

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 04-05-2011		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Security Cooperation: A New Functional Combatant Command		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER			
		5b. GRANT NUMBER			
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER			
6. AUTHOR(S)  Randal M. Walsh  Paper Advisor (if Any): Dave Carrington		5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
		5e. TASK NUMBER			
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)			
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)			
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
14. ABSTRACT Over the past decade the United States has conducted Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN) in two major theaters and participated in Security Cooperation (SC) operations worldwide to build partner capacity and defeat insurgents and terrorist networks. Successful COIN and SC operations hinge on the ability to fully integrate joint military and interagency capabilities to achieve strategic objectives. Recent operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and elsewhere show that when SC operations are synchronized with military and interagency elements of national power, they can have a positive impact on security and stability. The current emphasis on SC at the strategic and operational level reflects its significance; however, there is no DOD command responsible for integrated SC joint doctrine, training, interagency coordination, and worldwide force employment. Considering the importance of integrated SC operations and its relevance to the current global security environment, a new SC functional combatant command should be created that synchronizes joint, interagency resources and incorporates lessons learned in the past decade of SC and capacity building operations.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Security Cooperation					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES  22	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, R.I.**

**Security Cooperation:  
A New Functional Combatant Command**

**by**

**Randal M. Walsh**

**Major, United States Marine Corps**

**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**4 May 2011**

## **Contents**

Introduction	1
Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Security Cooperation	3
A Proactive Approach to Integrated Security Cooperation	5
Compelling Need to Institutionalize Security Cooperation	6
Security Cooperation: Unity of Effort without Unity of Command	11
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency	12
Recommendations and Lessons Learned	13
Counterargument	17
Conclusion	18
Bibliography	20

## **Abstract**

Over the past decade the United States has conducted Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN) in two major theaters and participated in Security Cooperation (SC) operations worldwide to build partner capacity and defeat insurgents and terrorist networks. Successful COIN and SC operations hinge on the ability to fully integrate joint military and interagency capabilities to achieve strategic objectives. Recent operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and elsewhere show that when SC operations are synchronized with military and interagency elements of national power, they can have a positive impact on security and stability. The current emphasis on SC at the strategic and operational level reflects its significance; however, there is no DOD command responsible for integrated SC joint doctrine, training, interagency coordination, and worldwide force employment. Considering the importance of integrated SC operations and its relevance to the current global security environment, a new SC functional combatant command should be created that synchronizes joint, interagency resources and incorporates lessons learned in the past decade of SC and capacity building operations.

**We will continue to rebalance our military capabilities to excel at counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stability operations, and meeting increasingly sophisticated security threats, while ensuring our force is ready to address the full range of military operations.**

*U.S. National Security Strategy*

**INTRODUCTION**

In order to meet the demands of the future U.S. security environment, a new Security Cooperation (SC) functional combatant command should be created that synchronizes joint, interagency resources and incorporates lessons learned during the past decade of SC and capacity building operations.<sup>1</sup> Recent operations substantiate the importance of SC and capacity building operations that fully integrate military and civilian capabilities to improve security and stability. The success and experiences of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) show the utility of SC in the counterinsurgency (COIN) environment and its potential to provide combatant commanders (CCDR) a valuable tool to achieve operational objectives. Special Operations Forces (SOF) operations provide additional examples of how non-traditional civilian-military operations can be effective in COIN and SC. SC and capacity building activities are being conducted around the globe in order to achieve national security objectives by intervening in failed or failing states. Integrated SC operations will be indispensable in the future global security environment which Marine Corps Commandant James F. Amos describes as a world where “[f]ailed states or those that cannot adequately govern their territory can become safe havens for terrorist, insurgent and criminal groups that threaten the U.S. and our allies.”<sup>2</sup> To improve stability and security in this environment, the U.S. must emphasize Phase Zero Shaping Operations through integrated SC in

---

<sup>1</sup>A functional combatant command is a type of unified command. Unified commands have broad and continuing missions under a single commander and are classified as geographic or functional combatant commands. There are ten unified commands such as US Central Command (geographic) and US Special Operations Command (functional). There are six geographic combatant commands and four functional combatant commands within the Department of Defense.

<sup>2</sup> 35<sup>th</sup> Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Commandant's Planning Guidance*, Headquarters USMC (2010), 3, <http://www.marines.mil>, (accessed 19 March 2011).

order to “dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to solidify relationships with friends and allies.”<sup>3</sup> By improving security and security in troubled regions through integrated SC operations, the U.S. can prevent or reduce conditions that often lead to terrorist activity. The goals outlined in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and those expressed by CCDRs emphasize this necessity.

