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COMPLACENCY KILLS: A SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS OF THE USMC COMMAND SCREENING PROGRAM

by

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In a profession where people are the greatest assets, the Marine Corps has an institutional imperative to understand its manpower processes and continuously seek out ways to improve them. This includes understanding how and why we select our lieutenant colonel commanders. The lieutenant colonel command billet is one of the most influential billets in the Marine Corps. Officers selected for these commands not only have a profound impact on the current and future readiness of the Marine Corps, they also influence every military manpower system from recruiting to retention. As such, it matters how the Marine Corps selects these commanders. In this thesis, I conduct a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the United States Marine Corps Command Screening Program (CSP). Using data from Fiscal Years 2015–2019 Lieutenant Colonel Command Selection Boards, I examine the mechanics of the CSP, the factors influencing selection outcomes, and whether or not the selection outcomes are affected by any relationships between the composition of the board and those officers being screened for command. I find that the CSP can be improved to meet its desired intent, and factors influencing selection outcomes vary between Primaries and Alternates, command types, and across years.

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COMPLACENCY KILLS: A SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS OF THE USMC COMMAND SCREENING PROGRAM

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ABSTRACT

In a profession where people are the greatest assets, the Marine Corps has an institutional imperative to understand its manpower processes and continuously seek out ways to improve them. This includes understanding how and why we select our lieutenant colonel commanders. The lieutenant colonel command billet is one of the most influential billets in the Marine Corps. Officers selected for these commands not only have a profound impact on the current and future readiness of the Marine Corps, they also influence every military manpower system from recruiting to retention. As such, it matters how the Marine Corps selects these commanders. In this thesis, I conduct a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the United States Marine Corps Command Screening Program (CSP). Using data from Fiscal Years 2015–2019 Lieutenant Colonel Command Selection Boards, I examine the mechanics of the CSP, the factors influencing selection outcomes, and whether or not the selection outcomes are affected by any relationships between the composition of the board and those officers being screened for command. I find that the CSP can be improved to meet its desired intent, and factors influencing selection outcomes vary between Primaries and Alternates, command types, and across years.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMOS	Additional Military Occupational Specialty
ASA	attraction-selection-attrition
CFT	Combat Fitness Test
CGI	Commanding General Inspection
CNA	Center for Naval Analyses
CSB	Command Screening Board
CSL	Centralized Selection List
CSP	Command Screening Program
DC	Deputy Commandant
DBR	digital board room
DOPMA	Defense Officer Personnel Management Act
DRRS	Defense Readiness Reporting System
FITREP	Fitness Report
FSMAO	Field Supply and Maintenance Analysis Office
FY	Fiscal Year
GM	General Manager
HQMC	Headquarters Marine Corps
LTCOL	Lieutenant Colonel
M&RA	Manpower and Reserve Affairs
MARADMIN	Marine Administrative Message
MBS	Master Brief Sheet
MCBUL	Marine Corps Bulletin
MCCAT	Marine Corps Cyber Assessment Team
MCCRE	Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation
MCO	Marine Corps Order
MCRC	Marine Corps Recruiting Command
MLDC	Military Leadership Diversity Commission
MM	Manpower Management Division
MMOA	Manpower Management Officer Assignments
MMRP	Manpower Management Records and Performance Branch

MOC	Marine Corps Operating Concept
MOE	measures of effectiveness
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MSC	Major Subordinate Command
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
OMPF	Official Military Personnel File
OPFOR	Operating Forces
PFT	Physical Fitness Test
PME	Professional Military Education
PMOS	Primary Military Occupational Specialty
RAND	Research and Development Corporation
RBR	remove by request
RO	Reviewing Officer
RS	Reporting Senior
SPTEST	Supporting Establishment
STEM	Science Technology Engineering Math
TFDW	Total Force Data Warehouse
TLS	Top Level School
USMC	United States Marine Corps

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PURPOSE

The Marine Corps has a problem. According to the Marine Corps Operating Concept, "The Marine Corps is currently not organized, trained, and equipped to meet the demands of [the] future operating environment" (Neller, 2016, p. 8). Ultimately, this is a manpower problem that demands a manpower solution. This solution starts with understanding how and why we select our lieutenant colonel commanders. This thesis intends to contribute to that understanding.

ORGANIZATIONAL IMPORTANCE

The lieutenant colonel command billet is one of the most influential billets in the Marine Corps. Officers selected for these commands not only have a profound impact on the current readiness of the Marine Corps, but also have the ability to influence every military manpower system, from recruiting and retention to incentives and promotions. Commanders at this level have a direct and immediate impact on the operational, maintenance, and administrative readiness of the institution writ large. As such, it matters how the Marine Corps select these commanders.

BACKGROUND

In 1992, the Marine Corps implemented the Command Screening Process (CSP) to ensure Marines receive the "best and most fully qualified" leadership. The CSP is intended to "provide all eligible officers with a fair and equitable opportunity to command" to "maintain a competent and well-balanced fighting force" (United States Marine Corps [USMC], 2017, p. 1). As part of the CSP, the command selection board is one of the most important boards in the Marine Corps because it is the first level of command at which the Marine Corps deliberately selects its leaders and decides the future direction of the organization. However, the Marine Corps defines CSP success as putting the best and most qualified lieutenant colonel in a command billet. The reality is that we, as an institution, do not really know if the CSP is meeting its intent. The process may be working and comparatively better than other processes, but we have an institutional imperative to understand the process and continuously seek out ways to improve it.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

My thesis focuses on how the CSP selects Marine Corps lieutenant colonel commanders. Using data from FY2015–FY2019 Lieutenant Colonel Command Selection Boards, I examine the mechanics of the CSP, the factors influencing selection outcomes, and whether or not the selection outcomes are affected by any relationships between the composition of the board and those officers being screened for command. To answer my research questions, I organize my analysis along four lines of effort: quantitative data, survey results, board room observations, and comparisons with civilian organizations.

My datasets are comprised of 98 board member observations and 2838 eligible officer observations and are compiled from three separate sources: personnel data from Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW); Fitness Reports from Manpower Management Records and Performance Branch (MMRP)–30; and board records and results from Manpower Management Officer Assignments (MMOA)–3. My survey includes responses from active duty Marine officers who have been board members on the Lieutenant Colonel Command Selection Board. Out of the 114 surveyed, there are 29 survey respondents spanning boards ranging from FY2006 to FY2019. Additionally, I use information obtained through observations during the FY2019 Lieutenant Colonel Command Selection Board, as well as discussions and observations with employees of both Amazon and the Seattle Seahawks organization to compare their hiring and selection processes with those of the Marine Corps.

I use two multivariate regression models in my analysis: Logistic Regression Odds Ratios and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). I use these models to determine the relationships between 1) personnel data and officers that are selected for command, 2) board composition and those selected for command, and 3) board voting iterations and an officer's performance while in command. These models indicate how certain variables influence the outcome of those lieutenant colonels selected for command. These variables include data on both the board members and the eligible officers screened for command, and range from demographic data and experience to Fitness Reports and unit history

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

I find that I cannot currently conclude whether or not the CSP is meeting its intent and selecting the best and most fully qualified eligible officers for command. I do find that board members generally agree on how to define "best and most fully qualified" and what characterizes a successful command tour. Furthermore, I find that the board is much more conclusive when selecting Primaries than Alternates, and what matters for selection varies by Command Type and even across time in some cases. The findings also show that on average commanders perform well in their billet regardless of when they were selected by the board. I also find that similarities between the board and the eligible officer sometimes do matter; further supporting the board members' beliefs that board composition has the ability to impact the selection outcomes.

I further find that the CSP is analogous to the resume portion of most civilian firms' initial hiring processes. Whereas civilian organizations place significant emphasis on being able to assess a person's qualitative attributes through interviews and other means, board members are required to make command selection decisions directly from a resume. Lastly, I find that the Marine Corps should implement ways to measure the effectiveness of the CSP to better understand the process and continually discover ways to improve it.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on my findings, I recommend the Marine Corps improve the Command Screening Program in four specific areas. First, the CSP needs to make changes to the information available to the board by providing an analytical summary to board members and leveraging HQMC elements. Second, the CSP should randomize the briefing order of sub-boards and packages within those sub-boards to better meet its intent of a fair and equitable opportunity for all eligible officers to command. Third, the Marine Corps should require all eligible officers who desire to be screened for lieutenant colonel command to submit an application. Through this change, board members would receive a more holistic picture of each eligible officer and be able to spend more effort screening those officers who actually want command. Lastly, the Marine Corps should include Cornerstone as the final step in the CSP. This is a logical transition for two reasons: the mission of Cornerstone

is inherent to the CSP mission; and Cornerstone can be a means to provide a qualitative assessment of each board-selected commander

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Further research should focus on expanding the scope to compare board results during times of varying national security threats and economic stability. Additionally, I recommend comparing command climate results to command selection board voting results to assess the congruency of board and subordinates' perspectives of those selected for command. Lastly, I recommend an analysis of RBRs to assess the relationships between those officers who are screened for command and those who self-select out of consideration.

