] Therefore, a commander must identify, assess, and mitigate risk another way when including allies as part of a multinational operation.

At the tactical level of operations, *Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 5-19, Risk Management*, provides a prescriptive guide on how to conduct risk management.[2] However, this manual is primarily for risk associated with training, exercises, and non-combat operations. As the Army transitions to large-scale combat operations that are expected to include allied and coalition partners, a reexamination of the model is necessary. The current model will always be at high risk due to the expected number of casualties. It severely limits the utility of this model as useful to mitigate hazards and lower the risk level.[3]

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[1] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), V-14; US Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0, The Operation Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 2012), 13-14.

[2] US Department of the Army, *Army Training Publication (ATP) 5-19*, *Risk Management* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 1-3.

[3] US Army, *ATP 5-19* (2014), 1-7; the US military has not conducted a large scale war without having allies since World War One. It is a safe assumption that the US military will continue this trend into the future as wars become more complex and the military downsizes its footprint in countries abroad.

At the strategic level, the *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3105.01, Joint Risk Analysis,* is used. However, this manual's primary purpose is to provide a way for joint commanders to communicate their risk concerns for their operations to higher level decision makers at the Department of Defense. The commanders do this to reduce the risk of impact to US strategic lines of effort.[4] This manual does not inform a commander on how to weigh risk when facing a decision that has a significant impact on allied or coalition partners.

While doctrine does address risk, it provides little guidance on how commanders mitigate or accept a large amount of prudent risk to their operation. It leads to the question; how do commanders address risk inside multinational large-scale combat operations that are inherently extremely high risk in nature? By assessing two historic multinational large-scale combat operations, this study examined how these two commanders understood coalition risk, and what steps they took to mitigate it. It will try to understand the relationship between education and experiences that shaped their ability to influence the planning of their operations. By examining Operation Overlord, and Operation Desert Storm through a methodology of structured focus comparison, this monograph examined how commanders in a multinational large-scale combat operation identified, assessed, and weighed operational risk.

Combined large-scale combat operations, while not new to the US Army has not been a part of current operations since 1991. The main focus has been conducting foreign internal defense, or conducting counter-insurgency type operations. It is essential to examine these topics of risks so when commanders encounter it during their next operation, they can effectively find ways to mitigate this without jeopardizing political and military relationships.

[4] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3105.01, Joint Analysis* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), A-1.

Definition of Terms

While joint publications do not define the term risk alone, the *CJCSM 3105.01, Joint Risk Analysis,* does define it as "the probability and consequence of an event causing harm to something valued."[5] Risk management, defined by *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Operations*, is "the process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits."[6] Risk assessment, defined by the joint staff, is "the identification and assessment of hazards."[7]

Experience can be defined by both the direct and indirect interactions with an environment. Direct interaction with the environment comes from information collected from the five senses while indirect experience comes through acquired information from a second-hand source. They both develop a knowledge or wisdom but the information is processed differently.[8] Experience is important, as both, the US Army and joint operations doctrine are "built on warfighting philosophy and theory derived from experience."[9]

It is important to define three types of operations for this monograph, large-scale combat operations**,** joint operations, and multinational operations. *Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations* describes large-scale combat operations "as intense, lethal, and brutal" and characterized by "complexity, chaos, fear, violence, fatigue and uncertainty."[10] These operations are seen as "the

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[5] Joint Staff, *CJCSM 3105.01* (2016), GL-4.

[6] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), GL-15.

[7] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), 204.

[8] Rebecca W. Hamilton and Debora Viana Thompson, "Is There a Substitute for Direct Experience? Comparing Consumers' Preferences after Direct and Indirect Product Experiences," *Journal of Consumer Research* 34, no. 4 (December 2007): 546, accessed November 3, 2018, http://doi:10.1086/520073.

[9] Joint Staff, *JP 3-0* (2017), I-1.

[10] US Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 3-0*, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 1-2.

greatest challenge for Army forces."[11] Large-scale combat operations will likely be joint operations because their plans will require the assistance of the other Department of Defense services. They are usually part of a campaign that seeks to achieve national objectives while using division sized fighting formations. For joint doctrine, *JP 3-0, Operations*, describes large-scale combat operations as a major operation that is a "series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operations area."[12]

Joint operations, defined by joint doctrine, are "military actions conducted by joint forces and those service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces."[13] Multinational Operations as defined by *JP 3-16, Multinational Operations*, is a "term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance" towards a common military objective.[14] Large-scale combat operations can be joint or multinational operations.

Hypothesis

In order to answer the overall research question of this paper, "How do commanders address risk with multinational large-scale combat operations that are inherently extremely high risk in nature?" this study proposed two hypotheses. The first is when commanders identify risk during multinational large-scale combat operations, they rely on their experiences over doctrine. The second is that commanders will assume more risk with allies because they identify the alliance as essential to the accomplishment of political and military goals.

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[11] US Army, *FM 3-0* (2017), 1-2.

[12] Joint Staff, *JP 3-0* (2017), V-5.

[13] Joint Staff, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 130.

[14] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, Multinational Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), GL-5.

Research Questions

The following research questions guided this study: What operational risks do commanders face when involved with coalition partners? What doctrine was available for the commander in regards to planning operations with coalition partners? What previous experiences did the commander have with fighting with coalition partners? How did the commander weigh the risks, mitigate them, and make decisions involving coalition partners?

Organization of the Study

This monograph consists of six sections. The first provides the background of the study, statement of the problem, the significance of the study, definition of terms, hypothesis, research questions, delimitations, and organization of the study. The literature review provides an examination of risk within operations, doctrine, and a discussion of the MDMP and the joint planning process. The methodology section will describe the structured, focused comparison methodology of the two cases studies of Operation Overlord and Operation Desert Storm in order to analyze the different actors for this study. The fourth section examines the two case studies of Operation Overlord and Operation Desert Storm. The fifth section provides an assessment of the findings and analysis between the two case studies. Last, the sixth section provides a summary of the study, to include conclusions and recommendations for further research.

Literature Review

This section presents a review of the doctrine on risk management, current military decision-making models, and current theories of risks. Risk management doctrine illustrates how risk management has historically been incorporated into operational planning. The decision-making models show how risk assessment and mitigation is incorporated into the planning process but is vague in how to implement it. Last, risk theory reveals how the current theoretical risk models examine the individual, and their experience to make decisions with risk.

Risk Management Doctrine

The US Army's risk management doctrine originates in the Army Aviation branch. After a myriad of aviation accidents in the 1950s, the Army created the US Army Board for Aviation Accident Research.[15] Due to a lack of doctrine, the US Army Board for Aviation Accident Research developed the *Army Regulation (AR) 95-5*, *Aviation Accident Prevent, Investigation, and Reporting*, in 1966. This document introduced the foundation of risk management into doctrine. However, at the time the terms risk and accident were indistinguishable from each other due to a lack of doctrinal defined terminology.[16] In 1979, *AR 385-10, The Army Safety Program* remedied this issue by introducing the doctrinal term of risk as "an expression of probable loss, described in terms of hazard, severity, and mishap probability."[17] The Army began shifting from accepting risk as a byproduct of Army training and operations, to seeing risk as something that could be mitigated and managed. By 1990, *FM 25-01, Battle Focused Training* charged leaders to conduct risk assessments of their training and operations in order to achieve a safer outcome. The current risk management model used by the US Army did not appear in doctrine until *FM 101-5, Staff Organizations and Operations*, published in 1997.[18] It charged the commander to incorporate risk management into the decision-making process, while looking "at two kinds of risk, tactical risk, and accident risk."[19] Risk management received its doctrinal publication in 1998, *FM 100-14, Risk Management,* which is today's *ATP 5-19, Risk Management*.[20]

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[15] Mike Mobbs, "Army Aviation and the Development of Risk Management Doctrine," *Army History*, no. 102 (Winter 2017): 28-29, accessed October 28, 2018, https://www.hsdl.org /?view&did=797901.

[16] Ibid., 29.

[17] US Department of the Army, *Army Regulation (AR) 385-10, The Army Safety Program* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 1-6.

[18] US Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), J1-J3.

[19] Ibid., J-1.

[20] Mobbs, "Army Aviation and the Development of Risk Management Doctrine," 34.