Security Cooperation is defined as “all Department of Defense [DOD] interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”<sup>4</sup> Recent experiences show that when *integrated* with civilian agencies SC operations can have a dramatic impact on a host-nation’s ability to provide security and governance for its people. Although there are many examples of SC operations, there is no DOD central coordinating command responsible for integrated SC doctrine, training, and force employment. As a result, the potential for redundancy, lost institutional knowledge, insufficient doctrine, and insufficient coordination with various agencies exists. A joint forces SC functional combatant command would better posture the military and other USG agencies for the most likely future threat environments.

To make the case for a new functional combatant command that focuses on SC, this paper initially provides a description of PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan as an example of SC operations that integrate military and civilian capabilities. Next, it examines SC and COIN

---

<sup>3</sup> Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 22 March 2010), IV-21.

<sup>4</sup> Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 31 January 2011), 323, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp1\\_02.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf) (accessed 14 April 2011).

operations in the Philippines conducted by SOF. These operations reflect a more proactive approach to integrated SC and capacity building without introducing major combat forces. After providing examples of recent integrated SC operations, a review of the National Security Strategy and other United States Government (USG) policy documents shows that a new combatant command responsible for SC is relevant today. This paper also illustrates how a SC command would serve to compliment the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Lastly, this paper addresses recommendations and lessons learned that should be incorporated into a new SC functional combatant command.

## **PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS AND SECURITY COOPERATION**

The PRT concept was introduced in Afghanistan in 2002 in order to expand the reach and effectiveness of the Afghan central government without introducing significantly more troops in the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) Area of Responsibility (AOR). As explained in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, "PRTs were conceived as a means to extend the reach and enhance the legitimacy of the central government..."<sup>5</sup> By 2003, PRTs were deployed in the ISAF AOR and comprised up to 100 servicemen and civilians with members of the U.S. State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture.<sup>6</sup> Their mixture of members from DOD and other agencies was intended to provide unique capabilities and resources that could improve conditions throughout Afghanistan and enhance the effectiveness of the central government. Since they were first introduced, PRTs in Afghanistan have been under the direct control of US military and ISAF

---

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Army, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, Field Manual (FM) 3-24 (Washington, D.C: Department of the Army, December 2006), 2-12, [www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf](http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf) (accessed 15 March 2011)

<sup>6</sup> Michael J. McNerney, "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?" *Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly*, Vol. XXXV, No. 4, (Winter 2005-06), 32, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/05winter/mcnerney.pdf> (accessed 11 February 2011).

commanders.<sup>7</sup> Although the Afghan government has successfully held elections and conditions in the country have generally improved since the introduction of PRTs, the legitimacy of the national government is fragile and violence and corruption remains.<sup>8</sup> As a result, the capabilities PRTs offer will be needed well into the future.

PRTs were later adopted in Iraq in 2005 and may be credited for much of the progress seen throughout the country. After major combat operations ended and a full-blown insurgency erupted, coalition forces recognized the need to employ PRTs to enhance security, stability, and governance in Iraq. PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan are similar but their composition and command and control vary. Unlike their counterparts in Afghanistan who are directly controlled by the military with guidance from the PRT Executive Steering Committee in Kabul, PRTs in Iraq are led by the Department of State (DOS). Like PRTs in Afghanistan, PRTs in Iraq consist of military and civilian personnel with members from the DOS, Justice, Agriculture, and USAID. Iraq PRTs are assigned military officers as deputy leaders, liaison officers, as well civil affairs and Army Corps of Engineers personnel. Embedded or “ePRTs” were also created in Iraq which are smaller than normal PRTs with 8 to 12 servicemen and civilians.<sup>9</sup>

Although there are differences in PRT composition and command structure, they share the common goal of improving security, stability, and governance. They are also similar in that they require close integration of multiple USG agencies in order to be effective. Even though PRTs have been recently introduced in Afghanistan and Iraq, the concept is not new and has been seen in other forms over the years. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development

---

<sup>7</sup> John, H. Ebbighausen, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Good Governance” (research paper, Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2010), 24, <http://stinet.dtic.mil/> (accessed 12 March 2011). Available at Defense Technical Information Report (DTIC) ADA522991.

<sup>8</sup> US Agency for International Development (US AID), *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, An Interagency Assessment*, (June 2006), 7, [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNADG252.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADG252.pdf), (accessed 19 March 2011).

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, 39.



