

2019 CYBER-AUGMENTED OPERATIONS TECHNICAL SYMPOSIUM

Operationalizing the Technical Advantage

March 26 – 27 | Austin, TX | NDIA.org/CAOSpring

AGENDA

TUESDAY, MARCH 26

- 7:00 am 4:45 pm **REGISTRATION** ZLOTNIK BALLROOM PREFUNCTION
- 7:00 8:00 am NETWORKING CONTINENTAL BREAKFAST ZLOTNIK BALLROOM PREFUNCTION
- 8:00 8:15 am WELCOME REMARKS ZLOTNIK BALLROOM 4

Lt Gen Robert Elder, USAF (Ret) Chair, NDIA Cyber-Augmented Operations Division

8:15 – 9:00 am KEYNOTE SPEAKER

ZLOTNIK BALLROOM 4

COL Stoney Trent, USA Chief of Operations, Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC)

9:00 - 10:00 am DATA ANALYTICS & ALGORITHMS PANEL

ZLOTNIK BALLROOM 4

Brig Gen J.O. McFalls III, USAF (Ret) Senior Consultant, U.S. Cyber Command (J9) *Moderator*

COL Benjamin Ring, USA Chief, J9 Applied Research & Development Division, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)

Dr. Katie Liszewski Data Scientist, Battelle Memorial Institute

Keith Riser

Team Lead, Identity Intelligence Team, C5ISR Center, Information & Intelligence Warfare Directorate, U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Center (DEVCOM)

10:00 – 10:30 am **NETWORKING BREAK**



10:30 – 11:30 am **ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE PANEL**

ZLOTNIK BALLROOM 4

COL Stoney Trent, USA

Chief of Operations, Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) Moderator

Dr. Elisha Peterson

Chief Scientist, Analytic Capabilities Group, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU-APL)

Syeed Mansur

President and CEO, SENTRANA

COL Benjamin Ring, USA

Chief, J9 Applied Research & Development Division, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)

Mark Ashford

Data Manager Support, Air Force Agency for Modeling and Simulation, Huntington Ingalls Industries

11:30 am - 12:30 pm DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS PANEL

ZLOTNIK BALLROOM 4

Jeff Moulton

President and CEO, Stephenson Technologies Corporations (STC) *Moderator*

Bryan Bartels

Chief, Future Ops, Joint Air Component Coordination Element for U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) in coordination with USSTRATCOM

Chris MacDonald

Senior Director, Global Analytics Business Development

Derrick Franceschini

Senior Scientist, Cole Engineering Services, Inc.

Nathan Dawn

Weapon Systems Team Program Analyst, A5/8, Department of the Air Force

12:30 – 1:30 pm LUNCH & NETWORK PROTECTION PANEL

ZLOTNIK BALLROOMS 4, 5 & 6

Dr. Greg Wettstein

Principal Engineer, IDfusion *Moderator*

John Grosen

Chief Information Officer, IDfusion

James Cole

Director of Architecture & Engineering, Intel Corporation

Albert Taglieri Cadet, U.S. Air Force Academy

Victor Lee Cadet, U.S. Air Force Academy

1:30 – 2:15 pm KEYNOTE SPEAKER

ZLOTNIK BALLROOM 4

Robert Butler

Senior Vice President, Critical Infrastructure Protection Operations, AECOM Management Services

2:15 – 3:15 pm VIRTUAL TRAINING SYSTEMS PANEL

ZLOTNIK BALLROOM 4

Keenan Skelly

Vice President, Global Partnerships & Security Evangelist, Circadence *Moderator*

Dr. John Surdu Senior Scientist, Cole Engineering Services, Inc.

Dr. Omar Hasan Chief Architect, Dignitas Technologies

Maj Gen Howard Baker, USAF (Ret) Vice President, Worldwide Federal Aerospace and Defense, PTC

Ambrose Kam Chief Engineer/Fellow, Rotary & Mission Systems Cyber Innovation, Lockheed Martin Corporation

Lt Col Warren Carroll, USAFR

Operations, Plans and Requirements Lead, U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC)

3:15 – 3:45 pm NETWORKING BREAK

ZLOTNIK BALLROOM PREFUNCTION

3:45 – 4:45 pm AGILE SPECTRUM APPLICATIONS PANEL

ZLOTNIK BALLROOM 4

Lizy Paul

Director, Strategy & Business Development, Data Links & Communication Systems, Collins Aerospace *Moderator*

Dorie Famalette

Deputy for Product Manager Waveforms, PEO C3T, U.S. Army

John Wentworth

Lead Engineer for Product Manager Waveforms, PEO C3T, U.S. Army

William Cave

President and CEO, Prediction Systems, Inc.

Dr. Nancy Grady

Chief Data Scientist, Cyber Operations, SAIC

Dr. Doug Thornton

Cyber Scientist, Battelle

5:00 – 6:00 pm NETWORKING RECEPTION



WEDNESDAY, MARCH 27

7:00 am – 3:45 pm **REGISTRATION** ZLOTNIK BALLROOM PREFUNCTION

7:00 – 8:00 am NETWORKING CONTINENTAL BREAKFAST ZLOTNIK BALLROOM PREFUNCTION

8:00 – 8:15 am **ADMIN REMARKS**

ZLOTNIK BALLROOM 4

Lt Gen Robert Elder, USAF (Ret) Chair, NDIA Cyber-Augmented Operations Division

8:15 – 9:00 am KEYNOTE SPEAKER

ZLOTNIK BALLROOM 4

Steve Gray Chief Executive Officer, Asteri Networks

9:00 – 10:00 am AUGMENTED REALITY PANEL

ZLOTNIK BALLROOM 4

Jason Ingalls Founder and CEO, Ingalls Information Security Moderator

Seana Murray Program Manager, Microsoft Corporation

John Parsons

Augmented Reality Sales Representative, Federal Aerospace and Defense

Joshua Burns Simulations Engineer & Augmented Reality SME, Honeywell

Brandi Pickett Risk Management Consultant, Ingalls Information Security

10:00 – 10:30 am **NETWORKING BREAK**

10:30 – 11:30 am PHYSICAL SYSTEM REPLICATION/DIGITAL TWIN PANEL

ZLOTNIK BALLROOM 4

Lt Gen Robert Elder, USAF (Ret) Chair, NDIA Cyber-Augmented Operations Division *Moderator*

William Cave President and CEO, Prediction Systems, Inc.

