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The Role of Australian and Indonesian Strategic Culture in the Borneo Confrontation and the East Timor Crisis

BY

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The undersigned certify that this thesis meets master's-level standard of research, argumentation, and expression.

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ABSTRACT

This study undertakes an analysis of the influence of Indonesian and Australian strategic cultures on their decision-making during the Borneo Confrontation (1963-66) and the East Timor Crisis (1975-1999). The study examines the individual roles of historical/geographical, institutional, and geopolitical factors that shaped each state's respective culture, while also identifying other "intervening variables" that explain where strategic culture did not influence decision-making. Specifically, this thesis looks to answer the following question: How did Indonesian and Australian strategic culture influence the decisions to use force in the Borneo Confrontation and the East Timor Crisis? Secondly, extrapolating from these results, the study will address a further question; what insights can this provide for future Indonesian-Australian relations?

To achieve this objective, the paper divides the study into six chapters: Background Information, Indonesian Strategic Culture, Australian Strategic Culture, Analysis of Influence during the Borneo Confrontation, Analysis of Influence during the East Timor Crisis, and Conclusions. Given the length of the East Timor Crisis, and the shifts in decision-making observed, the analysis covers factors in 1975 and 1999 separately.

The conclusion of this study is that Indonesian and Australian strategic cultures did influence the initial decisions to use (or not use) force in both case studies. For Indonesia, institutional factors proved most influential, followed by historical/geographical factors, and lastly geopolitical factors over the course of both cases. In contrast, for Australia, historical/geographical factors ranked highest, followed by geopolitical, and finally institutional factors. Interestingly, for both states, decision-making during at least one of the case studies involved the resolution of conflicting strands of strategic culture. Additionally, intervening variables such as an Indonesian government coup or Australian public opinion, altered both states' decisions at some point during the cases studies. Finally, great power attention also proved to be an interesting intervening variable to bring an end to the East Timor crisis. Application of these conclusions to future Indonesian-Australian relations suggests that the states' underlying strategic cultures have not only remained relatively constant since 1963, but they will always risk conflicting over regional issues like the two case studies examined.

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Introduction

> *[T]he study of strategic culture… should enable us to better understand ourselves, to better understand others, and (scarcely less important) to better understand how others interpret us.*
>
> Colin Gray

On 12 May 1989, the Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, described the unique relationship between Australia and Indonesia: "No two neighbours anywhere in the world are as different, in terms of history, culture, population, language, and political and social traditions, as Australia and Indonesia."[1] The diverse Australian and Indonesian histories, cultures, and political/social constructs that Evans described shaped those nations' preferences for the use of military force, forming their strategic culture. Using strategic culture as a lens, this study aims to answer the following question: How did Indonesian and Australian strategic culture influence the decisions to use force in the Borneo Confrontation and the East Timor Crisis? Subsequent case study analysis generates several conclusions. First, both nations exhibited several strands of strategic culture, identified through three determining factors that shaped the respective preferences for force; historical/geographical, institutional, and geopolitical. Both case studies showed evidence of these multiple preferences either aligning or opposing during state decision-making. Second, it became clear that intervening variables played a role in either shifting or resolving these conflicting preferences. Finally, observation of permanent shifts in the strategic culture of both nations occurred; in Indonesia's case this shift occurred sharply, whereas Australia's shift occurred more gradually. Given these findings, the study concludes with considerations on how they impact future Australian-Indonesian relations. Through a strategic culture lens, this thesis discovered that

[1] Desmond Ball and Helen Wilson, eds., *Strange Neighbours: The Australia-Indonesia Relationship* (North Sydney, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin Australia, 1991), 1.

Australian-Indonesian relations have and will continue to be defined by aligned, shifting, and opposing preferences.

Chapter 1

Background

The concept of strategic culture refers to a nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements, and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat and use of force.

Ken Booth

Indonesia

Figure 1: Map of Indonesia

Source: CIA World Factbook

The Dutch colonized the Indonesian archipelago in the early 17th century until Japanese occupation during World War II (1942 to 1945).[2] Following Japanese surrender, Indonesia declared its independence but it took four years of violent struggle

[2] "The World Factbook: Indonesia" (Central Intelligence Agency, December 12, 2017), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html.

with Dutch forces, along with UN mediation before the Netherlands finally agreed to transfer sovereignty in December 1949.[3]

The Republic of Indonesia is situated in South East Asia between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Indonesia is the world's largest archipelagic state with 13,466 islands, consisting of 54,716 km of coastline.[4] The population of Indonesia is over 260 million, ranking at fourth largest in the world.[5] Indonesia is comprised of hundreds of ethnic and linguistic groups, the dominant being Javanese.[6] Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim-majority nation, with 87% of the population Muslim, with the remainder consisting of Protestant, Roman-Catholic, Hindu, and other minority religions.[7] Indonesia is the world's third most populous democratic nation, with the largest economy in South East Asia and the world's 16th largest by nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP).[8] Indonesia currently commits 0.8% of GDP to military expenditure.[9]

Internationally, Indonesia is a member of several multilateral organizations including the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Group of Twenty (G20).[10] Additionally, Indonesia is a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), East Asia Summit (EAS), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC).[11]

Australia

Originally inhabited by native Aboriginals, Australia observed European exploration in the 17th century. In 1788, the British claimed the east coast of Australia,

[3] "The World Factbook: Indonesia."
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] "World Economic Outlook Database" (International Monetary Fund, October 2017), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/02/weodata/.
[9] "The World Factbook: Indonesia."
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.

soon followed by six other British colonies on the continent.[12] Federation of the six British colonies formed the Commonwealth of Australia on 1 January 1901.[13]



Figure 2: Map of Australia

Source: US Department of State

Australia resides in Oceania bordered by the Indian and Pacific Oceans. As the world's smallest continent, but sixth-largest country, Australia is also the largest country without land borders, boasting 25,760 km of coastline.[14] The population of Australia is just over 23 million, with 75% comprising of Australian, English, or European ethnicity.[15] Approximately 50% of the population are Protestant, Roman Catholic, or Christians, 30% secular, and the remaining are religious minorities (2.7% Muslim).[16] Australia has a historically strong economy, largely unaffected by the global financial crisis, ranking as the world's 13th largest economy by nominal GDP.[17] Australia's defense budget currently comprises 2% of GDP.[18]

[12] "The World Factbook: Australia" (The Central Intelligence Agency, December 12, 2017), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/as.html.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] "World Economic Outlook Database."
[18] "The World Factbook: Australia."

Regionally and internationally, Australia has a large presence in multilateral organizations including the UN, WTO, IMF, G20, ASEAN (dialogue partner), and APEC just to name a few. Australia has free trade agreements (FTAs) with China, Korea, Japan, Chile, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States, and is currently negotiating with Indonesia.[19]

Strategic Culture

Since Jack Snyder first coined the term in his 1977 report, *The Soviet Strategic Culture*, strategic culture has been a widely defined and contested concept. For the purposes of this work, the definition of strategic culture is in accordance with Snyder's intent, but narrowed to include Colin Gray's contributions, specifically, application of strategic culture to include how it affects a state's use of military force. Gray defined strategic culture as "the modes of thought and action with respect to force, [that] derives from perception of the national historical experience, aspiration for self-characterization, and from all the many… experiences (of geography, political philosophy, of civic culture, and "way of life") that characterize a… citizen."[20] Ken Booth offers a more succinct definition that is adopted for this study – "The concept of strategic culture refers to a nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat and use of force."[21] Furthermore, Booth attributes the formation of a state's strategic culture to its history, geography, and political culture, representing the "aggregation of the attitudes and behavior of the most influential voices; these may be, depending upon the nation, the political elite, the military establishment and/or public opinion."[22] Importantly, to remove any debate surrounding the use of the term "culture," Snyder's later work clarified his intent. Snyder's use of the term culture was to suggest that "once a distinctive strategy takes hold, it tends to persist despite changes in circumstances that gave rise to it, through processes of socialization and

[19] "The World Factbook: Australia."
[20] Gray, Colin, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," *International Security* 6, no. 2 (Fall 1981): 22.
[21] Carl G. Jacobsen, ed., *Strategic Power: USA/USSR* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 121.
[22] Ibid.

institutionalization."[23] In summary, strategic culture consists of the dominating beliefs and attitudes derived from geographical, historical, or political factors that shape or influence how a country perceives, protects, and promotes its interests and values with respect to the threat and use of force.[24]

"Strategic culture 'shapes' but does not 'determine' behavior."[25] The intent of this thesis is not to engage in the international relations (IR) debate regarding how the concept of strategic culture compares to other IR theories and concepts, but rather to use strategic culture as a useful IR lens to analyze and identify trends in the historical relationship between two neighboring states that may be useful in negotiating future interactions. In doing so, the acknowledgement of the terminology used in the chosen strategic culture definition is important. Acknowledgement that strategic culture may only influence or shape a state's behavior, regarding the threat or use of force, acknowledges that other factors may be equally as important. Snyder, in his original work, maintained that regarding certain issues, intervening variables may override strategic culture tendencies.[26] Booth, in his co-edited book with Russell Trood, *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, identified several of these other variables as strategic rationality, bureaucratic politics, and technological dynamism.[27] Therefore, this study considers other intervening variables that may complement, conflict with, or negate strategic culture's shaping effect. While intervening variables may limit strategic culture's influence, acknowledgement that strategic culture is subject to change is equally important.

As geographical, historical, and political factors continually change so, too, does a nation's strategic culture. Although the previously identified definition includes the idea that strategic culture will persist despite changes in the circumstances surrounding its

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[23] Jacobsen, *Strategic Power,* 4.
[24] Desmond Ball, *Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region: With Some Implications for Regional Security Cooperation*, Working Paper / The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre 270 (Canberra: Australian National Univ, 1993), 4.
[25] Ken Booth and Russell B. Trood, eds., *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 12.
[26] Snyder, Jack L., "The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations" (RAND, September 1977), 10.
[27] Booth and Trood, *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 12.

formation, particularly dramatic events such as wars, technological innovations, or revolutions will shift a nation's strategic culture, albeit often slowly.[28] There must be an acknowledgement of this slow rate of change inherent in strategic culture in any analysis over a large historical period, and this acknowledgement only provides weight to the value in regularly updating strategic culture analysis of relevant foreign states. As a result, this analysis considers any possible shifts in strategic culture during the period of the state interactions studied.

Finally, the chosen definition of strategic culture highlights a consideration for analysis. The wide range of inputs that shape strategic culture suggests that it is highly unlikely that a single preference for the use of force may emerge. As Alastair Johnston highlighted, "…it would be more logical to conclude that the diversity of a particular society's geographical, political, cultural, and strategic experience will produce multiple strategic cultures."[29] With this consideration in mind, the respective strategic cultures of Indonesia and Australia are analyzed through a lens of three separate factors of influence; historical/geographical, geopolitical, and institutional.

Why Strategic Culture as a Lens?

Strategic culture offers an alternative concept for examining IR problems, avoiding some pitfalls of applying Western IR theory to non-Western nations, and providing a lens for comparing strategies between two states. In Snyder's pioneering work on strategic culture, he concluded that the Soviet Union did not behave according to rational choice theory and strategic culture offered a useful explanation for its nuclear strategy.[30] Snyder suggested that key decision-making individuals within the Soviet Union were "socialized into a distinctively Soviet mode of strategic thinking."[31] Snyder's first use of the concept of strategic culture explained the strategic thinking of an adversary where traditional rational choice theory could not. Blind application of

[28] Booth and Trood, 12.
[29] Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 38, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539119.
[30] Lawrence Sondhaus, *Strategic Culture and Ways of War*, Cass Military Studies (London: Routledge, 2006), 1.
[31] Gray, Colin, "National Style in Strategy," 21.

Western IR theory models to non-Western states risks the same problem faced by Snyder in his report to the United States Air Force on Soviet nuclear strategy.

Desmond Ball, in his working paper "Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region," identified the many differences between the strategic cultures of the West and those of nations in the Asia/Pacific region. For example, Ball noted that South East Asian strategic culture includes "longer time horizons and policy perspectives than those which characterize Western thinking and planning."[32] Policy-makers in many of these countries are not constrained by three- or four-year election cycles, like those faced by Western governments.[33] There is value in comparing the strategic culture of one's own state against another of interest, as the key differences between the two may provide valuable insight into future policy-making. Colin Gray summarizes, "the study of strategic culture… should enable us to better understand ourselves, better to understand others, and (scarcely less important) better to understand how others interpret us."[34] This thesis aims to achieve Gray's proposal, by considering how the strategic cultures of Australia and Indonesia respectively have shaped foreign relations between the two countries and what insights this provides for the future.

[32] Ball, *Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 3.
[33] Ibid., 3.
[34] Gray, Colin, "National Style in Strategy," 46.

Chapter 2

Indonesia's Strategic Culture

> *These doctrines (Archipelagic Outlook, National Resilience, and Total People's Defence) are characterized by self-reliance and an inward-looking strategic posture, based on an assumption on the unity between the military and civilians.*
>
> Dewi Fortuna Anwar

To understand Indonesia's strategic culture requires identifying the earliest point of influence on it as a nation. Although Indonesia's history as a sovereign nation is quite short, the influences of colonial rule over the archipelago extends back centuries. To establish a baseline for the first case study in 1963, an examination of Indonesian strategic culture will occur up until this point. Differing factors that influenced the formation of this culture – historical/geographical, geopolitical, and institutional – are analyzed respectively here for use during the latter case studies. This study leverages existing works on Indonesian strategic culture for this purpose, rather than attempting to establish this baseline from first principles.

Historical/Geographical Factors

Due to the density of historical influence on Indonesia's strategic culture up until 1963, this study segments this factor as described by Anwar's chapter contribution to Booth and Trood's edited book, *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*. The three major elements of historical influence upon Indonesia's strategic culture are: Dutch colonialism, Japanese occupation, and Indonesia's struggle for independence.[1]

[1] Ken Booth and Russell B. Trood, eds., *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 203.

Dutch Colonialism

The experience of three centuries of Dutch colonial rule is the single-most influential element of Indonesia's birth as a nation and ongoing strategic culture. Indonesia's colonial history forged a strong sense of nationalism and an underlying distrust of foreign nations, laying the foundations for the *Ketahanan Nasional* (National Resilience) doctrine, the first of three key concepts framing Indonesian strategic culture for years to come.[2] Since the first conquest of Batavia (now Jakarta) in 1619 to the submission of Aceh in 1904, Dutch colonial forces managed to govern over 300 culturally distinct ethnic groups living among the 13,000 islands of the modern-Indonesian archipelago. The ability for the Dutch to rule these once-independent ethnic communities for so long was largely due to culturally-diverse groups being historically divided.[3] A lack of unity between pre-colonial states – shaped by differences in language, culture, religion, and sometimes resulting in war – allowed the Dutch to conquer the region piecemeal over the course of several centuries, forming the Netherlands East Indies.[4] As a result, the Indonesian people identified national unity as the prerequisite for independence, the only perceived path to breaking free of the hardships and humiliations suffered under colonial rule.[5] Indonesia's state ideology, *Pancasila* (The Five Principles: Belief in One God, Humanitarianism, Indonesian Unity, Democracy, and Social Justice) attempted to capture this national unity in 1945 as a "compromised formula to appease both proponents of an Islamic state and those in favor of a more secular nationalism."[6] *Pancasila* states that all Indonesians must follow a religion, but may have complete freedom of choice of religion, promoting religious tolerance and harmony between all different groups and cultures.[7]

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[2] Booth and Trood, 203; Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture: Ketahanan Nasional, Wawasan Nusantara, and Hankamrata*, Australia-Asia Papers, no. 75 (Nathan, QLD, Australia: Griffith University, Faculty of Asian and International Studies, Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, 1996), 2.
[3] Booth and Trood, *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 200.
[4] Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture*, 5.
[5] Booth and Trood, *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 203.
[6] Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture*, 6.
[7] Ibid., 6.

Furthermore, the uniting principles of *Pancasila* helped to strengthen national unity through a second key concept, *Wawasan Nusantara* (Archipelagic Outlook).[8] Although not formally declared until 1957, the Archipelagic Outlook concept's roots spawned from Indonesia's national motto, *bhinneka tunggal ika*, roughly translating as "unity in diversity."[9] Later, the formal declaration of the concept would stress the sovereignty of an archipelagic Indonesian state, that "all waters around, between and connecting, the islands or parts of islands belonging to the Indonesian archipelago irrespective of their width or dimension are…subject to the absolute sovereignty of Indonesia."[10] Ironically, it was the Dutch rulers that generated many of the conditions that allowed this idea of national unity to flourish.

Consolidation of the Netherlands East Indies in the early twentieth century saw improvements in transport, communication, and education that brought the peoples of the archipelago together and built the foundations of a single Indonesian consciousness that would spark the nationalist movement. As the Netherlands East Indies existed to exploit opportunities in international trade, the modernization of transport and communications naturally followed as a requirement.[11] Additionally, to allow the children of indigenous nobilities to work for the Dutch administration, establishment of a system of modern education followed.[12] The combination of these factors allowed bright young students from various regions to come together and form the basis for Indonesian nationalism that saw its earliest beginnings in 1908.[13] The lack of work for newly educated Indonesians, combined with preferential treatment of Europeans in education and salaries constituted the early grievances of an early nationalist movement.[14] Unknowingly, the Dutch "helped open up one great channel into which the many local-based antagonisms and grievances resulting from contact with the alien ruler could flow."[15]

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[8] Ashley J. Tellis et al., eds., *Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific*, Strategic Asia 2016–17 (Seattle ; Washington, D.C: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2016), 173.
[9] Ibid., 173.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture*, 11.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid., 10.

Over the next several decades, two additional sources of nationalism spawned from early Islamic and Communist political movements. First, as the most widespread religion within the indigenous people of Netherlands Dutch Indies, Islam offered the "most tangible common denominator" for the diverse population.[16] The politicizing of Islam revealed itself in the formation of several Islamic parties, the most important being the *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (PNI or Indonesian Nationalist Party), founded in 1928.[17] Secondly, the communist party of Indonesia, formed in 1920, *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI or Communist Party Indonesia), would also prove to be an influential force in Indonesia's ongoing struggle for independence in the years to follow.[18] The increasing unification of the Indonesian people's voice, materialized in growing numbers of nationalist movements and political parties, marked the foundations of an independence movement that would shape Indonesia's strategic culture for the next century. The events of World War II in the Pacific, however, would ultimately be the catalyst for the Indonesian revolution.

Japanese Occupation

In the eyes of the Indonesian people, the Japanese invasion of the Netherlands East Indies ultimately represented the replacement of one resource-greedy colonial power with another, however the end of WWII created a window of opportunity for Indonesia's long-wanted independence. Initially, the Indonesian people positively viewed the Japanese defeat of Dutch forces.[19] Indonesians were hopeful that another Asian power would be sympathetic to their plight for independence. Soon, however, the Japanese motivation for resources to support the Pacific War was apparent; local men became "economic soldiers" of Japan, working in mines and plantations to extract oil, rubber, tin, and other raw materials in Southeast Asia.[20] Forcibly removed from their families, sometimes as far away as Burma and Thailand, these Indonesian men left families

[16] Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture*, 11.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture,* 12; Florence Lamoureux, *Indonesia: A Global Studies Handbook*, Global Studies (Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-CLIO, 2003), 40.
[19] Lamoureux, *Indonesia*, 36.
[20] Ibid.

starving at home due to the Japanese soldiers receiving priority in food distribution.[21] Under these conditions, revolutionary movements continued to grow during the Japanese occupation, the most powerful of which being the PNI, led by a former young engineer named Sukarno.[22] Sukarno had a charming personality and had become widely recognized as the voice of Indonesia's independence while continuing to broadcast his revolutionary message via radio during the Japanese occupation.[23] When Japan surrendered to the Allies in Indonesia on 15 August 1945, Sukarno and the PNI declared Indonesian independence two days later, on 17 August 1945, still celebrated as *Hari Merdeka*, Independence Day.[24] An Indonesian declaration of independence would only be the start of a long journey, however, one which would not culminate until many years later.

