INCREASED MARITIME COOPERATION: INDIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

by

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# Increased Maritime Cooperation: India and Southeast Asia

India’s primary method for security cooperation in Southeast Asia is through maritime engagement, predominantly through naval exercises, port visits, and capacity development with partner navies. This thesis examined why and how this maritime cooperation has increased since the implementation of the Act East Policy. The research used two approaches to identify and understand India’s maritime engagement. First, a quantitative approach measured naval exercises and port visits from 2013 to 2018 and found that India has increased its maritime cooperation with Myanmar and Indonesia, which implies India’s interests in border security. It also revealed India’s lack of engagement with South China Sea claimant states, which suggests risk aversion to China. Second, the researcher used a framework to measure the scope and depth of maritime cooperation between India and Southeast Asian countries to explore India’s maritime engagement from 2015 to the end of 2018. Findings reveal an increase in both maritime security and capacity development initiatives between India and Indonesia, Myanmar, Singapore, and Vietnam. Both frameworks illustrate India’s increased maritime engagement in Southeast Asia, and show that the reasons for the increased cooperation are the desire of Southeast Asian countries for capacity development and India’s economic motivations since 2015.
ABSTRACT

India’s primary method for security cooperation in Southeast Asia is through maritime engagement, predominantly through naval exercises, port visits, and capacity development with partner navies. This thesis examined why and how this maritime cooperation has increased since the implementation of the Act East Policy. The research used two approaches to identify and understand India’s maritime engagement. First, a quantitative approach measured naval exercises and port visits from 2013 to 2018 and found that India has increased its maritime cooperation with Myanmar and Indonesia, which implies India’s interests in border security. It also revealed India’s lack of engagement with South China Sea claimant states, which suggests risk aversion to China. Second, the researcher used a framework to measure the scope and depth of maritime cooperation between India and Southeast Asian countries to explore India’s maritime engagement from 2015 to the end of 2018. Findings reveal an increase in both maritime security and capacity development initiatives between India and Indonesia, Myanmar, Singapore, and Vietnam. Both frameworks illustrate India’s increased maritime engagement in Southeast Asia, and show that the reasons for the increased cooperation are the desire of Southeast Asian countries for capacity development and India’s economic motivations since 2015.
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<thead>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADMM</td>
<td>ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMM+</td>
<td>ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEP</td>
<td>Act East Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF ISM</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum inter-sessional meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>anti-submarine warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBMs</td>
<td>confidence-building measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORPAT</td>
<td>coordinated patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DiREx</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>fast attack craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-FDTL</td>
<td>Timor-Leste Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HADR</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance/disaster relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTMS</td>
<td>His Thai Majesty’s Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICGS</td>
<td>Indian Coast Guard Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFR</td>
<td>International Fleet Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMCOR</td>
<td>Indian-Myanmar Coordinated Patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMDEX</td>
<td>International Maritime Conference and Exhibition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IND-INDO CORPAT</td>
<td>Indian-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDO-THAI CORPAT</td>
<td>Indian-Thailand Coordinated Patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INS</td>
<td>Indian Naval Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMNEX</td>
<td>India-Myanmar Naval Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMBL</td>
<td>international maritime boundary line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRI</td>
<td>Kapal perang Republik Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MN</td>
<td>Myanmar navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>memorandum of understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASSEX</td>
<td>passage exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMC</td>
<td>Post Ministerial Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ReCAAP</td>
<td>Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSN</td>
<td>Republic of Singapore Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>Royal Singapore Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTN</td>
<td>Royal Thai Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMBEX</td>
<td>Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOC</td>
<td>sea lanes of communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STS</td>
<td>Sail Training Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMS</td>
<td>Union of Myanmar Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Finally, I would like to thank my husband, Ron Appelhans. Thank you for your unwavering support of my graduate studies and for reminding me continuously that I have what it takes to complete this thesis.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

In recent years, Indian maritime cooperation with Southeast Asian countries appears to have grown sharply. In Prime Minister Modi’s “Act East” Policy (AEP), the maritime component focusing on increased engagement in the Asia-Pacific region includes port visits, increased deployments, and maritime capacity building programs.\(^1\) Furthermore, through large-scale multilateral exercises, such as MILAN, to high-end bilateral naval exercises, such as the Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX), India’s maritime engagement with Southeast Asian countries exemplifies its strategy for further integration in the Asia-Pacific region.\(^2\)

This thesis compiles data on Indian maritime cooperation with Southeast Asian countries, identifies patterns in maritime activities and other examples of defense cooperation, and explains those patterns. The main question this thesis answers is, why has Indian security cooperation with certain Southeast Asian countries grown considerably during the last several years?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

This research is significant in three ways. First, this study aids in detailing the scope and depth of India’s security relationships with the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) and individual countries of Southeast Asia during the time since the AEP’s implementation. Second, this research contributes to understanding Indian and Southeast Asian countries’ motivations and implications for increased maritime cooperation. Third, this research is important for the U.S. strategies for the Indo-Pacific. Over the last several years, India has become a focal point in U.S. strategy. For the first time, the United States

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\(^2\) Singh, 3.
named the Indo-Pacific as a regional area of concern and ranked it above all other regions in the 2017 *National Security Strategy*.\(^3\) Washington views New Delhi as a fulcrum for providing regional security and with assisting to counterbalance China due to India’s naval capabilities and its proximity to Southeast Asia.\(^4\)

### C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature pertinent to this thesis is divided into three parts. The first part establishes a consensus in the literature that maritime security cooperation between India and countries of Southeast Asia has increased over the past several years. The second part examines India’s motivations for increased maritime cooperation with Southeast Asia. The third and final part examines the motivations of countries of Southeast Asia for increased maritime cooperation with India.

1. Increased Maritime Cooperation between India and Southeast Asia

In support of the aims of this thesis, this research includes an examination of the growth in maritime cooperation between India and Southeast Asia over the last several years along with an analysis of the different activities for maritime cooperation. It also creates a time frame to aid in an analysis of the growth in maritime cooperation between India and Southeast Asia. First, according to India’s maritime doctrine, maritime cooperative activities include “port visits, bilateral interactions, training initiatives, operational exercises, and technical support arrangements.”\(^5\) Second, as the AEP represents an important foreign policy instrument for India’s deepened endeavors with Southeast Asian countries, it is important to focus on the time frame surrounding the implementation when measuring growth. For that reason, this thesis used the time frame

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from one year prior to the AEP announcement in 2013 to the end of the calendar year of 2018 for measuring the growth regarding maritime cooperation. With regard this time frame, there is a broad consensus among scholars that maritime cooperation between India and Southeast Asia has grown over the last several years. Table 1 substantiates India’s growing maritime presence and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific regions. The four countries India visited in 2013 were all to Southeast Asian countries.\(^6\) India visited seven Southeast Asian countries in 2015 and 2016, and nine Southeast Asian countries in 2017.\(^7\)

### Table 1. Indian Navy Deployments to Asia Pacific Countries from 2013–2017\(^8\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Deployments</th>
<th>No. of Asia-Pacific Countries Visited</th>
<th>No. of Ships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

India’s bilateral relations with Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia best illustrate India and countries of Southeast Asia’s growing maritime cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Harsh V. Pant and Abhijit Singh agree that maritime cooperation between India

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\(^8\) Adapted from Singh, *Nautical Dimension*. 

3
and Vietnam is a focal area of their overall security partnership. Since 2013, India has increased its maritime ties with Vietnam. For example, in 2016, India offered a credit line of $500 million to Vietnam to modernize its frigates as well as to purchase approximately a dozen patrol boats. Also in 2016, the first round of Vietnamese submariners finished a long course in India in which sailors were trained to operate and maintain Vietnam’s procurement of six Kilo-class submarines. India is also predicted to sell BrahMos anti-ship cruise missiles to Vietnam in the near future, thereby drastically increasing Vietnam’s maritime defense capabilities. In return, Vietnam will permit India to have access to the port in Nha Trang, which is strategically significant owing to its proximity to the Cam Ranh Bay. Cam Ranh Bay is of strategic importance due to its deep waters and position between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.

Abhijit Singh states that because the SIMBEX represents the Indian navy’s most prolific naval engagement in Southeast Asia, India’s closest maritime partner is Singapore. India and Singapore consistently try to deepen their maritime ties by renewing agreements and expanding existent exercises. In 2017, the long-standing SIMBEX went beyond traditional antisubmarine exercises by including advanced exercises in air defense, live-firings, and other advanced naval warfare exercises. As of July 2018, Singapore and India have signed an additional bilateral logistics agreement,

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12 Pant, *India and Vietnam*.

13 Pant.


15 Singh, 6.
which allows India to use Changi Naval Base.\textsuperscript{16} This access increases India’s operational reach in Southeast Asia.

Utham Jamadhagni states, “India’s first-ever naval exercise outside the Commonwealth was with Indonesia.”\textsuperscript{17} Since 2002, India and Indonesia have conducted coordinated patrol exercises twice a year; in 2014, they began expanding the exercises to a more robust naval exercise and include other countries.\textsuperscript{18} In May 2018, Indonesia and India stepped up their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership wherein India agreed to develop Sabang, a western port in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{19}

India’s maritime cooperation with Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia indicates that cooperation between India and Southeast Asian countries is in fact growing. Although the scope and depth of maritime cooperation between India and each country varies, the trends in increased exercises, naval capacity building programs, and naval dialogues between India and Southeast Asia indicate that the maritime cooperation is on the rise.

2. India’s Motivations for Increased Maritime Cooperation

Most analysts believe that India’s increasing presence in Southeast Asia can be best explained by a combination of economic and strategic drivers. These two factors bolster India’s drive for increased engagement with the countries of Southeast Asia. This section is divided into two subsections. The first subsection discusses India’s economic motivations and how these motivations are related to maritime cooperation, and the second


\textsuperscript{19} Linda Yulisman, “Indonesia, India Agree to Step up Cooperation in Defence and Other Key Areas,” \textit{Straits Times}, June 1, 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-india-agree-to-step-up-cooperation-in-defence-and-other-key-areas.
subsection discusses India’s aspiration to expand its strategic role in Southeast Asia in the context of Sino-Indo rivalry.

**a. The Economic Dimension**

The importance of trade to India is evident, and it is directly tied to the maritime domain. According to the Indian Ministry of Shipping, “around 95% of India’s trading by volume and 70% by value is done through maritime transport.” Notably, 40 percent of that trade flows through the Strait of Malacca. Therefore, it is not surprising that India’s maritime doctrine heavily emphasizes trade. Its maritime doctrine attaches trade to safety and security of the international shipping lanes, sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), and exclusive economic zones. Because of Indian maritime doctrine’s explicit articulation concerning the importance of safeguarding India’s trade linkages, its motivations for increased maritime cooperation are undoubtedly reinforced.

Numerous authors, such as Arabinda Acharya, argue that nonconventional and conventional security threats in the Strait of Malacca drive greater demand for maritime security for India in Southeast Asia. India’s maritime doctrine strongly addresses terrorism and piracy threats in the Strait of Malacca. Any disruption in the Strait of Malacca would have detrimental ramifications not only to India but also of world shipping schedules. India generally exhibits sensitivity to the littoral states with claims in the Strait of Malacca when offering maritime security, and it is often requested to not interfere. Even so, by requesting to participate in joint exercises, India has consistently voiced its


22 Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), *Ensuring Secure Seas*.