Parker Wiksell

Cyber Scientist, Battelle

Dr. John Kelly President, Model Software Corporation

11:30 am –12:30 pm NETWORKING LUNCH

ZLOTNIK BALLROOMS 5 & 6

12:30 – 1:15 pm KEYNOTE SPEAKER

ZLOTNIK BALLROOM 4

COL Paul Craft, USA

Director of Operations, Joint Forces Headquarters, Department of Defense Information Networks (JFHQ-DODIN) *Invited*

1:15 – 2:15 pm MACHINE LEARNING APPLICATIONS PANEL

ZLOTNIK BALLROOM 4

Maj Gen David Senty, USAF (Ret) Vice Chair, NDIA Cyber-Augmented Operations Division *Moderator*

Chris MacDonald

Senior Director, Global Analytics Business Development

Ambrose Kam Chief Engineer/Fellow, Rotary & Mission Systems Cyber Innovation, Lockheed Martin Corporation

Eddie Green Director,Special Projects/Intelligence, OccamSec

2:15 – 2:45 pm **NETWORKING BREAK**



2:45 – 3:45 pm AFWERX INITIATIVES & UPDATES PANEL

ZLOTNIK BALLROOM 4

Col Alan Rock, USAF

Reserve Advisor to the Commander, U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) *Moderator*

Col Craig Leavitt, USAF (Ret)

Strategist, National Security Air and Space Programs, National Defense University (NDU) *Invited*

Matthew Scott

Austin Director, AFWERX

Jeff Gilmore

Data Scientist, Defense Innovation Unit (DIU)

Lt Col Eric Frahm, USAF

Austin Lead, Chief Product Officer, Air Education and Training Command (AETC)

3:45 – 4:00 pm CLOSING REMARKS

ZLOTNIK BALLROOM 4

Lt Gen Robert Elder, USAF (Ret)

Chair, NDIA Cyber-Augmented Operations Division

The NDIA has a policy of strict compliance with federal and state antitrust laws. The antitrust laws prohibit competitors from engaging in actions that could result in an unreasonable restraint of trade. Consequently, NDIA members must avoid discussing certain topics when they are together at formal association membership, board, committee, and other meetings and in informal contacts with other industry members: prices, fees, rates, profit margins, or other terms or conditions of sale (including allowances, credit terms, and warranties); allocation of markets or customers or division of territories; or refusals to deal with or boycotts of suppliers, customers or other third parties, or topics that may lead participants not to deal with a particular supplier, customer or third party.



Cyber Al

Cyber-Augmented Operations Technical Symposium

March 2019

Elisha Peterson elisha.peterson@jhuapl.edu Chief Scientist & Lead for Cyber AI, Analytic Capabilities Group Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory



 How do we leverage AI/ML (and visualization) to make operators more effective





Ask the Right Questions

- <u>Visualize</u> data to better understand context, find new anomalies
- <u>Train</u> data scientists in cyber, e.g. by embedding with operators/exercises/etc.
- <u>Be more specific</u>
 - Not "what netflow is malicious" but "when do these clients open an unusual port?"
- <u>Be more comprehensive</u>
 - Not "do any bad hosts talk to my web server?" but "what are the set of all allowed/expected flows for this web server?"





Use the Right Data

- Need good labeled data
 - 1999 DARPA Intrusion dataset flawed, out of date, dozens of papers
- Need more than just netflow
 - Collect from multiple locations for cross-site correlation
 - Collect from multiple types for corroboration/ground truth
- Repeatable experimentation platforms?



Apply the Right Tools/Techniques

- What is the simplest technique that will work?
- Techniques that work well in one domain may not work well with cyber
 - Deep learning is not "one size fits all"
- Feature Engineering / Domain Understanding
 - Add statistics for packet sizes/times within a flow
 - Model connections between (ip+proto+port) rather than ip's
- Incorporate modeling, e.g. attack graphs



Apply Answers to the Right Situation

- <u>Context matters</u>: enterprise networks, research networks, university networks, ICS/SCADA networks, other constrained networks
- Need more research on transferability of models



Ensure Value to Operators (Users)

Layer 10 - Missior

letwork Defense

Intrusion

System

Patching

IT Department

aver 09

/atchfloo

aver 07 - Software

Layer 04 - Hardware

aver 03 - Networks

Laver 02 - Transport

_aver 01 - Facilitie

erver Room A

NS Sensor Network

rontEnd se FrontEnd

Laver 06 - Software Services

Layer 05 - Net-Centric Enterprise Services

Traffic

letwork Sensor Services

• Who is the user?

- analyst? defensive/offensive ops? decision-maker? developer? data scientist?

Analysts

- Need low false positives
- Need context, especially with alerts

Decision-makers

- Tools like Dagger can help decisionmakers understand impact and prioritize resources

Data scientists

- AI to make analytic development faster?





Maintain Situational Awareness

IT Research and ..

ost Sensors

Internet Access

Network

Sensing

SolarWinds Geospatial Mission Outlook

What-If Analysis, Overlay = General status

Display

Display

Enrichment Service

Server Room A

Application Areas Where Al Is Likely to Help

- Anomaly Detection
- Cyber Key Terrain Mapping
- Automated Data Science
- Planning & Executing Cyber Ops
- Currently helping malware analysis, spam detection, DNS queries, ...

Challenge #1: Establish Cyber CTF

Common Task Framework

- Requires **public** data sets, automated evaluation/metrics, and a competition
- Establishes feedback loop for constantly improving models and techniques
- Always leads to declining error rates

• What would a CTF for cyber look like?

- Define classes based on both host roles (web, DNS, enterprise client, etc.) and traffic (web, scanning, video, data exfiltration, etc.)
- Models must grapple with cyber semantics to be successful
- Goal becomes "out of all this traffic, what is understood and what is not understood"

Challenge #2: Automated Network Characterization

- From an observed set of data, define the rules that govern that data
 - Subnets, firewalls, servers, applications, etc.
- Difficulty varies by network type: constrained, enterprise, research
- Immediate value for alerting on constrained networks
- Immediate value for CPTs understanding an unfamiliar environment

*also known as "key cyber terrain mapping"



JOHNS HOPKINS APPLIED PHYSICS LABORATORY

Application Areas Where Al Is Likely to Help

- Anomaly Detection finding unknowns, combinations of techniques, zero days
 - Likely adds less value for known attacks when strong signatures are available
- Analytic Assistance automated enrichment, query expansion, information aggregation, correlation
- Cyber Key Terrain Mapping automated network discovery, mapping to mission
- Automated Data Science developing, testing, deploying, maintaining ML and other analytics models in production; enabling end-users to harness the power of ML
- Planning & Executing Cyber Ops human/machine teaming for planning, analysis, COA selection, rapid employment of defenses and effects in cyberspace
- Currently helping malware analysis, spam detection, DNS queries, ...

Intelligent Sensing Vision

Autonomously understand the world as a trusted partner to the symbiosis of humans and other Als



Headquarters U.S. Air Force

Integrity - Service - Excellence

Operational Training Infrastructure (OTI)

Augmented Intelligence to support OTI Ecosystem

U.S. AIR FORCE

SAF/PA Release: 2019-0189



Must Transform We can't get there from here!

Simulators

- Some challenges/areas to consider:
 - Aging workforce; GS civilian leaders need updated competencies for the future
 - Obsolescence; Different underlying hardware/software configurations
 - Baselines managed individually by platform
 - Attrition Workforce subjective succession planning
 - Current fleet of simulators were never designed to work together

https://research.newamericaneconomy.org/report/sizing-up-the-gap-in-our-supply-of-stem-workers/

"The United States has a persistent and dramatic shortage of STEM workers—a problem that worsened considerably during the first half of the decade."