Support (CORDS) during Vietnam as well as recent SOF operations in the Philippines are also examples of operations that integrate civilian and military resources to build partner capacity and improve stability, security, and governance. Each example proves that when military and civilian operations are conducted in conjunction with each other, the results can be substantial.

## **A PROACTIVE APPROACH TO INTEGRATED SECURITY COOPERATION**

Ongoing COIN and SC operations conducted by SOF in the Philippines can be compared to PRT operations since their aim is also to improve security, stability, and governance through multiple agencies in coordination with the host nation. Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) began in 2002 as one of the main fronts in the Global War on Terror.<sup>10</sup> What makes OEF-P operations different from those of PRTs is that they were initiated before major combat forces were needed and conducted by highly specialized SOF. Their success reinforces the importance of proactive PRT-like SC operations that integrate military and civilian capabilities and are designed to counter conditions that lead to insurgent or terrorist activity.

In February 2002, Joint Task Force (JTF) 510 was established in the Southern Philippines in support of OEF-P to quell a growing insurgency. The Southern Philippines is “notorious for civil unrest, lawlessness, terrorist activity, and Muslim separatist movements” and required a comprehensive approach to COIN without the introduction of major combat forces.<sup>11</sup> Using a mix of civilian, military, and host nation resources, JTF 510 employed what is known as the indirect approach to COIN. By acting “by, with, and through” the host nation, the JTF supported the Philippine government’s efforts to defeat the insurgency. Their approach called for “interactions between the host-nation government, the insurgents, the local populace, and

---

<sup>10</sup> Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-PHILIPPINES and The Indirect Approach,” *Military Review*, Vol. 86, no. 6 (Nov/Dec 2006), 4. <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 21 March 2011).

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*, 4.

international actors or sponsors.”<sup>12</sup> Unlike the PRTs discussed above, JTF 510 focused heavily on the employment of SOF to work with indigenous forces in order to establish security. Once the security situation improved, civil affairs units were introduced and the U.S. Naval construction Task Group commenced infrastructure projects. Key to the entire operation was the close coordination with the DOS country team to “facilitate interagency planning and synchronization.”<sup>13</sup>

Like PRTs, JTF 510’s success in the Philippines using relatively small joint, interagency teams shows how synchronized SC operations can be effective in improving partner capacity to fight an insurgency. With a task force that consisted of only about 1,300 U.S. troops, JTF 510 achieved significant results. By focusing on building the capacity of the Philippine armed forces and emphasizing host nation, military, and USG agency cooperation, an insurgency has been mitigated. The fact that there is no functional combatant command to coordinate similar activities throughout the globe represents a shortfall in the U.S. capacity to achieve its operational and strategic objectives of improving stability and security and building partner capacity.

## **COMPELLING NEED TO INSTITUTIONALIZE SECURITY COOPERATION**

In the post 9/11 era, irregular threats facing the U.S. require a whole of government approach to prevent the emergence of unstable environments like the one in Afghanistan before 9/11. The best strategy in the twenty-first century is to keep terrorist-friendly environments from surfacing by building partner capacity without introducing significant numbers of ground forces. The National Security Strategy (NSS) establishes the foundation for this approach and states that “our military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train

---

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 4.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, 6.

and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments.”<sup>14</sup> The National Defense Strategy captures the intent of the NSS by stating that “by helping others to police themselves and their regions, we will collectively address threats to the broader international system.”<sup>15</sup> The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review reinforces this point and explains that “building the capacity of partner nations can help prevent conflict from beginning or escalating, reducing the possibility that large and enduring deployments of U.S. or allied forces would be required.”<sup>16</sup>

The Secretary of Defense, CCDRs and other government agencies such as the DOS and USAID have committed themselves to conducting SC with governments around the world to combat insurgencies and terrorist networks. A review of the National Security and National Defense Strategies and CCDR mission and posture statements reflects a focus of effort in this regard. For instance, in the National Defense Strategy, the Secretary of Defense emphasized that “[o]ur forces have stepped up to the task of long-term reconstruction, development and governance.”<sup>17</sup> It further states that the “U.S. Armed Forces will need to institutionalize and retain these capabilities, but this is no replacement for civilian involvement and expertise [and] we will continue to work with other U.S. Departments and Agencies, state and local governments, partners and allies, and international and multilateral organizations to achieve our

---

<sup>14</sup> U.S. President, *National Security Strategy May 2010*, (Washington, DC: White House, 2010), 12, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/.../national\\_security\\_strategy.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/.../national_security_strategy.pdf) (accessed 15 March 2011).