24 Jamadhagni, “India-Southeast Asia Maritime Cooperation,” 266.

25 Jamadhagni, 273.
desire to have a role in securing the strait. Additionally, India’s push for a role in maritime security in the Strait of Malacca with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore demonstrates the importance it places on safeguarding trade.

Recent literature from several scholars have pointed out efforts of India and Southeast Asian countries toward developing “blue economy” cooperative partnerships separate from safeguarding their trade in the Strait of Malacca. The term blue economy does not have a universal definition but rather fits specific countries’ context. In the ASEAN-India context, for example, the goal of the blue economy is to strengthen collaboration to prevent illegal fishing, increase exchanges of technical data to improve maritime sustainability, enhance commerce and transportation, create jobs, and promote security. Over the last two years, India and ASEAN have held workshops on initiating this blue economy partnership. The 2018 blue economy workshop between India and ASEAN directly tied economics and maritime security in a singular framework for maritime cooperation. This development has already produced bilateral blue economy agreements and stands as a benign approach to enhancing maritime security.

b. The Strategic Dimension

David Brewster notes that Singapore and the United States are strong advocates for India taking on a greater role in balancing Southeast Asian countries against China. According to Brewster, despite pressures to take on this role, India has no clear strategy for assuming a balancing role other than deepening select military-to-military


28 VNA, “Second ASEAN-India Workshop.”

29 VNA.

relationships, specifically through expanding naval cooperation. Amitav Acharya also agrees that India’s balancing strategy is through increased cooperation. The Indian navy is expanding its relationships with other countries as illustrated by its encouraging periodic defense dialogues, ship visits, and regular naval exercises and patrols. Along with deepening its partnerships, India’s robust advocation for international maritime law norms shows its commitment to restore strategic balance in the Asian waters through focusing on international laws. Indian analysts claim that Chinese aggression in the South China Sea has created a power imbalance between India and China in the Asian waters through China’s grip over the Spratly Islands; these islands enable China to project its naval power into South Asian waters. James Russell and Daniel Moran state that China’s naval facilities in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Maldives, Pakistan, and Oman are major points of friction between India and China. Therefore, the Chinese expansionism threat is shared in both Southeast Asian countries and waters. Overall, China’s actions in Southeast Asia have prompted an increased maritime response from India.

3. Southeast Asia’s Motivations for Increased Maritime Cooperation

The motivations of countries in Southeast Asia for increased maritime cooperation with India are represented from two viewpoints. The first viewpoint is the institutional viewpoint (ASEAN), and the second is representative of the individual countries that make up Southeast Asia. Therefore, the motivations for increased maritime cooperation with India vary depending on the viewpoint. The following subsections address the different viewpoints on increased maritime cooperation with India.

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31 Acharya, *East of India*, 155.


34 Singh, 4.

a. **ASEAN’s Motivations for Increased Maritime Cooperation**

The Southeast Asian waters are rich in resources and comprise vital SLOCs and international shipping lanes that are of high importance to many countries. Consequently, high-level disputes such as those over oil exploration and Chinese military expansionism have heightened instability in this region. ASEAN’s strategy for dealing with this instability primarily occurs at a dialogue level by holding workshops and meetings to discuss the maritime security front.\(^\text{36}\) Specifically, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting (ADMM) and the ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting Plus (ADMM+) hold periodic meetings where maritime security is generally on the top of the list for discussion.\(^\text{37}\) Acharya states that ASEAN’s original motive for inviting India into the ARF was partially because of the role India can play in counterbalancing China.\(^\text{38}\) More recently, he also asserted that ASEAN’s inclusion of both China and India is aimed at maintaining regional order.\(^\text{39}\) ASEAN-India’s initiatives for developing blue economy cooperative relationships is indicative of ASEAN’s benign method for increasing maritime cooperation in Southeast Asia and beyond. Whereas there is increasing literature concerning India’s motivations for a cooperative ASEAN-India blue economy partnership, such as Padmaja’s article on Modi’s maritime diplomacy,\(^\text{40}\) literature on ASEAN-Sino blue economy initiatives are scarce.


\(^{37}\) Bhattacharyya, “Understanding Security,” 72–89.

\(^{38}\) Acharya, *East of India*, 161.

\(^{39}\) Acharya, 173.

b. Individual Country Motivations for Increased Maritime Cooperation

In general, individual members of ASEAN regard the institution’s goals of preserving a peaceful stable environment in Southeast Asia as a key part of their own national strategies. However, the individual countries of Southeast Asia face their own problems, which are reflected in their foreign policies. Table 2 provides a snapshot of the motivations of individual countries for increased maritime cooperation with India.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Primary Motivations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>Defense capabilities development, naval training, claimant in South China Sea dispute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Naval capacity development and assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Arms supplies, increased joint maritime proficiency, technological assistance, capacity building in maritime waters, naval training, proficiency in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) and other non-traditional threats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Logistical support, capacity development, proficiency in naval training, technological support, South China Sea claimant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Proficiency in HADR and other non-traditional threats, naval equipment procurement, increased joint maritime proficiency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Access to Indian military training, proficiency in HADR and other non-traditional threats, increased joint maritime proficiency, procurement of naval ships, claimant in South China Sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Desire for advanced naval technological procurement, increased joint maritime proficiency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Increased joint maritime proficiency, security in Malacca Strait, capacity development, proficiency in naval training.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Primary Motivations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>Protection of offshore resources, desire to build naval force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Arms supplies, increased joint maritime proficiency, technological assistance, capacity building in maritime waters, naval training, South China Sea claimant.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several scholars indicate that because Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia are heavily dependent on Russian hardware and arms, their navies seek out naval expertise, arms sales, and capability development from India due to India’s historical relationship with Russia.43 Other countries in the region seeking out India for capacity development are primarily motivated by their desire to build up their naval forces with high-tech capable ships. For instance, the Philippines opted to purchase two Indian-built frigates due to its multi-mission capabilities.44

Besides equipment capacity development, most Southeast Asian countries seek operational capacity development from India by way of naval exercises. In a 2015 RAND Corporation study, an Indian strategist concluded, “Every single Southeast Asian country wants to conduct exercises with us, everyone wants to engage with India.”45

Some scholars assert that claimants in the South China Sea have sought increased cooperation with India due to India’s non-alignment policy. South China Sea claimants find it beneficial to lean on India because of India’s lack of territorial disputes in the South China Sea and their naval outreach to western Southeast Asia.46 Due to India’s sensitivity

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45 Blank et al., *Look East, Cross Black Waters*, 60.

to Vietnam’s relationship with China, India’s support to Vietnam for a diplomatic resolution of the South China Sea dispute has played a vital role in fortifying mutual trust between the two countries.47

Table 2 supports scholarly assertions that the individual countries in Southeast Asia are overall motivated by their desire to develop their naval capacity and increase their naval proficiency, and India’s naval superiority and capabilities have thus attracted maritime cooperation from these countries. Additionally, claimants in the South China Sea may look to India as a maritime security provider because of India’s benign policies.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

The literature review reveals the primary reasons that are compelling India and Southeast Asia to deepen relations with each other. Also, the literature review establishes driving imperatives of Southeast Asian countries for increased cooperation with India and reviews ASEAN’s perspective of India’s increased maritime presence in the region. These hypotheses drawn from the literature review help to assess the validity of the drivers and motivations for increased cooperation between Southeast Asia and India.

The data presented in Chapters II and III show that hypothesis one and two had some validity. Economics does play a role in increased maritime cooperation but is not a primary factor driving increased cooperation. Data also found that many countries do seek capability development as proposed by hypothesis two. However, Chapters II and III refuted hypothesis three. A thorough look at the patterns of India’s naval exercises found that India is not directly balancing against China, nor are the countries of Southeast Asia.

- Hypothesis One: Maritime cooperation between India and Southeast Asian countries has grown because naval cooperation is conducive for India’s desire to protect and enhance its economic linkages.

• Hypothesis Two: Maritime cooperation between India and Southeast Asian countries has increased because individual countries of Southeast Asia desire naval capability development from India.

• Hypothesis Three: Maritime cooperation between India and Southeast Asian countries has increased due to their mutual interest in balancing against China.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

In “A Sea of Opportunities,” Ristian Supriyanto argues that distinctions between naval cooperation of individual maritime countries in Southeast Asia and India can be divided into three categories: probing, developmental, and advanced.  

48 Supriyanto, “A Sea of Opportunities.”
Table 3. Three Categories of Naval Cooperation in Southeast Asia\(^{49}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Depth/Scope</th>
<th>Naval Dialogues &amp; Information Sharing</th>
<th>Training, Exercises, &amp; Patrols</th>
<th>Defense/Naval Industrial Cooperation &amp; Arms Transfer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Probing</td>
<td>Very limited, usually taken under multilateral framework (e.g., sidelines meeting)</td>
<td>Irregular and incidental (e.g., passage exercises [PASSEX] during goodwill visits)</td>
<td>Non-existent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>Regular and formal as per bilateral MoU/defense agreement (e.g., bilateral joint defense committee)</td>
<td>Mostly functional and ad hoc, (e.g., counterpiracy)</td>
<td>Intentions are displayed, but concrete action is yet to be taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced</td>
<td>Regular and formal as per bilateral MoU/defense agreement (e.g., bilateral joint defense committee)</td>
<td>Held regularly and include complex scenarios and activities (e.g., antisubmarine warfare)</td>
<td>Already occurring</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{49}\) Adapted from Supriyanto, “A Sea of Opportunities.”
Table 4. Bilateral Naval Cooperation between India and Southeast Asian Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>Yes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Yes (2007)</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>Probing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Yes (2001)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Probing</td>
</tr>
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<td>Yes (2006)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Probing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Advanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Yes (2012)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Probing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Yes (2007)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Developmental</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis is divided into four chapters. This first chapter has described the conceptual framework used throughout the thesis, the initial hypotheses, and the explanations. Chapter II examines the background and importance of ASEAN-India diplomatic security groupings, such as the ARF, as they relate to maritime cooperation. Chapter II also examines the multilateral naval cooperation between ASEAN and India. Chapter III examines the bilateral naval cooperation from 2013 to 2018 between India and each Southeast Asian state, as listed in Table 4. Chapter IV concludes with a summary of the research findings, potential areas of further study, and concluding remarks.

50 Adapted from Supriyanto, “A Sea of Opportunities.”
II. INCREASED ASEAN-INDIA MARITIME COOPERATION, 1990–2018

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the evolution of maritime security cooperation between ASEAN and India from 1990 to 2018. Prior to the 1990s, India and ASEAN’s relationship was relatively distant and lacked cooperation due to their divergent trajectories. India was “preoccupied with its domestic problems and the conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir, while ASEAN remained concerned with the threat of communist insurgency and potential Vietnamese and Chinese expansionism” during the Cold War. Also, India’s support of Vietnam’s invasion into Cambodia was antonymous with ASEAN’s efforts to condemn Vietnam’s actions. India showed little interest in engaging ASEAN, and this contributed to ASEAN forming a distinct regional institutional identity that did not include India. Economic problems in the early 1990s and the fall of the Soviet Union prompted India to initiate re-engagement with countries in Southeast Asia.

This chapter is divided into three periods to allow the identification of patterns of increased maritime security cooperation following India’s re-engagement with countries in Southeast Asia. Section B discusses the decade from 1990 to 2000, which saw the launch of India’s and ASEAN’s security partnership. Section C discusses the years from 2001 to 2009, which shows an intensification in India’s and ASEAN’s security partnership following the emergence of shared interests in combatting transnational terrorism. Finally, Section D discusses the period from 2010 to 2018 to demonstrate how increasing shared interests in maritime security initiatives contributed to increased maritime cooperation.


