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THESIS

TRACKING THE MARINE CORPS' LANGUAGE, REGIONAL EXPERTISE & CULTURE (LREC) PROGRAM CONCEPTS TO MEET OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

by

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December 2018

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TRACKING THE MARINE CORPS' LANGUAGE, REGIONAL EXPERTISE & CULTURE (LREC) PROGRAM CONCEPTS TO MEET OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAA	American Anthropological Association
AAR	After action report
BMOS	Billet military occupational specialty
BTR	Basic training record
CAC	Common access card
CAOCL	Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning
CBRIB	Capabilities-based requirements identification process
CCMD	Combatant Command (geographic)
CDET	College of Distance Education and Training [MCU]
CEWRC	Civilian expeditionary workforce readiness cell
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
Civ-Mil	Civil-military (relations)
CMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps
CMO	Civil-military operations (or Civ-Mil Officer)
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center
CoE	Code of ethics
CREL	Culture, regional expertise, and language [US Army]
CRELMO	CREL management office [US Army]
CWO	Chief Warrant Officer (ranks include CWO 1-5)
DIRINT	Director of Intelligence [USMC]
DLAB	Defense language aptitude battery
DLNSEO	Defense Language National Security Education Office
DLPT	Defense language proficiency test
DMDC	Defense Manpower Data Center
DoD	Department of Defense
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, operations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
DRRS-MC	Defense Readiness Reporting System—Marine Corps
EDIPI	Electronic data interchange personal identifier (10-digit code)
FAO	Foreign area officer

FAS	Foreign area non-commissioned officer
FLPB	Foreign language proficiency bonus
FMF	Fleet Marine Force
FOUO	For official use only
FRAGO	Fragmentary order
FSF	Foreign security force (Advisor)
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GEF	Guidance for employment of the force
HA/DR	Humanitarian assistance & disaster relief
HN	Host nation
HRPO	Human research program office
IAP	International affairs program
IC	Intelligence community
IDA	Institute for Defense Analysis
ILR	International language roundtable
IRB	Institutional review board
IWST	Irregular warfare skills tracker
JCIDS	Joint capabilities integration and development system
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIIM	Joint interagency, international, and multinational (operations)
JSAP	Joint staff action process
JTF	Joint Task Force
KLE	Key leader engagement
LDO	Limited Duty Officer
LP	Linear programming
LREC	Language, regional education, and culture
M&RA	Manpower and Reserve Affairs
MAGTF	Marine Air Ground Task Force
MARSOC	Marine Corps Special Operations Command
MCCLL	Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned
MCCMOS	Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School
MCIA	Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

MCIOC	Marine Corps Information Operations Center
MCO	Marine Corps Order
MCPP	Marine Corps Planning Process
MCSCG	Mare Corps Security Cooperation Group
MCTFS	Marine Corps Total Force System
MCTIMS	Marine Corps Training Information Management System
MCU	Marine Corps University (Quantico, VA)
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MET	Mission Essential Task
METL	Mission Essential Task List
METT-TC	Mission, enemy, troops and fire support available, terrain and weather, time, civilian and cultural considerations
MFR	Marine Forces Reserve
MOL	Marine Online
MOS	Military occupational specialty
M-SHARP	Marine—Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program
NA	Net assessment
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NEO	Noncombatant evacuation operation
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
NSS	National Security Strategy
OAG	Operational advisory group
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPFOR	Operating force
OPI	Oral proficiency interview (separate module from the DLPT)
OPT	Operations planning tool (part of MCPP)
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PDF	Portable document format
PME	Professional military education
PMOS	Primary military occupational specialty

PP&O	Plans, Policies, and Operations (USMC HQ)
PPT	Power Point (presentation) [Microsoft Office]
PSYOPS	Psychological operations
RAO	Regional area officer
RCLF	Regional, culture, and language familiarization
Ret.	Retired
ROMO	Range of military operations
SIGINT	Signals intelligence
SIPRNET	Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (“high side”)
SLA	Senior language authority
T&R	Training and readiness (manual)
TBS	The Basic School [Marine Corps’ basic officer training course]
TECOM	Training and Education Command
TEEP	Training and exercise employment plan
TRADOC-CC	Training and doctrine cultural center [US Army]
TSR	Training support request (CAOCL document)
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USSSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
VBA	Visual basic for applications [Microsoft Excel]
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This master's thesis explores the value added and system effectiveness of the United States Marine Corps' Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) programs employed today to educate, train, and equip Marines for operational success. This thesis offers four products to answer the primary and secondary questions: (1) How can the Marine Corps systematically track LREC concepts to meet operational capability requirements? (2) How can the Marine Corps' Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) better identify the latent language and cultural capabilities that Marines bring with them to the Marine Corps in order to leverage those skills to optimize LREC training and education?

First, I identify where CAOCL has gaps in its efforts to identify latent language and cultural competence among its existing ranks, train and educate Marines enrolled in its programs, and sustain levels of relevant expertise throughout the Marine Corps. Second, I offer a 130-page *Commander's Portal*, which is an interactive tool accessible to Commanders at all levels that maps the Marine Corps Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) system from doctrinal requirements to operational capabilities. Third, I build an online survey to collect latent LREC talent information from all Marines graduating from The Basic School (TBS) on their personal linguistic and cultural backgrounds, their spouse's backgrounds, their interest level in LREC, and preference values for their Regional, Culture and, Language Familiarization (RCLF) region assignments. This survey directly informs the fourth product this thesis offers: A linear programming optimization tool that determines the RCLF region assignments for all TBS graduates based on their preference values for the various regions and CAOCL's constraints for available region assignment slots.

I built these products to give Commanders a succinct and user-friendly forum to access LREC information in order to broaden CAOCL's influence at all echelons of the Marine Corps. Additionally, these products address LREC talent management from a new perspective that offers future cost-saving potential. All parts of this thesis are available for CAOCL's immediate use and distribution.

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I. AREA OF RESEARCH AND MOTIVATION

> Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.
>
> —Sun Tzu[1]

Cultural competence and linguistic expertise have long been invaluable skills to military commanders.[2] In his famous treatise, *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu teaches that understanding the enemy is a necessity for all military leaders. A commonality among victorious commanders throughout the history of warfare is an appreciation for the complexity of the enemy's socio-political motivation, cultural determination, and management of the public voice. In its most simplistic terms: The enemy has a vote.

Following World War II, some of the world's most powerful militaries fell into an arms race, highlighting the primacy of technology, overt power, and the precept that size was congruous with might. With these foci driving policy and doctrine, many of the subtle warfighting techniques that shaped millennia of tactical competency took a back seat, including the appreciation for cultural and linguistic expertise. These capabilities eventually fell under the ownership of military intelligence, playing a significant role in psychological operations (PSYOPS) and signals intelligence (SIGINT), but remained

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[1] *The Art of War* ((tr. Griffith, 84), 1963, III (31–33)).

2 The term *culture* is a complex one. Many streams of literature on organizational behavior and culture theory debate and discuss the definition of *culture*; however, for the purposes of this thesis, I rely on a definition that CACOL uses. In their book, Salmoni and Holmes-Eber spend an entire chapter collecting and distilling various definitions of *culture* in an effort to contextualize the concept for a military audience. Ultimately, they conclude that *culture* is "The shared world view and social structures of a group of people that influence a person's and a group's actions and choices" (2008, p. 47). The authors list five factors that culture includes in their operational definition of the term: "(1) Culture is shared; (2) Culture underlies our world view: what we perceive and think about the people and events surrounding us, and how we interpret and understand those people and events; (3) Culture is interconnected and holistic; each dimension of culture is intimately related to the others; (4) Culture is varied—over time, over space, and among individuals; (5) Culture is fluid and dynamic; humans are active agents, and not passive recipients" (2008, P. 47). Because this thesis works within CAOCL's construct, any reference to the term *culture* will use this same definition.

largely divorced from the force at large. On 10 September 2001, the United States military had almost 1.4 million active duty service members (Coleman, 2014). Of those, only 4,384 had any known Arabic language background (Kaplan, 2008).

As Operation ENDURING FREEDOM developed, the military services scrambled to identify, recruit, and train service members to speak Pashto and Dari, and to understand the cultural nuances that unit commanders faced on a daily basis. Marine leaders had been taught to operate their weapons systems and locate, close with, and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver,[3] not to sit down to tea. Becoming heavily reliant on friendly foreign national translators had its own set of challenges, including the extra security commitment to those translators and their families who, by supporting the allied mission, incurred great personal risk. In 2005, then-Director of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command General James Mattis, USMC,[4] directed the establishment of the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL). With a mission statement to "enable Marines to operate more effectively across the range of military operations in complex joint expeditionary environments," Mattis tasked CAOCL with developing and monitoring LREC training and education for Marines of every rank. This initiative sought to institutionalize and standardize culture-based efforts within the existing service doctrine, promote field social science research, and advise the operational forces in matters of cultural importance (Lellou, 2018). Ultimately, CAOCL would be responsible for developing Language, Regional Education, and Culture (LREC) capability that would give Marine unit commanders more flexibility when conducting their missions.

In the past 12 years, CAOCL has helped the Marine Corps to recognize and embrace the need for linguistic and cultural expertise on the battlefield by making LREC considerations and programs like RCLF universally known and implemented. However, this process of integrating LREC requirements into everyday Marine lexicon is an on-going

[3] "The mission of the Marine Corps rifle squad is to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver, and repel the enemy's assault by fire and close combat."—Mission of a Marine Rifle Squad (from MCWP 3–11.2 (2002), pg. 1–1: https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCWP%203-11.2%20Marine%20Rifle%20Squad.pdf)

[4] General James Mattis retired from the United States Marine Corps (USMC) in 2013 and became the 26th Secretary of Defense in 2017. He still held that position at the time of this thesis's writing.

process. *NAVMC 3500.59C: Security Cooperation/Language Regional Expertise and Culture Training and Readiness Manual* (LREC T&R), published in 2017, is not yet widely recognized, understood, and utilized by deploying Marines, but it currently serves as the bridge between training and operation for culture and language requirements. The LREC T&R serves as the first stone in the path of aligning LREC capabilities to *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3126.01A: Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Capability, Identification, Planning, and Sourcing* guidance. This thesis will offer another stone along that path—a *Commander's Portal*—that maps the LREC T&R with doctrinal requirements, academic concepts, existing CAOCL programs, and LREC elements to give unit commanders a guide for optimizing LREC for battlefield success. Additionally, this thesis offers a linear programming optimization tool specifically designed to assist CAOCL in assigning its Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization (RCLF) regions based on responses to a survey I designed. The survey not only asks junior officers graduating from The Basic School (TBS) for their RCLF region preferences, but also measures their interest in LREC programs, asks them to self-assess their pre-existing language abilities on the International Language Roundtable (ILR) scale, inquires about their spouses' linguistic and cultural backgrounds, and records data on those Marines who have experience living abroad. I hope that collecting this information will both aid CAOCL and the Marine Corps in better talent management of existing LREC expertise and to increase Marine-level interest in and command-level implementation of LREC initiatives at levels of war.

A. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Working with CAOCL, I analyze the efficacy of the systems in place that determine, measure, assess, recruit, and develop linguistic and cultural competence across Marine Corps ranks. I use both quantitative and qualitative research methods to answer the question: How can the Marine Corps systematically track LREC concepts to meet operational capability requirements?

Additionally, in order to assist in the future strategic development of the LREC program and offer a talent management tool, I ask a secondary question: How can CAOCL

better identify the latent language and cultural capabilities that exist Marine Corps-wide in order to leverage existing knowledge and skills to optimize LREC training and education?

By answering these questions, I am ultimately able to give CAOCL tools to determine and track existing LREC capabilities at all ranks of the Marine Corps, and I give unit commanders a resource for determining not only what LREC capabilities they already have in their units but also a means of determining how they can best leverage LREC training and education for mission success. I focus my recommendations on existing LREC program and system adjustment, not established policy.

B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This thesis examines the changes in the LREC capabilities in the Marine Corps since 11 September 2001, including General Mattis's establishment of CAOCL in 2006.[5] This study is multi-fold. It simultaneously offers an assessment of gaps surrounding my research question, builds an interactive LREC map, designs and recommends future use and analysis of a survey to enhance talent management, and designs and implements a linear programming (LP) optimization model to match existing talent with RCLF region assignments.

First, in order to determine how to link doctrinal requirements through academic concepts, existing programs, and LREC elements to operational capabilities, I charted the gaps in the existing system. Based on that assessment, I built the second deliverable that this thesis offers: the LREC map, which I call the *Commander's Portal*.[6]

The *Commander's Portal* mirrors what a website might offer unit commanders in the future to help them: (1) understand the role of effective LREC training and education in operational success, (2) find methods to most efficiently and effectively optimize that training and education among their Marines, and (3) guide them in their decisions of how

[5] When the charter was signed on 14 Jan 2006 by General James Mattis, USMC (MCCDC), it was called the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning Center of Excellence (Dallas, 2016; O'Berry, 2017).

[6] This thesis project began with CAOCL's request for a systematic mapping project of the LREC system.

to leverage LREC expertise in the operational environment. In addition to connecting the various dimensions of LREC training and education to operational employment through the use of the LREC T&R Manual and Mission Essential Tasks (METs), the LREC map also investigates the tracking mechanisms available from the Marine Corps' Total Force System (MCTFS), Marine Corps' Training Information Management System (MCTIMS), MarineNet, Marine Online (MOL), Command Profile, and the Defense Readiness Reporting System—Marine Corps (DRRS-MC). Ultimately, the *Commander's Portal* maps the relevant LREC information in an easy-to-use system for unit commanders to find information on LREC capabilities and requirements, determine and request the optimal training and education curriculum for their Marines, and track and find Marines within their units who have existing LREC expertise. To supplement the *Commander's Portal*, I redesigned and updated the existing CAOCL Training Support Request form (TSR).

Third, I designed an online survey that identifies and tracks existing LREC expertise among fleet-bound officers. This survey is the first of its kind to directly address LREC talent management from a perspective of leveraging existing expertise and interest and will allow CAOCL to gather data on the cultural and linguistic backgrounds of individual Marines. This data has the potential to inform future research on cost-saving initiatives.

Finally, the survey feeds this thesis's fourth deliverable: a linear programming (LP) optimization model for CAOCL to leverage those pre-existing interests and talents of junior officers by optimizing its RCLF region assignments.[7] The LP optimization tool incorporates CAOCL's constraints on the available training billets per region and automatically assigns RCLF regions to Marines in a selected TBS class. This tool saves CAOCL time and increases Marine buy-in to the RCLF program at the grassroots level.

[7] Every Marine officer graduating from The Basic School (TBS) (Lieutenants as of April 2009 and Warrants as of February 2011) and every Enlisted Marine that graduates from Sergeant's Course (as of 2012 for Active Duty and May 2013 for Reservists) is randomly assigned a RCLF region for which they will be responsible for the remainder of their careers (see MARADMIN 231/14). Per MARADMIN 231/14, RCLF completion required at each rank is tied to completion of that Marine's Professional Military Education (PME) for grade.

Furthermore, this optimization model may be leveraged with other groups needing RCLF region assignments (e.g., Sergeant's Course graduates), not just TBS graduates.

1. Assessment of Gaps

In addressing my primary research question, I spoke to various program directors at CACOL and concluded a review of the existing literature. Throughout this process, I discovered that there were several places where the LREC program in the Marine Corps could be more efficient. Among the gaps I identified were:

1. The lack of a specific Marine Corps Foreign Area Officer (FAO)/Regional Area Officer (RAO)/Foreign Area Staff Non-commissioned Officer (FAS) course.

2. The lack of a suitable feedback loop between CAOCL's training and education initiatives and the Fleet Marine Forces (FMF).

3. The lack of a single, comprehensive repository to track LREC expertise, training and education assignment and completion, and LREC readiness FMF-wide.

4. Random Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization (RCLF) region assignment results in a lack of buy-in from the Marines.

5. The lack of an ability to identify and track the existing LREC expertise that new Marines bring with them to the FMF in order to leverage that expertise in the future either in theater or in determining the best candidates for FAO and RAO pipelines later on in their careers.

6. The lack of the average unit commander's knowledge and understanding of how to optimize LREC resources to maximize operational success.

7. The lack of emphasis by commanders and Operations Planning Tool (OPT) leaders on Civil-Military (Civ-Mil) relations and the Green Cell.