The current doctrine lists four principles of risk management; integrate risk management into all phases of missions and operations; make risk decisions at the appropriate level; accept no unnecessary risk; and apply risk management cyclically and continuously.[21] While the principles describe how a commander is to identify, assess, and develop controls to mitigate as much as risk as possible; doctrine accepts that residual risk will remain. This risk is known as prudent risk. *Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0*, *Mission Command* notes prudent risk as "a deliberate exposure to potential injury or loss when the commander judges the outcome in terms of regarding mission accomplishment as worth the cost." The doctrine seems to contradict itself, as it has shifted from *ATP 5-19, Risk Management's,* "accept no unnecessary risk," to *ADRP 6-0's* "deliberate exposure to potential injury or loss."[22] *Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0* goes further to state that successful commanders use risk assessment and risk management to mitigate risk, and that "experienced commanders balance audacity and imagination with risk and uncertainty."[23]

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, The Operations Process, lists risk management as part of the staff's responsibility to put all risk associated "into their running estimates and provide recommendations for control measures to mitigate risk within their areas of expertise."[24] The Army puts the burden of risk management on the staff, and relies on their experience and training to provide the best advice for the commander to mitigate risk in their operations. The doctrine, *ADRP 5-0*, lists broad options a commander has available to reduce risk when faced with uncertainty during an operation. While this provides little guidance to a commander on how to reduce risk, it does provide context to begin the mitigation of risk. *Army*

[21] US Army, *ATP 5-19* (2014), 1-1.

[22] US Army, *ATP 5-19* (2014), 1-1; US Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, Mission Command* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 2-5.

[23] US Army, *ADRP 6-0* (2011), 2-5.

[24] US Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0*, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1-12.

Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0 then refers the staff to *FM 3-90*, *Offense and Defense*, on risk reduction for further review for tactical operations.[25] Both doctrine manuals provide details on the types of tactical operations and tasks the US Army does doctrinally, and provides some risks associated with each one.

While *JP 3-0, Operations* does not define risk by itself, it does bring up the word eighty-four times within the publication. It incorporates the word *risk management,* and defines it as "the process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits."[26] *Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Planning*, covers risk with two pages on the identification and mitigation of risk. The doctrine notes that commanders and their respected Department of Defense senior leaders should work together to develop a common understanding of risk associated with a situation, decide what risk is acceptable, and then develop controls to mitigate what risk they can.[27] While expressing the conveyance of risk associated with an operation to political leadership is noted, joint doctrine is not descriptive in how to mitigate risk.

Army and Joint Decision-Making Models

The Army has two doctrinal decision-making models used for planning operations; the MDMP, and the rapid decision-making and synchronization process (RDSP). The MDMP is "an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action (COA), and produce an operation plan or order."[28] The seven-step process integrates staff functions, helps provide clarity and understanding for the commander, and guides the force

[25] US Army, ADRP 5-0 (2012), 4-3; US Army, *Field Manual (FM) 3-90* is composed of two actual FMs: US Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 3-90-1, Offense and Defense Volume 1* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), and US Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 3-90-2, Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks Volume 2* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013).

[26] Joint Staff, *JP 3-0* (2017), GL 14.

[27] Ibid., xxi.

[28] US Army, *ADRP 5-0* (2012), 2-11.

through the preparation and execution of an operation.[29] As the staff begins to develop their estimates during mission analysis and COA development, they update any risks they identify during the process, along with recommended controls needed to mitigate the hazards associated with those risks. As a parallel planning process, both commanders and their staffs are looking for risks they can overcome, and the prudent risk they will have to accept.

The RDSP is a model used primarily after initial planning is complete, and the operation is underway. The process is one that commanders and their staffs develop through training and practice. Army doctrine sees effective decision-making during execution of operations as relying "heavily on intuitive decisionmaking by commanders and staffs" to ensure successful execution.[30] The RDSP is a five-step process that seeks "a timely and effective solution within the commander's intent, mission, and the concept of operations."[31] While this process takes places during the execution phase of an operation, it still reminds the staff to avoid exposing units to "unnecessary tactical risk" by ensuring decision making is done within a reasonable time to allow subordinate units to respond.[32]

The seven-step Joint Planning Process is similar to the Army's MDMP process in design. The staff develops their estimates along with identifying risk associated with the operation, while conducting parallel planning with the commander. During step two, mission analysis, the staff completes an aggregated risk assessment to identify military risk that will need to be addressed for the operation.[33] The difference between the two models is the probability of the risk impeding the success of the mission. Joint doctrine explains that commanders "use historical data, intuitive

[29] US Army, *ADRP 5-0* (2012), 2-12.

[30] Ibid., 4-4.

[31] Ibid., 4-6.

[32] Ibid., 4-9.

[33] Joint Staff, *JP 5-0* (2017), V-7.

analysis, and judgment," to determine risk since it is considered "more art than a science."[34] During the COA development phase, planners will identify the risks associated with it.[35]

Expected Utility Model

Daniel Bernoulli argues that a person could not value a risk without measuring the expected utility or potential benefit that they would receive.[36] He believes an individual's risk is both perceived and dependent on their utility for what is at stake to be gained or lost. Bernoulli's ideas are the basis for what is known as the expected utility hypothesis, or the Expected Utility Theory for decisions about risk. Over time, this theory has been debated, modified, and criticized. Bernoulli's ideas were adapted to their modern form in the middle of the 20th century with Neuman and Morgenstern. They apply axioms of preference to show a gradation in scale for preference in utility.[37] This modification of the theory is known as the Maximized Expected Utility Theory. This adaptation argues that a person seeks to maximize gain or utility with the least amount of risk. The model also predicts that a person will take a risk if the probability of the outcome is known.

Maurice Allais criticizes this theory because it does not take into account the human behavior of risk acceptance or risk aversion with certainties.[38] Allais' criticism of the expected utility theory became the Allais Paradox; when data on choice is presented in two different formats, but contain the same information, people's choices are contradictory.[39] Kahneman and

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[34] Joint Staff, *JP 5-0* (2017), V-14.

[35] Ibid., V-22.

[36] Daniel Bernoulli, "Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk," *Econometrica* 22, no. 1 (January 1954): 24-25, accessed October 16, 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1909829.

[37] Paul Weirich, "Expected Utility and Risk," *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 37, no. 4 (December 1986): 420, accessed October, 16 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/687368.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Jason L. Harman and Cleotilde Gonzalez, "Allais from Experience: Choice Consistency, Rare Events, and Common Consequences in Repeated Decisions," *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making* 28, no. 4 (October 2015): 369, accessed October 16, 2018, http://dx.doi:10.1002/bdm.1855.

Tversky also argue against maximizing expected utility because the model does not consider a person who may be risk-averse, or attracted to risk, similar to Allais' argument.[40] However, Kahneman and Traversky further argue that expected utility theory has the assumption that all people are rational, with similar attitudes towards risk when making decisions. Kahneman and Tversky's argument is the basis for their Prospect Theory model.[41]

Prospect Theory Model

Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory Model argues that people frame their decisions regarding gains and losses, and not of their assets. They note that individuals handle gains differently than losses. People are more risk-averse with gains, while losses make people more risk attracted. People who experience losses have a higher tendency to drive towards more risk because of their fear of overall loss. The theory argues that the framing of choices makes a difference in the propensity to risk more or less, and that people will overweigh a choice that has a low probability for a desired outcome.[42] This model develops the explanation for when certain individuals appear attracted to high-risk bets, while others appear risk-averse even when outcomes were favorable.

Natural Decision Making (NDM) Model

Gary Klein argues that experience is what drives people to make better decisions, thus leading to the development of the Natural Decision Making (NDM) Model.[43] Klein bases his findings off research from the Army Research Institute. He argues that different decision skills,

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[40] Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," *Econometrica* 47, no. 2 (March 1979): 264-265, accessed October 16, 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1914185.

[41] Ibid., 270.

[42] Jack S. Levy, "An Introduction to Prospect Theory," *Political Psychology* 13, no. 2 (June 1992): 174-179, accessed October 16, 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3791677?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.