The Struggle for Independence

Despite hesitant international support, Indonesia's successful revolutionary struggle against superior Dutch forces imbued Indonesia with a strong sense of nationalism and self-reliance. Following the Japanese surrender in 1945, the Allied powers allowed the Dutch to return to their former colony despite the recent Indonesian declaration of independence.[25] The Netherlands and the United States were allies standing against the Soviet Union in the coming Cold War.[26] Moreover, the Dutch had convinced the United States that the most powerful Indonesian revolutionary parties were communist.[27] Dutch forces subsequently returned to Indonesia, but this time were met with a passionate, revolutionary population. Supported by the Indonesian people in a campaign of guerilla warfare, the "poorly armed and trained Indonesian militia" managed to wear down the superior Dutch forces over the ensuing years.[28] In the eyes of the international community, the high costs of the Second World War had been a price

[21] Ibid., 37.
[22] Lamoureux, *Indonesia*, 33.
[23] Ibid., 37.
[24] Ibid., 38.
[25] Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture*, 13.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.

worthy of freedom. There was, therefore, little sympathy for the Dutch struggle in Indonesia, and in 1948, following India and Australia's calls to bring the matter before the United Nations, the Dutch signed the Renville Treaty, signifying a cease-fire in the conflict.[29]

Faced with a perception that the Renville Treaty was a compromise to Indonesia's independence, cracks within the unity of the revolution began to appear. Notably, the communist PKI called for allegiance with the Soviet Union to help defeat the colonial Dutch.[30] When, in 1948, the PKI attempted to overthrow Sukarno as leader of Indonesia's independence movement, Sukarno, backed by the Indonesian people, defeated the communist attempts at power.[31] The defeat of the attempted communist takeover had a positive impact on the United States, who subsequently would finally support Indonesian independence aspirations, pressuring the Netherlands to negotiate.[32] In December 1948, the Dutch broke the UN cease-fire and captured Sukarno and several key Indonesian revolution leaders, invoking even greater international outrage.[33] Succumbing to international pressure, including US threats of withdrawing Marshall Plan aid to Holland, the Netherlands transferred sovereignty of the Dutch East Indies to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia on 27 December 1949.[34]

Characterized by centuries of Dutch colonialism, Japanese occupation, and a four-year fight for independence post-WWII, the Indonesian independence experience shaped Indonesia's strategic culture through the ideas of strong nationalism and self-reliance. By the 1970s, these ideals had cemented themselves within the *Ketahanan Nasional* (National Resilience) doctrine.[35] Additionally, the resilience of the Indonesian guerilla forces and wider population against the better equipped Dutch, imbued a strong sense of self-confidence and belief that Indonesian future defense must rely on the "unity between

[29] Lamoureux, *Indonesia*, 40.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture*, 13.
[33] Lamoureux, *Indonesia*, 41.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Booth and Trood, *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 204.

the armed forces and the civilian population."[36] The revolutionary experience, therefore, also gave birth to the final of three key concepts shaping Indonesia's strategic culture – *Hankamrata*, or Total People's Defense doctrine.[37]

Institutional Factors

The strong political influence of the Indonesian military, shaped by the military's role in the nation's formative years, imprinted heavily upon Indonesia's strategic culture. The rise of the Indonesian military within the political system occurred because of its role in establishing order following a perceived failure of the civilian leadership to quell the internal rebellions of conflicting political entities. Following Indonesia gaining independence in 1949, various political parties competed for national power while the government proved unable to rehabilitate the war-ravaged economy.[38] These entities represented five main political streams within Indonesia: radical nationalism (Sukarno), Javanese traditionalism, Islam, Democratic Socialism, and Communism.[39] The period 1950-57 represented an era of instability that culminated with various regional rebellions, the most serious of which pitched Sukarno's Java-based PNI, in allegiance with traditionalist Islamists and the communist PKI, against Masyumi, a modernist Islamic party, in coalition with the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI).[40] Due to US-allied concerns of communist influence in Indonesia, the Masyumi-led rebellion (known as the *Permerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia/Perang Rakyat Semesta* PRRI/PERMESTA; or, Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic/Universal People's War), drew covert support from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, as well as arms supplies from Malaysia and Singapore.[41] In 1957, restless with incompetent civilian leadership, the Indonesian Army Central Command initiated martial law and quickly suppressed the rebellions, and once again asserted its authority over the outlying territories.[42] The Indonesian military's success was rewarded by President

[36] Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture*, 13.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Booth and Trood, *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 206.
[39] Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture*, 16.
[40] Ibid., 17.
[41] Ibid., 1, 18.
[42] Ibid., 19.

Sukarno with shared power under the new era of Guided-Democracy beginning in 1959. During Sukarno's Guided-Democracy era, the Indonesian military shared power in a more authoritarian style government than the failed liberal-democratic experiment from 1950-59.[43]

The internal power struggle of Indonesian politics during the 1950s prevented any significant influence of the political institution on strategic culture. The military's role in thwarting the regional rebellions and associated political instability gained the Indonesian Army most of the influence that shaped the strategic culture leading into the 1960s. Despite the alliance of the communist PKI and Sukarno's PNI parties emerging to lead the Guided-Democracy era, the communist politicians also failed to significantly influence the resultant strategic culture. Much suspicion of the communist-PKI party remained following the attempted coup over a decade earlier, reducing subsequent communist influence to mostly domestic politics. To manage this suspicion, Sukarno relied largely upon the Indonesian military to keep the PKI in check.[44]

By the early 1960s, the Indonesian military, having gained significant political power, emphasized a strategic culture that recognized the need for "internal stability rather than security from an external enemy," strengthening the military's role in the doctrines of National Resilience and Total People's Defense.[45] Acutely described by Anwar, the experiences of Indonesia since the 1945 declaration of independence embodied "strong prejudice against communism, a deep suspicion of Islam, hostility towards liberalism and antagonism towards regional demands for autonomy," while leaving the government and army "…suspicious of foreign involvement in Indonesia's domestic affairs."[46] Similar to the historical and institutional factors that shaped Indonesia's strategic culture, the geopolitical factors also began during the quest for independence.

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[43] Booth and Trood, *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 206.
[44] Leading into the 1960s, Sukarno did hold significant power through his authoritarian-style, military backed, Guided-Democracy government. Sukarno's individual influence on Indonesia's strategic culture however is assessed to be largely in step with the historical factors already assessed. Sukarno's preferences echoed the nationalism and self-reliance ideals that identified foreign, communist, and Islamic extremist influence as a threat to Indonesian security.
[45] Booth and Trood, *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 206.
[46] Ibid.

Geopolitical Factors

The United States' hesitation to support Indonesia's 1945 declaration of independence, combined with the 1948 communist party revolt, and the Western allied support for the rebellion of the late 1950s, forged Indonesia's strategic distrust of major powers – East or West – and their associated political systems – Communist and Liberal-Democratic. As previously described, Indonesia's struggle for independence left the Indonesian government suspicious of the United States and communist motivations. The United States, led by the Dutch to believe the new independent Indonesia was communist-backed, failed to support the revolutionary government in its quest for independence.[47] It was not until 1948, when the Indonesian government defeated a communist attempt at overthrowing the government, that the United States finally agreed to pressure the Netherlands into granting independence to the South East Asian state.[48] While the Indonesian nationalist leaders expressed their gratitude towards the United States for this long-awaited support, the experience highlighted the fact that major powers would only support Indonesia when it was in their own interests.[49] Indonesia could not rely upon foreign powers for its own national survival. Furthermore, Sukarno and his nationalists interpreted the attempted communist PKI power-grab during a time that the country was fighting the Dutch for independence as the ultimate betrayal, instilling a deep suspicion of Indonesian communist entities for decades to come.[50]

A decade later, the covert and not-so-covert support to the PRI/PERMESTA regional rebellions provided by the United States, the United Kingdom, and its allies further fed Indonesia's distrust of foreign powers. The actions of Western powers, fueled by concerns over communist elements within Sukarno's government, only magnified the suspicion of Indonesian leaders that colonial or world power interests always drive Western foreign power intervention.[51]

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[47] Booth and Trood, *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 204.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid., 205.
[51] Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture*, 30.

Geopolitically, by 1962, the lessons learned from the period of independence through to the late 1950s crafted a distrust of both foreign power intervention into Indonesian domestic affairs and communism's influence on political stability. Indonesia interpreted the wider influences of the Cold War as having a greater emphasis on foreign power decisions regarding Indonesia than the interests of Indonesia itself. Evidence of this emerging strategic culture is Indonesia's early involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the United Nations. In 1955, at the Bandung Asia-Africa Conference in West Java, Indonesia played a key role in the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement; "countries that did not want to be clients of either the USSR or the USA in the Cold War."[52] NAM resolutions – one on peaceful coexistence and the other on decolonization – promoted by Indonesia, influenced similar UN General Assembly resolutions at the time.[53] Indonesia's key role in the formation of NAM and promotion of its values in the UN, demonstrate its strategic distrust of Cold War powers, shaped by their own geopolitical experiences and strategic culture.

Summary

Historically, Indonesia's Dutch-colonial experience, Japanese occupation, and the struggle for independence all contributed to the nation's belief that coming together as one Indonesian people, and fighting for their nation's survival, independent of foreign power support, demonstrated strong nationalism and a unique attribute of resilience. Furthermore, the guerilla-style warfare that proved successful in wearing down the Dutch colonial army showed that mobilizing the entire population could achieve future security for the diverse archipelagic nation. Finally, the long struggle for independence taught Indonesians that the Islamic and Communist political factions did not represent the wider religious and cultural tolerance required of *Pancasila* principles, and therefore threatened maintaining the unity of such a culturally diverse nation. Historically, the concepts of National Resilience and Total People's Defense shaped Indonesia's strategic culture.

These historical experiences were fundamental in shaping Indonesia's civilian-military relations. The Indonesian military's role in mobilizing the population against the

[52] Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 126.
[53] Lamoureux, *Indonesia*, 165.

Dutch, putting down a communist revolt, and stamping out the rebellion, cemented the army's beliefs that the civilian leadership had demonstrated weakness, and future survival of an independent Indonesia depended upon a more active role by the military. By 1962, the Indonesian military had key roles in the concepts of National Resilience and Total People's Defense, maintaining an inward-looking security posture characterized by deep suspicions of political Islam, communism, regional desires for autonomy, and foreign intervention in Indonesia's domestic affairs.

Indonesia's lessons in geopolitics only strengthened the already emerging strategic culture. Foreign powers would only support Indonesia when it furthered their own Cold War or colonial interests. The influences of communism within the Indonesian political system and foreign power intervention in Indonesian affairs both threatened Indonesia's journey for independence, and continued to threaten Indonesia's future.

By the early 1960s, Indonesia's strategic outlook identified that its own nationalism and resilience, combined with civil-military unity in defense, had been the key to breaking free from the chains of Western colonialism. Strategically, Indonesia decided it must look internally to maintain national security, remaining suspicious of Islamic and communist political influences, and ever wary of foreign powers' attempts to meddle in Indonesia's domestic affairs.

Chapter 3

Australia's Strategic Culture

...the paradox of geographical proximity to, but cultural distance from, Asia and of geographical distance from, but cultural intimacy with, the Anglo-Saxon heartlands has been at the centre of Australia's security dilemma.

Michael Evans

Australian history as a sovereign nation, like Indonesia's, is short when compared to many other middle power states. Despite Australia being a British colony since 1788, the development of its own unique strategic culture only began after it gained independence in 1901. Once again, this study includes the influence of several factors of Australian strategic culture: historical/geographical, geopolitical, and institutional. Consistent with chapter two, to establish the baseline for the case studies in chapters four and five, this study leveraged the existing works of several authors focusing on Australian strategic culture.

Historical/Geographical Factors

Geography and history played a major role in the development of Australia's strategic culture. The evolution of these factors and their respective influence on Australian preferences for the use of force in 1963 becomes clear when examined over two distinct periods, from independence to WWII, and from WWII to 1963.

From Independence to WWII – Anxiety and Dependence

Firstly, Australia's geographical situation founded a strategic culture characterized by anxiety and dependence. As described earlier, Australia is a vast country and a continent whose land mass encompasses almost 20% of the earth's globe.[1]

[1] Kilcullen, David, "Australian Statecraft: The Challenge of Aligning Policy with Strategic Culture," *Security Challenges*, Vol. 3 No. 4, November 2007, 50.

In 1960, Australia's population was a little over 10 million, making it one of the most sparsely populated countries in the world.[2] Then, as now, over half the population lived on the 2,500-kilometer east coast strip from Brisbane down to Melbourne.[3] Any perceived threat to the country would most likely arrive from the north.[4] Australia's small and geographically isolated population contrasted against the vastness of the continent and established the initial strategic dilemma; how could the nation realistically defend itself?[5] This geographical reality morphed into national anxiety that shaped Australia's strategic culture.

The history of Australia's colonization meshed with geographic realities created a unique paradox that fueled the anxiety and dependence and in turn shaped the nation's strategic culture. Michael Evans identified this paradox as a "clash between Asian geography and European history."[6] As described by Evans, "the paradox of geographical proximity to, but cultural distance from, Asia and of geographical distance from, but cultural intimacy with, the Anglo-Saxon heartlands has been at the centre of Australia's security dilemma."[7] Australian officials exhibited knowledge of this geography-history dilemma. In 1922, the Minister for Defence, George Pearce outlined the problem; "We are of European race. Our fathers came from Europe; we have grown up to think as Europeans, and our interests have been centered in that group of nations from which our stock has come. Whilst racially we are European, geographically we are Asiatic."[8] Australian anxiety spawned from the geographical proximity to a culturally diverse region, fueling a dependence upon a geographically remote, but culturally-alike British people. This emergence of a unique strategic culture manifested itself in early foreign policy.

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[2] "Population Pyramid," https://www.populationpyramid.net/australia/1965/, accessed 7 March 2018.
[3] Nick Bisely, "Australia's Strategic Culture and Asia's Changing Regional Order" (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2016). 5.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Evans, Michael, "The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia's Strategic Culture and Way of War," (Duntroon, Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2005), 25.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.

Analysis of Australian foreign policy up until 1945 highlights both the regional anxiety and the British dependency of the newly independent nation. Australia existed as a British colony from 1788 until the federation of the colonies in 1901, and establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia as a dominion of the British Empire. Importantly, this meant that Britain continued to legislate Australian foreign policy until 1939, when Australia adopted Britain's 1931 Statute of Westminster which severed most Australian constitutional ties to Britain, and granted full legislative independence.[9] After gaining independence from Britain in 1901, Australia's early immigration policy represented Australia's anxiety while its national security policy defined its dependence. The 1901 Immigration Restriction Act, commonly referred to as the "White Australia Policy," was the first act passed by the new Commonwealth Parliament and restricted non-white immigration to the nation until the mid-1960s.[10] The maintenance of a European-centric society was Australia's domestic policy response to alleviate the nation's fears characterized by a lack of understanding and trust of Asians.[11] In addition to enforcing a "white Australia" through immigration, policy-makers would depend upon Australia's founding fathers for security from a perceived Asian invasion threat.

A proximity to a feared Asian culture and an inability to defend so much territory with so few people, Australia would depend upon a strong British sponsor, cementing this sponsorship through a policy of forward defense. Nick Bisely, among other authors on Australian strategic culture, highlighted that the forced British settlement of the continent emerged as an analogy that would play into Australia's insecurity. Bisely suggests that "Australians are haunted by the idea that what the British did to the indigenous population could well happen to them… a recognition of the land's inherent vulnerability, which is what after all brought the country into being."[12] An existing

[9] "Statute of Westminster 1931" (Legislation, Goverment of United Kingdom), accessed May 7, 2018, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1931/4/pdfs/ukpga_19310004_en.pdf.
[10] Marcelina Mastalerz, "Strategic Culture, Identity, and the Shaping of Security Policy: A Comparative Study of Australia and New Zealand" (Wellington, New Zealand: Victoria University of Wellington, 2008), 30.
[11] Desmond Ball and Helen Wilson, eds., *Strange Neighbours: The Australia-Indonesia Relationship* (North Sydney, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin Australia, 1991), 161.
[12] Bisely, "Australia's Strategic Culture," 5.

anxiety of Asian neighbors, fueled by analogies of Australia's colonization, forced Australian leaders to look to what Sir Robert Menzies, twice Australian Prime Minister, would refer to as a policy of "great and powerful friends."[13] This policy, known as forward defense, encapsulated British-provided Australian maritime security in return for millions of dollars in payment and a pledge of Australian troops to wherever Britain may require.[14] Andrew MacIntyre, in his chapter contribution to *Strange Neighbours*, summarized this arrangement, "Britain's wars were automatically Australia's."[15] Australians honored this agreement fighting alongside British forces in the Sudan (1885), the Boer War (1899-1902), the Boxer Rebellion (1900), the First World War (1914-1918), and the Second World War (1939-45).[16] The power-shifting implications of the Second World War, however, resulted in adjustment of this forward defense policy.

From WWII to 1965 – Increased Anxiety and a Shift in Dependence

The Japanese aggression in the Pacific during World War II (WWII) cemented the existing Australian anxiety over its Asian neighbors, but more importantly initiated a shift in dependence from Britain to the United States, while also highlighting a need for increased self-defense. In 1942, the Japanese conducted 64 bombing raids on the north-Australian city of Darwin, killing 243 and wounding over 400 citizens.[17] Also, that year, Sydney and Newcastle on Australia's east coast, experienced Japanese raids.[18] Although Japan did not have the logistical means to seriously threaten an invasion of Australia, the first (and only) direct military attacks on continental Australian soil legitimized the anxiety within Australian strategic culture. Australian strategic anxiety had morphed from the fear of invasion to the vulnerability of Australian territory to physical attack. The ability of Australia's small military capability to defend the vast, sparsely populated northern coastline was in question without great power assistance. Subsequently, the fall of the British Empire in Singapore exemplified the war's impact on Britain's power in the

[13] Ken Booth and Russell B. Trood, eds., *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 273.
[14] Jeffrey S. Lantis and Andrew A. Charlton, "Continuity or Change? The Strategic Culture of Australia," *Comparative Strategy* 30, no. 4 (September 2011): 297, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2011.605019.
[15] Ball and Wilson, *Strange Neighbours*, 165.
[16] Booth and Trood, *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 276.
[17] Mastalerz, "Strategic Culture, Identity, and the Shaping of Security Policy," 31.
[18] Ibid.

region. Not only was Australia's anxiety heightened, but the policy solution, which relied upon dependence, was in question. The result was a two-pronged revision in foreign policy; a shift in dependence to the new great power and an increased focus on Australia's self-defense.

Post WWII, Australia's strategic culture was conflicted in two elements of foreign policy, forward defense, and continental defense; a dichotomy of strategy that still exists today. Prior to WWII, an imperial obligation drove Australia's forward defense policy, whereas after, shaped by a recent memory of Japanese aggression, a rise of communism in the region, and a new US-led global order, Australia looked to forward defense in terms of addressing national security.[19] In a shift away from British reliance, Australia was, for the first time, participating in international society as a truly independent nation. Following aggressive diplomatic courting, Australia forged a new great power relationship with the United States, and replaced the British Imperial military expeditionary commitments with those that supported the new American-influenced global order. Australia's strategic culture favored the commitment of military force in support of the new international order, or American interests directly, in exchange for a pledge of US security of Australian interests. In 1950, Australia's commitment of the army, navy, and air force to the Korean War, where 17,000 Australians served, is the first example of this new forward defense commitment. Australia's immediate response to the UN-led Korean conflict helped convince the United States of the value in a future partnership, with the Australia New Zealand United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) cementing this relationship a year later.[20] Australia, however, still had a residual anxiety of the Japanese attacks of WWII, which developed a conflicting strategy of homeland defense as opposed to expeditionary forces.

Australia's WWII experience revealed that a dependence on a foreign power was not a complete strategy – Australia had to develop a military that could defend the nation directly. Author Coral Bell described the formative period of Australian strategic

[19] Bisely, "Australia's Strategic Culture," 6.
[20] Ibid.

thinking as "the six months between Pearl Harbor and the US victory in the naval battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942."[21] Bell surmised Australia's realization that the sea-air gap surrounding the nation was the key to homeland defense, and that an "advanced air and naval capacity" was the solution to this problem.[22] The military capability requirements of this new continental defense policy somewhat contradicted forward defense. Evans described Australia as a "liminal state" in this regard – Australia's foreign policy on the threshold between that which supported the international order through forward defense-orientated expeditionary forces, and that which bolstered immediate defense of the state via air and sea superiority.[23] The geopolitical implications of the emerging Cold War would further imprint on Australia's anxiety, dependence, and the policy of forward defense.

Geopolitical Factors

Australia's existing strategic culture, which, fed by anxiety and dependence, featured commitment of expeditionary military forces to support a great power partnership, and naturally aligned with the geopolitical realities of the time – the emerging Cold War. The expansion of communism to Asia, in addition to existing turmoil in South East Asia following the crumbling of colonial footholds, added to Australia's extant strategic anxiety. In recognition of a defense-in-depth strategy, Australia's provision of military forces supporting US-led international objectives contributed directly towards a "stable regional balance of power, open and freely transversable sea lines of communication, and a broadly liberal international order" – all elements unachievable by a solely Australian military force.[24]

Furthermore, Australian leaders took seriously the notion which Bell referred to as a "Beijing-Jakarta axis; that is, a sort of revolutionary alliance between the PKI (Communist Party) in Indonesia and the Maoists in China to evict what were called the

[21] Desmond Ball and Andrew Carr, *A National Asset: 50 Years of the Strategic and Defense Studies Centre* (Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, 2016), 3.
[22] Ibid., 3.
[23] Evans, "The Tyranny of Dissonance," 26.
[24] Bisely, "Australia's Strategic Culture," 10.

