Military Infrastructure in the Philippines: Defense Partnership Policy and the Future

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

Ever since the United States and the Philippines were joined by the result of the Spanish-American War, a unique bond of mutual defense has been shared by their people. Although this bond has never been without strain, the “special relationship” between the United States and the Philippines is a mutual benefit of defense for both nations. Shared-use infrastructure and the corresponding military partnership in the Philippines is the critical capability necessary to maintain regional stability, but Filipino nationalism and sovereignty are at odds with American ownership and occupation, even in the spirit of mutual defense. How can the United States adhere to multiple strategic and defense cooperation agreements, its own policies, and enforce stability in the Asia-Pacific region, while respecting the sovereignty and independence of the Filipino people?

Strategic considerations drive military basing and infrastructure in the Philippines. The longstanding military partnership between the United States and the Philippines is driven by international policy and domestic considerations. Bold implementation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement of 2014, with a careful balancing of respect for Philippine sovereignty, is necessary to maintain regional balance in accordance with the 2017 National Security Strategy.

Subject Terms

Infrastructure; Philippines; Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement; Mutual Defense Treaty; China; South China Sea; Nine-Dash Line; Spratleys; Rodrigo Duterte; USINDOPACOM; mutual defense

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Abstract


This monograph provides an in-depth analysis of the balance between US military presence in the Philippines and a sovereign Filipino nation. Ever since the United States and the Philippines were joined by the result of the Spanish-American War, a unique bond of mutual defense has been shared by their people. Although this bond has never been without strain, the “special relationship” between the United States and the Philippines is a mutual benefit of defense for both nations.

Shared-use infrastructure and the corresponding military partnership in the Philippines is the critical capability necessary to maintain regional stability, but Filipino nationalism and sovereignty are at odds with American ownership and occupation, even in the spirit of mutual defense. How can the United States adhere to multiple strategic and defense cooperation agreements, its own policies, and enforce stability in the Asia-Pacific region, while respecting the sovereignty and independence of the Filipino people?

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This writing is dedicated to my late father, Jose Francisco Blancaflor (1933-2017). He grew up in the Pandacan barangay of Manila in the 1930s and 1940s. He and his family suffered tremendous hardships, thankfully unknown to my children. An “accident” killed his father during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines during World War II. Subsequently, he left the Philippines to work abroad in Guam to construct U.S. military infrastructure. During his time on Guam, he enlisted in the United States Army. He served in the infantry for the next 22 years, including multiple combat tours in Korea and Vietnam, and achieved the rank of Master Sergeant. If not for the long-standing defense partnership between the Philippines and the United States, I would not be here today.
## Acronyms

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<tr>
<td>A2/AD</td>
<td>Anti-Access/Area-Denial</td>
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<td>ACC</td>
<td>Air Combat Command</td>
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<td>ADM</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
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<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
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<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control Systems</td>
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<td>ARMM</td>
<td>Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCDA</td>
<td>Bases Conversion and Development Authority</td>
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<td>BMC</td>
<td>Bagong Marawi Consortium</td>
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<td>CCG</td>
<td>China Coast Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Combat Training Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>BARMM</td>
<td>Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDCA</td>
<td>Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement</td>
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<td>EDSA</td>
<td>Epifanio de los Santos Avenue</td>
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<tr>
<td>HADR</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State in Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
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<td>JUSMAG</td>
<td>Joint United States Military Assistance Group</td>
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<td>LOTS</td>
<td>Logistics Over-The-Shore</td>
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<td>MBA</td>
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<td>Military Defense Assistance Act</td>
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<td>MILF</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
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<td>MNLF</td>
<td>Moro National Liberation Front</td>
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<td>MLSA</td>
<td>Mutual Logistics Support Agreement</td>
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<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
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<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Defense Strategy</td>
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<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>OEF-P</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines</td>
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<td>PAFMM</td>
<td>People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia</td>
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<td>PAP</td>
<td>People’s Armed Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<td>PLAN</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>REFORGER</td>
<td>Return of Forces to Germany</td>
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<td>UFG</td>
<td>Ulchi-Freedom Guardian</td>
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<tr>
<td>USINDOPACOM</td>
<td>US Indo-Pacific Command</td>
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<td>USNS</td>
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Introduction

Ever since the United States and the Philippines were joined by the result of the Spanish-American War, a unique bond of mutual defense and a “special relationship” has been shared by their people. American occupying forces modernized and made use of many original fortifications developed by Filipinos and Spaniards originally designed to fend off foreign invaders. These fortifications are considered the foundation of modern basing infrastructure in the Philippines. The United States’ military use of infrastructure in the Philippines created a unique and complex relationship between the two countries with economic, social, and political consequences.

The “special relationship” between the United States and the Philippines is a mutual benefit for both nations. Mutual defense military partnership in the Philippines through shared-use infrastructure is the critical capability necessary to maintain regional stability and to ensure the defense of the Philippines against foreign aggression. The 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) reinforced prior mutual defense and reinforced shared-use infrastructure and basing to achieve mutual defense goals in the Philippines. Despite the intentions written in the EDCA, its implementation has been slow and challenging.

Three points of friction in US-Philippine relations have developed that are detrimental to mutual defense. First, an emergent and revanchist China threatens Philippine territorial sovereignty through reclamation and occupation of a series of islands in the South China Sea and ambitious state-sponsored infrastructure projects within the Philippines. Second, the current president of the Philippines shows reluctance to a strong alliance with the United States and makes efforts to align with China. Lastly, long-standing Filipino nationalism and the importance of sovereignty are at odds with American ownership and occupation, even in the spirit of mutual defense. How can the United States adhere to multiple strategic and defense cooperation agreements, its own policies, and enforce stability in the Asia-Pacific region, while respecting the sovereignty and independence of the Filipino people? Bold implementation of the 2014 EDCA,
with a careful balancing of respect for Philippine sovereignty, is necessary to maintain regional balance in accordance with the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS).

This monograph will not address whether or not the current defense cooperation policies and agreements are sufficient. Current policies, strategies, and agreements will be explored to determine a way the defense partnership with the Philippines can be maximized while retaining and respecting Philippine national sovereignty. The Philippines is a critical platform of US power projection across the globe. To protect this element of our national strategy, US-Philippine defense cooperation must allow greater US presence for uncontested regional military dominance. The following pages explore the importance of deterrence through military infrastructure capacities and partnership in the Philippines, and how it must be balanced with the difficulties encountered in today’s tense political and social environment of a sovereign Filipino people.

Section I: A Short History of Strategic Basing in the Philippines

Many fortifications developed by indigenous Filipinos and colonist Spain were also used during the American occupation, and are considered the foundation of the implementation of modern basing in the Philippines. The Philippines, an archipelago consisting of over 7,000 islands, spans almost a thousand miles from north to south. The first known inhabitants of the Philippines came by glacial land bridges nearly 30,000 years ago.¹ Islam was introduced in the southern islands of the Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao by 1500 and reached Manila by 1565. As trade and territorial competition grew in the region, the Philippines became increasingly

vulnerable to attack because of its ports and natural resources.\(^2\) To mitigate the vulnerability, indigenous Filipinos built fortresses to protect their communities from invaders.\(^3\)

The Spaniards constructed colonial fortifications in the Philippines for protection against foreign aggressors during the Spanish Colonial Period.\(^4\) In 1521, a Spanish expedition led by Ferdinand Magellan discovered the Philippine Islands and claimed them for Spain.\(^5\) In 1571, Miguel Lopez de Legazpi founded the Manila Intramuros (Latin for “within the walls”), designed to protect the Spanish seat of government.\(^6\) The Manila-Acapulco galleon trade route required enormous infrastructure to produce and maintain the ships. Spice trade between Spain and China became lucrative, but the travel was dangerous. For protection of these investments against invaders, King Philip II of Spain approved an armed escort of galleons (an armada).\(^7\)

One particularly influential group of invaders, the Moro pirates, inspired stronger defenses of population centers and trade routes. The Muslim Moro populations of southwestern Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago desired independence from Spanish rule and the religion of

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\(^7\) Antonio De Morga, *History of the Philippine Islands, from Their Discovery by Magellan in 1521 to the Beginning of the XVII Century: With Descriptions of Japan, China and Adjacent Countries* (Cleveland, OH: A. H. Clark Company, 1907), 300-331. Appendix B of this book lays the details of Dutch incursions into the Philippines and the corresponding maritime and land-based responses of the Spanish colonials.
Christianity. The Moros saw increases in Spanish settlement and feared this population would overtake theirs and spread to their southern islands. During the 250-year span of Moro piracy in the Philippines, thousands of inhabitants were murdered while more were taken as captives for slavery. Pirates burned villages and looted churches for ornaments and jewels. Spanish authorities initiated several measures to reduce piracy. One measure called for the construction of strategically located networks of forts, fortresses, and watchtowers in vulnerable coastal towns. Patrols of armed galleys and frigates supplemented the defensive networks.

Subic Bay was first recognized as a valuable strategic base in 1542 upon explorer Juan de Salcedo’s assessment of its sheltered anchorages and deep water. Demand for a solution to the Spanish fleet’s location at Cavite arose due to British capture and subsequent twenty-month occupation of Manila in 1762-1763 during the Seven Years’ War. A Spanish military survey found Subic Bay suitable and strategically superior as a location for a naval yard. A Royal Decree declared Subic Bay a naval port in 1884. Construction started in 1885, which included Arsenal de Olongapo (the entrance/gates and defensive positions), a canal, coastal artilleries (to include Grande Island, at the entrance of Subic Bay), a jail, foundry, and construction/repair shops.

In 1569, the Spanish chose Zamboanga as a settlement and built a garrison on La Caldera in 1593. Zamboanga City was one of the main Spanish strongholds in Mindanao, supporting Christian colonizing efforts in the south of the island. In 1634, Captain Juan de Chavez landed at Zamboanga with 300 Spaniards and 1000 Visayans to commence building the first fort on

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Zamboanga, Real Fuerza de San Jose (Royal Fort of Saint Joseph), now known as Fort Pilar.\(^{12}\) The fort would serve as a defense for the Christian settlement against Moro pirates and foreign invaders.\(^{13}\)

In addition to Subic Bay and the Royal Fort of Saint Joseph, the Spaniards built several watchtowers and fortress churches. Local populations used fortress churches as a defensive position. The incorporation of curtain walls and defensive towers in their construction facilitated their resiliency to attacks and breaches.\(^{14}\) This fortress type is common in Franconia, Southern France, and Romania.