In Figure 1, I built a mind map based on my primary research question. I saw four directions of foci: CAOCL culture programs, CAOCL's culture expertise tracking mechanisms, tracking mechanisms accessible by unit Commanders, and existing LREC expertise. By filling in what I knew about each sub-topic, I was better able to visualize the gaps and their relation to the question this thesis works to answer. The tracking mechanisms used by CAOCL and those available to unit Commanders are largely similar, though there is no central repository for this information. Even the Marine Corps' Total Force System (MCTFS)—a central data base for most demographic and pay information for Marines—is not optimized to pull LREC data from a single source. While I discuss the gaps identified in Figure 1 by the dark gray arrows in detail in this section, the *Commander's Portal* (Part III of this thesis) more comprehensively discusses on each light gray node on the mind map.



Figure 1. LREC tracking mind map with potential gaps and fixes.

This thesis addresses five of the seven gaps to help design a way forward for effectively incorporating LREC expertise into a Commander's training timeline for deployment and the Marine Corps' Planning Process (MCPP) as a whole. The remainder of the gaps serve as recommendations for follow-on research. I first briefly describe the two gaps that this thesis does not address, followed by the five that it does.

2. Gaps this Thesis Does Not Address

a. Gap #1: Naval Postgraduate School FAO/RAO/FAS Course

Anecdotal feedback from students in the FAO and RAO programs at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) is that the week-long course during the summer thesis and research break is primarily focused on the Army and the Navy (because of their primary MOS transition) and families living abroad. There is little tangible advice for Marine Corps FAOs and RAOs regarding expectation management of what their roles should be when they return to the FMF. Throughout the National Security Affairs (NSA) curriculum at NPS there is no class that focuses on culture general learning or anthropology. However, in the Marine Corps, FAOs/RAOs/FASs are expected to not only be regional and linguistic experts, but also to be the LREC leaders for their units. They stand upon this expectation, however, without a firm foundation in culture general concepts, which is the majority of what all Marines are expected to learn. See Section V.B.3 of this thesis for more information on this subject.

b. Gap #2: Feedback Loop between CAOCL and the Fleet Marine Forces

Currently, the best feedback loop between the FMF and CAOCL regarding LREC expertise and requirements is the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL). However, that feedback loop is indirect and is in the same format for CAOCL representatives as it is for every Marine who searches the website for relevant information to their operational objectives. In an initial search on the MCCLL website,[8] I searched for "LREC" and narrowed my search to "Marine Corps." Of the only 35 results, 25 were references to existing doctrine or newsletters, one was a CAOCL after action report (AAR)

[8] CAC enabled only: https://www2.mccll.usmc.mil/

for the FAS experiment on the 15th MEU in 2013,[9] and of the remaining nine, four were from the same 15th MEU. Thus, of all AARs submitted to MCCLL, only five mentioned LREC. Similarly, with a quick search within the Marine Corps for "RCLF," there were only 34 hits and when searching for "culture," of the 250 returns, 24 were from CAOCL, 25 from the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), 57 from the Marine Corps Education Command (EDCOM), and six from MCCLL itself, leaving a total of only eight references to the word from deployed units.

If these reports are the only tangible feedback that CAOCL can glean directly from the FMF regarding the validity of LREC, RCLF, and culture general training, then there remains a gap to be filled by a more robust process of determining the long-term operational efficacy of LREC expertise. See Part V.B.6 of this thesis for more information on this topic.

3. Gaps this Thesis Addresses

a. Gap #3: Lack of a Single LREC Expertise Tracking Repository

Currently, LREC capabilities are tracked in various locations that generally share MCTFS as a common database, but this is not universally true. There is no central location where CAOCL—or a commander—can go to identify the LREC capabilities available to him/her based on the unique requirements of an impending operation. Figure 2 displays some of the current locations where Commanders can pull LREC information about their Marines. Part III.A.6 of this thesis maps these tracking tools in more detail.

[9] CAOCL conducted a beta test of the Foreign Area Staff Non-commissioned Officer (FAS) program in 2013 aboard the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The FAS program is designed to fill a tactical-level gap of LREC expertise by employing seasoned Enlisted Marines trained with similar cultural and language backgrounds as FAOs. Marine Gunnery Sergeant Andrew Hodges was the centerpiece of this successful experiment. See Jasparro, 2013.



Figure 2. Current LREC tracking tools

CAOCL does not currently have a central LREC capabilities tracking capability that is any more robust than what a commander has in the Fleet. Additionally, there is no single CAOCL program leader that has access and oversight over all of the previous tracking mechanisms or any that has MCTMS access through 3270; instead, the individual data fall under the responsibilities of the different program managers. If CAOCL chooses to implement a survey similar to the one outlined in Chapter IV of this thesis, then it will have a unique set of data for future use with LREC expertise tracking. Additionally, CAOCL's Training and Education Command (TECOM) website was hacked in early 2018 and, as of the writing of this thesis, it had not been re-established.

b. Gap #4: Randomized versus Optimized RCLF Region Assignments

RCLF is an established CAOCL-initiated and -run program that assigns one of 17 world regions to every officer and Warrant Officer graduating from TBS (for a complete list of RCLF regions and associated languages, see Appendix A: RCLF Diagnostic Survey Questions). Enlisted Marines are assigned a region upon their promotion to Sergeant. Many Marine officers who have been assigned and completed their requisite RCLF training for grade feel that region assignment was random and lacking tangible follow-on requirements for the MarineNet training.

Currently, Marines do not have a means of requesting a specific RCLF region that they either have an interest in learning about or in which they have an existing LREC

expertise. However, Marines are able to choose one of the languages associated with their assigned regions (if there is more than one) for their course of study that is accessible through MarineNet. The language portion (currently administered via the Defense Language Institute's (DLI) Headstart II program) aims to teach Marines basic tactical terminology in the target language, enhanced recognition of non-verbal communication cues, and tips for how to best utilize an interpreter (MARADMIN 619/12, 2012).

An informed optimization process for assigning RCLF regions would benefit CAOCL, the Marine Corps, the RCLF students, and ultimately, the Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) as a whole. Therefore, in an effort to address observed gap (4), this thesis includes a survey designed to not only provide CAOCL with a robust foundation for determining existing LREC skill among TBS graduates about to join the Fleet, but also to provide these students with a forum through which to express interest and desire toward specific RCLF regions.

The data collected from this survey feeds directly into a linear programming optimization model I created to assign TBS graduates RCLF regions based on their professed interests and personal backgrounds. This optimization is constrained by the quantity of RCLF education slots available for each class as determined by CAOCL itself. The survey will help CAOCL identify and track latent expertise in the future, while the optimization process creates immediate programmatic buy-in for the Marines. See Chapter IV in this thesis for additional information on this survey and optimization tool, which will ultimately also serve as a robust LREC capabilities tracking tool for CAOCL.

c. Gap #5: Identify and Track Existing LREC Expertise among Marines

For Marines who begin their careers with an existing LREC expertise or interest, the only outlets for them to make this information known is either through part I.13 of DD-1966, the "Self-Professed Language Ability" or "Self-Professed Travel" modules in MOL, or by petitioning their commands to take a day or two off of work to take the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT). These time and rank barriers are often difficult to overcome for junior Marines, especially if their Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) does not require or applaud a foreign language capability. The "Self-Profess" modules in

MOL are neither monitored by CAOCL, nor is that information substantiated by any level of proficiency demonstration.[10] Additionally, if there is no monetary incentive to take the DLPT, many Marines see the seven-hour exam as a wasted work day.

There are, however, many Marines who have foreign language or cultural expertise that goes unidentified, untracked, and unused by the Marine Corps. Many Marines, for example, have partial language capabilities—for example, they grew up speaking and hearing a language, but not reading or writing it. Therefore, if they took the time to take the DLPT, their scores would be lop-sided with high listening and low reading values. Technically, the DLPT consists of three parts, the third and much less common part being the Oral Proficiency Test (OPT). However, because OPTs require about an hour of a paid contractor's time either on the phone in a test environment (being observed by a superior) or in person, OPTs are more expensive and are often reserved for either Defense Language Institute (DLI) students or extenuating circumstances like rare languages. See part V.B.2 for a recommendation for future research on this subject.

However, the survey I designed for assigning RCLF regions includes several questions about a Marine's existing language capabilities and cultural experiences and asks respondents to self-assess their abilities on the ILR scale. Upon its implementation, results from this survey will directly inform CAOCL regarding the existing LREC expertise and talent that is lying dormant among Marines. This information can help CAOCL identify Marines to encourage to take a DLPT to gauge their language abilities in an established forum; better inform future assignments to the FAO, RAO, or FAS pipelines; broaden the understanding of how a spouse's background plays a role in the LREC interests of a Marine; and ultimately help the Marine Corps to manage the latent LREC expertise and talent that already exists among Marines. This approach brings the talent management

[10] The self-professed language capability module was initially introduced to MOL in the early 2000s in an attempt to speed up the process of finding Marines with unique and operational language expertise. However, the module has not been updated since its implementation. The module does not require Marines to describe in any way the level of their language capability, nor can Marines edit their language inputs over time as their skills either progress or deteriorate. Therefore, this method of identifying language capabilities among Marines is unrefined and potentially misleading. (Citation: Conversation with Mr. John Durish, Marine Corps Foreign Language Manager, HQMC Intelligence Department.

discussion to a different level; instead of focusing solely on retaining trained assets, it addresses actually optimizing the unique and varied talents of the Marines as people.

d. Gap #6: Commander's Lack of Knowledge Regarding the Effect that LREC Expertise can have on Operational Success and Failure

To determine the optimal LREC capability a unit should employ during a unique operational mission, the Commander must have a tangible method of determining what LREC capabilities will meet his/her requirements to optimize operational success. To provide this capability, I create an interactive systematic model that provides a portal where unit commanders can find specific information, supporting documentation, links to Training and Readiness Manual (T&R) requisites and the CAOCL Training Support Request form, and a guide to the current LREC capabilities tracking mechanisms to which commanders have access. Chapter III of this thesis outlines the *Commander's Portal* tool, which I designed to be a guide for unit commanders who recognize the necessity and benefit of optimizing the LREC expertise already existent in their units and who want to supplement that talent with additional training and education. This first step will help define how Marine Corps commanders can optimize how they educate, train, and equip Marines for victory.

e. Gap #7: Lack of Emphasis on Civ-Mil relations and Green Cell in OPTs

The descriptions for LREC Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual event code LREC-PLAN-7001 and -8001 state (NAVMC 3500.59C, 2017):

> In order to develop a refined view of the operational environment, Marines will need to examine the range of individuals, groups, and populations by employing cross-cultural information, concepts, and skills in each step of MCPP. This event enables the Commander and staff to more effectively visualize and characterize the operational environment.

Therefore, to address identified gap (7): Maximizing the expertise of a unit's FAOs/RAOs/FASs as part of the Civ-Mil team and Green Cell gives the OPT experience more depth and accuracy. The better informed and more robust these players are, the more the other experts in the unit will understand the strategic implications of their decisions and what responses they may encounter from the local population in real time. The *Green*

Cell/CMO page in the *Commander's Portal*, as well as utilization of the LREC Map outlined in Chapter III, briefly addresses this cause.

C. BENEFIT OF THE STUDY

By determining the efficacy of current LREC expertise tracking systems and building a *Commander's Portal*, I seek to enable unit commanders to identify, assess, train, and track cultural and linguistic expertise among their Marines. Additionally, I seek to aid CAOCL in its evaluation of potential improvements to the compilation, updating, and availability of that information. Dissemination and use of the Commander's Portal gives unit leaders a succinct and comprehensive tool to empower themselves and their Marines with LREC knowledge and capabilities.

Additionally, by determining why CAOCL may lack the ability to identify latent language and cultural competencies among the existing Marine Corps population, I highlight potential avenues to address the gap. Efficient talent management is a cost-effective way to maximize program resources. Therefore, the ability to detect not only uniquely qualified Marines who access into the service with experience, but those Marines who may be particularly well-suited for additional LREC training and responsibilities over the course of their careers, will ultimately enable CAOCL to more efficiently manage its limited resources. Categorizing the Marine Corps' LREC talent and expertise will benefit the service, the individual Marines, and the foreign nationals with whom the average warfighter may interact in an increasingly globalized, allied, and multi-lateral battlespace.

D. BACKGROUND

Catapulted by General Jim Mattis, USMC (ret.) and General Tony Zinni, USMC (ret.), the LREC programs within the Marine Corps have grown to become part of the daily vocabulary among Marines of all ranks and specialties. Reminiscent of Sun Tzu's treatise that the best leaders win war without bloodshed,[11] the Marine Corps' *Small Wars Manual* teaches that "A Force Commander who gains his objective in a small war without firing a shot has attained far greater success than one who resorted to the use of arms" (1940, p. 18).

[11] "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill" (Tzu (tr. Griffith), 1963, III(3)).

Prussian General and war theorist Carl von Clausewitz—by studying the successes of the military under Napoleon in the wake of the French Revolution—also recognized the importance culture plays in war by and including *the people* in his "remarkable trinity"[12] alongside the government and the army (Hartley, 1994; Salmoni & Holmes-Eber, 2008).

Today, the Marine Corps teaches several different methods of incorporating populations into battlefield assessments. All Marines learn to conduct a METT-TC[13] analysis at its lowest echelons of warfighter training to instill in Marines the need to recognize the breadth of factors that they must consider when planning. The "C" in METT-TC stands for "civilian/cultural considerations," which is a broad, but an important step in forcing all Marines give planning credence to the cultural dimension of a battlespace. More recently, the Marine Corps has adopted models that stem from the strategic-level instruments of national power—DIME[14]—analysis to build the ASCOPE/PMESII[15] matrix to help Marines visualize the complexity and nuance of the civil dimension of the battlespace. In Figure 3, MCCMOS provides a planning template of the ASCOPE/PMESII matrix with brief descriptions of how each function of one axis interplays with each function of the other. Even this matrix is arguably not comprehensive; for example, Fosher et al. point out that an Air Force model includes health as a specific dimension for consideration whereas Marine Corps models do not. However, health can be incorporated into any number of the dimensions represented in the Marine Corps models as the Commander deems appropriate (2017, p. 19).

[12] Clausewitz's Remarkable Trinity is comprised of a tension between the government, the military, and the people in a given society. These three forces are always constantly at play against the others, but are paradoxically also requirements for the stability of the others.

[13] METT-TC stands for: Mission, Enemy, Troops and fire support available, Terrain and weather, Time, and Civilian/cultural considerations.

[14] DIME stands for: Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic

[15] ASCOPE stands for: Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organization, People and Events.
PMSII stands for: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastucture.

ASCOPE/PMESII

	P Political	M Military	E Economic	S Social	I Information	I Infrastructure
A Areas	Areas - Political (District Boundary, Party affiliation areas)	Areas - Military (Coalition / LN bases, historic ambush/IED sites)	Areas - Economic (bazaars, shops, markets)	Areas - Social (parks and other meeting areas)	Areas –Information (Radio/TV/newspapers /where people gather for word-of-mouth)	Areas – Infrastructure (Irrigation networks, water tables, medical coverage)
S Structures	Structures - Political (town halls, government offices)	Structures - Military / Police (police HQ, Military HHQ locations)	Structures - Economic (banks, markets, storage facilities)	Structures - Social (Churches, restaurants, bars, etc.)	Structures - Information (Cell / Radio / TV towers, print shops)	Structures - Infrastructure (roads, bridges, power lines, walls, dams)
C Capabilities	Capabilities - Political (Dispute resolution, Insurgent capabilities)	Capabilities - Military (security posture, strengths and weaknesses)	Capabilities - Economic (access to banks, ability to withstand natural disasters)	Capabilities - Social (Strength of local & national ties)	Capabilities - Info (Literacy rate, availability of media / phone service)	Capabilities - Infrastructure (Ability to build / maintain roads, walls, dams)
O Organizations	Organizations - Political (Political parties and other power brokers, UN,)	Organizations - Military (What units of military, police, insurgent are present)	Organizations - Economic (Banks, large land holders, big businesses)	Organizations - Social (tribes, clans, families, youth groups, NGOs / IGOs)	Organizations - Info (NEWS groups, influential people who pass word)	Organizations - Infrastructure (Government ministries, construction companies)
P People	People - Political (Governors, councils, elders)	People - Military (Leaders from coalition, LN and insurgent forces)	People - Economic (Bankers, landholders, merchants)	People - Social (Religious leaders, influential families	People - Info (Media owners, mullahs, heads of powerful families)	People - Infrastructure Builders, contractors, development councils)
E Events	Events - Political (elections, council meetings)	Events - Military (lethal/nonlethal events, loss of leadership, operations, anniversaries)	Events - Economic (drought, harvest, business open/close)	Events - Social (holidays, weddings, religious days)	Events - Info (IO campaigns, project openings, CIVCAS events)	Events - Infrastructure (road / bridge construction, well digging, scheduled maintenance)

Figure 3. ASCOPE/PMESII example matrix
Source: MCCMOS Planning Templates

While the Army, Air Force, and Navy sometimes use different models (Fosher et al., 2017), there has been growing concern throughout the Department of Defense to project "soft power" throughout the range of military operations through sustainment and contingency operations including humanitarian aid/disaster relief (HA/DR) and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) (Hillson, 2009). Similarly, Salmoni and Holmes-Eber adapt an anthropological model to simplify operational culture into five dimensions (2008): physical environment, economy, social structures, political structures, and belief systems in an attempt to distill what would take years of *in situ* experience manageable for Marines in a battlefield environment. With this anthropological model, the authors contextualize operational culture by noting that, while every society is unique, "all cultures are organized according to a predictable set of categories or dimensions…. [T]hese

dimensions can be found in any culture anywhere in the world" (Salmoni & Holmes-Eber, 2008, p. 62). While DIME, ASCOPE, and PMESII address a few of the five dimensions of operational culture directly and by name, this model would be a good one for Marines to incorporate directly under the "C" while doing their METT-TC analyses. It is important for Marines using the five-dimension model to understand that the dimensions themselves are neither static nor independent. There is significant overlap between the dimensions and the comparative importance of each dimension in different environments will vary. The model shown in Figure 4 shows how each of the five dimensions may interact with the others.