Integrity - Service - Excellence







- What can be accomplished with Augmented Intelligence?
 - Using Deep Learning Technologies
- Initial focus is on "smart automation" that demonstrates the "art of the possible"
- Data Architecture
 - AF Chief Data Officer symposium
 - Data Lake
 - Kylo
 - AF Chief Data Officer Data Service Strategy
 - Set-up data service
 - Set-up deep learning





- Initial Use Case : Augment Data Engineering Job function
 - Facilitate Loading the Data from Pilot Training Next Program (PTN)
 - Establish heuristics that facilitate automation
 - Smart Automation
 - Sense
 - Neural Networks (AI Agent)
 - Act
- Potential Use Cases
 - ETL (Extract-Transform-Load) that collect metadata
 - Smoke test to facilitate regression testing of simulation capabilities to ensure Composability and Interoperability





- Use Augmented Intelligence to address STEM shortage in AF M&S
- Focus on Smart Automation Demo
- Utilize the AF Chief Data Officer data lake architecture
- Follow the AF Chief Data Officer Data Services Strategy



References

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Integrity - Service - Excellence

CAPITALIZING ON DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION

Chris MacDonald Head of Global Analytics CoE



March 2019

THE TIME TO TRANSFORM IS NOW





Digital Transformation is the means by which industrial companies capitalize on **PHYSICAL DIGITAL** convergence

CONVERGENCE ACROSS PRODUCTS, PROCESSES, AND PEOPLE









DRIVE BUSINESS OUTCOMES





UNLEASH OPPORTUNITIES ACROSS THE ENTERPRISE



Customer Service Focused on ways to improve customer **Customer Operations** satisfaction through increased uptime, Focused on breakthrough digital reduce truck rolls, and quicker time-toexperiences (like training and self-service) resolution if failure occurs. that result in value-added services Corporate/CXO Focused on ways to create new business models and modernize the workforce while increasing shareholder value Manufacturing & Supply Chain Focused on optimized plant and worker productivity which increases throughput, production quality, compliance and worker safety. Engineering Focused on accelerating time Sales & Marketing to market with optimized designs, Focused on giving "Voice of the Product" for real-time simulation and virtual customer usage and consumable replenishment collaboration which will close the while providing engaging demo experiences loop from design to production with 3D holograms. 맓

PRODUCTS

PEOPLE

PROCESSES

6

VIA MARKET-PROVEN INDUSTRIAL SOLUTIONS

PRODUCTS |





맓

PEOPLE | PROCESSES

7

DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION SOLUTION SUITE





POWER OF PTC'S SOLUTION FRAMEWORK



3D PLATFORM	PRODUCT LIFECYCLE PLATFORM	INDUSTRIAL ORCHESTRATION	EXPERIENCE PLATFORM
Associative 3D Modeling	Requirements Management	ा & OT Data Acquisition	Object Recognition & Tracking
Generative Design	Content Management	$\bigwedge_{=}^{=}$ Contextualization	Spatial Recognition & Tracking
IOT-Connected 3D Digital Twin	Project Collaboration, Governance & Workflow	Data Analytics & Visualization	Experience Authoring
3D Work Instructions	BOM Management	Business Process Flow	Expertise Capture
Configured Digital Mockup	Change & Configuration Management/Digital Thread	UX Composition	Logical Procedure Guidance
3D Spatial & Object Capture	Product Variability Management	Domain-specific Logic Composition	Ad Hoc Collaborative Experiences
Design for Additive Manufacturing	Manufacturing Process Management	Domain-specific Data Models Composition	HMI / Experience of Things
Multi-CAD Collaboration	Service Process Management	Industrial Protocol Translation	Multi-Platform Device
Real-time Simulation	Quality Management	Digital Content Management & Remote Access	Content Management
🟫 creo®	🖉 windchill*	🔶 thingworx®	📚 vuforia [.]

INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION PLATFORM




TURNING POSSIBILITY INTO REALITY



- PTC uniquely provides industrial companies with:
 - Deep industrial domain expertise that provides a starting point
 - Technology framework that enables agility and scale
 - OOTB solutions that allows customers to configure not code
- With PTC, and its partner ecosystem, manufacturers can capitalize on the promise of digital transformation today





Embedding Simulation Into Mission Command Systems

Dr. John R. Surdu, COL (ret.)

Senior Scientist Cole Engineering Services, Inc.

Objective

Embed simulation INTO a fielded mission command suite to support operations, embedded training, and war gaming.

- **Course of Action Analysis:** Run a constructive simulation with little or no human intervention to simulated several friendly and enemy courses of action many times and report useful metrics to aid in commander's decision making. Requires a simulation that can run much faster than real time.
- **Planning Support:** Simulating the plan even as it is being created to identify risks and opportunities.
- **Mission Execution Monitoring:** Running the simulation in real time to slightly faster, racing ahead from time to time, comparing the planned state of the operation to the actual state of the operation, raising a flag when things seem to be going awry, and running the simulation much faster than real time to determine if any differences between planned and actual impact to the outcome of the operation.
- **Embedded Training:** Operators create plans in the MC system and then run them seamless in the embedded simulation to stimulate command and control processes.
- War gaming: The employment of simulated military resources in operations, either exploring the effects of warfare or testing strategies without actual combat.
- Learning Simulations: Enabling simulations to monitor the real operation, update their parameters, and become better predictors over time.

Challenge

- In military operations, COA is facilitated by "wargaming." This is currently a manual process in which the staff looks at each stage of a COA, using an action-reaction-counteraction paradigm.
- Wargaming, though a formal part of doctrine, is only a semi-formal process, subject to the bias, experience, fatigue, and competence of the participants.
- The purpose of integrating a simulation to support COA analysis is to mitigate the human factors and provide more rigorous assessment of each COA.
- We have a generation of officers that are used to CONOPS and directed COAs who do not have experience with conducting COA analysis.

How it Works

- Develop plan using native SitaWare planning capability.
- Used Operation Tiger Claw scenario from Maneuver Center of Excellence.
- No special planning tools to learn.



~1:125,000 35.430390°N 116.494502°W 35.428432°N 116.537760°W N/A

How it Works

First interaction with the simulation is merely to click on the icon in the tool ribbon.



~1:125,000 35.430390°N 116.494502°W 35.428432°N 116.537760°W N/A

Drag, Drop, and Start



Intermediate Results



Exploring Simulation RESULTS

Progress and results rollup matrix

Traditional matrix that compares Blue COA performance against Red COAs.



CESI

Deeper Dive



Each pairing of Red and Blue COAs is simulated many times to generate statistically-significant results.

Cole Engineering Services, Inc.

Adjusting Weights



Viewing the Simulation as it Executes

Run Time View for Tiger Claw Demo Blue 1 vs Tiger Claw Demo Red 1



The mission command operator need not know how to operate the simulation. This view allows the operator to view the execution of the COA to gain insight.

CESI

Note:

The operator never sees the simulation.

Just simulation RESULTS.

The correct approach is to HIDE complexity from the users, not add complexity.

Cole Engineering Services, Inc.

Summary

- Many use cases for embedded simulation in mission command systems.
 - Course of Action Analysis
 - Planning Support
 - Mission Execution Monitoring
 - Embedded Training
 - War gaming
 - Learning Simulations
- We implemented this with three simulations: OneSAF, MTWS, and OpSim (purpose-built simulation).

Embedded Live, Force-on-Force Training for Infantry Soldiers

Dr. John R. Surdu, COL (ret.)

Senior Scientist Cole Engineering Services, Inc.

CESI

Motivation

- Negative training associated with laser engagement systems (e.g., MILES):
 - Cannot lead moving targets
 - Cannot fire through foliage
 - Cannot properly elevate rifle based on range
 - Cannot represent grenade launchers
 - Cannot fire "non line of site"
- Create a technology that improves live, force-on-force training.
 - Eliminate the negative training
 - Reduce additional equipment needed for live, force-on-force training
 - Provide an expeditionary and deployable capability soon, not in twenty years
 - Be AR/MR "ready"
- This work pointed the way to a technology solution that would <u>eliminate</u> <u>the negative training associated with MILES-type systems</u> while providing additional capabilities

Overall OBSAT Patent-Pending Process



LTE

When a shot is fired, the orientation of the weapon, location of the shooter, and processed sight picture is transmitted to the OBSAT server.



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All participants report their locations at 10 Hz.