'old established forces' (i.e. Western powers)."[25] The Korean War founded the first whispers of communism in the Asia-Pacific, shifting the gaze of the United States to the region for what was to be decades to come. The recent war in the Pacific had demonstrated Australia's strategic geographic significance, ensuring a future Australian-US partnership would produce "strategic depth" in an emerging Asian-proxy Cold War.[26] As David Kilcullen identified, Australia's commitments to future conflicts in East and South-East Asia (SE Asia) were in line with forward defense policy and produced "an implicit strategic guarantee, and on the broader understanding that support for the democratic world against Communism was most likely to create a secure and viable environment for Australia's interests."[27] The geopolitical implications of the Cold War strengthened Australia's current strategic culture in forward defense – as a young contributor to the new liberal-democratic international order, Australia's preference was to commit military forces in return for a broader security arrangement with its new "great and powerful friend," the United States.[28]

Institutional Factors

Up until 1963, Australia's short history embellished the role of the military in Australian culture, while limited international engagement experience post-WWII constrained political leadership to a small community in agreement on the use of Australia's limited military force. Bisely claimed that "the role that the military has come to play in managing Australia's anxieties is one of Australian strategic culture's central features."[29] Through its expeditionary history, the military's place in the Australian national identity shaped the public's unconscious acceptance of the "legitimacy of the use of military force as a tool of statecraft."[30] Bell correctly described Australians as not a militaristic people, but a people who take pride in military traditions.[31]

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[25] Ball and Carr, *A National Asset*, 9.
[26] Ball and Wilson, *Strange Neighbours*, 162.
[27] Kilcullen, David, "Australian Statecraft," *Security Challenges*, Vol. 3 No. 4, November 2007, 54.
[28] Booth and Trood, *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 273.
[29] Bisely, "Australia's Strategic Culture," 10.
[30] Ibid., 8.
[31] Ball and Carr, *A National Asset*, 11.

The Gallipoli Campaign, as commemorated by the ANZAC tradition, became the dominant icon of the Australian national identity. As a new nation, Australians adopted the ANZAC ideal as a symbol of the sacrifice, bravery, and loyalty of Australian "diggers" – the colloquial name given to the Australian soldiers who fought in the First World War and subsequent conflicts – and the role of the broader military in forging the nation's international identity.[32] After all, as Bell rightly describes, "historically speaking, Australia is a bit short on drama: no Declaration of Independence and no civil war."[33] Etched into the Australian national consciousness was the sending of expeditionary forces around the world, which as Bisely describes, "means that the kinds of questions about military power that are raised in countries with a stronger pacifist sensibility are at best marginal in Australia."[34] The use of force in issues of foreign policy is an element of Australian strategic culture which is rarely up for public debate. Similarly, the Australian political domain also demonstrated a lack of debate regarding the use of force like that of the Australian public.

In 1963, the Australian government had less than 20 years of independent foreign policy experience which resulted in a narrow frame of reference for debate on the use of military force other than that already established by the existing strategic culture. Australia's youth as a strategically independent nation had restricted the formation of opposing political party ideals, independent think tanks, a broader range of defense-reporting media, and the energetic public debate that these institutions spark. Bisely appropriately describes this environment; "the point is not that strategic debate in Australia is dominated by a narrow, self-selecting "politico-military" elite that echoes back to government the prevailing wisdom; rather, it is that the small number of voices shaping strategic policy in government is mirrored by a small community of experts."[35] An example of this lack of debate was Australia's decision to commit troops to the Korean War in 1950. Worried about an imminent British decision to enter the war,

[32] Bisely, "Australia's Strategic Culture," 8; Booth and Trood, *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 276.
[33] Ball and Carr, *A National Asset*, 11.
[34] Bisely, "Australia's Strategic Culture," 8.
[35] Ibid., 8.

Australian parliament hurriedly approved Australian military commitment, becoming the second nation to commit support to the UN behind the United States. This quick decision-making intended to obtain "favorable reactions from the United States."[36]

By 1963, the Australian government had limited exposure to the commitment of force in support of foreign policy (Malaya and Korea), and much of the wider foreign policy engagement was under frameworks such as the UN or SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), both ultimately US-initiated institutions to which Australia supported under a forward defense doctrine. In summary, Australia's political institutions had little influence on shaping strategic culture. Up until WWII, foreign policy was largely the under the purview of Britain. Following WWII, Australian legislative and executive systems of government largely reflected the existing strategic culture forged from historical, geographical, and geopolitical factors already discussed. The Australian government's limited experience in international policy-making and general agreement within the political community and wider public on commitment of military force reinforced the existing strategic culture through forward defense policy.

Summary

The geography of the Australian landscape and the history of the young independent nation both significantly fed into the development of anxiety which subsequently reflected itself in a dependence upon first the British, and later the United States. This anxiety and dependence, which formed the backbone of Australia's strategic culture, evolved into a policy of forward defense, a policy that shifted from expeditionary force in the service of British imperial interests to use of the same force to defend the US-led international order in conflicts within the Asia-Pacific region. WWII provided Australian policy-makers the realization that to defend the continent from future aggression, like that witnessed by the Japanese, Australia required a more independent military capability, reflected in the policy of continental defense. The combination of forward defense and continental defense portrayed the paradox in Australian strategic

[36] "Australians and the Korean War," Menzies video footage, http://tlf.dlr.det.nsw.edu.au/learningobjects/Content/R11341/object/r4544.html.

culture, focus on security within the immediate region, or rely on great and powerful friends.

Geopolitically, the Cold War injected fear into an already anxious nation. The spread of communism into East and South East Asia fed directly into Australia's existing apprehension regarding its culturally, and now politically diverse northern neighbors. The Cold War intensified Australia's commitment to a forward defense policy, as defending the international order through the UN represented defending US-interests. Supporting the United States through commitment of military force to conflicts such as Korea, directly resulted in increased US commitment to Australian security through the signing of the ANZUS Treaty.

Finally, strong public acceptance of the use of force in Australian foreign policy, combined with a narrow range of common political ideology regarding policies of forward defense and continental defense, strengthened the existing strategic culture within these institutions. Public and political debate regarding the commitment of military force rarely occurred in the lead-up to the first case study for analysis in 1963 – the Borneo conflict.

Chapter 4

Case Study I: Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation

…to crush Malaysia, we must launch a confrontation in all fields. We cannot talk sweetly to the imperialists.

Indonesian President, Sukarno

It is our intention that the primary responsibility should remain with Britain and that we should tag along very much in second place accepting no more than we have to to preserve our forward defense posture.

Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Sir Hastings Harrington

The first case study will examine how the previously-identified factors that developed Indonesia's and Australia's respective strategic cultures influenced the decisions by these nations to commit forces in the Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation.

Background

The Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation was an undeclared war initiated by Indonesia in response to the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia, fought largely on the border between the two nations on the island of Borneo from 1963-1966 (see Figure 3).[1] President Sukarno declared the implementation of Indonesian policy known as *Konfrontasi* against Malaysia on 20 January 1963.[2] *Konfrontasi*, or confrontation, was a widely-used term in Indonesia that "referred to the diametrically opposed differences

[1] Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, *Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya & Borneo 1950-1966*, The Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts, 1948-1975 (St. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1996), xiv.
[2] Nicholas Van der Bijl, *Confrontation: The War with Indonesia, 1962-1966* (Barnsley [England]: Pen & Sword Military, 2007), 37.

between conservative traditionalism and liberal thought and expression."[3] Many westerners who misinterpreted the term typically regarded confrontation as "a direct threat or open hostilities."[4] Sukarno, through *Konfrontasi*, hoped to achieve political success through a combination of diplomatic lobbying and economic or military threats; a tactic with proven success in the annexation of West Irian (or West New Guinea) only a year prior.[5] Sukarno and President Diosdado Macapagal of the Philippines both saw a British-supported independent Malaysia as a threat to their aspirations for a South Asia federation, a plan that would encompass Malaya, British North Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines, named *Maphilindo*.[6] British North Borneo however, had no ambitions to form an alliance with Indonesia and the Philippines, and supported the newly proposed Malaysian Federation with a stable and economically viable Malaya that had achieved its own independence in 1957.[7]

Brunei, also a British protectorate on the island of Borneo, faced its own revolt as a prelude to Konfrontasi in 1961. Guerilla forces, opposed to the proposed inclusion of Brunei into the Federation of Malaysia, and suspected of having Indonesian training and assistance, attempted to take control of the Brunei government and key oil reserves.[8] The poorly executed revolt failed quickly following support of British forces from Singapore. Ultimately, however, the failed revolt may have influenced the Sultan of Brunei's decision not to join the proposed federation, having already gained executive authority powers for management of internal affairs from Britain in 1959.[9] This revised protectorate remained until Brunei gained full independence from Britain in 1984.

The Confrontation, best described as a low-intensity conflict, saw Indonesian guerilla forces and British Commonwealth forces clash in the jungles of North Borneo. Limited Indonesian incursions in the Malayan peninsula also occurred when Sukarno attempted to escalate the conflict. Australia's military commitment in 1964 initially

[3] Van der Bijl, *Confrontation,* 16.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid., 24.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid., 29.
[9] Ibid.

consisted of combat support (Royal Australian Navy, combat engineers, and air transport) until the eventual decision to deploy combat forces in 1965 (3rd Battalion Royal Australian Regiment and 1st Squadron Special Air Service).[10]

Figure 3: Island of Borneo

Source: Wikimedia Commons

In 1965, following an attempted communist-led coup that killed several top Indonesian generals, the Indonesian Army, under General Suharto initiated a power-transition that by 1966 had ceded presidential powers away from Sukarno and destroyed the remaining elements of the PKI communist party. Suharto, accepting that Confrontation had run its course, recognized the Federation of Malaysia, and ended the hostilities on 12 August 1966. Australian military forces fought under British Commonwealth leadership from 1964 until the conflict's end in 1966. *Konfrontasi*

[10] Dennis and Grey, *Emergency and Confrontation*, 203, 237.

claimed the lives of 19 British, 43 Gurkha, 22 Australian, and 7 New Zealander Commonwealth soldiers.[11] Estimates of Indonesian losses included 590 killed, 222 wounded, and 771 captured.[12]

Indonesia's Strategic Culture Influence

Influence of Historical/Geographical Factors

Did the historical and geographical factors that shaped Indonesia's strategic culture influence its decision to commit military force in the Confrontation with Malaysia?

Indonesia's own strategic culture highlighted how nationalism and resilience had been key factors in allowing Indonesia to break free of Western imperialism earlier in the century. Sukarno, as the first Indonesian leader post-independence, strongly incorporated this anti-colonialist rhetoric into his own nationalistic propaganda campaign to bolster the *Pancasila* principles of national unity. The proposed formation of a Federation of Malaysia, which incorporated former British colonies in North Borneo bordering on the Indonesian province of Kalimantan, therefore invigorated analogies of a Dutch-colonial East Indies for many Indonesians. On several occasions, there was evidence of this prevalence of thinking among Indonesian leaders, consistent with existing strategic culture.

Firstly, on 20 January 1963, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio declared that Malaya represented the "accomplices of neo-colonists and neo-imperialist forces that were hostile to Indonesia."[13] Secondly, at the Manila Conference in June 1963, Subandrio, in conference with the Philippine and Malayan foreign ministers, and to the detriment of the proceedings, focused on highlighting Malaya's reliance upon Great Britain, and the Philippines' close connection with the United States, most notably through SEATO.[14] Author Nick van der Bijl found that these comments were in line with existing anti-colonialism rhetoric in support of a united Indonesian national identity.[15]

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[11] Van der Bijl, *Confrontation,* 241.
[12] Ibid., 242.
[13] Ibid., 37.
[14] Ibid., 64.
[15] Ibid.

On 27 July 1963, President Sukarno, in his "*Ganjung Malaysia*" (Crush Malaysia) campaign, used anti-colonial rhetoric; "…to crush Malaysia, we must launch a confrontation in all fields. We cannot talk sweetly to the imperialists."[16] Again, a year on, following the failure of the Toyko Summit to resolve the crisis, the Indonesian Foreign Minister remarked, "Confrontation goes on…as Indonesia's determined answer to neo-colonialist subversion and encirclement tactics."[17]

Moreover, after nearly two years of conflict, Indonesia's efforts to diplomatically isolate Malaysia at the NAM and the UN both demonstrated continued narrative influenced by a strategic culture of anti-colonialist sentiment. At the second NAM conference in October 1964, as described by a journalist a year later, President Sukarno delivered a speech focused on "one-side fulminations against imperialism."[18] Finally, in January 1965, after failing to prevent Malaysia's acceptance onto the UN Security Council, Indonesia left the UN, citing as a reason, "this international body being manipulated by colonial and neo-colonial powers."[19] The influence of recent history also most likely strengthened this perception of Western power imperialism.

The direct and indirect British and American support to the PRRI/PERMESTA rebellions in Indonesia only six years earlier fed Sukarno's feelings of distrust of the West, including a planned return of imperialism to South East Asia. Anwar's analysis of Indonesian strategic culture identified that the formation of Malaysia represented a direct threat of "returning colonial domination."[20] Despite statements from the United States and Great Britain of non-intervention in Indonesian sovereignty from either the Philippines or Malaysia, Indonesian leaders saw the retaining of British bases in the new state, combined with US-presence in the Philippines and Australians to the south as an encirclement of hostile forces.[21] Combined with the recent Western power support of the 1957 regional rebellions, the Indonesian suspicion of British intentions shaped Sukarno's

[16] Van der Bijl, *Confrontation,* 64.
[17] Michael Leifer, "Indonesia and Malaysia: The Diplomacy of Confrontation," *The World Today* 21, no. 6 (June 1965), 253, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40393740.
[18] Ibid., 256.
[19] Ibid., 257.
[20] Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture*, 30.
[21] Van der Bijl, *Confrontation*, 68; Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture*, 30.

decision-making in implementing *Konfrontasi*, reinforced by the existing strategic culture which leveraged a history of anti-colonialism.

Indonesia's historical focus on the national geographical and cultural unity that fostered independence was the second element of Indonesian strategic culture that influenced Indonesia's Confrontation against Malaysia. Fueled by the nationalism and *Pancasila* principles that represented Indonesia's successful independence, Indonesian leaders "revived the ideas of a 'greater Indonesia'…to argue that much of the Borneo territory was part of Indonesia."[22] Embracing the idea of "one Indonesia," Sukarno always believed that the British colonies on Borneo would join the Republic of Indonesia, uniting the island.[23] The recent success of Indonesian annexation of West Irian a year earlier, also most likely played directly into Sukarno's decision to employ *Konfrontasi* against Malaysia in Borneo.

Influence of Institutional Factors

Did the institutional factors that shaped Indonesia's strategic culture influence its decision to commit military force in the Confrontation with Malaysia?

Institutional factors that influenced Indonesia's strategic culture shaped the commitment of military force to the *Konfrontasi* conflict in two ways, a communist-PKI influence on Sukarno to initiate *Konfrontasi*, and the military's preference for a focus on internal security that ultimately ended the campaign. The influence of institutional factors on Indonesian strategic culture highlight an interesting point regarding the use of force in Confrontation against Malaysia. Power of influence in government ultimately resolved the differing preferences for the use of force between state institutions. The power shift between these two Indonesian institutions – the PKI communist party and the Indonesian Army – that occurred amidst the Malaysian Confrontation ultimately also shifted the strategic culture and subsequently ended the conflict.

The strategic culture preferences of the communist PKI aligned with those of Sukarno, reinforcing the domination of those anti-colonialist views within the Indonesian government. The PKI's support of Sukarno's preference for force in preventing the

[22] Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 150.
[23] Florence Lamoureux, *Indonesia: A Global Studies Handbook*, Global Studies (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003), 62.

formation of a Malaysian state however, existed as part of a secondary agenda. The Indonesian Army had long held suspicions of PKI intent, fed by an attempted communist coup earlier in Indonesia's history. Communism had been growing in SE Asia, and there were many suspicions of links between the PKI and the Chinese Communist Party. However, the communist PKI party had increasingly gained power in the Indonesian government since its alliance with Sukarno and the Indonesian Army in putting down the recent 1957 rebellions. The deteriorating economic conditions in Indonesia also resulted in increased support for a communist-based system that would claim to disperse limited wealth and commodities more equally among the population. Additionally, Sukarno, although still wary of an increasingly powerful communist faction, used the PKI's political power to help keep a powerful Indonesian Army in check.[24] The Indonesian Army, suspicious of PKI-intent, had a preference against the use of force in dealing with Malaysia, a contrary strategic cultural influence that eclipsed that shared by Sukarno and the PKI by the end of the campaign.

The Indonesian military's historical role in securing the nation's independence, including halting a Communist-led coup, and a rising rebellion, shaped a strategic culture that heavily reflected an inward-looking security posture that conflicted with Sukarno's preference for the use of force in *Konfrontasi*. Evidence of this opposing strategic culture is evident throughout the Confrontation campaign. In an invidious position from the outset, the Indonesian Army, although faced with a preference not to use force in any disputes with a future Malaysia, could not be seen to be undermining the national aspirations as represented by the President and a strong PKI political base.[25] The Indonesian Army had established doctrine around the ideas of national resilience and total people's defense well suited to low-intensity conflict and guerilla-style warfare as established during the nation's fight for independence. This doctrine lent itself to dealing with internal security threats, including the annexation of West Irian a few years earlier. Indonesian military leaders, however, were concerned about the potential escalation of

[24] Ashley J. Tellis et al., eds., *Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific*, Strategic Asia 2016–17 (Seattle ; Washington, D.C: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2016), 179.
[25] Van der Bijl, *Confrontation*, 133.

Confrontation, in particular the capabilities of well-established and seasoned Commonwealth forces.[26] Low-intensity conflict doctrine that shaped the current Indonesian Army's capability was not compatible with a "Crush Malaysia" campaign.[27] The Indonesian military's historical preference for the use of force had therefore shaped the composition of the military organization and capabilities that did not operationally support a potential clash with conventional Western forces.

Moreover, an increasing transparency of the Indonesian Army's view resulted in a decreased involvement in Sukarno's decision-making as escalation of *Konfrontasi* continued. For example, General Yani was not aware of the Indonesian military landings on the Malaya peninsula in 1964. Sukarno had bypassed elements of the military command chain, confirming the military leadership's concerns that they were being cut out of planning altogether. Faced with military operations unsuited to existing doctrine and capabilities, key Indonesian Army leadership saw a risk of being drawn into a campaign far wider than originally perceived. In response to an increasingly disillusioned military leadership, elements of the Indonesian Army began to discreetly hold peace talks with Malaysia from mid-1964 onwards.[28]

The memory of a 1948 communist-inspired coup that shaped the strong distrust of the PKI among the Indonesian Army formed another element of the army's strategic culture. Combined with the army's role in declaring martial law to put down the 1957 rebellions, the Indonesian military had a strong preference for the use of force against what it perceived as the state's greatest threat – internal unrest as a threat to governance. Communism, and the PKI as its government sponsor, represented this threat, a threat which was validated in 1965 when PKI elements sprung a *coup d'etat*, executing six senior Indonesian generals.[29] The PKI-coup failed however, largely due to the survival of the Army Strategic Reserve Commander, Lieutenant General Suharto.[30] Suharto and his forces were primarily responsible for dealing with internal unrest and attempted coups.

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[26] Van der Bijl, *Confrontation,* 124.
[27] Ibid., 124.
[28] Ibid., 164.
[29] Ibid., 201.
[30] Ibid., 202.

Suharto re-took control of the government, and over the following months conducted a purge of PKI members and supporters with estimates ranging anywhere between 80,000 and 1 million killed.[31] Once again in Indonesian history the army had protected the state's sovereignty and independence from the forces representing external influence – communism.