A key turning point in India’s and ASEAN’s relationship was India’s period of economic reform in the early 1990s, when it reached out to Southeast Asia. Amitav Acharya explained,

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51 Amitav Acharya, Sino-Indian Encounters in Southeast Asia (Oxford University Press, 2017), 49.
A major shift occurred when Indian prime minister Narasimha Rao outlined a vision of an Indian “Look East” policy whose main thrust was “to draw, as much as possible, investment and cooperation from the Asia-Pacific countries, in consonance with our common concept and solidarity and my faith in our common destiny.52

This was following the administration’s overall shift in opening up India to pro-free market structural adjustments. The Look East policy was more focused on economic growth than security concerns as India reached out for new markets and resources. Beginning with this policy in 1991, Figure 1 provides a timeline of India’s increasing interaction with various organizations that are mentioned throughout the remainder of this chapter.

Figure 1. Detailed Timeline of Various Organizations of the Indo-Pacific
Overall, security cooperation between India and ASEAN remained minimal in the early 1990s. In 1993, India desired to join the ARF as it presented India with an opening to reassess its Look East policy to include more than just an economic focus. However, India’s initial application to join the ARF as a founding member was rejected because many ASEAN member states had concerns with potential spillover from the dispute between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, ASEAN member states were concerned about India’s naval operations in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. India’s and ASEAN’s security partnership in the first half of the 1990s was nonexistent because ASEAN remained wary of involving India.

To assuage ASEAN member states’ concern about India’s military endeavors, the Indian navy began conducting confidence-building measures in the form of small bilateral exercises with Singapore and Indonesia. To provide transparency, India held the first MILAN multilateral exercise, which was merely a gathering of naval officers in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in 1995. Finally, in response, Singapore led a significant diplomatic effort to secure India’s entry into the ARF in 1996. Singapore advocated for India’s inclusion by arguing that India represented a counterbalance to other political heavyweights in the region—namely, the United States and China.

The Asian financial crisis of 1997, along with India’s nuclear tests in the late 1990s, hindered further engagement for several years. However, India kept pressing for increased cooperation. India held MILAN again in 1999 and, in 2000, India hosted a seminar on antipiracy. It has since hosted several events, intersessional workshops, and

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54 Brewster, *India as an Asia Pacific Power*, 105.
56 Brewster, *India as an Asia Pacific Power*, 107.
meetings focused on counterterrorism, maritime security, and United Nations’ peacekeeping, illustrating its capacity for increased regional collaboration.58

The inclusion of India into the ARF in 1996 marked the beginning of India and ASEAN’s security relationship. In the mid- and late-1990s, the Indian navy began to conduct confidence-building exercises with Southeast Asian countries to provide further transparency. Overall, however, ASEAN and India’s security cooperation moved at a slow pace picking up only after 1995 when it began to develop slowly due to changed global climate as well as India’s efforts.

C. 2001–2009: TERRORISM AND NONTRADITIONAL MARITIME THREATS

From 2001 through 2009, security cooperation was minimal between ASEAN and India until the threat of transnational terrorism and nontraditional security threats in the early twenty-first century provided a common external threat. Since then, institutional security cooperation has steadily grown in the maritime sector. The remainder of this section discusses various security issues that have fostered increased cooperation.

1. Terrorism

Prior to September 11, 2001, the majority of the interactions between India and ASEAN had been economic. High-profile and coordinated attacks in Asia following September 11 introduced new security challenges to ASEAN and India and prompted increased cooperation. Arabinda Acharya described the violence:

These include terrorist attacks against the Indian Parliament in December 2001, the killing of French technicians in May 2002, targeting the American Consulate in June 2002, and coordinated attacks against 21 petrol pumps in June 2003 in Karachi, Pakistan, suicide attacks in Bali in Indonesia in October 2002 and 2005, the bombing of the Marriot Hotel in August 2003

and of the Australian embassy in September 2004 in Jakarta, Indonesia, and the explosion in Super Ferry 14 in the Philippines in February 2004.\(^5^9\) Acharya also noted that during the rise of Islamic terrorism, bilateral alliance systems were inadequate to deal with transnational terrorism; thus, a need for multilateral arrangements arose and caused India and ASEAN’s partnership to grow.\(^6^0\)

The first ASEAN-India summit took place in 2002, and the participants specifically addressed the necessity to intensify security cooperation in the ARF to combat terrorism and other nontraditional threats.\(^6^1\) Later, in 2003, members of the ARF endorsed the ARF Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security.\(^6^2\) This measure encouraged bilateral and multilateral maritime security cooperation. India would go on to agree to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation at the second ASEAN-India Summit in Bali, Indonesia in October of 2003. Additionally, the “Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism was signed, symbolizing concrete initiatives to step up cooperation in the fight against terrorism.”\(^6^3\)

2. **Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief**

The Asian tsunami in 2004 further placed India in a positive light and alerted ASEAN to the need to enhance multilateral disaster relief cooperation. When the tsunami hit, “India responded with its largest ever relief operation by sending nearly 20,000 troops, 40 naval vessels, 35 fixed-wing aircraft, 42 helicopters, and medical teams with relief

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\(^6^0\) Acharya, “India and Southeast Asia,” 300.


supplies to Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives.”64 India’s response increased the standing of its navy throughout Southeast Asia and directly resulted in “an agreement for routine refueling and refitting of Indian vessels in six ASEAN nations.”65 Additionally, as a result of the tsunami, ASEAN reconvened the ARF intersessional meeting on disaster relief in 2004, of which India became an active participant. 66

3. Antipiracy

Piracy remains a major concern for the security of India’s shipping through the Malacca Strait. For that reason, India increased its engagement in antipiracy regional frameworks in Southeast Asia, such as the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Created in 2006 to formalize antipiracy efforts in Southeast Asia, with India as the 10th ratified member, ReCAAP provided an opportunity for seven ASEAN member states and India to interact multilaterally.67 India’s notable monetary contribution to ReCAAP has furtherted the country’s engagement in the region. However, Indonesia and Malaysia found ReCAAP controversial due to its claims and profess responsibilities as littoral states to the Straits of Malacca.

In the following years, cooperation on maritime security issues has strengthened. The ARF intersessional meeting (ARF ISM) on maritime security was established in 2008 to promote an annual dialogue. Additionally, the first ARF ISM promoted maritime cooperation and capacity building, and its agenda specifically addressed piracy concerns.68 India’s cooperation with ASEAN in the ARF ISM is still demonstrated today via co-

64 Blank et al., Look East, Cross Black Waters, 67.
65 Blank et al., 67.
67 The ReCAAP members from ASEAN are Brunei, Cambodia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
chairing seminars and undertaking confidence building measures. For instance, in 2009, the Indian Coast Guard organized the ARF Training Program on Maritime Security in Chennai.69

Therefore, it is obvious that transnational terrorism and an increase in nontraditional security threats in the maritime sector have fostered increased cooperation between ASEAN and India in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Moreover, the creation of several regional institutions, meetings, and workshops to combat security threats has enabled India to have greater engagement in the region.

D. 2010–2018: ENHANCED ASEAN-INDIA ENGAGEMENT

From 2010 to 2018, ASEAN established new security frameworks that provided more opportunities for India and ASEAN to cooperate. ADMM+ established in 2010 provided a new confidence-building platform between ASEAN and its respective dialogue partners to enhance defense cooperation and security with the overall goal of stability and peace in the region.70 Furthermore, in 2011, the Maritime Security Expert Working Group emerged as a subset of ADMM+ to enhance maritime cooperation, identify risks in the maritime domain, and encourage wider information sharing.71 It created a forum to bring together defense officials and officers of the ASEAN and Indian navies for dialogue and has conducted several exercises since its establishment. Between ADMM+ and the ARF, the Indian navy began to participate more frequently in naval exercises.

69 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).”


1. **2011–2013: Strategic Partnership**

   In 2011, India sent Indian Naval Ship (INS) *Kesari* to participate in the Disaster Relief Exercise (DiREx) 2011 in Manado, Indonesia.\(^{72}\) Later, in June 2013, India sent INS *Gharial* to Brunei to participate in the ASEAN Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief and Military Medicine Exercise.\(^{73}\) As India’s engagement began to grow in Southeast Asia, India put forth a blueprint to further enhance its maritime ties in Southeast Asia at the 2012 ASEAN-India commemorative summit. Members highlighted the need for a rules-based maritime security community and extensively discussed freedom of the seas and methods to enhance maritime cooperation. At the summit, ASEAN and India upgraded their relationship to a “strategic partnership.” As a direct result, Myanmar and Vietnam reached out to India for assistance; India then invested money in Myanmar’s coastal defense and provided Vietnam with a $100 million line of credit.\(^{74}\)


   At the 2014 ASEAN-India summit, India upgraded its Look East policy to the Act East policy (AEP). The policy continues to lack a vision statement, but the AEP has been an important instrument for India to further enhance engagement with countries in Southeast Asia. Amitendu Palit analyzed the strategic depth of the policy, explaining,

   > In addition to deeper economic engagement, India would be playing a greater geostrategic role by being proactive in areas where its role had previously been limited. These include not only humanitarian assistance and

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disaster relief, but might also extend to maritime security initiatives, including joint naval exercises.\textsuperscript{75}

Palit was correct, and India has been more proactive, especially via maritime cooperation. Chapter III further discusses India’s proactive stance in its bilateral partnerships.

India has since labeled most of its engagement following the AEP’s announcement as actions carried out in pursuit of the AEP. Additionally, most of that engagement has been through its navy, although there are other areas of cooperation. For instance, India co-chaired the Expert Working Group on Humanitarian Mine Action with Vietnam from 2014 to 2017.\textsuperscript{76}

In May 2015, India sent INS \textit{Saryu}, a patrol vessel, to participate in the 3rd ASEAN DIREX in Penang, Malaysia; the exercise conducted simulated search and rescue exercises.\textsuperscript{77} In the following year, India sent a large amphibious vessel, the INS \textit{Airavat}, capable of transporting 500 troops, 10 tanks, and 11 combat trucks, to participate in the ADMM+ Exercise on Maritime Security and Counter Terrorism in Brunei.\textsuperscript{78} Then in 2017, India sent INS \textit{Satpura} and INS \textit{Kadmatt} to Pattaya, Thailand to represent India in ASEAN’s International Fleet Review, which commemorated the 50th anniversary of ASEAN.\textsuperscript{79} As part of this ASEAN anniversary and ASEAN-India’s 25th anniversary of

\begin{footnotes}{\footnotesize


}
dialogue relations, the Indian navy deployed four naval vessels to make several port visits to ASEAN member states.80

3. 2018: Enhanced Maritime Initiatives

To mark the 25th anniversary of their relations, in 2018, ASEAN India relations the two jointly adopted the “Delhi Declaration of the ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit” that charted the future of the two entities’ relations.81 Moreover, ASEAN and India agreed to enhance their maritime cooperation through existing frameworks as well as to coordinate efforts to uphold maritime law and further collaborate on various maritime issues.82 According to a 2018 press release from the Thai Ministry of Affairs, the “Advisor to the Foreign Minister gave a special address on ‘Strengthening India-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation,’ highlighting key elements in enhancing ASEAN-India maritime cooperation, including historical and civilizational links, maritime infrastructure development, the ‘Panca Tara’ Initiative, and maritime safety and security.”83 Since his election, Prime Minister Modi has actively advocated for increased maritime cooperation with ASEAN, as he did when he visited ASEAN leaders at the ASEAN-India Informal Breakfast Summit in Singapore in November 2018.84


82 ASEAN, “Delhi Declaration.”


The Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) 10+1, the East Asia Summit, and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum have all provided ASEAN member states and India with a forum to collaborate on shared maritime concerns. At the 2018 PMC, attendees of the ASEAN-India Ministerial Meeting discussed several maritime initiatives, including India’s Indo-Pacific concept and enhanced maritime cooperation regarding maritime connectivity and the blue economy.\footnote{“Chairman’s Statement of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) 10+1 Sessions with the Dialogue Partners,” ASEAN, August 2018, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Chairmans-Statement-of-the-ASEAN-PMCs-final1.pdf.} Good order at sea, the blue economy, and maritime safety and security were all topics at the 3rd East Asia Summit on Maritime Security conference in July 2018.\footnote{Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “India at the East Asia Summit,” August 2018, http://mea.gov.in/aseanindia/about-eas.htm.} These forums provide guidance for ways in which India and ASEAN may collaborate in the future.