<sup>15</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, June 2008), 10, <http://www.defense.gov/.../2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf> (accessed 15 March 2011).

<sup>16</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2010), 7, <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.pdf> (accessed 19 March 2011).

<sup>17</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, 17.

objectives.”<sup>18</sup> This statement highlights the importance of multi-agency PRT-like or SOF units capable of building partner capacity through integrated SC.

As stated above, combatant commands have focused on capacity building and SC. In the 2010 AFRICOM Posture Statement, General Ward emphasized the importance of working “in concert with our interagency partners, such as the U.S. Department of State and United States Agency for International Development, to ensure our plans and activities directly support U.S. foreign policy objectives.”<sup>19</sup> He went on to stress that in order to meet our national defense challenges a “holistic view of security” is needed that incorporates a whole of government approach. AFRICOM applied this approach with the DOS in the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. This program is funded by the DOS and supported by AFRICOM and targets selected militaries in Africa to improve their capacity to respond to crises.<sup>20</sup> SOUTHCOM also incorporates a whole of government approach to address security challenges in its AOR. As stated in SOUTHCOM’s 2010 Posture Statement, “security will depend upon expanding cooperative engagement with multinational, multi-agency and public-private partners...”<sup>21</sup>

U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) Strategy 2010 also underscored the importance of a “fully-integrated approach to security.” In what it calls the “3-D Construct,” SOCOM aims to synchronize Diplomacy, Defense, and Development in coordination with other instruments of national power. Their approach stresses “the integration and collaboration of each

---

<sup>18</sup>Ibid, 17.

<sup>19</sup> William E. Ward., Commander United States Africa Command, “AFRICOM Posture Statement” (March 2010), 11, <http://www.africom.mil/> (accessed 10 March 2011).

<sup>20</sup> Anonymous, “Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA),” *DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management*, Vol. 3, no. 4, (December 2006) 5, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 21 March 2011).

<sup>21</sup> Douglas M. Frazier, Commander United States Southern Command, “Posture Statement of United States Southern Command” (11 March 2010), 2, <http://www.southcom.mil>, (accessed 10 March 2011).

element [of national power] toward defined purposes... [and] requires all government departments and agencies to operate and collaborate in concert in order to produce an effective approach to national security.”<sup>22</sup> Admiral Eric T. Olson, the commander of SOCOM, explained to the House Armed Services Committee that SOF “are conducting a wide range of activities in dozens of countries around the world on any given day – at the request of the host government, with the approval of the U.S. Ambassador and under the operational control of the U.S.”<sup>23</sup> SOF is clearly dedicated to meeting today’s security and stability challenges as proven by the success of JTF 510. Similar operations that integrate and synchronize military and civilian capabilities are necessary to respond to threats worldwide. Unfortunately, SOF lacks the resources to conduct operations on the scale necessary in the future security environment.

SOCOM may serve as the most compelling example for creating a functional combatant command dedicated to SC. The founding of SOCOM can be traced back to the 24 April 1980 failed attempt to rescue 53 American hostages held by Iran. The operation, now known as Desert One, revealed DOD’s lack of jointness in handling such difficult missions and highlighted weaknesses in SOF. The event also highlighted the need for a dedicated command capable of responding to complex scenarios such as terrorist threats and low-intensity conflicts. Subsequent events and congressional initiatives reinforced this requirement since some felt “strongly that the DOD was not preparing adequately for future threats... [and] needed a clearer organizational focus and chain of command for special operations...”<sup>24</sup> Eventually, SOCOM was created in 1987 in response to these concerns. In addition to its Title 10 responsibilities and authorities, the

---

<sup>22</sup> Eric T. Olson, Commander United States Special Operations Command, “Special Operations Command Strategy 2010,” 5 (November 2009).

<sup>23</sup> Eric T. Olson, Commander United States Special Operations Command, “Posture Statement of the United States Special Operations Command,” (3 March 2011), 5, <http://armedservices.house.gov/> (accessed 10 March 2011).

<sup>24</sup> United States Special Operations Command, “History United States Special Operations Command,” 6, <http://www.socom.mil/> (accessed 1 April 2011).

