Chasing Emergence: Historical Development of Planning and Intelligence in Great Power Conflict

A Monograph

By

MAJ Jared A. Carter
US Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
US Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, KS

2019

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*	**2. REPORT TYPE**	**3. DATES COVERED** *(From - To)*
23 05 2019	MASTER'S THESIS	JUNE 18-MAY 19

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Chasing Emergence: Historical Development of Planning and Intelligence in Great Power Conflict

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)
MAJ Jared A. Carter

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

Modern US Army doctrine requires collaborative planning by all War Fighting Functions. The years between WWI and WWII became the planning forge for the American military. Why did the United States develop integrated planning before WWII and how did it affect Army operations? The integration of intelligence, and other functional specialties, into interwar planning established a new planning paradigm in the US Army. Contributions from non-combat functional areas like intelligence, signals, and logistics became a central theme to interwar planning.

The United States' unique geographical location in the world made power projection difficult. Difficulties in mobilization, deployment, and execution of the Spanish American war of 1898 and WWI provided the drive for the Army to improve. Within the Army, the Army War College, supplied the War Department General Staff with a large organization capable of planning and conducting war games on an annual basis as part of the curriculum.

The interwar planning iterations conducted at the Army War College laid the foundation for the importance of intelligence, and other non-combat functions, contributions to Army planning. This continuity continued during WWII and likely forms the historical bedrock of modern Army functional support to planning. WWII cemented the importance of Soldier education, collaboration between staff functions, and the repetition of planning to keep pace with a changing environment into Army culture and doctrine.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Military Intelligence, WWII, Army War College, Education, Planning, Conceptual Planning, Detailed Planning, Philippines

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			**17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**	**18. NUMBER OF PAGES**	**19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**
a. REPORT	**b. ABSTRACT**	**c. THIS PAGE**			**19b. PHONE NUMBER** *(include area code)*
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)		913 758-3300

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

Monograph Approval Page

Name of Candidate: MAJ Jared A. Carter

Monograph Title: Chasing Emergence: Historical Development of Planning and Intelligence in Great Power Conflict

Approved by:

_____, Monograph Director
Mark T. Calhoun, Ph.D.

_____, Seminar Leader
Geoffrey A. Whittenberg, COL

_____, Director, Schools of Advanced Military Studies
Kirk C. Dorr, COL

Accepted this 23rd day of May 2019 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, PhD

Abstract

Chasing Emergence: Historical Development of Planning and Intelligence in Great Power Conflict, by MAJ Jared Carter, US Army, 43 pages.

Modern US Army doctrine requires collaborative planning by all War Fighting Functions. The years between WWI and WWII became the planning forge for the American military. Why did the United States develop integrated planning before WWII and how did it affect Army operations? The integration of intelligence, and other functional specialties, into interwar planning established a new planning paradigm in the US Army. Contributions from non-combat functional areas like intelligence, signals, and logistics became a central theme to interwar planning.

The United States' unique geographical location in the world made power projection difficult. Difficulties in mobilization, deployment, and execution of the Spanish American War of 1898 and WWI provided the drive for the Army to improve. For the Army, the Army War College, supplied the War Department General Staff with a large organization capable of planning and conducting war games on an annual basis as part of the curriculum.

The interwar planning iterations conducted at the AWC laid the foundation for the importance of intelligence, and other non-combat functions, contributions to Army planning. This continuity continued during WWII and likely forms the historical bedrock of modern Army functional support to planning. WWII cemented the importance of Soldier education, collaboration between staff functions, and the repetition of planning to keep pace with a changing environment into Army culture and doctrine.

Contents

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge my wonderful family who has always supported me in my military career. To my wife, Mindi, who works so hard every day parenting and schooling four kids so I can play Army. I also acknowledge the peer mentors in my life. It has been fun and professionally developing to be a member of the class of 2018-19's SAMS Seminar 8, "The Ocho." I cannot imagine the past year with any other group. I would also like to acknowledge the professional faculty at SAMS, specifically Dr. Mark Calhoun and Colonel Geoffrey Whittenberg. Both of you are consummate professionals with a passion for teaching the lessons you have learned to the next generation.

Acronyms

ACTS	Air Corps Tactical School
ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
AEF	Army Expeditionary Force
AWC	Army War College
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COMINT	Communication Intelligence
FEAF	Far East Air Force
GEOINT	Geographical Intelligence
GHQ	General Headquarters
HIMINT	Human Intelligence
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JPC	Joint Planning Committee
JPB	Joint Planning Board
MID	Military Intelligence Division
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence
OPD	Operations Division
POA	Pacific Ocean Area
SIS	Signal Intelligence Service
SWPA	Southwest Pacific Area
USAFFE	United States Army Forces Far East
WDGS	War Department General Staff
WPD	War Plans Division
WPO	War Plan Orange

Illustrations

Tables

Introduction

In one of history's great continuities, military leaders have long sought to improve their understanding of their adversaries' capabilities and intentions. While the types of intelligence disciplines rarely change, emerging technologies have enabled new means of collection, analysis, and dissemination of enemy capabilities and intentions through several distinct intelligence domains. Human intelligence (HUMINT) of various forms has been the predominant form of intelligence for much of recorded history. The use of scouts, spies, and cavalry dates back to antiquity. These methods fulfilled most of the intelligence needs of America's antebellum armies. In the decades before the Civil War, a rare, but significant, paradigm shift in the character of war took place. This paradigm shift, sparked by the Industrial Revolution, increased the importance of intelligence. The technological developments that came about during the Industrial Revolution increased the sustainment, communication, lethality, and mobility of large armies. This increase in mobility led to a decrease in warning time at both the strategic and the operational level. State mobilization times and indicators quickly became important to prevent strategic and operational surprise and in deployments over large distances. These historical contingencies increased the speed of the changing strategic context requiring continuous intelligence collection and input. [1]

In both the Civil War and World War I, industrial-age innovations contributed to changes in the character of warfare. New technology and large armies facilitated the formation of intelligence staff organizations to manage the collection of HUMINT and the new field of communication intelligence (COMINT). In 1885, the US Army established its first permanent intelligence organization to provide the United States with sustainable intelligence regarding readiness. WWI further illuminates the new found importance of intelligence. In addition, WWI

[1] John L. Gaddis, *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 29-30; Michael I. Handel, *War, Strategy and Intelligence* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass & Co Ltd., 1989), 65, 231-232, 239; Oscar W. Koch, *G-2: Intelligence for Patton* (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing Ltd., 1999), 55-56.

saw the development of new technologies and intelligence disciplines, such as imagery intelligence (IMINT) and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). The emphasis placed on intelligence during WWI led one commentator to refer to the war as a "watershed in the evolution of US Army intelligence."[2]

The technology behind many of these developments required focus, prioritization, and proper timing to be effective. Moreover, as collection technology increased in sophistication and numbers, it produced ever-greater quantities of information, increasing the time required to analyze the data and make recommendations to support decision-making. Frequent inter-war changes to the strategic context and technological innovations demanded continual assessment of adversary capabilities and intent. At the tactical level, starting in WWI, units began to require additional collection capabilities, affecting an increase in the number of collection platforms. In addition to traditional cavalry, communication intercept and light aircraft made substantial contributions to tactical level intelligence. The number of collection systems located at multiple echelons required detailed planning to synchronize the effects of intelligence.[3]

Starting in WWI, a new continuity emerged. The successful projection of combat power required iterative conceptual and detailed planning to capture the emergent changes within a rapidly changing strategic context. One of the chief inputs to this planning included intelligence. The integration of intelligence, and other functional specialties, into interwar planning established a new planning paradigm in the US Army. Planning and intelligence collection would need to be conducted in peace and in war to ensure the greatest chance of victory. Planning was not a new idea in WWI; however, intelligence driving iterative planning was new. In order for intelligence to drive planning, staff collected intelligence to answer specific questions on enemy capabilities

---

[2] Bruce W. Bidwell, *History of the Military Intelligence Division Department of the General Staff* (Department of the Army, 1964), 31, 35, 57; John P. Finnegan, *Military Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1998), 39.

[3] Handel, *War, Strategy and Intelligence*, 234-235.

and intent to capture the emergent changes in the strategic and operational context. Modern US Army doctrine refers to planning as "the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about." For US Army intelligence, the desired future centers on anticipating and answering the commander's questions to provide situational understanding. While viewed through a modern doctrinal lens, officers assigned to intelligence roles arrived at very similar conclusions between WWI and the end of WWII.