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I. INTRODUCTION

> Leaders must have a strong sense of the great responsibility of their office; the resources they will expend in war are human lives.
>
> —*MCDP 1 Warfighting*

Complacency kills. In the military profession, this phrase carries both a literal and figurative meaning. In the context of this thesis, this phrase is equally as consequential. History has shown the impact of military commanders on the battlefield and on their troops (Hart & Tzu, 1971; Moyar, Kagan, & Kagan, 2009; Ricks, 2013; Schell, 1987). Complacency—with respect to command selection—has the potential to critically affect the Marine Corps, whether in the form of human lives or institutional existence through retention and talent management. The Marine Corps holds Marines at every rank accountable for knowing themselves and seeking self-improvement. This naturally invokes the question: Does the Marine Corps hold itself accountable for doing the same as an institution? The answer is "yes" in many respects, and we can do better in at least one: command selection. The reality is that we, as an institution, do not really understand how or why we select our commanders or if our screening program is actually meeting its intent. In this thesis, I provide a systemic analysis of the Command Screening Program (CSP) and the factors influencing selection outcomes.

A. MANAGING EXPECTATIONS

I focus solely on the lieutenant colonel command selection processes within the CSP. My primary and secondary research questions investigate whether or not the CSP is meeting its intent of selecting the best and most fully qualified eligible officers for lieutenant colonel command, the factors influencing those selection outcomes, and how the Marine Corps should measure the effectiveness of the CSP.

From my research, I find that I cannot determine whether or not the CSP is meeting its intent. Whereas I do find that board members generally agree on how to define "best and most fully qualified" and what characterizes a successful command tour, I also find that the board is much more decisive when selecting Primaries than Alternates.

Furthermore, I find that what matters for selection varies by Command Type and in some cases, even across time. The findings also indicate that while board composition can have an effect on selection outcomes, those selected perform well in their command billet regardless of when they were selected by the board.

To answer these research questions, I examine the mechanics of the CSP, the board composition, and voting results from the last five boards. Using survey results, I provide perspective into the CSP from past board members, to include how they define the phrases "best and most-fully qualified" and "successful command tour." Additionally, I discuss the hiring methods of two well-established organizations, Amazon and the Seattle Seahawks, to explore best practices that could be implemented into the CSP.

While acknowledging the vast improvement opportunities in manpower processes and systems (e.g., Performance Evaluation System and incentive structures), I use this thesis to think on the margins about practical actions that the Marine Corps *can* take within its current structures. With that stated, this thesis is not a discussion on officer promotion or officer quality, nor am I am going to spend chapters arguing the importance of leadership or what makes a good leader. Marines understand the importance of leadership, and the CSP intends to provide Marines with the best leaders. This thesis is an analysis of the process and the factors influencing that process.

B. PROBLEM FRAMING

Marine Corps leadership is neither flippant nor careless with command selection. The Generals and Colonels responsible for selecting commanders have a grave understanding of the institutional impacts of their selections.[1] In fact, my underlying assumption of this thesis is that every board member intends and desires to select the best and most fully qualified officer for command. The board members do this with the information provided by the established process. My thesis is not a challenge to the integrity and/or wisdom of the board members; however, it absolutely challenges the

[1] The Marine Corps Manual clearly outlines the responsibilities and authorities of commanders (USMC, 1980). Furthermore, board members are sagaciously chosen because they have profound experience and institutional perspective that support their command selection decisions.

process used to inform their decision-making. This thesis is all about understanding the process. So here is my *disruptive thought*: if we are to analyze and critique the individual Marine—at any rank and in any billet—we had better first understand and be relentlessly improving the institutional processes that put them there.

The Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC) acknowledges and identifies the holistic service problem clearly: "The Marine Corps is currently not organized, trained, and equipped to meet the demands of [the] future operating environment" (Neller, 2016, p. 8). Whereas the MOC's five critical tasks are necessary for institutional improvements and solutions to this problem, they are not sufficient. Critical Task 6.5 identifies the need to "exploit the competence of the individual Marine" (Neller, 2016, p. 24). This need is real, but it is not the whole truth. This task should be less about exploiting individual competence than it is about ensuring the structural processes and people are aligned with the outcomes we say we want.[2] To accomplish this critical task, we must first examine the organizational systems responsible for empowering the people charged with that exploitation. Ultimately, this is a manpower problem that demands a manpower solution.

Marines want and need commanders who know how to exploit their individual competence and who fervently approach uncertainty with unbridled imagination and will. We already have competent, creative, and motivated Marines, but individual attributes are worthless if the command climate limits them or fails to realize their value altogether. As New England Patriots Head Coach Bill Belichick states it, "Good players cannot overcome bad coaching, it's impossible" (CNBC, 2017). If commanders do not know how to effectively create an environment that maximizes the talent and creativity of our Marines, it does not matter how many competent Marines we have or how many incentives we use to attract and retain them. From recruitment to retirement, the Marine Corps' greatest core competency is its human element, and its competitive advantage is its reputation and warfighting ethos. The Marine Corps does not "promise us a rose garden," nor does it promote service career opportunities as an incentive for wearing our hallowed eagle, globe,

[2] Steven Kerr describes this organizational dynamic in his article "On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B" (Kerr, 1975).

and anchor. What the Marine Corps does promise is the honor and privilege of being a Marine, of being one of the few and the proud. Commanders must exploit *that*. *That* is why we choose to be Marines. Using this framework, the Marine Corps must reexamine its leadership paradigm and command selection processes if it hopes to solve its holistic service problem.

Some might argue that the Command Screening Program (CSP) is working and should be left alone. Others might contend that only minor changes are necessary.[3] If we define working as slating high-performing officers to commands then, yes, by that definition the process is working. However, the reality is that we, as an institution, do not really have a consistent definition of CSP success. Common CSP defenses center on three themes that favor the process as-is: the first is that those selected for command are highly qualified, more so than those commanders selected before the formalized process was established; the second is that the Marine Corps' command selection process is better than any other service's; and the third being that on average, less than two percent of Marine Corps commanders are fired.[4] I believe these statements are true and significant, but can we really claiming these comparative-type answers as evidential proof the process is working? *Working* is not analogous to *excellent*. As a reader, would it warrant any pause if I told you that of the eleven lieutenant colonel commanders that were selected on the last five selection boards and then subsequently fired, all of them were considered the "best of the best" by the board? Although commander relief rates do not entirely represent the health of the process, we should be asking why and how this happened.

Using the comparative rationale to define process effectiveness, these officers were probably more qualified to command than their pre-process predecessors, were selected by the relatively best process, and represent only a small percentage of those high-quality officers selected by the process. Furthermore, these officers were highly competent and

[3] Based off the survey results. Additionally, the CSP does incorporate feedback from annual After Action Reports and board debriefs to constantly improve its processes. Past feedback includes standardizing briefing templates and discrepancy notices; however, most feedback highlights poor Fitness Report writing and inaccurate or outdated OMPFs.

[4] These comments are summarized from the survey I conducted in support of this thesis. These survey responses are discussed more fully in subsequent chapters.

exhibited qualities valued and rewarded by the institution throughout their careers. It is also reasonable that under this rationale, the individual commander is solely to blame for the paradoxical outcome while the institutional processes that placed them there remain unscathed and unchallenged. By these standards, the process is working.

For whatever reasons—warranted or not—the Marine Corps is complacent with its command screening program. We choose to accept working as the permanent stand-in for greatness. And we do so at the expense of our greatest resource, our Marines at *every* rank. Our institutional complacency with the CSP may have unintended effects, whether in the form of retention and talent management or in the most literal and consequential form of human lives. From the recruit to the Commandant and the board member to the commander, the Marine Corps owes *every* Marine its institutional best. Yes, the process might be working and comparatively better than other processes, but we have an institutional imperative to understand the process, determine if it is optimally working, and continuously seek out ways to improve it. Our institutional survival depends on it.

C. WHY THE MARINE CORPS SHOULD CARE

The lieutenant colonel command billet is one of the most influential in the Marine Corps. Officers selected for these commands not only have a profound impact on the current readiness of the Marine Corps, but they also influence future readiness with respect to retention rates and leadership quality throughout its ranks. Commanders at this level have a direct and immediate impact on the operational, maintenance, and administrative readiness of the institution writ large. As such, the Lieutenant Colonel Command Selection Board is one of the most important boards in the Marine Corps. It is the first level of command at which the Marine Corps deliberately selects its leaders and decides the future direction of the organization.

In 1992, the Marine Corps implemented the Command Screening Program (CSP) to ensure Marines receive the “best and most fully qualified” leadership. The CSP is intended to “provide all eligible officers with a fair and equitable opportunity to command” to “maintain a competent and well-balanced fighting force” (United States Marine Corps

[USMC], 2017, p. 1). However, there is currently no comprehensive evaluation metric in place to determine the success rate of the CSP.