Figure 4. The five dimensions of operational culture
Source: Adapted from Salmoni & Holmes-Eber (2008)

Adding the dimension of people and culture into the military calculation increases its complexity, and the Marine Corps is working to tackle these concepts through doctrinal requirements, academic concepts, CAOCL programs, and LREC elements. The youngest Marines serving in the Corps today were born the same year that terrorists destroyed the Twin Towers in New York City. This generation of Marines have only ever known a nation at war. Therefore, teaching them to use LREC capabilities in an effort to return to Sun Tzu's maxim of winning wars without bloodshed is both challenging and paramount.

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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The history of and tension surrounding cultural and linguistic competency in the military is varied and has an ethical component that is not always represented during tactical-level training. In this section, I review the role of cultural competence in war throughout history, the recurring ethical debate between anthropologists and national security planners, the DoD's Office of Net Assessment and its multi-dimensional problem-solving techniques, established DoD instructions and policies governing LREC, previous assessments of the Marine Corps' LREC system and their findings, and ongoing CAOCL initiatives.

A. THE ROLE OF CULTURAL COMPETENCY IN WAR

Cultural and linguistic competence has been pivotal to military campaigns throughout history, but has often been categorized as intelligence, spying, subversive, irregular, or hybrid warfare. Objectively identifying the correlation between cultural competence and campaign success can turn an intangible capability into a tangible requirement. This competence has allowed the Marine Corps to leverage LREC elements to be effective at all echelons of command and on different types of battlefields throughout history, and it remains relevant today.

As changing military environments began to outpace the military technology available during the Colonial Era, Dutch, French, and British military leaders realized that understanding the local beliefs and cultural behaviors of their commonwealth regions was necessary to their ability to assert foreign dominance (Salmoni & Holmes-Eber, 2008, p. 16). Knowing the existing social, political, economic, and familial structures of these cultures allowed colonial officers to "'guide' and 'manipulate' the cultural environment" (Salmoni & Holmes-Eber, 2008, p. 17). This operational demand led to an increased scholarly supply of ethnographical research yielding detailed studies of leadership nuances, networking practices, hierarchical sensitivities, and interpersonal relations (Salmoni & Holmes-Eber, 2008, p. 17).

Realizing that relatable examples are an effective and direct connection for Marines, researchers at CAOCL have collected many examples of the use of LREC expertise at all operational levels—but particularly at the tactical level—in order to more effectively reach its audience. For example, Presley O'Bannon's is a legacy that every Marine knows and respects. In the *USMC LREC Strategy 2016–2020*, the authors tell of 1stLt O'Bannon's actions during the assault on Derna in 1805: by understanding the unique differences between the Greek, Arab, and Berber cultures, the hero built a coalition and managed to lead a multicultural force toward a common objective despite ethnic and religious differences (p. 8).

In a similar story that demonstrates the role that careful use of LREC expertise can play on mission success, Kruze et al. tell of Guy Gabaldon, a 12-year-old member of an ethnic gang in Los Angeles, who fled his home and found refuge with a Japanese-American family from whom he learned cultural customs and their native language. After his adoptive family was sent to a relocation camp at the outbreak of World War II, Guy joined the U.S. Marine Corps. Private First Class Gabaldon used his Japanese language ability to convince more than 1,500 Japanese soldiers on Saipan and Tinian to surrender, arguably saving not only their lives but the lives of innumerable American servicemen (2008, p. 5).

Experiences fighting irregular warfare in the Philippines, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua led to the Marine Corps' publication of its *Small Wars Manual* in 1940. The manual describes the differing motives between what history remembers as definitive wars (World War I and World War II) and small wars, which, unlike their large-scale counterparts, do not seek complete material destruction of the enemy. Instead, small wars focus on the development of native peoples through socio-economic and political initiatives (1940, p. 18). Army Major Kenneth Carey argued in 2005 that "If all our soldiers spoke Arabic, we could have resolved Iraq in two years. […] Even a fundamental understanding of the language would have had a significant impact on our ability to operate" (Kruze et al., 2008, p. 5). There are testimonies heralding the value of cultural and linguistic competence throughout warfare's history, and the Marine Corps can claim many of these stories on its own. The *Small Wars Manual* has remained relevant and largely unedited for the last eighty years. Over time, however, without training and education,

these lessons could be lost; I endeavor to aid CAOCL in its defense of the importance of cultural and linguistic expertise throughout the Marine Corps.

B. TUG-OF-WAR: ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE MILITARY

What some call "militarized anthropology" (Gonzáles, 2007; Gusterson, 2007; Gusterson, 2009; LREC Strategy, n.d.) strikes a nerve with warfighters and ethnographers alike. The former may strive to disassociate humanity from the battlefield and the latter may loathe the label of manipulated spy (Gusterson & Price, 2005). Either way, the topic is a hurdle for LREC practitioners. In a series of articles published in *Anthropology Today*, Roberto Gonzáles accuses fellow anthropologist Montgomery McFate and Australian infantry officer David Kilcullen—through their contributions to the U.S. Army's *Counterinsurgency* manual (FM 3–24)—of instructing soldiers to manipulate social relationships at a local level to instate colonial occupation (2007, p. 15). Gonzáles's primary concern is that the soldiers offer no respect to the grievances of the insurgents. Additionally, disgusted by what he considers a limited definition of culture and an unethical distillation of his field to "human terrain," Gonzáles defends against the contamination of the unbiased passivity inherent to pure anthropology (2007).

The American Anthropological Association's (AAA's) Code of Ethics (CoE) is stringent regarding research that does not comply with its regulations on informed consent or is clandestine in any way (Gonzáles, 2007; CoE 1998; Plemmons & Albro, 2014). Additionally, Gonzáles highlights the "[work] carried out by anthropologists working as cultural mercenaries—hired to design or implement culturally specific counterinsurgency campaigns or extreme interrogation tactics" as the gravest of ethical indiscretions (2007, p. 19). Adhering to a professional premium on ethics couched in overt neutrality (CoE, 1998), many anthropologists fear that collusion with the military puts the entire scientific field (and its research subjects) at risk (Gonzáles, 2007; Price, 2000).

Many anthropologists work in remote and hostile environments and being suspected as a U.S. intelligence agent could prove fatal (Price, 2000). However, the AAA CoE notes that, depending on the circumstances, an anthropologist's contribution to shaping actions or policies may sometimes be equally as ethical as inaction (Code of Ethics,

1998, p. 2). The discussion in the anthropological community regarding the use of ethnographic information to meet military objectives rekindled after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City and is increasingly polarizing (Plemmons & Albro, 2014). Anxiety regarding the ethics of what some call "military humanitarianism" (Plemmons & Albro, 2014) excites debate surrounding programs like the Army's now-defunct Human Terrain System and the intelligence community, both civilian and military. Largely parallel in many of their investigative efforts, anthropologists and intelligence analysts follow differing moral models of why they conduct their research and what it can and should be used to accomplish.

However, there are security anthropologists who work to bridge the gap between the AAA and the military's needs. Dr. Kerry Fosher, an anthropologist working at CAOCL, spoke with Paul Nuti, AAA Director of External, International & Government Relations on the subject and expressed her belief that an ethical balance was not only possible, but necessary for all sides to respect: "The guideline to do no harm to one's research community, seemingly so simple, may be the most complex," she explains. "Our emphasis on protecting informant communities is still a critical touchstone in our ethical code, but the code—or related guidelines—must be refined to cope with the complex kinds of engagements and collaborations many of us now face" (2007). She continues in her interview to discuss the pull between a need for secrecy in the military and the anthropology community's issues with concealment. Additionally, she argues that the military is an educated and scrappy community that would endeavor to leverage open-source anthropological techniques anyhow, and having engaged anthropologists helping military operators both to understand the ethical nuance and to use the discipline to limit harm to local cultures meets the intent of the AAA CoE (Fosher, 2007).

The ethical debate surrounding anthropology and its use on a battlefield is as timeless as war itself, with outcomes similarly varied. Franz Boas, the father of American academic anthropology, condemned four anthropologists in a letter published by *The Nation* in 1919. This letter accused the four of having "prostituted science by using it as a cover for their activities as spies" (Price, 2000, Gusterson, 2005), a criticism that sparked debate within the community as World War I raged. Estimates indicate that the majority of

the registered members of the AAA contributed understanding of cultural nuance to the World War II effort, and most did so without false pretexts by working for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Army or Navy Intelligence branches, or the Office of War Information (Price, 2000).

Famously, some of these anthropologists included Ruth Benedict, Gregory Bateson, Clyde Kluckhohn, and Margaret Mead (Price 2000), the latter of whom personally lobbied during the war for the government to allow anthropologists to utilize their scientific techniques to characterize enemy cultures. From 1948 to 1950, Mead worked at the Air Force RAND Corporation, examining the Soviet Union and predicting the USSR's critical vulnerabilities and centers of gravity for military exploit (Bauman, 2018), but her research went largely uncontested by the anthropological community. The ethical difference for the AAA may have been that she was merely using anthropological techniques to conduct research from within the United States rather than working directly with Soviet citizens and later betraying their confidence.

However, the AAA worked directly with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the early 1950s, a negotiation that provided the CIA with a list of the AAA members' linguistic and geographic expertise. Furthermore, Price reports that linguists and ethnographers assisted America's war effort during the Korean War with little resistance (2000). It was not until 1965 and the illumination of Project Camelot—during which anthropologists aided counterinsurgency programs in Latin America—that the issue of professional ethics again ignited within the AAA (Price, 2000). Anthropologist involvement in the wars in South East Asia fueled the fire, and the Margaret Mead-chaired AAA fact-finding committee reported in 1971 that the anthropologists had committed no wrong-doing (Price, 2000). However, buoyed by the anti-Vietnam War sentiment, the voting members of the AAA subsequently rejected Mead's report. Despite the deepening divide among anthropologists, some members assisted allied efforts during the First Gulf War with limited backlash (Price, 2000).

Today, with security anthropologists like Dr. Fosher helping to shape policy and practice by engaging with the military (Fosher, 2007), the Marine Corps' LREC operations can meet operational necessities on the battlefield, and use anthropological models and

meet ethical standards to limit harm to host nation communities. The U.S. Marine Corps' textbook *Operational Culture for the Warfighter* recognizes that "Our wars will be 'wars amongst the people'—not wars against the people, and not wars oblivious to people. […] The quality of our relationships with people, in and out of uniform, is of paramount importance in determining mission success" (Salmoni & Holmes-Eber, 2008, p. 1). The textbook highlights the importance of every Marine's ability to function in areas that are significantly culturally different from the United States, and to be able to do so with respect, creativity, and temerity.

C. NET ASSESSMENT AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Dr. Andrew Marshall has been called "the most influential man you've never heard of" (Nelson, 2016, p. 35). Serving as Director of the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) for more than 40 years and successfully advising Presidents and Secretaries of Defense of all political backgrounds, Marshall designed and implemented a system of approaching the most complex problems facing the United States Government and its national security from a multi-disciplinary perspective. Using a Socratic-style method of inquiry facilitate top level decision-makers' resolutions, net assessment is an analytic framework that strives to comprehend the central character of multifaceted and competitive situations (Nelson, 2016; Manea, 2014).

Differentiating between policies and systems is necessary to understanding CAOCL's constraints and restraints with its LREC training and education programs. The United States Government opened the ONA in 1973 in order to insert diversity and cross-discipline expertise into its strategic decision-making (Augier, 2013; Manea, 2014; Nelson, 2016). Net assessment has since affected how the military has perceived ethnographic expertise since World War II and, as the leading advocate of holistic problem-solving in the government, the ONA represents the complexity and depth that culture and people bring to the battlefield.

Net assessment employs bounded rationality to analyze an enemy's patterns and behaviors in order to define its critical vulnerabilities and centers of gravity. Relative strengths and weaknesses can include history, cultural studies, economic indicators,

funding methodologies, educational systems, religion, social media (as a resource and a vulnerability), and access to television, books, and movies (Manea, 2014). It is a holistic approach to understanding how human nature influences socio-economic behavior on a large scale and developing comparative frameworks to determine comparative advantage. Employing bounded rationality forces the analysts to consider the enemy's social history, culture, schema, human context, and leadership mechanisms in order to arrive at a conclusion (Manea, 2014).

For example, Andrew Marshall found that incorporating biosocial anthropology—how decision-makers are influenced not only by their environments but by their basic biology—can heavily influence the nature of inter-cultural interaction. The understanding that "people are not simply driven and motivated by factors such as utility or other quantifiable aspects […but that] there are certain deep, instinctual, and essentially biological components to human behavior" is important in Net Assessment (Augier, 2013). Marshall understood that "biogrammar," a term coined by Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox, played an important role in defense and security (Augier, 2013).

Associate Director of the Office of Net Assessment, Department of Defense (DOD), Dr. Andrew May, recommends redefining "cost" to include all scarce resources, including "attention, quality personnel, [and] time" (Manea, 2014). Reiterating Tzu and Clausewitz, May says: "Every day that you compel a possible competitor to decide that now is not the time for action, but to take time to think, to shore up positions that he came to believe that now he is weak, you have just preserved the peace time confrontation, rather than let the things get into conflict" (Manea, 2014). Only by deeply understanding the cultural context, through which a competitor observes its situation in relation to others, orients its strategic goals, decides how to tactically implement those goals, and ultimately acts,[16] can Marines on a battlefield most expediently and effectively disrupt that enemy's

[16] United States Air Force Colonel John Boyd (retired) coined the "OODA loop," which describes the basic decision cycle. OODA stands for: Observe—Orient—Decide—Act. In order to emerge victorious, battlefield commanders must "get inside" the enemy's OODA loop and disrupt it by anticipating the enemy's next move before he can act upon it. For more information on Col Boyd and the OODA Loop, interested readers can seek out: Ford, Daniel (2010). *A vision so noble: John Boyd, the OODA Loop, and America's War on Terror.* Durham, NH: Warbird Books.

decision-making process. May advocates disruption prior to the enemy's action in order to limit loss of life in the conflict.

May and Marshall outline a perspective on warfare that goes beyond technology and weapons. Instead, they advocate a multi-disciplinary view of strategic competition that focuses on basic cultural assessments, key trends and asymmetries, major uncertainties, and emerging opportunities (Augier, 2013; Manea, 2014; Nelson, 2016). The ONA has withstood half a century of wars and conflicts, political and economic turmoil, and social change. There is currently no direct link between the Marine Corps' LREC program and the ONA, which could be an untapped opportunity for the integration of cultural competence at a strategic level.

D. ESTABLISHED POLICIES, DIRECTIVES, AND INSTRUCTIONS

Since CAOCL's founding in 2006, plans, policies, directives, instructions, guidance, and other forms of communique have outlined the requirements for and implementation of the expanding Marine Corps' LREC system. At the highest levels, the expressed need for LREC expertise at all echelons of command is woven into broader strategic goals. For example, in its discussion of developing a global operating model and cultivating workforce talent, the Secretary of Defense James Mattis's National Defense Strategy (NDS) expressly outlines the need for a shift in focus toward educational development and talent management (2018, pp. 7–8). Directly addressing the need for Professional Military Education (PME) "to be used as a strategic asset to build trust and interoperability across the Joint Forces and with allied and partner forces," the NDS also calls for broad talent management across the forces including better understanding of our international partners (Mattis, 2018, p. 8).