E. \hspace{1em} CONCLUSION

From 1990 to 2000, India and ASEAN’s partnership revolved around economics. While their security partnership began in 1996 with India’s inclusion in the ARF, little security cooperation occurred between them from 1990 to 2000. From 2001 to 2009, the increase in transnational terrorism and other nontraditional threats in the maritime sector fostered greater cooperation. From 2010 to 2018, both the ARF and the ADMM expanded their agenda and activities significantly, therefore increasing the amount of activities in which India could participate.\footnote{Haacke, “The ASEAN Regional Forum,” 429.} Additionally, with the implementation of the AEP, India set out to take a more active role in affairs in Southeast Asia. Over the last three decades, cooperation between ASEAN and India has grown from economic initiatives alone to shared interests in combatting maritime security threats, enhancing maritime cooperation, and maintaining good order at sea.

Analysis of the first hypothesis from Chapter I demonstrates that economics does play a role in increased maritime cooperation. That is, efforts to curb piracy and terrorism
and sea protect shipping. However, it is not clear from the data discussed in this chapter that economics was a driving factor for increased maritime cooperation between ASEAN and India.

The second hypothesis is partially supported in this chapter. ASEAN-India meetings have resulted partially due to outreach from certain countries seeking Indian investment, which India has provided. Many ASEAN countries utilize ADMM+ meetings as a multilateral platform for engaging the Indian defense establishment. However, without taking a closer look at bilateral relations, Chapter II cannot provide enough evidence for hypothesis two. However, Chapter III further substantiates hypothesis two.

This chapter does not support hypothesis three. While an increase in rhetoric for good order at sea is aimed at containing Chinese territorial claims, very little rhetoric is found within ASEAN-India’s dialogue to support the premise that the two entities form a balancing weight against China. Some analysts believe that the AEP is a policy instrument to shore up against China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative. For instance, Palit declares, “There is little doubt over engagement with China being an integral part of the Act East policy.”88 In that regard, India may see itself as a counterweight against China. However, data in this chapter does not support the understanding that ASEAN shares that same view of its own role in relation to China, as hypothesis three proposes. Chapter III, on bilateral naval cooperation between India and the individual countries of Southeast Asia, aids a further understanding of hypotheses one, two, and three.

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88 Palit, “India’s Act East Policy,” 83.
III. INDIA’S BILATERAL MARITIME COOPERATION WITH COUNTRIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. INTRODUCTION

The Indian navy’s method of taking on a greater strategic role in Southeast Asia is primarily through expanding naval cooperation by increasing the number of ship visits and regular naval exercises and patrols.89 This chapter presents data from 2013 to 2018 on Indian naval cooperation with individual Southeast Asian countries and focuses on identifying and explaining some patterns in that cooperation.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section provides a snapshot of Indian naval port visits and exercises utilizing data from the Appendix. The second section examines bilateral naval cooperation between India and the individual countries of Southeast Asia utilizing data from the Appendix and other sources. The third section uses Supriyanto’s framework to assess changes in the scope and depth of naval cooperation between India and Southeast Asian countries since 2015, which was the last year for which Supriyanto presents data.90 The third section also highlights emerging patterns observed through the data throughout this chapter.

B. INDIA’S INCREASED NAVAL COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The most concrete way to show the increased bilateral naval cooperation between India and Southeast Asian countries is by examining the quantity of port visits and naval exercises undertaken. The Appendix compiles data to appropriately examine the quantity of port visits and naval exercises and supplements this chapter. The Appendix extended Ajaya Das’s timeline of India’s naval exercises with ASEAN states from 1991–2013 to the end of 2018 and includes port visits for greater context. The Appendix utilizes data from various news sources, India’s annual defense reports, and numerous press releases from

89 Brewster, “India’s Defense Strategy,”158.
2013 to 2018. It is important to note that the data found in the Appendix is thorough but may not be complete. Even so, the data is sufficient to analyze certain trends.

One trend that the Appendix reveals is the rising number of port visits of the Indian navy to Southeast Asian countries since 2015; this is presented in Table 5. In contrast to Das’s timeline, the Appendix includes port visits that provides supporting evidence to data gathered on naval exercises. For instance, the Indian navy visited Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, and Singapore more than the other countries in Southeast Asia, which supports assertions on India’s relations with those countries made in Section C.

The Appendix also lists a remarkable increase in the number of naval exercises in a shorter time frame. His timeline from 1991 to the early part of 2013 lists 74 naval exercises over nearly 23 years. Table 6 concludes with a total of 48 exercises in just six years. One point to mention is that Das’s timeline only lists one naval exercise with Myanmar. The Appendix shows an increase in naval exercises with Myanmar to include regular coordinated patrols.

The researcher used data from Appendix to create Tables 5 and 6, which provide snapshots of the Indian navy’s port visits from 2013 to 2018 and naval exercises by country. The two tables show that since the implementation of Prime Minister Modi’s AEP in the second half of 2014, the number of India’s naval activities in Southeast Asia has grown each year. Furthermore, the two tables comparatively show the prevalence of the Indian navy’s presence in a country-by-country categorization.

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91 Das, “India’s Naval Exercises with ASEAN.”
Table 5. The Indian Navy’s Southeast Asian Port Visits by Country\(^{92}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port Visits</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Vietnam</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Annual Totals</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some port visits associated with coordinated patrols could not be identified; actual numbers may be higher.

Table 6. The Indian Navy’s Participation in Bilateral Naval Exercises in Southeast Asia by Year and Country\(^{93}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Naval Exercises</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1(^d)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{92}\) Adapted from data in the Appendix.

\(^{93}\) Adapted from data in the Appendix.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Naval Exercises</th>
<th>2013</th>
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<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>Multilateral$^a$</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Totals</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$ Multilateral exercises include ARF, ADMM+, KOMODO, and MILAN.

$^b$ PASSEX are not reflected but mentioned in the Appendix.

$^c$ An embedded bilateral exercise in the fall cycle of the India-Indonesia coordinated patrol.

$^d$ Vietnam and India’s first bilateral exercise in 2018 is disputed.

However, Tables 5 and 6 both fail to provide the depth and scope of the naval exercises held and the reasons why India made port visits to certain countries. For instance, India made more port visits in 2017 because that year marked the 25th anniversary of Indian-ASEAN dialogue, which the Indian navy commemorated with a special deployment. SIMBEX-16 was also conducted between the Indian navy and the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) with the participation of four vessels, while 16 vessels from the two navies participated in SIMBEX-18. This is important to note because the increased participation of both navies may increase interoperability and further deepen naval cooperation. The following section discusses further country-by-country patterns observed from the Appendix.

C. BILATERAL MARITIME COOPERATION

The central purpose of this section is to provide an update on the status of India’s naval cooperative relationships with Southeast Asian countries since Supriyanto’s analysis of such relationships in 2015. The status of naval cooperation between India and individual Southeast Asian countries is provided by comparatively categorizing the scope and the depth of the respective maritime cooperation under three distinctive levels: probing, developmental, and advanced cooperation, as Table 3 in Chapter I illustrates.

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95 Supriyanto, “A Sea of Opportunities.”

framework is useful because it provides criteria for assessing the scope and depth of the naval cooperation between India and Southeast Asian countries. Additionally, the framework is helpful because it can be used to monitor the quality of the relationships and to depict whether or not progress has occurred. The rest of this section is organized as a country-by-country catalogue to provide a deeper understanding of the tables and the data provided throughout this thesis.

1. Brunei

Little evidence since 2015 supports further development past the probing stage, although India’s naval interaction with Brunei has increased. At the time of Supriyanto’s review of the relations between India and Brunei in 2015, a defense memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the two countries had yet to be signed. However, in February 2016, India and Brunei solidified the basis of their cooperation by signing a defense MOU with a framework for the exchange of visits, experiences, information, and training and for conducting joint military exercises, discussions, and seminars. Two measurable activities have occurred between the two navies since the MOU. First, the 2016 ADMM+ Exercise on Maritime Security and Counter Terrorism was held in Brunei, where INS *Airavat*, a large amphibious ship, participated alongside ships from 14 other countries. Second, INS *Satpura*, a frigate, visited Muara, Brunei, where the two navies conducted a PASSEX in 2017. At the 2018 ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit, India’s Prime Minister Modi and Brunei’s Sultan Bolkiah held a bilateral meeting to discuss bolstering their defense, security, and energy cooperation. However, no concrete

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97 Supriyanto, “A Sea of Opportunities.”


99 *Sputnik International*, “Indian Warship Arrives in Brunei.”

100 Parameswaran, “India Warship Makes Brunei Visit.”

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maritime-related collaboration occurred in 2018 aside from informal talks.\textsuperscript{101} Most activities between India and Brunei remained irregular and incidental although the defense MOU called for regularizing cooperation. One reason that activities with Brunei may not expand beyond port visits and ASEAN-led exercises is India’s apparent aversion to bilateral exercises with claimant states of the South China Sea as Table 6 reflects.

2. Cambodia

Cambodia’s maritime cooperation with India remains at the probing stage due to its navy’s lack of capacity to participate in naval exercises and Cambodia’s ties with China. Supriyanto argues that despite the 2007 defense agreement between Cambodia and India, Cambodia lacked the requisite equipment and funding to further deepen its level of cooperation.\textsuperscript{102} Overall, the capacity of the Royal Cambodian Navy limits further cooperation between the two navies and is why that bilateral interaction between Cambodia and India mainly takes place in the form of dialogues. Additionally, Cambodia’s partnership with China supersedes all other partnerships because most of Cambodia’s naval vessels. However, Cambodia’s participation in MILAN, hosted by the Indian navy, in 2014 and in 2018 demonstrates that the country has at least some willingness to cooperate with countries other than China.\textsuperscript{103} Another way that increased cooperation occurred was when Indian naval ships docked in Cambodia and conducted a PASSEX in 2015 and docked again in 2017;\textsuperscript{104} both were goodwill visits. Their maritime partnership in the past couple of years is possibly representative of deepening ties; nonetheless, there has been little maritime interaction.


\textsuperscript{102} Mukherjee and Mohan, \textit{India’s Naval Strategy}, 198.