OBSAT server conducts hit adjudication and informs target of location and severity of wounds.

For direct fire, hit adjudication is based on the sight picture, *not* geometric pairing.

Minimal Appended Equipment



- Human Systems Integration, Inc. wearable USB hub, smart phone, player software, and smart phone enclosure.
- Surrogate for Nett Warrior device.



- A single Inertial Labs OS3DM sensor mounted to Picatinny Rail on rifle or scope.
- Will be embedded in next-generation digital scopes and/or IVAS.



- AtN commercial digital daylight or thermal scope.
- Surrogate for next-generation digital scopes under development.

- AR-15 or M-4.
- Detect bolt cycling via Eblanks analog output.

Cole Engineering Services, Inc

OBSAT Small Arms System Configuration



OBSAT server being replaced by a CTIA OBSAT Gateway, but the overall architecture remains the same.

Hardening and Simplifying

Before



- Weapon tethered to Player
- Airsoft rifle
- Note 1 phone
- Lots of wires
- Image processing on the server

- Weapon untethered from Player
- AR-15 with eBlanks
- Note 8 phone + Raspberry PI
- Fewer wires
- Image processing on phone / player unit

This simplification and making the software more robust took six months.

After

Ongoing Efforts









- Create a library of representative images
- Train a computer vision image classifier to identify the target in the sight picture
- Working with Google to leverage most advanced computer vision tools available
- Develop, prototype, integrate, and test the orientation sensor with optical correction

Stinger System Overview

Targets with no MILES gear report their location.



Stinger System Overview (Player Unit and Stinger Surrogate)



Stinger Image Processing



CESI

Summary

- OBSAT Technology mitigates or eliminates negative training associated with laser engagement systems.
 - M-16
 - M-203
- OBSAT Technology is MR/AR ready.
- OBSAT Technology reduces need for appended equipment, thereby reducing training distractors and maintenance tail.
- Further maturation is required to get the technology ready for prime time.

Improvements in Image Processing

Old Image Processing Model					
Trials		Predicted			
		No	Yes		
Actual	No	50	0	50	
	Yes	56	114	171	
		106	114		

Accuracy = (114+50) / 220 = 75%

Notes of issues we are seeing:

- Running side profile
- Side profiles
- Trouble with Peggy

New Image Processing Model(1)					
Trials		Predicted			
		No	Yes		
Actual	No	34	28	62	
	Yes	28	131	159	
		62	159		

Accuracy = (34+131) / 200 = 75%

New Image Processing Model(2)					
Triolo		Predicted			
	ais	No	Yes		
ual	No	50	11	61	
Act	Yes	4	155	159	
		54	166		
Accuracy = (54+166) / 200 = 939					

Accuracy = (True Positives + True Negatives) / Total Trials









Image Contract of Currently Problematic







U.S. ARMY COMBAT CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT COMMAND – SOLDIER CENTER

Cyber Augmented Operations Technical Symposium 2019: CyberBOSS Overview

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Simulation and Training Technology Center (STTC)

Distibution A: Approved for Public Release



CYBERBOSS OBJECTIVES



Broker Cyber Actions and Effects Across LVC&G Systems

- Adjudicate cyber effects between federates to enable fair-fight concepts

Use a Services Approach to Develop a Cyber Terrain Ecosystem

- Open and Transparent easy to see what is happening internally
- Flexible and Extensible adaptable to future needs and/or third party extension

Define Common Data Model for Cyber Events

- Leverage existing models (e.g. COATS)
- Incorporate cyber-specific information (e.g. intentions, cyber-attacks, and cyber control)

Correlate Cyber Terrain between Synthetic Battlespaces

Common device representation across federated LVC&G simulations and/or cyber ranges (e.g. CyberCENTS)



CENTRAL CONTROL AND ROUTING OF CYBER EFFECTS





TA / Battle Command Staff

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ARCHITECTURE COMPONENTS





- A. Cyber Range Adapter
- B. COBWebS Adapter
- C. CyberBOSS Interface Framework (CIF)
- D. Cyber Modeling Enhancements (OneSAF)

- E. Correlation Management Services
- F. CDM Data Model Enhancements
- G. CDM Documentation Generator
- H. Control Tool Enhancements

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DEVICE CORRELATION





Disjoint Representation of Devices between CyberBOSS Federates

- Simulations use different information to refer to the same device
 - Cyber range represents operating system & version information
 - LVC&G simulation provides location information (tied to owning entity)

CyberBOSS Server Correlates Device Information between Federates

- Adjudicates information from all federates
 - Supports bridging device effects between the connected applications

Correlate Devices between Federates



Harness Correlated Object Representation to Delegate Requests

• E.g. Issue task in LVC&G simulation, but delegate to federate with a higher fidelity representation

Adjudication / Routing Capability in CyberBOSS Server

- Actions are directed to the domain where they are best suited
- E.g. Cyber attacks should route to a cyber range if it is part of the federate

Route Cyber Events between Federates



QUESTIONS?



Govt. Lead:

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CCDC – Soldier Center Simulation & Training Technology Center (STTC)



Presenters

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Kevin Hofstra CyberCENTS Metova Federal, LLC cybercents.sales@metova.com





BACKUP SLIDES


DEMO OBJECTIVES



- Incorporate cross-domain communication with CyberBOSS as a broker
 - Reconnaissance & Attack operations interoperate over disjoint applications (LVC & Cyber Range)
 - Demonstrate connections to the Cyber Range.
- Develop more complex scenarios that support offensive cyber training
- Extend Cyber Data Model (CDM) expression to support more robust client integration.
- Prototype the CyberBOSS Interface Framework (CIF) as a standardized client API / connection paradigm
 - Extend OneSAF to show vision of how a compliant cyber simulation would interface with CyberBOSS
 - Utilize Prototype CIF client adapter (within OneSAF)
 - Build ODM, Modeling & Agent infrastructures (following OneSAF development paradigm)
- Demonstrate COBWebS REST API integration





Scenario Description *Part 1*:

NO Offensive Cyber Attack



DEMO PART 1: NO CYBER OFFENSIVE



MCT [Login ID: onesaf] [Node: tracker-mac-LinuxMint] - cyberboss_phase_II_demo_2_PART_1_NO_CYBER_OFFENSIVE - Exercise ID: 1 - SWA_terrain_database - POV: Coalition [OneSAF: 8.8 Release]



- Part 1: No BLUFOR Cyber Offensive
 - BLUFOR convoy traveling down route in urban environment
 - OPFOR insurgents situated in WiFi cafes, using a drone to surveil convoy activity
 - Commander instructs movement of Convoy, unaware of Insurgency coordinated IED attack
 - DoS on BLUFOR Commander's Tactical Device
 - Demonstrates extension of COBWebS into more complex training scenarios
 - BLUFOR Forward Observer attempts to relay impending attack to Commander, but message fails
 - Convoy moves through area, IED detonated with BLUFOR casualties





Scenario Description *Part* **2**:

WITH Offensive Cyber Attack



DEMO PART 2: WITH CYBER OFFENSIVE



MCT [Login ID: onesaf] [Node: tracker-mac-LinuxMint] - cyberboss_phase_II_demo_2_PART_2_WITH_CYBER_OFFENSIVE - Exercise ID: 1 - SWA_terrain_database - POV: Coalition [OneSAF: 8.8 Release]



Part 2: With BLUFOR Cyber Offensive

- BLUFOR commander mitigates active attack on internal network & by ordering cyber reconnaissance
 - Obtains ability to hack into OPFOR controlling devices for drone & IED detonator
- BLUFOR commander orders cyber attack on the OPFOR devices
- OPFOR loses communication with the drone and can no longer surveil the BLUFOR convoy
- OPFOR cannot initiate IED
- BLUFOR convoy moves through area unharmed.