In addition to the NDS, the Marine Corps' LREC program's development has required a series of high-level strategic guidance documents that have trickled down into the initiatives with which Marines engage with on a daily basis. The 36th Commandant of the Marine Corps' (CMC's) *Planning Guidance* called on Marines to be "innovative, adaptable, and versatile." This guidance led to the 37th CMC's *Fragmentary Order* (FRAGO) calling for "decentralized, realistic, standards-based training." Similarly, the

2014–2022 USMC Service Campaign Plan explicitly outlined plans to "expand regional specialization through a fully developed and phased Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization (RCLF) Program," which led to the *Force Development Strategic Plan*'s Critical Task 3.10.3: "Execute the Marine Corps language, regional and cultural strategy" (LREC Strategy [PPT], 2016, p. 2). Additionally, the *Marine Corps Vision & Strategy 2025* highlights that "Our language and cultural communication skills require considerable enhancement and must become integral to our training and education programs" (2008). These documents outline the strategic requirements that must be molded into operational effects.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3126.01A outlines a Language, Regional Expertise and Culture Capabilities-Based Requirements Identification Process (LREC CBRIP) that is a five-step progression that begins at the Joint Staff level. The J-1 first tasks the geographic Combatant Commands (CCMDs) to identify their LREC capability requirements based on Defense Planning Scenarios. Second, each geographic Senior Language Authority (SLA) provides an annual workshop as a forum for planners to refine LREC capabilities for the next five to ten years. After identifying and prioritizing the CCMD's LREC capability needs, those needs are integrated using the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) to form a two-pronged approach. First, the identified LREC needs must support the global end state and strategic missions determined by the NDS;[17] second, the LREC needs must address and weave into the CCMD theater end states. Ultimately, the J-1 sponsors the LREC requirements through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) within the Department of Defense (DOD) acquisitions process (CJCSI 3126.01A, 2013).

The CJCSI 3126.01A further delineates specific core Mission Essential Tasks (METs) required for specific scenarios and mission sets that it ties to specific LREC activities (2013, p. D-2). By rating the mission criticality of these LREC tasks, CCMDs have a tangible, measurable standard to which they can train their units. Additionally, by

[17] The National Security Strategy (NSS) is the United States' highest security document and is signed and promulgated by the President of the United States. The NDS designs a mission set or the military based on the NSS and is signed and disseminated by the Secretary of Defense.

defining capabilities and proficiency levels required to meet specific METs, and by providing examples of grading criteria for those competencies, the CJCSI 3126.01A created the foundation of credibility that the Marine Corps needed to develop its *Security Cooperation/LREC Training and Readiness Manual* (T&R), NAVMC 3500.59C. Mapping LREC requirements to the Mission Essential Task List (METL) also helps unit commanders determine what expertise they need on their staffs in order to deploy and optimize mission success.

Based on training manuals developed for the Naval Aviation Community, almost every established Marine Corps operational community has adopted and specialized its own T&R Manual. A symbol of CAOCL's programmatic legitimacy, its T&R, first published in 2012, has grown from a 44-page overview of METS and operational culture and language events to a 164-page tool for planning, conducting, and evaluating LREC training across the Marine Corps at both a collective and individual level (NAVMC 3500.59C, 2017, p. 1–1). Unit proficiency and currency of LREC METs is updated in the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) on a monthly basis and individual proficiency and currency is tracked by the units individually, usually in the Marine Corps Training Information Management System (MCTIMS). With these tools, commanders are able to track some of the cultural competencies and linguistic abilities organic to their units. (NAVMC 3500.59C, 2017, p. 1–2). What the T&R neglects, however, is a system of integrating LREC MET requirements into pre-existing, MOS-specific T&R manuals and a universal tracking system across MOSs on the individual level.[18] Focusing on deployment-ready capabilities before addressing total Fleet Marine Force (FMF) competency, CAOCL has identified DRRS reporting using the MET construct on a unit level and is working toward integrating its T&R tracking into the Marine Corps Training Information Management System (MCTIMS) (MCO 3000.13, 2010; MCO 3500.100, 2011; Dallas, 2016, p. 8). However, this dispersion of data on individual Marines makes it difficult for

[18] For example, the Special Operations community (MARSOC) uses an Irregular Warfare Skills Tracker (IWST), Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) scores are recorded in the Language Readiness Index (LRI), CAOCL tracks Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization (RCLF) with an in-house system, and the aviation community uses the Marine - Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program (M-SHARP) program to track T&R proficiency and currency.

higher echelons of Marine Corps leadership to determine individual Marine competencies, Corps-wide.

Unlike T&R coded requirements to demonstrate proficiency in most MOSs, LREC competency is relatively subjective. In an aircraft, a pilot can be graded on her ability to maintain heading within two degrees on take-off, and an artilleryman can be graded on his ability to hit a target within 25 meters, but grading whether a "five paragraph order is informed by cultural considerations" (NAVMC 3500.59C, 2017, p. 7–9) is inherently a biased assessment. Recognizing this difficulty, CAOCL has endeavored to be as specific with its T&R performance steps and other definitions as possible.

The *DODD 5160.41E: Marine Corps Language, Regional Expertise & Culture (LREC) Strategy 2016–2020* directs LREC's establishment as a functional area with an assigned Advocate at Deputy Commandant of Combat Development and Integration (DC CD&I). This advocacy officially establishes LREC as a functional requirement and thereby validates it to receive fiscal attention through JCIDS (USMC LREC Strategy (PPT), 2016, p. 8). MCO 5311.6 describes Advocates as proponents who "shall provide subject matter expertise, insights and coordinated recommendations to the Commandant [of the Marine Corps] in order to inform Marine Corps force development and other relevant decisions" (2013, p. 2; USMC LREC Strategy (PPT), 2016, p. 8). With this endorsement, the LREC program will become increasingly established in the next decade as a fundamental warfighting function, further necessitating a system to accurately identify, track, and employ its assets during conflicts anywhere in the world.

However, when it comes to identifying, tracking, and maximizing use of existing LREC expertise and interest among Marines, there is little established doctrine. Upon entering the Marine Corps, new enlistees fill out a DD-1966, which has a single block (I, 13) that asks for existing foreign language proficiency (see Figure 5). Once filled out, this information is entered into the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS) as meta-data that can be pulled when necessary. However, this language information is both unsubstantiated and unmeasured. This system is similar to the Self-Professed Language Ability module available on Marine Online (MOL), which records languages Marines profess to speak in MCTFS without any association to the Interagency Language

Roundtable (ILR) proficiency scale. The only substantiated records of a Marine's language ability are if they have taken the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) for that language.



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A. SERVICE PROCESSING FOR	B. PRIOR SERVICE: YES NO / NUMBER OF DAYS:	C. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION	D. SELECTIVE SERVICE REGISTRATION NO.

SECTION I - PERSONAL DATA

1. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	2. NAME *(Last, First, Middle Name (and Maiden, if any), Jr., Sr., etc.)*
3. CURRENT ADDRESS *(Street, City, County, State, Country, ZIP Code)*	4. HOME OF RECORD ADDRESS *(Street, City, County, State, Country, ZIP Code)*

5. CITIZENSHIP *(X one)*
- a. U.S. AT BIRTH *(If this box is marked, also X (1) or (2))*
  - (1) NATIVE BORN
  - (2) BORN ABROAD OF U.S. PARENT(S)
- b. U.S. NATURALIZED
- c. U.S. NON-CITIZEN NATIONAL
- d. IMMIGRANT ALIEN *(Specify)*
- e. NON-IMMIGRANT FOREIGN NATIONAL *(Specify)*

ALIEN REGISTRATION NUMBER *(If issued)*

6. SEX *(X one)*
- a. MALE
- b. FEMALE

7.a. ETHNIC CATEGORY
- (1) HISPANIC OR LATINO
- (2) NOT HISPANIC OR LATINO

7.b. RACIAL CATEGORY *(X one or more)*
- (1) AMERICAN INDIAN/ ALASKA NATIVE
- (2) ASIAN
- (3) BLACK OR AFRICAN AMERICAN
- (4) NATIVE HAWAIIAN OR OTHER PACIFIC ISLANDER
- (5) WHITE

8. MARITAL STATUS *(Specify)*

9. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS

10. DATE OF BIRTH *(YYYYMMDD)*	11. RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE *(Optional)*	12. EDUCATION *(Yrs/Highest Ed Gr Completed)*	13. PROFICIENT IN FOREIGN LANGUAGE *(If Yes, specify. If No, enter NONE.)*	1st	2nd

14. VALID DRIVER'S LICENSE *(X one)* YES NO *(If Yes, list State, number, and expiration date)*	15. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State and Country)*

Figure 5. Section I, Part 13 of DD1966
Source: DODI 1304.02 (2011)

This thesis seeks to address the gap of the Marine Corps' knowledge and tracking of latent language talent among its ranks. For more information on this subject, see part III.A.6 of this thesis.

E. ASSESSMENTS OF THE USMC LREC PROGRAM AND FINDINGS

There is a need for enhanced processes to identify latent cultural competency and linguistic talent among the existing Marine Corps population. Earlier studies of Marine Corps talent management within the LREC context identified cracks in tracking and measurement systems and recommended ways to address those gaps (Adams, 2014; Alrich, 2008; Alrich et al., 2011; DeCamp et al., 2012). After a slow start in 2005 and literature ramping up through 2013, the LREC initiatives in the Marine Corps grew significantly.

However, since 2014, little research has assessed how the Marine Corps has implemented those recommendations and whether or not the adopted systems are effective and efficient.

In 2013, Booz Allen Hamilton assessed *Geographic Combatant Command Capability Requirements* and found that LREC capabilities were very important to mission success but there were many competency gaps. CENTCOM reported its desire for prioritizing language training and the study recognized capability-tracking capabilities as fundamental to LREC success moving forward (Booz, 2013). These findings mirrored those highlighted by RAND's 2012 *Assessment of the Ability of the U.S. Department of Defense and the Services to Measure and Track Language and Culture Training and Capabilities among General Purpose Forces* (DeCamp et al.). RAND's study recommended improvement of LREC skills and training tracking to better reflect readiness, as well as standardizing terms across the services, implementing a standing LREC After Action Report (AAR) system, and to "develop a theoretically sound causal model linking LREC skills to mission success" (DeCamp et al., 2012, p. 43).

An Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) report (Adams et al., 2014), highlighted the Marine Corps' focus on LREC at a tactical level, largely ignoring the strategic uses of cultural and linguistic competence in contrast to the other military services. However, similar across all forces was the need to make the FAO accession and skill acquisition programs more efficient, an initiative that "may decrease the ultimate utility of these officers as regional experts" (Adams et al., 2014, p. 55). Whereas many of our Allied and partner nations use promotion to incentivize their own LREC-equivalent programs, the United States military historically prioritizes other skill sets on promotion boards (Adams et al., 2014, p. 56). The IDA report again recommended a better experience and expertise tracking system, but also changing the intrinsic culture of the DoD by rewarding cultural and linguistic interest and expertise among its personnel. Adams et al. additionally recommended requiring all Flag Officers slated to assume command overseas receive comprehensive regional and cultural training and education, potentially highlighting those who have FAO backgrounds (2014).

Ultimately, the research agrees that discerning the relevance of LREC training on mission accomplishment is key to determining its future relevance as a program (RAND,

2012; Adams et al., 2014). RAND believed that the transition to using METs as a standard of tracking LREC capability would be a beneficial to the Marine Corps, an initiative that CAOCL has undertaken with its 2017 SC/LREC T&R Manual.

F. ON-GOING CAOCL INITIATIVES

One of CAOCL's tasks is to translate the strategic requirements outlined in DoD-level doctrine and instructions into tangible programs and capabilities that will directly affect operational capabilities. CAOCL's influence has been steadily growing across the Marine Corps' range of military operation (ROMO) and across the rank structure throughout the past decade, which increasingly necessitates an effective and efficient tracking system. The 2008 MCO 1553.4B outlines Professional Military Education (PME) requirements for all ranks and only specifically requires culture-based training as part of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College (CSC) Intermediate Level PME for CWO4s, CWO5s, LDO Majors, and Majors (p. 1–8). However, MARADMIN 231/14 outlines RCLF completion for CWO3s, LDO Captains, and Captains commissioned in 2009 or afterward to be considered PME complete for grade (Dallas, 2016, MARADMIN 231/14).[19]

Operational Culture for the Warfighter defines Operational Culture as "Those aspects of culture that influence the outcome of a military operation; conversely, the military actions that influence the culture of an area of operations" (Salmoni & Holmes-Eber, 2008, p. 15). The distinction between the two different cultures at play within a holistic purview of an operation is important because it informs the students from the outset that there are many different forms of culture and infinitely more forces of interplay between them that together define the operational environment in which they will work. Endorsed by General Mattis USMC (ret.), *Operational Culture for the Warfighter* remains a textbook for understanding cultural nuance within the military context. It is not, however, required reading for any program. The textbook's successor, *Applications in Operational Culture: Perspectives from the Field* is a collection of essays by Marines, for Marines,

[19] Additionally, established PME at all ranks will include at least introductory cultural competency material, including basic training, and Lance Corporal's - and Corporal's Courses (Dallas, 2016).

which highlight the importance of LREC expertise based on first-hand experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan (Holmes-Eber et al., 2009).

CAOCL's initiatives cover not only training and education through RCLF PME programs, cross-cultural competence instruction, and LREC pre-deployment training for Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Marine Expeditionary Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), and Marine Forces Reserve (MFR) units. CAOCL also supports the operating forces by providing reach-back and cultural advisors; Doctrine, Operations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) institutionalization of joint and service standards and doctrine through the JCIDS process; and translational study through field and social science research (CAOCL [PPT], 2016, p. 1).

CAOCL's approach to LREC imposes gradations of expertise as "culture general" and "culture specific." Additionally, it divides the operational cultural framework into five dimensions: physical environment, economy, social structure, political structures, and belief systems (CAOCL [PPT], 2016; Fosher et al., 2017). CAOCL recognizes that LREC assets come together from numerous established sources to support operations and is currently focusing on the MAGTF to determine the best method of determining, training, and fielding LREC resources. FAOs, RAOs, and FASs come from the International Affairs Program (IAP), linguists and attachés often hail from the Director of Intelligence (DIRINT), and other assets are trained through the Marine Corps Information Operations Center (MCIOC), the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG), the Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School (MCCMOS), and the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) (CAOCL [PPT], 2016).

I seek to use the multi-disciplinary concept espoused by the ONA to determine how to improve the various existing structures and policies to strengthen CAOCL's LREC program throughout the Marine Corps. A complete understanding of the history of LREC initiatives is imperative to accurately assessing its current capabilities and future employment for both the Marine Corps as a whole and the individual Marines to execute its missions.

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III. THE *COMMANDER'S PORTAL* AND CAOCL'S LREC CAPABILITIES MAP

A. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Discussions with CAOCL representatives outlined a need and a desire to systematically track LREC concepts to meet operational capability requirements. CAOCL had started a basic map that would track doctrinal requirements through their conceptualization into academic concepts, then turned into CAOCL programs that manifested into LREC elements that had a tangible effect on operational capabilities. I call this relationship the DACLO Loop (see Figure 6). The DACLO Loop demonstrates how LREC programs take doctrinal requirements and turn them into operational capabilities. The *Commander's Portal* takes that initial mapping concept and molds it into a tangible tool that commanders at all levels can use to understand the underlying concepts that drive CAOCL programs and the integration of the 2017 SC/LREC Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual into basic, annual, and pre-deployment training.



Built by author based on discussions with CAOCL representatives

Figure 6. DACLO Loop

The Commander's Portal is a 130-page document that is designed to be a single-stop tool for Commanders to find the background, information, and direct links that they need to designate a training plan for their Marines based on the unique mission requirements with which they are faced. Built as a Microsoft PowerPoint (PPT) presentation, all pages are hyperlinked to each other and to outside resources that are referenced on the pages themselves. I have published this PowerPoint in portable document format (PDF) as Supplemental 1 to this thesis. The Commander's Portal in PDF format makes it a tangible interim solution for Commanders until the information can be built into CAOCL's website. Additionally, CAOCL can update or change the PPT at any time and re-publish an updated PDF for distribution to Commanders.

The Commander's Portal has eight primary sections: PTP Toolkit, T&R Manual, Publications and Instructions, RCLF, Commander's CAOCL Checklist, Commander's LREC Tracking Tools, LREC Capabilities Map, and Diagnostic Tool (see Figure 7). In the following chapter, I discuss each of the sections in more detail.