Spain had three objectives in its policy in the Philippines: to acquire a share in the spice trade, to develop Chinese and Japanese contacts to spread Catholicism, and to convert the Filipinos to Christianity. Although the spice trade was largely elusive and the spread of Christianity was limited, the successful Catholicization of the Philippines was the most influential event that brought unity to the islands under Spanish rule. Church and state were inseparable in Spanish policy. Thus conversion of the Filipinos to Christianity was synonymous to their allegiance. The Christian concept of private individual ownership replaced the traditional idea of communal use of land. This allowed for greater wealth and greater influence by indigenous Filipinos in an oligarchic system of local control. Although Spain desired profits from their Philippine colony, they also recognized the responsibility of protecting the property and personal


rights of all Christians, both Spanish and Filipino. Under Catholicism, the relationship between Filipinos and Spaniards grew a collective interest in their defense from outside invaders.15

The century and a half after the 1762 capture of Manila by the British marked the decline of Spanish rule in the Philippines, highlighted by rebellions, religious movements, and development of national consciousness.16 The decline came to a head in 1896, when a secret revolutionary society called the Katipunan led a revolt against Spanish rule of the Philippines.17 The guerrilla activity by the Katipunan could not be suppressed, and the Spanish negotiated with Katipunan’s commander Emilio Aguinaldo for a new Spanish government.18

Spain’s rule of the Philippines ended as a result of the United States’ involvement in Spain’s other major colony, Cuba. The United States declared war on Spain in 1898 and sent the Navy to the Philippines to destroy the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay.19 Under the direction of the United States, Aguinaldo resumed command of his rebels and overwhelmed the Spanish garrisons. In the Philippine perspective, their relationship with the United States was that of two nations standing shoulder to shoulder against a common enemy. This perspective was short-lived, as the Spaniards conspired an exit plan alone with the United States, and Aguinaldo was told to stay out of the battle of Manila.20

The Treaty of Paris of 1898 was an agreement after the Spanish-American War that mandated Spain to cede Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the United States.21

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Aguinaldo set up an independent government, The First Philippine Republic. The government did not accept the terms of the Treaty of Paris. Filipino nationalists desired independence from Spain and did not desire another colonial master in the form of the United States.  

Philippine rejection of the treaty led to a declaration of war on the United States by the First Philippine Republic (the Philippine-American War) in mid-1899. Americans viewed Filipinos as savages, and the lack of adherence to any sort of law of war produced widespread atrocities. American soldiers employed the water cure, a method of torture that mimicked drowning. Fighting ended in 1902, but widespread publication of the water cure torture and racist treatment of Filipinos left lasting psychological scars on Filipino sovereignty. The United States gained the Philippines as an unincorporated territory. Shortly thereafter, the Philippines became a Commonwealth of the United States.  

Colonial governors and occupation force soldiers implemented a widespread pacification program immediately after the war, and permanently influenced Filipino culture. The resulting culture shift led to the introduction of English as the official language of government, education, and industry. US influence led to the disassociation of the Catholic Church as the official state religion. The Philippines quickly adopted American ways of life as a means to become

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“civilized.” School systems, civil and criminal courts, local governments, and American culture were injected into Philippine daily life.

President Theodore Roosevelt prioritized the defense of the Philippines. He declared Subic Bay and the Manila Bay islands military reservations in 1903. The valuable and vulnerable Dewey Drydock infrastructure investment at Subic Bay needed to be secured. The lack of effective Spanish harbor defenses allowed relatively easy capture of Spanish-ruled Manila. From 1902 to 1919, the United States led and funded construction of the Manila and Subic Bay fortifications. By 1907, strained US-Japanese relations and the Japanese threat to US influence motivated war plan preparations and fortifications. Between 1904 and 1910, Corregidor Island, the largest in Manila Bay, became the main effort of fortification. US funding and a Filipino labor force built a network of concrete reinforced harbor defense islands. The platforms for the batteries on Corregidor were built under a plan to transition to newer 14-inch guns. Fortifications on Carabao, El Fraile, and Caballo Islands were built from 1908-1919 to the same technological standards as Corregidor. The US Navy desired the development of Subic Bay, due to having deeper waters than Manila Bay offered. To defend this port, the US Army purchased El Grande Island, strategically located in the middle of Subic Bay’s entrance. Construction of a series of prepared land defenses took place from 1911-1920, with modernized coastal artillery, stockpiles of surplus World War I weaponry, and trench systems with integrated machine gun positions. The Manila Bay defenses were state of the art in 1910. By 1922, these coastal defenses were made obsolete by modernized battleships and the emergence of aerial bombardment.


The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 changed strategic considerations and war planning. The treaty prohibited Japan, Britain, and the United States from building new overseas bases or reinforcing existing ones. To make matters worse for Philippine defense, the Great Depression of the 1930s caused drastic reductions and cuts in funding of US military forces. Nevertheless, the Malinta Hill tunnel system on Corregidor was built from 1931-1938. This tunnel system was built to protect supplies and personnel from aerial bombardment and served as an underground transport system, complete with its own hospital and branch-off tunnels leading to strategic locations within Manila Bay’s defenses.

Philippine independence evolved during the pre-World War II decades of defensive infrastructure development. The Jones Law of 1916 is regarded as a major step toward Philippine sovereignty. The Jones Law gave legislative branch control to the Filipinos and declared the intent to give independence to the Philippines, once the Filipinos create and maintain a viable, stable government. The Jones Law became the basic legislation for the US-led administration of the Philippines. The Philippine Independence Act, known as the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act, granted Philippine independence. Under this act, the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines was written, thereby establishing the Commonwealth of the Philippines. The act mandated US recognition of the new commonwealth after a ten-year transition period. It also allowed the United States to maintain a military presence in the Philippines. The United States could call

Philippine military forces into US military service. Another important provision of the act allowed the President of the United States to negotiate issues of US naval reservations and fueling depots. Filipinos saw the act as highly unfair. The United States viewed Filipino immigration as a problem and saw Filipinos as an inferior race. Under this act, the United States granted entrance to a mere fifty Filipino immigrants yearly, and trade provisions within the act heavily favored the United States.

On December 8, 1941, the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan launched a surprise attack on the Philippines. Defending forces withdrew from Manila, and Japan occupied on January 2, 1942. The US and Philippine forces surrendered to the Japanese at Bataan in May and were forced on a 105-kilometer march to a prison camp. Subsequently, Japanese military authorities organized a new government structure and directed government affairs through Filipinos serving under their rule. Opposition to the Japanese occupation continued to grow, as is evidenced by massive guerilla organizations in existence at the time of the war. The largest of these groups was the Hukbalahap (Huks), a communist guerrilla movement formed by the peasant farmers of Central Luzon. After reclaiming regions from the Japanese, the Huks established their own regional communist government, complete with tax collection and a functional rule of law. These regional government structures would become problematic after the war. General Douglas MacArthur’s Allied forces landed in the Philippines in October 1944, and Japan surrendered in

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38 Lee, Lim, Matsukawa, Re/Collecting Early Asian America, 120.


41 Anderson, Subic Bay, 197-198.
September 1945. Manila was only one of the many Southeast Asian cities overrun by Japan, but it paid an excruciatingly high price. Manila lost an estimated 100,000 citizens.42

In 1945, the final months of the war in the Philippines against Japan, the strategy of Corps of Engineers’ design was a highly extensive construction and reconstruction of the bases, in a decentralized fashion. While fighting was ongoing in the Philippines, engineers were building up bases and airfields from which US forces would launch their final attacks on Japan.43 That same year, the Southwest Pacific Area Office of the Chief Engineer published survey information of potential base development in an engineer intelligence report, declassified in 1965.44 Liberation of the Philippines from Japan further entrenched the dependence on US military power.45

Shortly after World War II, the Philippines headed for independence. The Philippines signed a Treaty of General Relations with the United States, effective July 4, 1946. The document recognized the independence of the Philippines and relinquished US sovereignty over the islands.46 The United States retained dozens of military bases through several acts, agreements, and treaties. The Philippines actively pursued favorable and legitimate international recognition by becoming one of the fifty original United Nations signatory members on October 24, 1945.47


45 Lee, Lim, Matsukawa, Re/Collecting Early Asian America, 125.


The Bell Trade Act of 1946, also known as the Philippine Trade Act, specified policies governing trade between the Philippines and the United States following independence. The United States offered $800 million for post-World War II rebuilding funds for a Philippine Congress ratification of the act. The specifics of the act required an amendment to the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines. It required preferential tariffs on US products imported into the Philippines, a fixed exchange rate between Philippine and US currency, no restrictions on currency transfers from the Philippines to the United States, and granted US citizens and corporations rights to Philippine natural resources equal to Philippine citizens. The Bell Act was seen as a surrender of Philippine national sovereignty to many Filipinos. The post-war Philippine economy was fragile and the government was willing to make concessions at this point that were untenable in the 1930s.48

The Military Bases Agreement (MBA) of 1947 permitted the United States to establish and operate military bases in the Philippines and allowed the use of twenty-three specified bases for ninety-nine years.49 The most important bases identified in the MBA were Clark Air Base in Pampanga and Subic Naval Base in Zambales.50 A key provision of the MBA assured mutual protection and cooperation through the use of military installations, and prohibited the Philippines from granting bases to other nations without US consent. The agreement permitted US recruitment of Filipino citizens into the US military, on a voluntary basis. Commanders of the US-led bases retained the right to tax, distribute utilities, hand out licenses, search without warrants, and deport “undesirables.” Many of these provisions did not sit well with the idea of

Philippine sovereignty. Philippine nationalists argued that the Philippines could not be truly independent under these pretenses. US-led bases became permanent reminders of colonial rule and fueled many anti-American protests in Manila.

The United States and the Philippines signed the Military Assistance Agreement one week after approval of the MBA. This agreement created the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG). The JUSMAG advises the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and assists in their readiness requirements. From post-World War II until the base closures, the United States granted the AFP substantial support through the JUSMAG. The 1991 base closures significantly reduced these activities.

The Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951 is perhaps the most impactful and influential document in current US-Philippine relations. The 1951 MDT emphasized mutual commitment to peacefully resolve international disputes, develop the capacity to resist attack, and mandate consultation when territorial integrity, political independence, or security of the United States or the Philippines came under threat of attack. The treaty established self-defense obligations, but

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varying interpretations of the treaty have caused confusion and political tension over the years.\textsuperscript{57} The United States did not explicitly state whether Philippine-claimed disputed territory fell under the provisions of the treaty.\textsuperscript{58} According to Manila, the treaty’s geographic scope should be extended to the disputed territories. The misunderstandings led to other criticisms, such as the nature and extent of US military assistance, the legal processes for implementing treaty obligations, and expectations of an automatic US response in case of an actual threat.\textsuperscript{59}

During these formative years of US-Philippine policy development after World War II, the US Army returned to the Philippines under the newly signed agreements of 1947 and 1951.\textsuperscript{60} The recurring theme of sovereignty and nationalism rebirthed in the form of the communists responsible for the successful World War II Huk Rebellion. The Huks posed a real threat to the weakening democracy in 1950, and nearly forced their hand at the political table. They were subsequently defeated by Nacionalista Party President Ramon Magsaysay, through US-supplied weaponry, JUSMAG support, and his successful administrative reforms.\textsuperscript{61}

Several rounds of negotiations to revise the MBA took place in the mid-1950s through the mid-1960s. Predictably, the majority of these negotiations focused on the central issue of Philippine sovereignty and US modernization and expansion. The 1953 Military Assistance Agreement reaffirmed previous commitments, including the Military Defense Assistance Act (MDAA) of 1949.\textsuperscript{62} In 1956, Vice President of the United States Richard Nixon met with

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{58} Castro, \textit{United States Military Facilities}, 169-171.
\item\textsuperscript{59} Albert, “The U.S.-Philippines Defense Alliance.”
\item\textsuperscript{60} Dolan, \textit{Philippines: A Country Study}, 273-276.
\item\textsuperscript{62} Castro, \textit{United States Military Facilities}, 173-179.
\end{itemize}
Magsaysay. Nixon agreed to US transfer of all base titles to the Philippines, thereby reaffirming Philippine sovereignty over the bases. In 1956 negotiations resumed, this time centered around the perceived security threat from China. The US perspective placed ultimate importance on international security issues, and the Philippine perspective reflected their priority for strong homeland security. Toward the end of the 1950s, Philippine nationalism was becoming a stronger force in these negotiations, and many of these nationalists strongly questioned the “special relationship.” The 1958 negotiations focused on operating procedures, reduction in the size of US base boundaries (land delimitation), military cooperation, and criminal jurisdiction. Agreements to reduce the bases in size and in number began in 1965. Negotiations reduced the MBA length of effectiveness from ninety-nine to twenty-five years once signed into effect. MBA formal documents would be signed in 1966, setting the term to expire in 1991.63 Perhaps the most impactful agreement in the MBA was the return of Olongapo, the city adjacent to Subic Naval Base, to Philippine jurisdiction.64 From 1920 until the MBA negotiations in the late 1950s, the US Navy exercised control over this city of 65,000 locals, and this control was a constant source of friction that implied the Philippine court system was incapable of delivering justice.65

Ferdinand Marcos was elected President of the Philippines under a populist campaign in 1965. President Marcos heavily supported US military presence through the 1951 MDT, mainly because he was seen by the United States as the legitimate leader of the Philippines and was assured protection from uprisings by the US military. During his reelection campaign, Marcos released a public statement consisting of eventual US withdrawal and a stronger China. This spurred President Nixon’s enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine, designed to create a better balance

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65 Greene, The Philippine Bases, 142.
of power in the region. At the height of the Mao-inspired, China-funded armed communist insurgency, Marcos declared martial law in the Philippines on September 21, 1972. A new constitution in 1973 introduced a parliamentary-style government. This new constitution gave Marcos legislative powers and remained in effect until his removal in 1986. During his martial law regime, human rights violations were widespread. Martial law allowed Marcos to confiscate and appropriate many institutions and redistribute them to his associates and friends. Marcos and US President Jimmy Carter signed amendments to the MBA in 1979 to reaffirm commitment to the agreement. In 1981, martial law was lifted and Marcos was re-elected for a third term.

The United States and the Philippines held another round of base negotiations leading to an agreement in 1983. The issues remained generally unchanged (US base expansion and Philippine sovereignty), but two major current events affected everything about these negotiations in the years that followed. That August, exiled opposition leader (and staunch Marcos regime critic) Benigno Aquino was assassinated upon returning to Manila. His assassination galvanized a large revolt and led to the Epifanio de Los Santos Avenue (EDSA) People Power Revolution of 1986, which overthrew Marcos.

Benigno Aquino’s widow, Corazon Aquino, was catapulted into the presidency. Aquino dismantled the 1973 constitution, only retaining parts of it that were essential to set up a new democratic constitution in 1987. President Aquino abided by the terms of the MBA during her

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70 Berry, *Special Relationship*, 280-284.
72 Schirmer, *A History of Colonialism*. 
presidency. The rewritten 1987 constitution added two important provisions concerning mutual
defense: disallowance of nuclear weapons and conditions of the MBA’s 1991 expiration
(requiring one year’s notice prior to termination).73 The 1988 base agreement secured military
and economic aid and loans and guaranteed full operation of Clark Air Base and Subic Naval
Station through the September expiration.74 As democracy reemerged in Philippine politics,
President Aquino did not have the political freedom of action that Marcos had, and therefore base
negotiations were subject to a different political complexity. Under Corazon Aquino and recently
out from a successful revolution, Filipino nationalism was strong and brought an important vote
to negotiations.75 Despite the unpopularity of the bases, the Filipinos realized that the benefits far
outweighed threats on independence and sovereignty.76

During the Cold War, the Philippine bases and infrastructure were vital in containing the
growing Soviet military presence in East Asia. The persistent American presence communicated
the intent to retain its regional hegemonic power. For Filipinos, Russian external threat was not
considered through the same alarmist lens as that of the United States. For the Philippine
government, handling internal threats from insurgents was the priority.77 For both sides, the value
of defense cooperation was clear: training, equipment, and intelligence were common benefits to
retain and protect the interests of both nations. The bases provided an overwhelming military
element of national power and thus was critical to the US-Philippine political alliance during this
period of internal and international turmoil.78

73 Berry, Special Relationship, 286-291.
74 Elaine Sciolino, “U.S. and Philippines Sign Pact on Bases,” The New York Times, October 18,
philippines-sign-pact-on-bases.html.
75 Berry, Special Relationship, 286-301.
76 Berry, Special Relationship, 296-298.
77 Blitz, The Contested State, 65.
78 James Gregor, The Key Role of U.S. Bases in the Philippines (The Heritage Foundation, January
10, 1984), accessed September 23, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/report/the-key-role-us-bases-the-
philippines.
The 1987 Philippine constitution limited foreign bases in the country after 1991. Of the twenty-three original US bases established in 1947, only six (Subic Bay, the adjacent Cubi Point Naval Air Station, Clark Air Base, John Hay Air Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station, and Wallace Air Station) remained by 1990.\textsuperscript{79}

Clark Air Base was the largest US military facility outside the continental United States. It had an 8,000-foot runway (long enough to accommodate any US aircraft) and three million square feet of storage area. It was a major communications link in the West Pacific. Nearby Wallace Air Station provided a major radar facility that served the entire region. In any general conflict, the Thirteenth Air Force at Clark would assume responsibilities in the West Pacific and Indian Oceans, supporting the activities of the Fifth Air Force operating out of Japan, providing escorts for long-range bombers based at Guam, and resupplying Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{80}

Subic Naval Base included the Port Olongapo Naval Station, the Cubi Point Naval Air Station, and Camayan Point Naval Magazine. Subic Naval Supply Depot provided most of the fuel and supply to US efforts during the Vietnam War.\textsuperscript{81} The four floating drydocks at Subic Bay Naval Base could service all US naval vessels other than aircraft carriers. The base had a storage capacity of about 110 million gallons for petroleum, oil, and lubricants. The Naval Air Station at Cubi Point provided 1.68 million gallons of storage capacity and had the capacity to service two carriers’ worth of aircraft at once. The Naval Magazine provided 4 million cubic feet of ammunition storage. In the mid-1980s, support facilities at Subic Bay provided about 60 percent of all servicing and repair for the US Seventh Fleet.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{80} Gregor, \textit{Role of U.S. Bases}.
\textsuperscript{81} Anderson, \textit{Subic Bay}, 143-145.
\textsuperscript{82} Gregor, \textit{Role of U.S. Bases}. 
Over the years, Clark and Subic evolved into a vital part of the infrastructure necessary to project US military power globally. These bases enabled rapid deployment of US forces into the Western Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean and sustained its operations as the major logistics hub for the region. In anticipation of MBA expiration, Philippine and United States representatives began new negotiations on the future of the bases. A resulting agreement, the Republic of the Philippines-United States Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security, allowed ten more years of US military presence. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed treaty by one vote. US forces left the Philippine bases in 1992. 83

The closure and transfer of US bases in the Philippines changed the “special relationship.” The military repercussions were immediate and visible. Acceptance of higher military risk and vulnerability to sea and air routes came with the withdrawal. In many wartime scenarios, the most likely consequence was a delay in delivering adequate US forces to counter adverse strategic situations. Additionally, base-related military assistance such as support for Philippine Armed Forces modernization became more complicated. Politically, the loss of these bases created a perception of a weakened US presence, and may have led to slight power shifts amongst regional actors. 84 Economically, near-term unfavorable effects included loss of direct base-related compensation, of which were 70,000 local workers and local businesses providing supplies and services. 85

During the Cold War, US military posture in the form of basing was a key element in the containment strategy against Sino-Soviet communist hegemony. The fall of the Soviet Union can be seen as a major cause for the decline in Philippine basing significance to the United States.


Although US military installations were closed as the world was getting acquainted with its post-
Cold War status, the following years were as active as any time with respect to US-Philippine
defense cooperation.