When it comes to command selection and slating, the Marine Corps defines success as putting the best and most qualified lieutenant colonel in a command billet. However, the Marine Corps has no definitive means for accurately determining the "success rates" of its commanders. We assume the board members who select these commanders choose the best and most fully qualified commanders, and as such, the process is successful.

Very little research evaluates the CSP's effectiveness in selecting and slating commanders. Currently, studies only compare the CSP to previous command selection methods (Marr, 1997), or more specifically, examine how the Marine Corps chooses commanders for Marine Aviation Logistics Squadrons and Recruiting Stations (Gonzalez, 2011; Munoz, 2005). In contrast, much research has been done on Marine Corps promotion processes and how the Marine Corps determines officer quality (DeBardeleben, 2013; Hoffman, 2008; Long, 1992; Rateike, 2017; Stolzenberg, 2017). Though many characteristics may overlap, there is a significant difference between promotion and command. It is time the Marine Corps better understood its command screening processes and the dynamics affecting the outcomes.

D. THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION

The command selection boards are nonstatutory, meaning they are not governed by law. This signifies that the Marine Corps has the flexibility to adjust both the inputs to the process and the process itself to achieve the desired outcomes. The CSP currently mirrors the statutory promotion boards. As previously stated, there are numerous qualification overlaps between promotion and command, but they are not the same. As detailed in the MOC, we are all charged to think differently and more creatively about complex problems (Neller, 2016). The Marine Corps has the opportunity and authority to be more creative in its command selection processes; this thesis contributes to the institutional endeavors of putting our words into action.

E. THE THESIS CHAPTERS

I organize this thesis into seven chapters. Chapter I is an introduction to the thesis and its relevance to the Marine Corps. Chapter II provides the background and detailed description of the CSP. Chapter III is a literature review of past research. Chapter IV describes the data sources, models, and variables used in the analysis. Chapter V is the analysis and findings. Chapter VI offers recommendations to the CSP. Chapter VII concludes the thesis with a discussion of thesis limitations and recommendations for further study.

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II. BACKGROUND

Equipment is useful only if it increases combat effectiveness.

—MCDP 1 Warfighting

A. WHAT AND WHY IS THE CSP?

In 1992, the Marine Corps established the Command Screening Program (CSP) to select the best and most fully qualified lieutenant colonel and colonel commanders (USMC, 2017). Prior to the CSP, Commanding Generals at the division, group, and wing levels were given the authority to select the commanders in their respective major subordinate commands (Marr, 1997). This system—colloquially referred to as the "ol' boy network"—often conveyed a perceived bias and left little opportunity for smaller MOSs to have command (National Naval Officers' Association [NNOA], 2008). To address these perceptions and concerns, the Marine Corps implemented the CSP to achieve four tenets. NNOA states these four tenets as follows,

- Ensure Marines are being led by the "best and most fully qualified"
- Ensure officers are afforded an equal opportunity to compete for command
- Formalize command assignments
- Eliminate sponsorship/cronyism. (NNOA, 2008)

Except for a few distinct Commandant-selected commands, all lieutenant colonel and colonel commanders that have held command since the CSP's inception have been selected by the CSP. The program has undergone many informal changes over the years, in addition to a couple of formal revisions to the Marine Corps Order (MCO). The most recent formal revision was with the publication of MCO 1300.64B in 2017.

Though the CSP covers both lieutenant colonel and colonel command selections, I focus solely on the Lieutenant Colonel Command Screening Board (CSB) in my thesis. Henceforth, whenever I use the term "CSP," "CSB," or "the board" in this thesis, I refer to lieutenant colonel command selection only, as the primary purpose of this analysis is to

determine whether or not the CSP selects the best and most fully qualified eligible officers for lieutenant colonel command.

B. CSP OVERVIEW

The CSP comprises every CSB preparation, CSB execution, and post-CSB action. Whereas these actions range from command validation and board member solicitation to release of the board results and managing any commander replacement requirements, the command board (CSB) is the fundamental function of the CSP.

There are two types of boards in the Marine Corps, statutory (e.g., officer promotion boards) and non-statutory (e.g., command selection boards). The CSB is non-statutory, meaning it is conducted in accordance with Marine Corps policy not law. However, the CSB is structured to mirror statutory boards (USMC, 2016, 2017). This fact is crucial to the heart of this thesis and will be discussed throughout because the Marine Corps has the authority and flexibility to revise the CSB to meet its institutional needs and objectives.

The CSP is the Commandant's program. The program is assigned to the Deputy Commandant, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) and delegated to the Director of Manpower Management (MM) for execution. Marine Manpower Officer Assignments (MMOA), MM, M&RA administers the CSP and any changes to the CSP must be approved by the Deputy Commandant, M&RA.

The CSP mission is to provide "Marines with the best and most fully qualified commanders in order to maintain a competent and well-balanced fighting force" (USMC, 2017, p. 1). The Marine Corps defines "best" as those officers that possess particular skills that meet the needs of the Marine Corps; furthermore, it defines "fully qualified" as officers that have demonstrated the requisite qualifications and performance of duties to capably perform the duties associated with the slated command (USMC, 2017).

The board selects from a list of "eligible lieutenant colonels and lieutenant colonels (select) who are best and most fully qualified for command" (USMC, 2017, p. 1). Furthermore, "the board selects as primaries—those slated for command—the number of officers equal to the number of command billets available. Additionally, the board selects

a sufficient number of alternates to meet command requirements when the primaries decline or cannot otherwise take command" (USMC, 2017, p. 1).

C. CSP TIMELINE

The CSB convenes every July to select the officers who will assume command of the vacated billets in the following fiscal year. As stated previously, the CSP encompasses a wide variety of actions that are accomplished throughout each fiscal year. The general CSP timeline is below and is followed by brief description of each major milestone (the FY2019 CSP timeline is depicted for clarity):

1. March 2018. MMOA solicits CSP billet information to identify command billets to be slated for vacancies from 1 June 2019 to 31 May 2020
2. April 2018. MMOA receives command billet validation from the commands
3. May 2018. MMOA releases the CSB announcement MARADMIN
4. July 2018. MMOA conducts the CSB
5. August 2018. MMOA releases the CSB results MARADMIN
6. October 2018. MMOA reviews and confirms any declinations and subsequent Fleet-ups

1. Command Billet Validation (March–April)

The CSP billet solicitation and validation process ensures that commanders are selected for the appropriate command billet during the fiscal year command screening boards. This annual process is vital for preparing the CSB and command slating. The intent of the process is to gain accurate and command input to identify required billet information, validate actual command billets, and identify command billets that require screening on the board. Of note, command billet lengths range between 18 and 24 months and depend on the unit; as such, the same commands are rarely screened each year. Furthermore, this process includes validation and/or removal of existing commands and the addition of new

commands to the CSP. This validation process is critical for achieving optimal results for both the commands and officers slated for command (MMOA-3, personal communication, March 2018).

Every March, MMOA sends out a message to Major Subordinate Commands requesting their validation of commands both to be screened during the board in July and those that will not be screened. Between March and April, each command updates its respective available command billets in a spreadsheet provided by MMOA, and MMOA updates the Command Database. MMOA then publishes the list of all commands to be screened during the board on its webpage. MCO 1300.64B outlines the guidance for inclusion and/or removal of commands into the CSP. Any request to add or remove commands from the CSP must be approved by DC, M&RA and takes effect during the next board. These requests are also validated during this process.

The number of commands being screened varies annually. On average, there are approximately 148 command billets screened per year. Figure 1 shows the variation of validated commands over the last five boards (see Chapter IV for a description of my thesis data sources). An example of the validation document is provided in Appendix A.



Figure 1. Number of Validated Commands (FY15–FY19)

2. CSB Announcement (May)

The purpose of this announcement MARADMIN is to provide information regarding board composition, outline eligibility criteria for consideration, provide instructions for those who decline command, and provide guidance for communication with the board. Because eligibility criteria can change (e.g., lieutenant colonels (select) were not eligible in some years), the current criteria is published in the annual CSB announcement in accordance with MCO 1300.64B. On average, 882 officers have been eligible to be screened for command each year over the last five boards.

Eligible officers are not required to opt-in to be screened for command, only to opt-out. Some officers do not desire to be considered for command due to various personal and professional reasons even though they are eligible to be screened. These officers submit a written request—known as remove by request or "RBR"—to their monitors (if submitted prior to the board convening) or to the board president (if submitted while the board is convened) and are removed from command consideration without prejudice or negative repercussions on their careers. On average, 568 officers have been screened for command per year (out of the 882 eligible officers) over the last five boards due to RBRs. Figure 2 shows the summary of those eligible to be screened for command over the last five boards.



Figure 2. Summary of Eligible Officers (FY15–FY19)

3. Conduct of the CSB (July)

The CSB is convened every July at Marine Corps Base Quantico and lasts for approximately three to four weeks. Figure 3 depicts the standard flow of the board process.

Figure 3. Standard Command Selection Board Process. Source: MMOA-3 internal documents (2018).