Lieutenant Colonel Oscar Koch stood out during WWII as an exceptionally effective intelligence planner. Relatively early in American involvement in the war, Koch led the intelligence planning effort for Sicily. During months of planning and executing intelligence collection, Koch learned to estimate enemy capabilities, anticipate their intent, limit surprise, and enable his commander, Lieutenant General George S. Patton, to make timely decisions. Koch continued this pattern in Italy and Western Europe, where he was one of the very few intelligence officers to predict the Battle of the Bulge. Although his higher headquarters did not share Koch's assessment, Patton authorized a contingency plan to attack west, should the Germans launch their counter offensive. This branch plan enabled Patton's Third Army to relieve Bastogne after less than six days of siege. Intelligence officers like Koch were effective because lessons from WWI, integrated into interwar education, improved how senior leaders planned intelligence during WWII.[4]

Understanding the evolution of intelligence planning before and during WWII is important to modern professionals. History often informs modern doctrine development. Doctrine regarding intelligence collection and support to planning is no different. Understanding the history of intelligence support to planning will enable modern professionals to think creatively

[4] Gaddis, *The Landscape of History,* 29-30; US Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Publication 5-0*, *Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 6; Oscar W. Koch, *G-2: Intelligence for Patton* (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing Ltd., 1999), 40-42, 55, 94, 110, 112-113.

about the use of current doctrine and its manner of application, while discerning anomalies in the operating environment. Situations will inevitably arise in which current doctrine no longer fits the given environment and operational circumstances. By recognizing these anomalies, intelligence professionals can quickly adjust worldviews to accept a new paradigm. The professional's ability to orient on a changed environment, make decisions, and act more quickly will enable success on future battlefields.[5]

The monograph consists of four sections: an introduction, a review of the US Army's incorporation of WWI lessons learned into interwar intelligence education, a case study section, and a conclusion section. Section three presents two case studies for analysis: the Philippines campaign of 1941 and the war in the Pacific Theater of Operations during 1944 reveal the wartime evolution of intelligence planning. These case studies focus on General Douglas MacArthur's command and his intelligence officer (G-2). During WWII, MacArthur had the same G-2 at the loss of the Philippines and upon his return. Given this unusual stability between a commander and a primary staff officer, analysis of these case studies provides a unique opportunity to understand how intelligence planning in one theater changed between 1941 and 1945. Section four includes results of the analysis to illustrate how intelligence planning evolved between the end of WWI and the end of WWII. Each case study will be evaluated through the lens of three criteria: conceptual, or intended, strategic formulation, flexibility in the plan, and intelligence. Together these criteria evaluate the broad process of planning, flexibility in execution, and intelligence as the driver of the planning. Intelligence is an important criterion as a primary focus of the research. Intended planning and flexibility are criteria that develop out of interwar research. The concept behind the terms intentionality and flexibility loosely come from Henry Mintzberg's notions of the intended and emergent strategy. Intended strategic planning

[5] Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 10, 52-53; John R. Boyd, "The Essence of Winning and Losing" (presentation, June 28, 1995), 3, accessed October 20, 2018, http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Boyd-Papers.html.

captures the idea of conceptual planning. Further, organizations must be flexible to take the emergent changes in the strategic context into account.[6]

Planning and Intelligence during the Interwar Years

> Considering the evolution of World War II strategy, the distinction between Army War College plans and "official" plans is a distinction without a difference.
>
> —Henry G. Gole, *The Road to Rainbow*

Understanding the structure of intelligence planning development during the interwar years, between WWI and WWII, is essential to understanding the conduct of WWII. Further, understanding interwar period intelligence requires observation through the window of continuities and paradigms. Continuities from WWI intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination did not change during the interwar period. Discernable patters persist despite improvement in technology. Planning took on an altogether different appearance. The interwar years served as a period of paradigm testing for intelligence planning. Throughout the interwar period, enemy estimates continually changed based on an assortment of factors. The post-WWI organization of the intelligence staff underpins both the continuities of intelligence domains and the paradigm testing that followed.[7]

In 1921, General John J. Pershing assumed his position as the Army Chief of Staff. Pershing changed the organization of the War Department General Staff (WDGS) to mirror the Army Expeditionary Force (AEF) staff. These organizational changes also affected the Military Intelligence Division (MID) within the WDGS. The MID faced a multitude of handicaps during the interwar period. Unfortunately, the WDGS G-2 became the outranked member of the staff due to a discrepancy between Pershing's new staff structure and the General Officers allocated to the

---

[6] Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 12-14, 31-32. Mintzberg defines the ideas of intended strategy, deliberate strategy, emergent strategy, and realized strategy. Intended strategy is a broad conceptual strategy that becomes more refined in the deliberate strategy. Each of these ideas will be discussed in more detail later.

[7] Gaddis, *The Landscape of History,* 29-30; Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 10, 52-53.

staff through the National Defense Act of 1920. The rank structure of the WDGS was soon copied throughout the Army ensuring G-2s were on the losing side of many battles for interwar resources. Despite these handicaps, one fact remained constant. The need for a permanent intelligence staff was widely recognized and valued. In the 1930s, another WDGS intelligence section was created within the War Plans Division (WPD). The WPD G-2 section was significant for its direct contact with the Army half of the Joint Planning Committee (JPC). This section received intelligence from the MID and used it to further develop enemy estimates based on specific war plans being created either within the WPD or the JPC. These two organizations supplied the intelligence estimates for all the interwar plans and the exercises conducted by the Army War College (AWC). Within the WDGS, there was also an intelligence training section responsible for conducting and ensuring up to date intelligence training in the field and at educational institutions like the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS). Intelligence training became critical for the improvement of existing intelligence disciplines.[8]

Intelligence Disciplines During the Interwar Period

HUMINT remained a continuity for intelligence during the post WWI era. In fact, operational and strategic peacetime collection capabilities remained unchanged since 1889 with congressional establishment of the Military Attaché system. Military attachés stationed throughout the world at US Embassies provided valuable information to the Army and Navy intelligence community. Attachés provided the MID with information on policy, individual civil and military leaders, technical developments, and the organization of foreign militaries. In addition, the attachés provided required information on a country's geography and industrial capacity. Unfortunately, the attaché system was the only source of collection available to the MID

[8] Bidwell, *History of the Military Intelligence Division,* 255-257, 342-344, 359-361; Henry G. Gole, *The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934-1940* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003), 169.

for strategic intelligence. Vulnerabilities within the attaché system included the limited number of embassies that included military attachés and the limited nature of their collection. Many attachés were only able to collect whatever they could ascertain from social dinners and coffees. Nevertheless, the MID and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) relied heavily on the attaché system. The MID conducted analysis of attaché information on a routine basis. This analysis enabled the MID to ascertain a particular country's capabilities and intent. The MID conducted this type of analysis on both friend and foe throughout the interwar period. The collection of intelligence by military attachés proved crucial for baseline planning estimates. The analysis derived from military attachés supported AWC planning exercise injects and WPD planning. This system continued from 1889 into the Cold War.[9]

Another historical continuity for intelligence during the interwar period was COMINT. Technological capability did improve the capability of COMINT while still falling into familiar patterns similar to WWI. During WWI, the war department cypher bureau fell under the MID and conducted all the cryptographic activities for the US government. The cypher bureau continued to operate after the armistice, primarily engaged with deciphering coded diplomatic traffic. As an example, the cypher bureau successfully deciphered Japanese political communication traffic regarding the Japanese naval policy pursued at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921 to 1922. This information was corroborated by the Japanese military attaché and aided United States decision-making and policy. In 1930, the WDGS reorganized cryptographic intelligence from the MID into the newly minted Signal Intelligence Service (SIS). This reorganization separated cryptology from the MID, however, it served to mass all the COMINT functions under the Chief

[9] Matheny, Michael R. *Carrying the War to the Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012), 19, 31, 40; US Army Intelligence Center and School, *The Evolution of American Military Intelligence* (Fort Huachuca, AZ: US Army Intelligence Center, 1973), 10-11, 41; James P. Finley, *U.S. Army Military Intelligence History: A Sourcebook* (Fort Huachuca, AZ: US Army Intelligence Center & Fort Huachuca, 1995), 56-57, 63-66; Finnegan, *Military Intelligence*, 43; Thomas G. Mahnken, *Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918-1945* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 28-31.

Signal Officer, which proved advantageous as funding eventually increased and new technology became available. Therefore, despite the reorganization, deciphering activities continued with little interference. The1930s saw some advancement in cryptology despite budgetary constraints. The budgetary constraints ended in 1937 when both the budget and the organization began an expansion. Especially during the years between 1937 and 1941, the SIS developed cipher devices and cracked foreign government codes. The famous "purple code" used by the Japanese diplomatic office was one of the SIS's more extraordinary breakthroughs. The exploitation of the "purple code," later codenamed MAGIC, provided crucial intelligence to the allies between 1940 and 1945. Further, the SIS improved wireless radio intercept capabilities for tactical and operational use. As WWII loomed, the SIS underwent a steady growth up to the declaration of hostilities. The resulting growth of the SIS ensured that the US military would have capable COMINT abilities at the start of WWII. COMINT was not the only intelligence discipline with a comparatively successful history during the interwar years.[10]

Finally, IMINT was another intelligence discipline continuity during the interwar period. While technology greatly improved aerial observation and reconnaissance during the interwar period, the methods and systems remained the same. These methods and systems, used to incorporate IMINT into planning and future operations, flourished through interwar education. Understanding interwar education within the US Army Air Corps is essential to any understanding of IMINT during this period.

The US Army Air Corps consisted of two major classes. The first was the Air Service, which operated as the auxiliary arm to the Army Air Corps. The Air Service included the observation aircraft and pilots needed to support tactical, operational, and strategic collection.

---

[10] Bidwell, *History of the Military Intelligence Division,* 327-335; Edward J. Drea, *MacArthur's ULTRA Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942-1945* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1992), 8-12; Finnegan, *Military Intelligence*, 46-49; Finley, *Military Intelligence History*, 170; US Army, *Evolution of Military Intelligence*, 37-38.