The 1965 communist coup attempt reinforced the Indonesian Army's existing strategic culture that identified domestic instability as the nation's greatest threat, validating the lack of support for *Konfrontasi* against Malaysia, and cementing this preference in a new doctrine – a requirement for military involvement in governance beyond just military matters, known as *Dwi Fungsi* or Dual Functions doctrine.[32] Despite claiming a lack of knowledge of the PKI-plot, President Sukarno lost the faith of the Indonesian Army, and its new leader Suharto. Over the next 18 months, through a series of political maneuvers, Suharto wrestled all remaining power from Sukarno, with a formal Presidential decree transferring government power to Suharto in March 1966.[33] The Indonesian Army's strategic culture visibly emerged only a month later, with Suharto stating that he would recognize the state of Malaysia.[34] The army-led Indonesia now considered concerns of communism in SE Asia as a greater threat than British or United States imperialism. In fact, many Indonesian military leaders saw Western power presence in the region as a stabilizing function against the threat of communism. With a new preference regarding the use of force in the international arena, Suharto's new army-led government ended *Konfrontasi* on 12 August 1966.[35]

The most influential element of Indonesian strategic culture during *Konfrontasi* was the marked shift in preference sparked by a violent transfer of government power that also ended the campaign – identified as an intervening variable. Surprisingly, this shift in dominant strategic culture occurred not because of *Konfrontasi* itself, but rather a communist-inspired coup that would impact upon the Indonesian memory and strategic

[31] Van der Bijl, *Confrontation,* 203.
[32] Booth and Trood, *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 207.
[33] Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 160.
[34] Van der Bijl, *Confrontation*, 231.
[35] Ibid., 236.

outlook, more than jungle warfare with Malaysia. Entering 1962, anti-colonialism and the external threat this represented to Indonesia and the region dominated Indonesia's strategic culture. President Sukarno and the PKI elements of his government both shared this anti-colonial rhetoric, which dominated the view of Malaysia's federation. Although the Indonesian Army shared a more internal security strategic culture, this would not prevail until the purge of the communist-PKI members of government in 1966, immediately affecting Indonesia's decision to continue the Borneo confrontation against Malaysia.

Influence of Geopolitical Factors

Did the geopolitical factors that shaped Indonesia's strategic culture influence its decision to commit military force in the Confrontation with Malaysia?

Geopolitical factors of Indonesia's strategic culture did not emerge to shape Indonesia's preferences to commit force to *Konfrontasi*, other than those wider Cold War considerations that influenced the ideology of the PKI communists through the institutional factors already discussed. The PKI, like the Soviet Union, Chinese, and other regional communist parties, objected to a "politically powerful and culturally influential Malaysia," given communist ambitions for expansion throughout SE Asia.[36] In the Cold War context, obviously, the democratic states welcomed Malaysia as a buffer against the increasing influence of communism in the same region.[37] Other than this existing ideology of the PKI communists, and the resultant influence of their relative power with Sukarno, the other elements of existing geopolitically influenced strategic culture were not entirely apparent. The "inward-looking" preference to use force to fight internal rebellion, or foreign powers attempting to influence Indonesian domestic politics, was irrelevant due to the external nature of Malaysia's quest for federation. As these aspects of strategic culture, represented by National Resilience and Total People's Defense doctrines, were largely relevant to the Indonesian Army, it is not surprising that the military never really had a preference for force against a Malaysian federation not perceived as a threat to domestic security or as a counter to Western "imperialists."

[36] Van der Bijl, *Confrontation,* 67.
[37] Ibid.

Summary

Analysis of the Indonesian decision to conduct the Borneo confrontation reveals strategic preferences that originated primarily from historical and institutional factors. While there were conflicting preferences for the use of force between elements of Indonesia's government – historically influenced anti-colonialism for Sukarno/PKI versus "inward-looking security" for the Indonesian Army – the preference for the use of force against what was a perceived British imperialist move to North Borneo held the balance of power in 1962. Interestingly, however, the unsuccessful 1965 communist-led coup, identified as an intervening variable, validated the army's preference for prioritization of internal security, confirming the suspicions of communist factions and the concerns of wavering civilian leadership. A subsequent power shift in government made the military more active in governance, and the new preference for a focus on internal security not only ended the conflict, but dominated Indonesia's strategic culture for decades under Suharto and the Dual Functions doctrine. This finding challenges the widely-accepted assumption that strategic culture evolves slowly over time. This research highlights that varying conflicting elements of strategic culture can exist, the most dominant preference shifting with associated power changes within government. When government power shifts quickly and violently like that seen during Indonesia's coup, the strategic preferences of the military that rose to power changed the strategic culture with the associated rapidity.

Anwar concludes that many Indonesians see Sukarno's Konfrontasi as an "aberration" that contradicted the nation's proud heritage of independence and regional leadership.[38] In addition, the military exploits of Sukarno destroyed the economy and Indonesia's international political standing. The PKI-coup however dominates Indonesian memories more than the Borneo conflict. As authors of Emergency and Confrontation, Dennis and Grey describe, "the traumatic events of 1 Oct 1965 and its

[38] Ken Booth and Russell B. Trood, eds., *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 203; Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture: Ketahanan Nasional, Wawasan Nusantara, and Hankamrata*, Australia-Asia Papers, no. 75 (Nathan, QLD, Australia: Griffith University, Faculty of Asian and International Studies, Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, 1996), 31.

aftermath serve to overshadow the ground war in Kalimantan almost completely."[39] The transfer of power that took place under the umbrella of Konfrontasi, served as an emotional catalyst that would narrow Indonesia's preference for the use of force for years to come.

Impact on Indonesia's Strategic Culture

Indonesia's strategic culture evolved following the conflict with Malaysia, a shift sparked by the Confrontation itself, but cemented by the rise of the military leadership that followed. The failed communist coup intervened in Indonesian strategic culture, signaling the end of Sukarno's Guided-Democracy era and the beginning of the "New Order" political system under military leadership and guidance.[40] In retaliation for the communist betrayal, the military killed or arrested PKI leaders, banning the PKI from future political roles.[41] The Indonesian army then cemented political control when General Suharto replaced Sukarno as Indonesian President. A new Indonesian political system known as the New Order emerged, in which the military influence extended beyond just military matters. During the New Order the army developed the *Dwi Fungsi* or Dual Functions doctrine which legitimized the military domination of all aspects of Indonesian national life.[42] A 1966 Indonesian Army seminar described the new role;

> The army, which was born in the cauldron of the Revolution, has never been a dead instrument of the government concerned exclusively with security matters. The army, as a fighter for freedom, cannot remain neutral toward the course of state policy, the quality of the government, and the safety of the state based on Pancasila [i.e. the general principles of belief in one God, humanitarianism, national unity, representative and consultative government, and social justice]. The army does not have an exclusively military duty but is concerned with all fields of social life.[43]

Under Suharto, and the New Order, the Indonesian Army embraced a socio-political role in addition to the traditional role of defense. The dominating strategic

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[39] Dennis and Grey, *Emergency and Confrontation*, 321.
[40] Desmond Ball, *Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region: With Some Implications for Regional Security Cooperation*, Working Paper / The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre 270 (Canberra: Australian National Univ, 1993), 20.
[41] Booth and Trood, *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 207.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ball, *Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 20.

culture under this new military-dominated leadership was focused around the traditional doctrines of National Resilience and Total People's Defense, to challenge the threat of internal unrest, whether driven by internal or external groups. Communism was the primary threat of external influence, although suspicion still existed regarding Western foreign powers intentions. The decision never to host US, British, or other foreign bases or forces in sovereign Indonesia is evidence to this fact. Despite this lack of trust, the New Order leadership privately admitted to a sense of security through Western presence in the SE Asia, as a barrier against communism.[44]

Post-*Konfrontasi*, the Dual Functions doctrine, in addition to National Resilience and Total People's Defense, characterized Indonesia's self-reliant and inward-looking strategic culture. Indonesia continued to deny foreign intervention in their domestic affairs, suspicious of foreign-power intentions. Likewise, Indonesia promoted this idea within the region, evidenced in the inclusion of the idea of "non-interference" in the ASEAN charter in 1976.[45] Article 2(c) of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South East Asia, signed in 1976, states that "non-interference in the internal affairs of one another" is a "fundamental principle" guiding the relations of the contracting Parties.[46] As Anwar summarized, "New Order Indonesia does not equate military power with national prestige in international politics. This is a reaction to the earlier Sukarno period when Indonesia pursued an aggressive and confrontational policy against its close neighbors."[47] Suharto, therefore, sought to restore Indonesia's credibility with political stability and economic development.[48] Post 1965, the Indonesian strategic culture would be preoccupied by domestic sources of insecurity, dominated by a military-dominated leadership, and suspicious of foreign and communist influence.

In contrast to Indonesia's experience, Australia's decision to interfere in the Borneo Confrontation can be linked to their own unique strategic culture, shaped by very different historical, institutional, and geopolitical factors.

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[44] Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture*, 31.
[45] Ball, *Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 9.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture*, 34.
[48] Ibid.

Australia's Strategic Culture Influence

Influence of Historical/Geographical Factors

Did the historical and geographical factors that shaped Australia's strategic culture influence its decision to commit military force in the Confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia?

Australia's decision to commit military forces against Indonesia in the Borneo Confrontation represented a localized arena for the wider Australian foreign policy paradox – forward defense versus continental defense. The Australian traits of anxiety and dependence that developed throughout the first half of the twentieth century were now clashing to validate Evan's depiction of Australia as a "liminal state." Australia's preference for the use of force in addressing the Borneo confrontation was on the threshold between what was best for forward defense policy versus the doctrine of continental defense.

In 1963, Australia's forward defense strategy underlined expeditionary forces in support of the United States and the wider liberal-democratic international order, along with a weakened preference to support British objectives directly. Combined with an anxiety of negative Indonesian reaction to Australian intervention – in the form of a possible *Konfrontasi* against the Australian territory of Papua New Guinea (PNG) bordering Indonesia's West Papua – Australia's strategic culture was dominated by a continental defense outlook which avoided direct conflict with Indonesia.

Evidence of Australia's preference for the use of force in the Borneo Confrontation exists in the examination of the meetings of the Australian Defence Committee, "the peak policy advisory body comprising the chiefs of staff, the secretary of the Department of Defence and such others as were invited or co-opted."[49] The strategic aspirations of Australia in 1963 were: establish the security of Australasia, pursue a close relationship with non-Communist countries (this included Indonesia), support SEATO, counter communist aggression, and support the UN.[50] Britain had requested Australian troops and support to defend Malaysia from Indonesia at the very

[49] Dennis and Grey, *Emergency and Confrontation*, 174.
[50] Van der Bijl, *Confrontation*, 164.

outset of the confrontation. Despite Australia's recognition of the regional security importance of the outcome of the Borneo conflict, it was the opinion of the Defence Committee at the time that if the existing Commonwealth (British and Malaysian) forces remained "'there appears to be little prospect of Indonesia's 'crush Malaysia' policy being successful through military confrontation alone."[51] (D/G174) The perceived requirement for Australian intervention, therefore, appeared low in the eyes of the government.

Furthermore, the influence of Australia's anxiety, embodied by continental defense policy, also favored non-commitment of force in Borneo. With regards to Indonesia, the Australia Defence Committee's focus was the potential threat of Indonesia to Australian territory in PNG, rather than in Malaysia. The Defence Committee concluded that "if Indonesia underestimated Commonwealth reaction to her confrontation activities against Malaysia," Australia risked a war in the form of "a type of military confrontation now being carried out in Borneo" but against Papua-New Guinea.[52] Therefore, although Australia identified Indonesia as a direct threat to Australian sovereignty, a military response in Borneo under the guise of continental defense policy was not required while Britain was adequately managing tensions in North Borneo. The Defence Committee further reasoned that pitching Australian troops directly in conflict with Indonesian soldiers while the British already have the conflict contained, may spark an Indonesian response in PNG.[53]

Two unresolved but equally influential doctrines shaped Australia's strategic culture early in the Borneo Confrontation. Direct military support for British objectives had fallen out of favor in the forward defense policy, replaced largely by US interests. In this regard, US interests, largely driven by the Cold War, did not indicate a preference for military intervention in Borneo either – a factor examined later under geopolitical factors. While Australia's anxiety-driven continental defense policy identified Indonesia as a potential threat to neighboring Australian territory, the assessment that British forces were containing Indonesian aggression in Borneo provided weight to the preference for

[51] Dennis and Grey, *Emergency and Confrontation*, 174.
[52] Ibid., 186.
[53] Ibid.

non-intervention to avoid inviting a direct Indonesian response in PNG. Moreover, in attempts to resolve Australian anxiety of its neighbors, Australia had improved relations with Indonesia, evidenced by the attendance of Indonesian officers at the Queenscliffe Staff College for the duration of the Borneo Confrontation.[54] In summary, the Australian preference is highlighted in a 1963 briefing to the Australian Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, from the Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Sir Hastings Harrington, who concluded, "It is our intention that the primary responsibility should remain with Britain and that we should tag along very much in second place accepting no more than we have to to preserve our forward defense posture."[55] One year into the conflict, however, Indonesia's escalation forced Australia to reconsider this preference.

Australia's preference for the use of force in the Borneo Confrontation shifted following Malaysian requests for assistance and Indonesian military escalation outside of Borneo, factors which tipped the balance in favor of the use of force. As authors Dennis and Grey, in *Emergency and Confrontation*, outline, the "increasingly sharp diplomatic exchanges between Canberra and Jakarta and the clear and continuing intransigence on the part of the Indonesians began to lead to a shift in the advice being given to [Australian] ministers."[56] By April 1964, Australia was more willing to consider provision of forces to aid Malaysia's plight in Borneo. Importantly, Australia supported the request from Malaysia, not Britain. Malaysia was now a Commonwealth partner to Australia, and their future cooperation considered vital to the anticipated future struggle against communist aggression. Initially, forces committed only consisted of combat support elements of the Australian Regular Army, Royal Australian Navy, and RAAF. However, Indonesia's escalation of hostilities with the landing of troops on the Malaysian peninsula soon prompted the Australian Government to increase its commitment expanding forces to include combat troops in Borneo itself.

In response to Indonesia's 39 separate landings or attempted landings on the Malaysian peninsula between August 1964 and March 1965, Australia committed the 28

[54] Van der Bijl, *Confrontation*, 164.
[55] Dennis and Grey, *Emergency and Confrontation*, 191.
[56] Ibid., 203.

Commonwealth Brigade Battalion, 3 RAR, and the Australian SAS forces, authorized by Canberra in January 1965.[57] After a year of Indonesia's *Konfrontasi* against Malaysia, Australia's tolerance for its northern neighbor had disappeared, and Australia had interpreted Indonesia's increased aggression on the Malaysian peninsula as a sign that Indonesia may consider similar operations into the Australian territory of PNG. Ultimately, it was Australia's anxiety, expressed through its continental defense doctrine, that influenced Australia's final decision to commit military force against Indonesian aggression in SE Asia. While the success of SEATO and its reliance on British basing in Malaysia is a good argument for Australia's force commitment as part of a forward defense strategy, it was only after perceiving a direct threat to Australia's territory that the decision to use combat forces was made.

Influence of Geopolitical Factors

Did the geopolitical factors that shaped Australia's strategic culture influence its decision to commit military force in the Confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia?

At the outset of the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation, Australia's geopolitical interests focused on supporting United States' interests, and the United States' hesitation to commit force against Indonesia influenced Australia's early preference not to engage in conflict with Indonesia. Australia's recent forward defense policy shift to favor support for the United States and the wider liberal-democratic order, subsequently aligned Australia's interests with the United States, which in 1963, were largely focused on the Cold War. Despite diplomatic condemnation of Indonesia's aggression, the larger Cold War context shaped United States' preferences. Preoccupied with communist aggression in Asia, the United States' focus was on a widening conflict in Vietnam, replacing a recent memory of the Korean War. President Kennedy's outlook, in Cold War terms, saw "Indonesia as a strategically important regional chess piece in SE Asia."[58] Kennedy believed the PKI political party, although communist in structure, to be more nationalist in objectives, and "therefore a valuable buffer against international communism."[59] The American preference for non-intervention in Indonesia influenced

[57] Dennis and Grey, *Emergency and Confrontation*, 228; Van der Bijl, *Confrontation*, 165.
[58] Van der Bijl, *Confrontation*, 93.
[59] Ibid.

Australia's preference, shaped by an Australian strategic culture that prioritized commitment of force in support of US interests as dictated by forward defense policy and evidenced by the views of Australian Defence at the time.

The views of the Australian Defence Committee supported a preference for non-intervention, aligning with US interests and cultural preference for the use of force as outlined by forward defense policy. Dennis and Grey found that it was this "concern for the views of the United States, rather than any objective operational requirement, [that] continued to dominate Australian thinking."[60] Australian Joint Planning Staff, when instructed to prepare contingencies against Indonesian activity in east New Guinea, concluded there were "long term implications for Australia of participating in offensive operations in a war Indonesia, not least in terms of American attitudes under ANZUS."[61] If involvement of Australian forces in Borneo initiated a retaliatory Indonesian response in Australian-governed West Papua, then the ANZUS treaty may invoke US commitment. Involvement in a conflict with Indonesia was undesirable, therefore, to both the United States and Australia. Moreover, Australia had to consider the implications of Vietnam.

The same forward defense policy that did not support military commitment to Borneo, expected a military response in the emerging Vietnam War. The United States had already tripled its force commitment to the theater in 1961 and again in 1962. Australian forward defense policy, as shaped by its strategic culture, therefore preferred the deployment of military forces to support the United States in this endeavor. Authors Dennis and Grey's findings support this conclusion, "the Australian Government was then under pressure from the Americans to supply a unit for service in South Vietnam."[62] Furthermore, Dennis and Grey conclude that the requirements of Australia's forward defense policy – the commitment of forces to Vietnam – in addition to the introduction of a National Service scheme (draft), an army organization re-structure, and a desire keep force deployment concentrated, all supported a preference to avoid deployment of forces

[60] Dennis and Grey, *Emergency and Confrontation*, 201.
[61] Ibid., 195.
[62] Ibid., 235.

to Borneo.[63] The preferences forged by a US-orientated forward defense strategy aligned with a reduced desire to fight in support of British interests, a continental defense policy risk of Indonesian retaliation, and a perception that British intervention alone would succeed, all supported Australia's initial decision not to commit forces to the Borneo conflict. It was not until Malaysia directly requested assistance, combined with increased Indonesian aggression, that Australia's strategic culture of fear and anxiety dominated government decision-making and continental defense policy took center stage.

Influence of Institutional Factors

Did the institutional factors that shaped Australia's strategic culture influence its decision to commit military force in the Confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia?

As expected by Australian institutional strategic cultural factors, there was little debate within the Australian military and public society, however a political deliberation did take place surrounding the two diverging strands of Australian policy; forward defense and continental defense. The Australian military and public's preference for the use of force in managing the anxiety element of its strategic culture did not significantly influence decision-making regarding any commitment to the Borneo conflict. In accordance with Australia's previously identified institutional preferences, following the final decision to send troops in early 1965, there was little military or public debate against the determination. In fact, up until 1965, as Dennis and Grey concluded, "the willingness of the Australian Army to help was overridden by the political argument."[64] The two dominant historical elements of Australia's strategic culture – anxiety and dependence – through their respective foreign policies, did create a political discussion regarding the preference for the use of force in Borneo.

A political dilemma reflecting the paradox of forward defense versus continental defense influenced Australian decision-making during *Konfrontasi*. Initially, as outlined by the previous geopolitical factors, due to existing British involvement and intelligence assessments, the SE Asian conflict did not meet the requirements for action under continental defense policy; Australia's anxiety surrounding Indonesia was not initially

[63] Dennis and Grey, *Emergency and Confrontation*, 235.
[64] Ibid., 200.

great enough to warrant force. Furthermore, a forward defense policy that now focused on the United States rather than Britain, did not justify Australian military commitment. After Malaysia's request for assistance and an Indonesian escalation of the conflict however, Australia's anxiety of the threat to its PNG territory began to dominate the Australian preference for the use of force in Borneo, in line with a continental defense strategy. The finding however, is that there was overriding Australian political agreement throughout the Borneo campaign, first for non-commitment, followed by a shift to use of force as the conflict evolved. Institutionally, the Australian politicians acted consistently in accordance Australia's strategic culture, albeit a shift occurred when one strand of preference took priority over the other.

Summary

Two strands of strategic culture shaped Australia's decision-making regarding the use of force in the Borneo Confrontation; forward defense and continental defense. Australia's historical and geographical factors that shaped the national strategic culture were important in the decision-making regarding Borneo because they generated the anxiety and dependence that spawned Australia's two conflicting foreign policies. Additionally, the geopolitical factors of Australia's strategic culture played a major role because of the Australian forward defense shift from Britain to the United States, and the US-preference not to engage in the conflict due to Cold War considerations. Finally, Australian institutional factors were consistent in that there was little debate regarding Australia's military commitment to Borneo.

The geography and history of Australia forged the anxiety and dependence characteristics that shaped the divergent and conflicting decisions regarding the Borneo conflict. Britain's initial containment of the Indonesian aggression, combined with Australian concerns of Indonesian retribution in the neighboring Australian territory of PNG, restrained the political decision to commit troops in support of Malaysia – Indonesia had not tripped the continental defense policy red line. Initially, that decision aligned with the preference for Australia's other strand of strategic culture. Forward defense policy, post-WWII, had shifted away from favoring British interests, moving towards a dependence on the United States. As the United States Cold War interests identified Indonesia as a potential ally against regional communism, Australia's forward

defense preference, therefore, was not to get directly involved in military conflict with Indonesia.