The specifics of the board process are described in detail in this section. I first discuss the board composition, governing documents, and general setup, and then transition to the actual selection process.

Board Composition. The members of the CSB consist of General Officers and Colonels that have executed successful command tours at both the colonel and lieutenant colonel levels (by exception upon approval from the Director of MM). Though varied from year to year, on average there are 19 board members on each board comprised of 2 General Officers and 17 Colonels. Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) annually solicits each Major Subordinate Command (MSCs) to nominate board members in accordance with the requirements as prescribed in MCBUL 5420. To ensure a diversity of demographics and experience, the board is comprised of General Officers and Colonels assigned to all elements of the MAGTF and supporting establishments, and those who have executed alternative career paths (USMC, 2016). HQMC thoroughly screens the records of each nominated board member prior to confirming their participation to reinforce board integrity. The Director of MM has the authority to add or remove board members to achieve the desired representative mix. To further protect the integrity of the board process, board membership is kept confidential until the board convenes, and HQMC keeps the identity of the board members from the public until the results of the board are released in August.

Precepts. As stated previously, the CSB is non-statutory though it is executed under the general construct of statutory boards. As such, the board is guided by a precept signed by the Commandant. The precept includes a list of the board members and support personnel, oaths to be taken by the aforementioned, eligibility criteria for officers to be screened, any specific requirements and necessary information used for selection criteria, and a statement regarding equal opportunity (USMC, 2017). The FY2019 LtCol CSB precept is provided in Appendix B for reference.

Board Communication. The primary form of communication is the electronic command screening questionnaire provided by MMOA (see Appendix C for template), accessible to each eligible officer approximately six weeks prior to the board convening. Each eligible officer is afforded the opportunity to list his or her command preferences, unique qualifications, and any other information he or she would want the board to consider. Additional forms of communication are encouraged, to include updates to the officer's official military record and/or remove by request (RBR). Of note—and a significant deviation from statutory boards—the board president, at his or her discretion, may allow the board room to consider any and all record updates even after the board has convened. Any submissions and updates made by an eligible officer for the purposes of the board are destroyed after the board. Communication with the board is mandatory, though those officers who do not communicate with the board are still screened.

Board Room Setup. Board members are assigned seats in the board room according to rank seniority, regardless of experience as board members. For example, the Board President is both the senior ranking Marine and Board Member #1 whereas the junior colonel is Board Member #19. Though this configuration is not explicitly stated in the board room, many board members are aware of the seating arrangements. Board Member #1 sits at an elevated desk at the front of the room facing the board members; all other board members face in the direction of the board president. Board Member #2 is positioned at the front row desk to the far right of Board Member #1; all subsequent board members are arranged in ascending numerical order after Board Member #2, ultimately resulting in Board Member #19 being seated in the back row. These assigned seats remain throughout the duration of the board and are equipped with a desk, computer, and storage space. There

are multiple television screens mounted throughout the board room which display everything from the briefing order and voting results to the daily schedule and additional coordinating instructions. Figure 4 provides an example of the board room setup.

Figure 4. Board Room of Lieutenant Colonel Command Selection Board (Boardroom "E"). Source: MMOA-3 internal documents (2018).

Board members use the digital board room application (DBR) system to prepare, brief, and vote the eligible officer packages. The DBR is software that allows the board members to conveniently access the MBS and OMPF of each officer being screened by the board. While the board is convened, board members spend nearly all of their time using DBR to prepare their assigned packages, take notes during board member briefs, and vote on each officer being considered. An example of a DBR screenshot is shown in Figure 5.



Figure 5. Example of DBR Application. Source: MMOA-3 internal documents (2018).

Selected versus Slated. An officer must first be selected for command to be slated for command. *Selection* refers to those officers chosen by the board members to be either primaries or alternates for command. *Slated* refers to the specific unit for which the selected officer is assigned to command. For example, an officer who is selected as a primary is then slated to a specific command; an officer selected as an alternate is on standby to be slated for a command if a primary is either unable or unwilling to accept command or is relieved of command.

Command Types. There are two types of commands for which an officer can be selected and slated: MOS-specific commands (e.g., Engineer Battalions or F/A-18 Squadrons) and commands open to any MOS, also known as "strung" commands (e.g., Combat Logistics Battalions or Recruit Depot Battalions). MOS-specific commands and strung commands are found in both the operating forces and the supporting establishment. MOS-specific commands, or Primary MOS commands, are those commands available only to officers with that MOS. Strung commands are available to any MOS or a certain group of MOSs. "Stringing" is the process by which the board screens officers of a certain MOS or group of MOSs for a command (USMC, 2017). Stringing is done to provide an equitable

opportunity for all officers of all MOSs to command, as some MOSs have a lower opportunity to command than others. The board president has the flexibility to deviate from the stringing plan to ensure the best and most fully qualified officers are selected and slated to each command. To reiterate, the board screens only for commands that have been validated for that respective board.

Board Execution. The board process starts with swearing in of board members, board recorders, and support personnel on Day 1, in addition to the review of board precepts, board president guidance, and additional in-briefs from MMOA support personnel (e.g., using the digital board room application, reading a Master Brief Sheet, routine administrative and logistic information, etc.). Board support personnel are an integral part of ensuring efficient board execution, as they provide continuous assistance and updates to the board members as required. Once the Day 1 introductory actions are complete, the board begins case preparation.

Every board is executed in accordance with the precepts and board president's guidance. Because the CSB is non-statutory, the board president has flexibility to determine how operations will be conducted within the board room. For example, some board presidents allow additional material to be introduced to the board room (e.g., updated photos, fitness reports, certificates) even though the board is already convened; other board presidents do not allow such material. Additionally, board presidents establish actions such as voting "cut lines" (will be discussed in further detail later), selection of alternates, board room dialogue expectations during briefings, and the MOS briefing order.

MMOA provides a recommended MOS briefing order to the board president, though the actual order is determined by the board president. For example, the board president may choose to have the larger MOS "pools" briefed first or brief all aviation MOSs last.[5] The MOS "pools" are briefed and voted on in what are technically referred to as sub-boards. Sub-boards are also established for Strung commands and at times, Alternate selections. The board systematically selects officers for command within each

[5] Over the last five boards, the board selected commanders for all ground MOSs first and then selected commanders for all aviation MOSs.

MOSs before moving onto the next MOS sub-board. However, depending on the size of the MOS sub-board (e.g., screening 150 infantry officer packages versus 40 supply officer packages), the board president may decide to combine smaller MOS pools into a single sub-board (e.g., legal officers and public affairs officers) during package preparation to maintain board room efficiency and adhere to established timelines. Prior to starting the process for each MOS sub-board, the board members receive a MOS advocacy brief from either a HQMC representative or board member with that respective MOS background. The purpose of this advocacy brief is to convey relevant experiences, billets, and skillsets important to each MOS, in addition to the qualities of a good commander in that MOS. This process contributes to the board members' understanding of each MOS and provides an opportunity for board members to engage in beneficial dialogue with the advocates.

Each board member is randomly assigned officer packages (commonly referred to as "cases") to review and subsequently brief to the board room for sub-board voting. Case preparation is the process by which board members review each assigned package, all supporting documentation in the officer's official military personnel file, and prepare respective briefing notes. On average, every board member is afforded approximately two hours to prepare each case. The optimal case distribution is to have an equitable number of cases randomly assigned to each board member, though at times, some board members are randomly assigned more cases in a sub-board than other board members. In the event that a board member finishes preparing all of his or her assigned cases with ample time remaining, that board member may be assigned a few of another board member's cases to adhere to the board's established schedule. Additionally, board members may request to have a case reassigned if they have previous experience with that officer and/or have previously written Fitness Reports on that officer. (Of note, the board president has the authority to mandate case reassignment in such occurrences; some choose to do so where as others do not.) Once all cases have been prepared, the board then transitions to the briefing portion of the sub-board.

Cases are briefed in any order as designated by the board president. Often, the board president chooses to have the cases briefed in ascending alphabetical order of the cases' last names (e.g., LtCol Alpha to Major Zulu). Additionally, the board president designates

which information gets briefed first (e.g., most recent experience and performance evaluations to time as a second lieutenant, or vice versa). Each briefer is allotted six minutes to brief each case and provided the briefing template as shown in Figure 6.

1	Rank, name, and MOS	13	Personal Decorations
2	Current billet and duty assignment. Since?	14	Command Billets
3	Recommended value (e.g., 6, 5, 4)	15	Staff Billets
4	Adverse material?	16	Joint Duty Billets (if applicable)
5	Letter to board? Questionnaire submitted?	17	Acquisition Billets (if applicable)
6	Photo is or is not current?	18	Remarks
7	Personal appearance		-Company Grade trends
8	Rifle/Pistol/PFT/CFT/MCMAP		-Field Grade trends
9	Secondary MOSs (brief by exception)		-Overall trends
10	Language Skill (brief by exception)	19	Relative Value
11	Civilian Education	20	Reviewing Officer assessment
12	PME / Military Education	21	Recommendation restated

Figure 6. Board Member Briefing Template.
Source: MMOA-3 internal documents (2018).