2004 Unified Command Plan required SOCOM to synchronize DOD plans against terrorist networks and conduct global operations as necessary.<sup>25</sup> Considering it took just one event to serve as the catalyst for establishing SOCOM, it stands to reason that the last decade of COIN operations and thousands of casualties warrants the creation of a command devoted to building partner capacity through integrated SC operations. Our failure to do so after the tough lessons in Vietnam reinforces this point.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has emphasized the requirement to integrate DOD, DOS, USAID, and other USG agencies to meet demands of the Long War. Like the CCDRs described above, he fully recognizes the requirement to integrate multiple agencies together to be effective. He also recognizes that the civilian and military instruments of national power were not designed to handle the complex threats faced by the U.S. today. As he put it, the “military was designed to defeat other armies, navies, and air forces, not to advise, train, and equip them [and]... the United States' civilian instruments of power were designed primarily to manage relationships between states, rather than to help build states from within.”<sup>26</sup> In order to adapt to the most likely security environment, it is time to institutionalize integrated SC in DOD.

---

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 16.

<sup>26</sup> Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves,” *Foreign Affairs*, 89, no. 3 (May/June 2010), 2-5, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 17 February 2011).

## **SECURITY COOPERATION: UNITY OF EFFORT WITHOUT UNITY OF COMMAND**

While there may be unity of effort to integrate military and civilian capabilities at the tactical and operational level, DOD does not have a command dedicated to that effort with the capacity to respond to SC demands facing the U.S. and its allies. In other words, DOD lacks unity of command in integrated SC and capacity building operations. Secretary Gates articulated this problem by stating that the “institutional challenge we face at the Pentagon is that the various functions for building partner capacity are scattered across different parts of the military... [and] there has not been enough attention paid to building the institutional capacity (such as defense ministries) or the human capital (including leadership skills and attitudes) needed to sustain security over the long term.”<sup>27</sup> The solution may lie in a new command dedicated to facing the threats of the twenty-first century that synchronizes joint, interagency SC and capacity building operations.

The need for capacity building and joint, interagency SC efforts is clearly understood. Unfortunately, DOD has not structured itself to meet current and future SC and capacity building demands. PRTs have been immersed in operations that combine DOD and other USG agencies to enhance stability, security, and governance in Iraq and Afghanistan but they are only dedicated to those theaters and are relatively small. SOCOM also has tremendous experience in the SC and capacity building arena but lacks the capacity to address requirements worldwide. Considering the widespread emphasis on SC and capacity building, it appears there is unity of effort. However, since there is no central command authority within DOD to maintain and coordinate operations like those conducted by PRTs and SOF, there is not unity of command.

---

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, 2-5.

## THE DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY

DSCA provides even more relevance for a SC functional combatant command. DSCA exists to synchronize “global security cooperation programs, funding and efforts across OSD, Joint Staff, State Department, COCOMS [combatant commands], the services and U.S. Industry [and] is responsible for the effective policy, processes, training, and financial management necessary to execute security cooperation within the DOD.”<sup>28</sup> The agency oversees funding and education programs such as Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Internal Defense (FID), International Military Education and Training (IMET), as well as humanitarian and civic assistance projects. With only 670 DSCA personnel worldwide focused mainly on military training, education, and financing, a SC command would serve as the operational arm of SC within DOD capable of supporting the global SC effort.<sup>29</sup>

A SC command would provide DSCA a link between the strategic, operational, and tactical level of SC operations and could deliver integrated interagency and military teams to conduct SC activities. As a source of funding and as a connection between key agencies, DSCA would be a key enabler for an integrated SC functional command. What an SC command could provide DOD and DSCA are tactical and operational SC capabilities with force employment options. In the same manner SOCOM provides highly trained forces to conduct special operations, a SC command could organize and train forces ready to conduct integrated SC operations and provide those forces to geographic CCDRs to execute their Theater Security

---

<sup>28</sup> Defense Security Cooperation Agency Web Site, “What We Do,” <http://www.dsca.osd.mil/> (accessed 20 April 2011).

<sup>29</sup> Beth McCormick and Scott Schless, “Building Partnership Capacity Through Education and Training: Key Efforts of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency,” *DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management*, Vol 32, no. 1 (July 2010), 199. <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 20 April 2011).



Cooperation Plans. The command could maintain PRT-like SC forces capable of supporting DOD's and DSCA's strategic objectives. Several of SOCOM's Title 10 authorities and responsibilities might apply to a SC command. For instance, a SC command could develop SC operations strategy and tactics, conduct specialized courses of instruction, validate requirements, and ensure SC forces readiness.<sup>30</sup>

## **RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED**

Recognizing the importance of institutionalizing SC and capacity-building capabilities within DOD, it follows that the recent lessons learned must be captured in order to provide DOD a responsive and capable command ready to employ SC forces in joint, interagency, multi-national operations. Three primary recommendations must be considered if a new SC functional combatant command is to be successful in the future. First, integrated SC operations require a central coordinating authority. Second, experiences have shown that joint, interagency doctrine must be created to guide SC operations. Finally, USG agencies supporting SC and capacity building operations must be fully incorporated into the new command.