The Air Service supported the ground campaign and conducted observation for Army Air Corps targeting. The Army Air Corps was the second class and included the remaining branches of aviation. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the Army Air Corps received the preponderance of the aviation budget for improved technology. As the Army Air Corps sought independence from the Army as a separate service, it developed new doctrine and theories concerning the future conduct of warfare. This included daylight, high altitude, and precision bombing. While the air force recognized the need for observation, bombers and fighter aircraft continued to receive the majority of the resources.[11]

Education in aerial observation continued despite a lack of funding for updated aircraft. During the late 1930s and WWII, the requirement for observation aircraft increased due to the need for locating and assessing potential bomber targets. In addition, the air service flew reconnaissance for ground combat formations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Interwar education was instrumental in training air force G-2s to manage competing requirements. When integrated into the G-2 staff of an Army or Corps, these skills proved invaluable during the war. The ACTS served as the air corps' senior school. The school was responsible for training air tactics, strategy, and the techniques of airpower to air officers and selected officers from other branches. The ACTS included a multitude of academic courses and training in both air and ground combat. The curriculum included the ACTS G-2 course. As AWC faculty member Michael Matheny points out, "ACTS shared an emphasis with the CGSC and the AWC on military intelligence and logistics." This is especially true due to the Army Air Corps' requirement to identify and prioritize targets. For example, the G-2 component to the 1934 observation course required students to serve as G-2 officers tasked with the prioritization of resources for General Headquarters (GHQ). As a second example to the importance the Army Air

[11] Robert T. Finney, *History of the Air Corps Tactical School* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Center for Air Force History, 1992), 60-68

Corps placed on intelligence, the GHQ Air Force distributed a memorandum emphasizing intelligence training and noting, "Flying personnel as well as intelligence personnel should have a clear and definite idea of their intelligence duties." The air corps continued to maintain interwar intelligence education. Education allowed the air corps to have an immediate impact on intelligence collection and planning at the start of hostilities. The Army Air Corps' ACTS provided continuity in education for IMINT. Additionally, coordination helped bridge the gap between the Army Air Corps and the senior planning staffs. This enabled IMINT to have a peacetime contribution to interwar planning through air photography and mapping.[12]

The intelligence branch organized its disciplines into branches or services segregated from the intelligence staff. Neither the MID, WDGS G-2, or the WPD G-2 section had any direct control over the ACTS curriculum. Despite the disjointed nature of the intelligence organizational structure, loose coordination occurred. The MID coordinated with the different schools to ensure proper intelligence training. Further, the MID incorporated air officers to ensure integration at the WDGS level. Unfortunately, the MID had no formal authority to conduct intelligence training, inspections, or receive training reports. Even without formal authority over intelligence training, the MID continually coordinated across the Department of War. As Bruce Bidwell describes, the MID "inaugurated a suitable air intelligence program…. and materially assisted the semi-independent Army Air Force in fulfilling its own intelligence requirements, both from a tactical and technical standpoint." This loose coordination enabled each intelligence discipline to

[12] Robert T. Finney, *History of the Air Corps Tactical School* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Center for Air Force History, 1992), v, 35; Matheny, *Carrying the War to the Enemy*, 52, 110-112; Bidwell, *History of the Military Intelligence Division,* 300; Final quotation came from "Summary of Courses," AWC Curricular File 1-105, Course 1923-1924, 7, USAMHI. Quoted in Matheny, *Carrying the War to the Enemy*, 52.

contribute in producing estimates used by planners in both the AWC and the WPD of the WDGS.[13]

Intelligence Planning During the Interwar Period

Planning during the interwar period honed what became one of the US Army's greatest strengths. At the beginning of WWII, the United States had war plans for each country it fought. These plans were war-gamed, adapted over time, integrated into military education, and managed at the service level. Both the Navy and the Army war colleges were instrumental in the creative thinking and adaptation of the various war plans eventually adopted by the US military. Nor did the military develop its war plans from a purely US perspective. Potential allies and coalitions of adversaries received detailed consideration. These developments led to one of historian Henry Gole's assessments regarding interwar planning that "there is something surreal in a third-rate military thinking first-rate global schemes." These first-rate global schemes created and amplified United States' strengths.[14]

US interwar planning resulted in two unique strengths at the beginning of WWII. Each of these strengths resulted in significant contribution to the allied war effort. First, strength in planning resulted in a more rapid mobilization of industry and combat power. This is important due to the sheer distance of the Pacific and European theater from the continental United States. The US government developed pre-conflict mobilization plans and updated them in 1936 and 1939. Specifically, the government wrote industrial mobilization plans in 1930 and subsequently underwent revisions in 1933, 1936, and 1939. Congress even authorized certain companies to bypass competitive bidding to help industry "transition from planning to mobilization as industry acquired the know-how to posture itself for mass production of war material." Gole further

---

[13] Finnegan, *Military Intelligence*, 45-46; Bidwell, *History of the Military Intelligence Division,* 413-417; the final quote in this paragraph came from Bidwell, *History of the Military Intelligence Division,* 414, no 14-15.

[14] Quotation from Gole, *The Road to Rainbow*, 152.

describes the US industrial situation in 1939 as having "enormous potential" only requiring "authorization and funding to crank up the industrial base." Second, planning enabled a more rapid and efficient deployment of resources and forces. This planning had an impact on mobilization. As an example, interwar planning supported the increase in amphibious capabilities for the purpose of seizing air and naval bases in any Pacific campaign. Within a year of Pearl Harbor, the United States began the decisive ground battle of the war in the Pacific. Furthermore, planning facilitated a North African campaign within six months of Germany's declaration of war against the United States.[15]

The United States' ability to quickly mobilize and deploy was not perfect. However, in comparison to the Spanish American War and WWI, the relative efficiency of mobilization and deployment for WWII testifies to the value of war planning. Considering the United States advantages in resources and industry, the capability to mobilize and deploy those resources proved to be a major advantage. The ability to project combat power faster than either Germany or Japan expected contributed to the US war effort. United States planning advantages in deployment and mobilization did not mean there were not challenges. President Roosevelt's production priorities hampered US Army leaders' ability to properly equip the Army for modern combat. Historian Mark Calhoun, in his description of the difficulty the United States experienced in mobilization, has argued that the "availability of army equipment remained limited and its fielding unpredictable long after protective mobilization, and even combat deployments, began." Despite these challenges, the ability of the US military to project power

[15] Bidwell, *History of the Military Intelligence Division,* 339, 334, 411-412; George S. Pappas, *Prudens Futuri: The US Army War College 1901-1967* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The Alumni Association of the US Army War College, 1967), 2, 117; Quotes come from Gole, *The Road to Rainbow*, xvi, 8, 18, 27; Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 56; Edward S. Miller, *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan 1897–1945* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991) 13; John Prados, *Islands of Destiny: The Solomon Campaign and the Eclipse of the Rising Sun* (New York, NY: Dutton Caliber Publishing, 2013), 350-353; Handel, *War, Strategy and Intelligence*, 65.

quickly still resulted in an advantage. Additionally, US mobilization and deployment strengths did not necessarily translate into immediate tactical success. However, having the right resources in the right place at the right time had immediate operational and strategic effects. These effects were possible due to the Army's emphasis, despite limited resources, on education and planning.[16]

Planning as a concept has many definitions. One definition comes from *Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 5-0, The Operations Process,* "planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about." Henry Mintzberg, an expert in business management and planning processes, provided an alternative view in his book, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, describing planning as a "formalized procedure to produce an articulated result, in the form of an integrated system of decisions." The Army definition narrowly assumes a plan will bring about the desired result. However, Mintzberg's definition offers a more expansive definition from which to analyze interwar planning. The distinction between the Army and Mintzberg's definition is important to understand that planning must be constantly evolving as the context changes. Inputs into planning from sources like intelligence provide contextual awareness that drives continued planning. Mintzberg further elaborated on the meaning of a "formal process" with three additional characteristics. The first characteristic is decomposition and is understood to be "reducing states and processes to their component parts." Planning involves some aspect of analysis to break down the current conditions and the desired future into component pieces. Mintzberg's notion of decomposition fits with his next characteristic, which is rationality. Rationality refers to a formal, systematic, and structured process. Planning must be factual, logical, and realistic. Rationalization

[16] David Stahel, *The Battle for Moscow* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 179-180. Stahel gives an excellent example of US resources making a small impact at the right time and place in the battle for Moscow, 1941; quotation from Mark T. Calhoun, *General Lesley J. McNair: Unsung Architect of the US Army* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 211-212; Gole, *The Road to Rainbow*, xvi-xvii.

is also inherently analytical and reductionist which is a very similar idea to decomposition. The final characteristic of a formalized process is articulation. The formal process for planning must be articulated so others inside and outside the planning group can understand the process. These characteristics and Mintzberg's definition of planning provide a useful lens through which to assess interwar intelligence planning.[17]

Mintzberg also provides a reason for planning. His reasons for planning aid in understanding interwar planning. Mintzberg outlines four reasons for planning. In brief, Mintzberg's four reasons to conduct planning are to coordinate, to take the future into account by preparing for the inevitable or preempting the undesirable, to be as rational as possible, and to control the controllable. *ADP* 5-0 uses very different words, but similar ideas, in providing the reasoning for Army planning. According to *ADP* 5-0, "Army leaders plan to create a common vision among subordinate commanders, staffs, and unified action partners for the successful execution of operations." Within the Army's reasoning for planning we see similar ideas in the coordination among military echelons and between partners, taking the future into account through the creation and communication of a vision, and controlling the outcome. Mintzberg's concept of rationality is also addressed within the *ADP* 5-0 as different planning methodologies. Interwar planners both fulfilled Mintzberg's vision and validated the modern US Army's doctrinal reasons for planning.[18]

During the interwar period, the military did not consider military intelligence a separate branch of the services. Only in 1967 did military intelligence become a distinct branch of service. Before 1967, infantry, cavalry, artillery, or signal officers performed duties as intelligence

---

[17] US Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Publication 5-0*, *Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 6; Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning* (New York, NY. The Free Press, 1994), 12-14, 31-32.

[18] Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning* (New York. The Free Press, 1994), 16-18; US Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Publication 5-0*, *Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 6-7.

officers. These officers served as G-2s for all staff organizations throughout the Army. On many occasions, these officers continued performing intelligence duties reaching high levels of competency. The WDGS MID G-2 formed the primary intelligence staff organization at the Army level. The MID performed the intelligence analysis and wrote the relevant intelligence annexes to Army war plans. The WPD G-2 served as the link between the MID and the WPD ensuring all war and mobilization plans were supported.[19]

The MID contributed to interwar education and training. Members of the MID maintained close indirect ties to the WPD section for training participating in the intelligence training management of the Army. One important means of participation involved observing the intelligence duties of tactical level organizations conducting field exercises and other training. Additionally, the MID maintained ties to the ACTS and CGSC to ensure quality intelligence training for junior officers. Perhaps the most important training and education duty for the MID involved the AWC. The MID facilitated AWC exercises and problems with intelligence products. The MID also observed officers working as G-2s at different points throughout the curriculum.[20]

MID work supported much of the interwar planning and education effort. Intelligence officers within the MID published collection requirements to the foreign attachés, analyzed the data received, and published reports. Members of the MID would conduct open source data collection and research to obtain the economic, political, social, cultural, geographical, and financial information required for planning. The intelligence personnel maintained all the open source information with folders containing military information for various countries. The MID was responsible for intelligence mobilization planning and estimates of enemy capabilities to

[19] Finley, *Military Intelligence History*, 232; Bidwell, *History of the Military Intelligence Division,* 343.