KEY OBJECTIVES

- Demonstrate interoperability of cyber range and constructive simulation systems to provide cyber training.
- Demonstrate modeling of BLUFOR offensive cyber operations
- Demonstrate collaborative training between Maneuver & Cyber Team

DEMO PART 2: BLUFOR CYBER ENTITIES







DEMO PART 2: OPFOR CYBER ENTITIES





UNCLASSIFIED // APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE



DEMO PART 2: CYBER BATTLESPACE





Cyber Virtual Training

NDIA CYBER AUGMENTED OPERATIONS SYMPOSIUM

26 March 2019

Ambrose Kam

ambrose.kam@lmco.com

Cyber Innovations



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Ambrose Kam

•Over 24 yrs in Modeling & Simulation (M&S) and Operations Analysis (OA) with broad expertise in communications, networking, mission planning, renewable energy, radar, cyber, etc.

•Pioneer in applying M&S and OA techniques to cyber threat analysis.

•MIT Fellow in Systems Design & Management since 2002

- •LM Fellow in Cyber
- •2017 Asian American Engineer of the Year (AAEOY)

•Published over 30 research papers on a variety of subjects; guest lecturer @ MIT and Georgia Tech; industry internship sponsor/project lead on research projects with military academies

•MEng from Cornell; Dual Master's Degree from MIT (Systems Engineering & Management) Bachelor of Science from University at Buffalo

Cyber Virtual Training in a Multi-Domain Op (MDO) Environment)

Real-Time Simulation-Based Operator-in-the-Loop



https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/news/features/2016/webt-navy-area-51.html

Lockheed Martin Image

Motivations

- Objectives
 - Develop an operator-in-the-loop capability to support a wargaming environment; the goal is to determine how EW/Cyber TTPs affects mission effectiveness for both Red/Blue teams
- Problem Statement
 - Multi-domain Operations (MDO) is a big challenge; EW/Cyber will only make MDO more complicated given the quick advancement of the EW/Cyber techniques. Recent conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine showed how EW/Cyber can compliment traditional weaponry. US cannot afford to be left behind.

*Disclaimers: The example shown in this presentation is unclassified; it is not intended to represent any domestic or foreign systems/platforms.

What is Cyber Attack Network Simulation (CANS)?



The Cyber Attack Network Simulator (CANS) is a discrete event simulation that allows analysts to study the effect of various cyber events against a model of a planned or operational network system.

CANS models cyber events and their impacts to a system



What is **AFSIM**?

- Advanced Framework for Simulation, Integration & Modeling
- Government Owned object-oriented C++ library
- Discrete Event Simulation
- Can run at, faster and slower than real time
 - Can be Human-in-the-loop

The intent of AFSIM is not to provide all encompassing models, but rather to provide the framework for incorporating the necessary models*

*from AFRL

AFSIM Warlock Operator Interface



Q CANS PDU - Warlock				×
Cyber Attack Type:	0 - Sensor Turn On (All)			
Originating Entity:			Set	
Target Entity:			Set	
			Send P	DU

🔬 CANS PDU - Warlock			×
Cyber Attack Type:	0 - Sensor Turn On (All)	ř.	
Originating Entity:	1 - Sensor Turn Off (All) 2 - Comm Turn On (All)	Se	t
Target Entity:	3 - Comm Turn Off (All)	Se	
	4 - Weapon Turn On (All)	Send	PDU
	6 - Track Mgr Turn On (All)		
	7 - Track Mgr Turn Off (All)		
	8 - Platform Turn On All Components		
	10 - Sensor Spoof (All Tracks)		
	11 - Weapon Firing Delay Increase		
	12 - Track Mgr Purge All Tracks		

CANS/AFSIM DIS

Lockheed Martin Image

EW/Cyber Wargaming: **A Madden Football Analogy**



Image: Independence Image:	11 -	V/	S Corner Roll 2
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Lockheed Martin Ima	Discovered Nodes		Close
	Connected to NetSm	00000	Lockheed Martin Image

9

CANS/AFSIM Software Architecture



Lockheed Martin Image

MDO Scenario OV-1



engine that leverages real-time operator-in-the-loop virtual simulation

Conclusion

- CANS/AFSIM Multi-Domain Wargaming Framework
 - Low Cost, Real-Time, Operator-in-the-Loop Wargaming Engine
 - Flexible scenario implementations to expose operational & capability gaps
 - Experiment with new Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP)
 - Large variety of EW/Cyber exploits (offensive/defensive)
- Future Work
 - UCI messaging to bring in tactical systems
 - Mission planning tool integration
 - Artificial Intelligence, machine learning and optimization via AFSIM plug-ins

Questions?







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The SPECTRUM ENERGY BATTLE

March 2019

UNCLASSIFIED





The PSI AI – AJ RADIO Part 1

January 2019

UNCLASSIFIED





BUTTONS

View from

Optimizing Equipment Design Parameters Or Flight Paths in Mountains with peaks of 28000 ft

Prediction Systems, Inc. (PSI)







Determining Connectivity (examples):



Measuring the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) (Could have multiple ROCS depending on the design.)





Determining Connectivity (examples):



Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) - for a Soft Decision Receiver (Less DSP)





Determining Connectivity (examples):



Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)

- for a Hard Decision Receiver (More DSP)
- and Much improved SNR (Better ASP)





ACCURACY OF PROPAGATION PATH LOSS DEPENDS UPON: DISTANCE, ANTENNAS, TERRAIN, & OTHER FACTORS



CONNECTIVITY IS NOT SIMPLY LINE-OF-SIGHT (LOS) !



SIGNAL AT FRONT END OF RECEIVER CAN BE ENHANCED BY ANTENNA DESIGN, BOTH ON THE TRANSMITTER AND RECEIVER;



SMART ANTENNAS CAN ADAPT TO THEIR ENVIRONMENT





SIGNAL AT FRONT END OF RECEIVER CAN BE ENHANCED BY ANTENNA DESIGN, BOTH AT THE TRANSMITTER AND THE RECEIVER;



SMART ANTENNAS CAN ADAPT TO THEIR ENVIRONMENT





Determining Connectivity – Example Factors:







Determining Connectivity – Example Factors:





VERTICLE VIEW - LOOKING DOWN ON THE EARTH



Determining Connectivity – Example Factors:



Ensuring Connectivity Requirements are met Using a NETWORK

Prediction Systems, Inc. (PSI)


EXAMPLE REQUIREMENTS



Capacity Requirements - *orange lines* - Solid - met; Dotted - not met - between Navy Battle Groups

Prediction Systems, Inc. (PSI)





Prediction Systems, Inc. (PSI)



THIS REQUIRES A NETWORK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

FIEURIUM Systems, Inc. (FSI)



Prediction Systems, Inc. (PSI)