\textsuperscript{104} See the Royal Cambodian Navy’s participation in the years 2015 and 2017 in the Appendix.
3. Indonesia

Several developments over the last three years have transitioned the relationship between India and Indonesia to an advanced stage. Supriyanto placed the India-Indonesia naval relationship at the developmental stage because their coordinated patrols began to lose steam in 2015. However, three main developments over the last several years of naval cooperation between these two countries suggest the opposite. First, the total of 22 port visits by the Indian navy to Indonesia during the period from 2013 to 2018 is markedly higher than that of any other country visited by the Indian navy. The reasons for the visits include port calls as part of Indian deployments, coordinated patrols, port calls for India’s training fleet, and participation in Indonesia’s KOMODO multilateral exercises. One port visit was for an operational turnaround during which India began to coordinate a plan to develop Sabang, a western port in Indonesia.

Second, coordinated patrols between India and Indonesia have grown in complexity to include a bilateral exercise (later developed into a separate bilateral exercise). Additionally, India and Indonesia held their inaugural bilateral exercise in conjunction with the 26th Indian-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol (IND-INDO CORPAT), held in the fall of 2015. After holding the embedded exercise again, along with the 27th and the 28th IND-INDO CORPAT in 2016 and 2017, respectively, the two countries opted to conduct a separate inaugural bilateral exercise, Samudra Shakti, in 2018. Samudra Shakti

105 Mukherjee and Mohan, *India’s Naval Strategy*, 200.


consisted of a harbor phase and a sea phase consisting of antisubmarine warfare, surface warfare, and antipiracy exercises.\textsuperscript{109}

Third, India and Indonesia have increased their partnership from a strategic to a comprehensive strategic partnership when Prime Minister Modi and President Widodo met in 2018. During the meeting, President Widodo said, “In defence, both leaders reached agreement to advance maritime cooperation, particularly in the context of the Indo-Pacific strategy.”\textsuperscript{110} Additionally, Prime Minister Modi remarked, “India’s vision on security and welfare in the region and its Act East Policy were similar to Mr. Joko’s maritime fulcrum policy.”\textsuperscript{111} The leaders agreed to develop infrastructure to support their maritime connectivity, joint manufacturing of water cannons, future cooperation in military training, and enhancement of other areas of cooperation.\textsuperscript{112}

In accordance with Supriyanto’s framework and the above-listed developments, India and Indonesia’s maritime partnership is categorized at the advanced level. Additionally, as data in Tables 5 and 6 show, it is evident that Indonesia is the main focus of India’s strategic objectives in Southeast Asia, and in response, Indonesia has reciprocated interest. For example, India has one oil bloc in Indonesia and provides hydrographic assistance and expertise to Indonesia, which may be a potential explanation for increased cooperation.

4. **Malaysia**

India and Malaysia’s naval cooperation remains at the developmental stage despite India’s frequent port visits to Malaysia. Supriyanto attributes this limitation of their partnership to Malaysia, stating, “Malaysia does not intend to make participation regular nor is it willing to conduct ‘coordinated patrols’ with the Indian Navy in the Andaman

\textsuperscript{109} Rahmat, “India, Indonesia Hold Inaugural Edition of Exercise.”

\textsuperscript{110} Yulisman, “Indonesia, India Agree.”

\textsuperscript{111} Yulisman.

\textsuperscript{112} Yulisman.
Supriyanto’s statement is corroborated with data from Table 6. Although the Indian navy traveled to Malaysia to participate in a HADR exercise in 2017, the prior years’ bilateral activity is almost nonexistent. The Indian navy and the Royal Malaysian Navy’s exercises typically only occur at the multilateral level as seen by Malaysia’s participation in MILAN-14 and MILAN-18.

There are several reasons (unrelated to maritime security) why further maritime cooperation is unlikely between Malaysia and India, one of which is Malaysia’s relationship with China. In 2017, Rajiv Bhatia said,

Mutual negative perceptions, which existed in the past, have diminished, but they have not disappeared altogether. The Indian side tends to view Malaysia as being too close to China, deeply sympathetic towards Pakistan, and always anxious to assert its Islamic identity under the influence of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The Malaysian side seems to dwell on the disconnect between India’s commitments and delivery, the huge asymmetry of power between China and India, and the impressive success of Malaysia’s development model as compared to India’s. Nevertheless, politico-economic convergences and bonds of history, culture and the diaspora have ensured that the two nations essentially relate to each other as good partners and friends today.

However, in a progressive step, Malaysia and India held a high-level delegation meeting to discuss deepening their maritime cooperation to include advanced maritime security initiatives in July 2018. Both countries agreed to upgrade their maritime cooperation to include bilateral naval exercises, which is a step toward advanced

113 Mukherjee and Mohan, *India’s Naval Strategy*, 200.


115 The Royal Malaysian Navy’s participation in MILAN-14 and MILAN-18 are noted in the Appendix.

cooperation. While some progress has occurred, Indian and Malaysian maritime cooperation still falls under the developmental stage per Supriyanto’s framework because of Malaysia’s tightknit relationship with China and India’s aversion for bilateral exercises with South China Sea claimant states.

5. **Myanmar**

Key events over the last three years have transitioned the relationship between India and Myanmar to a developmental stage. The infancy of their newly increased relationship puts their cooperation at a developmental stage, despite meeting all criteria (as shown in Table 3) regarding the depth of an advanced stage. In other words, regularity in complex exercises has yet to be observed. The data in the Appendix illustrates the rise in maritime cooperation between India and Myanmar. The Indian and the Myanmar navies conducted coordinated patrols annually from 2013 until 2017 and increased these to twice a year in 2018. Additionally, India and Myanmar also kicked off their nine-day maiden naval exercise, called the India-Myanmar Naval Exercise 2018 (IMNEX-18). Its first phase was held at the harbor where both navies conducted cross-deck familiarization training, demonstrations, and sporting events. The at-sea phase included antisubmarine exercises, live gun firings, and fleet maneuvers.

Furthermore, the countries signed a defense MOU in September 2017, which was a crucial development that solidified the deepening of the maritime security cooperative partnership between India and Myanmar. Additionally, the maiden Joint Consultative

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118 Pattern observed through data presented in the Appendix.


120 Parameswaran, “What’s Behind?”

Commission Meeting between the two countries concluded with India’s pact to assist in the modernization of Myanmar’s army and navy, with the aim of taking its “military to military cooperation to the next level.” While the increase in maritime cooperation between Myanmar and India may be attributed to Myanmar’s political reforms during 2011 through 2015, it is apparent that the interaction between the two countries has expanded and is on a trajectory toward deeper cooperation. Another explanation for increased maritime cooperation may be that India has eight oil blocs in Myanmar.

6. Philippines

There is very little evidence that maritime cooperation between the Philippines and India has proceeded beyond the probing stage. In 2015, Supriyanto predicted a likely increase in maritime cooperation between the Philippines and India. However, Tables 5 and 6 reflect only five port visits and zero bilateral exercise over the past six years. Multilaterally, their navies interacted in MILAN-14 and the 2016 ADMM+ exercise in Brunei. India desires to remain engaged with the Philippines and continues to conduct goodwill port visits, but development has moved at a slow pace. At the January 2018 ASEAN-India conference, Prime Minister Modi held a bilateral meeting with President Duterte, wherein both parties agreed that cooperation between the two countries could gain some momentum. Prime Minister Modi and President Duterte also agreed that “under India’s AEP and the Philippines’ Build, Build, Build Program, there are several areas for cooperation between private sectors of the two countries.” However, little naval cooperation has occurred between the two countries since 2013 or even since the signing

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123 Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), *Ensuring Secure Seas*.


125 Mohan, “PM Modi Engages Vietnam, Philippines, Myanmar.”
of the Defense Cooperation Agreement in 2006. One reason may be that India intentionally avoids naval cooperation with countries whose South China Sea claims conflict with China’s.

7. Singapore

India’s maritime partnership with Singapore is the most advanced among the Southeast Asian nations. Beginning in 1993, the navies of Singapore and India have held regular exercises, made frequent port visits, and made advancements in the industrial defense realm. The year 2018 marked the 25th anniversary of the long-standing SIMBEX. SIMBEX grows each year in complexity with either additional forces or the depth in the exercises. In SIMBEX-18, both navies used submarines for the first time to enhance their antisubmarine training. Additionally, 2018 was a year full of bilateral agreements between the two countries, most of which were renewals or revisions of previous agreements. For instance, both India and Singapore signed a revised defence cooperation agreement allowing easier access to each other’s naval ports to further strengthen their defense relationship.

The India-Singapore cooperation is already advanced and continues to advance further because of their shared interests. Of note, the Singapore Armed Forces is the only country to hold bilateral agreements with India for every branch of armed forces. Singapore has always been a gateway to ASEAN for India as Singapore continually supports and requests increased engagement from India. Overall, India and Singapore’s pursuit of regional collaboration in support of the Indo-Pacific region’s security is reflective of their efforts to further deepen maritime cooperation.

126 Mukherjee and Mohan, India’s Naval Strategy, 204.

127 Pattern observed through data presented in the Appendix.


8. Thailand

Held twice a year since 2006, Indo-Thai coordinated patrols represent India and Thailand’s maritime partnership. Because of the regular occurrence of these naval exercises, the depth of the relationship between the two countries could pass from the developmental to the advanced stage, depending on the results of their increased efforts in both technological and industrial sectors. One observation from data in the Appendix is that the Indo-Thai coordinated patrols over the last six years have not really increased in complexity. Their coordinated patrols have not included additional ships or complex scenarios, such as antisubmarine warfare, as India has done with Indonesia and Myanmar. On the other hand, Tables 5 and 6 reflect high numbers of port visits over the last six years. Thailand has also attended every MILAN exercise held by India, which is a testament to their long partnership.

While their cooperation level remains the same as when Supriyanto analyzed their partnership in 2015, in July 2018, Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha visited Prime Minister Modi in India to consider enhanced maritime security cooperation between the two countries. The main issues that the two leaders discussed were ways to increase maritime cooperation and ways to meet their shared regional goals and bilateral interests in economics and research and development. Without advances in the maritime sector and added complexities, the framework in Table 3 still places Thailand at the developmental level. If Thailand and India deepen the complexities of their coordinated patrols and further expand bilateral naval industrial cooperation, then the two countries would meet the criteria for an advanced level of cooperation.

130 Pattern observed through data presented in the Appendix.
131 Mukherjee and Mohan, India’s Naval Strategy, 205.
133 PTI, “India, Thailand to Forge Close Ties.”
9. **Timor-Leste**

India’s maritime cooperative partnership with Timor-Leste remains at the probing stage due to Timor-Leste’s small naval force. *The Timor-Leste Strategic Development Plan (2011–2030)* states that by 2030, “The naval component of the F-FDTL [Timor-Leste Defence Force] will be well trained with the necessary infrastructure to control and protect our territorial waters and participate as a full partner in international naval exercises.” A 2018 article on the *India Today* website remarks that representatives from Timor-Leste have briefed their Indian counterparts on their strong desire for enhanced cooperation in increasing their maritime capacity. Of note, India lists Timor-Leste as a maritime investment due to India’s contracted rights to explore two oil blocs in Timor-Leste’s economic exclusion zone. India’s interests in the country will likely increase due to India’s oil blocs in Timor-Leste and Timor-Leste’s desire to increase its naval capacity.

10. **Vietnam**

India and Vietnam’s naval partnership remains at the developmental stage due to the lack of bilateral exercises, despite the increased naval cooperation between the two countries. The lack of bilateral exercises may be due to Vietnam’s policy approach to the South China Sea dispute, which is a three-pronged strategy: accommodating China’s interests, increasing self-defense, and mobilizing international support. Vietnam has affirmed that it will neither have military alliances nor allow foreign bases and will maintain a general policy of independence to cooperate with China’s interests. However, India and Vietnam’s maritime cooperation may contradict Vietnam’s policy.