As the Borneo conflict evolved, the pressures of continental defense outweighed those of the forward defense policy. By late 1964, the direct requests of the new Commonwealth partner Malaysia, combined with increasing Indonesian aggression on the Malaysian peninsula, changed the Australian calculus – the risks of Indonesia succeeding in *Konfrontasi* were greater than the preference for non-interference under forward defense posture. The failure of a Malaysian Federation, along with the subsequent impacts on British military presence in the region directly threatened the security of Australia's north. Additionally, an emboldened Indonesia may have subsequently looked east to conduct *Konfrontasi* against Australian-governed PNG. In response to this risk, Australia's preference under continental defense policy was to intervene in the Borneo Confrontation in 1965 until its conclusion a year later.

Institutional factors of Australia's strategic culture supported but did not significantly influence Australian decision-making regarding Borneo, with little internal debate surrounding the policy that dominated the politician's thinking at any one time. The Australian military consistently expressed a readiness to deploy, the Australian public supported the government following a decision to send troops, and the government remained unified through its decision-making as it weighed up the relative importance of the two sometimes contradicting foreign policies.

Impact on Australia's Strategic Culture

Australia's role in the Borneo Confrontation marks an important shift away from Evan's "liminal" state depiction, an experience that initiated a trend of favoring regional engagement and leadership over commitment of expeditionary forces to distant parts of the world. While *Konfrontasi* marked the beginning of this trend in Australian thinking, the events of the years to follow strengthened the shift to a continental defense focus. Dennis and Grey described Australia's role in Confrontation as "part of the prologue to the more assertive and self-reliant engagement with its region which has come to characterize Australian policy in SE Asia in the 1980s and 1990s."[65] Although

[65] Dennis and Grey, *Emergency and Confrontation*, xv.

Australia's shifting preference for the use of force in *Konfrontasi* is evidence to the beginnings of a broader shift in strategic culture, the conflict itself cannot claim to cement the change outlined in Australia's first Defence White Paper in 1976. Larger geopolitical events shaped Australia's commitment to a preference for continental defense towards the end of the twentieth century, events which arguably would have influenced the same change regardless of the conflict on the island of Borneo in the 1960s. Australia's evolving strategic culture leading up to the next case study – the East Timor Conflict – will be examined as part of that analysis.

Chapter 5

Case Study II: East Timor Crisis

The problem is that those who want independence are those who are Communist-influenced.

Indonesian President, H. Muhammad Suharto

We would do absolutely nothing.

Australian Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam

I am recommending a pragmatic rather than a principled stand but that is what national interest and foreign policy is all about.

Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, Richard Woolcott

The second case study will examine how the previously-identified factors that developed Indonesia's and Australia's respective strategic cultures influenced the decisions by these nations to commit the use of force in the East Timor Crisis.

Background

The East Timor Crisis began with the Indonesian invasion and occupation of the small Portuguese-governed colony in 1975, which persisted for a quarter of a century before a UN intervention led by Australian forces generated the conditions for independence of the island nation (see Figure 4). In 1974, the Portuguese "Carnation Revolution" resulted in the withdrawal of Portuguese governing authorities from East Timor as the European nation transitioned from dictatorship to democracy. The absence of Portuguese colonial administration sparked the East Timorese independence ambitions that would take 27 years to realize.

Indonesia, threatened by a perceived risk of communist-led East Timorese political parties taking power, invaded neighboring East Timor to crush the communist factions and annex the territory as part of Indonesia. Immediate UN criticism did not

follow Indonesia's invasion, and over the years UN resolutions denouncing Indonesia's invasion and subsequent humanitarian atrocities against the East Timorese people arose to no effect. Indonesia continued to occupy the territory in the absence of any credible UN or international intervention. For years, the East Timorese experienced human rights violations that included "random massacres, extra-judicial killings, starvation, deaths from preventable diseases, torture, forced movement of population, coerced sterilization of women, rape and imprisonment without legal redress."[1] The Indonesian media blackout that successfully hid many atrocities from the world was finally broken in 1991, when video footage of Indonesian soldiers shooting East Timorese civilians at a funeral memorial service – known as the Dili massacre - was exposed to the international community.



Figure 4: Map of East Timor

Source: Encyclopedia Britannica

Finally, in 1999, following mounting international pressure, a UN intervention in East Timor, led by Australian military forces, restored security to the territory and allowed the successful UN-administered transition to independence in 2002. Australia

[1] Paul Hainsworth and Stephen McCloskey, eds., *The East Timor Question: The Struggle for Independence from Indonesia* (London ; New York : New York: I.B. Tauris ; In the U.S. distributed by St. Martin's Press, 2000), 4.

had largely ignored the plight of the East Timorese for the previous 25 years, favoring improved relations with Indonesia. The successful UN intervention involved approximately 5000 Australian troops among a total UN force peaking at 11,000, ending an Indonesian-initiated conflict that claimed over 200,000 East-Timorese lives, one-third of the population.[2] Australian forces under the UN mandate to restore and maintain security – International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) – suffered no combat fatalities and two non-combat fatalities during the five-month operation.[3]

Indonesia's Strategic Culture Influence

Influence of Historical/Geographical Factors

Did the historical and geographical factors that shaped Indonesia's strategic culture influence its decision to commit military force in East Timor?

Despite a strategic culture that focused on the threat of domestic instability and indicated restraint in the use of force in settling foreign disputes with Indonesia's neighbors, a history of communist-initiated unrest fueled the security concerns that formed the preference for the use of force when Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975. At first glance, Indonesia's strategic culture leading up to 1975 – codified by doctrines such as National Resilience, Total People's Defense, and Dual Functions – demonstrated an unwillingness to use military force outside the borders of Indonesia. Post-1965, the New Order leadership had focused on restoring friendly relations with its SE Asian neighbors, evidenced by ASEAN cooperation. As a leader in ASEAN, Indonesia had lobbied principles of "non-interference" and "regional resilience," both ideals that spawned from Indonesia's own strategic culture. The ASEAN outlook, like Indonesia's, characterized the use of diplomacy, not force, in settling regional affairs, and maintaining resilience, not dependence, in being able to secure individual state security.

Furthermore, there was no evidence of an expansionist mindset among Indonesian leadership, especially after the disastrous confrontational policy regarding Malaysia that

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[2] Michael G. Smith and Moreen Dee, *Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence*, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 19; Hainsworth and McCloskey, *The East Timor Question*, 4.
[3] Smith and Dee, *Peacekeeping in East Timor*, 47.

destroyed the Indonesian economy and destabilized the political institution. Historically, Indonesia had not expressed interest in the Portuguese colony. As Anwar indicated, "the founding fathers of the Republic made no attempt to include the territory into the new state, confining their claim to the former Netherlands East Indies territories."[4] Was there another aspect of Indonesian strategic culture that drove the decision to invade East Timor in 1975, or was the influence of strategic preference absent?

Despite the inward-looking security aspect of Indonesia's strategic culture, post-1965, the greatest perceived threat to Indonesia was communism, from both inside and outside the nation. As examined in the historical factors of Indonesian strategic culture, the threat of communism to Indonesia's domestic security arose in 1948; the PKI Communist coup-attempt during the nation's struggle for independence. The Indonesian military's ongoing suspicion of the PKI was again validated after the murder of five senior Indonesian generals during the second coup attempt in 1965. Although in both cases the communist threat came from within the government, Indonesia had always suspected outside influence. In 1948, the PKI openly suggested that assistance from the Soviet Union be sought to aid in the independence struggle against the Dutch colonialists. In 1965, the New Order leaders had always suspected the People's Republic of China of involvement in the abortive communist coup.[5] In this regard, the threat of outside communist influence on Indonesian domestic security had historically been high, a threat heightened by a possible foreign communist influence residing on the Indonesian archipelago itself.

The Indonesian perception of communist links to political organizations devoted to East Timorese independence invoked the historical communist fears within Indonesian strategic culture and the preference for violence that followed. The independence movement in East Timor did not gain traction until the emergence of the "Carnation Revolution" in Portugal in 1974, at which point several East Timorese groups saw an

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[4] Booth and Trood, 203; Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture: Ketahanan Nasional, Wawasan Nusantara, and Hankamrata*, Australia-Asia Papers, no. 75 (Nathan, QLD, Australia: Griffith University, Faculty of Asian and International Studies, Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, 1996), 31.
[5] Ibid.

opportunity during the Portuguese political chaos for an independent East Timor. Stephen McCloskey, in *The East Timor Question*, describes the three main East Timorese political parties:

> the UDT (Timorese Democratic Union), led by members of the colonial administrative elite, initially favored federation with Portugal but eventually supported independence; Fretilin (the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor), a formerly clandestine movement which was legalized in September 1974; and a third much smaller party, Apodeti, (the Timorese Popular Democratic Association), was established with the encouragement and support of the Indonesian consulate in Dili, and favored full integration with Indonesia.[6]

Indonesia increasingly became threatened by the rise of Fretilin, after the party gained majority support in local elections in July 1975. Indonesia perceived the Fretilin party to be communist in ideology, despite claims by analysts such as John Pilger, that the idea that Fretilin "would turn East Timor into a base for communist insurgency was absurd…Above all, they were nationalists who wanted their people to control their own destiny, trade, and resources."[7] As part of a plan to check Fretilin's growing support, Indonesia orchestrated the UDT – motivated by Indonesian-fed information suggesting Fretilin communist aspirations – to conduct a coup d'etat on 11 August 1975.[8] The attempted coup sent East Timor spiraling into civil war, at which point the Portuguese withdrew its governing administration and abnegated its responsibilities to the Timorese.[9] Amidst the struggle for power, on 28 November 1975, Fretilin declared the independence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor.

Faced with a rising Fretilin organization with perceived communist ideology, Indonesia launched a secret intelligence operation, code-named *Operasi Komodo*, "aimed at destroying the burgeoning independence movement."[10] As part of the accompanying media blackout, McCloskey attributes the murder of five Australian-based journalists in East Timor to the Indonesian military, in what later an Australian government report

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[6] Hainsworth and McCloskey, *The East Timor Question*, 2.
[7] John Pilger, "East Timor: The Silence and the Betrayal," *The New Internationalist* 253 (March 1994): 6.
[8] Hainsworth and McCloskey, *The East Timor Question*, 3.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.

described as "the start of a general offensive by the Indonesian military to annex East Timor."[11] On the 7 December 1975, Indonesia launched a full-scale invasion of East Timor. Anwar supports the claim that "there was a real fear in Jakarta that an independent communist East Timor could be used as a base by a hostile communist power in a move against Indonesia."[12]

Moreover, the timing is important. The threat of a rising communist movement in neighboring Indonesia, just months after the fall of Saigon to communism, was most likely not lost on Suharto and his New Order.[13] Despite the inward-looking security element of Indonesia's strategic culture, the evidence suggests that the anti-communist ideology forged by Indonesia's history ultimately dominated the decision to use force in East Timor. This decision is consistent with elements of existing strategic culture, a fear of foreign interference from a potential neighboring communist state drove Indonesia to act, using military force to protect its own sovereignty and future domestic security as its National Resilience doctrine would support. In line with Indonesia's strategic culture, the New Order leadership most likely also saw the East Timor crisis, although involving a neighboring state, as an internal security issue, as evidenced by comments by the Chief of Indonesia's Armed Forces, General Try Sutrisno, following the Dili massacre; "This is an internal affair, and there should be no meddling."[14] The threat of communism of course, fell under a much wider geopolitical umbrella – the Cold War.

Influence of Geopolitical Factors

Did the geopolitical factors that shaped Indonesia's strategic culture influence its decision to commit military force in East Timor?

Previous analysis of the geopolitical factors showed that Indonesia believed foreign powers made decisions which prioritized Cold War considerations rather than the interests of Indonesia itself. This preference to avoid great power influence manifested in Indonesia's establishment of and membership in NAM. The suspicion of great power

[11] Hainsworth and McCloskey, *The East Timor Question*, 4.
[12] Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture*, 32.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Desmond Ball, *Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region: With Some Implications for Regional Security Cooperation*, Working Paper / The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre 270 (Canberra: Australian National Univ, 1993), 10.

influence, in this case communism, therefore strengthened Indonesia's already existent anti-communist outlook identified previously. The threat of a future communist ally to China or the Soviet Union, on the doorstep of Indonesia, risked bringing the Cold War to the forefront of Indonesia's security concerns.

Furthermore, the absence of Western opposition to Indonesia's pre-cursor actions to the East Timor invasion messaged Suharto that the West condoned the use of force against a burgeoning communist state. The PKI-purge after the failed coup of 1965, during which at least half a million communist-supporters were killed, although denounced by the UN, was largely looked upon favorably by Western allies in the light of the Cold War.[15] Australia's complicity in Indonesia's blood-letting is evident in previously classified Australian papers released in 1997, that show the former Minister for External Affairs, Paul Haslack, "persuaded the cabinet to approve secret financial aid to Suharto's anti-communist forces regardless of their widespread atrocities both during and after the 1965 coup."[16] McCloskey described the West's view of Suharto following establishment of the New Order, "Regarded as the bulwark against communism in SE Asia, Suharto was valued as an ally by the West because of the strategic importance of Indonesia in the region, combined with Jakarta's pursuance of an ultimately disastrous neo-liberal economic programme."[17] The years following Suharto's rise to power were met with increased US, British, and Australian trade-relations, including military arms. Indonesia's violent handling of PKI sympathizers in 1965 set future expectations of what acts of force would be condoned under the pretense of the Cold War. Following the murders of five western (British and Australian) journalists in October 1975, and with access to intelligence of Indonesian troop movements, McCloskey argues that the inaction of US, British, or Australian governments convinced Suharto of the West's approval of the impending invasion.[18]

Previously classified US documents, including memorandums of meetings between Suharto and President Ford support McCloskey's finding. Suharto's preference

[15] Hainsworth and McCloskey, *The East Timor Question*, 4.
[16] Ibid., 135.
[17] Ibid., 4.
[18] Ibid., 3.

for the use of force in dealing with an increasing independence movement in East Timor is evident five months prior to the invasion during a meeting with President Ford at Camp David on 5 July 1975. During this meeting, Suharto states to President Ford;

> The problem is that those who want independence are those who are Communist-influenced. Those wanting Indonesian integration are being subjected to heavy pressure by those who are almost Communists. I want to assert that Indonesia doesn't want to insert itself into Timor self-determination, but the problem is how to manage the self-determination process with a majority wanting unity with Indonesia. These are some of the problems I wanted to raise on this auspicious meeting with you.[19]

Following Indonesia's orchestration of the UDT-led coup, the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, in a staff meeting discussing the event, stated "It is quite clear that the Indonesians are going to take over the island sooner or later."[20] Mr. Habib responded, "Eventually. That is always expected. The only ones liable to react verbally will be the Australians, who will feel impelled to say something."[21] The United States leadership, with clear knowledge of the impending invasion, provided Suharto the final green light he required on the eve of the invasion, during a meeting in Jakarta.

On 6 December 1975, during a meeting between President Ford, Kissinger, and Suharto in Jakarta, Ford clearly indicated US consent for Suharto's planned invasion. During this meeting Suharto advises, "It is now important to determine what we can do to establish peace and order for the present and the future in the interest of security considerations we are now contemplating, we want your understanding if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action."[22] To which President Ford responded, "We will understand and not press you on the issue. We understand the problem you have and the intentions you have."[23] While the meeting convened, Indonesian para-military soldiers, armed with US-provided weapons, were preparing to capture East Timor's capital Dili

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[19] Presidents Ford and Suharto, Memorandum of Conversation, Gerald R. Ford Library, July 5, 1975, 6, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/.
[20] "Minutes of Staff Meeting of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger" (National Archives, August 12, 1975), 3, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/.
[21] Ibid.
[22] "Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579 to Secretary State" (Gerald R. Ford Library, December 6, 1975), para 41, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/.
[23] Ibid., para 42.

the following day. Indonesia's national resilience element of its strategic culture had evolved partly from an observation that great powers do not intervene in SE Asia unless it is in their direct interests (evidenced by the lack of initial US intervention in supporting Indonesia's independence). The United States had now confirmed that Indonesia's pending invasion was not in conflict with their interests, and therefore America would stand by on the sidelines while Suharto executed his preference for the use of force.

In the larger context of the Cold War, informed by geopolitical interpretations upon Indonesia's strategic culture, Suharto and his New Order demonstrated a preference for the use of force against a rising communist influence in East Timor, one that aligned with the same anti-communist elements informed by previously-identified historical factors, and not hindered by US interests.

Influence of Institutional Factors

Did the institutional factors that shaped Indonesia's strategic culture influence its decision to commit military force in East Timor?

Combined with the historical and geopolitical factors already identified, military institutional factors had a large influence on Indonesia's decision to invade East Timor in 1975. The military had always considered themselves the "fighters of freedom" for Indonesia, playing a large role in the independence of the nation, putting down internal rebellions, and preventing coups. Post-1965, the role of the military in politics was increased, through the Dual Functions doctrine, which gave the military a more socio-political role in governance. The Indonesian military, justifiably, had no tolerance for communism in Indonesian politics following the 1965 coup. The PKI-purge, in which thousands of communist supporters were killed, had cemented a preference for the use of force in dealing with such a threat. This preference was evident within the military and Suharto when faced with the perceived communist threat in East Timor.

Summary

Despite an "inward-looking" Indonesian strategic culture focused on domestic instability as the greatest threat to national security, the threat of an independent and communist East Timor represented the potential source of that threat in the form of foreign influence and communist ideology. Indonesia, had a turbulent history of communist influence, a threat countered by the use of military force. Therefore,

Indonesia's historical factors that influenced its strategic culture supported a preference for the use of force in dealing with a communist uprising in the neighboring state of East Timor.

Geopolitically, the backdrop of the Cold War supported Indonesia's preference for invasion. Soviet and Chinese communist support had been in the background of Indonesia's two previous communist-inspired coups. Cold War great powers had always been a threat of influence into Indonesia's domestic affairs, including the United States, who had demonstrated that great powers only interfere in SE Asia when it is in the interests. Fearing the threat of communist influence, combined with an acknowledgement from the United States that fighting the East Timorese communist threat was not counter to US interests, Suharto's interpretation of the geopolitical landscape supported his preference for the use of force.

Finally, the Indonesian military, now firmly integrated into politics and foreign policy decision-making, had already cemented a preference for how to handle the communist threat to Indonesian security – the PKI purge of 1965. The preference of the military elite that controlled the New Order government therefore neatly aligned with the historical and geopolitical elements of Indonesia's strategic culture.

The Indonesian decision to allow UN peacekeepers into East Timor in 1999 to oversee a transition to independence was the result of US pressure – an intervening variable – and not characterized by a shift in strategic culture. President Suharto's New Order governance had proven unsuccessful in wake of the Asian financial crisis, and in 1998, under significant political pressure, Suharto resigned.[24] Despite a shift in leadership and a more democratic system of government from this point onwards, the preference for the use of force in East Timor continued to exist, most likely resulting from the momentous military influence on Indonesian strategic culture over the past 50 years. Although the power of the military in Indonesian politics would soon decrease under the new President Habibie, the accompanying shift in strategic culture would not be realized for several more years.

[24] Jeffrey S. Lantis and Andrew A. Charlton, "Continuity or Change? The Strategic Culture of Australia," *Comparative Strategy* 30, no. 4 (September 2011): 301, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2011.605019.

In 1999, Australian support for Indonesia succumbed to public opinion that protested the Indonesian atrocities committed against the East Timorese. A reversal in Australian support, eventually led to a shift in US support for a UN-led intervention in the conflict. Under US threats of economic sanctions, President Habibie finally agreed to allow UN peacekeepers into East Timor and formally end the East Timor Crisis. The US pressure applied to Indonesia is identified as another intervening variable which ultimately overcame Indonesian preference for the use of force. This intervening variable is addressed in more detail in the following analysis of Australia's strategic culture influence.

Australia's Strategic Culture Influence

Background

Australia's decision-making regarding an intervention in East Timor spanned 25 years. This lengthy period is significant, especially when considering strategic culture, so the analysis will take a two-step approach; first, the analysis examines the influence of strategic cultural factors immediately before and following Indonesia's 1975 invasion, and second, the examination changes to focus on these same factors leading up to Australia's decision to lead the UN intervention in 1999.

1975 Indonesian Invasion

Influence of Historical/Geographical Factors

Did the historical and geographical factors that shaped Australia's strategic culture influence its decision to commit military force in East Timor?