Example Operational Considerations



	Jammer Power: 10000 Watts, UAV Power: 1000 Watts, ROC: -15 dB													
	U1	U2	U3	U4	U5	U6L	PE	AW	RJ	R1	R2	R3	SH	Total
U1		100%	30 %	30 %	100%	70 %								66%
U2	100%		0%	0%	100%	15%								43%
U3	100%	100%		100%	100%	100 %								100%
U4	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%								100%
U5	100%	100%	100%	52%		100%								90 %
U6L	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		0%	0%	0%	0%				56%
PE						100%		100%	100%	100%	52%	0%		75%
AW						100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	0%		83%
RJ						100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	0%		83%
R1						100%	100%	100%	74%					94%
R2							100%	100%	100%			100%	0%	80%
R3							0%	0%	0%		100%		100%	40%
SH											0%	100%		50%
Total	100%	100%	66%	56%	100%	87 %	67 %	67 %	62%	75%	70 %	40%	50 %	74%

Jammer Power: 10000 Watts, UAV Power: 1000 Watts, ROC: -25 dB

	U1	U2	U3	U4	U5	U6L	PE	AW	RJ	R1	R2	R3	SH	Total
U1		100%	100%	100 %	100 %	100%								100%
U2	100%		100%	100 %	100 %	100%								100%
U3	100%	100%		100 %	100 %	100%								100%
U4	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%								100%
U5	100%	100%	100%	100 %		100%								100%
U6L	100%	100%	100%	100 %	100 %		0%	0%	0%	33%				59 %
PE						100%		100 %	100%	100%	100%	0%		83%
AW						100%	100 %		100%	100%	100%	0%		83 %
RJ						100%	100%	100 %		100%	100%	0%		83%
R1						100%	100%	100 %	100%					100%
R2							100 %	100 %	100%			100%	0%	80 %
R3							0%	0%	0%		100%		100%	40 %
SH											0%	100%		50 %
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	67 %	67 %	67%	83%	80%	40%	50 %	83%

Parametric Analysis of % Connectivity Prediction Systems, Inc. (PSI)



MODEL HIERARCHY

PSI MODEL HIERARCHY











PREDICTION SYSTEMS, INC.

PREDICTION & CONTROL SYSTEMS ENGINEERS

309 Morris Ave - Suite J Spring Lake, NJ 07762

Telephone: (732) 449-6800 Fax: (732) 449-0897

Web Site: www.predictsys.com E-Mail: psi@predictsys.com





2019 Cyber-Augmented Operations Division Spring Conference

www.asteriholdings.com



Using Data Analytics to Optimize Content Effectiveness

Steve Gray's Career









Mathematician & Computer Scientist Developed graphical displays and C&C systems for the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Heavy Iron Studios Founder (sold to THQ)

Steve's Lord of the Rings games at Electronic Arts generated >US\$1B at retail Head of Production Tencent Games China 2009 – 2017

Tencent腾讯

2017 revenue \$15.6B

Under Steve, market share grew from 15% to 65%



Asteri Founder & CEO



How Did This Work At Tencent?

Steve Gray was the principal architect of Tencent Games' data-driven IP development, publishing and operations method which drove Tencent's China market share from 15% to **65%**.

Asteri's solution combines web, mobile and social media platforms to provide a zero cost customer acquisition solution.

Our revolutionary data analytics platform enables the reliable development, publishing & operation of online entertainment.



Predictive Audience Analytics™ Platform



Business Level Metrics

Key Performance Indicators (KPI) are needed to maximize success. KPIs apply to all businesses but Apps have specific metrics.

BUSINESS LEVEL	GAMES	CUSTOMER SERVICE	C2C COMMERCE
MUV Monthly Unique Viewers	Average Daily Play Time	User Inquiries	Potential sales initiated
MAU Monthly Average Users	Games per Session	Quits without final results	Click through rate
DAU Daily Average Users	Player Attach Rate	Time on hold	Closed sales
PCU Peak Concurrent Users	Revenue per Player	Staff interaction time	Average transaction size
ACU Average Concurrent Users	Revenue per day	Staff interaction percent	Average monthly transactions
Weekly Return Rate		Ticket escalation percent	Abandoned shopping carts
Monthly Return Rate			

Connecting Telemetry to Business Level Metrics

Think of Applications as having many knobs which are connected to both each other and to KPIs.

Some of the knobs are known, some you need to discover.

Once you how they are connected to KPIs, you can turn them in the right direction to drive those Business Level Metrics to success.



Using Iterative Refinement to Produce Actionable Results



Case Study: "Next" Button Placement In Asteri Analytics

At Asteri we believe in taking our own medicine, so we used our Analytics to test two different configurations of the "Next" button on our image testing website.



We measure a user's engagement in an image by measuring the amount of time they spend looking at it.

However we discovered there is a 2nd influence on time.



4

 \cap

It doesn't matter what image you show, or how engaged the user is, by moving the "Next" button from the bottom to the right side consistently reduces the average click time by about 1.6 seconds.





This is how the Asteri Data Analytics Platform is used to optimize User Experience.

Case Study: Tuning AI in the Otrio* Game

While set on *Easy* the AI loses most of the time – which is good.

However on *Medium* the game is definitely too difficult.

We feel on *Medium* the Player should win a bit more than half the time.

By collecting data in real time, we can use the Asteri Data Analytics Platform to quickly tune the AI while watching the changes in the Player Win Rate until we achieve our target result.



* Otrio is a mobile game being developed by Asteri in partnership with Spin Master, Ltd.

Use Cases for Predictive Audience Analytics™

Asteri's HQ in historic downtown Shreveport, our close relationship with the locally based BRF InterTech Innovation Accelerator, as well as our proximity to Barksdale AFB make these logical projects for us.



Build a Permanent Change of Station (PCS) app that automates the process by providing checklists & tracking fully instrumented to optimize the App and the PCS process.



Partner with training & simulation companies to instrument and optimize the learning process and cockpit configurations.



Track candidates' interest & abilities, use the data in an attribution system to optimize a multi-platform media recruitment campaign.



Predictive Audience Analytics™ is a SaaS Platform

Software-as-a-Service Platform

- It is designed to be integrated into any application.
- Asteri's Analytics division can provide subcontracting services to help with integration and create all necessary analysis and reporting systems.



How can we use Data Analytics to effect **Positive Change** in Social Norms and Structures?

Tracking Positive Social Behavior (PSB)



Data Mining combined with Natural Language Processing allows us to build an accurate profile of a User's interests and behavior.



How Asteri uses Intra- and Inter-Media Optimization

- CREATE
- DEPLOY
- ANALYIZE
- OPTIMIZE
- ITERATE



Local Content is Critical

Asteri's Analytics helps target and refine linear and interactive content, but it is not a replacement for creativity.



There is a real opportunity to use *Asteri's iterative optimization* to create online content that can promote *Positive Social Behavior*





Contact Steve Gray steve@asteri.io

About Me

CISSP®

Certified Information Systems Security Professional











PROFESSIONAL



PROTECT YOUR INFORMATION³⁶

Future of Cyber Tools

"We are going to have to be able to take information from any platform, any sensor, and connect it at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to bring effects anywhere on the planet, and I've got to be able to do that in fifteen minutes or less."

> General Steven Wilson, VCSAF Wright Dialogue with Industry Dayton, Ohio, 18 July 2018



PROTECT YOUR INFORMATION®

Solve Limiting Factors



Go From This:

		00		x		
	E	1	В	/ C	D	E
	-	Client	IP	ClientPort	Duration	Filesize
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	200 ****	10.10.1.	253	52125 8	seconds	3653
	200 ****	10.10.1.25	53	51218 15	seconds	4680
20	10	10.1.253	1	63264 11 se	econds	8048
200"	10.1	0.1.253	62	725 5 seco	inds	8048
200 ****	10.10.	1.253	622	68 6 secon	ds	6694
00"""	10.10.1.	253	6222	3 6 second	s	4295
)"""	10.10.1.2	53 6	4513	4 seconds		8048
10	0.10.1.253	620	000 4	seconds	8	04.