For each case, the briefing board member provides a numerical ranking recommendation (or "recommended value") to the board. During the brief, other board members take notes on that officer and assign that officer an initial ranking; these board member rankings may differ from the briefing board member's recommendation. The ranking scale and description is as follows:

6—Eminently Qualified ("Water Walker")

5—With Enthusiasm

4—With Confidence

3—With Reservation

2—Not Recommended

1—Show Cause

Some board presidents allow briefers to include additional descriptors with the rankings—such as "6++" or "Soft 5"—to mitigate the limitations of a constrained numerical scale. Though these descriptors may assist board members in distinguishing cases during the voting process, the only rankings that are entered in DBR during the voting process are the numerical rankings.

The voting process is relatively simple and quick, but it might be the most significant action in the CSP. The voting process determines which officers are selected as Primaries and Alternates and those who are not. Voting is anonymous and done in iterations (iterations are analogous to rounds). The board president determines the structure of the iterations for each sub-board and as such, this process can vary each year. For example, the board president may choose to have separate voting iterations for Primaries and Alternates, or the board president may use the same sub-board voting iterations to select both. Regardless of construct, board members vote on all Primaries first; once the Primaries are selected, the board members then select the Alternates from the remaining officers in the respective sub-board. The number of voting iterations varies and is situationally dependent upon the "cut line" established by the board president. The "cut line" distinguishes those who receive a final selection determination (e.g., select or non-select) in a particular iteration from those who are voted on again in a subsequent iteration. Moreover, the number of voting iterations could depend on the board members' ability to reach a decisive number of "Yes" votes for the authorized number of selections.

The first voting iteration begins after all briefs in a particular sub-board are completed and ends after every board member has entered a respective rank (6-1) in DBR for each case in the sub-board. Board members may use their initial rankings assigned during the briefing process, or they may update their rankings upon hearing all of the briefs. Board member rankings and votes interact in the following manner: only rankings of "6" receive "Yes" votes whereas rankings of "5-1" equate to a "No" vote. This respective equivalence is necessary due to the limited number of cases that board members are authorized to select for the validated commands. Figure 7 is an example of the DBR voting.



Figure 7. DBR Voting Example. Source: MMOA-3 internal documents (2018).

There is no time limit placed on the voting process. This ensures board members are able to make the best voting decision without unnecessary added pressure. When all board members have voted—usually after a few minutes—the board recorder provides a print out of the iteration voting results to the board president and displays the results on the board room television screens for the board members to view. In general, two criteria must be met before the voting process is complete for each sub-board: 1) the voting iteration results clearly indicate a strong selection recommendation, and 2) the board has selected the authorized number of cases for that sub-board. If neither criteria have been met, the board president then determines the "cut line" for the subsequent voting iteration. Though situationally dependent on the size of the sub-board and number of cases authorized to select, common "cut lines" are made immediately below cases receiving all—or all but one—"Yes" votes, and immediately above cases receiving all—or all but one—"No" votes. Figure 8 is an example of an iteration results printout with "cut lines."

DATE: 10 Jul 13 | Candidate List for 1302 Iteration 1 | Page 1 of 1

Name	Lineal No	PMOS	SSN	Briefer	Status	Yes	No
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00000000	1302	000000000	MEMBER12	S	19	0
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00000001	1302	010000000	MEMBER09	S	19	0
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00000002	1302	020000000	MEMBER18	S	18	1
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00000003	1302	030000000	MEMBER09		16	3
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00000004	1302	040000000	MEMBER10		15	4
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00000005	1302	050000000	MEMBER17		13	6
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00000006	1302	060000000	MEMBER03		12	7
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00000007	1302	070000000	MEMBER16		12	7
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00000008	1302	080000000	MEMBER14		11	8
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00000009	1302	090000000	MEMBER12		10	9
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00000010	1302	100000000	MEMBER01		9	10
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00000011	1302	110000000	MEMBER06		2	17
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00000012	1302	120000000	MEMBER10	NS	1	18
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00000013	1302	130000000	MEMBER15	NS	1	18
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00000014	1302	140000000	MEMBER04	NS	1	18
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00000015	1302	150000000	MEMBER19	NS	0	19
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00000016	1302	160000000	MEMBER07	NS	0	19
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00000017	1302	170000000	MEMBER08	NS	0	19
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00000018	1302	180000000	MEMBER02	NS	0	19
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00000019	1302	190000000	MEMBER11	NS	0	19

Board members select (S) these cases for command

"Cut Line"

Board members vote again on these cases in iteration #2

"Cut Line"

These cases not selected (NS) for command and not voted on in subsequent iterations

Note: Case distribution is random and seeks to assign to board members equally. However, depending on the size of the MOS sub-board, some board members brief more than once while other bord members may not brief at all. All data in Figure 8 is fictional.

Figure 8. Example Results for Voting Iteration #1. Adapted from actual board voting results.

Cases receiving the most "Yes" votes are listed first, and the remaining cases are listed in descending order of "Yes" votes. As stated previously, the board president determines whether or not the sub-board is complete or if another voting iteration is required to select the authorized total number of cases. If another voting iteration is required, the board president determines the "cut line(s)" and identifies which cases will be voted on again in the next iteration. The board members then re-vote on the identified cases only. As the number of iterations per sub-board increases, board members often rank the same case differently per iteration to reach the authorized total number of cases. As such, case order may vary with each successive iteration. Figure 9 is an example of Iteration #2 voting results.

DATE: 10 Jul 18 | Candidate List for 1302 Iteration 2 | Page 1 of 1

Name	Lineal No	PMOS	SSN	Briefer	Status	Yes	No
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00 0000004	1302	040000 000	MEMBER10	S	18	1
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00 0000005	1302	050000 000	MEMBER17		16	3
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00 0000003	1302	030000 000	MEMBER09		16	3
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00 0000008	1302	080000 000	MEMBER14		16	3
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00 0000006	1302	060000 000	MEMBER03		10	9
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00 0000007	1302	070000 000	MEMBER16		5	14
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00 0000009	1302	090000 000	MEMBER12		2	17
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00 0000010	1302	100000 000	MEMBER01	NS	0	19
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI	00 0000011	1302	110000 000	MEMBER06	NS	0	19

Board members select (S) this case for command

Board members vote again on these cases in iteration #3

These cases not selected (NS) for command and not voted on in subsequent iterations

Note: Ranking order may vary in each iteration (e.g., officer who received 16 "Yes" votes in Iteration #1 now ranked lower in Iteration #2 than two officers who received only 15 and 13 "Yes" votes in Iteration #1. All data in Figure 9 is fictional.

Figure 9. Example Results for Voting Iteration #2. Adapted from actual board voting results.

This iterative process continues until the board members select the authorized total number of cases for each sub-board. Some sub-boards have been completed in one iteration, whereas others have gone as many as nine iterations. If the board president chooses to have separate sub-boards for Alternates, the iterative selection process is similar. However, the board president has the flexibility to select Alternates in any manner, so this description might not accurately represent every selection method.

Strung command sub-boards use the iterative voting process as well. As previously stated, stringing is the process by which the board screens officers of a certain MOS or group of MOSs for a command open to any MOS (USMC, 2017). As such, strung commands are typically briefed after MOS-specific commands (see Appendix D for a comprehensive list of strung commands from FY2015–FY2019 boards). The exception is those MOSs that do not have MOS-specific commands.

Slating. The slating process matches the selected officers with their respective command preferences. MOS-specific commands are slated with officers who currently hold the primary MOS required by the command; strung commands are slated with officers of any eligible MOS required by the command. This process also varies year to year. Regardless of the slating variations, the board takes into account officer command preferences (from the command questionnaire), past unit history, and any special circumstances. However, not all officers slated for command in a particular board are selected for command by that same board.

In the board precept, the Commandant provides a by-name list of those officers selected for command on a previous selection board but were unable to assume command due to uncontrollable circumstances (known as "deferrals"). The convening board is directed to make every effort to slate those officers for a command requisite to their previous slating. Additionally, the board considers any and all commands identified for early slating during the slating process.

Board Report. At the conclusion of the board, the board provides a report to the Commandant for final approval. This report contains the recommended command slate, a prioritized list of those selected as alternates, statistics of those selected and those not selected, and a signed document acknowledging the board's compliance with all precept guidance. As it is the Commandant's program, the Commandant has the authority to change the board results. Once the Commandant has approved the final command slate, MMOA releases the CSB results.

4. CSB Results (August)

MMOA publishes the CSB results in a MARADMIN. The MARADMIN lists details about the number of officers screened by the board and a by-name list of the command slate approved by the Commandant. The alternate list is published via the MMOA website and lists only the names of those selected as alternates, not the order of precedence by which they were selected.