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In 2016, Vietnamese submariners went to India to learn to operate and maintain Vietnam’s procurement of six Kilo-class submarines.\textsuperscript{138} To convey India’s desire to invest in Vietnam, India conducted further training of the Vietnam People’s Navy in 2016 when a 49-member team went to the INS \textit{Eksila} for a lengthy program on the operation and the maintenance of M-15 gas turbines.\textsuperscript{139} In late 2018, India and Vietnam met and agreed to step up their defense cooperation to include oil exploration and maritime cooperation. Specifically, the meeting reaffirmed their position on unimpeded economic activities and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{140} During INS \textit{Sahyadri}, INS \textit{Shakti}, and INS \textit{Kamorta}’s visit to Da Nang, Vietnam in 2018, experts believe that the countries engaged in an inaugural bilateral exercise; however, neither country has revealed much.\textsuperscript{141} According data in Table 6, India and Vietnam have only participated in one bilateral exercise. This is important because Vietnam is the only South China Sea claimant state with which India has held a bilateral exercise. Perhaps the countries revealed little the inaugural bilateral exercise in 2018 because of Vietnam and India’s risk aversion to China.\textsuperscript{142}

Overall, the maritime partnership between Vietnam and India remains at the developmental stage, but the scope of their cooperation is increasing. If Vietnam and India had developed regular coordinated patrols similar to those between India and Myanmar, Thailand, and Indonesia, then its partnership with India would have reached an advanced stage of cooperation.

\textsuperscript{138} Unnithan, “Why India Needs to Ramp Up.”


\textsuperscript{140} PTI, “India, Vietnam to Step up Defence Cooperation.”


\textsuperscript{142} Muni and Mishra, \textit{India’s Eastward Engagement}. 

D. EMERGING PATTERNS AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS

This presented research in this chapter has defined and examined the development of naval cooperation between India and the individual countries of Southeast Asia using data retrieved from various sources. From increased port visits to greater complexity in naval exercises, India and Southeast Asian countries have been enhancing their maritime cooperation. Table 7 shows the changes compared with Table 4 (in Chapter I) and reflects India’s greater presence and increasing strategic role in Southeast Asia since 2015. Tables 5 and 6 and the individual sections on bilateral cooperation clearly indicate that India’s maritime cooperation has grown, especially with Indonesia and Myanmar. Section C has shown increased cooperation outside of what Tables 5 and 6 could provide in a country-by-country catalog.
Table 7. Updated Status of India’s Cooperative Relationships with Southeast Asian Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Defense/naval cooperation MoU/agreement (signed)</th>
<th>Naval dialogues and information sharing</th>
<th>Training, exercises, and patrols</th>
<th>Defense/naval industrial cooperation and arms transfer</th>
<th>Depth of cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td><strong>Yes (2016)</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Probing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Yes (2007)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Probing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Yes (2001)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Advanced</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Yes (1993)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Developmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td><strong>Yes (2017)</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td><strong>Developmental</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Yes (2006)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Probing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Yes (2003)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Advanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Yes (2012)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Developmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Probing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Yes (2007)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td>Developmental</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The bold text denotes a difference since the status indicated in Table 4, Chapter I.

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143 Adapted from Supriyanto, “A Sea of Opportunities.”
India’s outreach, and perhaps prioritization, of certain Southeast Asian countries is informative regarding its strategic objective to deepen ties in the region. Collectively, data explored in all sections of this thesis reveals emerging patterns. First, the data supports a pattern of India’s risk aversion to participating in naval exercises with claimant states in the South China Sea. Second, the data supports a pattern in increased cooperation with Indonesia and Myanmar, which both share boundaries with India. Third, the data supports a pattern of increased cooperation with Indonesia, Vietnam, and Myanmar, all of which hold India’s oil bloc investments in their waters. Lastly, the data supports a pattern of Southeast Asian countries’ desires for capability development from India.

When analyzing the first hypothesis from Chapter I, economics does play a role in increased maritime cooperation. That is, there is a correlation of increased maritime cooperation between the countries where India has current contracts for oil investment. The exception is Timor-Leste, due to its limited naval capacity. However, it is not clear that economics is a primary factor for increased maritime cooperation between India and the individual countries of Southeast Asia.

The second hypothesis is supported in this chapter. Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, and Myanmar have all enhanced their naval capacity development by increasing maritime cooperation with India. Vietnam is the most notable case that supports this hypothesis as India has provided training and has given lines of credit to Vietnam’s military.

This chapter does not support hypothesis three. First, no Southeast Asia country is forming an anti-China alliance with India. Also, trends in the Appendix’s data revealed that Cambodia, Malaysia, and those that have maritime disputes with China hardly participated in naval exercises with India from 2013 to 2018. Both patterns suggest that India’s engagement in Southeast Asia is carefully not balancing.
IV. CONCLUSION

A. FINDINGS

This thesis has shown that maritime cooperation between India and Southeast Asia has grown over the last several years and has sought to understand why. Collectively, Chapters I, II, and III answer the research question of why Indian security cooperation with certain Southeast Asian countries has grown so much during the last several years. To begin this exploration, Chapter I proposed three hypotheses: first that India and Southeast Asia maritime cooperation has grown because it protects India’s economic interests in the region; second that maritime cooperation has grown because individual countries in Southeast Asia desired naval development through partnership with India; and third that maritime cooperation between India and Southeast Asian nations has increased due to a shared interest in balancing against China.

Chapter I presented evidence of the increased maritime cooperation between India and countries of Southeast Asia and examined the driving factors for this growth for India, the individual countries of Southeast Asia, and ASEAN. Chapter II then established a timeline to demonstrate patterns of increased maritime cooperation between India and ASEAN since the beginning of the twenty-first century, and that the data revealed that the rise in cooperation was due to India and Southeast Asia’s efforts to enhance maritime security. Subsequently, Chapter III utilized the research design framework presented in Chapter I to further demonstrate the increase in maritime security cooperation from 2013 to 2018 and explain emerging patterns.

Throughout this examination, weak evidence supports the first hypothesis. Chapter III found that maritime cooperation increased with countries where Indian companies have oil exploration contracts. However, there is little evidence that India’s naval cooperation increased with those countries to defend their economic interests. Further research is needed to support the assertion that maritime cooperation has increased due to India’s desire to protect its economic linkages.
The second hypothesis is supported by evidence from Chapter III. Chapter III’s evidence revealed that maritime cooperation between India and Southeast Asian countries has increased because individual countries in Southeast Asia desire naval capability development from India, and the chapter demonstrates how certain countries have received such developments specifically from partnerships with India. For instance, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Myanmar have all bolstered their antisubmarine warfare capabilities by participating in complex exercises with India. The development of Sabang port in Indonesia as well as India’s training of Vietnamese sailors are additional examples of the country’s naval contributions to maritime cooperation with Southeast Asian nations. In general, Southeast Asian countries welcome the opportunity to increase their naval capabilities by enhancing their joint maritime expertise. Most of this capability development is motivated by a desire to counter nontraditional security threats, such as HADR, terrorism, and piracy. The research found little evidence to support countries’ needs for enhanced capability motivated by a desire to counter China.

Specific evidence in Chapter III refutes the third hypothesis and implies that India is trying to avoid directly balancing against China. Chapter III found that India has only held one bilateral exercise with a claimant state of the South China Sea (Vietnam). The bilateral exercise held with Vietnam in 2018 yielded few public details, and neither side released a public statement. Aside from Vietnam, India’s maritime cooperation with Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines has only marginally approved since 2015. Overall, there is not strong balancing behavior to support hypothesis three.

B. IMPLICATIONS

This thesis reveals that since the implementation of AEP in 2014, India’s maritime relationships with countries in Southeast Asia has primarily increased with nonclaimant states of the South China Sea. An examination of port visits and naval exercises shows that India rarely held naval exercises with claimant states (only Vietnam), further indicating India’s risk aversion toward China. Additionally, exploration of the depth of India’s security relationships with ASEAN and with individual countries of Southeast Asia demonstrates that India has formed tighter partnerships with Myanmar, with which India
shares a land border, and Indonesia, with which it shares a maritime border. This implies India’s relative comfort in expanding cooperation with its neighbors and substantiates the assertion that India’s interests lie in securing its own borders. Another implication derived from this thesis is that India can be expected to further deepen maritime cooperation with the individual countries of Southeast Asia due to the developmental factor driving it; the desire of Southeast Asian countries for enhanced maritime security and naval capabilities places India in a position to take on a greater role in the region and permits India to take advantage of that role. Lastly, the results of this research imply that India’s enhanced role and ambitions in Southeast Asia may not necessarily be a fulcrum to assist the United States in an immediate counterbalancing role against China. Data throughout this thesis suggests that India’s maritime interests are mainly in securing India’s own borders and not balancing against China. The United States’ vision for India to assist in counterbalancing does not seem to be reciprocated by India.

C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

One area for further research that would expand understanding of India’s maritime relations in Southeast Asia would be to look at India’s maritime partnerships with countries that hold congruent interests in the region. For example, examination of the India-U.S. or India-Japan naval relationships and actions in Southeast Asia may provide greater context. Additionally, given that maritime partnership is within the broader domain of security cooperation, further examination of all aspects of security cooperation may provide a more holistic perspective for increased reciprocity in this regard. One way to research security cooperation as a whole would be to undertake research using case studies of claimant and nonclaimant states in the South China Sea disputes. Finally, another interesting area of related study could involve investigating the political limitations within India of furthering maritime cooperation.
APPENDIX. INDIA’S NAVAL EXERCISES AND PORT VISITS WITH AND TO ASEAN STATES FROM 2013–2018

2013

March 17–21 Maiden coordinated patrol (CORPAT) with the Myanmar navy (MN) was conducted near the Great Coco Islands, Myanmar, with INS Baratang and Battimalv and MN ships Aungzeya and Bayintnaung.144

April 18–26 The 16th cycle of INDO-THAI CORPAT was conducted with INS Bitra and His Thai Majesty’s Ship (HTMS) Phuket.145

May 6–26 21st IND-INDO CORPAT was conducted along their international maritime boundary line (IMBL) with INS Mahish, INS Bangaram, and one Dornier. Indonesia participating units were Kapal perang Republik Indonesia (KRI) Pattinunas and one CASA-50 aircraft.146

May 15 Port visit: INS Satpura and INS Kirch visited Singapore for International Maritime Conference and Exhibition (IMDEX) 2013.147

May 16–23 The Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX-13) was conducted in the South China Sea with INS Satpura and Kirch, Royal Singapore Ship (RSS) Steadfast and Valiant (including integral helicopters), RSS Conqueror (submarine), and an aircraft Fokker 50.148

May 26–31 Port visit: Frigate INS Satpura, Rajput class destroyer INS Ranvijay, corvette INS Kirch, and replenishment vessel INS Shakti led by Rear Admiral Ajit Kumar visited Port Klang, Malaysia, as part of a Western Pacific deployment.149


145 Das, “India’s Naval Exercises with ASEAN.”


June 5–8  Port visit: INS Satpura, INS Ranvijay, INS Kirch, and INS Shakti led by Rear Admiral Ajit Kumar visited Danang, Vietnam, as part of a Western Pacific deployment.150

June 10–22  Port visit and exercise: INS Gharial visited Brunei and participated in the ASEAN Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief and Medical Medicine Exercise.151