[43] Raanan Lipshitz, Gary Klein, Judith Orasanu, and Eduardo Salas, "Focus Article: Taking Stock of Naturalistic Decision Making," *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making* 14, no. 5 (December 2001): 332, accessed October 18, 2018, https://doi:10.1002/bdm.381.

when taught, build the foundation of experience for individuals to make quicker and better decisions weighing risks. The NDM de-emphasizes the use of rational choice or expected utility, and was designed as a way of "explaining how decisions are made in real-world environments.[44] Klein argues that while many decision-making models are only based off controlled lab experiments, the NDM proves itself outside the lab by people relying on their previous experiences to interact and navigate the complexity of real-world dilemmas.[45]

The users of NDM are experienced decision makers who experience similar situations requiring risky decisions in a short time frame. The model creates a standard for decisions based on experience that is predictable.[46] The model does not allow for extreme variables that a decision maker might encounter in a complex situation. The theory notes that an experienced individual does not always qualify as someone who can make correct decisions with risk. Other factors such as biases, misjudgments, or misinterpretation of information can lead to errors in using the NDM model.[47]

Methodology

This study used primary and secondary sources on the planning and execution of Operation Overlord and Operation Desert Storm to better understand what operational risks commanders assessed, and how they reacted. It examined the decisions Eisenhower and Schwarzkopf made to mitigate risks in their operations; and what prudent risks they accepted in order to achieve their objectives. The study also looked at unknown risks not identified during planning, but which arose once their operations commenced. An assessment of doctrine at the

[44] Rebecca Grossman, Jacueline M. Spencer, and Eduardo Salas, "Enhancing Naturalistic Decision Making and Accelerating Expertise in the Workplace: Training Strategies that Work," in *Judgement and Decision Making at Work*, ed. Scott Highhouse, Reeshad S. Dalal, and Eduardo Salas (New York: Routledge, 2014), 277.

[45] Ibid., 277-278.

[46] Lipshitz et al., 340.

[47] Ibid.

time of the operation was examined to see if it addressed multinational operational risks, and what the commander could do to mitigate it at the time. Last, this study looked at the previous experiences of Eisenhower and Schwarzkopf, to examine if there is any evidence, they based their decisions off their experience if doctrine did not address the risks.

The two cases were chosen because of their complicated relationship with allied partners. Operation Overlord contained only several allied nations, but the number of forces made it the largest military coalition the US military had worked with to this point. Operation Desert Storm contained over thirty nations that included many Middle Eastern nations that the United States had never worked with. Both operations and their commanders had extensive research on them allowing for ample research material.

A structured and focused comparison methodology was used for this study. This methodology allowed for the examination of two multinational large-scale combat operations, with standardized questions aimed at a systematic analytical comparison from both cases to demonstrate a phenomenon. The method allowed for an examination of "the historical and contemporary processes that have produced a sense of shared place, purpose, or identity" of two commanders facing similar situations.[48]

Case Studies

Operation Overlord

Operation Overlord was the amphibious operation during World War Two that landed 156,000 American, British, and Canadian troops onto the beaches at Normandy, France on June

[48] Lesley Barlett and Frances Vavrus, "Comparative Case Studies," *Educacao & Realidade, Porto Alegre* 42, no. 3 (July/September 2017): 907, accessed February 12, 2019, http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/2175-623668636.

6, 1944.[49] By August 30, 1944, over 1.2 million troops had landed in France.[50] The operation was more than just an amphibious operation. The initial stages of the operation included the insertion of airborne forces, and an elaborate deception plan to support the amphibious landing.[51] The operation was even more complex and ambitious because the US military had to coordinate, de-conflict, and synchronize with three allied partners for the operation.

The plan for the cross-channel operation was conceived in early 1942, with both the British and American militaries separately developing their plans before actually coordinating together. The United States and Great Britain differed on when to engage Germany's military forces on the European mainland. Sir Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, considered a cross-channel operation against Germany as the last blow to the German military.[52] The basis for the British plan came from their experience at Dunkirk, and the massive losses they experienced in World War One. The United States wanted to attack Germany as early as the spring of 1943 during Operation Roundup.[53] However, the British thought that 1943 was too early due to the overall strength of Germany in comparison to the inexperienced American military.[54]

The divide about when to attack Germany strained the coalition partners early in the war, and only added to the stress of the commanders planning the operation. Churchill met with President Franklin D. Roosevelt several times in 1942, and both came to the agreement that

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[49] Edward E. Gordon and David Ramsay, *Divided on D-Day: How Conflicts and Rivalries Jeopardized the Allied Victory at Normandy* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2017), 162.

[50] Gordan and Ramsay, *Divided on D-Day*, 101. Operation Overlord officially ended August 30, 1944. The Allies accomplished the objectives of liberating Paris and pushing German forces crossed eastern portion of the Seine River.

[51] Operation Bodyguard and Operation Fortitude were massive deception plans with the intent to mislead the German forces of the wrong location for the Allied forces landing site.

[52] Maurice Matloff, "Wilmot Revisited: Myth and Reality in Anglo-American Strategy for the Second Front," in *D-Day 1944,* ed. Theodore A. Wilson (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 5.

[53] Ibid., 6.

[54] The American military, at this point in the war, was inexperienced at large-scale combat operations. American land forces in World War Two did not see large-scale combat operations until August 1942 at Guadalcanal and North Africa in November 1942.

Operation Torch, the military campaign in the North African theater should be first. Before conducting a cross-channel operation, the allies would follow the North African campaign with the Italian campaign of Operations Husky and Avalanche, in order to further weaken German forces.[55] After the 1943 Trident Conference in Washington, DC, the US Army agreed to the 1944 cross-channel invasion date with their allies.[56]

Operation Overlord commenced on the night of June 5, 1944. The operation began with an airdrop of three airborne divisions ahead of the amphibious assault. They were tasked with capturing key terrain, and securing the flanks of the landing sites from enemy reinforcements. The amphibious assault commenced on the morning of June 6, with six divisions landing at five key beach landing sites.[57] Once the beach front was secured, the follow-on plan was for US forces to secure the Western peninsula, and the port city of Cherbourg. The British's essential tasks were to secure the Eastern flank, and capture the city of Caen.[58] Once the British, Canadian, and American forces established a Northern front, they planned to push to the Seine River and liberate Paris from German forces. The operation met its objective of securing Paris on the eighty-fifth day. While the operation did accomplish its objectives, it did have its challenges.

Question One: What operational risks did the commander face that involved coalition partners?

Before Eisenhower was appointed Commander of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, he faced friction over the issue of when to conduct the initial invasion into France. As the Chief of the War Plans Division for the Army General Staff, Eisenhower

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[55] Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-1944* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1959), 11-13, 23.

[56] Ibid., 130-131.

[57] Victor Brooks, *The Normandy Campaign: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris* (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2002), 57. The Americans had two beaches (code named UTAH and OMAHA) with two airborne divisions assisting. The British had two beaches (code named GOLD and SWORD) with one airborne division supporting the landing. The last beach (code named JUNO) was charged to the Canadians to secure.

[58] Ibid., 58.

developed three plans for the cross-channel invasion in February 1942. During his planning, Eisenhower realized that the allies needed to conduct a cross-channel operation soon to keep their Russian ally in the war. His initial plan consisted of a build-up phase called Operation Bolero, that would move US forces to the British Isles. Then, the allies would conduct an invasion into France as early as April 1943, called Operation Roundup, in order to keep the Russians from being defeated. The plans also contained a contingency for a small-invasion of Southern France in the fall of 1942 called Operation Sledgehammer.[59] While Eisenhower recognized that the timing was too early, he argued that "we should not forget the prize we seek is to keep 8,000,000 Russians in the war."[60] He stressed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that "Every obstacle must be overcome, every inconvenience suffered and every risk run to ensure that our blow is decisive. We cannot afford to fail."[61]

However, the British wanted to invade North Africa first to build experience in the American military, and give them time to build a military force capable of fighting the Germans. The British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Brooke, called Eisenhower's proposal for an April 1943 invasion, "castles in the air," and General George C. Marshall "a strategic fool" for supporting his proposal.[62] Marshall and Eisenhower appealled to President Roosevelt, who dismissed their argument and ordered them to find a compromise with the British military.[63] While Eisenhower did not have the authority to determine the general time frame of the attack, he

[59] Craig L. Symonds, *Neptune: The Allied Invasion of Europe and the D-Day Landings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 52.

[60] Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Soldier and President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 76.

[61] Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 124. During World War Two, each nation had its own Chief of Staff (CoS) for their respected military forces and then the allies created a Combined Chief of Staff comprising of members from each of the allies' CoS. While the Combined Chief of Staff was designed to centralize all decisions about the plans of the war, in reality Eisenhower answered to the demands from all of them.

[62] Mark A. Stoler, "Dwight D. Eisenhower: Architect of Victory," in *D-Day 1944,* ed. Theodore A. Wilson (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 307.

[63] Ibid., 309.

had to negotiate with the political leadership of both the United States and Great Britain on his recommendations for the cross-channel operation.