As explained above, the lack of a central coordinating authority to orchestrate SC operations for DOD represents a significant gap in the USG ability to promote security and stability and build partner capacity. Although CCDRS, DOD, DSCA, and DOS all emphasize the need to conduct joint, interagency operations, a dedicated command structure has yet to be created. This has caused problems in recent operations. For instance, the diversity of PRTs "created challenges in maintaining a common mission and coordinating an increasingly diverse

---

<sup>30</sup> U.S. Special Operations Command, "SOCOM Factbook," 6.  
[www.socom.mil/socomhome/newspub/pubs/documents/factbook.pdf](http://www.socom.mil/socomhome/newspub/pubs/documents/factbook.pdf) (accessed 20 April 2011).

group of stakeholders.”<sup>31</sup> Although SOCOM conducts integrated SC operations, it lacks the size and resources necessary to respond to the current and future security environment. A dedicated command would boost DOD’s capability to employ SC forces and synchronize joint, interagency efforts.

Given the limited size and high demand on SOF forces, strategy expert Andrew Krepinevich proposed that “the Army and its sister services must be prepared to conduct training and advising of host nation militaries and, where necessary, allied and partner militaries. If the Army’s partners in the U.S. Government’s interagency element — e.g., the State Department, intelligence community, USAID — prove unable to meet their obligations as partners in restoring stability, the Army must also be prepared to engage in operations to help restore the threatened state’s governance, infrastructure, and the rule of law.”<sup>32</sup> He went on to explain that the Army should maintain a standing training and advisory force which is institutionalized in the Army through training and doctrine.<sup>33</sup> On the other hand, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli believes that a separate low-intensity force is not required but that the U.S. “should consider increasing the number and adjusting the proportion of specialized units such as civil affairs, engineers, information operations, and others that play critical roles in stability operations.”<sup>34</sup> In each case, the importance of increasing U.S. capacity to meet global SC and capacity building requirements is clear. A command to orchestrate those efforts makes sense.

New doctrine must be created to implement a SC functional combatant command that incorporates lessons learned throughout DOD and USG agencies. Since SC operations around

---

<sup>31</sup> Michael J. McNerney. “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?” 38.

<sup>32</sup> Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Strategy for the Long Haul: An Army at the Crossroads,” *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments* (Washington, DC: 2008), 63. <http://www.dtic.mil> (accessed 15 March 2011). Available at Defense Information Report (DTIC) ADA491440.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Peter W. Chiarelli, “Learning from our Modern Wars; The Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future,” *Military Review*, Vol. 87, no. 5 (Sept/Oct 2007), 7. <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 21 March 2011).

the globe will entail “the proliferation of partner countries and growing diversity in areas of operations, there is an ever-greater need for central direction, coordination, and standardization.”<sup>35</sup>

Operations conducted by PRTs are one example of what new SC doctrine must address. Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, states that “a PRT is an interim interagency organization designed to improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy and effectiveness of a HN local or provincial government in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services... While the PRTs are primarily concerned with addressing local conditions, they also work on building and improving communication and linkages among the central government, regional, and local agencies.” While this definition may be useful, it does not establish sufficient doctrine for PRTs or similar integrated SC forces. As expressed by one scholar, “[t]he recent accomplishments of PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq deem them relevant, and future successes may depend on clearly delineated concepts relating to the broad scope of capabilities that PRTs bring to the table.”<sup>36</sup>

Fortunately, the foundation for joint integrated SC doctrine can be found in the *International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) PRT Handbook* and the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) *PRTs in Iraq*, and the CALL *PRT Playbook*.<sup>37</sup> U.S. Army FM 3-07.1, *Security Assistance Operations* will provide another source to create doctrine applicable to a new SC command. The 2007 *U.S. Army International Security Cooperation Policy* will provide yet another reference for SC command doctrine. Using these sources and others, DOD can establish

---

<sup>35</sup> Robert M Perito, “The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan; Lessons Identified,” *United States Institute for Peace*, 13.

<sup>36</sup> William D. Frazier, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams; The Compelling Need for Joint Doctrine” (research paper, Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations Department 2009), 7, <http://www.stinet.dtic.mil/> (accessed 15 March 2011). Available as Defense Information Center Report (DTIC) ADA502916.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid*, 13.

the doctrine necessary to consolidate SC training, force employment, and interagency coordination. In addition to key elements of the sources mentioned above, the doctrine must specifically address interagency cooperation so that DOD can institutionalize relationships and lessons learned in recent SC and capacity building operations.