[20] Bidwell, *History of the Military Intelligence Division,* 413-417.

support adjacent department mobilization planning. Further, the MID directly contributed to each of the WPDs war plans.[21]

The MID provided detailed annexes for WPD mobilization and war plans. The WPD developed color plans with each color representing a specific country. As an example, Plan Red represented Great Britain and Plan Black represented Germany. Plans existed for a variety of countries including, Italy, Mexico, Canada, and Australia. Probably the most famous example is the War Plan Orange (WPO) set against Japan. The 1933 AWC class serves as an example of MID and AWC influence in the process of war planning. The 1933 AWC class included both Captain William Halsey and a relatively unknown MAJ Philip Faymonville. The school tasked Halsey with leading the development of the United States, or Blue plan, while MAJ Faymonville developed the Japanese WPO as the G-2. At the conclusion of the exercise, the MID incorporated MAJ Faymonville's enemy estimate into the intelligence annex of the real WPO. In this way, war planning included the AWC, MID, and the WPD.[22]

The AWC was crucial to interwar planning development. The AWC first received students in 1904. Since its inception, the AWC either worked directly under or assisted the General Staff. In so doing, the AWC courses tended to be very practical in nature. The National Defense Act of 1916 officially separated the War College from the General Staff. However, the practical nature of course work and the ties to the WDGS continued. Over the years, commandants of the AWC shaped the course in slightly different ways. The AWC curriculum changed in 1921 to reflect General Pershing's changes in the General Staff. This change included courses on each major staff section, G-1 Personnel, G-2 Intelligence, G-3 Operations, and G-4 Logistics. Starting in 1922, Major General Edward McGlachlin further adapted the AWC course

---

[21] Gole, *The Road to Rainbow*, 35-36; Bidwell, *History of the Military Intelligence Division,* 344-339, 411-417; Mahnken, *Uncovering Ways of War*, 28.

[22] Bidwell, *History of the Military Intelligence Division,* 339, 334; Gole, *The Road to Rainbow*, 40, 190 no. 3.

in several ways. McGlachlin's first adaptation incorporated the interagency of the day and the National Guard as AWC students. The major subdivisions of the academic year included preparation for war and conduct of war. While the AWC used different names for these major subdivisions of the courseware, nevertheless, continuity existed between 1922 and 1946. The second major institutional change involved changing the emphasis from staff work to command. This change did not ostracize good staff work or diminish its importance. In fact, students were formed into staff sections to do detailed staff work before the command related portions of the curriculum. This practical work within student committees' involved analysis of actual war plans. Future AWC commandants only made superficial changes to McGlachlin's vision. McGlachlin's changes were important because it resulted in exercises and problem solving that ultimately informed planning and commander decision making during WWII.[23]

The AWC quickly became a type of think tank for Army strategic and operational planning and thought. General Malin Craig consistently turned to the AWC "for imaginative planning" during his tenure as Army Chief of Staff. The WPD during the 1930s consisted of a dozen officers requiring a close relationship between the AWC and WPD. The AWC provided a convenient pool of experiences and competent officers to annually analyze, war game, and recommend adjustments to actual war plans. The AWC became a venue that allowed professional officers the time to think, exchange thoughts, reflect, and provide original ideas to solve anticipated problems. In fact, the problem sets became more specific as WWII loomed. From

[23] Gole, *The Road to Rainbow*, 18; Pappas, *Prudens Futuri,* 85-86, 89-93, 114-117, 125-127, 129; Harry P. Ball, *Of Responsible Command: A History of the U.S. Army War College* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The Alumni Association of the US Army War College, 1984), 180-206, 233; Matheny, *Carrying the War to the Enemy*, 57-58.

1934 to 1940, the AWC considered strategic and operational problems of high interest to the WPD.[24]

The Participation with Allies exercise, an AWC initiative, began in 1934. This event challenged students to conduct planning as part of a coalition fighting another enemy coalition. As Gole describes, several of these exercises "began to look like a dress rehearsal for World War II." These important exercises not only gave officers repetitions in planning from the lens of a coalition but also provided an opportunity for officers to learn command decision making as part of a coalition. General Fox Connor, a mentor to Dwight Eisenhower, argued "dealing with an enemy is a simple and straight forward matter when compared with securing close cooperation with an ally," explaining that he would prefer to fight an enemy alliance rather than a single country—and the larger the alliance the better. His point on the difficulty of coalition warfare illustrates the importance of the Participation with Allies exercise.[25]

The AWC support to the Army's colored plans eventually had a direct impact on the Army's Rainbow series of war plans. The Rainbow plans are the manifestation of coalition plans in the Joint Planning Board (JPB) through the WPD's JPC. The JPB and JPC were created in 1903 to coordinate inter-service activities and planning. Between 1934 and 1940, the results of AWC planning and intelligence analysis were nearly identical to the actual conceptual scheme of the United States in WWII. Of note, was the analysis done by the AWC class of 1936. This particular class produced recommendations that likely influenced later classes leading up to WWII. A committee group briefed a solution during the 1936 Participation with Allies exercise that "actually anticipated what happened in WWII" and unknowingly paved the way for future

---

[24] Gole, *The Road to Rainbow*, 25-26, 103, 113. Gole's quote from General Fox Connor on page 30 came from MHI, Course at the AWC, 1933-34, Preparation for War Course, 2d Part, War Plans Period, War Plans Group 4, "Participation with Allies," tab 3, 15.

[25] Gole, *The Road to Rainbow*, 25-30, 65. Gole's quote from General Fox Connor on page 30 came from MHI, Course at the AWC, 1933-34, Preparation for War Course, 2d Part, War Plans Period, War Plans Group 4, "Participation with Allies," tab 3, 15.

"dress rehearsals" of WWII. The 1936 exercise emphasized a maximum effort to defeat Germany and Italy while the Navy held the Japanese at bay in the Pacific. Many of the mobilization and deployment figures were very similar to future events. AWC classes of 1937 to 1940 built on the work of the 1936 class. One of the students of the 1936 class, LTC Charles Willoughby, would later serve as General MacArthur's G-2 throughout the war. Before the fall of France in 1940, the AWC actually wrote Rainbow X, which formed the principle elements of the actual plan to defeat Germany and Japan. Rainbow X included most of the elements that the AWC exercised since 1936, with one unique difference. Rainbow X assumed a German dominated Europe. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, professional officers of the AWC, supported by updated intelligence from the MID, were able to supply the WPD with annually updated coalition war plans keeping track with developments in the worldwide strategic context. Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between the WPD, MID, and the JPB. Throughout the interwar period, a dynamic but crucial relationship existed between these three groups.[26]

[26] Gole, *The Road to Rainbow*, 25-26, 65, 107-108, 114, 120-121, 125; Matheny, *Carrying the War to the Enemy*, 212; Miller, *War Plan Orange*, 13.



Figure 1. Relationship between the WDGS, MID, WPD, AWC, and the Joint Board. Gole, *The Road to Rainbow*, 32-35, 139, 164-169; Bidwell, *History of the Military Intelligence Division*, 258, 342; Matheny, *Carrying the War to the Enemy*, 65.

Analysis of Intelligence's Interwar Planning Contribution

Intelligence, education, and planning maintained a reciprocal relationship during the interwar period with each influencing development in the other. This phenomenon is explained using Thomas Kuhn's model for the structure of intelligence revolutions applied to the historical continuities of intelligence, education, and planning. Figure 2 illustrates the paradigm testing of intelligence, education, and planning. These continuities first emerged in the Civil War as military leaders recognized the need for intelligence collection, analysis, and application to war planning. Unfortunately, this discovery did not lead to any changes lasting beyond the end of the Civil War. Further, military leaders did not recognize the strength of peacetime contingency planning. Two events served as the crisis needed to push the US Army into a period of paradigm testing—the Spanish American War and WWI.



Figure 2. U.S. Army Paradigm Testing in Intelligence, Education, and War Plans. Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, Preface, 10, 52-53, 64, 67, 92, 143-146.

The Spanish American War, while successful, comprised a crisis for the military. The difficulty of recruiting equipping, and deploying troops to Cuba and the Philippines posed difficulties the United States had never faced up to that time. Even the deployment of troops in the Mexican American War did not compare to the Spanish American War. War with Mexico required relatively little cooperation between the Army and Navy with the only exception being General Scott's landing at Vera Cruz. In contrast, a war with Spain required Joint action against a better trained, equipped, and financed military spanning half the globe. The Spanish American War exposed the antiquated nature of the US staff system. While military leaders going back to Washington had advocated for a more efficient staff system, the Spanish American War provided the final crisis that forced action.[27]

[27] Pappas, *Prudens Futuri,* 86; James D. Hittle, *The Military Staff: Its History and Development* (Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1961), 195-196; Miller, *War Plan Orange*, 13.