The risk of conducting the operation too early posed significant risks to the force, along with the equipment and supplies that would need to be built-up before conducting a large-scale amphibious operation. The continued internal strife of when to conduct combat operations within the European theater threatened the alliance. At one point during the negotiations, the US military proposed a shift to the Pacific theater if their British partners did not agree to a 1942 cross-channel operation.[64]

Another problem Eisenhower faced with Operation Overlord and the allies was the command structure of the combined forces. His struggle over resources within the theater highlighted this, mainly the control over strategic bombers. For the support of Operation Overlord, Eisenhower learned the strategic bomber forces did not fall under his command. Air Marshall Harris of the Royal British Air Force Bomber Command, and General Spaatz of the US Strategic Air Forces in Europe retained control. Their main objectives were German strategic assets including military, economic, or industrial targets in order to pressure the civilian population to demand surrender.[65] They refused to assist with tactical objectives, or to support land component forces. The allied bomber commands continued to argue they were best used for strategic, not tactical targets.[66]

Another problem to overcome with the alliance was how to balance headquarters' roles and responsibilities, as well as the chain of command for the forces. Although the British had more experience in fighting the war, they agreed to appoint Eisenhower as the overall commander of their forces. Washington and London's political leadership's agreement for Eisenhower's

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[64] Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941-1942* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History), 218-219.

[65] Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 126-127.

[66] Gordan and Ramsay, *Divided on D-Day*, 200.

appointment came with the condition that the land, maritime, and air commands would be British flag officers. With Eisenhower surrounded by British commanders, the information he received from his staff and commanders shaped his decisions towards the British's favor.[67] Both militaries believed in different strategies for defeating Germany, and Eisenhower had to find a balance, and ensure that both political leaders agreed to any COA. American doctrine held that higher commands provided objectives and tentative timetables, while subordinate commands conducted the detailed planning to accomplish their objectives. The British, on the other hand, would provide detailed planning for their subordinate commands, and ensured they secured agreement throughout the chain of command.[68] Eisenhower needed a staff that understood this balance of the doctrines for Operation Overlord.

The most considerable challenge Eisenhower faced with the allies was with one British officer in particular; Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery. Even before his appointment as the overall Commander of Operation Overlord, Eisenhower had run afoul of Montgomery in North Africa and Italy. After the landing of the invasion forces, Montgomery became a thorn in Eisenhower's side. Before the June 6 operation, Montgomery promised Eisenhower he would seize Caen within a day of the landing, as it was essential to consolidate the forces on the beach, in order to allow the armor units to advance east towards the Seine River.[69] By the end of June, Montgomery still had not seized the town. When Eisenhower approached Montgomery on why he had not progressed, he replied that he never promised to take Caen, but was to hold the left of the beach while General Bradley broke out on his right.[70] Montgomery never admitted that when his offensive plan failed to capture Caen within a day of landing, he changed it to a plan of attrition.[71]

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[67] Gordan and Ramsay, *Divided on D-Day*, 52.

[68] Ibid., 41.

[69] Ibid., 87.

[70] Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 145-146.

[71] Gordan and Ramsay, *Divided on D-Day*, 203.

The decision on how to approach Montgomery was delicate because of the political power and support he had. Montgomery was popular with British troops, the British public, and Field Marshall Brooke.

Question Two: What previous combat experiences did the commander have with coalition partners?

Eisenhower lacked the field command experience that many of his peers, such as General Patton or Bradley had. Eisenhower had served in a variety of staff positions before being selected as the Supreme Allied Commander. The staff positions exposed him to the inner circle of general officers who had gained experience in World War One, the Spanish-American War, and other contingency operations. Eisenhower had served under General Fox Conner, General John J. Pershing, General Douglas MacArthur, and Marshall. These experiences allowed him to learn the challenges of military art and leadership.

Conner had a significant impact on Eisenhower's career, and his leadership education. Eisenhower saw his time with Conner as a "sort of graduate school in military affairs" that taught him not just leadership as a discipline, but the "psychology, understanding the motivations that make a common man fight."[72] Conner discussed his experiences with allies during World War One, and how they created additional risk in the war because of the in-fighting between the allies, and their individual political goals.[73] These lessons would surface during Eisenhower's time as Supreme Allied Commander.

From Pershing, MacArthur, and Marshall, Eisenhower learned other valuable lessons. While serving with Pershing, Eisenhower toured Europe as he wrote *A Guide to the American Battlefields in Europe,* as part of a project Pershing headed for the American Battle Monuments Commission. During this time, Eisenhower visited and studied battlefields the American

[72] Matthew F. Holland, *Eisenhower between the Wars: The Making of a General and Statesman* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 102-103.

[73] Ibid., 103.

Expeditionary Force had fought on during World War One. This experience allowed him to gain knowledge that assisted him during the invasion of France in 1944.[74] Under MacArthur, Eisenhower learned the general's management style for his staff, and how to work effectively with allies. At the time, MacArthur was the Field Marshal for the Philippine Army. MacArthur had a way of inspiring his men to work hard for him, and instilled a sense of loyalty in them. While Eisenhower worked for MacArthur, he learned patience through MacArthur's impatience, and his inability to take criticism.[75] Last, Eisenhower worked as the plans officer for Marshall, right up to the United States entry into World War Two. This allowed him insight into how politics in Washington DC worked.

After being appointed the Supreme Allied Commander for Operation Torch, Eisenhower experienced a lot of the same issues that would beset him through Operation Overlord. He also learned from the mistakes he made from decisions to address those issues. The mistakes made during Operation Torch left an impression on his ability to make decisions for Operation Overlord, and saw the campaign as a learning experience. Eisenhower experienced issues with command structure, interference with allies' leadership, and command discipline issues with Montgomery. Eisenhower learned quickly that the allies had agreed to appoint him as Supreme Allied Commander so they could outflank him in authority. The British maneuvered to place their generals in charge of the sea, air, and land forces with the intent of making him irrelevant to the conduct of the war. Brooke wrote in his diary:

> We were pushing Eisenhower up to the stratosphere and rarified atmosphere of a supreme commander, where he would be free to devote his time to the political and inter-allied problems, whilst we inserted under him our own commanders to deal with the military situations and to restore the necessary drive and coordination which had been so seriously lacking late.[76]

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[74] Holland, *Eisenhower between the Wars*, 105.

[75] Ibid., 111.

[76] Rick Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa 1942-1943* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002), 328.

Eisenhower took the lessons learned from the British ploy to control the operations of the campaign, and pushed forward, ensuring American troops shared the responsibility of the operations. The Americans fought the North African campaign in order to gain experience as both the British and Eisenhower wanted. He learned some hard lessons at the battle of Kasserine Pass in Tunisia. His American army commander, General Fredendall, disobeyed Eisenhower's orders to attack the German flank, resulting in the loss of over 5,000 casualties, hundreds of tanks, and other equipment. Eisenhower fired the commander along with several other subordinate commanders and staff officers. After Kasserine Pass, Eisenhower made the decision, against British wishes, to put American forces on the front lines throughout the rest of the African campaign to continue to build experience for the troops.[77]

Eisenhower feared the allies were pursuing their own agendas, and would fracture the alliance's unity while they pursued the German army.[78] On one occasion, Eisenhower witnessed the interaction between French General Charles De Gaulle, and British Prime Minister Churchill during the Casablanca conference. The two argued over the future of North Africa, which showed Eisenhower that the higher powers had ulterior motives other than to vanquish Germany.[79] Another example of allied leadership interference occurred after the landings in Algeria. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force combined staff made a recommendation, based on the influence of Churchill, that Eisenhower expand his operations in the Mediterranean, and capture Sardinia. Eisenhower rebuffed this idea because he wanted to concentrate his forces on the North African Campaign before moving to another campaign.[80] Eisenhower wrote that "'everyone pursues their own selfish or political concerns and fails to understand what in not

[77] Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 95-96.

[78] Ira Chernus, *General Eisenhower: Ideology and Discourse* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2002), 33.

[79] Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn*, 292-293.

[80] Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 86-87.

being done to win the war.'"[81] Learning these lessons taught Eisenhower that he had to take into account the political aim of each ally, while making decisions on the best COA.

When it came to Montgomery, Eisenhower understood that he would be a source of trouble in the future. Montgomery did not have a high regard for US forces, especially after the debacle at Kasserine Pass. After US forces delayed their expected timeline to capture Tunisia, Montgomery called the American effort "'a complete dog's breakfast . . . IKE knows nothing whatever about how to make war or to fight battles; he should be kept right away from all that business if we want to win this war.'"[82] While Eisenhower was angry at Montgomery's caustic remarks, he continued to work on protecting the British and American relationship. He would even punish American officers if they exhibited disrespect towards the allies.[83]

Question Three: What doctrine was available for the commander in regard to fighting with coalition partners?