One of the most critical lessons learned after years of operating in the SC environment is the need to fully incorporate civilian agencies to accomplish the mission. Robert Perrito, Coordinator of the Afghanistan Experience Project at the U.S. Institute for Peace, stressed that the U.S. must “match PRT military capabilities with a robust component of specially trained, adequately resourced, and logistically supported civilian representatives.” Mr. Perrito compared the PRT effort with that of the CORDS program in Vietnam. The CORDS program was a civilian-military organization led by USAID and consisted mostly of civilians. The DOS assigned hundreds of Foreign Service Officers to CORDS in an effort to improve conditions in Vietnam.<sup>38</sup> A new SC command should maintain the ability “to field, on short notice, CORDS [type] groups capable of providing advice, mentoring, and support to the host nation’s non-security institutions (including its civil administration and its legal, economic, and healthcare sectors).”<sup>39</sup> Like PRTs, “CORDS groups would vary in size depending on the circumstances, but they should include military personnel, civilians made available from the interagency and expert personal services contractors.”<sup>40</sup> This ability will depend heavily on the involvement of civilian agencies. The emphasis on civilian involvement will be essential to the success of future SC operations and must be an integral part of a new SC functional combatant command.

---

<sup>38</sup> Robert M Perito, “The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan; Lessons Identified,” *United States Institute for Peace*, 14.

<sup>39</sup> Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Strategy for the Long Haul: An Army at the Crossroads,” *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments*, 63.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid*, 63.

## **COUNTERARGUMENT**

Some might argue that SOCOM exists to address the SC and capacity building efforts described in this paper. Others may argue that existing commands and the current DOD DSCA structure can meet SC demands. For instance, some say that current geographic CCDRs can apply the PRT concept or tap into SOF assets in response to SC or capacity building requirements. However, as mentioned, SOCOM lacks the size to conduct SC and capacity building on the scale necessary today and in the future. Additionally, the PRT concept has yet to be institutionalized as reflected by the lack of doctrine and there is not central command to train, equip, and deploy PRT-like forces that are integrated with necessary civilian agencies. Although conventional forces may be capable of temporarily handling the SC and capacity building role, they lack a central command authority to coordinate joint, interagency efforts necessary to meet SC demands. A SC functional combatant command could overcome these challenges.

## CONCLUSION

*“The most obvious action for the United States to take in its COIN campaign is to anticipate the possibility of an insurgency developing before it materializes. Many of the recommended steps are relatively low cost and easy to implement, especially when compared with fighting a full-blown insurgency...”<sup>41</sup>*

**Daniel Byman**  
**RAND Corporation Counterinsurgency Study**

The above quote emphasizes the necessity for the U.S. to be proactive in pursuing its National Security Strategy and a new SC functional combatant command may be one of the first steps to implement at relatively low cost yet have a tremendous impact. What has been referred as “persistent conflict,” the U.S. and its allies will likely face the continuous complex challenges of failed or failing states that have the potential to become safe havens for insurgents or terrorist networks. In such an environment, the U.S. essentially finds itself in Phase Zero Shaping Operations which are intended to “to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined military and national strategic objectives.”<sup>42</sup> A new SC functional combatant command would focus on this phase of operations. A command dedicated to integrated SC could ensure that efforts throughout DOD and the USG are aligned with the strategic and operational SC objectives expressed in U.S. national security policy documents. A new SC command could also ensure that SC at the tactical level is conducted with forces that have the appropriate doctrine, training, and readiness necessary to succeed. Instead of introducing SC and capacity building forces after major ground combat operations like in Iraq and Afghanistan, a new SC command could orchestrate DOD and interagency efforts before

---

<sup>41</sup> Daniel Byman, “Understanding Proto-Insurgencies,” *RAND Corporation Counterinsurgency Study*, Paper 3, ix, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\\_papers/2007/RAND\\_OP178.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2007/RAND_OP178.pdf) (accessed 15 March 2011).