When Indonesia invaded the Portuguese colony of East Timor on 7 December 1975, Australia's strategic culture had completed an important transition based upon significant events within the region. The previously identified historical and geographical factors, notably anxiety and dependence, had evolved since Australia's involvement in *Konfrontasi*, an excursion in international military engagement (like Korea, the Malayan Emergency, and Vietnam) that had provided significant experience to a young nation. Management of Australia's anxiety towards its northern Asian neighbors had occurred through increased diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation. Indonesia, after a transition to the New Order government led by Suharto, had demonstrated a drive to re-build its economy and international relations, evidenced

by leading the formation of ASEAN and significantly reducing its military budget to favor infrastructure and trade programs. Moreover, as previously identified, Indonesia's decisive handling of its internal communist threat in 1965, although largely still considered genocide, drew further confidence from Australia and its Western allies. Australia, therefore, looked to improve relations with Indonesia, a strategy aligned with other regional developments.

The withdrawal of Britain and the US from Asia and SE Asia marked a significant shift in Australia's defense outlook, one that added momentum to a new Australian policy – self-reliance. Over the previous decade, Britain, after securing the independence of its post-colonial states, largely withdrew from SE Asia to focus on Europe.[25] The United States had recently withdrawn from mainland SE Asia, and had witnessed the fall of Saigon in April 1975. Nixon's Guam Doctrine had preceded the US withdrawal from Vietnam. Referring to its implementation on 25 July 1969, Nixon stated that "the United States would assist in the defense and development of allies and friends," but would not "undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world."[26] In the face of this withdrawal of historically-present world powers and allies, Australia's defense outlook had to face a stark reality.

Published in November 1976, Australia's first white paper, titled *Australian Defence*, captured the evolving international landscape, and the subsequent policy response – self-reliance. The first white paper is significant because it acknowledges the shift to Australia's independent foreign policy-making;

> Remote from Europe, we now have one significant alliance - the ANZUS Treaty, with New Zealand and the US. Both countries are important to us; but it is prudent to remind ourselves that the US has many diverse interests and obligations. Australia has local and regional associates with who we enjoy close and cooperative relations. We must continue to work constructively with them to support stability and security in the general strategic situation; and by our own policy and effort we can insure against

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[25] *Australian Defence 1976* (Canberra, Australia; Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976), 1, http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/wpaper1976.pdf.
[26] Gregg Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), http://site.ebrary.com/id/10351499.

> the uncertainties that continuing change will sustain and that could produce situations with which we may well have to deal on our own.[27]

The white paper provides the evidence of the plan to accommodate Australia's previous and often conflicting strategic cultural preferences – encapsulated by a balance of forward defense and continental defense – into a single strategy. While Australia acknowledged the existence of the ANZUS Treaty, to be relied upon in times of existential threat to Australia's national security, this preference for dependence on "great and powerful allies" was not relevant to many regional circumstances affecting Australia's national security, and that Australia "should expect to handle more independently."[28] Moreover, in dealing with these regional security challenges, once dubbed anxiety, Australia needed a more proactive role in building strong regional partnerships with neighbors such as Indonesia. This new policy, "self-reliance," acknowledges the shift in preference from the often conflicting "forward defence" and "continental defence," as detailed in the 1976 document;

> A primary requirement emerging from our findings is for increased self reliance. In our contemporary circumstances, we no longer base our policy on the expectation that Australia's Navy or Army or Air Force will be sent abroad to fight as part of some other nation's force, supported by it. We do not rule out an Australian contribution to operations elsewhere if the requirement arose and we feel that our presence would be effective, and if our forces could be spared from their national tasks. But we believe that any operations are much more likely to be in our own neighbourhood than in some distant or forward theatre, and that our Armed Services would be conducting joint operations together as the ADF.[29]

Specifically, regarding Indonesia, the new government policy outlined the geographical significance of the archipelago in any future state aggression directed towards Australia, stating "This consideration alone gives Australia an enduring interest in the security and integrity of the Indonesian Republic from external influence."[30] The 1976 *Australian Defence* policy highlights an Australian preference for the use of force in stabilizing its immediate region, including SE Asia, through strong diplomatic, economic,

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[27] *Australian Defence 1976*, 2.
[28] Ibid., 10.
[29] *Australian Defence 1976,* 10.
[30] Ibid., 7.

and military partnerships with countries like Indonesia, and while acknowledging possible commitments to joint international operations regionally, puts a previous "forward defense" posture very much in the back seat. This preference is visible in the Australian government's responses to Indonesia's invasion of East Timor.

Although published in 1976, *Australian Defence* summarized the position of the Whitlam and Fraser governments in the lead up to Indonesia's invasion. Australia's preference for a strong relationship with Indonesia, and as a result, stable regional security, took precedence over both the East Timorese calls for independence and the inflicted human rights atrocities that followed. Despite a trend of international support for post-colonial self-determination over previous decades, the Australian government indicated a preference for Indonesia's annexation of the small Portuguese territory. Prime Minister Whitlam, during a meeting with Suharto in 1974, indicated that "East Timor would be better off as a part of Indonesia," and that it "was too small a territory to be independent."[31] As events unfolded in 1975, including intelligence highlighting Indonesia's plans, the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, Richard Woolcott, in a cable to Canberra in August, discussed Australia's position; "we leave events to take their course, and act in a way which would be designed to minimize the public impact in Australia and show private understanding to Indonesia of their problems. I am recommending a pragmatic rather than a principled stand but that is what national interest and foreign policy is all about."[32]

Moreover, even following the murder of three Australian journalists in Balibo, East Timor in October, the failure to condemn, or launch an immediate official enquiry indicated the Australian government's preference for good relations with Indonesia. On 4 December 1975, only three nights prior to the East Timorese invasion, Whitlam summarized the Australian preference on whether to commit force in opposition to Indonesia's planned invasion – "we would do absolutely nothing."[33] The statements by Australian politicians, combined with the 1976 *Australian Defence* policy, clearly indicated an Australian preference to use force in the maintenance of regional security.

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[31] Hainsworth and McCloskey, *The East Timor Question*, 137.
[32] Ibid., 136.
[33] Ibid., 133.

This preference favored good relations with Indonesia, a strategy to manage historical anxiety of its northern neighbor, while failing to acknowledge East Timor's plight as an issue of national security to Australia.

Following Indonesia's invasion on 7 December, the recently appointed government under Malcom Fraser, maintained a position of silence, like the response following the murder of Australian journalists. Despite subsequent international outcry and UN resolutions, Australia would not support the use of force in East Timor. This preference would dominate Australian government for the next 25 years, until either an intervening factor or shift in culture, or both, led to the decision to use forceful intervention in 1999. But, before moving ahead we will analyze the influence of geopolitical factors in 1975.

Influence of Geopolitical Factors

Did the geopolitical factors that shaped Australia's strategic culture influence its decision to commit military force in East Timor?

Australia's strategic culture, influenced by a historical dependence on the United States, meant that American interests in Indonesia affected Australian preferences in the East Timor crisis. Although dominated by a preference for regional stability as analyzed above, Australia's decision not to intervene in East Timor aligned neatly with US interests in Indonesia. Like the US position in 1963, America saw Indonesia as a key strategic chess piece in the Cold War. The United States had just witnessed the fall of Indochina to communism, and Indonesia, a leader in ASEAN and a staunch adversary of communist influence, held considerable value as a regional ally. Additionally, Indonesia's archipelago sat in the middle of a key strategic shipping choke-point, having security implications for international trade and oil supplies. Finally, with high tensions between Israel and the Arab states, Indonesia, as the world's largest Islamic state, maintained significant importance. As Australia observed in 1963, US interests aligned with Australian regional interests, allowing the coexistence of traditional forward defense and continental defense policies. However, the Australian shift to a more independent "self-reliant" foreign policy stance identified above appears more influential in Australia's preference not to use force in East Timor in 1975, over the geopolitical

factors just discussed. Subsequent analysis of the geopolitical factors affecting Australia's decision to commit force in 1999 support this assessment.

Influence of Institutional Factors

Did the institutional factors that shaped Australia's strategic culture influence its decision to commit military force in East Timor?

The institutional influences on Australia's strategic culture, notably the Australian public and government, served to strengthen a preference for non-interference of Australian forces following Indonesia's 1975 invasion. A 1975 decision to intervene militarily in East Timor would have amounted to political suicide given recent negative public opinion regarding Australian troops in Vietnam. The views of the Australian people, although historically in support of Australian force deployment, neatly aligned with the government's regional security outlook that favored Indonesia. Indonesia's media blackout of much of the East Timor plight, combined with a failure of Australia to officially challenge the deaths of Australian reporters, also helped subdue this public opinion, already weary of Australian deaths in Indochina.

Moreover, Australia had just experienced its worst constitutional crisis in history. On 11 November 1975, the Governor-General, Sir John Kerr, dismissed the Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, over the Australian Labor Party's (ALP) inability to pass a budget through parliament, among other political scandals. Kerr appointed the leader of the opposition Liberal Party, Malcolm Fraser, as caretaker Prime Minister, a position subsequently permanent following an election one month later. Fraser, however, as acting Prime Minister when Indonesia invaded its neighbor, shared the common preference regarding Australia's intervention in East Timor. Earlier that year, Fraser had referred to East Timor's Fretilin party as "communists," so it is unsurprising that a similar policy of non-intervention continued after Whitlam's demise.[34] However, this political continuity regarding East Timor does not result from the previous politically narrow view-points identified in Australia's post-WWII strategic culture.

Despite healthy debate between Australian political parties and institutions, the government's preference for East Timorese non-intervention echoed between ruling

[34] Hainsworth and McCloskey, *The East Timor Question*, 140.

governments; a factor attributed to the persuasive influence of the historical factors previously discussed. The "small number of voices shaping strategic policy in government … mirrored by a small community of experts," identified as a factor in Australia's strategic policy a decade earlier, no longer existed in 1975. Debate occurred between ministers and parties; despite Fraser labelling Fretilin communists, other politicians challenged the assumption based upon first-hand experience. The report compiled by Ken Fry and Senator Gietzelt after a trip to East Timor in September 1975 described:

> We are also satisfied that there is no genuine basis for the charge by the UDT forces that Fretilin is a communist controlled or dominated organization…Their leadership impressed us as being moderate, highly responsible, dedicated, and intelligent in their approach. To attribute their success so far to outside influence would, in our opinion, be a grave error of judgement and a misperception of the over-riding grassroots desire for independence from colonial overlords by the indigenous people and their leaders.[35]

Furthermore, in 1975, it was the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade's (DFAT) assessment that Australia should support East Timor's self-determination. Whitlam, however, dismissed this advice, like other views contrary to the ALP government's. A steady course of non-intervention survived within changing political leadership, despite preferences contrary to the sitting Australian government. Although the character of Australian political decision-making had evolved since WWII, the dominant factor of Australia's strategic culture – historical development of Australia's anxiety and dependence – overcame any internal debate to ensure observation of the preference not to commit force in East Timor.

1999 Australian Intervention

Influence of Historical/Geographical Factors

Did the historical and geographical factors that shaped Australia's strategic culture influence its decision to commit military force in East Timor?

The historical elements of Australia's strategic culture that shaped its preferences in Borneo in 1965 and East Timor in 1975 do not explain Australia's decision to lead the

[35] Hainsworth and McCloskey, *The East Timor Question*, 141.

UN intervention in 1999. The Australian preference for non-intervention in East Timor demonstrated in 1975, had continued to prevail over 25 years. Australia's strategic preference for regional security through "self-reliance," had favored improved relations with Indonesia. The Australian government executed this preference through its diplomatic, economic, and military support to Jakarta, despite the multiple UN resolutions and international pressure for action. Clearly, Australia's preference against the use of force in East Timor reflected the strong influence of its strategic culture, a trend finally broken in 1999. Analysis shows, however, that the same preference existed in 1999, so either another factor of influence within Australia's strategic culture, or an intervening variable contributed to Australia's reversal.

During 25 years of support for Indonesia's annexation of East Timor, several significant regional and international events occurred, any one of them having the potential to induce change in Australia's preferences, or independently alter Australia's decision-making. Independent examination of these events shall determine their potential role. As examination of the historical, geopolitical, and institutional factors of Australian strategic culture in the lead-up to 1999 occur, the analysis will consider these significant events.

Highlighting the significance of the historical factors identified in Australia's 1975 decision not to intervene in East Timor is the 25-year period that Australian decision-makers maintained this position. Diplomatically, Australia continued to support its bias towards a strong Indonesia. In 1978, Canberra "accorded de facto recognition of Indonesia's annexation of East Timor which by that time had been designated Jakarta's 27th province."[36] That same year, Australia shifted from abstaining on the UN General Assembly resolutions condemning East Timor's occupation to voting against them.[37] Nearly two decades later, Australia's diplomatic support for Indonesia was only growing. Despite international condemnation of the 1991 Dili massacre, Australia's Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans' underwhelming description of the event used the term

[36] Hainsworth and McCloskey, *The East Timor Question*, 141.
[37] Ibid., 142.

"aberration," defined by Oxford as "a departure from what is normal, usual, or expected, typically an unwelcome one."[38] Furthermore, following the massacre, on his return from Dili, Keating reported to parliament, "President Suharto was the best thing in strategic terms that had happened to us; by bringing stability to the archipelago he has minimised the Australian defence budget."[39]

In 1995, Prime Minister Paul Keating and President Suharto witnessed the signing of "The Agreement Between Australia and Indonesia on Maintaining Security."[40] Officially, the reasons for the agreement, as stated within were; "to strengthen the existing friendship," while recognizing a "common interest in peace and stability in the region," as a basis for "economic development and prosperity."[41] Diplomatically, despite several UN resolutions calling for action, Australia continued to bolster its relations with Indonesia, in line with the preference to enhance regional security through a doctrine of "self-reliance," rather than traditional "forward defense" policy. Australian-Indonesian economic interaction supports this assessment.

Australia's continued economic aid and interaction with Indonesia from 1975 to 1999 supports the Australian preference for non-intervention, even in the face of the Asian economic crisis of 1997. Australia's doctrine of self-reliance nested upon a requirement for the security of Australia's northern neighbors such as Indonesia. A strong and friendly Indonesia, eased Australia's historical anxiety, and as Keating described it, "minimized the Australian defense budget."[42] Australia's support of Indonesia's economic power included monetary aid; already, by 1975, Canberra had

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[38] Hainsworth and McCloskey, *The East Timor Question*, 139; Oxford Living Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/aberration.
[39] Clinton Fernandes, "Companion to East Timor: The Keating Government," School of Humanities and Social Sciences (website), University of New South Wales, 2012, https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/school-of-humanities-and-social-sciences/timor-companion/keating.
[40] Bob Lowry, *Australia-Indonesia Security Cooperation: For Better or Worse?* Working Paper / Strategic and Defence Studies Centre 299 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National Univ, 1996), 1.
[41] Ibid., 10.
[42] Fernandes, "Companion to East Timor: The Keating Government," School of Humanities and Social Sciences (website), University of New South Wales, 2012, https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/school-of-humanities-and-social-sciences/timor-companion/keating.

granted Jakarta an estimated AUD$141 million in bilateral aid.[43] Furthermore, following Indonesia's invasion of East Timor until 1998, Australia granted an additional AUD$2 billion in various forms of aid.[44] Between the 1997-98 and 1998-99 financial years, total aid to Indonesia saw a 30-percent increase.[45] Australia also benefitted from improving relations with Indonesia, and their annexation of East Timor; by 1986, oil company bids for drilling rights off East Timor's coast had produced AUD$31.5 million, for contracts later executed following Australia and Indonesia's signing of the Timor Gap Treaty in 1989.[46]

The year of 1997 marked the beginning of the Asian economic crisis, after which Indonesia's suffering economy began to put a strain on its relative power and on Suharto's influence. Australia, initially concerned about a possible collapse of the Suharto regime, sighed with relief when Suharto peacefully stepped aside on 21 May 1998, following three decades of Indonesian rule. As Hainsworth described, "The immediate context to his resignation was the economic crisis that swept through the Asian regional economy and severely hit the fragile construct of Suharto's highly personalized, weakly structured 'crony capitalism'."[47] Suharto's replacement, Vice-President B.J. Habibie, stepped in to address "growing opposition within civil society to authoritarian rule and devastating environmental problems."[48] Despite massive devaluation of the Indonesian currency and political upheaval, Australia continued its supportive stance of Indonesia, as evidenced in a speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, in November 1998; "Our prosperity, stability and security will always be influenced by Indonesia's and it is logical, therefore, for Australia to stand by Indonesia in troubled times."[49] Australia's years of economic support to Indonesia, through times of prosperity and decline, are further evidence to indicate that the strategic

[43] Hainsworth and McCloskey, *The East Timor Question*, 138.
[44] Ibid., 138.
[45] Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer, "Indonesia's Challenges: How Australia Can Help," speech, 23 November 1998, https://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/1998/981123_indonesia.html.
[46] Hainsworth and McCloskey, *The East Timor Question*, 142.
[47] Ibid., 193.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Downer, "Indonesia's Challenges: How Australia Can Help."

preference for regional security influenced Australian government right up to 1999, a conclusion further supported by military relations.

Australia's military support to Indonesia continued unabated from 1975 until the 1990s, further supporting the argument that Australian strategic culture influenced a preference for non-intervention in East Timor. During the period 1972-80, Australia's military aid to Indonesia totaled AUD$50.5 million, consisting of fighter and transport aircraft, patrol boats, officer training, and mapping projects.[50] Despite a suspension of US-funded military training following the Dili massacre, Australia increased its training of Indonesian officers, from five in 1990-91 to 225 in 1995-96.[51] Throughout the international condemnation of Indonesia's atrocities in East Timor, Australia's preferences remained steadfast as evidenced in all expressions of its national power.

Australia's strategic cultural preference, as expressed in the 1976 white paper, continued to favor a secure and friendly Indonesian neighbor despite human rights violations in East Timor. By 1994, this was still evident in security policy, as outlined within *Defending Australia, Defence White Paper* 1994; "[Australia's] defence relationship with Indonesia is our most important in the region and a key element in Australia's approach to regional defence engagement."[52] The historical factors of Australia's strategic culture analyzed here consistently support non-intervention in East Timor as a prerequisite for strong bilateral ties with Indonesia. The analysis shifts to institutional factors to find explanation in Australia's shift in decision-making.

Influence of Institutional Factors

Did the institutional factors that shaped Australia's strategic culture influence its decision to commit military force in East Timor?

The influence of Australian politics and society that shaped Australia's strategic culture did not influence Australia's policy reversal in 1999, but an increasing pressure of pro-East Timor public opinion on the Howard government does reveal itself as an intervening variable. The healthy political debate within Government identified in the

[50] Hainsworth and McCloskey, *The East Timor Question*, 139.
[51] Lowry, *Australia-Indonesia Security Cooperation*, 8.
[52] *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994* (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1994), 87, http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/wpaper1994.pdf.

1975 analysis still existed in 1999. However, like decades earlier, the dominating preferences for non-intervention identified in the previous historical factors continued to shape the leadership's decision-making. Despite opposing Australia's decision not to intervene in East Timor as the opposition party leader, now Prime Minister John Howard continued to maintain the strategic preference like those leaders before him all the way back to Whitlam.

Throughout the decades, government leaders had considered intelligence assessments, ministerial opinions, department positions, non-government organization (NGO) protests, and UN resolutions in opposition to Australia's stance on East Timor. One example is an annual report written by James Dunn, the Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs advisory body, in which Dunn states; "the military seizure of East Timor has been a bloody operation, in which atrocities of a disturbing nature have been committed against the civilian population. Indeed, these accounts of Indonesian behavior in East Timor suggest that the plight of these people may well constitute, relatively speaking, the most serious case of contravention of human rights facing the world at this time."[53] Not even the 1991 Dili massacre constituted enough of a dilemma to shift the position of Australian politicians. In the absence of a deviation in the preferences demanded from Australian strategic culture, in 1998 Australian politicians began to exhibit signs of change in East Timor policy.

In 1999 Australian society had historically been a strong supporter of Australian military deployments (except for Vietnam), but it was a public outcry for human rights that ultimately shifted Australian policy to intervene militarily in East Timor. While many Australians in 1975 most likely considered Indonesia's use of force in East Timor a blatant human rights violation, the recent opposition to Australian troops in Vietnam combined with an Indonesian media blackout, and Australian government acquiescence, resulted in a failure of the East Timor plight to dominate public opinion. However, over the decades, successive UN resolutions, combined with the 1991 Dili massacre footage, and anxiety surrounding Indonesia's recent economic and political instability all gradually allowed the Australian public to re-focus on the systemic atrocities in East

[53] Hainsworth and McCloskey, *The East Timor Question*, 140.

Timor. By the end of 1998, "responding to both domestic pressure from the campaigns of Australian activists and the positive policy changes of the Labour party, the government dispatched the Australian Military Attaché to East Timor to review the Indonesian military position and offer various recommendations."[54] On 5 January 1999, the Howard government cemented a shift in policy by recognizing the East-Timorese right to self-determination. Howard transmitted this shift in a letter to President Habibie that same month, suggesting a reversal of Australia's support for the status quo.