Would War I is the second crisis faced by the US military. The Army mobilized and deployed troops more smoothly in WWI than in the Spanish American War. Cooperation between the Army and Navy improved during the war due to the creation of the Joint Board in 1903. However, the United States was not prepared for warfare on the scale of WWI. The industrial mobilization and the planning knowledge required to equip, deploy, and employ a modern army in France was beyond the capabilities of many army officers. WWI started a period of paradigm testing. Military leaders did not require perfect solutions but constantly sought the best possible fit for the strategic and operational context. Kuhn labeled this idea probabilistic verification. After 1922, the staff system remained relatively unchanged. Next, leaders spent the interwar period testing the outcome of military conflict using current, planning, intelligence, and technological capabilities. The interwar education system, especially the AWC, proved key to testing military outcomes.[28]

Even before an official intelligence branch of service existed, intelligence played a crucial role in the United States' peacetime preparation for war. The AWC, supported by the MID, enabled the WPD and the WDGS to maintain flexibility against emergent changes in the strategic context. Eventually, the WPD directly translated the annual war gaming and planning conducted at the AWC into strategic plans executed throughout WWII. Figure 3 illustrates the AWC's contribution to interwar planning and the MID's contribution to strategic development. The MID's most important contribution to the various Army and Navy theater strategies lay in the continual reassessment of the strategic context before WWII. This ensured that exercises and war games at the WPD or the AWC were incorporating the emergent elements of strategy inherent in the ever-changing strategic context before WWII.

[28] Pappas, *Prudens Futuri,* 86.



Figure 3. Army War College's Contribution to Interwar Planning. Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, 24.

The MID maintained indirect influence over military intelligence training which enabled methods in collection and analysis to keep pace with technological innovation. The MID maintained ties to intelligence training through the WPD training section to Army schools including CGSC and AWC. The MID also maintained relationships with the intelligence training conducted at ACTS retaining a crucial wartime tie with the air service. The MID's influence was critical for maintaining standards for intelligence across the Army resulting in greater shared understanding among intelligence officers at the beginning of the war.

Intelligence benefited from interwar education. The AWC provided three key advantages for intelligence and planning during WWII. First, the AWC demonstrated the importance of intelligence work and the need for keeping intelligence estimates current. The MID provided updated estimates to both the WPD and the AWC for use in the exercises. The real-world intelligence aided in accurate plans the WPD put to the JPC. Eventually, approved Rainbow plans would result. The second advantage included a smooth transition to war at the start of WWII. The AWC provided the education and command exercises incorporating US and allied armies ultimately producing commanders who better understood the operational and strategic context of WWII. Future commanders and G-2s better understood what they knew and what they needed to

know for successful operations. Finally, the AWC provided shared understanding between intelligence and operations. Intelligence benefited from officers selectively performing intelligence duties that supported planning exercises. At the senior levels of the Army, this fostered an integration of intelligence with operations.

Understanding interwar links between intelligence, education, and planning are crucial to understanding WWII. Recognizing the continuities of intelligence collection that began after WWI describes the methods and capabilities that would be used during WWII. Recognizing both the continuities and contingencies of interwar planning paradigm testing shows how the United States entered WWII with war plans that strategic and operational level leaders helped create and fully understood. Leaders also understood the intelligence supporting the plans. This created a climate of shared understanding throughout the upper echelons of the officer corps.

WWII Case Studies

The United States entered WWII with a set of war plans and a strong sense of shared understanding within the professional officer corps. The real-world intelligence injects and the detailed analysis done by students during AWC exercises, especially the coalition warfare exercises of the 1930s, were instrumental in creating a positive condition in 1941. This annual work by AWC students captured the emergent changes in the strategic context of the late 1930s and early 1940s. The work of the AWC and the dissemination of their results fostered a common understanding of the threats, the intended, and deliberate strategies to defeat several different threats, and a common, albeit broad, methodology for developing plans.

Case studies of the Pacific Southwest Area (SWPA) illustrate the theater and operational level implication to the trends set in the interwar period. Specifically, analysis of the fall of the Philippines and the recapture of the Philippines illustrate the role of intelligence and the broad planning approach to theater strategy. Significantly, the interwar planning was conducted at the grand strategic level while the case studies illustrate the theater strategic and upper operational levels of war and planning. The grand strategic level of planning occurred at the WDGS after the

beginning of WWII. The AWC ceased classes during the war; however, the WPD and the General Staff expanded, enabling those organizations to conduct planning and analysis on a constant basis without the AWC students. The WDGS continued operating in much the same way, as during the interwar period, except for a greatly enhanced organic analytical and planning capacity. Pacific theater case studies show the same methodology being used outside of Washington on the other side of the world. The Pacific theaters and the Philippines in particular, are important for several reasons. One, the Pacific was the focus area for WPO, one of the most exercised United States war plans in history. Two, the Pacific theater is the scene of Army operations for nearly the entire first year of the war before Operation Torch launches in November of 1942. Therefore, this theater provides the earliest picture of Army plans and their execution. Finally, several of the key characters involved in Army operations in the Pacific have ties to the AWC and remain the same throughout the war.

By the time WWII begins, Lieutenant General Douglas MacArthur had been in the Philippines for four years and in overall command of the United States Army Forces Far-East (USAFFE) for over four months. After the creation of the SWPA, General MacArthur served as the commander throughout the war. General MacArthur and his staff serve from the Japanese invasion of the Philippines to the surrender of Japan. Colonel Charles A. Willoughby, one of General MacArthur's prominent staff officers, served as MacArthur's G-2 from July of 1941 to the end of the war. Colonel Willoughby graduated from the AWC in 1936. The 1936 class of the AWC is significant due to that years "Participation with Allies" coalition warfare exercise. The results of the exercise were nearly identical to the actual event of WWII in the Pacific. Students identified the friendly and enemy coalitions, how the war would start, how the coalition partnerships would evolve, the broad course of the war, and the eventual outcome. The 1936 solution closely resembled the war plan executed by the United States, Rainbow V. Colonel Willoughby commissioned into the infantry in 1916 for service in WWI. He was well educated and taught at the collegiate level before service overseas. While overseas in France, Willoughby

joined the Army Air Corps, trained with the French, and eventually flew in combat and taught at the US Army aviation school in Chateauroux. After WWI, Willoughby's formal intelligence career began in 1923 working for the MID as an attaché in South America. In 1929, Willoughby attended CGSC and subsequently AWC in 1936. In 1939, the Army posted Willoughby in the Philippines where he became MacArthur's G-2 for the USAFFE and eventually the SWPA. Throughout his time in the Army Willoughby served as a soldier scholar teaching and writing prolifically.[29]

Three criteria enable the evaluation of each case study. The first criterion, intentionality, refers to the general planning process. Borrowing from Mintzberg, intentionality reveals the conceptual nature of an intended strategy, as opposed to the more detailed and deliberate strategy. This evolution in planning must take emergent changes of the strategic context into account. The second criterion, intelligence reveals whether intelligence provided inputs into the strategy, thus enabling intentionality. Finally, flexibility determines whether the case describes an iterative planning process that provided multiple opportunities to adjust the plan due to emergent changes in the strategic context. Together, these criteria demonstrate some of the same attributes of the interwar planning methodology practices at the WDGS. Viewed through the lens of these criteria, the case studies illustrate the end of the paradigm testing of the interwar period, leading to the new continuity of United States Army planning in the Pacific during WWII.

Case Study: Loss of the Philippines

After the Spanish American War of 1898, the United States became a global power with several acquisitions in the Pacific. Notably, the Philippines became a US possession and eventual commonwealth. The Philippine islands sit at the heart of the Southwest Pacific, making the island

[29] Gole, *The Road to Rainbow*, 13, 16, 25; James P. Finley, "Charles Willoughby: World War II Intelligence in the Pacific Theater," in *Masters of the Intelligence Art* (Fort Huachuca, AZ: US Army Intelligence Center, 1999), 1-4. Accessed April 03, 2019. https://web.archive.org/web/20100331105728/http://www.huachuca.army.mil/sites/History/PDFS/MWILLOU.pdf.

network key terrain with its central position roughly equidistant from Japan, China, Burma, French Indochina, Malaya, Thailand, and the Netherland Indies. Additionally, the Philippines fall directly between Japan and vital natural resources like oil and rubber found in the Indies. The Japanese required these resources to wage war throughout the Pacific and Asia. Significantly, the Philippines lay only 3,070 kilometers southwest of Japan, and Formosa (present day Taiwan) served in 1941 as the nearest Japanese airbase to the Philippines—a mere 1,205 kilometers away. By contrast, more than 8,700 kilometers separates the Philippines from the Hawaiian Islands.[30]

US strategic planners realized both the importance and the vulnerability of the Philippines. Since the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, the army and navy began planning for war in the Pacific, anticipating between 1906 and 1941 that the United States would go to war with Japan at some point. WPO became the epicenter of America's operational plans for war with Japan. The WPD continued to update these plans regularly until incorporation into the Rainbow series of plans just before WWII. They consistently featured loss of the Philippines in the event of war with Japan as a key assumption. The Philippines were situated too far away from the United States relative to the Japanese, with their powerful navy and army in easy striking distance.[31]

This assumption changed in the summer of 1941, when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, leaders of the allied powers, and senior officers in both the US Army and US Navy expressed support for a strong defense of the Philippines in the event of war. In May of 1941, President Roosevelt declared China vital to US security. A strong Philippines would enable military support to China and interdiction of Japanese shipping by serving as a base for the new B-17 heavy bomber, which had demonstrated its capabilities during recent service in the

[30] Louis. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, US Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1993), 4, 80. The Japanese would eventually use Formosa as the staging area for the invasion of the Philippines.

[31] Louis Morton, "War Plan Orange: Evolution of a Strategy," *World Politics* Vol 11, no 2 (January 1959): 221-223; Miller, *War Plan Orange*, 22-25.