Those officers slated for command are required to accept command within two weeks of the MARADMIN's release. Officers that have been slated for command and subsequently decline command are "not considered for any other command and are ineligible for command screening on future boards" (USMC, 2017, p. 1-4). Only DC, M&RA can approve any exceptions to this policy. Furthermore, "officers that accept command and refuse to execute orders" are administratively separated from the Marine Corps (USMC, 2017, p. 1-4). Of note, eligible officers are required to route declinations to MMOA by October of their respective FY board, and the declination "must be endorsed through the first general officer in the chain of command" (USMC, 2017, p. 1-4).

As previously discussed, slated officers also have the opportunity to defer command. Deferrals are those officers who were slated for command but were unable to assume command due to uncontrollable circumstances. Those approved for deferral "will be non-competitively selected for command on a later board and then compete for slating" (USMC, 2017, p. 1-4).

5. Confirm Fleet-ups (October)

When command vacancies result from slated officer declinations and deferrals, MMOA fills those vacancies from the prioritized list of Alternates. This process is known as "fleet-ups." Fleet-up packages are based on Alternate rankings, command requirements, Alternate command preferences, and timing. In special cases, officers selected as Primaries for a supporting establishment command may be fleeted-up to a vacant operational command; an alternate would then fleet-up to the vacated supporting establishment command. The Director, MM is the approving authority for all fleet-up packages.

Those Alternates fleeted-up for command are required to accept or decline command within five working days of notification. If a slated Alternate declines command, that officer is subject to the same processes as previously listed for slated Primaries. Initial fleet-ups are completed by October and continue throughout the year, as required.

D. CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter describes the purpose of the Command Screening Program (CSP) and provides a detailed description of the actions and information included therein. This chapter is essential for understanding the significant amount of planning and preparation that the Marine Corps requires to ensure the CSP is fair, equitable, and unbiased to the fullest extent. Furthermore, I reference many of these actions throughout the remaining chapters, so it is important to have an understanding of each. In the next chapter, I present the gaps and overlaps in existing military and civilian literature that influence my thesis analytical framework.

III. LITERATURE REVIEW

> The very nature of war makes certainty impossible; all actions in war will be based on incomplete, inaccurate, or even contradictory information.
>
> —*MCDP 1 Warfighting*

There is no shortage of literature on the topic of leadership. And there is no knowledge gap when it comes to the importance of leadership and command in the Marine Corps. A search through Marine Corps Gazette archives, review of organizational leadership principles and traits, or scan of the Commandant's Reading List quickly demonstrates this truth. However, the Marine Corps espouses that all Marines are leaders regardless of rank and billet. As such, research in leadership is necessary but not sufficient for understanding how and why the Marine Corps selects its commanders.

Leadership in the officer ranks has typically been studied through the lens of promotion processes. In fact, many studies look at factors influencing officer promotions in the Marine Corps, and how the Marine Corps defines "quality officer" using promotion and education board outcomes as proxies (Gonzalez, 2011; Hoffman, 2008; Long, 1992; Rateike, 2017; Stolzenberg, 2017). In contrast, very little has been written about how the Marine Corps selects its commanders. Whereas there are similarities and overlapping criteria for both command and promotion, a sound argument can be made that the two are not synonymous. However, because the Marine Corps uses the "best and fully qualified" criteria in nearly every selection board—both statutory and nonstatutory—the existing research done in these areas is still relevant to my thesis.

It is important to acknowledge that these studies focus on the record of the individual officer being screened, and their outcomes are based on the underlying assumption that the current processes used to inform the board accurately and holistically capture an officer's quality and value to the organization. Very few of these studies examine the processes and systems in place that influence how and why boards have certain outcomes. To supplement the significant gap in military literature, I use the profusion of academic literature to examine how civilian hiring processes and committees influence

hiring decisions, as well as the relationship between those who select organizational leaders, those who are selected, and organizational performance. My research blends existing military and academic research to provide insights into the processes by which the Marine Corps selects is lieutenant colonel commanders and the factors that might influence those selection outcomes.

A. MILITARY RESEARCH

There is an overwhelming presumption that the CSP is successful. Success in this context is defined as selecting the "best and most fully qualified" officers for command. Although there have been a few disapproving remarks made since the program's inception in 1992, Marine Corps leaders have continued to praise the fairness and effectiveness of the CSP, especially when compared to its "good ol' boy" predecessor (Dobson, 2008; Fetzer, 1999; Keenan, 2013; Krulak, 1996; Mundy Jr, 1992; Wilkins & Anderson, 1995). Whereas I fully support and embrace the CSP's intent and inherent virtue, I am, however, compelled to seek out the evidence supporting such enthusiastic claims.

1. Military Research Organizations

I am not able to find any relating studies by RAND Corporation or Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), which is unusual considering they are two organizations widely-used to conduct military-related research. However, the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC) released an Issue Paper in 2010 describing the dynamics inherent to both command and promotion selection processes within the military services (MLDC, 2010). Using a qualitative examination of the processes, they conclude that these processes attempt to maximize fairness while mitigating board member biases through guidance to the board, and through racial/ethnic and gender diversity of the board.

2. Command-Selection Studies

Marr is the first—and only—person to conduct a statistical analysis of the CSP (1997). Completed five years after the program was established, Marr's thesis examines whether or not the CSP is a better system of selecting lieutenant colonel commanders than previous methods used. He establishes and subsequently compares four separate groups

based on a specific characterization of pre- and post-board selections and develops seven measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to assess the comparisons using statistical tests. From his analysis, Marr ultimately finds that the CSP is achieving its purpose and should remain in place. He further concludes that the CSP is a "better" system according to two of his MOEs, "worse" according to two of his MOEs, and the other three MOEs show there is no statistically significant difference between the CSP and previous methods. Furthermore, due to the relative newness of the CSP, Marr acknowledges the need for further study when more data becomes available. However, I am unable to find similar quantitative studies to assess against Marr's findings. Though his study is dated, Marr provides analytical insight into the CSP's effectiveness as compared to previous command selection methods.

There is only one other study I find that directly assesses the effectiveness of the Marine Corps' CSP (Rideout, 2005). In his thesis, Rideout conducts a qualitative examination whether or not the CSP is the most effective process for screening and selecting lieutenant colonels and colonels for command. He uses summary promotion statistics from MMOA and qualitative results from surveys sent to general officers and past board members in his examination. Rideout subsequently concludes that the Marine Corps should continue using the CSP to select its commanders, as it is the most effective process and its program objectives remain valid. This study is qualitative in nature and provides no statistical analysis to support the author's claims. Although his omits any quantitative analysis, I include Rideout's study for two reasons: first, it is one of only two available studies pertaining directly to the CSP; and second, it reinforces my previous statements about the significant gap in this specific research area.

A few others have studied the processes by which their respective military services select commanders (Norris, 2013; Taylor, 2017; White, 2015). Norris' examination of the United States Army's command selection processes is the most analogous to my own research (Norris, 2013). In it, he suggests that "the Army does not select the best qualified officers to command … because it does not provide those who select commanders with all of the information necessary to make well-informed decisions" (Norris, 2013, p. 1). He further posits that the Army does not properly manage these officers selected for command. He provides a qualitative analysis of the Army's Centralized Selection List (CSL)—the

program that selects the Army's battalion and brigade commanders—by identifying three factors that contribute to the Army selecting subpar commanders: 1) poor personnel management resulting from DOPMA requirements; 2) shortfalls and limitations of the Officer Evaluation Report (similar in concept to USMC Fitness Reports); and 3) the selection board process and composition of the board members (p. 5–13). To remedy these deficiencies, Norris suggests: 1) the removal of command tour length requirements to decrease the need to select unqualified officers to fill command vacancies; 2) including interviews and 360-degree assessments to provide a more comprehensive picture of an officer; and 3) more effectively identifying relevant information during the board, and selecting board members that have either served in the units being slated for command or are familiar with the operations and culture of each. All three deficiencies and solutions are applicable to the Marine Corps' CSP. Though there are cultural, structural, and size differences between the Army and Marine Corps that affect our respective processes, Norris's work demonstrates the fundamental need to improve how the services select commanders.

3. Command-Related Studies

Though not exactly related to lieutenant colonel command selection, there have been a few studies relating to the topic of command selection in the Marine Corps (Gonzalez, 2011; Munoz, 2005). Munoz analyzes the formal selection process for RS Commanders that was implemented in 1996, and evaluates the effectiveness of the process against previous selection methods. He concludes that recruiting success is attributed to the formalized process, finding there is a decrease in the number of RS Commanders fired and an increase in selection of females and minorities. Furthermore, he finds there is a decrease in MOS diversity selection, and that graduate education is not a decisive factor in the selection process. Qualitatively, Munoz identifies three important skills of successful RS Commanders, they: 1) mentor and serve; 2) effectively communicate the correct message; and 3) trust the capabilities of their people. It is unclear from the analysis whether or not any of these results are statistically significant. This study is relevant to my thesis because officers selected as RS Commanders are also board-selected and have a higher probability of being selected for lieutenant colonel command. In fact, every year in the CSP precepts,

the Commandant specifically states that a successful tour with Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) should be viewed as a significant accomplishment because it demonstrates an ability to function in a highly competitive and highly pressured environment. Essentially, this assumes that if an officer qualifies for RS Command, they are inherently qualified for lieutenant colonel command as well.