<sup>42</sup> Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 22 March 2010), IV-21.

conflict begins and before conditions arise that lead to terrorist activity or full-blown insurgencies.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- “Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA).” *DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management*, Vol. 3, no. 4, (December 2006): 5-7. <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 21 March 2011).
- Byman, Daniel. “Understanding Proto-Insurgencies.” *RAND Corporation Counterinsurgency Study*, Paper 3. [http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\\_papers/2007/RAND\\_OP178.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2007/RAND_OP178.pdf) (accessed 15 March 2011).
- Chiarelli, Peter W. “Learning from our Modern Wars; The Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future.” *Military Review*, Vol. 87, no. 5 (Sept/Oct 2007): 2-15. <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 21 March 2011).
- Defense Security Cooperation Agency Web site. “What We Do.” <http://www.dsca.osd.mil/> (accessed 20 April 2011).
- Ebbighausen, John H. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Good Governance.” Research paper, Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2010. <http://www.stinet.dtic.mil/> (accessed 12 March 2011).
- Frazier, Douglas M., Commander United States Southern Command. “Posture Statement of United States Southern Command.” (11 March 2010). <http://www.southcom.mil/>, (accessed 10 March 2011).
- Frazier, William D. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams; The Compelling Need for Joint Doctrine.” Research paper, Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations Department 2009. <http://www.stinet.dtic.mil/>, (accessed 15 March 2011).
- Gates, Robert M., “Helping Others Defend Themselves,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, no. 3 (May/June 2010): 2-5. <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 17 February 2011).
- Secretary of Defense. Address. West Point, NY, 25 February 2011. <http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1539> (accessed 15 March 2011).
- Krepinevich, Andrew F. “Strategy for the Long Haul: An Army at the Crossroads.” *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments*. Washington, DC: 2008. <http://www.dtic.mil> (accessed 15 March 2011).
- McCormick, Beth and Scott Schless. “Building Partnership Capacity Through Education and Training: Key Efforts of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.” *DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management*, Vol 32, no. 1 (July 2010). 196-200. <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 20 April 2011).



- McNerney, Michael J. "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?" *Parameters, U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, Vol. XXXV, No. 4 (Winter 2004-2006): 32-46.  
<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/05winter/mcnerney.pdf> (accessed 11 February 2011).
- Olson, Eric T., Commander United States Special Operations Command. "Special Operations Command Strategy 2010," (November 2009).
- . "Posture Statement of the United States Special Operations Command." (3 March 2011). <http://armedservices.house.gov/> (accessed 10 March 2011).
- Perito, Robert M. "The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan; Lessons Identified." *United States Institute for Peace*, Special Report 152 (October 2005). <http://www.usip.org/> (accessed 22 March 2010).
- U.S. Agency for International Development (US AID). *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, An Interagency Assessment*. June 2006.  
[http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNADG252.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADG252.pdf), (accessed 19 March 2011).
- U.S. Army. *Counterinsurgency Operations*. Field Manual (FM) 3-24. Washington, D.C: Department of the Army, December 2006. [http:// www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf](http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf) (accessed 15 March 2011).
- U.S. Army. *Army International Security Cooperation Policy*. Army Regulation 11-31. Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army 24 October 2007.  
[www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ar11-31.pdf](http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ar11-31.pdf) (accessed 20 April 2011).
- U.S. Department of Defense. *National Defense Strategy*. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, June 2008.  
<http://www.defense.gov/.../2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf> (accessed 15 March 2011).
- U.S. Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review*. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2010.  
<http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.pdf> (accessed 19 March 2011).
- U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02. Washington, DC: CJCS, 31 January 2011. [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp1\\_02.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf) (accessed 14 April 2011).

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0. Washington, DC: CJCS 22 March 2010.  
[http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jointpub\\_operations.htm](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub_operations.htm) (accessed 15 March 2011)

U.S. President. *National Security Strategy*. Washington, DC: White House, 2010.  
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/.../national\\_security\\_strategy.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/.../national_security_strategy.pdf) (accessed 15 March 2011).

U.S. Special Operations Command. "History United States Special Operations Command."  
<http://www.socom.mil/> (accessed 1 April 2011).

U.S. Special Operations Command. "SOCOM Factbook."  
[www.socom.mil/socomhome/newspub/pubs/documents/factbook.pdf](http://www.socom.mil/socomhome/newspub/pubs/documents/factbook.pdf) (accessed 20 April 2011).

Ward, William E., Commander United States Africa Command, "AFRICOM Posture Statement." (March 2010). <http://www.africom.mil/> (accessed 10 March 2011).

Wilson, Gregory. "Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-PHILIPPINES and The Indirect Approach." *Military Review*, Vol. 86, no. 6, (Nov/Dec 2006) : 2-12.  
<http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 21 March 2011).

35<sup>th</sup> Commandant of the Marine Corps. *Commandant's Planning Guidance*. Headquarters USMC, 2010. <http://www.marines.mil/> (accessed 19 March 2011).