June 12–15  Port visit: INS Satpura, INS Ranvijay, INS Kirch, and INS Shakti led by Rear Admiral Ajit Kumar visited Manila, Philippines, as part of a Western Pacific deployment.152

September 6–27  22nd IND-INDO CORPAT was conducted along their IMBL with INS Kumbhir, one Indian Dornier, KRI Teiku Umar, and one Indonesian CASA-50 aircraft.153

November 13–18  The 17th cycle of INDO-THAI CORPAT was conducted in the Andaman Sea and exercised counterpiracy, poaching, and arms smuggling. The participating ships were INS Bitra, one Indian Dornier, HTMS Phuket, and HTMS Sriracha.154

November 19–20  Port visit: The 17th INDO-THAI CORPAT closing ceremony was held in Phuket.155


151 High Commission of India, “Brief on India-Brunei Bilateral Relations.”


154 Ministry of Defence, Government of India.

2014

February 2–10  MILAN-2014 was conducted at Port Blair with 14 participating countries: Australia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kenya, Cambodia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, Seychelles, Singapore, Tanzania, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.156

February 13–20  The 2nd cycle of the IN-MN CORPAT (IMCOR) was conducted in conjunction with MILAN-14.157

February 20  Port visit: The 2nd Indian-Myanmar CORPAT closing ceremony was held in Yangon, Myanmar.158

March 28–April 3  Port visit and exercise: INS Sukanya with integral Chetak participated in the six-day exercise, KOMODO-14, at Batam Bay, Natuna Islands, and Anambas Islands. KOMODO-14 consisted of a harbor phase, a sea phase, and a civic mission phase.159

April 16–May 3  23rd IND-INDO CORPAT was conducted along their IMBL with KRI Imam Bonjol, an Indonesian maritime patrol aircraft CN 235, INS Kumbhir, and one Indian Dornier.160

April 30–May 2  Port visit: 23rd IND-INDO closing ceremony was held at Belawan, Indonesia.161

April 1–8  18th INDO-THAI CORPAT was conducted with participating INS Bangaram, one Indian Dornier, HTMS Sriracha, and one RTN Dornier.162


158 Ministry of Defence, Government of India.


161 Sanjib, “CINCAN Attends Closing Ceremony.”

162 Bank of India, Bangkok, “Indo-Thai Coordinated Patrol.”
**May 22–28** SIMBEX–14 was conducted in the Andaman Sea in May 2014 with INS Kuthar, INS Karmuk, an Indian maritime patrol aircraft, and Singapore ships Valour and Independence.\(^{163}\)

**August** Port visit: INS Shivalik, INS Ranvijay, and INS Shakti made a three-day goodwill port visit to Hai Phong, Vietnam, after participating in various exercises including MALABAR-14 in the South China Sea.\(^{164}\)

**August 8–11** Port visit: INS Shakti visited Brunei as a goodwill port call.\(^{165}\)

**August 20–24** Port visit: INS Sahyadri made a port call in Manila, Philippines, on its way back from participating in RIMPAC 14.\(^{166}\)

**September 9–11** 24th IND-INDO CORPAT opening ceremony was held at Port Belawan, Indonesia.\(^{167}\)

**September 9–30** 24th IND-INDO CORPAT was conducted at their IMBL with KRI Pattimura, Indonesian maritime patrol aircraft CN 235, INS Kesari, and one Indian Dornier.\(^{168}\)

**November 18–26** The 19th cycle of INDO-THAI CORPAT was conducted in the Andaman Sea and exercised counter piracy, poaching, and arms smuggling. The participating ships were INS Baratang and HTMS Tayanchol.\(^{169}\)

**November 24–26** Port visit: The 19th INDO-THAI CORPAT closing ceremony was held in Phuket.\(^{170}\)

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165 High Commission of India, “Brief on India-Brunei Bilateral Relations.”


169 Bank of India, Bangkok, “Indo-Thai Coordinated Patrol.”

170 Bank of India, Bangkok.
2015

March 16
Port visit: The 3rd IMCOR opening ceremony was held at Yangon, Myanmar.171

March 16–22
The 3rd IMCOR was conducted in the Andaman Sea.172

March 22
Port visit: The 3rd IMCOR closing ceremony was held at Great Coco Islands, Myanmar.173

April 3–9
The 20th cycle of the INDO-THAI CORPAT was conducted.174

April 16–May 6
25th IND-INDO CORPAT was conducted at their IMBL with INS Cheetah and one Indian Dornier, KRI Tjiptadi, and CN-235 maritime patrol aircraft from the Indonesian side.175

May 4–6
Port visit: The 25th IND-INDO CORPAT closing ceremony was held in Belawan, Indonesia.176

May 18
Port visit: Indian ships arrived for IMDEX-15 and SIMBEX-15 Singapore.177

May 20
SIMBEX-15 was held in the South China Sea with INS Satpura, Kamorta, Ranvir, and Shakti and conducted PASSEXs with Indonesian, Thai, Cambodian, and Australian navies.178

May 22–26
Port visit: Indian ships returned from SIMBEX-15 to participate in IMDEX-15 in the port of Singapore.179

172 Ministry of Defence, Government of India.
173 Ministry of Defence, Government of India.
174 Ministry of Defence, Government of India.
176 Indian Navy, “CORPAT—India-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol.”
179 Ministry of Defence, Government of India.
May 24–28  Port visit: INS *Saryu* participated in the 3rd edition of the ASEAN ARF DiREx-15 in Penang, Malaysia. China, Malaysia, Thailand, and India were the participating countries. The maritime component of the ARF DiREx-15 included search and rescue from a simulated incident.180

May 31–June 4  Port visit: INS *Ranvir* and INS *Shakti* visited Jakarta, Indonesia, as part of their eastern deployment.181

June 17–20  Port visit: INS *Satpura*, Kamorta, Ranvir, and Shakti visited Kuantan, Malaysia, as part of their eastern deployment.182

June 23–27  Port visit: INS *Satpura* and INS *Shakti* visited Sattahip, Thailand, as part of their eastern deployment.183

June 23–27  Port visit: INS *Ranvir* and INS Kamorta visited Sihanoukville, Cambodia, as part of their eastern deployment.184

October 1–3  Port visit: INS *Saryu* entered Port Belawan, Indonesia, for the 26th IND-INDO CORPAT opening ceremony.185

October 3–21  26th IND-INDO EXPANDED CORPAT with the inaugural bilateral exercise element (October 17–18) embedded took place at their IMBL, while the bilateral exercise took place in the Andaman Sea. INS *Saryu* and one Indian Dornier as well as a warship and one maritime patrol craft from the Indonesian side participated.186

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180 Indian Navy, “INS Saryu Participates in Disaster Relief Exercise.”


182 “Naval Ships Enter Kuantan, Malaysia,” Indian Navy, October 29, 2015, https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/naval-ships-enter-kuantan-malaysia.


186 Indian Navy, “CORPAT 2015.”
October 2–6  Port visit: INS Sahyadri visited Da Nang, Vietnam, on a four-day visit as part of operational deployment to the South China Sea and the Northwest Pacific region.187

November 1–4  Port visit: INS Sahyadri visited Manila, Philippines, on a four-day visit as part of operational deployment to the South China Sea and the North West Pacific region.188

November 14–24  The 21st cycle of the INDO-THAI CORPAT was conducted.189

2016

February 13–16  The 4th IMCOR was conducted in the Andaman Sea along the IMBL with participation from INS Saryu, INS Bitra, UMS Aung Zeya, and fast attack craft (FAC) 563.190 The 4th IMCOR was significant in that the Indian navy and the MN signed a standard operating procedure for coordinated patrols during the closing ceremony, marking the third country that India has a formal agreement with for maritime coordinated patrols.191

February 16  Port visit: The 4th IMCOR closing ceremony was held in Yangon, Myanmar.192


April 4–8  Port visit: INS Tir, INS Sujata, Sail Training Ship (STS) Sudarshini, and Indian Coast Guard Ship (ICGS) Varuna of the 1st Training Squadron visited Phuket, Thailand, as part of their overseas deployment.193

April 10–15  Port visit and naval exercise: INS Sumedha and an Indian P8I aircraft participated in the multilateral naval exercise, KOMODO-16, as well as the IFR in Padang, Indonesia.194

April 28–May 19  The 27th IND-INDO CORPAT was conducted at their IMBL with participation from INS Karmuk, KRI Imam Bonjol, and a maritime patrol craft from both countries.195

May 16–19  Port visit: The closing ceremony of the 27th IND-INDO CORPAT was held in Port Belawan, Indonesia.196

April 19–27  The 22nd INDO-THAI CORPAT was conducted at their IMBL with participation from INS Karmuk, HTMS Klaeng, and a maritime patrol craft from both countries.197

May 1  Port visit: INS Airavat arrived in Brunei for the ADMM+ Exercise on Maritime Security and Counter Terrorism.198

May 1–9  INS Airavat participated alongside warships from Brunei, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar, China, Japan, Russia, Australia, Republic of Korea, and the United States in the 2016 ADMM+ Exercise on Maritime Security and Counter Terrorism.199


196 Indian Navy, “INS Karmuk Attends Closing.”


199 Indian Navy, “ADMM Plus Exercise.”
May 9  Port visit: INS Airavat arrived in Singapore for closing ceremony for the ADMM+ Exercise on Maritime Security and Counter Terrorism.

May 30–June 2  Port visit: INS Sahyadri and INS Shakti visited Subic Bay, Philippines, as part of their deployment of the Eastern Fleet to the South China Sea and Western Pacific.

May 30–June 3  Port visit: INS Satpura and INS Kirch visited Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, as part of their deployment of the Eastern Fleet to the South China Sea and Western Pacific.

July 15–18  Port visit: INS Sahyadri, INS Kirch, and INS Shakti visited Port Klang, Malaysia, as part of their deployment of the Eastern Fleet to the South China Sea and Western Pacific.

August 31–September 3  Port visit: INS Satpura visited Singapore as part of their deployment of the Eastern Fleet to the South China Sea and Western Pacific.

October 10–12  Port visit: INS Sumitra visited Surabaya, Indonesia, as part of their deployment to the South Western Pacific Ocean. On departure, INS Sumitra undertook a PASSEX with Indonesian naval ships.

October 10–13  Opening ceremony for the 28th IND-INDO CORPAT was held at Port Belawan, Indonesia.

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200 Indian Navy.


202 Indian Navy, “Visit of Indian Warships.”

203 Indian Navy.


206 Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “INS Sumitra Visits Surabaya.”
October 13–27 The 28th IND-INDO CORPAT and second Bilateral Maritime Exercise was conducted at their IMBL with participation from INS Karmuk, KRI Wiratno, and a maritime patrol craft from both countries.

October 27–31 Port visit: INS Tir, INS Sujata, STS Sudarshini, and ICGS Varuna of the 1st Training Squadron visited Phuket, Thailand, as part of their overseas deployment.

October 31–November 5 SIMBEX-16 was held in the Bay of Bengal with INS Ranvijay, INS Kamorta, one Sindhugosh class submarine, RSS Formidable, and various aircraft. SIMBEX-16 focused on antisubmarine warfare.

November 2–6 Port visit: INS Tir, INS Sujata, STS Sudarshini, and ICGS Varuna of the 1st Training Squadron visited Yangon, Myanmar, as part of their overseas deployment.

November 18–21 The 23rd INDO-THAI CORPAT was conducted at their IMBL with participation from INS Karmuk, HTMS Longlom, and a maritime patrol craft from both countries.

November 22–25 Port visit: The closing ceremony of the 23rd INDO-THAI CORPAT was held in Phuket, Thailand.