European Theater. Additionally, the Battle of Britain had ended with a successful air defense of an island nation against superior odds. Further, a strong Philippines served British, Dutch, and Australian interests by either deterring or delaying Japanese invasions of their Pacific colonies. Major General Henry "Hap" Arnold, chief of the Army Air Forces, strongly supported placing a robust bomber presence within the Philippines to enable a strong strategic defensive capability. The Navy supported strengthening the Philippines since their Pacific fleet could remain safely based in Hawaii. At the time, retired General Douglas MacArthur supported the idea and promised he could raise 200,000 Filipino troops to protect the Philippines. These developments led to another major departure from the traditional Army approach to defending the Philippines.[32]

Since airfields were a critical requirement for the B-17s, MacArthur would need to defend the Philippines on the beaches and not be able to trade space for time in a withdrawal to Bataan and Corregidor. This type of defense suited MacArthur but he would need a large Army to defend all the key beaches in the Philippines. The B-17 would also assist in the operational defense of the Philippines. Important to any defense of the Philippines would include the strike capability of the B-17 bombers, the only aircraft capable of outranging the Japanese zero, and therefore, capable of striking Japanese airfields on Formosa.[33]

On July 26, 1941, Roosevelt recalled MacArthur to active duty, created the United States Army Forces Far East (USAFFE) under MacArthur, and incorporated all Philippine military forces into the Army of the United States (see Table 1 for strategic context). MacArthur would now enjoy the top priority of support the United States could offer. Time was necessary for any

---

[32] Maurice Matloff, and Edwin M. Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare*. US Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953), 67-70; Louis Morton, *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years*, US Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 2000), 76, 80-89; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 31-32, 37-39.

[33] Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 61-71. It is significant that Louis Morton notes that out of 913 US aircraft scattered overseas, over half the total bombers and one-sixth of the total fighters were located in the Philippines at the beginning of WWII.

reinforcement of the Philippines, but Marshall hoped the B-17 might serve as a deterrent to the Japanese and help buy six months to a year for the reinforcement of the Philippines.[34]

Table 1. Strategic Context for the Fall of the Philippines.

Strategic Context for the Fall of the Philippines	
26 July 1941	Major General MacArthur called to active duty. The next day he is promoted to Lieutenant General; USAFFE established
07 December 1941	Japanese attack Peal Harbor and temporarily neutralize the offensive capability of the Pacific fleet
December 1941	Acadia Conference meets to determine allied strategy in the Pacific
08 December 1941 (07 December Hawaii time)	Japanese attack the Philippines from Formosa; Japanese attack US Wake and Guam Islands, British Malaya, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand
10 December 1941	Japanese begin preliminary invasions of the Philippines Islands
11 December 1941	Japanese attack Burma
15 December 1941	The Far East Air Force (FEAF) is completely destroyed. The majority of the destruction occurred on the ground over a series of attacks starting on 08 December 1941. The few remaining B-17 fly to Australia
23 December 1941	Japanese begin main invasion landings; MacArthur decides to withdrawal to Bataan
25 December 1941	Hong Kong surrenders
07 January – 03 April 1942	Siege of Bataan
14 February 1942	United States decides to send troops to Australia
15 February 1942	British garrison in Singapore surrenders
11 March 1942	President Roosevelt orders MacArthur to leave the Philippines
08 April 1942	Major General King surrenders all forces on Bataan
18 April 1942	Doolittle Raid
06 May 1942	Lieutenant General Wainwright surrenders all forces on the Philippines from Corregidor island
08 May 1942	Battle of the Coral Sea

Source: William H. Mary, *Chronology: 1941-1945*. US Army in World War II, Special Study (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1989), 3-37.

The strategic context changed again upon the outbreak of war in the Pacific. On 07 December 1941 the Japanese temporarily neutralized the offensive capability of the United States Pacific fleet with a surprise attack of Hawaii, followed immediately by an assault on the Philippines and the seizure of Wake, Guam, British Malaya, Hong Kong, Thailand, and Singapore. Within a week of attacking the Philippines, the Japanese destroyed the Far East Air Force's (FEAF) fighter and bomber capability, predominantly on the ground. Capitalizing on the destruction of United States' air capability, the Japanese 14th Army conducted a successful amphibious landing on the main Philippine island of Luzon from December 20-23, 1941 (see Figure 4). MacArthur's inability to prevent the main Japanese landings and the destruction of the

[34] Louis Morton, *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years*, US Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 2000), 97-100.

FEAF forced a change in the plan. On December 23rd, MacArthur decided to withdrawal to the Bataan peninsula similar to previous versions of WPO. Unfortunately, MacArthur did not stockpile any supplies in Bataan for a protracted siege. Between late December and early January, MacArthur conducted a retrograde back to Bataan defensive positions. After the siege of Bataan stabilized, Roosevelt ordered MacArthur to leave Corregidor Island and turn command over to Lieutenant General Jonathan M. Wainwright. In less than two months, on May 6, 1942, the Philippines fell to the Japanese.[35]

[35] William H. Mary, *Chronology: 1941-1945*. US Army in World War II, Special Study (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1989), 3-37; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 92-97, 125-132, 161-166, 245-259, 353-366; Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare*, 120; Louis Morton, *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years*, 131-139, 181-185, 193-195, 264-268; Thomas M. Huber, "The U.S. Bataan Campaign December 1941 to April 1942," in *The U.S. Army and WWII: Selected Papers from the Army's Commemorative Conferences*, ed. by Judith L. Bellafaire (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1998), 74-79, 91-92.



PLATE NO. 1
The Japanese Conquests which Isolated General MacArthur's Forces in the Philippines]

Figure 4. The Japanese Conquests which Isolated General MacArthur's Forces in the Philippines. *Reports of General MacArthur, vol. 1: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific*, xvi.

The political situation and the large numbers of friendly casualties played a greater role in the initial battle of the Philippines than intelligence. Despite a high level of alert, intelligence ultimately failed to provide early warning. After the initial Japanese attacks, the loss of the FEAF drove MacArthur's key decision to abandon the beach defense plan. With no FEAF to protect, MacArthur decided to withdrawal to the Bataan peninsula.[36]

Intelligence continued to play a tactical role in the campaign even if it did not drive operational level planning or decisions after the Japanese attack. Combat units collected HUMINT with assistance from networks of informants left behind in civilian and administrative positions in the Philippines. Informants operated among the Japanese population in the Philippines and facilitated operations like the air raids that destroyed the FEAF early in the campaign, making counter-intelligence very important to intelligence planners. SIGINT and IMINT remained important as well, particularly in providing intelligence on the capabilities and intent of the Japanese during the withdrawal and siege of Bataan. Nevertheless, intelligence did not drive operations during the fall of the Philippines.[37]

MacArthur and Marshall understood the intended strategy of the Rainbow plan for the Philippines. In the summer of 1941, that strategy changed due to changes in the strategic context. The decision to defend the Philippines represented a major shift in US strategy. However, due to events in the first week of the war, MacArthur shifted back to the original intent of the Rainbow 5 plan to retrograde to the Bataan peninsula. Although planning for operations in the Philippines included both intended and flexible elements, both involved reactions to enemy effects, rather than intelligence-driven preemption or prevention of expected enemy actions.

---

[36] Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 80, 122; Louis Morton, *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years*, 181-182.

[37] Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 117-118; Drea, *ULTRA Codebreaking*, 16; General MacArthur's Staff, *Reports of General MacArthur, vol. 1, The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1994), 6, 8.

Case Study: Recapture of the Philippines

The first two years of WWII in the Pacific closely mirrored the situation the Navy and Army anticipated in the 1930s versions of WPO. Since 1935, this included a slow advance across the Pacific towards the Philippines. The attack on Pearl Harbor further undercut any expectations for a swift advance across the Pacific. Upon his appointment to command, MacArthur sparked significant changes to America's Pacific strategy, advocating for a return to the Philippines as soon as he arrived in Australia. MacArthur argued for an advance similar to the 1938 AWC solution to a war with Japan. In 1938, when Willoughby attended the AWC, this solution included an advance through the Southwest Pacific along the southern edge of the New Guinean coast towards Mindanao in the Philippines. In 1942, MacArthur advocated an approach along the North New Guinean coast, mutually supporting a Navy drive through the Central Pacific.[38]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) debated a strategy that included a return to the Philippines throughout 1942 to 1944. Both Army and Navy planners split on the question whether, and when to invade the Philippines. From 1942 to 1944, the consensus slowly drifted towards an invasion of the Philippines. The chief competitor in the minds of many planners was Formosa. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Earnest J. King strongly urged bypassing the Philippines in favor of an attack on Formosa. An attack on Formosa would enable support to China and cut off Japanese lines of communication to the East Indies. However, the general staff quickly recognized a major drawback within King's concept. Any attack on Formosa placed combat units and the Navy's fleet carriers both within striking range of Japanese land-based aircraft, and out of range of supporting friendly land-based aircraft. Further, the Japanese defenses would still require significant reduction to prevent staging of land-based air attacks from multiple directions. These

[38] Louis Morton, *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years*, 447; Matheny, *Carrying the War to the Enemy*, 85-91; Miller, *War Plan Orange*, 180-185, 331-346; Robert R. Smith, *The Approach to the Philippines*, US Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1996), 3-6.

tasks required tremendous Army and Navy resources that would not be available until late 1944 at the earliest.[39]

MacArthur led the Philippines faction aimed at seizing the island chain before moving on to either Formosa or striking Japan itself from bases in the Philippines, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima. MacArthur based his argument around resources, land-based air power, logistics, and politics. Seizing the Philippines would cut the Japanese lifeline to the natural resources of the Dutch Indies just as effectively as would an attack on Formosa, and MacArthur insisted that he could accomplished this almost immediately and with the resources currently available. A base within the Philippines enabled land-based aircraft to support future operations in Formosa or the Japanese home islands. Further, the Philippines' excellent port facilities and airfields could easily support the buildup of the logistical and combat capacity needed to invade the Japanese home islands. Finally, the United States needed to return to the Philippines as a point of national pride and to show solidarity with the Philippine people.[40]

The JCS did not confirm a return to the Philippines until September of 1944. Changes in the strategic context prompted a final decision for a return to the Philippines. As a shaping operation to Admiral Nimitz's invasion of Pelelieu, Admiral Halsey attacked the Philippines from September 7 to 14, 1944. Halsey met very little resistance while the raid destroyed a large number of aircraft and shipping within the Philippines. Halsey's raid on the Philippines confirmed Navy and Army intelligence estimates regarding Japanese strength in Mindanao and Leyte. Further, Japan's tepid resistance and high casualty rates during the raid demonstrated the weakness of Japanese land-based air power on the Philippines. Halsey immediately recommended to Nimitz a change in the Pacific Oceans Area (POA) concept of operations in favor of a more aggressive

---

[39] Robert R. Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, US Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1993), 3-17.