Furthermore, Indonesia moved by increasing Australian and international pressure, supported a UN-supervised act of self-determination for East Timor in August. An Australian television survey just prior to the referendum resulted in 83 per cent of respondents in favor of East Timor's right to self-determination.[55] The subsequent East Timorese referendum produced a clear majority 78.5 percent from a 99 percent turnout, in favor of independence from Indonesia.[56] The subsequent Indonesian-orchestrated militia violence that followed killed thousands, detained an estimated 230,000 in West Timor camps, and displaced about 200,000 fleeing East Timorese into the mountains.[57] The Australian public reacted to Indonesia's response with a poll in mid-September indicating 90 percent favoring an Australian intervention in East Timor.[58] Australians, in unison with the international community, deplored Indonesian actions, and the democratic Australian government could look away no longer. Two days after the referendum, the UN officially asked for Australian support for a UN peacekeeping mission. In response, Prime Minister Howard not only agreed but asked if the Australian military could lead the operation.[59]

Institutional factors of Australia's strategic culture do not explain the reversal in policy regarding East Timor, however, the democratic pressure of shifting public opinion did force the government to reconsider its previous dominating preferences. In this

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[54] Hainsworth and McCloskey, *The East Timor Question*, 146.
[55] Ibid., 145.
[56] Ibid., 146.
[57] Ibid., 204.
[58] Ian McAllister et al., *Attitude Matters: Public Opinion in Australia towards Defence and Security* (Barton, ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2004), 24.
[59] David Connery, *Crisis Policymaking: Australia and the East Timor Crisis of 1999*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, no. 177 (Canberra: ANUE Press, 2010), 32.

regard, Australian public opinion in the late 1990s is identified as an intervening variable that overcame strategic culture preferences for the use of force in the East Timor crisis. The role of public opinion is considered separate from the influence of the Australian public as an institutional factor analyzed earlier. The Australian public consistently supported the government's decisions to send expeditionary forces overseas in support of a forward defense policy and this was no different in the case of East Timor. The role of public opinion however is identified as a variable, fluctuating with the availability of media coverage throughout the crisis. Australia's decision to intervene was not enough however for Australia to act under UN authority. It would take geopolitics to ultimately give Australia the green light.

Influence of Geopolitical Factors

Did the geopolitical factors that shaped Australia's strategic culture influence its decision to commit military force in East Timor?

Geopolitical aspects of Australia's strategic culture did not influence the 1999 decision to intervene in East Timor because the new Australian position evolved regardless of conflicting US interests that still favored Indonesia. As the Borneo conflict case study established, American interests during the Cold War highlighted the strategic importance of anti-communist Indonesia in SE Asia. This importance had not diminished in the eyes of the United States in 1975. While Australia's preferences in 1975 neatly aligned with US Cold War interests, previous analysis determined that American objectives were not as influential as the historical factors. Furthermore, despite the end of the Cold War, US interests in Indonesia continued, replaced by economic and trade objectives. Moreover, the end of the Cold War strengthened Australia's need for regional security. Following economic reforms in the 1970s, China was emerging as a regional power, and as Lowry suggests, "it was fashionable, if not accurate, to talk of the United States as being a victim of strategic overreach and in long-term relative decline."[60] Once again, American interests neatly aligned with, but did not shape, Australian preferences regarding East Timor. That is of course until Australia reversed its policy in 1999.

[60] Lowry, *Australia-Indonesia Security Cooperation*, 9.

Considering pro-East Timorese public opinion in Australia, the government, despite displaying a strong preference for non-intervention, shifted its stance and offered to lead a UN peacekeeping force despite the conflict of this action with US interests. Therefore, this assessment concludes that the weight of public opinion on the democratic Australian leadership trumped not only pro-Indonesian preference driven from historical factors, but the same preference driven from US geopolitical interests despite the end of the Cold War. WGCDR Gus Porter's analysis, in *Windows of Opportunity*, provides valuable insight into these final months of Australian decision-making. As Porter outlines, despite an Australian offer to lead the UN peacekeeping operation – known as International Force East Timor (INTERFET) – the planned intervention remained stagnant until a resolution passed and Indonesia subsequently provided state approval.[61] Although Habibie had been somewhat pressured into the referendum by an Australian reversal in policy, US-vetoing of the UN peacekeeping resolution ensured that Habibie felt no pressure to cede. Ultimately, during a discussion between Prime Minister Howard and President Clinton at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum on 12 September 1999, Howard managed to convince Clinton that East Timor's successful transition to independence was in Australian interests and, therefore, required American support.[62] It was during a subsequent phone call between Clinton and Habibie, that under the threat of US economic sanctions, Indonesia agreed to allow UN peacekeepers access to East Timor.[63] On 15 September 1999, following 24 years of East Timorese pleas for assistance, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1264 providing Chapter VII mandate for INTERFET.[64]

The Australian decision to lead INTERFET and assist the East Timorese people gain their independence from an aggressive Indonesia did not extend from a strategic preference influenced by geopolitical factors. On the contrary, despite a significant reversal in Australian policy which contradicted its strategic cultural preferences,

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[61] Angus L. Porter, *Windows of Opportunity: East Timor and Australian Strategic Decision Making (1975-1999)*, First edition, Drew Paper, no. 27 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, Air Force Research Institute, 2016), 65-66.
[62] Porter, *Windows of Opportunity,* 66.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Connery, *Crisis Policymaking*, 35.

Howard, remained powerless to act under the pretense of UN authority while faced with opposing US interests. The interests of the United States in the case of the East Timor crisis emerged as a significant intervening variable in Australia's preference to use military force in SE Asia.

Summary

Following Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in 1975, Australia decided not to intervene, influenced by a strategic preference to maintain good relations with Indonesia in the greater interests of regional security. The strategic culture that shaped this decision attributes several factors. Firstly, and most importantly, the historical factors that evolved from Australia's early days of independence, to WWII, and post Borneo, represented an acknowledgement of great power withdrawal from SE Asia requiring a more "self-reliant" posture that integrated strong relationships with Australia's northern neighbors. East Timor's plight for independence demonstrated less of a threat to Australia's regional security than a possible conflict with Indonesia.

Secondly, in the geopolitical arena, as observed in Borneo, US interests shaped by the Cold War favored good relations with strategically important Indonesia, as a bastion against the spread of communism in the region. Given Australia's recent moves to self-reliance with less focus on forward defense, however, assessment of this aspect of Australia's strategic culture provided less influence than the historical factors. The fact that the geopolitical factors aligned with the historical factors therefore strengthened Australia's preference in 1975.

Finally, in contrast to the institutional factors that shaped Australia's strategic culture post-WWII, politicians and institutions frequently debated the government's decision-making, and the Australian public for the first time actively opposed troop deployments after the national impact of the Vietnam War. Despite healthy political debate, however, a change in ruling political parties just prior to the invasion did not change the government's stance on East Timor – the preference established by historical and geopolitical factors was unmoving. Australian public opinion at the time, influenced by the emotions of the war in Indochina and a lack of media coverage or government interest, neatly aligned with Australia's strategic preference in 1975.

Despite a consistent strategic culture over 25 years, including a steady preference for non-intervention that overcame the end of the Cold War, increasing human rights attention, and a relative decline of Indonesia's economic power, Australia reversed its policy on East Timor in 1999. On inspection, the factors that influenced Australian strategic culture were not responsible for this policy shift. Firstly, Australia's 1975 preference for non-intervention shaped by historical factors had not changed. The wording of the 1994 Defence White Paper, *Defending Australia* is evidence to this fact; "Australia's future security - like our economic prosperity - is linked inextricably to the security and prosperity of Asia and the Pacific. Australia's strategic engagement with the region is an integral element of our national effort to make our place in the region."[65] Right up until 1998, Australia had developed a strong commitment of diplomatic, economic, and military power to develop a strong relationship with Indonesia. At the time INTERFET intervened in East Timor, Australia's strategic culture had not changed. Historical factors, as the dominant influence on this culture, are not assessed as responsible for Australia's decision to commit force in the East Timor crisis.

Secondly, institutional factors such as the role of politicians and society on Australia's strategic preferences did not impact the shift in Australia's position. Politicians continued to engage in debate, as seen in 1975, but their underlying preference had not changed. The Australian public had seen a significant shift in their attitude towards East Timor, but this was not a shift from the traditional culture of supporting Australia's military commitment overseas. This greater public awareness of the atrocities in East Timor, highlighted by media exposure of the Dili Massacre, and increasing UN, NGO, and activist attention, emerged as an intervening variable that directly forced the government's hand. Australia's democratic system reminded the Howard government that failure to acknowledge the desire of 90 percent of the population amounted to political suicide, regardless of the government's dominating preference.

Finally, the analysis does not assess the geopolitical factors influencing Australia's strategic culture as causal in the Australian decision to militarily support East Timor's independence. US interests in Indonesia remained constant for 25 years, albeit

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[65] *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994,* 3.

shifting from strategic to economic interests following the end of the Cold War. Even following Australia's decision to participate in a UN peacekeeping operation, American interests still favored Indonesia until Howard and Clinton met in early September 1999. The fact that Australia made a decision to intervene militarily in East Timor in the face of opposing US interests suggests that geopolitical factors of Australia's strategic culture do not account for this reversal in policy. The subsequent Australian request to the United States to support the UN resolution and pressure Suharto into allowing a peacekeeping force into East Timor highlights another significant intervening variable – US interests prevented Australia's ability to exercise force in East Timor regardless of Australia's decision to do so.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

We will give a warning that this (Australian naval incursions) is not acceptable. We have international law, you must respect international law.

Indonesian President, Joko Widodo

A strong and productive relationship with Indonesia is critical to Australia's national security.

2016 Australian Defence White Paper

This thesis set out to answer the question how did the strategic cultures of Indonesia and Australia influence their decisions to use military force in the Borneo Confrontation and the East Timor Crisis? In seeking the answer to this question, the hope was to also achieve Gray's objective in the study of strategic culture, "to better understand ourselves, better…understand others, and (scarcely less important) better…understand how others interpret us."[1] As stated in the beginning, strategic culture may influence or shape a state's decisions to use force. This statement acknowledges that there are always other factors apparent that influence state's actions, factors identified in the previous two case studies – identified as intervening variables. Furthermore, this thesis acknowledges that strategic cultures evolve over time, for example, changed by traumatic national events. This analysis identified such shifts in strategic culture, sparked by intervening variables, over the nearly 40 years of case study coverage. The two cases – the Borneo Confrontation and the East Timor Crisis – identified a range of aligned, shifting, and opposing preferences for the use of force in settling security issues relevant to Indonesia and Australia.

[1] Gray, Colin, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," *International Security* 6, no. 2 (Fall 1981), 46.

Indonesian Strategic Culture

Pre-1963, two dominant strategic preferences shaped Indonesia's strategic culture, represented by separate institutions: the use of force against colonialism and imperialism, as defined during Indonesia's struggle for independence and embraced by Sukarno and the PKI, versus an "inward-looking" preference for force focused on threats to Indonesia's domestic security, codified by the Indonesian army. Sukarno and his communist PKI faction held the balance of power, and therefore the anti-colonialist rhetoric dominated in 1963. In 1965, however, the failed PKI coup against military leadership served as an intervening variable, not only shifting the balance of power to the army, but the dominating preference for the use of force with it. The coup attempt and the violence that followed proved to be a greater defining event to Indonesians than *Konfrontasi* and, as a result, shifted Indonesia's strategic culture for years to come. In sum, historical and institutional (Sukarno/PKI) factors of Indonesia's strategic culture proved to be most influential in the initial decision to use force against Malaysia. Following the failed communist coup, a shift in power realigned the dominant preference to one governed by institutional (military) factors, ceasing conflict with Malaysia and permanently shifting Indonesia's strategic culture.

Post-1966, the Indonesian Army became intertwined in all aspects of Indonesian life, social, political, and military, to ensure threats to Indonesia's national security no longer emerged from domestic instability. Indonesia's strategic culture shifted to one characterized by the military's dual functions and the state's national resilience. A military-dominated government expressed a preference to use force in the maintenance of internal security, while wary of communist and foreign power influence in that regard.

Influenced by the previously described strategic culture, Indonesia made the decision to invade East Timor to prevent a perceived communist-orientated party gaining power following the territory's calls for independence. The New Order government, led by Suharto, a former military general, demonstrated a feverous preference for the use of force to repel any potential communist state establishment on Indonesia's border. The dominant institutional factors resulting from the events of 1965 influenced Suharto and his military-heavy government's decision to invade East Timor in 1975. Historical factors, including the memories of the 1945 communist coup attempt, and geopolitical

factors, such as the Cold War communist threat to SE Asia and US approval of anti-communist rhetoric, all neatly aligned to form a strong preference for the violence in East Timor. While this strong preference for the use of force remained immediately post Suharto's 1998 resignation and the beginning of a more democratic government system, it was ultimately the intervening threat of US economic sanctions that forced Indonesia to accept UN peacekeepers into East Timor to oversee a transition to independence.

Observation of the two case studies provides the following overall conclusions regarding how Indonesia's strategic culture influenced its decision to commit force in 1963 and 1975-1999: Institutional factors proved highly influential in both cases, followed by historical/geographical factors, and lastly, geopolitical factors; Indonesia demonstrated two conflicting strands of preference in 1963; the 1965 coup proved to be a significant intervening variable that shifted Indonesia's dominant preference and permanently changed its strategic culture; and, international and regional institutions did not influence Indonesian preference during the East Timor crisis, however great power interest was a key intervening variable in the outcome. Table 1 summarizes the influence of analyzed strategic culture factors.

Table 1: Summary of Indonesian Strategic Culture factors

	Borneo Confrontation	**East Timor Crisis**
Institutional	Highly influential	Highly influential
Historical/Geographical	Highly influential	Moderately influential
Geopolitical	Non-influential	Moderately influential
Conflicting Preferences?	Yes	No
Intervening Variable	PKI coup attempt	US pressure
Strategic Culture Shift?	Yes	No

Source: Author's Original Work

Indonesia's institutional factors proved to be highly influential in both case studies, especially the evolution of the military's role throughout the period of examination. Indonesia's military has a strong history of evicting the colonialist Dutch, restoring order during rebellions, and defeating two communist coups. The military's role in destroying the PKI in 1965 outweighed any negative national perception during

the aggression against Malaysia, so much so that it dominated all aspects of Indonesian social and political life from that point forward. The military's dominant preference – executed through its Dual Functions doctrine – ensured that hatred for communism dominated the government's decision making for 25 years in East Timor.

Indonesian doctrine consistently reflected the role of historical and geographical factors. National Resilience, Total People's Defense, and Archipelagic Outlook doctrines all remained relevant throughout *Konfrontasi* and East Timor. *Pancasila* embodied the values forged from the struggle for independence, and the difficultly in uniting many islands, languages, and religions under one flag. These values, combined with the identification of territorial security of Indonesia's island chains and waterways, all reinforce the inwards looking strategic culture that Indonesia maintains.

The lesser influence of geopolitical factors on Indonesia's strategic culture reinforces elements of the culture itself. Indonesia learned early in their history that great powers will only intervene when it is in their interests to do so. Hesitant support for Indonesia's independence struggle, covert support for domestic rebellions, and the perception of Indonesia as a chess piece in a larger Cold War arena all shaped Indonesia's preference to avoid great power alliances. Indonesia formed the NAM, and integrated similar ideals into ASEAN. Geopolitics did not shape Indonesia's decision to confront Malaysia. Although branded as a fight against communism, historical and institutional elements of Indonesia's communist experience drove the decision to invade East Timor, rather than an acknowledgement to support for the West in the Cold War. Indonesia obviously used the alignment of Western interests to its benefit, however, through the acceptance of US and Australian military and economic aid over 25 years.

In the decisions to confront Malaysia and subsequently end the conflict, Indonesia exhibited conflicting preferences resolved through the transfer of power from the Sukarno and the PKI, to Suharto and the military in 1965. The structure of the Indonesian authoritarian-like government at the time demonstrated that although Sukarno, the PKI, and the Indonesian military shared power (since uniting to put down the 1950's rebellions), varying underlying preferences existed. Such a sharp and violent transfer of power to the military in 1965 therefore explains a new dominant preference

for the use of force emerging. The subsequent 32-year reign of Suharto's military-dominated New Order government cemented the new shift in strategic culture.

Neither the regional or international institutions that existed during the two case studies demonstrated a significant influence over Indonesia's strategic culture; however great power interest did appear as an intervening variable, dominating the prevailing strategic preference, and contributing to the end of the crisis. Indonesia's strategic culture has consistently been one of national resilience, embodying an avoidance of other states' influence, military alliances, or exposure to outside criticism or interference of Indonesia's domestic affairs. The SE Asian region embraced this culture, outlining the importance of "non-interference" in the ASEAN charter and promoting a regional resilience outlook. This element of Indonesia's strategic culture allowed it to boldly ignore and dispel multiple UN resolutions sanctioning the abuse of East Timorese human rights. Indonesia considered East Timor an internal issue, outside the purview of the international community. There is evidence of regional acceptance of this ideology; Malaysia, which fought Indonesia only a decade before, did not support a UN intervention in East Timor.[2] Importantly, however, Indonesia's ability to discard UN pressure for a quarter of a decade largely depended on great power interest. It was largely the pro-Indonesian interests of the United States, accompanied by US vetoing of UN resolutions, that allowed Indonesia's defiant stance to continue until 1999.

Australian Strategic Culture

Evan's depiction of Australian strategic culture perched on the threshold between two conflicting preferences revealed itself in 1963. Indonesia, as Australia's northern neighbor exemplified the paradox of "Asian geography" and "European history" that Evan's described. In the Borneo Confrontation, Indonesia's strategic importance to Australia's regional security and continental defense competed with Australia's British and commonwealth responsibilities to Malaysia under a forward defense policy. In 1963, continental defense's preference for good relations with Indonesia, a decline in forward defense commitment to Britain, and Britain's apparent containment of Indonesian

[2] Jeffrey S. Lantis and Andrew A. Charlton, "Continuity or Change? The Strategic Culture of Australia," *Comparative Strategy* 30, no. 4 (September 2011): 301, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2011.605019.

aggression aligned to resolve the preference conflict. By 1965, however, Britain's control was under question as Indonesian's aggression increased and Malaysia directly asked Australia for military assistance. Indonesian success in Borneo risked increased confidence in a *Konfrontasi*-style campaign against other colonial territories like Australia's PNG. The risks of Indonesia to Australia's regional security now exceeded the benefits of stable relations. The same risks also outweighed aligning Australia's interests with US interests under the forward defense policy. A preference to use force in maintaining regional security under a continental defense outlook dominated a forward defense policy supporting the United States and stable relations with Indonesia.

By 1975, Australia had attempted to resolve its conflicting preferences – continental and forward defense – into a single policy of self-reliance. While Australia now recognized the importance of providing forces to support the international order and US interests, a more self-reliant posture regionally dominated Australia's strategic culture. Stable relations with Indonesia once again were at the forefront of Australia's strategy, unfortunately at the expense of the people of East Timor. Australia's decision not to intervene in the invasion of East Timor represented strong unison of all factors of Australian strategic culture. Historical/Geographical, Geopolitical, and Institutional factors all supported Australia's 1975 decision, and continued to shape this preference for 24 years. Historical/Geographical factors proved to be most dominant in this regard, the goal to quell Australia's regional anxiety through strong Indonesian relations won over any pressure from the UN or international arena regarding human rights in East Timor. Geopolitical factors, including US interests in the Cold War and beyond, while aligned with Australia's preference, did not prove as dominating in Australia's decision-making. Likewise, institutional factors proved less influential in Australia's non-intervention. Interestingly, in 1999, the reversal in Australia's position defied all its strategic preferences. Australian public opinion intervened to pressure the government into action, and this pressure outweighed existing preference. The power of US interests in preventing the implementation of an Australian decision to lead a UN intervention highlighted a further interesting by-product of the East Timor analysis.

Observation of the two case studies provides the following overall conclusions regarding how Australia's strategic culture influenced its decision to commit force in

1963, 1975, and 1999: Historical/Geographical factors proved highly influential in both cases, followed by geopolitical factors, and lastly, institutional factors; Australia demonstrated two conflicting strands of preference in 1963; the Indonesian aggression and Malaysian request for assistance proved to be intervening variables that shifted Australia's dominant preference in 1965; Australian public opinion intervened in 1999 to dominate the favored strategic preference; and, although US interests did not influence Australia's preference or decision to help East Timor, they did prevent implementation of the decision under a UN framework. Tables 2 and 3 summarizes the influence of analyzed strategic culture factors.