Former General and Secretary of National Defense Fidel Ramos led the Philippines into
the post-Cold War era. Ramos was recognized as a hero of the 1986 EDSA People Power
Revolution. Ramos opposed Ferdinand Marcos and aligned with Aquino. The Filipino people
elected Ramos and he presided from 1992 to 1998.86 The first half of his presidency was marked
by economic prosperity, technological advancement, relative political stability, and efficient
delivery of Filipino citizens’ basic needs.87 President Ramos is credited with forging the peace
agreement between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).88 In 1995,
China’s construction of military features and presence of a Chinese flag spurred Ramos to deploy
warships and fighter planes to the Mischief Reef area of the Spratlys. The shipping lane control
that was afforded by control of the Spratlys was of major value to both nations. More importantly,
the potential of large oil reserves in this area motivated each nations’ claims.89 In his last year in
office, President Ramos presided over the signing of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in
1998. The VFA addressed the treatment of US Armed Forces visiting the Philippines. Article IV
of the VFA covers criminal jurisdiction at length, which clearly supplants any US rule with that

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87 Gregorio Zaide and Sonia Zaide, *Philippine History and Government*, 6th ed. (Quezon City:
All-Nations Publishing Company, 2004), 180; Jose Almonte, *The Philippines: New Directions in Domestic

88 Lee Marsden, *The Ashgate Research Companion to Religion and Conflict Resolution* (New

coral-reef.html.
of Philippine law. This agreement is clearly and specifically written to enforce Philippine sovereignty in the interactions with US military forces.90

Vice President Joseph Estrada succeeded President Ramos. President Estrada assumed office amidst a financial crisis, characterized by poor agricultural yields caused by weather conditions, which normalized by 2000. Estrada declared war against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and captured its headquarters and several camps.91 Estrada justified action against the MILF by highlighting the failure of multiple peace talks.92 He opposed cease-fires with the MILF, citing inevitable increases in terrorist attacks. President Estrada’s government was overthrown by the Second EDSA Revolution in 2001, after being accused of involvement in illegal betting.93 Estrada resigned. Vice President Gloria Arroyo assumed the Presidency in January 2001 and held the office until 2010.

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, President Arroyo voiced strong support for the United States. She said that the Philippines is prepared to “go every step of the way” with the United States, and allowed US military forces to use Filipino ports and airfields to support military operations in Afghanistan.94 She cited morality and Philippine national interests as reasons for her pro-US stance. President Arroyo defined the national interest as


linking a struggle against international terrorism with the struggle against terrorism within the Philippines.\textsuperscript{95}

In 2001, Special Operations Command Pacific led operations in the southern Philippines Islands of Mindanao and Basilan to increase Philippine armed forces capacity to deal with Abu Sayyaf as a part of the Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) strategy. This action increased the stability of the Philippines through contributions to the Global War on Terror (GWOT). This mission required operational approaches to achieve success in ways satisfactory to both the United States and the Philippines.\textsuperscript{96}

In November 2007, the United States initiated a Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) with the Republic of the Philippines that authorized the use of Philippine facilities, capabilities, and resources in exchange for various forms of payment.\textsuperscript{97} The 2007 MLSA is still in effect; in 2018 the JUSMAG supplied ammunition and explosives to the AFP under the MLSA, to enhance counterterrorism operations.\textsuperscript{98}

Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III (son of assassinated Senator Benigno Aquino and former President Corazon Aquino) succeeded President Arroyo and held office from 2010 to 2016. President Aquino III continued the ongoing domestic peace process between the Philippine government and the MILF. Two years before he took office, the two sides came to an agreement on a settlement granting regional autonomy. The agreement was struck down by the Philippines Supreme Court. Peace talks resumed in December 2009. In 2010, the newly elected Aquino


expressed willingness to facilitate the peace process. In 2012, President Aquino introduced more negotiations with the Islamic areas of Mindanao by announcing the pursuit of peace with the MILF in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) by way of establishing the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), also known as Bangsamoro.

Under President Aquino, military emphasis shifted from internal defense to its territorial claims. China’s heavy maritime posturing near the Philippines necessitated a strengthening of AFP coastal defenses. The United States and Philippines created the 2014 EDCA in response to the emergence of China in the South China Sea. The EDCA allows deeper US-Philippine defense cooperation by maintaining and developing military capacity and balancing it with the necessary respect for Philippine sovereignty. The EDCA supports the United States’ need to store, supply, and control a prepositioned, occupiable defense of the Philippines. The development of Philippine infrastructure in a sovereignty-conscious method is made possible by the provisions in the 2014 EDCA.

From the beginnings of simple Philippine fortress defenses to Spanish and American colonization, Philippine military infrastructure developed roots. Through the pain and suffering of multiple wars and the irreversible situation of a nation dependent on a superpower’s military for defense, that same infrastructure developed its unique, unbalanced character. Through the whole process, a demand for respect for Philippine sovereignty emerged and became an inseparable
component of the “special relationship.” The tenuous balance between necessary US presence in
the Philippines and fragile Philippine sovereignty creates continually conflicting dialogues that
form the foundation of this monograph.

Section II: United States – Philippine Relations

The US military presence in, and relationship with, the Philippines is written in the
strategy documents which drive the national security apparatus. The National Security Act of
1947 reorganized the foreign policy and military establishments of the US Government and
created many institutions responsible for formulating and implementing foreign policy. In light
of the looming threat of a destabilized post-World War II balance of power, the strategy of
containment of Soviet communist influence took center stage. Under the Truman administration’s
State Department Policy Planning Staff, George Kennan determined that reductions in
containment defense to a few critical points, backed by a strategic nuclear defense, would be
ideal. By July 1947, Kennan determined locations of a “strongpoint defense” along the
periphery of Asia, including Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. Additionally, he recommended
the exclusion of any military presence on the Asian continent. This strategy could work in favor
of the United States if military action were necessary. Kennan’s “strongpoint defense” closely
matches the current strategy in place in the Asia-Pacific region.

Strategy documents at the highest levels of US policymaking expresses the importance of
a strong partnership with the Philippines, and the critical nature of this partnership in the stability
of the Asia-Pacific region. The 2017 NSS states that US alliances in the Indo-Pacific region are
critical to responding to mutual threats such as China’s rapid military modernization and buildup

103 Robert Worley, Orchestrating the Instruments of Power: A Critical Examination of the U.S.
National Security System (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2015), 245; National Security Act of

104 “Kennan and Containment, 1947,” US Department of State Archive, accessed December 3,

105 Worley, Orchestrating the Instruments of Power, 111.
in the South China Sea. The NSS mandates a strengthening of economic cooperation with allies on high-quality infrastructure.\textsuperscript{106} The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) marks a shift in philosophy to worldwide multi-domain, large-scale combat operations and identifies China as a “strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea.”\textsuperscript{107} Consistent to the NSS and NDS, the 2015 National Military Strategy (NMS) identifies the Philippines as one of the core alliances that deters China’s military and economic ambitions in the South China Sea. The NMS emphasizes “maintaining highly-ready, forward-deployed forces, well trained and equipped surge forces at home, robust transportation infrastructure and assets, and reliable and resilient communications links with allies and partners.”\textsuperscript{108} Collectively, these documents form the basis of US-Philippine partnership agreements.

Regionally, the Philippines falls under the jurisdiction of \textit{US Indo-Pacific Command} (USINDOPACOM). The command’s area of responsibility spans the Pacific Ocean from the west coast of the United States to India. USINDOPACOM has considerable infrastructure oriented on humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR) and has responsibilities should conflict emerge in the region.\textsuperscript{109} The 2018 USINDOPACOM Posture Statement, issued by USINDOPACOM Commander Admiral (ADM) Harry Harris on March 15, 2018, is a direct narrative on the importance of the US-Philippine alliance in the face of territorial claims and China’s ongoing militarization of bases in the South China Sea. ADM Harris cites the alliance’s resilience despite President Duterte’s pursuit of increased relations with China’s Xi Jinping, and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{108}] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), \textit{National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States of America} (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 12.
\item[\textsuperscript{109}] Worley, \textit{Orchestrating the Instruments of Power}, 277-278.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
acknowledges improvements in his relations with the United States and President Trump. The posture statement cites expanded defense partnership activities and military cooperation. ADM Harris credits the MLSA with providing the timely delivery of weapons and ammunition to support the AFP in handling internal threats, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attack on Marawi City in Mindanao. More importantly, the posture statement reiterates how important the alliance is in achieving the objective of building territorial defense capability with the Philippines and assisting in the modernization of a self-sufficient AFP.110

While the US-Philippine defense agreements dominate the headlines, it is important to recognize alliances and partnerships Manila has cultivated with other nations. The most important of these alliances is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), established in August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand.111 As proclaimed in the ASEAN declaration, some of the ASEAN nations’ aims and purposes are promoting regional peace and stability, adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter, and mutual assistance on matters of common interest. Their fundamental principles include mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity.112 Although the idea of an ASEAN-based military integration (in light of the growing audacity of China’s increased maritime claims) is most likely a far reach in terms of feasibility and effectiveness, the potential alliance must be respected and not discounted.

by the United States.\textsuperscript{113} The Philippines status as a founding member of ASEAN is critical to how they perceive their standing in the international community.\textsuperscript{114}

The 2014 EDCA is the most recent defense agreement between the United States and the Philippines. The EDCA reinforces the MDT of 1951, the VFA of 1998, the MLSA of 2007, and the importance of Philippine sovereignty.\textsuperscript{115} The purpose of the EDCA is to deepen defense cooperation of the United States and the Philippines by maintaining and developing the capacity to resist armed attacks, including improving interoperability through security cooperation exercises, combined training activities, maritime security development, and HADR capabilities.\textsuperscript{116} The EDCA provides the framework of “agreed locations,” defined by the EDCA as facilities and areas that are provided by the Philippines for the use of defense cooperation. The locations are listed in the 2016 amendment to the EDCA, Annex A.\textsuperscript{117} Article III of the EDCA covers detailed agreements of the type of activities to be conducted at the agreed locations. Essentially, the language of the EDCA is specific enough for the United States to control and use the locations extensively, yet is written loose enough to accommodate a wide range of interpretations. Article IV supports the 2018 NDS’s strategic approach to China by allowing the United States unencumbered rights to store and control prepositioned defense equipment, supplies, and materiel.\textsuperscript{118}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[115] EDCA, 1.
\item[116] EDCA, 2.
\item[118] Page 7 of the 2018 National Defense Strategy summary calls for the prioritization of investments in “prepositioned forward stocks and munitions, strategic mobility assets, partner and allied support, as well as non-commercially dependent distributed logistics and maintenance to ensure logistics sustainment while under persistent multi-domain attack.”
\end{footnotes}
The EDCA provides the Philippines with opportunities to modernize its own defense with US assistance through training and acquisitions. Through the EDCA, the Philippines can achieve a credible defense capability. A more robust, flexible, dispersed US presence may be a viable deterrent to more serious external threats, while encouraging action in facing existing challenges.\(^{119}\) Annex A of the EDCA, signed in 2016 under President Aquino, identifies five Philippine military installations that will be configured to host US military units for the use of defense cooperation and are adequate for our current defense cooperation posture. Four of the five locations are air bases in proximity to ports, and one is a ground force location.\(^{120}\)