The US military experienced its first coalition warfare during World War One. At the time, the US military was hesitant to fight with another country's military. The idea stemmed from the country's desire to remain isolated from the world's problems, and had no desire to join another country's war. This mentality resulted in the US military neglecting the development of any coalition warfare doctrine. The services also disregarded developing joint doctrine at the time. It would be another forty plus years before the US military established its first joint doctrine publication. The US Navy and US Army did not work in unison before World War Two, as they both saw that joint operations required one service to subordinate themselves to the other. Instead,

[81] Chernus, *General Eisenhower*, 31.

[82] Thomas A. Hughes, *Overlord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 86.

[83] Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 76.

commanders sought cooperation with each other, which required compromise, and compromise distorted a commander's vision for an operation.[84]

Before the start of World War Two, US Army doctrine began hinting at the importance of joint service, mostly regarding the Army Air Corps. The *Tentative Field Service Regulations FM 100-5, Operations,* noted that combined arms from all services would be needed to contribute to success in war.[85] Later, the 1944 *Field Service Regulations FM 100-5, Operations*, incorporated lessons learned during the war. These lessons included joint service warfare in North Africa, Italy, and the islands of the Pacific. Unfortunately, the manual was not released until eight days after the commencement of Operation Overlord.[86] The US Army would not include coalition warfare or combined operations until the 1962 *Field Service Regulations FM 100-5, Operations*.[87]

Nonetheless, the British military did have experience and doctrine that addressed working with allies. Since the British were a colonial country, their allies were typically militaries that were recruited, trained, and in many cases led by British officers.[88] Since the primary use of the British military was to maintain colonies, the US largely disregarded British doctrine.

Question Four: How did the commander weigh the risks, mitigate them, and make decisions involving the coalition partners?

While initially, Eisenhower saw that a cross-channel invasion was needed for Russia because "the retention of Russia in the war as an active participant is vital to an Allied victory," he would later realize that an earlier offensive would have been devastating, setting the war back

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[84] Adrian R. Lewis, *Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 59.

[85] Walter E. Kretchik, *U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 145.

[86] Ibid., 151-156.

[87] Ibid., 182.

[88] Lewis, *Omaha Beach*, 35.

a few more years.[89] Eisenhower had helped negotiate a compromise between the US and UK military leaders for a landing in France, and for pushing the Normandy landings in order to satisfy both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, into 1944. Eisenhower recognized after the war that any attack prior to 1944 would have been a disaster given the knowledge he later learned.[90]

The British Chiefs of Staff proposed that the Combined Chief of Staff should dictate the structure of the tactical air forces for Operation Overlord.[91] This proposal angered Eisenhower to the point that he threatened to resign if he could not get their support, which was enough to persuade Churchill to throw his support behind Eisenhower.[92] There is conflicting evidence of whether Churchill indeed supported Eisenhower on the issue.[93] Eisenhower knew that if he did not have full control over the bombers during the operation, he risked higher causalities, and the risk of losing the bridgehead. This example showed where British political leadership's meddling with the control of the force by the commander created more substantial risks than necessary. However, right after D-Day, Eisenhower had to reallocate the bombers he had because Germany started to launch V-1 and V-2 rockets at England. Churchill and his military chief of staff demanded the strategic bombers go after the launch sites of the V-2 rockets in Operation Crossbow.[94] The reason for Operation Crossbow was more for political and moral reasons than military.

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[89] Dwight D. Eisenhower to Henry Lewis Stimson, memorandum, April 12, 1942, in Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years I,* ed. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1970), 241-244.

[90] Stoler, "Dwight D. Eisenhower," 309.

[91] Dwight D. Eisenhower to George Catlett Marshall, memorandum, December 31, 1944, in Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years III,* ed. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1970), 1648-1649.

[92] Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 126-127.

[93] Dwight D. Eisenhower to Henry Harley Arnold, memorandum, January 23, 1944, in Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years III,* ed. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1970), 1677.

[94] Dwight D. Eisenhower to Arthur William Tedder, memorandum, June 18, 1944, in Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years III,* ed. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1970), 1933.

When President Roosevelt selected Eisenhower as the Supreme Commander for Operation Overlord, Eisenhower decided against having both a British and American commander of land forces. He knew this would only complicate an already complicated command structure. He accepted that a British commander was highly likely because of his selection as the Supreme Allied Commander.[95] Eisenhower wanted General Harold Alexander as the commander for the landing force, because he knew Alexander to be an able commander, well-liked by the troops and others, and Eisenhower worked well with him. However, British military Chief of Staff Brooke favored Montgomery, and convinced Churchill to push for Montgomery to become commander of the landing force. Eisenhower accepted Montgomery at the insistence of Churchill.[96] Eisenhower's continual flexibility allowed him to accommodate his British ally's wishes, while Eisenhower's US superiors recognized that he was able to communicate, compromise, and work effectively with their British counterparts to ensure a smooth relationship.[97]

Later, Eisenhower realized that the bulk of the land forces would end up coming from US force, and therefore, the United States could not continue to be subjected to a British military commander; especially Montgomery. He decided that Bradley, the commander of US land forces in Operation Overlord, would report to him directly instead of Montgomery once forces had landed. After that point in the operation, Montgomery and Bradley would serve as equal commanders.

Churchill and the British military were against Eisenhower's decision to open another front on the Southern coast of France. The British preferred opening another front through the

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[95] Dwight D. Eisenhower to Joseph Taggart McNarney for George Catlett Marshall, cable, December 23, 1943, in Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower The War Years III* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1970), 1609-1610.

[96] Gordan and Ramsay, *Divided on D-Day*, 60-61.

[97] Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 70.

Northern Adriatic Sea, into the Baltics.[98] Eisenhower, the architect of the plan to conduct Operation Dragoon in concert with Operation Overlord, envisioned the forces linking up and massing their efforts against German forces.[99] The British argued that Operation Dragoon would not work. Eisenhower saw the risk, but saw that Operation Overlord was the decisive point, and continued to push for it. In the end, Eisenhower won the support of his political and military leadership, and eventually convinced the British that Operation Dragoon was the correct COA.

Eisenhower was frustrated with Montgomery's performance in not capturing Caen. After a month of stalemate, Eisenhower, in his usual modest tone, urged Montgomery to "use all possible energy in a determined effort to prevent a stalemate or of facing the necessity of fighting a major defensive battle," so the allies would not lose the established beachhead.[100] Montgomery's failure to achieve his objective stalled the allies effort for a breakout, and required Bradley's forces to divert in order to assist Montgomery. Air Marshall Tedder, Eisenhower's British Deputy Commander, recorded that if Eisenhower did not do something about Montgomery, he would ask the British Chief of Staff to do something.[101]

When it came to the idea of firing Montgomery, Eisenhower had a difficult decision to make. Montgomery had the support of the British people, and the British military, but had lost the support of Churchill. At one point during the battle for Caen, Churchill wanted Montgomery fired. Brooke met with Churchill and convinced him that firing Montgomery in the middle of a

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[98] Dwight D. Eisenhower to George Catlett Marshall, cable, June 28, 1944, in Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower The War Years III* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1970), 1958-1960.

[99] Operation Dragoon was the name of the operation for allied forces to land in Southern France and fight northward towards the allied forces in Normandy. This operation's objective was to encircle Germany forces and push them towards the Germany borders along with Operation Overlord.

[100] Dwight D. Eisenhower to Bernard Law Montgomery, memorandum, July 7, 1944, in Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower The War Years III* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1970), 1982-1984.

[101] Dwight D. Eisenhower to Bernard Law Montgomery, memorandum, July 21, 1944, in Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower The War Years III* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1970), 2019-2021.

war was a bad decision.[102] By not relieving Montgomery, Eisenhower decided that he did not want to replace a popular general of an ally that could have damaged the relationship he had built over the last two years. The results of keeping Montgomery had consequences. When he finally did breakout and take Caen, he lost 401 tanks with 2,600 casualties, and used over seven thousand tons of bombs to take seven miles worth of real estate.[103]

Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm

Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, invaded his Southern neighbor Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Within twenty-four hours the capital fell, and what remained of the Kuwaiti military either surrendered or fled to Saudi Arabia. Saddam sent his army into Kuwait to capture its oil-rich lands, and to restore the Iraqi economy.[104] Saddam felt betrayed by Kuwait and the Gulf Coast Council nations after the economic losses he suffered during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War. After being denied his requests for loan forgiveness from Kuwait and the Gulf Coast Council nations, Saddam accused Kuwait of stealing Iraqi oil through underground horizontal drilling.[105] Saddam determined to invade Kuwait, and shortly after, the invasion began. The invasion of an Arab country by another Arab country had been unthinkable at the time. Arab nations did not attack each other as they perceived the more substantial threat to be Israel or Iran.