Figure 7. The main page of the *Commander's Portal*

1. PTP Toolkit

All Commanders and their G/S-3 representatives are familiar with the TECOM's PTP Toolkit. However, the Toolkit continues to evolve as the locations, and mission sets to which Marines are deployed, change. The LREC updates to the PTP Toolkit are robust and stem from the 2010 Headquarters Marine Corps Plans, Policies & Operations (PP&O) Message (PPO MSG DTG 161827Z Feb 10), which is designated For Official Use Only (FOUO). The PTP Toolkit itself is laid out so that Commanders can navigate to the Combatant Command (COCOM) and structure (e.g. MEU or SPMAGTF-CR) that fits their mission assignment and find a tailored list of training requirements. In each case, the Operational Culture and Language Requirement page is the same (see Figure 8), with links to the SC/LREC T&R Manual, Joint Language University, and Operational Culture and Language Training Program (a screenshot of which I provided on this *Commander's Portal* page for easy reference). I added links to additional information within the Commander's Portal on both Key Leader Engagement (KLE) and how to submit a Training Support Request (TSR) to CAOCL. All of the screenshots on *PTP Toolkit* page are hyperlinked directly to their Common Access Card (CAC)-enabled websites.



Figure 8. TECOM's Operational Culture and Language Requirements for PTP[20]

2. Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual

CAOCL published its most recent update to the *NAVMC 3500.59C Security Cooperation / Language, Regional Expertise, and Language Training and Readiness Manual* (short title: SC/LREC T&R) in 2017. The most important change made in the 2017 update is that it maps LREC training events to Defense Readiness Reporting System—Marine Corps (DRRS-MC) reportable Mission Essential Tasks (METs) (Dallas, 2016). With this integration, CAOCL built a direct link between the LREC Requirements and Operational Capabilities portions of the DACLO Loop (see Figure 6). However, the newness of this linkage makes it both generally unknown and operationally untested.

Individual Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) understand how to integrate their own T&R requirements into training, but very few often consider T&R requirements of other MOSs outside of supporting combined training. However, the LREC T&R manual

[20] This webpage can be found at: https://vcepub.tecom.usmc.mil/genstaff/g3/ptp/SitePages/CENTCOM/CENTCOM%20Service%20Operational%20Culture%20and%20Language.aspx

is an overarching document that potentially impacts all MOSs in a way that is foreign to most commanders and their S-3 (Operations) shops.

By demonstrating examples of how the broader Marine Corps Mission Essential Tasks (METs) overlap with the METs that require LREC capability, Commanders and their operational planners can easily trace the LREC T&R completion requirements to optimize mission success. See Figure 8 for an example of Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)[21] / LREC overlap. This page of the Commander's Portal demonstrates one example of the METs designated by the pre-deployment training (PTP) and the overlap with tasks that require LREC capability. Each LREC task has T&R codes associated with it that must be completed by the requisite Marines before the unit will be deemed ready to deploy on a MEU.

Some examples of overlap highlighted in Figure 8 between the two sets of METs are Joint Interagency, International, and Multinational (JIIM) operations, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs), Security Cooperation operations, and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations. The *Commander's Portal* page highlights overlaps such as these to demonstrate to Commanders how important it is to consult the SC/LREC T&R manual when planning training evolutions in preparation for these mission sets. All of the METs outlined in the SC/LREC T&R have associated T&R code completion requirements for Commanders to meet readiness thresholds. On this page, I also included a hyperlink to the *LREC Capabilities Map* (see part III.A.7) and two examples of pages with additional information that will help Commanders navigate the requirements for those METs.

[21] A MEU is the smallest form of Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) that deploys independently. A MEU deploys with an Amphibious Ready Group, which is comprised of three Naval ships: an LHD (or LHA), an LPD, and an LSD. The MEU itself is comprised of a Command Element (CE), Ground Combat Element (GCE), Logistics Combat Element (LCE), and an Aviation Combat Element (ACE). There are at least three MEUs deployed around the globe at any given time.



Figure 9. Example: MEU / LREC MET[22] overlap.

The Marine Corps breaks METs down into three categories that can differ between MOSs and mission sets: Core METs are standardized according to unit type and delineate the tasks for which the organizations were designed—they directly enable execution of the unit's primary mission. Core Plus METs, because they represent sub-mission sets that are less likely to occur during a given unit's deployment, are not included in unit readiness assessments. Assigned METs are only subjected to readiness assessments if more than 25% of the unit is slated to deploy. These METs are assigned based on deployment guidance from higher, mission templates, and Core and Core Plus METs (Dallas, 2016).

In the LREC Capabilities Map section of the Commander's Portal, I link many of the Academic Concepts and CAOCL Programs from the DACLO Loop (see Figure 6) directly to SC/LREC T&R codes (see Figure 23 for an example of linked codes). This interface gives Commanders a visual and tactile link between concept and execution.

[22] THE MEU MET requirements can be found on the Marine Corps Training and Education Command's (TECOM) PTP Toolkit webpage. The Tasks Requiring LREC Capability list can be found in the NAVMC 3500.59C SC/LREC T&R Manual.

3. Publications and Resources

The most difficult part of navigating any Marine Corps system is collecting all of the pertinent information without overwhelming the learners or missing any of the important parts. Conceptually, LREC has been employed by every successful military commander throughout history and in every corner of the world. The extent to which LREC has been documented as such, however, is less prevalent. CAOCL has embarked on a mission to uncover as many vignettes of successful LREC implementation as possible, and publish those stories as learning tools at a personal level for Marines. Many of these vignettes can be found in the *Marine Corps Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Strategy: 2016–2020*. However, the most commonly referred-to Marine Corps foundational doctrine highlighting LREC capabilities is the *Small Wars Manual* published in 1940. Various other publications and instructions have shaped the Marine Corps' understanding and implementation of LREC. In Figure 10, I list several of the predominant DoD and USMC publications and instructions that have molded the LREC system into what it is today. Each of these titles offers a hyperlink to an online version of the publication for easy access by Commanders seeking additional information. Additionally, I have a link to three textbooks published by CAOCL: Fosher et al.'s *Culture General Guidebook for Military Professionals* (2017), Salmoni and Holmes-Eber's *Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications* (2008), and Holmes-Eber et al.'s *Applications in Operational Culture: Perspectives from the Field* (2009).



Figure 10. A sample of DoD and Marine Corps publications and instructions relating to LREC

This list of publications and instructions on the *Commander's Portal* page is not exhaustive, but it will give Commanders a place to begin their understanding of the complexity and dynamics of the requirements, implementation practices, and expected outcomes of properly training for and utilizing LREC expertise on the battlefield.

Salmoni and Holmes-Eber's seminal work *Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications* (2008) is a comprehensive textbook that uses anthropological paradigms to meet the needs of Marines by being both a reference and a planning tool. A continuation of the precepts outlined in this first book, Holmes-Eber partnered with Scanlon and Hamlen to collect and edit essays by Marines for Marines in their book *Applications in Operational Culture: Perspectives from the Field* (2009). This book catalogues first-hand challenges and successes of Marines working with local populations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, filling an intellectual gap of collecting and analyzing cultural lessons learned. Recognizing that the majority of Marines will not become LREC experts (nor should they), CAOCL employed its resident anthropologists to build the *Culture General Guidebook for Military Professionals* (2017). The broadest and arguably most

important for the average Marine, this guidebook teaches cultural concepts and perspective posturing without local specificity. The teachings in this guidebook will serve Marines well when interacting with anyone from Royal Marines to school children in Africa.

4. Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization (RCLF)

The Marine Corps' Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization (RCLF) program has become a common term in the Marine lexicon in the last decade, to the extent that RCLF requirements touch Marines at every rank. Upon graduation from TBS[23] or Sergeant's Course, CAOCL assigns all Marines a region of study for the remainder of their careers. With the implementation of MARADMIN 231/14, RCLF education requirements are required to be complete with Professional Military Education (PME) for grade.

The primary RCLF page in the *Commander's Portal* (see Figure 11) offers Commanders links to more background information, relevant MARADMINs, information on the countries and languages associated with each of the RCLF regions, and information on my TBS RCLF survey and optimization tool (see also Section IV of this thesis). There are 17 RCLF regions that are designed to group countries that share some cultural and/or linguistic traditions. By assigning these regions to all Marine officers and all Sergeants and above, the Marine Corps is assured to have a cadre of educated Marines in every unit that have at least a basic introduction to the language and culture of almost every country in the world. The United States military has a historically poor track record of guessing where its next conflict will take place, and having Marines at all ranks in all units have a basic knowledge of different regions gives the Marine Corps strategic leverage when the next unforeseen conflict arises.

[23] All Marine officers complete a six-month Basic Officer's Course in Quantico, VA after completion of either Officer Candidates School (OCS) or graduation from the United States Naval Academy. This course, called The Basic School (TBS) trains all Marine officers to be basic rifle platoon commanders, regardless of their assigned Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).



Figure 11. RCLF informational page
Source: CAOCL (map graphic)

Figure 12 graphically shows the career progression of RCLF education from the lowest to the highest ranks. CAOCL tailors RCLF education according to rank to move from culture general information and language at a tactical level at lower ranks to an operational level for mid-level Enlisted Marines and officers, and to a strategic level at the highest ranks. Along with defining the RCLF mission and the term *operational culture*, the page gives Commander's a visual depiction of the depth of knowledge they should expect of their Marines of varying ranks. Additionally, Figure 12 provides a percentage distribution of RCLF region assignments Marine Corps-wide. Approximately 800 Sergeants are randomly assigned regions every month and about 250 officers receive assignments every other month (Moeykens, 2018). These assignments, however, rarely take the Marines' personal experiences or preferences into consideration, leaving an LREC talent management gap. See Section IV of this thesis for further information.



Figure 12. RCLF background: Mission, definition, and scope
Source: Definition and graphics from CAOCL

5. Commander's CAOCL Checklist

The *Commander's Checklist* provides links to six additional topics that help Commanders identify and organize LREC training, education, and capabilities within their units (see Figure 13). I designed the Commander's Checklist to be an interactive tool that provided both strategic guidance in the form of recommended timelines for training and operating force (OPFOR) LREC integration prior to a deployment. Commanders should be aware of where their units fall on these timelines at all times in order to optimize LREC integration for mission success. Additionally, the *Checklist* has links to six pages that outline what tools Commanders have at their disposal to both identify and track the LREC skills that their Marines possess, how to submit a Training Support Request (TSR) form to CAOCL, and an additional avenue to the *Diagnostic Tool* (see Section III.A.8 for more information).



Figure 13. The Commander's Checklist

The *Training and Education: Tools and Materials* page gives Commanders a succinct list of links that can guide Commanders to understand what LREC programs exist and how they can best leverage the resultant knowledge and expertise (see Figure 14). This page differentiates between educational requirements and training tools available to Commanders. CAOCL does not currently have a list of offered courses—the courses they offer are tailored specifically to what a Commander requests based on his/her operational requirements. Some of this training is required through the PTP process, but CAOCL is able to offer additional training as requested. Often overlooked during training is the role of the Green Cell, the Civil-Military Officer (CMO), and establishing a Civ-Mil Operations Center (CMOC) during Phase I of an operations planning tool (OPT). Highlighting the importance of local host nation (HN) concerns and integration from the beginning of planning during the training stage will set the tone for actual operations. The *Green Cell/CMO* page gives Commanders several links and insights about how to potentially force its section leaders to incorporate HN nuances throughout planning, wargaming, and execution. It is particularly important to stand up a CMOC early and exercise some noted

assumptions about the outcome of the operations in order to allow the CMOC to plan a smooth transition into Phase IV.[24]



Figure 14. Training and Education: Tools and Materials page

Regarding educational opportunities, Commanders have access to information on the RCLF program (see sub-paragraph 4 in this section), and Foreign Area Officer (FAO), Regional Area Officer (RAO), and Foreign Affairs Specialist (Senior Enlisted Marines) programs and resultant expertise. This level of education takes years to cultivate through requirements for a Master's Degree in the region specified by the experts' earned MOSs, and, in the case of FAOs and FASs, a language requirement generally earned through study at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) followed by at least a year of living abroad immersed in that culture and language. If Commanders have access to these assets, they should engage them directly about how to best use their expertise to reinforce the operational capabilities of the unit.

[24] For more information on how to integrate Civ-Mil concerns into the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP), see the Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School's (MCCMOS) *Civil Affairs Capabilities Brief.*

CAOCL has a wide range of regional and cultural experts that are some of the foremost researchers and experts in their fields. Commanders can engage CAOCL directly to determine what training support the organization can offer at all levels and for all mission types. Using the Training Support Request gives CAOCL the opportunity to develop personalized training curricula for Commanders and their units, but Commanders should not hesitate to contact CAOCL to ask questions about what training it would recommend.



Figure 15. CAOCL's Training support request
Source: Adapted by author from the original form

I re-built CAOCL's Training Support Request document to streamline the request process and make the unit's preferences clearer to CAOCL representatives. CAOCL has already begun implementing the updated TSR. With a direct link from the *Commander's Portal*, Commanders—or their designated training representatives—can send an email to the appropriate CAOCL representatives requesting a blank TSR.[25] Not only is this training

[25] The link opens a new email in the users designated email program that auto-fills the CAOCL email addresses. The user, however, must change the subject to reflect his/her unit and training timeline. The body of the email is blank for the user to request that CAOCL send him/her a blank TSR. The user will then fill out the TSR and send it back approximately two months before the expected training date.

a required part of PTP, but CAOCL needs about two months to plan, build, and organize the training, often flying out to the unit directly. Because of the nature of RCLF, the majority of first term Marines are not exposed to any LREC education and receive all of their LREC knowledge through this PTP training.

Commanders can use the linked *OPFOR Training and LREC Integration* and *Recommended LREC Training Timeline* pages to plan ahead and work with CAOCL to organize the training their units require.



Figure 16. The OPFOR Training and LREC Integration model
Source: CAOCL

CAOCL built the OPFOR Training and LREC Integration model in Figure 16 to demonstrate the parallels between standardized Marine Corps block training requirements and the associated LREC training that Commanders should implement. This graphic incorporates the Training and Exercise Employment Plan (TEEP), which all Commanders use to have an idea of their units' upcoming exercises and deployments, with timing recommendations for focus on Core, Core Plus, and Assigned METs. Additionally, the graphic mirrors the recommended Block I—IV operational training requirements with

LREC incorporation from an individual through a MAGTF scale. This training continuum brings the requirements into focus from a tactical through an operational and ultimately into a strategic perspective.

Similarly, I built the *Recommended LREC Training Timeline* in Figure 17 to mirror the initiative of the OPFOR page but give more specific LREC training recommendations that a Commander can easily use as a checklist.



Figure 17. Recommended LREC Training Timeline
Source: Built by author; adapted from Figure 16.

This timeline demonstrates not only the types of training recommended at each stage of deployment preparation, but also the breadth of the LREC training. All Marines should be introduced to culture general concepts, but this training is broad and not culturally-specific. This scalable approach is at the Commander's discretion—there are no regulations keeping a Commander from introducing his/her entire unit to COCOM-level training. However, this level of training will focus more on the strategic impacts whereas mission-specific training will be more relevant to the junior Marines and young officers who are primarily operating at the tactical level. There may be individual Marines in

specific positions who would benefit from multiple levels of LREC training and education, and it is the Commander's responsibility to ensure plan ahead to optimize those training timelines.

The OPFOR Integration Model and the Training Timeline provide Commanders with the information they need to employ the academic concepts, CAOCL programs, and LREC elements of the DACLO Loop (see part III.A.8) toward optimizing their operational capabilities.

6. Commander's LREC Tracking Tools

One of the most difficult hurdles for Commanders is simply knowing which of their Marines have LREC skills that they can potentially employ in the right circumstances. There is currently no central repository for LREC data, nor is there a straightforward way for Commanders to easily determine existing talent within their units. Whereas a Platoon Commander may know simply from talking to his/her Marines that they have a Lance Corporal who speaks a given foreign language, a Battalion Commander would probably not have the same kind of direct access to that information. If that Marine neither took the Defense Language Proficiency Test nor declared that language ability either on a DD-1966 or through the Self-Professed Language Skills Information module in Marine Online (MOL), the higher-level Commanders may never know what assets they have organic to their units.

Due to LREC's nature as a peripheral requirement to almost all MOSs, many Commanders may not know where they can go to most efficiently determine what Marines they have under their command who have unique LREC capabilities, talents, or interests. Therefore, I built a consolidated and web-enabled map of the different LREC tracking tools the Marine Corps uses with descriptions of what information Commanders can glean from which tool. Figure 18 outlines the various locations that Commanders (or their G/S-1 administrators) can pull LREC data on their Marines.