Visualize Cybersecurity Data

- Data should have depth of focus:
 - General overview, metrics, and simple relationships can be thought of as a backdrop
 - Relevant information such as search results are better focused and delineated from the background
 - Critical data is presented in a way that is easily consumable
 - Ability to manipulate how data is displayed





Augmented Reality

Augmented Reality overlays your vision with computer rendered graphics.

This allows for many possibilities:

- Share a single 3D visualization among a group of people (around a conference table, for example)
- Provide briefings with substantive content in real-time
- Training, auditing, and other group tasks



Source: getmeta.com





Metadata: The Visualization Engine

- Using metadata allows us to:
 - Create situational awareness of the environment
 - Understand basic relationships clearly (clientserver, proxy, etc.)
 - Identify patterns
 - Position interesting data to gain context
- Getting metadata is fairly easy:
 - Network events are captured in flow records, IDS, etc.
 - Access logs provide event metadata
 - Endpoint applications
- Storing/retrieving metadata is a challenge with lots of options:
 - NoSQL database clusters provide fast storage and search
 - Hadoop and other analytics platforms



PROTECT YOUR INFORMATION®

Integrate and Optimize Cyber Ops

PROTEC

INFORMATION

- Data visualization allows us to:
 - Provide orders of magnitude of more data in a relationship model
 - Create situational awareness of network states quickly
 - Alert and Identify abnormalities or patterns (draw the user's attention)
 - Reference additional information and overlay it in a given situation
 - Example: systems classified as handling PII, PHI, PCI data can be identified among systems with IDS alerts

Analyst are able to:

- Identify intrusions faster
- Map them out faster
- Provide Remediation teams with detailed information to clean up intrusions in shorter amounts of time and with less Risk
- Additionally, this technology is able to:
 - Serve as a training aid for entry-level analysts
 - Provide leaders with situational awareness, attacker pathway, and a breach map when dealing with Incident Response



Viewpoint - Objectives

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- Allow modeling of security events that have occurred and intrusions that are discovered
- Defenders can cover more network area per Analyst
- Lower the technical barriers of analyst training
- Discuss security events among multi-discipline teams
- https://youtu.be/Lcw30z8l6Ck





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PHYSICAL SYSTEM REPLICATION

DIGITAL TWIN

March 2019

UNCLASSIFIED







MEASURABLE APPLICATION GOALS:

- Provide an order of magnitude reduction in the time & cost to develop models, simulations & systems;
- Provide 4 to 6 orders of magnitude improvement in simulation/system run-time speed
 -- while cutting costs by orders of magnitude;
- Allow application experts to design, build, and test systems directly;
- Allow newcomers to a project to quickly learn and understand complex systems.

Example Application: Use of Autonomous Vehicles with Network Facilities to achieve High A/J Margins







TAKING PROPER MEASURMENTS:

The principle Measure is the Speed Multiplier - SM:

SM = Ts / Tp

where Ts is Time to run on a Single Processor - Fast and Tp is Time to run on a Parallel Processor

Depending upon the application – this may be difficult to measure

The critical Measure is Processor Utilization Efficiency:

PUE = SM / Np

where SM is the Speed Multiplier and Np is the Number of Parallel Processors









The difference in speeds above is due to the Processor Utilization Efficiency (PUE) VisiSoft PUEs can be above 95%



4





Von Neumann's

Instruction Set Architecture

- the ISA for <u>Single</u> Processors

must be <u>extended by</u> VSI's

Application Space Architecture

- the ASA - for <u>Parallel</u> Processors







REPRESENTATIVE PARALLEL APPLICATIONS:

- Adaptive Control of Large Groups of Autonomous Moving Platforms
- Human Body Organ simulation
- Human Brain Artificial Intelligence modeling
- Global Climate prediction
- Currency Market prediction
- Chemical Molecular structure simulation
- Scanning, sorting, and correlating massive databases (Big Data)
- Weather prediction in mountainous terrain
- Power distribution simulation
- Electro-magnetic wave simulation
- Global HF power transmission
- Global Military Planning Multiple moving platform simulation



THESE ARE NOT SERVER REQUIREMENTS!



And: - Servers Are <u>Not</u> Parallel Processors - A Multi-Tasking OS is <u>Not</u> a Parallel OS

WisiSoft®

SERVER ARCHITECTURE







SOFTWARE IS AN EXTENSION OF MATHEMATICS:

- Must pick the "Best Spaces" to represent the problem;
- The Best Spaces provide independence (Kalman);
- They simplify the algorithms;
- Simple algorithms run much faster;
- Simple algorithms are much easier to understand;
- Newcomers to a project quickly learn the software

Also, What is a "Software Module" ? And, What is "Software Architecture" ?

These terms are used throughout the literature – undefined!





EXAMPLE OF A MODEL SPACE HIERARCHY









Spaces for Translation of Application Requirements into Software Requirements & then into Hardware Requirements



Defining the: Application Space Architecture (the ASA)













a RESOURCE -Contains Hierarchical Data Structures To Easily Map Complex Spaces

RESOUR	CE: TRANSCEIVER	INSTANCES: TRANSMITTER RECEIVER		
GENERA	L PARAMETERS			
1	TRANSMITTER POWER	REAL INITIAL VALUE 100		
1	RECEIVER_THRESHOLD	REAL INITIAL VALUE 120		
RADIO				
1	TRANSCEIVER	STATUS TRANSMITTING RECEIVING IDLE OFF		
1	LOCATION			
	2 X POSITION	REAL		
	2 Y POSITION	REAL		
	2 ELEVATION	REAL		
1	ANTENNA HEIGHT	REAL		
1	ANTENNA_GAIN	REAL		
RECEIV	ER_CONNECTIVITY_VECTOR			
1	POWER_AT_RECEIVER	REAL		
1	TOTAL_NOISE_POWER	REAL		
1	CONNECTIVITY_MATRIX			
	2 PROPAGATION_LOSSES			
	3 TERRAIN_LOSS	REAL		
	3 FOLIAGE_LOSS	REAL		
	3 TOTAL_LOSS	REAL		
	2 SIGNAL_POWER	REAL		
	2 SIGNAL_TO_NOISE_RATIO	REAL		
	2 LINK_DELAY	REAL		
	2 LINK	STATUS GOOD		
		FAIR		
		POOR		
TRANSC	EIVER RULES			
1	TRANSCEIVER_PROCESS	RULES GOOD_RECEPTION CONFLICTING_RECEPTION CONFLICTING_BROADCAST		



A Space / Data Structure



a PROCESS

Contains Hierarchical Rule Structures That Support One-in One-out Independent Control Structures (Mills)