In response to the invasion, the King of Saudi Arabia called on the United States to help protect the Saudi Kingdom from Iraqi aggression. President George H. W. Bush ordered the US military to the Arabian Peninsula on August 7, 1990, to defend Saudi Arabia from any future Iraqi aggression.[106] Schwarzkopf was put in charge of the operation because the Middle East was

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[102] Gordan and Ramsay, *Divided on D-Day*, 204.

[103] Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 147.

[104] Roger Cohen and Claudio Gatti, *In the Eye of the Storm: The Life of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1991), 183.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Richard Swain, *"Lucky War": Third Army in Desert Storm* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1994), 4.

part of his area of responsibility. US and coalition forces began to deploy immediately, and by the end of October 1990, had 200,000 troops in Saudi Arabia. However, Saddam had increased his military presence from 100,000 to over 430,000 by the end of September 1990.[107] By the time the war commenced, the coalition had over 740,000 personnel on the ground in Saudi Arabia, with a third coming from countries other than the United States.[108]

From the beginning of the operation, Schwarzkopf and his staff worked on the development of an offensive plan for US forces and coalition partners to repel Iraqi forces from Kuwait.[109] At midnight, on January 15, 1991, Iraq was declared in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 678's deadline to pull out of Kuwait.[110] On January 17, 1991, the United States and its coalition partners shifted from the defensive Operation Desert Shield, to the offensive Operation Desert Storm.[111] The operation was planned in two phases, with the first running from January17 through February 12. The air campaign had the objective of shaping the battlefield in preparation of the ground war. The second phase, running from February 13 through March 4, was the ground war.[112]

The war was quick, and accomplished all its military and political objectives. With the loss of 191 coalition troops against the world's fourth-largest military, the military was justifiably proud of their accomplishments.[113] The US and its coalition destroyed the Iraqi military, and

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[107] Cohen and Gatti, *In the Eye of the Storm*, 229.

[108] Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War* (New York: Dell Publishing Group, 1992), 238.

[109] Norman H. Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero: The Autobiography of General H. Schwarzkopf* (New York: Bantam Books, 1993), 314-315, 320-321, 326-327.

[110] James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay, *From Shield to Storm: High-Tech Weapons, Military Strategy, and Coalition Warfare in the Persian Gulf* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1992), 35.

[111] Ibid., 137.

[112] Dunnigan and Bay, *From Shield to Storm*, 244-245.

[113] National Desert Storm War Memorial Association, "Casualties," accessed February 20, 2019, http://www.ndswm.org/casualties; the number killed does not include friendly fire or accidently deaths; Swain, *Lucky War*, 32.

forced it to withdraw from Kuwait's borders. The alliance held together, and the operation became a successful model of how coalitions could fight together to achieve their nation's military objectives.

Question One: What operational risks did the commander face that involved coalition partners?

By the time the offensive phase of the war started, the coalition had thirty-three other nations.[114] Schwarzkopf had to manage the alliance, along with balancing service rivalries amongst the US forces. The US military had experience fighting with coalition partners during past conflicts, particularly during World War One and Two, Korea, and Vietnam. However, the fact remained that "coalition warfare is difficult at best and nearly impossible at worse."[115] There were many challenges associated with combining the efforts of the thirty-three countries who had mostly never trained with each other. There were political and religious considerations as well.

The relationship with Saudi Arabia was one that Schwarzkopf had the unenviable responsibility of ensuring that it stayed on good terms. Since the United States needed Saudi Arabia for basing and logistic hubs to support its forces, Schwarzkopf had to ensure that the US military did not upset the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In previous Middle East exercises such as the annual exercise Bright Star, the United States had to downplay its training with Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government had to maintain its standing within the Arab community as a nation against Israel, and against anyone who supported Israel. However, in truth, they needed the United States as protection against Iraq, another Arab country. The Saudi government could not publicize the relationship and risk the anger of its more conservative religious population. The

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[114] Cohen and Gatti, *In the Eye of the Storm*, 218. The members of the coalition included Afghanistan, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium Britain, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the United States.

[115] Norman Friedman, *Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992), 58.

United States also came to rely on host-nation support for fuel, water, food, transportation, and shelter.[116] The support allowed for the United States to have less support personnel in Saudi Arabia.

The French government also posed a problem at the beginning of the operation. France was a significant trading partner with Iraq before the invasion of Kuwait, which complicated their participation. At the beginning of Operation Desert Shield, the French government refused to put its military forces under the command and control of Schwarzkopf. The government wanted them to only answer to the French Prime Minister, and if Iraq attacked, they would fall under Saudi Arabian command and control. Not having French forces under Schwarzkopf's command during the buildup phase complicated planning for the operation, and created a fissure in unity of command. However, when the air offensive began on January 17, 1991, the French government finally allowed their forces to fall under the command of Schwarzkopf.[117]

There was significant concern over the risk of coalition forces becoming the victims of friendly fire. Many forces had Soviet and French equipment at the time, which was the same equipment used by the Iraqi military. France had between $15 billion and $17 billion in military equipment contracts with Iraq in the 1980s.[118] The Iraqis used a variety of French helicopters, which could be easily mistaken as the French coalition partners. Syria and Egypt, who were part of the coalition, used the same Russian equipment as the Iraqi military to include their tanks and armored vehicles.[119] Even the US Marine Corps and UK armored vehicles looked similar at a distance to Russian produced armored vehicles used by the Iraqi army.[120] The similarity in

[116] Swain, *Lucky War*, 49.

[117] Cohen and Gatti, *In the Eye of the Storm*, 219.

[118] Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict: Diplomacy and War in the NewWorld Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 24.

[119] Swain, *Lucky War*, 181.

[120] Dunnigan and Bay, *From Shield to Storm*, 381.

equipment created a need to ensure air and ground elements were able to properly identify ground vehicles.

The timing of the offensive operation was a genuine risk to the coalition. If the coalition did not conclude the war before March 15, they would have had to wait another month because of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.[121] During Ramadan, Muslims fast during the daylight hours for an entire lunar cycle. The fasting would have made the Arab coalition members exhausted during the day, and even less efficient throughout the operation. While the Saudi government could have issued an exemption during the national emergency of the war, it could have led to protests from the more conservative members inside the Arab coalition.[122] After Ramadan, the temperatures rose drastically in April because of the change of seasons. This would have made warfare in armored vehicles, and in chemical warfare suits unpleasant, if not impossible.[123] The commander and his staff knew the war had to be over before Ramadan began on March 15th.

The most significant risk became Iraq's scud missiles located in Western Iraq that could strike Israel. Schwarzkopf's concern was Saddam's ability to damage the Arab-coalition if he fired scuds at Israel, forcing them to counter-attack Iraq.[124] This dilemma was tested when Iraq fired eight scud missiles into Israel, six in Tel Aviv and two into Haifa, which came close to bringing Israel into the war.[125] Israel posed a severe problem to the alliance with the Arab-coalition. While the Arabs wanted Saddam out of Kuwait, they saw Israel attacking another Arab country as a more substantial threat. Any retaliation from Israel would require the air space clearance of Jordan or Syria, which neither country would support to allow Israeli aircraft to

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[121] Cohen and Gatti, *In the Eye of the Storm*, 230.

[122] Peter De La Billière, *Storm Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf War* (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992), 53.

[123] De La Billière, *Storm Command*, 53.

[124] Swain, *Lucky War*, 85.

[125] Rick Atkinson, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), 81.

attack another Arab nation.[126] If Israel proceeded regardless, they would have drawn the rest of the Arab countries into a war against them, and the Western coalition partners would have a more extensive war on their hands.

Question Two: What previous combat experiences did the commander have with coalition partners?

Schwarzkopf had several joint and coalition commands during his career up to his selection as the Commander-in-Chief of US CENTCOM. His first experience with coalition warfare was during his first tour to Vietnam. He served as an advisor to a Vietnamese Airborne Division in 1965. As an advisor, Schwarzkopf provided military and tactical support to the officers of a Vietnamese division. His experience allowed him to see combat while working with a foreign military. This also led him to receive two Silver Stars for his actions during combat engagements near the Cambodian border.[127]

Later in his career, Schwarzkopf served as the Deputy Director for Plans at the United States Pacific Command from 1978 to 1980. This position allowed Schwarzkopf to have exposure to joint operations, and the ability to interact with other nations' military forces. He traveled extensively throughout the Far East region, including the Republic of Korea.[128] In this role, Schwarzkopf practiced his political and diplomatic skills, and developed a better sense of the importance of alliances within a region.