Despite the promise of the EDCA, President Rodrigo Duterte’s election in 2016 has strained its implementation. Predecessor Benigno Aquino put political stock in the “special relationship” with the United States and held China accountable for territorial incursions. With the election of a new president, Philippine politics and posture towards both the United States and China changed dramatically. The current political climate created by the policies of Duterte makes strategic partnership difficult.\(^{121}\)

The Duterte administration is more permissive to China’s encroachments and is more cooperative with China’s President Xi Jinping. Duterte adopted an equilateral balancing strategy, not dissimilar to Vietnam and Malaysia.\(^{122}\) Duterte’s independent foreign policy seeks to maintain good relationships with all major nations without siding with one power against another. His


\(^{122}\) Robert O. Keohane, “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 2 (Spring 1971): 170. “Alternatively, small allies may assert their independence by negotiating for aid from the Soviet Union or China.” China has influenced Pakistan’s international realignment in the last fifty years.
recent political moves are creating a permissive environment for China’s power in the South China Sea. In a reversal of predecessor Benigno Aquino’s stance, Duterte stated he would not press China on the UN’s arbitral ruling in 2016, making their claims to territory in the South China Sea illegal. Duterte sees closer ties with Xi Jinping and China as a way to bring modern infrastructure to outlying areas of the Philippines, especially his home island of Mindanao.\textsuperscript{123}

China has been acting swiftly on this situation. In recent years, China has been encroaching into other Philippine realms, far beyond maritime claims in the South China Sea. Duterte’s strategic alliances with China have gone as far as to suggest the Philippines becoming a new Chinese province.\textsuperscript{124} Xi Jinping has offered support in Duterte’s highly volatile drug war efforts.\textsuperscript{125} Duterte sought joint exploration of the Philippine Sea with China. These “exploration” interests in the Philippine Sea include the Benham Rise. China’s interest in the Benham Rise bears a strong resemblance to their exploits in developing bases in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{126}

Duterte intends on favorable alignment with China, and this alliance may bring further Chinese infrastructure, capabilities, and influence to the Philippines. A good example of this can be seen in developments after terrorism destroyed a city on the Southern island of Mindanao. A battle between Islamic State loyalists and the AFP occurred from May to October of 2017 in Marawi City, Mindanao. Militants seized Marawi, and the subsequent months of urban warfare ruined the city of more than 200,000. In December 2018, the Philippine Congress voted to extend

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{126} Steven Stashwick, “China May Have Been Surveying Strategic Waters East of Philippines,” The Diplomat, last modified March 31, 2017, accessed November 1, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/china-may-have-been-surveying-strategic-waters-east-of-philippines/.
\end{itemize}
martial law in Marawi until the end of 2019. Plans have been developed to restore Marawi City, including compensation packages for those who have lost their homes. A Chinese-led group, Bagong Marawi Consortium (BMC), has been awarded the rebuilding project. The majority of the firms within the group are Chinese, including Chinese government-based companies such as China State Construction Engineering Corporation. The Chinese involvement is not a coincidence; in April 2018 President Duterte visited China to discuss this rebuilding project with Xi Jinping. This action further reinforces Duterte’s intentions of favorable alignment with China to the international community and facilitates an eventual Chinese foothold in Mindanao. Elsewhere in the Philippines, China has pledged billions of US dollars in infrastructure investment, including projects at Subic and Clark through the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA). Despite his friendly Sino-centric leanings Duterte makes pro-US assertions at times, and seems to understand how important it is to quell China’s influence in the region.

The MBA became the root cause of much friction between the United States and the Philippines. The Philippine nationalist’s view on sovereignty portrays defense agreements as a

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tool used by the United States to exert control over Philippine internal affairs. The US focus of defense is perceived to be freedom of navigation and not the people of the Philippines. Filipinos nationalists doubt the United States will defend the archipelago if attacked by China, and believe that the United States intervenes too much in their internal affairs. In the most serious of coup attempts against Aquino in the late 80s, suspicion of US intervention was at a peak. The US Embassy warned the Philippine military officials that all aid would be cut off if the AFP overthrew the Aquino government. As the relationship between the United States and the Philippines has evolved, similar concerns of US involvement overstepping sovereign bounds exist today in the military partnership that targets insurgents. These nationalistic, anti-American op-ed pieces are not uncommon in the Philippines. Yet despite highly visible nationalist views, most Filipinos still favor strong ties with the United States.

Philippine sovereignty is of utmost importance to the Filipino people. It would stand to reason that the Philippines should be against an agreement as wide sweeping and powerful as the EDCA. So, what was the reason that the Aquino administration was so eager to support the Obama administration’s involvement in the strategic pivot to Asia, and the corresponding developments in the Philippines? The quick support for the EDCA was President Aquino’s desire

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135 Niksch, Abu Sayyaf, 7-9.


for a fast, guaranteed, and powerful counter to China’s expansion into Scarborough Shoal. The stand-off in 2012 validated the necessity of a defense cooperation agreement that leverages the existing agreements and enhances response to surprise moves by aggressors. When confronted by emergent, hostile, and opportunistic regional power, smaller countries will likely lean on foreign policy choices that benefit them while providing the ability to shape its own future as a nation. As was the case after the 1941-1945 Japanese invasion and occupation of the Philippines, it comes down to a Filipino president taking the only feasible option against an aggressor powerful enough to overtake the Philippines. Similar to today’s situation with China, the future of the Philippines hinged on its defense agreements with the United States.

Section III: China

In US strategy, China is seen as the main threat to Indo-Pacific stability. China is aggressively expanding and protecting their self-proclaimed sovereign rights to international and foreign waters. China’s actions are not without specific goals, and the ideas behind their intentions are not new. One can look back to the Ming dynasty to realize Xi Jinping is acting on a hard lesson learned in Chinese history. The demise of the Ming dynasty in the fifteenth century drives many decisions made by modern-day China. Ming China’s “Great Wall” land defense strategy of the northern border was ineffective and costly in resources. This effort was an ineffective counter of the Mongolian invasions. Because of the extensive efforts in the north, China abandoned control over vital sea trade routes in the south to the Europeans. The loss of

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dominance resulted in Ming dynasty decline and eventual decline of China in the long term. Modern-day China heeds this lesson, and it is likely to avoid the same mistake.  

The Chinese mainlanders immigrated to and traded peacefully along the Philippine coasts for several centuries before Europeans arrived. After the Spaniards landed in the sixteenth century, Chinese immigration to the Philippines hastened due to economic opportunities that arose from Spanish presence. From the 1850s to the 1880s, the Chinese population in the Philippines grew from 8,000 to over 100,000. The Chinese mainlanders infiltrated every facet of daily Filipino activity and were there to stay. The genesis of Filipino nationalism occurred in the late nineteenth century. Today’s anti-Chinese sentiment held by Filipinos can be traced back to the explosion of Chinese immigration from 1850 to 1898. Economic competition between Chinese and Filipinos, Filipino nationalism directed against the Chinese, and formal political relations between the Chinese diaspora in the Philippines and mainland China are all phenomena of the late nineteenth century and contribute to current cultural clashes.

Relations between the United States and China have experienced ups and downs after the dissolution of its shared adversary, the Soviet Union, in the early 1990s. The first decade of this century saw differences between the two countries through beneficial engagements. China assumed an increasingly overt posture during the Obama presidency. China’s advances at American and Philippine expense resulted in strained relations. The NSS and the NDS employ harsh words about China as a predatory rival. These documents identify China as the top danger to US national security. Currently, China is seen as a peer competitor committing predatory

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144 Rozman, *Chinese Strategic Thought*, 110-114.

China’s interest in the militarization of sparsely inhabited, isolated islands on the periphery of their areas of interest is the Strategic Island Concept. After World War II, a US Navy planner named Stewart Barber postulated that strategically located naval base islands (such as Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean) would be indispensable in the coming decades of cold war. Thus was borne the Strategic Island Concept, which avoids traditional basing sites on large, populous mainland locations, thereby avoiding non-Western opposition. Instead, basing on relatively small, sparsely populated islands are more easily held under control by Western forces.

China is pushing its territorial claims in the South China Sea by actively pursuing international legitimacy of the Nine-Dash Line. At the conclusion of World War II, China reclaimed the Paracels, Pratas, and Spratly archipelagos, and secured these areas with their navy. China and Vietnam both asserted rights to these islands, and the Philippines followed with their own claim soon after. In 1958, China claimed the limits of its territorial waters within what is

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known as the Nine-Dash Line.\textsuperscript{150} This line has been hotly contested, and as recently as 2009 China submitted a version of the Nine-Dash Line to the UN that reflected the majority of the South China Sea. The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia have all lodged diplomatic protests against China for these claims.\textsuperscript{151} China continued its presence in the Spratlys in 2014. They drew international heat through their dredging activities in the area. International speculation concluded that China had plans to expand its military influence and presence closer to the edge of their claimed maritime boundary. In 2015, satellite imagery confirmed that China was rapidly constructing an airfield on Fiery Cross Reef within the Spratlys whilst continuing its land reclamation activities at other sites.\textsuperscript{152}

The Spratly Islands’ ownership is disputed by several nations, including the Philippines, China, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia, due to the highly desirable resources the islands contain. Most of the Spratly’s surrounding waters are very shallow and contain abundant fishing stocks.\textsuperscript{153} The Spratly area oil and natural gas reserves are estimated at 17.7 billion tons, the fourth largest reserve bed in the world. Additionally, the South China Sea is a vital shipping lane. The majority of Japan’s seaborne trade passes through these waters.\textsuperscript{154}

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\textsuperscript{150} Bill Hayton, \textit{The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia} (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 249-252.
\textsuperscript{151} Hayton, \textit{The South China Sea}, 113-114.
\textsuperscript{153} Clarence J Bouchat, \textit{The Paracel Islands and U.S. Interests and Approaches in the South China Sea} (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, June 2014), 6.
\textsuperscript{154} Martin Denny, “Regional Strategic Considerations in the Spratly Islands Dispute” (Master’s Thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1997), 40, accessed October 27, 2018, http://hdl.handle.net/10722/40415.
\end{flushright}
In the 2018 NDS, Secretary of Defense James Mattis identifies China’s predatory economics with its neighbors and active militarization of features in the South China Sea.  