Figure 18. Commander's LREC Tracking Tools page

The Defense Readiness Reporting System—Marine Corps (DRRS-MC) is available only on the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) and is often only available to Commanding Officers and above. Additionally, the data input into DRRS is subject to T&R code completion based on unit METs. CAOCL's T&R representatives are currently working to align the LREC T&R with other MOS T&Rs to ensure useful overlap and proper recording in DRRS, but LREC integration is still in its fledgling stages.

The Marine Corps Training Information Management System (MCTIMS) has grown in the last half-decade to be the primary source for tracking training completion across the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has expended extensive effort over the last several years to incorporate MarineNet and Marine Online (MOL) training completion data into MCTIMS, but the program is built to pull data based on training itself, not based on having profiles for individual Marines. However, unit Commanders are able to see some T&R completion based off of the LREC T&R Manual (as long as the G/S-3 shops are actively imputing those T&R code completions into MCTIMS).

The difficulty with the LREC T&R Manual lies with its status as a secondary training requirement that is not integrated into the specific MOS T&R manuals. For

example, MCTIMS is built on the individual ground MOS T&R manuals (e.g., Infantry), but the LREC T&R is a separate document that does not have specific codes tied to MOSs. Integration of the LREC T&R codes into MCTIMS is an ongoing initiative at CAOCL and until LREC codes are integrated into the specific MOS T&R Manuals (i.e., one of the 0302 required T&R codes is SC-INTA-2104: Manage interpreters), the difficulty with determining completion requirements and, therefore, accurate accountability will remain problematic.

Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS) is a centralized database of information collected by the Marine Corps about its Marines—test scores, demographics, pay information, etc. MCTFS, however, does not have a single interface—those seeking information from its archives must utilize other programs to pull the desired meta-data and there is no single program that can access all of this data in a format that will be immediately useful to a Commander. In general, Commanders will have access permissions for MOL and MarineNet, whereas their G/S-1 shops will have access to other MCTFS data through ReportNet and the Terminal Emulation Client (aka: "3270"). In an effort to simplify the search for Commanders, the *LREC Tracking Tools* page and its associated *Matrix* (see Figure 19) show Commanders where they should go to find what desired MCTFS-stored information.

All Marines have access to Marine Online (MOL). Commanders have additional permissions to see the Basic Training Records (BTRs) for all of their Marines. Therefore, by pulling various MOL reports, Commanders can see RCLF assigned regions and completion status, DLPT scores, and any self-professed languages by Marines in their units. However, MOL reports are quite spartan and require exporting to Excel before the data can be clearly organized.

MarineNet is the primary tracking tool for RCLF enrollment and completion data, including Headstart II language training. A unit commander with the correct permissions can determine which of their Marines have enrolled in and—by pulling a separate roster—completed their RCLF training within the past given number of years, but they cannot determine which of their Marines have been assigned to what RCLF region.

To determine what Marines have been assigned which RCLF region, unit commanders must find that information in the Command Profile section of the Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) website. However, the site is organized by region first; therefore, a commander will first choose a RCLF region and then be able to see which of his/her Marines are assigned to it. Commanders can also use Command Profile to pull a roster of languages spoken by their Marines, but this roster does not differentiate between self-professed language ability and those who have substantiated their language knowledge by taking the DLPT. Therefore, with a language roster from Command Profile, Commanders should be aware that they should engage those Marines directly about the depth of their language skills before relying on it in theater.

CAOCL does not currently have a central LREC capabilities tracking system that is any more robust than what a commander has in the Fleet. Additionally, there is no single CAOCL program leader that has access and oversight over all of the aforementioned tracking mechanisms; instead, different program leaders are responsible for different pieces of LREC data. If CAOCL chooses to implement the survey I built and describe in Chapter IV of this thesis, then it would begin building a unique set of data for future use with LREC expertise tracking and talent management.

	DRRS	MCTIMS	MCTFS		MOL	MarineNet	Command Profile	CAOCL
			ReportNet	3270				
Self-Professed Language			X	X			X	
DLPT Scores (substantiated language ability)			X	X	X			
RCLF – Assigned Region			X	X	X		X	X
RCLF – Enrollment & Completion			X	X		X		
LREC T&R Code Completion		X						
Unit MET Readiness	X							

Figure 19. LREC Tracking Tools Matrix

7. LREC Capabilities Map

CAOCL representatives began to map LREC capabilities on the axes of levels and categories of proficiency. Figure 20 shows categories of proficiency (leadership, methodology, LREC communications, and human aspects of military operations) on the x-axis and CJCSI 31206.01A levels of proficiency (basic, fully proficient, and master) on the y-axis. These axes created a two-dimensional matrix in which CAOCL began filling in the academic concepts and LREC elements (see DACLO Loop, Figure 6) that best met the matrix descriptors, making the matrix three-dimensional. For example, junior Marines operating at a tactical level will need training on how to use and lead interpreters, but it is the Commanders and senior Enlisted leaders that will need additional knowledge on how to manage key leader engagements (KLEs). Similarly, all Marines deployed in a foreign environment will need to understand the belief systems and political perspectives at a tactical, local, village level. FAOs, RAOs, and FASs will need to understand the impacts that religion and politics have at a national and strategic level.

When I joined the project, I was given free rein to add or delete the concepts and elements as I built up the *LREC Capabilities Map*, though I left them largely as CAOCL had provided them. What was missing from the map were the core linkages to CAOCL programs and operational capabilities that would bring the DACLO Loop full circle. In the Commander's Portal, the *LREC Capabilities Map* page offers links not only to individual pages for each of the academic concepts, CAOCL programs, and LREC elements, but also to the background behind the CJCSI 3126.01A's definitions of "basic," "fully proficient," and "master" regarding levels of culture proficiency. Additionally, there is basic background on each of the four categories: Leadership, methodology, communications, and human aspects of military operations.



Figure 20. LREC Capabilities Map
Source: Adapted from a map outline developed by CAOCL

Commanders can look at the Levels of Core Culture Proficiency from a perspective of moving from the tactical to the strategic levels of scope, but also with regard to the individual Marines executing those concepts, as transitioning from a basic awareness to extensive depth of expertise (CJCSI 3126.01A, 2013). For example, as Marines progress in rank and responsibility, they will move up proficiency levels. This structure obliges strategic leaders to be as knowledgeable in LREC priorities as possible, but also to know how to employ and train the assets that they have under their command. If the officers and the senior Enlisted leaders do not have the LREC expertise required of their level, then the Marines subordinate to them suffer the consequences at the tactical level.

CAOCL developed the four categories of cultural proficiency for the purposes of this mapping project. These categories effectively answer the "who, what, why, and how" of any operation that requires LREC integration.[26] The short answer to the question of "when" is simply: Always. Overlaid upon each other, these three levels and four categories

[26] Who: leadership / What: human aspects of military operations / Why: methodology / How: communications

form a matrix of 12 basic categories that contain a total of 72 distinct Academic Concepts and LREC Elements that I mapped to CAOCL Programs and Operational Capabilities.

Individual pages focused on these 72 concepts and elements can be found in Supplemental 1 to this thesis. Commanders can access each page by clicking on the individual Element on the LREC Map. In the lower right-hand corner of each page is a link that will return the user to the LREC Map. In the majority of cases, there are distinct (and sometimes multiple) SC/LREC T&R codes that require or otherwise engage the Concept or Element. I have created direct hyperlinks to an online and open-source copy of the T&R manual, which will take users directly to the T&R codes listed. Otherwise, I have provided direct- and open-source links to chapters in publications, instructions, books, and other sources that will guide Commanders to find the information that is relevant to the training and education of their Marines on those subjects. Figures 21, 22, and 23, provide three examples from different categories at different levels.



Figure 21. Example #1: Use Interpreter and Cultural Advisor

Effectively using an interpreter or other host nation cultural advisor can seem initially to be a simple task, but there are more considerations that leaders must take. There are some situations that are too sensitive to use interpreters or advisors. In these cases, Commanders must either have the LREC expertise themselves or have a trusted member of their staffs who can stand in. It is also important to remember that interpreters and cultural advisors are themselves people who have their own personal perspectives, experiences, and agendas. Interpreters and advisors that are assigned to deployed units are well-vetted, but finding the right Marines to work with them directly can be a deciding factor in success or failure. Not only must leaders know (and teach their Marines how) to most effectively utilize interpreters and advisors, but they must understand and weigh the risks associated therewith. Part of the required Headstart II language training on MarineNet focuses on this topic.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also consider this skill to be so important that they grouped it as one of six leader/influence function competencies in the CJCSI 3126.01A, a link to which is embedded on the Commander's Portal page. Also accessible to Commanders on the page is a link to CAOCL's *Culture General Guidebook for Military Professionals* and some information it provides about using interpreters and some examples describing tangible examples that Marines can apply to their management of interpreters and advisors. Though there is a specific LREC T&R code that directly addresses communicating through an interpreter (LREC-COMM-2002), at least two other T&R codes stem from its competency. I have provided links directly to the descriptions of those three T&R codes as well as a link to the Key Leader Engagement page of the Commander's Portal to tie the Element fully into Operational Capabilities.



Figure 22. Example #2: Incorporate LREC into the Orders Process

Similarly, *Incorporating LREC into the Orders Process* is an LREC Element that directly feeds six distinct T&R codes at all levels. This page in the LREC Capabilities Map links directly to those T&R codes, as well as providing a link to the Green Cell and Civilian-Military Operations page, which provides Commanders with concrete ideas of how to best ingratiate host nation (HN) LREC priorities into the planning and orders processes from the Phase I. The Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School (MCCMOS) published a PPT slide deck online that aptly demonstrates the role of the Green Cell and CMO throughout all phases of an operation. It is paramount that Commanders lead the incorporation of LREC perspectives in both the training and operational environment, forcing their Marines to have stability operations always be a planning factor. Additionally, this page offers a link to CAOCL's Culture General Guidebook and the Academic Concepts behind the Operational Capabilities of culture and operational planning.



Figure 23. Example #3: Interaction Management Skills

Interaction management skills is a broad category of Operational Capabilities that involves many dimensions of both Academic Concepts and LREC Elements. The list of LREC T&R codes that associate and support interaction management skills is long, because they have such a pervasive influence on all LREC-based METs. On this *LREC Capabilities Map* page, I included links to these T&R codes and their descriptions and requirements, as well as a link to some academic material on the topic.

8. Commander's Diagnostic Tool

Ideally, a Commander would be able to pull up an LREC diagnostic tool, highlight some drop-down menus about location, duration, mission, and force size, and the tool would present him/her an accurate list of exactly how many level 3+ linguists, interpreters, and Marines trained in each LREC T&R code that the Commander should have to optimize mission success. However, the very nature of language, culture, society, economics, politics, and all of the other minutiae that make humanity diverse serves such a diagnostic tool as water to paint, thinning it until it is unwieldy and unreliable. The Marine Corps trains its leaders to think and to consider not only a thinking enemy, but a thinking host

nation population. There cannot reasonably be a clean-edged recipe for human interaction. If there were, any thinking enemy would first exploit it and then manipulate those who rely on it. Instead, the Commander's Diagnostic Tool that I propose in the Commander's Portal is one that arms with Commanders with information and tools so that he/she can make the diagnosis him-/herself.

The United States military and the Marine Corps have taken requirements recognized after years of war and turned them into some worthwhile doctrine. CAOCL has been tasked with translating those Requirements into Academic Concepts and building training and education Programs around them. These Programs and Concepts feed into the LREC Elements that drove the T&R Manual to tie directly into Operational Capabilities that will enhance a Commander's capability in theater. However, the best way for this DACLO Loop to be complete is for the Commanders who have direct experience with the LREC training and education focused on battlefield and sustainment operations is to provide the feedback that will, in turn, drive doctrinal requirements (see Figure 24).



Figure 24. The Diagnostic Tool integrates the DACLO Loop

There are few means for Commanders to provide such feedback. The most prominently known is the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL); however, the form of MCCLL feedback decreases its function for follow-on Commanders. Because units submit after action reports (AARs) in Memorandum format, Commanders and small unit leaders alike must rely on a basic search function that assumes they know the accurate terminology to find information about experiences in certain categories. Using this method, I conducted a quick search on the MCCLL website for "LREC" and found that of all of the AARs ever uploaded by MCCLL, only five independently mentioned the term (see Gap #2 in the Scope and Methodology: Gaps this Thesis Addresses). Alternative, CAOCL's only feedback process is to collect course and instructor forms immediately after teaching a class. While this method is helpful for immediately addressing inconsistencies in the training it gives, it does not provide for a long-term feedback from Commanders and Marine users after a deployment. Developing a post-deployment feedback system for CAOCL would help increase the quality and relevance of content it builds into its training and education programs.

B. RESULTS

The *Commander's Portal* is a 130-page, interactive tool that CAOCL can both edit and distribute as it wishes. Instead of sifting through publications, MARADMINS, articles, and books to determine the most effective means of employing LREC training and education opportunities for their Marines, Commanders can use the *Portal* to find these answers in minutes. This capability has two advantages: First, Commanders' most valuable resource is time. As Marines, they are as thorough as they can be given their restraints and constraints,[27] but few will have the time, energy, or passion to find all of the resources that the Portal provides to them. Second, more Commanders at every level will have easy access to LREC capabilities that they did not know they did not know about. This increase in knowledge can potentially change the way that these Commanders train and educate their

[27] Doctrinally, constraints are those things that must be done and restraints are those things that may not be done.

Marines, which could lead to a Marine Corps-wide culture shift to be more attuned to LREC considerations in the future.

As a PDF, the *Commander's Portal* is distribution-ready upon CAOCL's initiative for release. CAOCL also has the option to edit the parent PPT to keep the information relevant and increase substance where it deems necessary. Additionally, the *Commander's Portal* can be used as a blueprint for a future website that could empower Commanders, their Marines, and CAOCL's mission to support them.

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IV. RCLF OPTIMIZATION TOOL

A. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

1. Purpose

CAOCL assigns all students graduating from The Basic School (TBS) and Sergeant's Course a region for which they will be responsible throughout their careers. These Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization (RCLF) regions are part of every Marine's Professional Military Education (PME) requirements for grade and require more than 100 hours of online culture and language training. The purpose of the RCLF program is to ensure that there is a robust cadre of Marines at every rank that have some basic cultural and linguistic background that Commanders can call upon when faced with impending operations in those regions. Ideally, the program would encourage interest and buy-in of LREC concepts throughout the Marine Corps. However, because Marines have no input into the assignment of RCLF regions, nor does the Marine Corps already have information about the LREC backgrounds of these Marines, either CAOCL or TBS Company Commanders assign RCLF regions randomly. The process for Marines to change their RCLF regions is arduous and often impossible without convincing testimony such as proven language skills and travel background.[28]

Because of this random assignment of RCLF regions, many Marines do not feel a personal connection to their regions and do not understand the full intent of the RCLF program.[29] Often, the phrase "talent management" is used colloquially in the Marine Corps to refer to the issue of retaining the expertise that the Corps itself has imbued in its Marines. However, often overlooked is the aspect of talent management that seeks to understand and recognize the existing expertise and interests that the Marines have when they join the Marine Corps, and to capitalize on those. In order to address this lack of RCLF buy-in by the Marines and the lack of LREC background information available to CAOCL, I have

[28] Observations based on author's personal experiences.

[29] Unempirical observations by the author over the course of ten years of peer-to-peer conversation on the subject.

designed a survey that has two goals: The first part of the survey addresses the language and cultural backgrounds of young Marines as they rise into leadership positions. The second part of the survey feeds into a Linear Programming (LP) optimization model that automatically assigns RCLF regions to Marines based on professed interest and region availability dictated by CAOCL. The survey and optimization tool are designed for a graduating TBS class, but the code and model can easily be adapted to accommodate any other group of Marines graduating—from Sergeant's Course, for example—as CAOCL's needs dictate.

2. Survey

An example of the CAOCL *RCLF Region Preference Survey* is available in Appendix A. This survey consists of 18 questions that I designed to take each graduating member of a TBS class fewer than 10 minutes to complete. The survey uses existing LREC grading criteria to allow students to self-assess their language capabilities in multiple contexts. With a single Excel Online link, all students in a graduating TBS class can take the survey simultaneously and on their own computers, saving TBS Company Commanders the hassle of singularly administering a survey through another system. Once students hit the "submit" button at the end of the survey, their responses are recorded automatically on Excel Online where only the administrator has access to the data. This data is able to be sorted by each column (question) specifically, allowing ease of use for the CAOCL administrators.