In 1984, Schwarzkopf was the US Army liaison officer to Atlantic Command's Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, during Operation Urgent Fury. While his role was not that of a commander, Operation Urgent Fury's small-scale forcible entry operation provided Schwarzkopf an understanding of the complexities of joint operations. Schwarzkopf later became the deputy commander of the operation, after his insightful input into the planning of the ground

[126] Atkinson, *Crusade*, 84.

[127] Cohen and Gatti, *In the Eye of the Storm*, 91-93.

[128] Ibid., 136.

operation.[129] Operation Urgent Fury included several Caribbean nations that contributed to the operation, although they mostly served in logistical support and peacekeeping roles.[130]

As the Commander-in-Chief of CENTCOM, Schwarzkopf saw Iraq as a possible threat to the Middle East region as early as November 1989. This allowed him to direct his staff to shift their focus from a Soviet threat in the region, to an Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabia.[131] In July 1990, Schwarzkopf used the threat as the basis for a five-day exercise at Hurlburt Field and Eglin Air Force Base, in Florida, called Internal Look '90.[132] The exercise focus was "testing rapid deployment, mobility, and combat readiness of American forces to protect air and sea lines of communication in the exercise region, and to exercise command, control, and communication activities."[133] The real intent of the exercise was to examine the response the US would have against Iraq if it invaded Kuwait. This exercise gave insight to the decisions needed during a real invasion, which occurred less than a month later. In the end, Schwarzkopf "had seen enough of war to know that sometimes improvisation has to take the place of doctrine in battle."[134]

Question Three: What doctrine was available for the commander in regards to fighting with coalition partners?

At the time of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, *FM 100-5, Operations*, better known as AirLand Battle, was the most current US Army doctrine available for commanders. The doctrine specifically mentioned that commanders must "prepare themselves to fight in coalition

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[129] Cohen and Gatti, *In the Eye of the Storm*, 166. Poor reconnaissance and intelligence, the lack of proper military maps, incompatibility of army and navy communication equipment, and the wrong configuration for the Marine Expeditionary Unit assigned to assault Grenada were issues General Schwarzkopf observed during the operation.

[130] Ronald H. Cole, "Operation URGENT FURY" (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 1997), 28, 34, accessed February 23, 2019, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Monographs/Urgent_Fury.pdf.

[131] Swain, *Lucky War*, 4.

[132] Cohen and Gatti, *In the Eye of the Storm*, 185.

[133] Ibid.

[134] Ibid., 165.

warfare alongside the forces of our nation's allies."[135] The doctrine stated that working with allies was part of the unity of effort, which was one of AirLand Battle doctrine imperatives.[136] The 1986 *FM 100-5, Operations,* helped highlight challenges that commanders may face with coalition warfare. It stressed that allies must share a political cohesion in order to maintain the coalition, and that this cohesion was required for the militaries to fight effectively. The FM stressed that accommodations for the differences in political-military objectives and capabilities must be carefully considered in campaign planning to ensure the interoperability, synchronization, and reduction of risk to the forces.[137] Command and control, intelligence, operational procedures, and combat service support were four areas that commanders must focus on with allies for synchronization of combat forces in order to be successful.[138] While the manual was broad in its applicability, it provided context for areas of friction that commanders needed to look at to ensure the risk was mitigated.

The AirLand Battle doctrine recognized that the United States fought in previous conflicts with allies, and would continue to do so into the future. The doctrine used two examples of how the US military worked through coordination efforts with coalition partners in the past. The examples were the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the US-Republic of Korea alliance.[139] Both military examples had well-established relationships that had developed over three decades, and exhibited shared doctrine, procedures, and principles to minimize inter-allied problems. In the Middle East, the US military had conducted some combined exercises previously with several of the Arab countries that fought in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The most notable of these exercises was the annual exercise Bright Star. However, Bright

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[135] US Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986), 2, 164-165.

[136] Ibid., 23.

[137] Ibid., 164-165.

[138] Ibid., 165.

[139] Ibid., 23.

Star exercises during the 1980s were limited in scope, did not include all the countries that fought in the Gulf War, and had the aim of fighting off Russian aggression within the Middle East. [140]

As for joint doctrine, the first official *JP 3-0, Operations,* was approved in 1993, two years after Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm occurred.[141] The Goldwater-Nicholas Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 had prompted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop joint doctrine. However, the approval of the Joint Publication System would not happen until February 1988, when the US Army had the responsibility to create *JP 3-0, Operations*.[142] The doctrine was published as draft in January 1990, titled *Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations,* but the final approved version was not published until 1993.[143] This meant that commanders did not have any joint doctrine available to refer to for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Question Four: How did the commander weigh the risks, mitigate it, and make decisions involving the coalition partners?

Saudi Arabia was a difficult challenge for the alliance, and Schwarzkopf went out of his way to ensure cooperation. The Saudi government wanted the United States there to help defend their borders, but the extremely conservative Islamic population of Saudi Arabia was leery of a Western presence in their country. Schwarzkopf knew the delicate relationship he had to balance with the Saudi government. He was very cordial with the Saudi Commander, Lieutenant General Khalid Bin Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz. Khalid became Schwarzkopf's close friend, and the liaison

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[140] Loren Jenkins, "U.S. Paratroopers Land in Egypt for War Games," *The Washington Post*, November 15, 1981, accessed February 23, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/11/15/us-paratroopers-land-in-egypt-for-war-games/1157dc7c-b0ef-48cd-b604-75b347d76148/?utm_term=.8be0064e9c8b; Edgar Kleckley, "Bright Star 85: Lessons Learned for Military History Detachment," *The Army Historian*, no. 9 (Fall 1985): 4-6, accessed December 17, 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26303492?seq =1#metadata_info_tab_contents.

[141] Rick Rowlett, "Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations," *Joint Force Quarterly* 86 (3rd Quarter 2017), accessed February 23, 2018, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1223888/joint-publication-3-0-joint-operations/.

[142] Vincent H. Demma, *Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1989* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History US Army, 1998), 51, accessed February 18, 2019, https://history.army.mil/books/DAHSUM/1989/CH4.htm.

[143] Rowlett, *JP 3-0 Joint Operations.*

between the US leadership and Arab forces to ensure communication was open between the militaries of different cultures. Schwarzkopf placed Khalid in charge of the Joint Arab Task Force which included members from eleven Middle Eastern nations. Schwarzkopf ensured he did not micromanage the task force, in order to allow them to demonstrate their ability to conduct military operations.[144] On several occasions, Schwarzkopf reached out to Khalid to help resolve issues within the country such as facilities access, or to settle local political disputes for the coalition forces.[145] This demonstration of commitment helped strengthen the bond between the forces.

Schwarzkopf integrated the Saudi Joint Staff with his staff, leading to forums such as the Joint Forces Support Committee, which allowed for the addressing of host-nation support issues. While the staff never fully integrated during the short time of the war, it allowed for CENTCOM's staff to adapt to "dealing with the complexity of Saudi politics and society."[146] The balancing of Saudi culture was a difficult task. Schwarzkopf ensured during the ground campaign that he placed coalition forces in locations best able to utilize their different capabilities, and to ensure that any regional animosities or suspicions were laid to rest.[147]

One decision that Schwarzkopf made was issuing General Order #1, which forbade alcohol within the area of operations. It also forbade pornographic material to include "items of art which displayed human genitalia, uncovered women's breasts, or any human sexual act."[148] Western women were restricted in what they could wear, and were encouraged to wear abayas outside military installations. These restrictions were meant to encourage the relationship

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[144] Rowlett, *JP 3-0 Joint Operations*, 221.

[145] De La Billière, *Storm Command*, 79.

[146] Swain, *Lucky War*, 58.

[147] Ibid., 91.

[148] Norman H. Schwarzkopf, "Desert Shield General Order #1," The 3rd Armored Division History Foundation, November 10, 1990, accessed December 17, 2018, http://3ad.com/history/gulf.war/general.order.1.htm.

amongst the Islamic allies and the Western nations. While some troops viewed this policy as conflicting against US principles of freedom of religion, it was done to smooth over tensions. Schwarzkopf also forbade the press from covering any religious ceremonies or celebrations of troops to ensure it did not upset the local conservative population.[149] The last thing Schwarzkopf wanted was an uprising in the country he was trying to protect because of religious differences.