Many would argue that this situation is not very different from the United States’ use of Diego Garcia as a military base in the Indian Ocean. The purpose of this strategic base was not purely for military power projection. The strategic location provided a projection of political and economic influences in India and the Middle East. The US military power at Diego Garcia allowed the ability to intervene faster and more dominantly in the region, thereby adding to the overall stability of the region.

In recent years, China’s strategic ambitions have manifested in its objective to dominate the first island chain in the so-called “Island Chain Strategy.” China is building its Anti-
Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capability by pouring manpower and resources into the Spratlys.\textsuperscript{157} In 2015, China’s President Xi Jinping claimed China did not plan a militarized Spratly Island presence, but satellite images show otherwise.\textsuperscript{158} All seven of their outposts in the South China Sea contain military facilities, as revealed in satellite images captured in 2016. Although the only weapons present currently in the Spratlys are short-range air defense capabilities, the infrastructure on these newly developed bases is specifically designed to support conventional and advanced naval, air force, and army capabilities. The largest three outposts in the Spratlys (Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef) mirror one another in highly specific military infrastructure. Each has a 10,000-foot runway with fighter and bomber aircraft hangars. These facilities are capable of supporting larger aircraft such as bombers, Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), protected air defense and anti-ship missile launcher sheds, water, fuel, and ammunition storage facilities, troop barracks, redundant communications systems, and deep water naval facilities. All indications show that these bases are intended as forward military outposts project Chinese military power and capability across China’s South China Sea claims.\textsuperscript{159}


\textsuperscript{158} Sim, “South China Sea Islands.”


Subi Reef is the largest of seven man-made outposts in the Spratlys. Subi was built primarily in the first nine months of 2016 and boasts nearly 400 individual buildings. Subi is capable of hosting hundreds of personnel and has the potential to take the shape of a Chinese administrative hub. China may attempt to solidify its Nine-Dash Line claim with a civilian presence, security analysts, and diplomatic sources.\footnote{Greg Torode and Simon Scarr, “Concrete and Coral: Beijing’s South China Sea Building Boom Fuels Concerns,” Reuters, last modified May 23, 2018, accessed October 26, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-southchinasea-insight/concrete-and-coral-beijings-south-china-sea-building-boom-fuels-concerns-idUSKCN1IO3GA.} Mischief Reef and Fiery Cross Reef have almost 190 buildings and structures each. The satellite images also show up to sixty South China Sea features occupied by other nations as well, including Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Although some islands show well-developed structures, these developments are nothing in comparison to Chinese militarization of the Spratlys.\footnote{Sim, “South China Sea Islands;” Torode and Scarr, “Building Boom Fuels Concerns.”} Prior to these developments in the

\footnote{Sim, “South China Sea Islands;” Torode and Scarr, “Building Boom Fuels Concerns.”}
Spratlys, one international incident gave China international confidence to expand their claims. This event became known as the Scarborough Shoal standoff.\footnote{Hayton, \textit{The South China Sea}, 115.}

Scarborough Shoal, located between the Macclesfield Bank and Luzon, was administered by the Philippines before China took control of it. In 2012, China sent warships to invade the shoal and administration of the shoal was taken by force. Initially, the United States was expected to defend Philippine territory through the 1951 MDT.\footnote{Ryan McMahon, \textit{The New Strategic Implications of China's Naval Modernization}, Doctoral Dissertation (Washington State University, 2013), accessed October 31, 2018, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a520039.pdf 109.} However, the United States determined this would not be a feasible course of action, instead opting for an international verbal protest.\footnote{Renato Cruz DeCastro, “The Philippines in 2012: ‘Easygoing, Do-Nothing’ President Delivers,” \textit{Asian Survey} 53, no. 1 (February 1, 2013): 115–116; Michael Green et al., “Counter-Coercion Series: Scarborough Shoal Standoff,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, last modified May 22, 2017, accessed February 28, 2019, https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-scarborough-standoff/}. Strained relations between China and the Philippines resulted and an international loss of face for the United States, with a tarnished reputation as an unreliable ally. Scarborough is still Chinese-
controlled and the event solidified the perception of China as an expansionist nation in the region.\textsuperscript{165}

A July 2016 arbitral tribunal issued a ruling in Manila’s case against Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea. The Philippines filed a case in 2013 after China seized a reef over which both countries claim sovereignty. The tribunal invalidated Beijing’s claims to their historical rights to maritime territory demarked by the Nine-Dash Line.\textsuperscript{166} It found that none of the Spratlys are legally islands and invalidated Chinese claims to more than the disputed islets themselves and the territorial seas they generate. While the decisions were legally binding and caused Chinese leadership to lose face, no enforcement mechanism existed, and President Xi Jinping rejected the tribunal’s decisions.\textsuperscript{167}

Xi Jinping is not focusing his country’s efforts of military power projection solely towards the South China Sea and the Nine-Dash Line. China is not finished expanding its influence and power through the Strategic Island Concept. The Indian Ocean is becoming another region in the midst of a power struggle. The Maldives, 700 kilometers from the Indian coast and located near international sea lanes for container ships and oil, is in a premium location to further extend China’s military and economic reach. China has pledged to finance a number of infrastructure projects, including the international airport and building a bridge between two

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\item \textsuperscript{166} “Philippines v. China: Arbitration Outcomes,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, last modified 2018, accessed November 16, 2018, https://amti.csis.org/arbitration-map/. This site has an interactive map, helpful in understanding the big picture in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Maldives islands, of which the two islands are a part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.\textsuperscript{168} Much of the money already invested by China went into infrastructure. The country must start making payments by 2020 or face land grabs in the form of equity and ceded territory, according to former Maldivian President Mohamed Nasheed.\textsuperscript{169} China has already proven its ability to convert island ports and commercial infrastructure into military assets. In August 2017, China established its first military installation abroad in Djibouti using the same scheme of lending more money than can be reasonably paid back.\textsuperscript{170}

Just as they have previously pushed territorial boundaries causing international alarm in the South China Sea, China is aggressively encroaching into the Philippine Sea with the current permissive stance held by President Duterte.\textsuperscript{171} Duterte continues pursuit of joint exploration of the Philippine Sea with China. China’s interest in the Benham Rise indicates a potential future repeat of territorial encroachment, with the goal of extending China’s strategic reach.\textsuperscript{172} In early 2018, the Chinese Institute of Oceanology conducted research in Benham Rise with approval from Duterte. Despite the nature of the agreement, Duterte didn’t intend to make the research public. China submitted research, and the International Hydrographic Organization declared China’s naming rights over five features in the Benham Rise, sparking nationwide outrage.\textsuperscript{173}


\textsuperscript{172} Stashwick, “China Surveying Strategic Waters.”

China plans to name 142 more features in the region.\textsuperscript{174} The research done in the name of oceanography is the same hydrographic information critical to Chinese submarine tactics. Among the Philippine defense establishment and Filipino citizens, there is growing concern that China’s intent is to deploy nuclear submarines, monitor the movement of foreign vessels and warships, and lay claim to rich energy and fishery resources of Benham. China’s display of territorial and maritime ambitions has triggered corresponding measures from its rivals and neighbors. President Duterte is adjusting his tone on this issue; recently he imposed new regulations on maritime scientific research, rejected Chinese naming of the features and has reiterated that the Benham Rise belongs to the Philippines, renaming the area “Philippine Rise.”\textsuperscript{175}

To give credible force to Xi Jinping’s ambitions of dominance in the South China Sea, each of the three major organizations of China’s Armed Forces include a maritime force. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) administers the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the People’s Armed Police (PAP) includes the China Coast Guard (CCG), and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is growing its maritime capabilities.\textsuperscript{176}

China’s Navy is modernizing and expanding at breakneck pace, with shipbuilding schedules not seen since before 1991.\textsuperscript{177} Included is the aircraft carrier program, with two complete and a third carrier under construction as of September 2018. They are also building six more Type 055 ships (large cruiser) to complement the two already built. Other various smaller


vessels are being built, each with state-of-the-art capabilities. Although impressive in scale, this activity makes sense when reviewing the ambitious maritime strides China has already taken.\textsuperscript{178}

The CCG is the largest in the world. It serves as China’s territorial waters law enforcement and coordinates search and rescue of its territorial waters. The CCG has become militarized rapidly in recent years.\textsuperscript{179} The CCG was formerly the maritime branch of the PAP border security force under the Ministry of Public Security. China announced the formation of a national coast guard in March 2013, subordinate to the State Oceanic Administration. In July 2018 the CCG was transferred back under control of the PAP, and thus under the command of Central Military Commission.\textsuperscript{180}

The CCG uses its large ships to outsize and bully smaller opponents. China’s largest ship outsizes the US Navy’s Ticonderoga-class missile cruiser by 50 percent and can reach speeds of twenty-five knots. It is heavily armed with 76-mm guns, two auxiliary guns, and two anti-aircraft machine guns, and has helicopter lift and storage capability. The size of the ship is an important factor in this region where “ramming contests” between opposing vessels are common.\textsuperscript{181} In April 2015, a CCG vessel used its water cannons to drive away a group of Philippine fishing boats near Scarborough Shoal, damaging their boats during the confrontation.\textsuperscript{182} China dismissed the

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incident while reiterating their claim to Scarborough, while the United States labeled these actions as “provocative.”