December 16–19 Port visit: INS Sumitra visited Jakarta, Indonesia, as part of its deployment to the South Western Pacific Ocean.


209 Naval Today, “Singapore Navy Frigate Comes to India.”


212 Sanjib, “23rd Indo-Thai Coordinated Patrol.”

2017

March 12  Port visit: The 5th IMCOR opening ceremony was held in Yangon, Myanmar.214

March 12–18  The 5th IMCOR was conducted in the Andaman Sea along the IMBL with participation from INS Karmuk, UMS Bangaram, and maritime patrol crafts.215

March 20–26  Port visit: INS Kora participated in Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition in Langkawi, Malaysia.216

April 13  The 24th INDO-THAI CORPAT opening ceremony was held in Phuket, Thailand.217

April 13–21  The 24th INDO-THAI CORPAT was conducted at their IMBL with participation from INS Cheetah, HTMS Longlom, and a maritime patrol craft from both countries.218

May 11–13  Port visit: INS Rajput visited Yangon, Myanmar, for an operational turnaround.219

May 12–21  Port visit: INS Sahyadri and INS Kamorta visited Singapore to participate in the international maritime review and IMDEX-17.220

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218 Ministry of Defence, Government of India.


May 18–24 SIMBEX-17 was held in the South China Sea with participation from INS Shivalik, INS Sahyadri, and INS Jyoti. INS Kamorta, RSN Supreme, RSN Formidable, RSN Victory, and various aircraft. SIMBEX-17 focused on antisubmarine warfare, integrated operations with surface, air and subsurface forces, air defense, and surface encounter exercises.221

May 14–19 Port visit: INS Shivalik and INS Jyoti visit Kuantan, Malaysia, following SIMBEX-17.222

May 9–22 The 29th IND-INDO CORPAT was conducted at their IMBL with participation from INS Utkrosh, KRI Sutedi Senoputra, and a maritime patrol craft from both countries.223

May 22–25 Port visit: The 29th IND-INDO CORPAT closing ceremony was held in Belawan, Indonesia.224

May 26–30 Port visit: INS Sahyadri and INS Kamorta visited Jakarta, Indonesia, as part of their deployment to Southeast Asia and Southern Indian Ocean.225

June 1–5 Port visit: INS Sahyadri and INS Kamorta visited Surabaya, Indonesia, as part of their deployment to Southeast Asia and Southern Indian Ocean.226

June 6–8 Port visit: INS Sumitra visited Yangon, Myanmar, to provide relief assistance post cyclone Mora.227


224 Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “29th India-Indonesia.”

225 Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Eastern Fleet Ships on Overseas.”

226 Press Information Bureau, Government of India.

Port visit: INS Satpura and INS Kadmatt visited Singapore as their first stop of multiple port visits to participate in ASEAN’s IFR in Thailand.228

Port visit: INS Satpura and INS Kadmatt visited Haiphong, Vietnam, on their way to ASEAN’s IFR. The Indian navy preformed drills and conducted a PASSEX with the Vietnamese navy.229

Port visit: INS Satpura and INS Kadmatt visited Manila, Philippines, as part of their deployment to ASEAN’s IFR.230

Port visit: INS Tir, INS Sujata, INS Shardul, and ICGS Sarathi of the 1st Training Squadron visited Penang, Malaysia.231

Port visit: INS Tir, INS Sujata, INS Shardul, and ICGS Sarathi of the 1st Training Squadron visited Jakarta, Indonesia.232

Port visit: STS Sudarshini of the 1st Training Squadron visited Jakarta, Indonesia, as part of their voyage to train junior officers.233

Port visit: The 30th IND-INDO CORPAT opening ceremony was held in Port Belawan, Indonesia.234

The 30th IND-INDO CORPAT and the embedded bilateral exercise was conducted at their IMBL with participation from INS Sukanya, KRI Imam Bonjal, and a maritime patrol craft from both countries.235
November 17–22  INS Satpura and INS Kadmatt visited Pattaya, Thailand, to represent India in ASEAN’s IFR. ASEAN’s IFR at Pattaya Bay commemorated the 50th anniversary of ASEAN.

November 27–30  Port visit: INS Kadmatt visited Sihanoukville, Cambodia, as part of their deployment to ASEAN’s IFR but also to commemorate 25 years of India-ASEAN dialogue.

November 25–28  Port visit: INS Satpura visited Muara, Brunei, following ASEAN’s IFR in Thailand. Following the port visit, INS Satpura conducted a PASSEX with the Royal Brunei Navy.

November 30–December 2  Port visit: INS Kadmatt visited Belawan, Indonesia, following ASEAN’s IFR in Thailand as well as to commemorate 25 years of India-ASEAN dialogue.

December 2–5  Port visit: INS Kadmatt and INS Satpura visited Port Klang, Malaysia, as part of their deployment to ASEAN’s IFR. The navies conducted a PASSEX and a HADR exercise.

2018

January 24–31  The 25th INDO-THAI CORPAT was conducted at their IMBL with participation from INS Saryu, HTMS Longlom, and a maritime patrol craft from both countries.

January 25  INS Sunayna undertook PASSEX with Singapore ship RSS Resolution off Kochi.

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236 Bhattacharjee, “Two Naval Ships Taking Part in Thai IFR.”


238 Parameswaran, “India Warship Makes Brunei Visit.”


240 Outlook, “INS Satpura, Kadmatt on Overseas Deployment.”


January 31  
Port visit: The 25th INDO-THAI CORPAT closing ceremony was held in Phuket, Thailand.\textsuperscript{243}

March 6–13  
MILAN-18 was conducted in the Andaman Sea with participation from the navies of Australia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Myanmar, New Zealand, Oman, Vietnam, Thailand, Tanzania, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kenya, and Cambodia.\textsuperscript{244} Some websites post participation from additional countries in the table top exercise portion.

March 13–18  
The 6th IMCOR was conducted in the Andaman Sea along the IMBL with participation from INS Kulish, INS Baratang, UMS King Sin Phyu Shin, UMS Inlay, and maritime patrol crafts.\textsuperscript{245}

March 18  
Port visit: The 6th IMCOR closing ceremony was held at Great Coco Islands, Myanmar.\textsuperscript{246}

March 31–April 3  
The 1st edition of IMNEX was conducted in Visakhapatnam, India for the harbor phase. INS Sahyadri, INS Kamorta, Indian submarine Sindushstra, UMS King Sin Phyu Shin, UMS Inlay, and various aircraft participated in the sea phase.\textsuperscript{247}

May 2–13  
Port visit and exercise: INS Airavat participated along 18 other navies at ADMM+ Maritime Security and Counter-Terrorism Exercise in Singapore.\textsuperscript{248}

\textsuperscript{243} Indian Navy, “Indo-Thai Coordinated Patrol.”


\textsuperscript{247} Indian Navy, “Indian Navy-Myanmar Navy.”

May 6–8  Port visit: INS Sahyadri, INS Shakti, and INS Kamorta visited Singapore as part of their overseas deployment to Southeast Asia.²⁴⁹

May 13–17  Port visit: INS Sahyadri and INS Shakti visited Sattahip, Thailand, as part of their overseas deployment to Southeast Asia.²⁵⁰

May 14–17  Port visit: INS Kamorta visited Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, as part of its overseas deployment to Southeast Asia.²⁵¹

May 21–25  Port visit: INS Sahyadri, INS Shakti, INS Kamorta visited Da Nang, Vietnam, as part of their overseas deployment to Southeast Asia.²⁵² Some sources claim this was the first naval exercise between the two countries, but little has been revealed.²⁵³

May 24–June 2  The 31st IND-INDO CORPAT was conducted at IMBL with participation from INS Kulish, a KRI vessel, and a maritime patrol craft from both countries.²⁵⁴

June 2  Port visit: INS Satpura visited Singapore as part of its overseas deployment to Southeast Asia. Prime Minister Narendra Modi boarded INS Satpura in Singapore while visiting Singapore to deepen ties.²⁵⁵


²⁵¹ PTI, “Indian Navy Sends Warships to Malaysia.”


²⁵³ Muni and Mishra, India’s Eastward Engagement.


June 6–9 Port visit: The 31st IND-INDO CORPAT closing ceremony was held in Belawan, Indonesia.256

June 16–22 The 26th INDO-THAI CORPAT was conducted at their IMBL with participation from INS Utkrosh, HTMS Longlom, and a maritime patrol craft from both countries.257

June 24–26 Port visit: INS Shakti and INS Kamorta visited Makassar, Indonesia, as part of their overseas deployment to Southeast Asia.258

July 11 Port visit: INS Sumitra visited Sabang, Indonesia, for an operational turnaround. This was the first port visit by an Indian naval ship to Sabang. Both countries agreed that India would develop the Sabang port.259

August 18–20 Port visit: INS Khanjar visited Yangon, Myanmar, for an operational turnaround.260

September 20–October 22 Port visits: INS Tir, INS Sujata, INS Sudarshini, INS Shardul, and ICGS Sarathi deployed in Southeast Asia as part of training deployment and visited Lumut, Malaysia, Singapore, and Jakarta, Indonesia. During the deployment, INS Tir, INS Sujata, and INS Shardul were diverted to Indonesia to provide relief assistance to Sulawesi following a tsunami.261

September 26 Port visit: The 7th IMCOR opening ceremony was held in Yangon, Myanmar.262


259 Bagchi, “INS Sumitra Enters Indonesia’s Sabang Port.”


September 26–29  The 7th IMCOR was conducted in the Andaman Sea along the IMBL with participation from INS Kulish, INS Battimalv, a UMS vessel, and maritime patrol crafts.²⁶³

September 27–30  Port visit: INS Rana visited Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, on its way to IFR in South Korea.²⁶⁴

September 30  Port visit: The 7th IMCOR closing ceremony was held at Coco Island, Myanmar.²⁶⁵

October 11  Port visit: The 32nd IND-INDO CORPAT opening ceremony was held in Belawan, Indonesia.²⁶⁶

October 11–27  The 32nd IND-INDO CORPAT was conducted at their IMBL with participation from INS Kulish, KRI Kapitan Pattimaru, and a maritime patrol craft from both countries.²⁶⁷

November 12–15  Port visit: INS Rana visited Surabaya, Indonesia, for the harbor phase of the inaugural bilateral exercise entitled Samudra Shakti.²⁶⁸

November 16–18  The inaugural bilateral exercise, Samudra Shakti, sea phase, saw participation from INS Rana, KRI Sultan Iskandar Muda, and various aircraft and conducted helicopter operations, a surface warfare exercise, an antisubmarine exercise, and antipiracy exercises.²⁶⁹

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²⁶³ Indian Navy, “7th India-Myanmar Coordinated Patrol.”


²⁶⁵ Indian Navy, “7th India-Myanmar Coordinated Patrol.”


²⁶⁹ Rahmat, “India, Indonesia Hold Inaugural Edition of Exercise.”
November 10–21

SIMBEX-18 was held in the Bay of Bengal and was the largest SIMBEX ever conducted. INS Ranvijay, INS Satpura, INS Sahyadri, INS Kadmat, INS Kirch, INS Sumedha, INS Sukanya, INS Shakti, INS Sindhukirti (submarine), and various Indian naval aircraft represented the Indian participation. RSS Formidable, RSS Steadfast, RSS Unity, RSS Vigour, RSS Valiant, RSS Swordsman (submarine), a deep-sea rescue vehicle, and various aircraft represented the RSN’s participation.²⁷⁰

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