[40] Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, 3-17; Milan Vego, *The Battle for Leyte, 1944* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 90-94.

attack by MacArthur in Leyte Gulf. After receiving concurrence from MacArthur's headquarters, the JCS ordered MacArthur to invade Leyte on October 20, 1944. Finally, the order MacArthur had coveted since 1942 finally arrived.[41]

Both the concept and the detailed plan for these operations underwent several revisions. The Philippines, as operational key terrain within both the SWPA and the POA, enabled both basing and operational reach for land-based aircraft and naval forces. Starting in early 1943, MacArthur's staff began to produce conceptual plans that included a return to the Philippines. An outline of the timing for the various planning iterations of MacArthur's staff is included in Table 2. The Reno series of plans did not focus solely on a return to the Philippines but always integrated operations meant to return to the US possession. The broader Reno plan went through five different iterations as the strategic context changed between February 1943 to June of 1944. The month after MacArthur's staff published Reno V, they published Musketeer I. The Musketeer plans were operational level plans for the seizure of the Philippines. Musketeer included timed and phased transitions with contingency plans achieving operational and strategic objectives. Historian Michael Matheny has described the Reno and Musketeer plans as "an excellent example of operational art." Both plans enabled MacArthur to fully develop both the broader concept and the specific details of the operation while remaining flexible enough to respond to changes in the environment. Many times, these changes included new directives from the JCS, as they exercised overall control of resources, pulling and loosening the reins of the SWPA and POA as appropriate.[42]

---

[41] Hamlin M. Canon, *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines*. US Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1993), 8-9; *The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific,* 172-174; Matheny, *Carrying the War to the Enemy*, 219; Walter Krueger, *From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of Sixth Army in World War II* (Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 1953), 143.

[42] Vego, *The Battle for Leyte,* 95-107; *The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific,* 166-172; Matheny, *Carrying the War to the Enemy*, 216-221.

Table 2. Planning Evolution for the Capture of the Philippines.

Planning Evolution for the Capture of the Philippines	
06 May 1942	Philippines Fall
08 May 1942	Battle of the Coral Sea
04-07 June 1942	Battle of Midway
25 February 1943	MacArthur submits plan RENO to JCS (Conceptual plan to recapture the Philippines)
30 June 1943 – 20 March 1944	Operation CARTWHEEL (Reduction of the Japanese fortress at Rabaul)
August 1943	RENO II
20 October 1943	RENO III
06 March 1944	RENO IV
March 1944	Japanese first plan to defend the Philippines
June 1944	RENO V
10 July 1944	MacArthur submits Musketeer I (Theater level detailed plan to recapture the Philippines with both branches and sequels)
29 August 1944	Musketeer II
28 September 1944	Musketeer III (Bypasses Mindanao based on intelligence and Naval operations against the Philippines)
08 September 1944	JCS issues order to invade the Philippines
20 October 1944 – 15 August 1945	Philippines Campaign
23-26 October 1944	Battle of Leyte Gulf

Source: William H. Mary, *Chronology: 1941-1945*. US Army in World War II, Special Study (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1989), 3-37, 95, 115-182, 211-316, 551; General MacArthur's Staff, *Reports of General MacArthur, vol. 1, The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific* (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 1994), 168-174; Matheny, *Carrying the War to the Enemy*, 216-221.

Each update of the Reno and Musketeer plans occurred due to changes in the strategic context and estimates of the enemy situation. These emergent changes originated from either the strategic or operational levels. As an example, the reduction instead of capture of Rabaul constituted a major change between Reno II and Reno III, while still maintaining overall focus on the recapture of the Philippines. In the case of Rabaul, estimates at the strategic level initiated the change. Conversely, an operational level raid on the Philippines by Halsey, and the associated intelligence analysis initiated the change from Musketeer II to Musketeer III. The new Musketeer plan called for the bypassing of Mindanao and the invasion of Leyte a month ahead of schedule. The Musketeer III plan (see Figure 5) describes the operational timeline within the various branches and sequels. Musketeer's major operations included the setting of conditions for the seizure of Luzon and the seizure of key terrain upon initiation of the attack. Finally, another major operation involved the reduction of the remaining Japanese strongholds bypassed during initial operations. Within these major operations, contingency plans existed to enable flexibility to

deal with evolving enemy dispositions and capabilities, enabling operational art in a manner envisioned in nearly twenty years of interwar planning.[43]

PLATE NO 67
"Musketeer III" Plan: Love and Mike Operations

[43] John Miller, *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*, US Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959), 222-225; Additionally, Operation Elkton, the detailed plan to reduce Rabaul, could serve as another example of a detailed plan maintained by MacArthur's staff showing itself to be remarkably flexible. Vego, *The Battle for Leyte,* 95-107; *The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific,* 170-174; Matheny, *Carrying the War to the Enemy*, 216-221.

Figure 5. The Japanese Invasion of the Philippines. *Reports of General MacArthur, Vol. 1: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific*, 244.

Beginning in 1942, through the initiation of operations, MacArthur's headquarters regularly adjusted both the concept and the detailed plan (in today's parlance, both the conceptual and the detailed planning) for the return to the Philippines. MacArthur's staff maintained intended strategies throughout this period, forecasting months and years into the future. These intended strategies allowed the staff to assess thoroughly changes in the enemy situation or the strategic context before commencing detailed planning. The detailed timing, phasing, and contingent nature of this operation ensured flexibility. In the three months between July and September of 1944, MacArthur's staff conducted three iterations of the Musketeer plan and then executed the plan in October. Willoughby's G-2 estimates informed the original plan and each subsequent adaptation to the plan. Extensive intelligence analysis informed MacArthur, and his subordinates, of Japanese capabilities throughout the islands using various forms of intelligence collection. MacArthur's staff linked strategy to tactics through operational art. Planning the operation started as intended operational plans at a conceptual level and later became detailed. Intelligence-driven and flexible plans resulted in the successful arrangement of basing to extend operational reach, thereby enabling the achievement of strategic and operational objectives.[44]

Analysis of Case Studies

The history of the Philippines in WWII reveals a stark contrast. The strategy before the fall of the Philippines did not illustrate the concepts learned during the interwar period. In contrast, the capture of the Philippines demonstrated a remarkable similarity to interwar planning

[44] Vego, *The Battle for Leyte,* 100-102; *Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific,* 180. In addition to aerial and signals intelligence, Pilipino guerillas supplied a large amount of the intelligence received by MacArthur's G-2 throughout the war. For a detailed description of the guerilla capabilities available to SWPA, see *Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific,* chapter X; Matheny, *Carrying the War to the Enemy*, 234-237.

(see Table 3). However, a quickly changing emergent strategic context typifies both the fall, and the return, to the Philippines.

Table 3. Criteria Analysis for Philippine Case Studies

Case Study	Criteria	Evaluation	Comments
Fall of the Philippines	Intended		Rainbow 5 provided a broad conceptual plan for the Philippines as a delaying action. Forces in the Philippines would retrograde to the Bataan Peninsula and delay the Japanese for an unknown amount of time. The strategic switch to deterrence using heavy bombers forced a perimeter defense of the Philippines.
	Flexible		There were no contingency plans.
	Intel Driven		The defense of the Philippines involved more reactions than intelligence driven actions by MacArthur and his forces.
Return to the Philippines	Intended		The plan for the Philippines included both conceptual and detailed plans.
	Flexible		The plan to return to the Philippines included branches and sequels.
	Intel Driven		Intelligence collection and analysis drove the plan to return to the Philippines.

Source: The author.

Leading up to and during the fall of the Philippines, US strategy included both intended and emergent elements. Emergent elements of the strategy included MacArthur's promised capability to defend the Philippines with Philippine troops, the recent British victory in the Battle of Britain, and the capabilities of the new B-17 bomber. The emergent elements of the strategy changed the intended strategy from strategic delay to deter. Unfortunately, the intended deterrence failed and the expected USAFFE capabilities did not survive beyond thirty-six hours into the war with Japan. Once the Japanese destroyed the bomber and fighter aircraft on the ground and successfully landed troops on Luzon, no reason existed to justify a continuation of the beach defense strategy. This left MacArthur with only one reasonable option—to fall back to the Bataan peninsula. Tragically, US forces had made no attempt to supply the Bataan peninsula for a siege. The result was a campaign with a realized strategy far different from pre-war strategic plans, as illustrated in Figure 6. The United States response to Japan's offensive in the Philippines did not demonstrate flexibility, and neither did intelligence influence MacArthur's decisions. In short, MacArthur's operations during the fall of the Philippines did not demonstrate the benefit of learning during interwar planning.



Figure 6. Strategy and the Fall of the Philippines. Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, 24.