On top of all this, China’s PAFMM is the world’s largest maritime militia. The PAFMM has been a critical enabler of China’s execution of “gray zone” operations, designed to increase Chinese control over desired waters. PAFMM has been actively pushing the envelope for at least a decade. China used the PAFMM to harass the US Naval Ship (USNS) *Impeccable* in 2009, it was involved in the seizure of the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012, and conducted the blockade of Manila’s outpost on Second Thomas Shoal in 2014. These actions combine to give China the power to engage in precise escalation that the United States could be hard-pressed to match.183

China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea and beyond are a compelling reason for the Philippines to allow US presence and capacity in the islands.184 It further stands to reason that there must be adequate military infrastructure for the Philippines and the United States to provide deterrence of aggressive nations.185 By using China’s presence and capabilities as a template, we can plan for the level of presence and involvement necessary in the region, and thus the amount of “cooperation” the United States needs with the Philippines.186 However, the level of involvement must always be tempered with the ever-present need to respect the sovereignty of our Filipino partners.

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Section IV: Current Situation and the Best Way Forward

The relationship between the United States and the Philippines is bound by the reliance they have on each other for the future. The strongest recommendation to ensure lasting mutual defense and security is a gradual, transparent expansion of US military presence and partnership under the current EDCA.\(^\text{187}\) Vis-à-vis the EDCA, enough Philippine military infrastructure exists to fulfill US obligations in a long-standing defense partnership, and favorable public and political status of Philippine sovereignty is maintained.\(^\text{188}\) However, the current political landscape in the Philippines and the bureaucracy of its implementation is hindering the momentum experienced in mutual defense under the previous administration. The United States is confident in the Philippine government’s willingness to ask for interdiction in the event of large-scale combat operations threat. However, the current threat of a gradual take-over of the Philippines by China’s incursions rightfully justifies the full presence and involvement of US forces, as long as necessary to return stability back to the region.\(^\text{189}\)

The capacity of the US and Philippine instruments of national power, the “tools the United States uses to apply its sources of power,”\(^\text{190}\) must be increased to meet NSS and NDS goals in the Asia-Pacific region. As ADM Harris advises in the 2018 USINDOPACOM Posture Statement, the volatile and unstable environment of the South China Sea requires increased military capacity. The most feasible way to address this vulnerability is to increase Philippine

\(^{189}\) Eduardo Z. Romualdez, \textit{A Question of Sovereignty: The Military Bases and Philippine-American Relations, 1944-1979} (Manila, Philippines: E.Z. Romualdez, 1980). Eduardo Z. Romualdez’s 675-page work on the subject captures the Filipino Nationalist point of view on sovereignty and simultaneously takes a realist’s point of view on the critical dependence on US military and diplomatic power, especially in chapters 18 through 21. Mr. Romualdez is career diplomat, ambassador, banker, and writer, and hails from powerful political pedigree.
military capacity, including basing infrastructure, military prepositioned stock, and multi-lateral military exercise cooperation. Language within the EDCA fully supports base grouping and frontier basing concepts. Increases in capacity are addressed in the EDCA and Annex A.

One of the main goals of the EDCA is to address shortfalls in Philippine military infrastructure as it relates to defense partnership. Basing infrastructure in the Pacific is well established and distributed to fit US military support in Japan, Korea, and Australia. The bases identified in the EDCA must be reinforced to the greatest extent possible to maximize their effects. The Philippines has three bases appropriate for fighter and attack purposes. Using a Logistics Over-The-Shore (LOTS) concept would facilitate prepositioned kit to feed into a group of bases. After the establishment of this logistics chain, a large ship could support multiple bases. Bases in close proximity to each other can be covered by the same assets, such as missile defense systems. Subic Bay, Clark Air Field, and Basa fit the description of such a grouping of interconnected, nearby military installations. The bulk of the Philippine base infrastructure is within range of China’s weapon capabilities. The use of frontier basing (an existing airfield that can be converted rapidly into an operational fighter and attack base) helps to address basing shortfalls. Frontier bases rely on the existing infrastructure provided by the host nation, supplemented by joint logistical capabilities as necessary.

Seabasing must be exploited to counter hostile actions toward the Philippines. Seabasing is the rapid deployment and projection of combat power by way of the sea, with continual support and sustainment to expeditionary forces without reliance on a land base. It allows maximum exploitation of international waters as a maneuver space by military forces. It maximizes the

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193 Pietrucha, “Making Places, Not Bases.”
effects of a forward presence, reduces dependence on land bases, and reduces concerns of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{194} With these concepts and mechanisms in place, the EDCA’s five installations are adequate for US military forces defense partnership with the Philippines.

Implementation of the EDCA will strengthen defense cooperation between the United States and the Philippines by developing the capacity to resist armed attacks, including increasing interoperability with security cooperation exercises, combined training exercises, maritime defense enhancement, and HADR capabilities.\textsuperscript{195} Under Articles III and IV, the EDCA allows for all typical military defense activities, including training and storage.\textsuperscript{196} Annex A of the EDCA identifies five Philippine military installations that will be configured to host US military units for the use of defense cooperation: Fort Magsaysay, Basa Air Base, Antonio Bautista Air Base, Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base, and Lumbia Airfield.\textsuperscript{197} These five military installations form the backbone of the EDCA and are adequate for our current defense cooperation posture. It is important to note that four of the five locations are air bases, with Fort Magsaysay being the only ground force location. Naval facilities are also notably absent. However, these locations are not land-locked. Each air base location is near a port or is suitable for logistics over-the-shore operations. Naval port and shipyard capabilities can be expeditiously added to the EDCA in the event an increase in infrastructure usage is necessary.\textsuperscript{198} These installations are depicted on the

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{196} EDCA, 4.
\textsuperscript{197} EDCA Annex A.
\textsuperscript{198} Heredia, “U.S.-Philippine Basing Deal.”
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following map, in addition to Subic Bay, Clark Air Field, and Chinese-developed features in the South China Sea.¹⁹⁹

![Map of South China Sea with sites marked]


Basa and Bautista Air Bases are the most strategically relevant locations, as they are both within strategic striking distance from Chinese infrastructure in the South China Sea. Basa Air Base is roughly 200 miles from China’s activities in Scarborough Shoal, and has intrinsic ties with both Subic Bay and Clark Air Base. Basa is thirty-six miles from Subic Bay, where MLSA-based support (weapons, munitions, military supply, and HADR supply) is received and stored. In late January 2018, JUSMAG delivered ammunition and explosives through Subic Bay.²⁰⁰ Basa Air Base is also closely connected to Clark Air Base via communications, roads, and historical


ties. Clark is also being utilized for equipment, weapons, and munitions as mandated through the MLSA. JUSMAG also delivered rockets, rocket motors, and other select munitions and equipment from US military stockpiles to Clark for counterterrorism efforts in 2017.\textsuperscript{201} The nearby areas capable of port and docking capabilities around Subic Bay are ideal and can be quickly materialized if the need arises. An additional 8,500-foot runway can be built at Basa, parallel to the existing one. Although the immediate vicinity of Subic Bay is restricted swamp and mountainous terrain, there are an estimated fifty square miles of suitable staging area around the San Antonio and Marcelino areas.\textsuperscript{202}

Antonio Bautista Air Base is near the capital of Palawan Island, strategically located 200 miles from the Chinese-occupied Spratly Islands.\textsuperscript{203} Nearby Oyster and Ulugan Bays have been discussed as a potential location to counter Chinese development in the Spratlys. These waterways can support deep-water ports favorable to maritime activity. Oyster Bay was a target of development talks and even construction of a deep-water naval port during the Aquino administration.\textsuperscript{204} However, ambitious talk of development has not yet been realized, and funding stymied its development.\textsuperscript{205} Puerto Princesa, adjacent to Bautista, has deep water port access in a concrete, T-head wharf. This wharf can extend to provide berthing for one Liberty ship, essentially a large World War II cargo ship. Other wharves may be built south of this location to accommodate up to four Liberty ships total. Two parallel runways existed east of Puerto Princesa

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\item \textsuperscript{202} US Army, \textit{Potential Base Development}, 10.
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in 1945, which are not in current use but are usable with rehabilitation. About forty square miles of adequately level terrain near Bautista can be used as staging locations.\textsuperscript{206}

Basa Air Base is in Pampanga Province in Central Luzon, the North shore of Manila Bay and strategically near the capital of Manila. It is an airbase built by the United States in 1941 and currently operated by the Philippine Air Force. The installation has an 8,000-foot concrete runway. Currently, the units garrisoned at Basa are the 5th Fighter Wing headquarters and the 355th Aviation Engineer Wing. Basa is built to accommodate US Air Force activities under the EDCA. All fighter and bomber elements of the Pacific Air Forces (PAF) and the Air Combat Command (ACC), two of the USAF Major Commands (MAJCOMs), could stage at Basa at the same time.\textsuperscript{207} The construction of the “Humanitarian Defense Response Warehouse” began in April 2018. The warehouse will function as a response to evolving security challenges and can serve as a defense command control center.\textsuperscript{208} However, facility use other than for HADR may perpetuate undue political and economic influence over the Philippines.\textsuperscript{209}

Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base is located on a small isle near Cebu, the provincial capital. It has a single 10,000+ foot long runway, shared by the Mactan-Cebu international airport. The air base houses many air transportation units of the Philippine Air Force, including the 208th Tactical Helicopter Squadron, 205th Tactical Operations Wing, and the 220th Airlift Wing.\textsuperscript{210}

\textsuperscript{206} US Army, \textit{Potential Base Development}, 33.


Lumbia Airfield is located on the southern island of Mindanao. It currently serves as a minor air base of the Philippine Air Force, under control of the 10th Tactical Operations Group. Relocation and buildup of the 15th Strike Wing will be complete in 2019, based on an effort to consolidate counterinsurgency efforts of the Philippine military and decongest commercial flights.

Fort Magsaysay, in Nueva Ecija Province on Luzon, is the largest military reservation in the Philippines. It covers 35,000 hectares, including twelve kilometers of Pacific Ocean coastline and the Sierra Madre Mountains. Fort Magsaysay is the primary training location of the annual training exercise known as Balikatan. Balikatan, literally translating to “shoulder to shoulder,” is a multinational allied ground forces exercise designed to enhance interoperability and is critical to defense partnership. The installation has an airfield with a one-mile asphalt runway, aircraft maintenance facilities, and air control facilities. Currently, the 7th Philippine Infantry Division, a Philippine Army Aviation Battalion, and Special Operations Command Philippines are garrisoned at Fort Magsaysay. The infrastructure at Magsaysay can be supplemented through the Cagayan Valley’s potential ports on the Pacific Ocean at Casigurian Sound and reliance on Subic Bay for access to the South China Sea. Although limited staging areas exist in the wet season, enough suitable land exists in the highlands near Fort Magsaysay for military staging area purposes. Fort Magsaysay is well-connected by land routes and air to Basa Air Field, Subic Bay, and Clark Air Base.