PROCESS: RECEPTION RESOURCES: TRANSCEIVER INSTANCES: TRANSMITTER MESSAGE FORMATS RECEIVER TRANSMITTER OUTPUT START RECEPTION IF TRANSCEIVER IS IDLE EXECUTE GOOD_RECEPTION ELSE IF TRANSCEIVER IS RECEIVING EXECUTE CONFLICTING RECEPTION ELSE IF TRANSCEIVER IS TRANSMITTING EXECUTE CONFLICTING BROADCAST GOOD RECEPTION IF SIGNAL_TO_NOISE_RATIO IS GREATER THAN RECEIVER_THRESHOLD SET TRANSCEIVER TO RECEIVING ADD SIGNAL POWER TO TOTAL POWER AT RECEIVER . CALL DECODE MESSAGE . MESSAGE TYPE IS FORMAT A AND SYNC CODE IS VALID AND LAST SYMBOL IS A TERMINATOR EXECUTE SEND_ACKNOWLEDGEMENT CONFLICTING RECEPTION IF POWER_AT_RECEIVER IS GREATER THAN SIGNAL_POWER SCHEDULE ABORT RECEIVE NOW . CONFLICTING BROADCAST CANCEL END RECEIVE NOW SCHEDULE START RECEIVE IN EXPON(0.83) MILLISECONDS WITH PRIORITY 80 SEND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT MOVE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TO TRANSMIT MESSAGE BUFFER IF DESTINATION IS BROADCAST SEARCH LINK_CONNECTIVITY_VECTOR OVER RECEIVER EXECUTING TRANSMISSION WHEN LINK IS GOOD ELSE EXECUTE TRANSMISSION . TRANSMISSION SCHEDULE LINK RECEPTION

A Transformation / Rule Structure PREDICTION & CONTROL SYSTEMS ENGINEERS

USING TRANSMITTER, RECEIVER

IN LINK DELAY MICROSECONDS

VisiSof





Spaces for Translation of Application Requirements into Software & Hardware



Connecting Resources & Processes to Create a Sequence of Transformations - <u>Mathematically Defining a Module</u>









An Architecture - a Hierarchy of Modules PREDICTION & CONTROL SYSTEMS ENGINEERS











RESOURCE TYPES ARE CRITICAL TO SHARING DATA & MAPPING **MODULES ONTO** PARALLEL **PROCESSORS**



SHARED_ RESOURCE	SHARED BETWEEN PROCESSES
SHARED_ ALIAS	SHARED BETWEEN MODULES UTILITIES & LIBRARIES
LOCAL_ INTERTASK	SHARED BETWEEN FAMILIES OF TASKS
GLOBAL_	
INTERTASK	GLOBAL TASKS TYPES
INTER_ PROCESSOR	SHARED BETWEEN PROCESSORS
IP_ ACCESS	ACCESS TO IP RESOURCES
PANEL_ RESOURCE	SHARED WITH PANELS
	FILE_NAME
FILE_ RESOURCE	ACCESS TO FILES
	5004
CHANNEL_ RESOURCE	ACCESS TO CHANNELS
	192.168.0.10





MODULE TYPES

MODULE **TYPES ARE CRITICAL TO INDEPENDENCE** & ARCHITECTURAL **MAPPING OF MODULES ONTO** PARALLEL PROCESSORS



LIBRARY_MODULE

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BACKUP SLIDES







Most Physical Systems Can Be Modeled Using 3-Dimensional Cells

A 3-D matrix of cells



A single resource is shared between the adjacent face of each major cell



Each cell may contain huge numbers of minor sub-cells



Cells need only interface with adjacent neighbors!







Start with the basic Chip design

- Greatly Simplified

PREDICTION & CONTROL SYSTEMS ENGINEERS

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Then use the 3-D Box Design

with all DMA Channels

<u>NOTE:</u> This drawing only illustrates relative placement of elements - not where they would reside! For example, chips will be located on the inside of the boards.







BASED ON THE:

APPLICATION SPACE ARCHITECTURE



Just Interconnect the boxes - In 3-D

- With all

DMA Channels





CAD for Prediction & Control Systems









Consider a comparison of Green Gene Machines with other

Green Gene Machine	Number of Processors	Power (KW) Consumed	Equivalent* Processors	Power (KW) Consumed
Green Gene 1	32	0.6	3200	12
Green Gene 2	64	0.8	7000	25
Green Gene 3	128	1.2	16000	60
Green Gene 01	192	4.0	50,000	188
Green Gene 04	768	16.0	400,000	1,500
Green Gene 09	1728	36.0	1,600,000	6,000
Green Gene 27	5184	108.0	5,000,000	18,750

Processors

Parallel

Then just look at the energy savings from the reduced number of processors



*Equivalent Processor differences depend upon applications





PREDICTION SYSTEMS, INC.

PREDICTION & CONTROL SYSTEMS ENGINEERS

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Functional Monitoring & Diagnosis (FMD)

John J Kelly, PhD Model Software Corporation www.ModelSoftware.com



Requirement

- Current tools for Monitoring & Diagnosis have major limitations
 - Poor Effectiveness
 - False Positives
 - False Negatives
 - Tuning makes one better at the expense of the other
 - Poor Coverage
 - Detect anomalies
 - Diagnose/Isolate them correctly
 - Expensive
 - Not affordable to achieve high coverage
 - Not affordable to maintain as the monitored system evolves



Strategy

- Empirical
 - EG Machine Learning, Neural Nets
 - Easily discovers patterns from data sets
 - But:
 - Many patterns are trivial
 - Most patterns are not predictive
 - Contact with the real world is always problemattic
- Models
 - Non-trivial patterns that are testably predictive are called models
 - Desire to fully exploit the entire operational math model of the system
 - Highly scalable
 - Even as big as a nuclear power plant (1k-10k sensors)



Simplified Example: System & Model





Luminance = c * Power Power = Voltage * Current Voltage = Current *Resistance Resistance = {if S=closed, R1} {if S=open, ~infinite} R1 = {if bulb=nominal, 1 ohm} Voltage = {if battery=nominal, 1.5 volts}



Nuclear Power Plant (Pressurized Water Reactor)





Nuclear Power Plant (PWR) – Balance of Plant (BoP)





Nuclear Power Plant (Pressurized Water Reactor) Reactor Water Cleanup System





Rocket Engine Propellant





Benefits

- Labor
 - Use existing process engineers
 - Not "AI experts"
 - Affordable to both set up & maintain as the target system evolves
- Effective
 - Minimize False Positives
 - Minimize False Negatives
 - Diagnostic limitations
 - Typically result from the limitations of the sensor suite
 - Not the software or the model


Real-time Detection of Failure



• Using an operating model enables detecting failures earlier than they might otherwise be detected, affording more time to manage them



Existing Technologies: Empirical



- Goodness of Fit (Overfitting)
 - Curve-fitting tools are notorious for fitting high-order polynomials to low-order phenomenon, such as for log and square-root functions, or even just simple linear equations that are slightly obscured by noise.
 - While by adding enough high-order terms, there can eventually be a fit, to some criteria, within the data domain of the exemplars, but as soon as the equations are used outside the range of the training exemplars the fit can be extremely bad



Combinatorial Space of Symptoms



Failure Modes

* Defined symptom-fault relation



Technicians & Engineers

- The empirical techniques are comparable to using technicians to diagnose equipment
 - Most all the time the technician immediately knows what is wrong because he has seen it before in actual practice or in training
 - The balance of the time the technician struggles because he doesn't know how to diagnose from first principles
- An engineer can diagnose anything if he has a schematic and some time
 - He is well-versed in the first principles and in reasoning about models
- The downside to using engineers is that they must be kept on call and they do require some time to think about the problem
- FMD software performs essentially the same analysis that an engineer would perform
 - But it is practical to keep the FMD software online 24/7
 - It is able to perform the analysis in less than a second



Technique Summary

	Handcode	Empirical	Models
Availability of	Expert/Model	Data	Model
Goodness of Fit	Varies	Overfit	As good as it gets
Combinatorics	Limited	Limited	Virtually unlimited
Reliability	Good	Limited	Best
Range of Scenarios	Considered scenarios	Scenarios in exemplar set	Limited only by # of elements in Model