The return to the Philippines case study illustrates MacArthur's use of an iterative planning process as seen in his staff's production of five Reno plans, which outlined his campaign in the Pacific as an anticipated drive to the Philippines. The Reno plans provided a conceptual road map for future operations. As MacArthur approached the Philippines, his staff produced three Musketeer plans based on both conceptual and detailed planning methods and focused specifically on the Philippines (see Figure 7). MacArthur's staff further sub-divided the Musketeer plans into operational level branches and sequels. These branches and sequels enabled flexibility to adapt to operational changes. A graphical depiction illustrating the planning for MacArthur's return to the Philippines is shown in Figure 8. Intelligence helped drive each staff planning iteration. Continuous intelligence assessment aided the staff in maintaining a relevant plan in the face of constant changes in the strategic and operational context. Therefore, MacArthur's return to the Philippines demonstrates the key ideas developed during the interwar years at the AWC. An important question remains. Namely, why did MacArthur's staff fail to demonstrate the benefit of learning from interwar strategic and operational planning efforts during the fall of the Philippines, but do as they planned for the return to the Philippines?



Figure 7. Conceptual and Detailed Planning in the Return to the Philippines. US Department of the Army, *Army Techniques Publication 5-0.1, Army Design Methodology* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 2-2.



Figure 8. Strategy and the Return to the Philippines. Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, 24.

One potential explanation for this disparity lies in possession of the initiative. Throughout the interwar period, both the US Army and the US Navy assumed that the United States would lose the Philippines quickly in a war with Japan. Planners assumed that the Japanese would seize

and retain the initiative due to the proximity of the Philippines to Japan. Various interwar solutions to the problem included a rapid naval counterattack against the Japanese fleet to relieve the Philippines. In the event, even before the attack on Pearl Harbor temporarily neutralized the Pacific fleet, the US Navy rejected any swift advance through the central Pacific as too risky. In fact, the United States did not seize the initiative until the Solomon Islands campaign. This stunted US efforts to conduct operational level intelligence collection. Still, this alone does not explain MacArthur's lack of flexible planning. This instead resulted primarily from a lack of contingency planning. MacArthur spent the first several days after the Japanese invasion in a state of indecision. Additionally, effective contingency planning could have revealed the benefit of dedicating resources to supply the Bataan peninsula, thereby delaying the eventual food shortages that made this a weak operational position for US forces. Regardless, MacArthur did not repeat his mistake in planning for his return to the Philippines.

Conclusion

The study of interwar planning for war with Japan and its ultimate execution reveals two primary conclusions. First, a paradigm shift occurred during the interwar period that dramatically changed how the US Army planned for future operations. This new interwar-planning model carried over into operations during WWII. Key ideas that permeated interwar planning included the combination of conceptual and detailed planning, the development of flexible plans, and the importance of intelligence to both operational planning and execution. Additionally, Army commanders and their staffs developed and used the modern concept of operational art. Concepts like basing, tempo, and operational reach, while not described in WWII Army doctrine as elements of operational art, influenced planning. The AWC proved critical to the WDGS's ability to conduct planning and in the education of future WWII senior Army officers. Each year a new class of officers became available to the WDGS to aid in planning. The annual classes of the AWC contributed to a culture of iterative planning. The planning conducted at the AWC influenced planning in WWII and likely set the foundation for modern Army planning.

The importance of intelligence development to planning lies at the heart of the second conclusion. The convergence of intelligence collection capabilities with interwar planning methodologies shaped the course of operations during WWII. The MID maintained constant informal relationships with the AWC, CGSC, ACTS, Signal Corps, and the operations section of the WPD. These relationships enabled the MID to maintain exposure to new technology and develop potential uses for intelligence collection. The MID also provided inputs into the AWC exercise scenarios. This process ensured that the AWC could conduct analysis and planning in the context of the real-world allowing work done by AWC students to be immediately applicable to the WPD. Additionally, the AWC incorporated intelligence as an equal partner in planning. A culture of valuing non-combat functional areas ensured success in WWII.

Two areas for future research could add to the study of interwar planning and its effects. One, a comparison and contrast of the different Axis and Allied approaches to interwar planning. Additionally, a history of the AWC interwar-planning methodology compared to US Army campaigns over time. Studies in these areas could describe the uniqueness of the AWC interwar planning and the effects it has had on the United States Army to the present day.

Study of the interwar period and its effects on later Army planning is important to understand. The work done before WWII has striking similarities to concepts described in today's US Army doctrine. For example, modern functional doctrine describes how different specialties contribute to the overall plan. This was important in WWII and it is even more important today in an era of great power competition across multiple domains. Today, the US Army uses conceptual planning that iteratively incorporates the changes to the strategic and operational context. More detailed campaign plans are exercised in war games to discover branches and sequels. Assumptions are captured and turned into facts. Intelligence maintains running estimates all over the world. Intelligence further develops future scenarios with indicators to provide early warning. The US Army's modern work in a complex world is not much different from our professional

predecessors who worked to create a culture of educated professional leaders that could integrate effectively their efforts to solve complex problems.

Bibliography

Ball, Harry P. *Of Responsible Command: A History of the U.S. Army War College*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: The Alumni Association of the US Army War College, 1984.

Bidwell, Bruce W. *History of the Military Intelligence Division Department of the General Staff*. Department of the Army, 1964.

Bigelow, Michael E. "A Short History of Army Intelligence." Federation of American Scientists*, US Army Selected Intelligence-Related Sources website (2012)*. Accessed January 5, 2016. https://fas.org/irp/agency/army/short.pdf.

Boyd, John R. "The Essence of Winning and Losing." Presentation given on June 28, 1995.

Calhoun, Mark T. *General Lesley J. McNair: Unsung Architect of the US Army*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2015.

Cannon, Hamlin M. *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines*. US Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1993.

Drea, Edward J. *MacArthur's ULTRA Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942-1945*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1992.

Finley, James P. "Charles Willoughby: World War II Intelligence in the Pacific Theater." In *Masters of the Intelligence Art*. Fort Huachuca, AZ: US Army Intelligence Center, 1999. Archived from the original PDF on March 31, 2010. Accessed April 03, 2019. https://web.archive.org/web/20100331105728/http://www.huachuca.army.mil/sites/History/PDFS/MWILLOU.pdf.

Finley, James P. *U.S. Army Military Intelligence History: A Sourcebook.* Fort Huachuca, AZ: US Army Intelligence Center & Fort Huachuca, 1995.

Finnegan, John P. *Military Intelligence.* Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1998.

Finney, Robert T. *History of the Air Corps Tactical School*. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Center for Air Force History, 1992.

Gaddis, Lewis J. *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past*. NY: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Gole, Henry G. *The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934-1940*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003.

———. “War Planning at the U.S. Army War College, 1934-1940: The Road to Rainbow.” In *The U.S. Army and WWII: Selected Papers from the Army's Commemorative Conferences*, edited by Judith L. Bellafaire. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1998.

Handel, Michael I., ed. *Intelligence and Military Operations*. Portland, OR: Frank Cass & Co Ltd., 1990.

———. *Leaders and Intelligence*. Portland, OR: Frank Cass & Co Ltd., 1989.

———. *War, Strategy and Intelligence*. Portland, OR: Frank Cass & Co Ltd., 1989.

Hittle, James D. *The Military Staff: Its History and Development.* Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1961.

Huber, Thomas M. “The U.S. Bataan Campaign December 1941 to April 1942.” In *The U.S. Army and WWII: Selected Papers from the Army's Commemorative Conferences*, edited by Judith L. Bellafaire. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1998.

Judge, Sean M. *The Turn of the Tide in the Pacific War: Strategic Initiative, Intelligence, and Command, 1941-1943*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2018.

Koch, Oscar W. *G-2: Intelligence for Patton*. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing Ltd., 1999.

Krueger, Walter. *From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of Sixth Army in World War II*. Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 1953.

Kuhn, Thomas S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

Lacey, Jim. *Keep From All Thoughtful Men*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011.

Mahnken, Thomas G. *Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918-1945*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.

Matheny, Michael R. *Carrying the War to the Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945.* Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012.

Matloff, Maurice, and Edwin M. Snell. *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942.* US Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1953.

Mary, William H. *Chronology: 1941-1945*. US Army in World War II, Special Study. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1989.

Miller, Edward S. *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan 1897–1945*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991.

Miller, John. *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. US Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959.

Mintzberg, Henry. *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*. New York, NY. The Free Press, 1994.

Morton, Louis. *The Fall of the Philippines*. US Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1993.

———. "War Plan Orange: Evolution of a Strategy." *World Politics* Vol 11, no 2 (January 1959): 221-250.

———. *Strategy and Command: the First Two Years*. US Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 2000.

Murray, Williamson and Allan R. Millett. *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Pappas, George S. *Prudens Futuri: The US Army War College 1901-1967*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: The Alumni Association of the US Army War College, 1967.

Prados, John. *Islands of Destiny: The Solomons Campaign and the Eclipse of the Rising Sun*. New York, NY: Dutton Caliber Publishing, 2013.

General MacArthur's Staff. *Reports of General MacArthur. Vol. 1, The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific.* Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1994.

Smith, Robert R. *The Approach to the Philippines*. US Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1996.

———. *Triumph in the Philippines*. US Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1993.

Stahel, David. *The Battle for Moscow*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Thorpe, Elliott R. *East Wind, Rain: An Intimate Account of an Intelligence Officer in the Pacific, 1939-49*. Boston, MA: Gambit Incorporated, 1969.

US Army, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff. *A Brief History of the G-2 Section, GHQ, SWPA and Affiliated Units.* Tokyo, Japan: General Headquarters, Far East Command, 1948.

US Army Intelligence Center and School. *The Evolution of American Military Intelligence*. Fort Huachuca, AZ: US Army Intelligence Center, 1973.

US Department of the Army. *Field Manual 3-0, Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017.

———. *Army Doctrine Publication 5-0*, *Planning*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017.

———. *Army Doctrine Publication 2-0, Intelligence*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012.

———. *Army Doctrine Reference Publication 2-0, Intelligence*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012.

———. *Army Techniques Publication 5-0.1, Army Design Methodology*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015.

Vego, Milan. *The Battle for Leyte, 1944*. Annapolis, MA: Naval Institute Press, 2006.

War Department. *Operations Plan: Rainbow No. 5, 1941*. War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.