The CAOCL administrator in charge of determining RCLF region assignment will have a macro-enabled version of the optimization tool I created for this thesis. With clear directions embedded in the product itself (as well as a how-to video linked to the main page), the CAOCL administrator need only copy and paste the worksheet of responses from Excel Online into the first tab of the optimization tool. After choosing the desired TBS class with an embedded drop-down menu and inputting the number of students from the class that need to fill CAOCL's desired constraints for each region, the CAOCL administrator clicks the "OPTIMIZE" button and the tool automatically assigns regions to the TBS students based on the officers' professed interest levels in each region.

In addition to the other biographical information, the survey asks the Marines to assign interest values (0 to 100) to the 17 RCLF regions based on the countries and languages they represent. Instead of merely ranking the RCLF regions, this system better accounts for the passion that Marines may have toward learning about specific areas of the world in which they may operate over the course of their careers.

3. Spreadsheet Modeling and Linear Programming Optimization

As the adage goes, along with death and taxes, one unavoidable part of life is resource constraints. Even without knowing they do so, everyone is constantly working to utilize limited resources to optimize outcomes. Examples range from coupon clipping to ride sharing to international economic agreements. With the evolution of spreadsheets, mathematical optimization has evolved to be a more accessible and automated means of optimizing many problems. All optimization problems share three common parts: decision variables, constraints, and an objective function. Linear programming (LP) is named thus because it "must be able to express all the functions in [the model] as some weighted sum (or linear combination) of the decision variables" (Ragsdale, 2007, p. 24). LP is one of the simplest forms of developing an optimization model.

In the case of this RCLF tool, I wanted to design an optimization tool that someone without LP background could easily use—a tool that was automated, had simple directions, and had as few steps as possible to execute the program and arrive at an optimized result. Using the visual basic for applications (VBA) system already part of Microsoft Excel allowed me to write code and create a macro that would automate the majority of the LP for the user. There were some challenges to building such a tool, particularly because the number of graduates in each TBS class (n) is different, so the number of variables that the system has to calculate changes.[30] Additionally, the constraints that CAOCL uses to define how many students may be assigned to each RCLF region change with each graduating TBS class. The program had to be flexible enough to take these variances into consideration.

[30] "n" is generally between 225-275 Marines graduating in a given TBS class.

Regarding the data itself, I would have no idea what combination of preference values the Marines would submit via their online surveys. I had to design a tool that could highlight just the necessary values from the survey results and import them into a format that the LP could understand and evaluate without time wasted with user inputs. This limitation narrowed the options that I had for how to develop the survey itself—I needed survey results that automatically arranged themselves in Excel format.

Therefore, I designed the LP optimization tool to take an unknown number of data points and maximize the sum of the preference values recorded by the survey. I intentionally designed the RCLF region survey to give Marines a scalable preference model from 0 to 100 instead of simply ranking the regions from 1 to 17. This flexibility gives Marines the option of having multiple variables without values and makes each data set unique. By summing the values the Marines assigned to the region that the LP model actually assigned to them, the model ensures that the region assignment distribution gives as many Marines their top choices as possible.

Because of the interplay between the total number of Marines and the number of RCLF regions, there are two dimensions to the problem. I assign i to the y-axis with the range $1 \rightarrow n$ and I assign j to the x-axis with the range $1 \rightarrow 17$ to capture the 17 RCLF regions available. The combination of i and j uniquely determine any preference data point. The preference values that the Marines input into the online survey represent P_{ij}. That preference value must be between 0 and 100. In order to reduce the possibility of inaccurate math by the Marines when summing their desire values to 100 ($\sum_j P_{ij} = 100$), I created a normalization table that took the survey values and ensured that the values used for the optimization represented the same percentage as each Marine's inputs.[31]

$$\hat{P}_{ij} = \frac{P_{ij}}{\sum_j P_{ij}} * 100$$

Additionally, the linear program had to be flexible enough to have changing constraints determined by CAOCL. Based on projections of future conflicts, CAOCL has

[31] If future versions of the surveys have the ability to check the Marines' math before they submit their preferences, then this step will be rendered obsolete.

assigned percentages of Marines that it deems appropriate to study the various regions.[32] Therefore, depending on retention and any potential changes, the number of slots for each region changes for each graduating TBS class. These constraints are designated by C_j.

The objective function is designed to maximize the sum of the preference values of those regions that the optimization tool actually chooses for the Marines. Therefore, I added a binary assignment in a separate table to represent the region assigned (X_{ij}). With this binary variable, the objective function will only include the preference values for regions that were assigned by multiplying each value assignment by either 1 or 0 and summing those values.

$i = 1 \rightarrow n$	n = Tot. # of Marines
$j = 1 \rightarrow 17$	RCLF Regions
$\hat{P}_{ij} = Marines' \ preference \ for$ "j"	$0 \leq \hat{P}_{ij} \leq 100$
$C_j = Capacity \ for$ "j"	Assigned by CAOCL
$X_{ij} = Binary \ assignment \ of \ Marines \ to \ region \ j \ \{1, 0\}$	1 = Assigned region

Objective function:

$$MAXIMIZE: \sum_i \sum_j \hat{P}_{ij} * X_{ij}$$

Subject to:

$$\sum_j X_{ij} \ \leq \ C_j \ \forall \ j$$
$$\sum_i X_{ij} \ = 1 \ \forall \ i$$

There are two sets of constraints for this function. The first set of constraints is that the sum of all of the binary region assignments must be less than or equal to the value that

[32] See page 18 of *Supplement 1: Commander's Portal* of this thesis for CAOCL's current distribution of RCLF region service-wide distribution by percentage.

CAOCL assigned to that region as its placement cap. The second set of constraints is that each Marine must be assigned one, and only one, region.

Using the Solver add-in in Microsoft Excel, I create a *sumproduct* between the $\hat{P}_{ij}$ range and the X_{ij} range. The resultant "max value" (see Figure 25) is $\sum_j \hat{P}_{ij}$ and the "percent optimized" is $\frac{\sum_j \hat{P}_{ij}/n}{100}$. Based on the capacity available for the different RCLF regions, the Optimization Tool will assign regions based off of $\hat{P}_{ij}$. Therefore, a higher max value and a percent optimized value demonstrate both that a higher percentage of Marines got choices for which they had a higher preference and that those Marines had differentiated preferences in the first place.[33] A Marine who had no preference for a region would theoretically value all of the regions equally, or have a smaller spread between the values he/she assigns to the regions.



Figure 25. Example RCLF Region LP Optimization Tool results

B. RESULTS

The LP RCLF Optimization Tool is Supplemental 2 of this thesis. The Tool enables CAOCL representatives to easily see what Marines were assigned what region based on

[33] This value is an average of the values the student assigned to the region they ended up being assigned. It is also an indicator of how determined students are to get their desired regions (i.e. a measure of passion toward chosen regions). Therefore, the higher the number the better, but it does not mean that there was an XX% success rate. For example, if one student's first choice was rated a 60 and another's was rated a 40, and they each got their first choice, the "Max Value" would be 100 and the "Percent Optimized" value would be 50 between the two students.

their interests and considering the constraints imposed by CAOCL's region availability for that graduation TBS class. The primary "Optimization Tool" tab is the user's interface complete with step-by-step directions and all of the resultant information on a single platform (see Figure 26). I include an embedded video on the primary tab as well. The video is a little longer than six minutes and it and walks the user through each step with an active example.



Figure 26. CAOCL RCLF LP Optimization Tool: Primary user tab

Steps One through Four of the Optimization Tool outline how a CAOCL user should proceed with the optimization. Step one requires the user to clarify in the Online Excel results page what graduating year and Company the data is meant to reflect. Then, the user copies and pastes the entire sheet of cleaned data from the Excel Online results into the first tab in the LP optimization workbook— "RCLF Survey Results." Step Two requires the user to input CAOCL's constraints for how many education slots for each region are available for this graduating TBS class. The user must input these values into the green cells available and ensure that they sum to a total greater than or equal to the number of students in the graduating class. Step Three runs the LP optimization, and Step Four clears the data so that the user can start back at Step One with a clear workbook.

After Step Three, the user can see how many students have been assigned to each region in comparison to how many slots were available. The user can also see the

percentage of students in the graduating class that were assigned their first, second, third, and less-than-third choices. Because this optimization model seeks to maximize the *sumproduct* of the values provided by the students, the resultant figure in the "Max Value" cell shows the sum of all of the student-assigned values associated with the resulting regions actually assigned to the students. The "Percent Optimized" value takes the Max Value and divides it by the number of students in the class (*n*). It then again divides that value by 100 to present the resultant value as a percent. This value is an average of the values the students assigned to the region they ended up being assigned. It is also an indicator of how determined students are to get their desired regions (i.e. a measure of passion or interest toward the chosen regions).[34]

The "Final Roster" tab displays a roster of the students with their assigned regions and their ranking of that assigned region compared to their other preferences (see Figure 27). This roster is built to both be sortable from each column header (e.g. alphabetically, by region, etc.), but the user can also copy and paste this information into any other resource he/she may be using to track RCLF regions. Additionally, the region assignments being associated with an Electronic Data Interchange Personal Identifier (EDIPI) allows users who have other meta-data on the Marines to merge the two data sets into a more comprehensive worksheet.

[34] Therefore, the higher the number the better, but it does not mean that there was an XX% success rate. For example, if one student's first choice was rated a 60 and another's was rated a 40, and they each got their first choice, the "Max Value" would be 100 and the "Percent Optimized" value would be 50 between the two students.

Final roster of RCLF Region assignments for TBS class:		2013	Fox
Name, First, M.	EDIPI	Region Assigned	Choice
Allen, Stacy H.	1334365152	(7) WEST SOUTH ASIA	1
Barrett, Stephen G.	123432083	(5) THE LEVANT	1
Barrion, Tyler T.	112732544	(15) SOUTHEAST ASIA	1
Stanley, Ginnifer V.	1334567589	(1) TRANSCAUCUS	3
Thomson, Catherine L.	1234915164	(2) CENTRAL ASIA	1
Classmate, Super D.	1231243456	(3) THE BALKANS	2
Tarbox, Alissa T.	1234567890	(10) THE SAHEL	3

Figure 27. "Final Roster" tab example with RCLF region assignments

There is a "Troubleshooting" tab available to aid the user as well. The steps to troubleshoot the optimization model are simple, first requiring the user to engage the Solver add-in in both Excel and VBA to ensure that the version of Excel on which the user is operating the model can run the optimization macro. The simplest troubleshooting method I recommend is to close and re-open a clean version of the tool. This will automatically stop running any VBA code on which the program seems to be stuck. Third, I embedded a how-to video that walks the user through how to break the code and run the optimization from the "LP Innards" tab as a last resort. Other than executing this troubleshooting step, there is no reason that users should need to open the "LP Innards" tab. Changing anything on the "LP Innards" tab could compromise the ability of the optimization tool to function.

C. IMPLEMENTATION AND GOALS

Future iterations of the *RCLF Region Preference Survey* should be optimized in a more conducive and secure online survey platform that can export the data to an Excel spreadsheet. Any changes in question numbering or data gathering could potentially change the necessary VBA code within the LP optimization. This issue is not insurmountable, but the CAOCL operators should be aware that any changes in the survey platform will necessitate some minor changes to the LP model itself.

The *RCLF Region Preference Survey* and *RCLF Optimization Tool* are both ready for CAOCL to implement at its discretion. The survey has the potential to provide not only CAOCL, but the Marine Corps, some invaluable data about the existing talent and expertise that Marines bring to the service when they join. Additionally, the survey not only

highlights self-professed language skills, but unlike a DD-1966 or the MOL Self-Professed Language tool, it asks the Marines to self-assess their abilities on the established ILR scale. This self-assessment will help CAOCL identify Marines to encourage to take the DLPT in order to substantiate their language abilities so that can potentially assist the Marine Corps in its LREC mission in the future. While the survey focuses on the Marines themselves, it also asks about Marine spouses and their cultural and linguistic backgrounds. I posit that many Marines who marry people of different heritage will have a keener interest in those regions and languages, and will have an advantage because of the cultural translators that they have in their own homes.

The *RCLF Optimization Tool* is a product that both streamlines CAOCL's time and effort spent on assigning regions, but also potentially increases the intangible buy-in of Marines themselves who feel that the organization respects their preferences. The optimization tool is also easily adaptable to new survey programs, survey formulas, or other changes to the system over time.

V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

A. SUMMARY

Chapter I of this thesis outlined the primary research question: How can the Marine Corps systematically track LREC concepts to meet operational capability requirements? I first identify seven gaps surrounding this question and address five of those gaps in chapters III and IV. Throughout the thesis, I refer to the DACLO Loop as a roadmap to understanding how doctrinal requirements are translated into the academic concepts that drive CAOCL programs to provide those LREC elements. Defining the link between those elements and operational capabilities is the SC/LREC T&R Manual.

Chapter II reviews the literature on the role of cultural competency in war, the dynamics between anthropology and the military, Net Assessment and its role at the national strategic level, established LREC policies and directives, previous assessments of the LREC program and their findings, and on-going CAOCL initiatives. This chapter sets the stage for a discussion on the importance of cultural and linguistic expertise on the battlefield.

Chapter III introduces and outlines the *Commander's Portal* and the *LREC Capabilities Map*, a 130-page, interactive product that is Supplemental 1 of this thesis. I designed this tool to offer Commanders at all levels a system to understand the Marine Corps' LREC system and how to most efficiently incorporate the academic concepts, CAOCL programs, and LREC concepts into their pre-deployment training plans. I posit that effective use of this tool will increase operational success on the battlefield.

Chapter IV focuses on this thesis's secondary question: How can CAOCL better identify the latent language and cultural capabilities that exist Marine Corps-wide in order to leverage existing knowledge and skills to optimize LREC training and education? This chapter offers CAOCL a survey designed to collect information on Marines' existing LREC expertise and interests. Additionally, the survey asks about Marines' spouses and their LREC backgrounds as well as collects the data on interest levels in the 17 RCLF

regions that feeds a linear programming *RCLF Optimization Tool*. I built the optimization tool—Supplement 2 of this thesis—to aid CAOCL in assigning RCLF regions to Marines graduating from TBS based on actual interest values provided by the Marines themselves, thereby saving CAOCL time and encouraging buy-in to the RCLF program.

I built the products presented in this thesis to give commanders and CAOCL user-friendly tools to access and optimize LREC information in order to broaden understanding and use of existing expertise at all Marine ranks. These tool focus on talent management from a new perspective.

B. IMMEDIATE RECOMMENDATIONS

- The quantity and quality of CAOCL-administered training during Commander's Course ebbs and flows. I recommend making training regarding how commanders can best utilize the Commander's Portal, or most importantly, the information therein, a mandatory and consistent part of Commander's Course for all operational leaders. For example, steps as simple as knowing that CAOCL can provide training for Green Cell leaders for OPTs can drastically change the perspectives of all ranks of Marines toward Civil-Military relations.

- I recommend that the *RCLF Region Preference Survey* be implemented at CAOCL's earliest convenience to begin collecting invaluable data on Marines' existing LREC experiences, expertise, and interests. Additionally, using the survey data to optimize RCLF region assignments will create buy-in to the RCLF program and save both CAOCL and TBS Company Commanders time and energy.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

I was unable to address all of the gaps initially outlined in part I.B.1 of this thesis. I recommend investigating those gaps as well as addressing the following topics:

1. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Optimizing the Experienced Track FAO and RAO Option

The Experienced Track FAO and RAO (and FAS and RAS) option is potentially underutilized, either because qualified Marines are unaware of the program or because they are uninformed about what applying for the program would mean for their careers. Though the MARADMINS listing the accepted applicants are published quarterly, the MARADMINS themselves contain little information on the program and, other than an example application, MCO 1520.11F does not answer many inherent questions about the FAO/RAO/FAS/RAS MOSs. Conducting a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of the Marine Corps engaging more uniquely qualified Marines instead of training unqualified Marines from bottom up could be an enlightening find for the future of the FAO/RAO program. Sending Marines to NPS, DLI, and on immersion tours is expensive, especially when there are Marines already serving that have language abilities, have lived abroad, and/or already have Master's degrees. Another avenue for this CBA would be to calculate each of the three educational parts separately and financially entertain the possibility of sending Marines who are qualified in one or two parts already on an abbreviated educational path to fill the gaps to make them FAOs or RAOs.

2. Cost-Benefit Analysis of DLPT Incentivization Tables to Balance FLPB Cost with Talent Management Opportunity Benefits

I found throughout my work on this thesis that there is a palpable desire for this research. The Marine Corps Foreign Language Program Manager in the HQMC Intelligence Department expressed to me personally how vital and relevant a research project on this topic would be. Originally intended to be a section of this thesis, I found throughout the course of my research, however, that the majority of the existing data and relevant MARADMINS are For Official Use Only (FOUO). Any researcher endeavoring to undertake this project must be willing to write an FOUO thesis.