Regarding coalition forces, Schwarzkopf always listened, especially in the case of the French. When French forces finally came under the military command of the United States, Schwarzkopf assigned them their own sector, and provided them logistical support from the 82nd Airborne Division. He also gave them the critical objective of capturing the Iraqi air base of Al-Salman during the ground campaign, a vital target for the alliance.[150] When British Commander, General de la Billière, displayed concerns about casualties for his forces if they conducted a fixed attack with the US Marines, Schwarzkopf shifted the British forces to the desert where they could conduct open maneuver warfare; something they trained and specialized in.[151] Schwarzkopf arrayed the Arab Task Force so they were the first to liberate Kuwait City as a symbolic gesture that Arab nations take care of each other. The US Army also loaned support assets to the Egyptian Corps, including on-call attack helicopter support and breaching equipment, as the Egyptian forces did not have enough of those capabilities.[152]

One major concern was the fratricide of coalition partners because of similar equipment to the Iraqi Army. The Cold War allowed for a proliferation of Russian equipment to the armies of the Middle East. Schwarzkopf directed his staff to ensure that they established close coordination and fire control measures with coalition partners, and that they received

[149] Cohen and Gatti, *In the Eye of the Storm*, 223.

[150] Ibid., 220.

[151] Swain, *Lucky War*, 95.

[152] Ibid., 129.

identification devices to prevent fratricide.[153] He also assigned US military personnel as liaison officers, and established restrictive boundaries to help ensure that fratricide did not occur.

Regarding the most significant threat of Israel entering the war, Schwarzkopf dedicated a tremendous amount of military assets to locate and destroy Iraqi scuds. Some of these assets included aviation units that flew well into Iraqi air space to find their targets. Pilots found it extremely difficult to fly between 16,000 and 18,000 feet, in the dark, to find and accurately bomb a scud launcher. In the beginning many pilots flew at lower altitudes to increase their chances of finding the launchers. However, after the loss of several aircraft due to surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft fire, pilots resumed flying at higher attitudes to mitigate the risk.[154] Schwarzkopf also dedicated a majority of his US Special Operations Forces, and UK Special Air Service forces to search and destroy scud missile sites throughout Iraq at often significant risk to themselves.[155]

Analysis and Findings

The findings of this study have shown that both commanders relied on their previous experiences to assess and mitigate risk among their allies, and to accomplish their objectives. The main reason this occurred is because joint and coalition doctrine was insufficient at the time of both commanders' operations. In the case of Operation Overlord, Eisenhower did not have any doctrine available in regards to allies. The doctrine was insufficient even in regards to joint operations. Eisenhower lacked field command time, but his experiences serving at senior levels allowed for the gaps in doctrine to be compensated with his experiences with Conner, Pershing, Marshall, and MacArthur. Eisenhower also gained extensive experience during his time as the Supreme Allied Commander of Operations Torch, Husky, and Avalanche. While those operations

[153] Swain, *Lucky War*, 181.

[154] Atkinson, *Crusade*, 101-104.

[155] Swain, *Lucky War*, 85.

provided a costly learning lesson to Eisenhower in regards to how to deal with allies, it prepared him well for Operation Overlord.

Schwarzkopf had a blend of experience, along with the availability of limited doctrine, for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. However, not everything he experienced during Desert Storm was covered by the 1986 AirLand Battle doctrine, to include threats to alliance unity from friendly external sources. The AirLand Battle doctrine did provide Schwarzkopf some principals to follow when conducting multinational operations with allies. Some of these principals were open communication with allies, providing necessary logistical support, and identifying maneuver boundaries for allies to prevent fratricide. However, Schwarzkopf also had extensive experience in handling allies during multinational operations. His earliest exposure was as an advisor to the South Vietnamese, followed later by his experiences as a Pacific Command planner, and as the Deputy Commander to Operation Urgent Fury. These provided him the experience to adapt to ever-changing scenarios that were not in doctrine at that time.

As for commanders identifying that their alliances were essential to their political and military needs, both commanders' actions demonstrated they understood this principle. Looking at their decisions as rational actors, it is hard to understand why a commander did not fire an insubordinate commander, or why they would risk million-dollar aircraft to destroy an ineffective weapons system.[156] The context that lies beyond those decisions, and the amount of risk they both underwrote to conduct such actions, demonstrated that the commanders were after a larger strategic objective. The strategic objectives were achieved, even at the risk of tactical failure.

Eisenhower tolerated Montgomery's insubordination and inability to achieve victory at Caen, yet retained him as a commander. This demonstrated there was an underlying reason he did not replace him. Eisenhower did not tolerate American commanders who failed him, such as

[156] Allison Graham and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Exploring the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), 17. Graham defines rational actor as one who acts with consistent behavior in decision making towards achieving goals and objectives concerning a particular action that maximizes one's values within specified constraints.

Fredendall at Kasserine Pass. Eisenhower understood that Montgomery represented the alliance because he held the support of the British troops, staff, and public. Eisenhower knew that if he replaced Montgomery, he would lose the support of the British people, along with risking the alliance. As for seeing the larger military strategic picture, Eisenhower knew he had to push for a Southern France amphibious landing over the British's preference for a Balkan's landing. Eisenhower knew that he needed to mass his troops in France, and not spread them like the British preferred. So, he persisted until he achieved his goal, leading to his more substantial strategic military victory in Europe.

For Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Schwarzkopf risked his air force assets and Special Operation Forces personnel to ensure Israel stayed out of the war. This risk came in the cost of several multimillion-dollar airplanes, and the lives of several pilots. If Schwarzkopf lost the Arab coalition, he knew he would lose the support of Saudi Arabia, and their basing. Schwarzkopf also worked to ensure the support of the Islamic population through certain restrictions on coalition personnel through his ordering of General Order #1, and suppressing media access to his personnel during religious ceremonies. By appeasing the Islamic conservatism, he helped his ally maintain control over their country, allowing them to stay in the campaign. Schwarzkopf knew that the higher military and political objectives were risks he had to mitigate in order to achieve his operational objectives.

Conclusion

This study examined two commanders through their campaigns, and has shown they relied on their experiences over doctrine. Both commanders assumed risk with their allies because they identified the alliances as essential to their political and military needs. A close examination of their operational risk in regards to their coalition partners showed that both commanders faced an array of challenging risks during the conduct of their operations. Looking at the doctrine available at the time led to the understanding that these commanders did not have much concerning alliance risk to rely on. This led them to fall back to their experiences that defined

their careers. Eisenhower lacked field command but made up for it with his superb staff performance. Schwarzkopf had an excellent balance of both staff and command time, as well as involvement in several joint and coalition conflicts. Both commanders demonstrated that it was also part of their personalities that allowed them to succeed.

This study examined how both commanders handled their challenges with allies. Eisenhower compromised with political leadership to get the resources and the options he needed to become successful in his theater. Schwarzkopf balanced the clash of Western and Middle Eastern civilizations to maintain an alliance that was delicate from the beginning. Both men demonstrated that they knew that the alliance was their center of gravity, and that they had to risk lives and equipment to preserve it. While their actions at times seemed irrational, they were successful in achieving their larger strategic and political objectives.

As found from both case studies, experience is a characteristic that is needed when addressing risk with alliances. A commander struggles when he or she is inexperienced, as Eisenhower demonstrated at the beginning of his tenor as Supreme Allied Commander. A commander that has multiple experiences with multinational partners, such as Schwarzkopf demonstrated they can adequately assess a situation, and apply the right decision to achieve optimal results. Today's military allows for its senior commanding generals to obtain this exposure before commanding a multinational force.

Military doctrine has advanced tremendously since Eisenhower launched Operation Overlord. While doctrine is not the only answer, it is a start. Today, the US military conducts multinational exercises, foreign exchanges with its officers, and ensures they integrate multinational partners in every combat operation as they have since the Korean War. These events help build upon the experience the US military needs to prepare itself for future operations.

For further research, an examination of the personality traits of commanders in multinational operations is something that could be analyzed. While it was not addressed in the

case studies, personalities played an important role when dealing with allies. A personality such as MacArthur or Montgomery, who if placed in command of an alliance may have generated different results. Such characteristics as the ability to communicate effectively, display empathy, and understand and respect cultural differences allow for a commander to effectively lead other forces.

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