Table 2: Summary of Australian Strategic Culture factors - Borneo

	Borneo Confrontation
Historical/Geographical	Highly influential
Geopolitical	Moderately influential
Institutional	Least influential
Conflicting Preferences?	Yes
Intervening Variable	Malaysia's Request / Indonesia's Escalation
Strategic Culture Shift?	No

Source: Author's Original Work

Table 3: Summary of Australian Strategic Culture factors - East Timor

	East Timor 1975	**East Timor 1999**
Historical/Geographical	Highly influential	Highly influential
Geopolitical	Moderately influential	Moderately influential
Institutional	Least influential	Moderately influential
Conflicting Preferences?	No	No
Intervening Variable	No	Public Opinion US interests
Strategic Culture Shift?	No	No

Source: Author's Original Work

The historical and geographical factors of Australian strategic culture dominated the preferences in both case studies. The paradox of geography and ancestry that shaped Australian anxiety and dependence proved powerful in shaping Australian preferences in Borneo and East Timor. After the East Timor Crisis, Australian strategic culture still struggled to resolve a preference for continental defense versus forward defense, despite the apparent shift to favor regional security through self-reliance exhibited in the East Timor case.

Geopolitically, Australia's forward defense policy ultimately favored the United States during both case studies. The Cold War dominated US interests in SE Asia during the Borneo Confrontation and over half of the East Timor Crisis. During this time, these interests appeared to be influential in shaping Australian preferences. However, as demonstrated in both case studies, regional security concerns in Borneo and Australian public opinion in East Timor both overcame the influence of any US interest.

The influence of institutional factors in sum appeared to carry the least weight over both case studies. Politicians, the military, and Australian society, all proved to be relatively consistent in their support for the dominating preference of the use of force against Indonesia. As the preference shifted in Borneo, there was little opposition from these institutions. The reversal in policy regarding East Timor did not highlight a conflicting Australian public preference for the use of force, but rather an increase in the concern of the plight of the East Timorese people.

Like Indonesia in the Borneo Confrontation, Australia also dealt with conflicting strategic preferences. Australia's conflicting preferences evolved from historical/geographical factors rather than the institutional factors identified in the Indonesian case. In contrast to Indonesia's coup attempt, Australia resolved its conflicting preferences through risk management and a change in strategy based upon intervening variables that changed the calculus in Borneo. The relative stable political and public debate within a democratic society such as Australia helps explain such a smooth transition between strategic preferences. Indonesia's violent coup attempt and follow-on retribution stands in stark contrast, highlighting the often-traumatic shift in preferences tied to power transfer in a more authoritarian style government.

The identification of Australian public opinion as a major intervening variable in the East Timor Crisis highlighted a potential limitation of strategic culture utilization in democratic societies. Australian decision-makers will always be at the mercy of public opinion and a three-year election cycle. As discussed earlier, the role of public opinion is considered independent of the prevailing preference of the wider Australian public as an institution. The Australian public was consistent in its support for the use of force, when the government identified the requirement. In this case, it was the media-focused attention of East Timorese human rights that drove public opinion to pressure Australian leaders to act. As a result, although Australian strategic culture proved consistent for 24 years regarding East Timor, an Australian public focus on human rights in 1999 shifted the government's focus away from preferred policy.

Another important intervening variable discovered in this study is the role of US interests in discussions of strategic culture. Although, as Borneo and East Timor show, Australian leadership will put US interests second concerning issues of regional security or public opinion, the ability for Australia to execute the use of force under a UN framework was at the mercy of US consent. As Porter concluded, this fact underlines the role of great power influence in international relations. Porter claims realism best explains the power of US interests in stalling Australia's ability to execute force under a UN framework. Great power interests clearly dominated over the power of the UN institution in this case, questioning the explanatory power of neoliberalism in the East Timor Crisis. Ultimately, while strategic culture proved to be valuable in correctly explaining the Australian decision to support Indonesia for 24 years, neither strategic culture, nor liberalism could explain Australia's and the international community's temporary inability to intervene in 1999.

General Conclusions

In seeking to discover what role strategic culture played in Indonesian and Australian decision-making during the Borneo Confrontation and the East Timor Crisis a few interesting conclusions emerged. First, as both cases demonstrate, strategic culture is not simply a single, well-defined preference. As Indonesian and Australian strategic culture factors highlight, many elements factor into the development of strategic culture, and these elements may result in different or conflicting preferences as a result.

Indonesia and Australia resolved these conflicting preferences in very different ways. The style of Indonesian government allows for one dominant preference, executed by the institution with the balance of power. Australia's democratic society allows for the existence of differing preferences to coexist, resolved through risk analysis, the changing international/regional environment, and healthy political debate.

The second general conclusion to emerge is that intervening variables were evident for both states, and in both case studies, and interrupted the dominating preference or decision to use force in all cases. This fact demonstrates the acknowledgement made up front – strategic culture only "shapes" or "influences" a state's decision to use force. Other variables interfere in a state's overall preference to use force in international relations. In any case the intervening variables affected the decision to use or not to use force, *after* the state made the decision. Understanding a state's underlying preference, or conflicting preferences, for the use of force still proves to be valuable in ongoing international relations regardless of the existence of other variables.

Finally, Indonesia witnessed a sharp and rapid shift in its strategic culture following the 1965 coup, whereas Australian shifts from forward defense to continental defense and finally to self-reliance were more gradual and deliberate. One explanation for this fact is that Australia, as Bell reminds us, "is a bit short on drama."[3] The history of Australia lacks any events as significant or traumatic to the Australian psyche as a brief overview of Indonesia's past. The dismissal of Whitlam as Prime Minister – Australia's worst constitutional crisis in history - hardly compares to the killing of thousands of communist supporters after the PKI attempted a coup. The extension of this observation is that any future potential shifts in Indonesian power and leadership, may be both traumatic in some way to Indonesia, and result in a shift in strategic culture as a result.

[3] Coral Bell, "Strategic Thought and Security Preoccupations in Australia," in *A National Asset: 50 Years of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre* (Australia: ANU Press, 2016), 11.

Insights for the Future

Current Indonesian and Australian strategic cultures still reflect preferences identified in the two case studies examined, providing insights into future interactions between the two states, as well as warnings; Australia's and Indonesia's conflicting preferences, the role of public opinion, and great power interest.

Indonesia has experienced significant political upheaval since the East Timor crisis. As Hamish McDonald, in *Demokrasi*, outlines, the resignation of Suharto in 1998 had significant potential to spark yet another coup, this time driven by military leadership intent on retaining the power enjoyed under Suharto.[4] President Habibie forged a new style of democracy, formulating new rules for free and fair elections, declaring "Anyone at all may form a political party."[5] Under this new Indonesian framework, the military abandoned the Dual Functions doctrine and the political power associated with it, but retained an inwards-looking perspective, through doctrines of National Resilience and Total People's Defense.[6] The reduced military intervention in Indonesian politics was codified in military regulation number 34/2004, "which specifically forbids engagement in practical politics as evidence that it is no longer interested in taking an active part in practical politics."[7]

Despite this formal shift in the military's role in Indonesian politics, the military still holds significant power and influence today. Many former generals hold key political positions within the current President Joko Widodo's cabinet.[8] In 2017, President Widodo replaced the commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI), General Gatot Nurmantyo, with Air Chief Marsahll Hadi Tjahjanto. General Nurmantyo's previous actions were evidence of continuing strategic preferences from the Suharto-era. Nurmantyo still declared communism a threat to Indonesia, but included the threat of liberalism as well; "the Indonesian Communist Party is dangerous, but

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[4] Hamish McDonald, *Demokrasi: Indonesia in the 21st Century* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 71.
[5] McDonald, *Demokrasi,* 72.
[6] Tellis et al., *Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific*, 180.
[7] Ibid., 181.
[8] "Indonesian President Jokowi Boosts Ties with Military in Power Shift," *The Straits Times*, February 15, 2018.

neocapitalism and neoliberalism are more dangerous because they could turn religious people into atheists, who will then embrace Communism."[9] The replacement of Nurmantyo, who was widely perceived to harbor presidential ambitions, is evidence of the continuing institutional power dynamics that still exist within Indonesian government.[10] Widodo's recent military appointments are also in response to an increase in Islamic representation within politics, including some radical streams, another historical threat to Indonesia's *Pancasila* values.

The 2015 Indonesian White Paper reflects long-standing elements of its strategic culture and previous doctrines such as National Resilience, Total People's Defense, and Archipelagic Outlook. Today, as evidenced by the White Paper, the nation still demonstrates an inward-looking framework. A "total defence system…involving all citizens in accordance with their roles and functions," echoes the historical preferences for the use of the entire population to repel foreign security threats.[11] Long-held concerns over the security of Indonesia's thousands of islands and associated waterways are still reflected in the current white paper, "Violation of Indonesia's sovereignty in the airspace and sea can cause tension and has the potential to conflict."[12]

Furthermore, the inwards looking nature of externally generated threats continues to highlight national resilience. The current White Paper identifies these external threats to Indonesian domestic stability as "nonlinear, indirect, and…[generating potential for] a proxy war."[13] The 2015 White Paper further outlines, "Serious problems related to the contemporary conflict is an internal conflict growth that could trigger separatist movements because of political and regional interests."[14] As evidenced by the current strategic policy, Indonesia's strategic culture still demonstrates strong preferences for the use of force in defending Indonesia's internal security from external threats, including compulsory military service to enhance a "total defence" posture, as well as sensitivities

[9] Tellis et al., *Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific*, 181.
[10] "Indonesian President Jokowi Boosts Ties."
[11] "Indonesian Defence White Paper 2015" (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia, November 2015), 1.
[12] Ibid., 10.
[13] Ibid., 11.
[14] Ibid., 12.

to the nation's territorial boundaries. The Indonesian military, although not formally involved in politics, still exhibits strong influence within the government, representing historical tensions regarding the reemergence of communist and/or Islamic threats to the state's stability.

Indonesian strategic culture today demonstrates strong linkages to the historical inwards-looking focus highlighted in the two case studies. Unrest within Indonesia's archipelagic and culturally-diverse population remains threatened by internal and external threats such as communism, Islamic fundamentalism, and foreign actors. Historically, as Indonesia's protector against these traditional threats, the military's preference for the use of force remains powerful within government, despite the formal withdrawal of the military institution from politics. As Indonesia's history shows, any transfer of power between major parties in politics can not only result in intense violence, but also shifts in dominant preferences. In comparison, Australia's current strategic culture demonstrates a similar battle of preference, however resolution still occurs in very different ways.

As evidenced by the most recent White Paper, Australia still exhibits two potentially conflicting strands of strategic culture today as observed in the two case studies. The 2016 Defence White Paper identifies three core Australian strategic interests. First, "to deter, deny and defeat any attempt by a hostile country or non-state actor to attack, threaten or coerce Australia.[15] As the same document later states however, "There is no more than a remote chance of a military attack on Australian territory by another country."[16] The second strategic interest is "a secure nearer region, encompassing maritime South East Asia and the South Pacific," to which later the document outlines the need for increased defense engagement in the region, "particularly Indonesia."[17] Finally, the third strategic interest identified is "a stable Indo-Pacific region and rule-based global order which supports our interests."[18] This interest highlights the importance of the US alliance and Australia's preference for globally-led

[15] Australia and Department of Defence, *2016 Defence White Paper*, 2016, 17.
[16] Ibid., 32.
[17] Ibid., 17.
[18] Ibid..

and coalition responses to threats. The second and third interests identified represent the ongoing strategic culture debate uncovered by this paper's investigation.

Coral Bell, in her article "Strategic Thought and Security Preoccupations in Australia," described this "characteristic dilemma" of Australian strategic culture observed since the 1950's as, "how to hold the balance between Australia's regional commitments and anxieties and its global ones."[19] As identified by Bisely, and evidenced by the two case studies, there is a "heavy inertia" regarding Australia's competing strands of strategic culture that still exists today; "the sense of vulnerability, the role of military power as a vital means of managing anxiety, and the part played by the alliance with the United States to help manage the country's strategic shortcomings."[20] David Kilcullen offers a modern outlook on this internal competition of preferences, suggesting that increased globalization is blurring the lines between local, regional, and global security interests, and forward defense – able to address all threats through reinforcement of the global order – is increasingly becoming the norm.[21] With regards to Indonesia, however, there is still evidence that suggests two potentially conflicting preferences.

The current Australian White Paper articulates the preference for a stable near-region that clearly refers to Indonesia as a key interest. As previously identified, Australia sees direct military threat from any state as a "remote" possibility, however it identifies regional instability as a more substantial threat; "Instability in our immediate region could have strategic consequences for Australia should it lead to increasing influence by actors from outside the region with interests inimical to ours."[22] Indonesia is one of only three states addressed directly within the White Paper (New Zealand and the United States being the others), and the importance of the relationship that shaped Australia's preferences in Borneo and East Timor is still clear today – "A strong and productive relationship with Indonesia is critical to Australia's national security."[23]

[19] Bell, "Strategic Thought and Security Preoccupations in Australia," 14.
[20] Bisely, "Australia's Strategic Culture and Asia's Changing Regional Order," 16.
[21] Kilcullen, David, "Australian Statecraft," 65.
[22] Australia and Department of Defence, *2016 Defence White Paper*, 48.
[23] Ibid., 125.

However, the competing preference for the use of force in supporting the United States and the wider global order is also still prevalent.

Australia still clearly identifies the value of the commitment of force in support of the US-alliance and the global international order as insurance towards Australia's future security. The 2016 White Paper attributes the last 70 years of relative peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region to a strong US-presence, underpinned by an effective global order.[24] Moreover, Eric Begue found evidence of similar phraseology to this in every Australian white paper since 1976.[25] Australia's current preference for the use of force in reinforcing this stability is also clear; "The Government is committed to making practical and effective military contributions to global security operations to maintain the rules-based order and address shared security challenges where it is in our interest to do so."[26] Australian strategic culture has demonstrated an inertia that has outlasted both examined case studies and is still relevant today. As a "liminal" state, Australia remains perched on the threshold between these two potentially conflicting strands of strategic culture. What makes the relationship with Indonesia challenging is that it exists right at the intersection of the two preferences.

The case study analysis demonstrated that although Indonesia's dominating inward-looking strategic culture often appeared compatible with Australia's strong preference for regional harmony, the reality is that these preferences sometimes align, but are prone to shift, and therefore may oppose. Since the end of the East Timor Crisis, Australia and Indonesia's strategic cultures have clashed again, albeit not ending in conflict. In 2014, Australia's anxiety towards illegal immigrants transiting through Indonesia to Australia's Christmas Island, along with the terrorist threat associated with these "boat people," sparked a military response. The Royal Australian Navy, in the process of turning back people smuggling vessels to Indonesia, inadvertently violated Indonesian waters on several occasions.[27] The Indonesian response underlined the

[24] Bell, "Strategic Thought and Security Preoccupations in Australia," 14.
[25] Eric Begue, "Australian Strategic Culture: A Case Study" (The University of Akron, 2017), 20, http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/honors_research_projects/509.
[26] Australia and Department of Defence, *2016 Defence White Paper*, 15.
[27] "Indonesia Condemns Australian Navy Waters Violation," *BBC News*, January 17, 2014.

preference to counter foreign "violation[s] of sovereignty" with force. Indonesia promised to "intensify its maritime patrols in areas where violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity are at risk."[28]

Only one year earlier, Australia's intelligence support for United States operations once again generated an Indonesian response to perceived "foreign intervention." Allegations of Australian attempts to tap the then Indonesian President's phone, combined with the alleged use of Australia's Jakarta Embassy as part of a US spy network, drew instant Indonesian criticism and resulted in the halting of all military exercises with Australia until 2014[29]. The media sourced documents supporting the allegations from whistleblower Edward Snowden.[30] Despite a preference for stable Indonesian relations, Australia's anxiety regarding its northern neighbor and its dependence upon the US alliance both clashed with the strong Indonesian principle of non-interference. While these incidents did not prove serious enough to warrant the use of military force, they do highlight the tendency for Australian and Indonesian strategic cultures to oppose one another. Moreover, as another conclusion of the case studies highlighted, seemingly aligning preferences can shift due to intervening variables.

Intervening variables, such as Indonesian shifts in political power, will continue to risk placing Australian and Indonesian preferences at odds (or alternatively, Australian public opinion risks dominating political preferences altogether). The previous update on Indonesian strategic culture demonstrated that although the military has formally reduced the amount of political power it yields, recent Indonesian general ambitions indicate a desire to return military preference to the center of Indonesian politics. This combined with an increase in more extreme Islamic political power begins to pave a path historically travelled once before. Another potentially violent power shift within Indonesian government in the future has the potential to quickly alter the prevalent preferences for the use of force to favor the victor and potentially place the preference of Australia at odds.

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[28] Ibid.
[29] "Indonesia Leader Says Australia Spying Damaged Ties" *BBC News*, November 19, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-24986093.
[30] Ibid.

Moreover, Australian public opinion already proved it can trump a strong preference against the use of force, as seen in the East Timor Crisis. Since 1999, Australian public opinion has impacted Australian policy regarding Indonesia in several cases. Indonesia's portrayed cruelty towards Australian live cattle exports in 2011 prompted "a public outcry and demands for the government to act."[31] Days later, Prime Minister Gillard suspended all live cattle exports to Indonesia.[32] In 2015, public reaction to the execution of two convicted Australian drug smugglers (and six others) resulted in the recalling of the Australian Ambassador and wider diplomatic fallout.[33] During a public plea Prime Minister Abbot stated, "Millions of Australians are feeling very, very upset about what may soon happen to two Australians in Indonesia."[34] A study conducted by the National Center for Australian Studies in 2015 found not only evidence of "a clear link between public opinion and foreign policy since at least the 1960s," but there is supporting evidence for the same conclusion in Australian foreign policy regarding Indonesia over the past 30 years.[35] The influence of Australian public opinion on Australian decision-making and its ability to abrogate existing strategic preferences is a very interesting finding of this study that warrants substantial consideration in future Australian-Indonesian relations studies.

This study concluded that, in the case of Indonesia and Australia, respective strategic cultures did influence the decisions to use force in the Borneo Confrontation and the East Timor Crisis. The strength of these strategic preferences varied significantly depending upon historical/geographical, geopolitical, and institutional factors. Importantly, after decision-making occurred, preferences sometimes shifted because of intervening variables attributable to the respective governing systems of each state. For

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[31] "Australia Bans All Live Cattle Exports to Indonesia," *BBC News*, June 8, 2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13692211.
[32] Agnieszka Sobocinska, "Australia-Indonesia Attitudes Impact Study - Historical" (National Centre for Australian Studies, November 2015), 55, http://australiaindonesiacentre.org/app/uploads/2015/12/Australia-Indonesia-Attitudes-Impact-Study-—-Historical.pdf.
[33] Kate Lamb, "A Year After the Bali Nine Executions, Indonesia Prepares Firing Squads Again," *The Guardian Weekly*, April 27, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/28/indonesia-firing-squads-year-after-bali-nine-executions.
[34] Sobocinska, "Australia-Indonesia Attitudes Impact Study - Historical," 55.
[35] Ibid., 51.

Australia, Indonesia represents the perfect intersection of the Asian geography and European culture paradox. Indonesia's "inward-looking" focus on domestic stability could trigger the use of force again in the future in areas of recent unrest, such as Aceh or West Papuan territories. Violent unrest within Australia's most strategically important neighbor will again rest on the threshold of Australia's dilemma; do not intervene, supporting Indonesia to maintain regional security, or, use force to prevent human rights violations in support of a UN mandate and a wider international order. Regardless of Australia's dominant preference, public opinion will surely weigh on the minds of any sitting government. Likewise, any continued Indonesian unrest may instill a lack of confidence in the current leadership providing an opportunity for a transfer of power that may significantly shift the nation's strategic culture and preference for the use of force. In the background, it is worth remembering that while great power interest may not shape Indonesia's or Australia's strategic preferences, they certainly may affect the execution of those preferences.

While strategic culture did play a part in shaping Australian and Indonesian decisions in the use of force in Borneo and East Timor, it is also clear that "shaping" is the most suitable description of this process. Both states exhibited varying and conflicting preferences, reconciled by very different means between the differing structures of government. Sometimes these differing strands of strategic culture aligned, and in different cases they opposed. After initial decision-making occurred, the role of intervening variables was important in shifting the dominant preference or overriding strategic preferences entirely. US interests played a role in both case studies, but either did not significantly influence the preference of either state, or internal preference factors ultimately overwhelmed US influence. These observations are still relevant today. Although Australian and Indonesian strategic cultures continue to evolve, there is a demonstrated longevity of many of the original factors that shaped these preferences. Future Australian decision-makers will benefit from strategic culture analysis regarding Indonesian relations. Like any other IR lens, strategic culture is both complex and dependent upon external variables. However, in acknowledging that strategic culture is continually changing, "shapes" not "defines," and may include multiple and conflicting ideas, the strategist will find value in these aligned, shifting, and opposing preferences.

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