I had intended to use a time-series regression model to answer the following questions:

- Is there a change in DLPT testing rates in the year following an announcement of a FLPB change with stronger monetary incentives? Is there a decrease in testing rates when the FLPB funding decreases? (If so, perhaps offering FLPB pay based on individual modules would entice more Marines to take the DLPT, affording the Marine Corps deeper knowledge of its existing talent and expertise.)

- Do Marines who fall below a two (score) threshold (having once received a two in the category) decrease in their probability of taking the DLPT the following year? (Marines who do not keep up with their language abilities or with taking DLPTs degrade the Marine Corps' knowledge of its latent talent and expertise.)

- What is the percentage of completely lopsided scores indicating an ability to speak the language but no ability to read it? (This information could indicate first- or second-generation American Marines who have a living connection to other languages and cultures. How much money would it save the Marine Corps to teach someone to write Korean who already spoke it fluently and grew up with Korean traditions at home, for example?)

- What percentage take the OPI? Are they primarily taking OPIs for a specific language or are they primarily DLI graduates? (The OPI costs about $1000 to administer, so the Marine Corps is loath to just have Marines take it unless they have proven through the DLPT that they have a language ability. However, there are languages for which there is no established DLPT—is the Marine Corps missing out on registering existing talent because Marines who speak these languages do not know that an OPI is a viable option?)

Applicable FOUO data is available from the Foreign Language Program Manager and unclassified data is available from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).

However, potential researchers should be wary that the translations of DLPT data until it reaches the DMDC loses the DLPT scores for anyone other than DLI graduates. Therefore, I recommend pursuing the FOUO data from HQMC Intelligence.

This project could potentially directly and tangibly affect not only FLPB pay but also change the way that the Marine Corps manages its existing language talent.

3. Design a Marine Corps-specific Foreign Area Officer / Regional Area Officer accredited course in the National Security Affairs department at the Naval Postgraduate School

Currently, there is a week-long required course for all FAOs and RAOs (of all services) during the summer thesis and research week at NPS. Common (unempirical) concerns regarding the content of the course include 1) very few Marine-specific lectures; 2) very little information about the requirements and expectations of FAOs and RAOs once they are executing their utilization tours; 3) the course is more focused on families and their concerns living abroad than the actual job requirements of being a FAO/RAO. Additionally, once assigned a course of study at NPS, students rarely deviate from that specific region. A gap lies between the LREC expertise that FAOs and RAOs are expected to have at the completion of their studies and the LREC general information that they will be expected to understand and teach their Marines in the Fleet.

A beneficial research project would be to conduct a formal survey of Marine students who have completed the course to analyze the feedback of the course and compare that information to a formal survey of Marines completing their FAO/RAO utilization tours in the Fleet. Use the resultant information provided by the second study group to design an accredited National Security Affairs (NSA) course at NPS that is focused more on culture general and socio-anthropological expertise while providing NPS students the teaching tools they will need to identify and fill LREC gaps in their Fleet units. Beneficial resources for culture general concepts and expectations in the Marine Corps are CAOCL's *Culture General Guidebook for Military Professionals* (Fosher et al., 2007) and *Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications* (Salmoni and Holmes-Eber, 2011).

4. Develop CAOCL briefs and support for Information Operations (IO) / Civil-Military Affairs (CMA) / Green Cell planning for specific CDET scenarios

In order to optimize scenario training and increase exposure to civil-military considerations, effective information operations and stability operations, and green cell responsibilities, Marine Corps University (MCU) College of Distance Education and Training (CDET) should partner with CAOCL to have appropriate regional and culture briefings available that fit the scenarios. Having CAOCL play a tangible role in the planning process could help leaders fulfil LREC T&R codes LREC-PLAN-2001 and LREC-PLAN-2002 and associated higher-level codes. Introducing leaders, commanders, and planners to the capabilities and expertise that CAOCL has to offer early in their careers will inculcate a new standard of expectation for LREC planning integration.

5. Analysis of the *RCLF Region Preference Survey*

The *RCLF Region Preference Survey* designed in this thesis includes questions not only about Marines and their language ability, experiences abroad, and regional interests, but about their spouses as well. After several TBS classes have completed the survey and CAOCL has used the results to optimize RCLF region assignments, a detailed analysis of its effectiveness would be beneficial. This analysis could include an investigation of the untapped LREC expertise of Marines who have self-professed language skills but have not taken the DLPT and/or a cost-benefit analysis of a) incentivizing these Marines to take the DLPT even if they do not self-profess above a 2/2, and b) incentivizing them to apply for the Experience Track FAO/RAO (or FAS/RAS) programs. This analysis would be timely and tangibly applicable to the talent management discussion.

6. Develop a Robust Post-Deployment Feedback System for CAOCL

As outlined in section III.A.8 of this thesis and in RAND's 2012 *Assessment of the Ability of the U.S. Department of Defense and the Services to Measure and Track Language and Culture Training and Capabilities among General Purpose Forces*, a more robust system for LREC-specific after-action reports (AARs) is necessary. CAOCL could benefit from a system that recorded feedback regarding their education and training efforts after a

full deployment as opposed to just after the training itself, or relying on the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL). In 2009, Holmes-Eber et al. published a book through CAOCL that offered chapters written by Marines for Marines about experiences they had in Iraq and Afghanistan that required LREC expertise. *Applications in operational culture: Perspectives from the field* would be a good place to start for ideas about how to solicit, categorize, analyze, and disseminate similar information, but geared toward CAOCL in order to allow the organization to continue to tailor its initiatives toward operational success.

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APPENDIX A. RCLF DIAGNOSTIC SURVEY QUESTIONS

CAOCL RCLF Region Preference Survey

This 10-min survey catalogs your language and cultural expertise, and gives you a vote in your future RCLF region assignment.

1. Name

Format: Last, First M.

2. EDIPI

Type in your EDIPI in the space provided below:

3. TBS Class -- YEAR

.....3(a).. TBS Class - COMPANY

4. Are you a Naturalized US Citizen?

No

.....4(a). Country of Birth

If United States, type "United States."

5. Spouse: Country of Citizenship

If not married, type "N/A."

.....5(a). Spouse: Country of Birth

If not married, type "N/A."

6. First Language

What is your "mother tongue?" If OTHER, designate the language in the next box.

▼

.....6(a). First Language if "OTHER"

Only fill in this box if your native language was not listed in the previous question.

7. Spouse: First Language

Choose from the drop-down menu. If the "OTHER," designate the language in the next box.

▼

.....7(a). Spouse: First Language if "OTHER"

Only fill in this box if your spouse's native language was not listed in the previous question.

8. Primary Language Spoken at Home

What is the primary language you speak with your family?

.....8(a). How would you rate your READING COMPREHENSION of this language?

▼

.....8(b). How would you rate your LISTENING COMPREHENSION of this language?

▼

.....8(c). How would you rate your SPEAKING ABILITY of this language?

▼

9. Secondary Language Spoken at Home

What is the secondary language spoken in your family? (Skip to question #11 if not applicable.)

.....9(a). How would you rate your READING COMPREHENSION of this language?

.....9(b). How would you rate your LISTENING COMPREHENSION of this language?

.....9(c). How would you rate your SPEAKING ABILITY in this language?

10. Tertiary Language Spoken at Home

What is the tertiary language spoken in your family? (Skip to question #11 if not applicable.)

.....10(a). How would you rate your READING COMPREHENSION of this language?

.....10(b). How would you rate your LISTENING COMPREHENSION of this language?

.....10(c). How would you rate your SPEAKING ABILITY in this language?

11. Have you lived "on the economy" (e.g. not on a military base) for more than 6 months in a foreign country?

This includes study abroad programs and other extended foreign travel.

No

.....11(a). If you have lived in a foreign country (on the economy), in what countries have you lived?

Separate the countries with commas (e.g. "Canada, Zimbabwe, Chile")

12. Have you ever studied a foreign language?

This includes any capacity from an app on your phone to the Defense Language Institute (DLI) to living abroad. (If no, skip down to question #15.)

No ▼

.....12(a). If yes, what language? (First language of study)

Use the drop-down menu to highlight your language of study. If "OTHER," fill in the blank in the next question.

▼

.....12(b). If studied language was "OTHER," fill in the language below:

.....12(c). How would you rate your READING COMPREHENSION of this language?

▼

.....12(d). How would you rate your LISTENING COMPREHENSION of this language?

▼

.....12(e). How would you rate your SPEAKING ABILITY in this language?

▼

.....12(f). Have you taken the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) for this language?

No ▼

.....12(g). Do you have any sort of degree or certificate for this language study?

▼

13. Have you studied a second foreign language?

If no, skip down to question #15.

No ▼

....13(a). If yes, what language? (Second language of study)

▼

.....13(b). If (second) language studied was "OTHER," fill in the language below:

.....13(c). How would you rate your READING COMPREHENSION of this language?

....13(d). How would you rate your LISTENING COMPREHENSION of this language?

.....13(e). How would you rate your SPEAKING ABILITY in this language?

.....13(f). Have you taken the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) for this language?

No

.....13(g). Do you have any sort of degree or certificate for this language of study?

14. If you have studied additional languages, please outline them and your self-assessed ability levels in the space provided below:

15. Have you taken the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB)?

No

16. Even if you do not already speak a language other than English, what is your interest level in foreign languages?

10 = very interested
1 = not interested at all

17. Even if you have not already lived abroad, what is your interest in foreign travel and culture?

10 = very interested
1 = not interested at all

▼

18. Fill in the percentage of your interest in each of the given regions. All values for the next 17 responses must sum to "100," but you are not limited in how you distribute your values. Enter a "0" to show no interest.

... (1) TRANSCAUCUS

LANGUAGES: Russian, Turkish
COUNTRIES: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey

For example, if you are solely interested in the Balkans, you can put "100" in the box. However, there is no guarantee that you will be assigned the Balkans. We recommend that you assign percentages to your top 3-5 choices and break out your preferences therein (e.g. Balkans - "55" / North Africa - "25"/ South Asia - "15" / South America - "5"/ others - "0").

Some countries are listed in multiple regions. This is due to the complex nature of geopolitics and international relations.

... (2) CENTRAL ASIA

LANGUAGES: Russian
COUNTRIES: Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

... (3) THE BALKANS

LANGUAGES: Russian
COUNTRIES: Albania
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Turkey

... (4) NORTH AFRICA

LANGUAGES: Arabic, French
COUNTRIES: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Western Sahara

... (5) THE LEVANT

LANGUAGES: Arabic
COUNTRIES: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey

... (6) ARABIAN PENINSULA / GULF

LANGUAGES: Farsi
COUNTRIES: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen

... (7) WEST SOUTH ASIA

LANGUAGES: Dari, Farsi, Pashto, Urdu
COUNTRIES: Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan

... (8) SOUTH ASIA

LANGUAGES: Urdu (Hindi)
COUNTRIES: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka

... (9) WEST AFRICA

LANGUAGES: French
COUNTRIES: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Togo

... (10) THE SAHEL

LANGUAGES: French
COUNTRIES: Chad, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan

... (11) EAST AFRICA

LANGUAGES: Arabic
COUNTRIES: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda

... (12) CENTRAL AFRICA

LANGUAGES: French, Swahili
COUNTRIES: Burundi, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda

... (13) SOUTHERN AFRICA

LANGUAGES: Portuguese, French
COUNTRIES: Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Glorioso Islands, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mozambique, Namibia, Reunion, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Zimbabwe

... (14) NORTHEAST ASIA

LANGUAGES: Chinese, Korean
COUNTRIES: China, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan

... (15) SOUTHEAST ASIA

LANGUAGES: Indonesian, Tagalog, Thai, Chinese
COUNTRIES: Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam

... (16) CENTRAL AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN

LANGUAGES: Spanish, French
COUNTRIES: Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Puerto Rico, The Bahamas

... (17) SOUTH AMERICA

LANGUAGES: Spanish, Portuguese
COUNTRIES: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Falkland Islands, French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela

19. Thank you for completing this questionnaire. We hope that it will help manage the talent that exists in our diverse Marine Corps and to allow you a vote in your RCLF region of study.

If you have any additional thoughts or comments, please leave them in the textbox below:

APPENDIX B. UPDATED CAOCL TRAINING SUPPORT REQUEST

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
EDUCATION COMMAND
CENTER FOR ADVANCED OPERATIONAL CULTURE LEARNING
2076 SOUTH STREET
QUANTICO, VA

Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture Training Request Form v20180419-1205r1m

Today's Date			
Unit Requesting Support			
Unit Commander			
Unit Primary POC Rank Name | Email			
Unit POC | Commercial/DSN | Mobile			

The unit requesting training is responsible for coordinating an appropriate training venue. Training is obtained through Task Orders on a contract. Requirements must be submitted no later than 45 days prior to the first day of the training month (e.g. NLT 15 APRIL for training on any date in JUNE). I understand that this request for training incurs a cost to the U.S. Government once a Task Order is awarded and that any gross underutilization may result in an investigation due to waste. [Waste is the extravagant, careless, or needless expenditure of government funds, or the consumption of government property that results from deficient practices, systems, controls, or decisions. The term also includes improper practices not involving prosecutable fraud.] This request may only be signed by uniformed personnel in an active status or federal employees. Contractors are prohibited by law from requesting this training.

I have read and understand the above statements and I am authorized to request this training by my Commanding Officer.

Printed Rank Last Name, First Name MI	
Signature and date (Double-click on the "X" to the right. It will open up a signature box. Type your name on the line and ensure your credentials are accurate the bottom. Click "sign.")	X

Example:

Help us help you determine what training you will need by selecting the appropriate COCOM, Region, and Country from the following dropdown menus. Please fill out the full row for each country:

COCOM		Region		Country	
COCOM		Region		Country	
COCOM		Region		Country	
COCOM		Region		Country	
COCOM		Region		Country	
COCOM		Region		Country	

Use the drop-down menus to the left to identify your target countries.

Briefly describe your unit's size and mission in the AOR in the space provided below:

CULTURE TRAINING REQUIREMENT

Class	Number of Students	Class Dates	Training Location	Notes

CAOCL can tailor training specifically to your unit, mission, and needs.
There are not specific classes to choose from; simply describe what you want.
e.g. Clan relationships
Socio-economic trends
Political trends
External organizations

LANGUAGE TRAINING REQUIREMENT

Class	Number of Students	Class Dates	Training Location	Notes

e.g. Gate-guard necessities
How to work with a translator
Customs and greetings

LREC SME TRAINING REQUIREMENT

Event	Number of SMEs	Dates	Training Location	Notes

e.g. S-2 Country Dynamics
FAO/RAO Update

In the "notes" section, please specify desired classification level and how long you expect the course to last.

Amplifying Remarks:

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SUPPLEMENTAL 1. COMMANDER'S PORTAL

This supplemental to this thesis contains the *Commander's Portal* – a 130-page, interactive document designed to give unit Commanders at all levels immediate and congruous access to the LREC system. Hyperlinked both internally and directly to all external sources, the *Portal* offers access to and explanation of LREC integration into pre-deployment requirements; links to relevant publications, resources, and MARADMINs; RCLF information; a Commander's CAOCL checklist; links to the Commander's LREC tracking tools; the LREC Capabilities Map; and the Commander's Diagnostic Tool.

As a PDF, the *Commander's Portal* is distribution-ready upon CAOCL's initiative for release. CAOCL also has the option to edit the parent PPT to keep the information relevant and increase substance where it deems necessary. Additionally, the *Portal* can be used as a blueprint for a future website that could empower Commanders, their Marines, and CAOCL's mission to support them.

See Chapter III of this thesis for more information on the *Commander's Portal*.

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SUPPLEMENTAL 2. RCLF OPTIMIZATION TOOL

This supplemental to this thesis contains a linear programming *RCLF Optimization Tool* designed to utilize the preference information declared by TBS graduates through the Survey in Appendix A. The *RCLF Region Preference Survey* and *RCLF Optimization Tool* are both ready for CAOCL to implement at its discretion. The survey has the potential to provide not only CAOCL, but the Marine Corps, some invaluable data about the existing talent and expertise that Marines bring to the service when they join. The *Tool* streamlines the RCLF region assignment process and ensures improved LREC talent management.

When opening the *Tool* on a new computer, users should click "Enable editing" on the banner at the top of the screen, followed by "Enable macros." If users encounter any further issues with the function of the tool, see the "Troubleshooting" tab at the bottom of the document for further instructions.

See Chapter IV of this thesis for more information on the *RCLF Optimization Tool*.

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