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Balikatan, the yearly multinational allied ground forces exercise designed to enhance interoperability, is critical to defense partnership between the United States and the Philippines. This exercise has the potential to expand to a massive Indo-Pacific exercise similar to the annual Operation REFORGER, shortened from “Return of Forces to Germany,” during the cold war starting in 1969. Operation REFORGER intended to act as a show of force to deter Russian aggression and to strengthen defense partnership and cooperation.215 Balikatan may be developed into a Combat Training Center (CTC) for Division Corps exercises. The Corps level could potentially link in with the annual Cobra Gold exercise in Thailand and Ulchi-Freedom Guardian (UFG) in South Korea. The US involvement in Cobra Gold has increased in recent years after the 2014 coup in Thailand.216 Although the UFG exercise has not been conducted yearly as of late, the incorporation of South Korean partnership in Pacific Pathways has encouraged strong ties between South Korean and US partnership. Pacific Pathways is an exercise that takes place every year with multinational (Japanese, South Korean, Filipino, Thai, Australian, Indian, Indonesian, and Malaysian) partners participating in Southeast Asia. These military exercises can be linked together and create training cycles similar to those currently being conducted in Europe under Atlantic Resolve, combining small-scale deployments with exercises such as Balikatan.217 These efforts will further pursue the policy of deterrence and create stronger defense cooperation between partner countries.

In the context of how national policy translates to action through the NSS, the NDS, and the NMS, the Philippines is a critical component in the capacity of the United States to fight a


large-scale combat operation in Southeast Asia. The limited capacity of the Philippines, both in terms of infrastructure and political will of the people to surrender some of their sovereignty, needs to be calculated in the near future. Parts of this calculation should include future expansion of the MLSA integrated with the concept of flexible, interconnected logistical nodes through Globally Integrated Logistics, with prepositioned stock and capabilities (such as sea basing and over-the-shore logistics) that can be selectively accessed and quickly moved.\textsuperscript{218} As the infrastructure of Philippine basing and ports is limited, the supplementation of facilities through Korea, Japan, Guam, and other nearby facilities will likely share the burden. Just as important in these calculations will be the acceptance of the Philippine national collective polity of the presence of US forces and the potential of the Philippines becoming a battleground as it was in World War II.

In the event of an escalation of force necessary to counter an aggressive enemy in the Indo-Pacific region, there are enough existing options within the Philippines to develop infrastructure for ground, naval, and air forces for successful staging for future operations. In a 1945 report by the Army Corps of Engineers, thirty-three areas on thirteen different Philippine islands were surveyed. Each location has a varying amount of staging area, potential and existing airfields and ports are identified. In addition, maneuver areas, road networks, water sources, beach characteristics, and meteorological data is provided.\textsuperscript{219} Although additional resources may need to be used in an extreme case of foreign aggression, the preexisting engineering data provides the future Joint Commander adequate flexibility and options in any scenario.

There is a possibility that the United States will abandon the Philippines as a long-term solution for power projection into Southeast Asia. Military functions being performed by the

\textsuperscript{218} Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), \textit{Joint Concept for Logistics} (Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 25, 2015), https://csl.jndu.edu/Portals/94/Documents/U_2015-09-25\%20Joint\%20Concept\%20for\%20Logistics\%20(JCL).pdf?ver=2015-12-16-103731-667.

\textsuperscript{219} US Army, \textit{Potential Base Development}.\n
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Philippine facilities could be continued from other sites. The United States operates multiple facilities in Japan, Korea, and Guam. Excess capacity at these US facilities could accommodate some redeployed forces in peacetime, with the need to expand to provide a wartime capability equivalent to the current basing system with the Philippine facilities available.²²⁰

These alternatives to Philippine basing carry risks. Relocation to Guam and Japan would compromise the security and increase the price of sea and air routes from the United States to the Indian Ocean. Relocation to Micronesia would be cost-prohibitive and result in poor positioning of force projection for the region. Relocating to new locations in the South China Sea, such as Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei would likely create political rifts. A plan that combines elements of all three could provide a best-case alternative. Relocation of aviation assets to Japan and Korea is feasible. Ship repair capacity of the Philippines could be replaced by Japan and Guam. And the use of port facilities on Vietnam’s and Australia’s coasts would contribute to US defense of sea lanes.²²¹ However, this option would be inferior to the effectiveness and accessibility to more predictable outcomes if the escalation of force is necessary.²²²

The EDCA is the best possible solution. As it was signed in 2014 and locations were agreed upon in 2016, the implementation has been slow. This lack of traction can be viewed in part as a necessarily methodical and slow process in the spirit of respect for Philippine sovereignty. It can also be seen as a symptom of President Duterte’s hesitation to align with either the United States or China too quickly in fear of losing support from either side. Development of the EDCA faces hurdles. Even if they are purely bureaucratic hurdles, regaining momentum of the EDCA will require political effort in the face of President Duterte’s anti-American

undertones. He has prevented weapons and munitions from being stored despite weapon storage being allowed in the agreement. Additionally, the Philippines suddenly called off plans of EDCA development of Bautista in March 2017. The de-emphasis of defense cooperation in favor of civilian infrastructure development was a common theme that slowed the progress of EDCA implementation in 2017. The national interests of both countries will suffer. The Philippines will continue to get steamrolled by Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, and the United States will continue to earn the moniker of “paper tiger,” unable to protect allies or defend international freedom of the seas. The commitment of the United States to the Philippines has not waivered. Ultimately, it is up to the people of the Philippines to demand follow through by President Duterte in full implementation of the EDCA. More pressing than this, China is being left unchecked, imposing their economic will through purposeful, calculating, and methodical military posturing.

Conclusion

The 120-year long US involvement in Philippine military infrastructure development and basing has been mutually beneficial in the national defense of the Philippines and hegemonic power projection into Southeast Asia for the United States. The defeat of Spain in Manila Bay in 1898, the defeat of Japan in Manila in 1945, the Military Bases Agreement of 1947, the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, the Visiting Forces Agreement of 1988, the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement of 2008, and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement of 2014 provide a


testament of the interoperability and mutual dependence of both countries. Mutual defense is the backbone of their “special relationship.”

Along with mutual defense, the Filipino struggle for independence and sovereignty has characterized US-Philippine relations. After the Philippine-American War, occupation and pacification infused American culture into the Filipino population. This forceful adoption of Western culture is partly responsible for undue US influence in Filipino political and internal affairs. On the other hand, Filipinos quickly adopted distinctively American cultural norms as their own, and enjoy the economic benefits that accompany the presence of US institutions. The Philippines has been shaped politically by strong nationalistic movements since the late nineteenth century. The current nationalist president of the Philippines has shown discontent with his country’s ties to the United States and has made efforts to align with an emergent and revanchist China. Although the current president of the Philippines shows strong nationalism, the vast majority of Filipinos favor stronger strategic alignment with the United States.

Maintaining and enhancing defense cooperation is vital to the defense of the Philippines and deterring China’s aggressive territorial posture in the region. Implementation of the EDCA’s five bases, maximizing the concepts of logistics-over-the-shore and seabasing, and an expansion of the annual Balikatan military training exercise will fulfill defense agreements with the Filipino people and facilitate stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The increased cooperation brings the risk of a perceived decrease in sovereignty, but is outweighed by an overwhelmingly favorable Filipino view of the United States. Ultimately, understanding the history and capabilities of the military basing infrastructure of the Philippines, leveraging the will of the Filipino people, and respecting the sovereignty of their nation must be carefully considered in the future utility of their “special relationship” with the United States.
Appendix: Definitions

“Agreed locations” – Facilities and areas identified in the EDCA that are provided by the Philippines for the use of defense cooperation.

Balikatan – The annual military exercises between the Philippines and the United States. Tagalog word meaning “shoulder-to-shoulder.”

Barangay – A basic communal settlement established by pre-colonial migrants, a native village. Originally a Malay term for “boat.”

EDSA Revolution – February 1986 uprising (People’s Power Revolution) that ousted President Ferdinand Marcos. EDSA is an acronym for Epifanio de los Santos, a circular road around Manila where the confrontation between pro- and anti-Marcos factions.

Hukbalahap (Huks) – The communist guerrilla movement formed by the peasant farmers of Central Luzon (People’s Anti-Japanese Army), and renamed People’s Liberation Army in 1946.

Intramuros – Manila fortifications by the Spaniards, designed to protect their governmental headquarters. Latin for “within the walls.”

Island Chain Strategy – A strategy that uses a series of islands strategically to protect China’s sovereign mainland. The Spratlys are a critical piece of their first island chain. This concept has become a major part of Chinese defense strategy.

Logistics Over-The-Shore – The loading and unloading of ships without the benefit of deep draft-capable, fixed port facilities in which there is a permissive environment. Can be used as a means of moving forces closer to tactical assembly areas.

Katipunan – A secret revolutionary society that led a revolt against Spanish rule of the Philippines in the 1890s, led by Emilio Aguinaldo.

Moro – Spanish term for Moor, the name given by the Spanish to Muslim Filipinos. Moros inhabit southern and eastern Mindanao, Sulu Archipelago, and Palawan. Moros generally have not assimilated into mainstream Filipino culture.

“Mutual defense” – A pact, agreement, or alliance that dictates each nation will support each other if one nation was attacked by an external party. In most mutual defense arrangements with the United States and weaker countries such as the Philippines, the US Department of Defense is allowed limited presence and actions in the partnering country, giving the weaker nation assured US-sponsored defense and facilitating military and diplomatic effects of the United States in the region.

“Special relationship” – The unique bilateral relations between the United States and the Philippines, especially in terms of mutual defense cooperation and military base agreements. This relationship has unique and complex economic, social, and political consequences.

“Strongpoint defense” – A tactically defensive arrangement that fortifies and arms key critical points, around which other positions are grouped for maximum protection. Used by George Kennan to describe the Philippines’ key role in the containment of Soviet communism.
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