Gonzalez examines the variables influencing promotion to lieutenant colonel and command selection rates for Aviation Maintenance Officers and Aviation Supply Officers in the Marine Corps. He finds that serving as a MALS XO, having a Meritorious Service Medal, and having above-average RO markings are positive indicators for selection to lieutenant colonel. He further finds that serving in combat is not statistically significant for promotion to lieutenant colonel, and not being PME complete and scoring below a first class PFT reduces the probability of promotion to lieutenant colonel. Additionally, Gonzalez finds that those typically selected to command have served as Operations Officers or Executive Officers, have above-average RO markings, and have at least one combat Fitness Report.

4. Promotion-Related Studies

As previously stated, the Marine Corps uses the "best and fully qualified" criteria in nearly every selection board, to include promotion and education boards. There is a vast body of research on factors influencing officer promotions and how the Marine Corps defines "quality officer." Though most of the studies find statistically significant positive correlation between promotion and variables depicting experience and performance (e.g., Fitness Report markings, physical fitness, and combat experience), the significance varies greatly by rank and military occupational specialty (Hoffman, 2008; Long, 1992; Rateike, 2017; Stolzenberg, 2017). This means that what a board deems important for one rank and/or specialty is not necessarily as important for another. It also indicates that subcultures in the Marine Corps have different values and perspective when it comes to officer quality. Furthermore, "quality officer" is primarily determined through performance measures such as higher education (PME), job experience, and awards; and officers who attain the rank

of lieutenant colonel have had a successful career and are therefore inherently quality officers (Rateike, 2017; Stolzenberg, 2017).

The outcomes of these studies as expected. The selection processes used to determine the "best and most fully qualified" officers are similarly structured, based on the same aggregate information (e.g., Fitness Reports and OMPF), and the phrase "best and most fully qualified" is itself ambiguous and subjective in nature. To date, these studies have placed the selection probabilities entirely on the officer being screened, providing little understanding of how and why the processes yield these outcomes. In this next portion, I explore academic research explaining the systematic dynamics of civilian hiring processes and those groups that charged with making those hiring decisions.

B. ACADEMIC RESEARCH

1. Impact of Hiring Committees

Those who make hiring decisions have a direct influence on selection outcomes (Morgan & Carley, 2014). Similar to the Marine Corps, many hiring and promotion decisions in the civilian sector are made by groups of decision makers, whether by a company's Board of Directors or hiring committee (Levy, 2007). The value and impact of group decision-making on hiring processes is well studied. Research shows that groups and committees make better hiring decisions because these groups provide greater experience, broader perspectives, and more diverse thought during the selection process (Alpern & Gal, 2009; Levy, 2007; Li, Rosen, & Suen, 2001; Marlowe, Schneider, & Nelson, 1996; Morgan & Carley, 2014; Stumpf & London, 1981). Groups are able to aggregate information that is not otherwise available to one person (Li et al., 2001). Additionally, groups can tend to be more fair and equitable toward those being screened than individuals (Stumpf & London, 1981). However, there are downsides to having these same groups.

Hiring committees have a propensity to use personal bias and experience as metrics for determining quality candidates (known as homophily and the "similar-to-me" effect) in their decision making processes (Dalessio & Imada, 1984; Frank & Hackman, 1975; Janis, 1982; Morgan & Carley, 2014; Rand & Wexley, 1975; B. Schneider, Goldstein, & Smith, 1995). This "similar-to-me" effect will be explained more thoroughly in the next section.

Depending on the motivations, some group members may manipulate their information to support their preferred selection outcomes (Levy, 2007; Li et al., 2001), and groups can also encourage uniformity and group think, especially when individuals within the group are similar and inclusion into the group is privileged (Janis, 1982; Morgan & Carley, 2014).

2. "Similar-To-Me" Effect

To paraphrase Warfighting, any principle or system that neglects the impact of the human dimension is inherently flawed (HQMC, 1997). This human dimension is inextricably linked to selection processes both in the Marine Corps and in the civilian sector and manifests itself through personal bias, imperfect information, and errors related to assessing that information. Throughout these processes, boards and committees continually assess a candidate's job fit (measured by past performance) and their fit within the organization (Kristof, 1996; Kristof-Brown, 2000; Rivera, 2012). Kristof asserts that while those involved in the hiring process often think they are assessing a candidate's fit within the organization, they are actually basing their assessments off of the candidate's similarity to themselves. Furthermore, selecting candidates similar to themselves is acceptable because those making the hiring decisions view themselves as successful and their values as being highly compatible with the organization's values (Kristof, 1996). This concept is further supported by Schneider's attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) model, Byrne's attraction paradigm model, and Frank and Hackman's 1975 seminal study, suggesting that interpersonal attraction influences hiring decisions because hiring decisions are interpersonal events (Frank & Hackman, 1975; Goldberg, 2005; B. Schneider et al., 1995). This attraction is commonly known as the "similar-to-me" effect.

Rand's study in 1975 examines the effects of biographical similarities, race of applicant, and the effect of an interviewer's attraction to the job applicant and the subsequent evaluation. He finds that "biographical similarity of interviewer and applicant led to higher ratings of the candidate's job suitability" and was perceived to be more intelligent, more knowledgeable, better adjusted, and better liked than biographically dissimilar job applicants (Rand & Wexley, 1975, p. 535). He also finds that a job applicant's race does not have a statistically significant effect, though highly prejudiced

interviewers rated all applicants as having lower job suitability regardless of race (Rand & Wexley, 1975). Another study finds that hiring decisions are affected more by the "degree of similarity between the interviewers' self-perception" of an ideal employee and the applicant than similarities between the applicant and the interviewer (Dalessio & Imada, 1984, p. 67). However, this study did not discuss how the interviewers arrived at the ideal employee; it is possible the ideal employee resembled the interviewers' perceived sense of self. There is also research showing the strong relationship between recruiter-applicant race similarities and weak relationship between age similarities on interview assessments and subsequent hiring decisions (Goldberg, 2005; Lin, Dobbins, & Farh, 1992), while recruiter-applicant gender dissimilarities have a significant effect (Goldberg, 2005). Lastly, although bias will always exist, studies show that the experience level of a hiring committee can mitigate the effect of those biases (Frank & Hackman, 1975; Marlowe et al., 1996). Another means to mitigate these biases would be to remove photos and personally identifiable information from applications; however, these actions have also shown to have unintended consequences and committees actually end up hiring less-diverse candidates (Behaghel, Crepon, & Le Barbanchon, 2015; Williams, Brooks, & Shmargad, 2018).

3. Impact of Board Composition

Diversity within a hiring committee or group influences how these groups select diverse candidates (Smith, Turner, Osei-Kofi, & Richards, 2004). This diversity can be race, gender, experience, and the like; but what about diversity of thought? The longer an employee is with an organization, the more they take on the characteristics and values of the organization as their own (Kristof, 1996). In the case of the senior officer selection boards, board members have been with the organization for at least two decades and may have subsumed organizational norms; as such, there might be less thought diversity than consciously realized. Moreover, groups are more prone to initially support a dissenting view as long as there is hope the dissenter will change his or her mind; however, if the dissenter remains steadfast, the group tends to exclude that individual to restore unity in the group (Janis, 1982). As such, groupthink has the potential to minimize the effects of more surface-level diversity such as gender, race, and experience. Many studies have shown that experience and backgrounds are still preferred with respect to board

membership, but organizations are now wanting members that bring new perspectives to the board (Siciliano, 1996).

Diverse groups also tend to value diverse candidates, whereas groups with similar attitudes and beliefs have difficulty accepting those candidates whose values differ from their own (Morgan & Carley, 2014). Morgan and Carley find that diverse groups feel less pressure to select those who look like them while committees that are similar have a difficult time selecting candidates from a diverse pool (Morgan & Carley, 2014). These results suggest that board composition, combined with an organization's focus on socialization, strongly impacts the number of candidates reviewed before being deciding on an acceptable candidate (Morgan & Carley, 2014).

Though not directly related to hiring committees, there is a vast amount of research examining the relationship between board composition—and human resource management practices writ large—and organizational performance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Huselid, Jackson, & Schuler, 1997; Morgan & Carley, 2014; Siciliano, 1996). Boards of Directors are analogous to selection boards in the sense that board members on the former choose senior leadership within organizations and also have a direct and holistic impact on the organization. Siciliano finds that board diversity enhances only certain types of organizational performance, whereas other studies find that overall board composition has no significant impact on organizational performance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Klein, 1998), though Klein does find that board structure significantly impacts performance (e.g., insider directors on board finance and investment committees). The results of these findings seem to intuitively contradict the impacts of diversity within decision-making groups; however, board composition is typically defined and studied under the context of internal and external directors, not diversity.

C. CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter provides a discussion of existing military and academic literature to provide insights into the processes by which the Marine Corps selects is lieutenant colonel commanders and factors that might influence those selection outcomes. In the next chapter, I discuss the data and methodology used in my analysis.

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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

> Decision-making requires both the situational awareness to recognize the essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution.
>
> —*MCDP 1 Warfighting*

My thesis focuses on how the Command Screening Program (CSP) selects lieutenant colonel commanders in the Marine Corps. I examine the mechanics of the CSP, the factors influencing selection outcomes, and the effects of board composition on those officers being screened for command. To answer my research questions, I organize my analysis along four lines of effort: quantitative data, survey results, board room observations, and comparisons with civilian organizations. Table 1 outlines the lines of effort (LOE) used to answer the respective research questions. This chapter provides a description of each line of effort, data sources, and the methodologies used in my analysis.

Table 1. Methodology Used for Analysis

Lines of Effort and Thesis Research Questions

	LOE 1	LOE 2	LOE 3	LOE 4
Primary Question *Does the USMC CSP select the best and most fully qualified eligible officers for LtCol command?*				
Secondary Question 1 *Does board composition influence selection outcomes?*	X	X	X	
Secondary Question 2 *Is there a correlation between voting iterations and performance in command?*	X			
Secondary Question 3 *How should the Marine Corps measure the effectiveness of the CSP?*		X	X	X

A. LINE OF EFFORT #1: FY15–FY19 LTCOL CSB DATA

1. Data Description

My quantitative data focuses on Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol) Command Selection Boards (CSB) between FY2015 and FY2019. To conduct my analysis, I use pooled cross-sectional data for both the board members and eligible officers who were screened on these

FY boards only (it does not include those from the eligible population who RBRd). The number of board member observations is 98, and there are 2838 eligible officer observations. Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of these observations.

Table 2. Observation Descriptive Statistics

Demographics Summary (FY15-FY19)

Eligible Officers (n = 2838)		**Board Members (n = 98)**	
Variable	**Mean**	**Variable**	**Mean**
Rank		***Rank***	
O4	0.403	O6 (Colonel)	0.888
O5	0.597	O7-O9 (Any General Officer)	0.112
PMOS Category		***AMOS Category****	
Ground Combat Arm	0.256	Ground Combat Arm	0.327
Combat Service Support	0.423	Combat Service Support	0.296
Aviation	0.321	Aviation	0.265
		General Officer	0.112
Time In Service (Yrs)	20.1	***Time In Service (Yrs)***	27.9
Gender		***Gender***	
Male	0.952	Male	0.939
Female	0.048	Female	0.061
Race		***Race***	
White	0.822	White	0.847
Non-White	0.178	Non-White	0.153
Assigned Unit		***Assigned Unit***	
Operating Forces	0.394	Operating Forces	0.459
Supporting Establishment	0.606	Supporting Establishment	0.541
STEM Degrees	0.175	***STEM Degrees***	0.143
Number of Deployments	4.3	***Number of Deployments***	5.1
Fitness		***Fitness***	
PFT 1st Class	0.895	PFT 1st Class	0.898
PFT Other	0.105	PFT Other	0.102
High PFT (>=285)	0.185	High PFT (>=285)	0.163
CFT 1st Class	0.894	CFT 1st Class	0.908
CFT Other	0.106	CFT Other	0.092
High CFT (>=285)	0.758	High CFT (>=285)	0.735
Marksmanship		***Marksmanship***	
Rifle Expert	0.769	Rifle Expert	0.765
Rifle Other	0.231	Rifle Other	0.194
Pistol Expert	0.649	Pistol Expert	0.796
Pistol Other	0.351	Pistol Other	0.204
Awards		***Awards***	
Meritorious Service Medal	0.755	Meritorious Service Medal	0.990
Bronze Star	0.210	Bronze Star	0.622
Recruiting Service Ribbon	0.076	Recruiting Service Ribbon	0.112

* Use the AMOS for board members because more similar to the eligible officer PMOS categories.

The quantitative datasets used in my analysis are compiled from three separate sources: personnel demographic data from Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW); Fitness Reports from Manpower Management Records and Performance Branch (MMRP)–30; and board records and voting results from Manpower Management Officer Assignments (MMOA)–3.

TFDW. TFDW is the Marine Corps' integrated data repository containing more than 30 years of historical manpower data (HQMC, 2019). Many of the independent variables I use in my thesis come from TFDW, including all demographic data for both the board members and those officers screened on the boards. For the purposes of my analysis, all TFDW data represents what existed on the date each respective board convened. The intent is to reconstruct what the board members see during the board.

MMRP-30. MMRP-30 processes and stores all Fitness Report data (HQMC, 2019). In the same manner used with TFDW, MMRP-30 provided me with de-identified Fitness Reports statistics of all board members and officers screened for command during the FY2015 and FY2019 LtCol CSBs. Using this data, I reconstruct the average cumulative Reporting Senior (RS) and Reviewing Officer (RO) values of each eligible officer at every rank. Additionally, I create the average cumulative RS and RO values for each eligible officer during their respective lieutenant colonel command tours. I use this data to compare board voting results and performance during command.

MMOA-3. MMOA-3 is responsible for administering the Command Screening Program and nearly all other Marine Officer boards (HQMC, 2019). MMOA-3 provided an extensive number of board documents and records. These documents contain the board planning documents, voting iterations, and selection outcomes of each board.

2. Methodology

I choose these datasets for multiple reasons. First, I use this data to examine the variables that influence selection outcomes. Second, much of the literature describes the impact of board composition on hiring selection outcomes. I use this data to examine the selection outcomes of the CSP by analyzing similarities between the selection committees and applicants, and the composition of the board itself. Third, the voting iterations provide

a rare insight into board room dynamics by illuminating how the board defines "best and most fully qualified" by means of their voting processes. Lastly, I use the Fitness Report data to not only examine the impact of performance on selection outcomes, but also as a retrospective comparison between the voting results (e.g., how the board viewed an officer) and how that officer performed while in command.

B. LINE OF EFFORT #2: SURVEY RESULTS

1. Data Description

My primary source of qualitative data includes online survey responses from active duty Marine officers who have been board members on the LtCol CSB. Those surveyed span boards ranging from FY2006 to FY2019. The purpose of the survey is to collect feedback on the LtCol CSB by focusing on the experience and perspective of the board members, the board processes, and existing measures of effectiveness. I categorize the survey into six sections: board member demographics, board member experience, board member perspective, board composition, CSP measures of effectiveness, and board member final thoughts. The number of questions range from 26 to 44 depending on the number of boards on which the officer has been a board member. I identify key themes throughout the responses, use those themes to answer my research questions, and provide insight on board member perspectives and board room dynamics.

Out of the total survey population of 114, there are a total of 29 survey respondents. The survey results show that 39 respondents took the survey. It records this number using the number of participants who opened the link. However, because only 29 respondents provided actual responses to the questions, I drop 10 of the respondents from the survey analysis. Table 3 provides the survey respondent summary statistics. Furthermore, I do not provide a statistical analysis of the results due to the small sample size. I only provide summary statistics of the responses, and discuss any trends in the comments.

Table 3. Summary Statistics of Survey Respondents

Survey Respondent Demographics

	Number of Respondents	% of Total Respondents
Gender		
Male	28	96.55%
Female	1	3.45%
Current Rank		
Colonel	17	58.62%
Brigadier General	8	27.59%
Major General	1	3.45%
Lieutenant General	3	10.34%
Original PMOS		
0180	1	3.45%
0202	1	3.45%
0302	7	24.14%
0370	1	3.45%
0402	3	10.34%
0802	2	6.90%
1302	2	6.90%
4402	2	6.90%
7532	2	6.90%
7557	1	3.45%
7562	2	6.90%
7565	1	3.45%
7566	1	3.45%
8003	1	3.45%
8040	1	3.45%
8041	1	3.45%

Survey Respondent Board Experience

	Number of Respondents	% of Total Respondents
Number of Times a LtCol CSB Board Member		
1	21	72.41%
2	5	17.24%
3	2	6.90%
5+	1	3.45%
Number of Times Any USMC Board Board Member		
1	6	20.69%
2	7	24.14%
3	6	20.69%
4	2	6.90%
5	4	13.79%
7	2	6.90%
15	1	3.45%
40	1	3.45%
Was LtCol CSB Your First Board Member Experience?		
Yes	10	34.48%
No	19	65.52%
Level of O6 Command Experience on First LtCol CSB		
O6 Cmd Not Slated	1	3.45%
O6 Cmd In Progress	17	58.62%
O6 Cmd Completed	11	37.93%

2. Methodology

I use the survey to explore how board members view the Command Screening Program. The board members provide a unique and invaluable perspective on the CSP, as they are the rare few Marines who have not only directly participated in the CSP but are also outcomes of it. As academic literature suggests, the experiences and biases of board members impact the hiring selection outcomes. In this survey, past board members share their perspectives on how they define "best and most fully qualified" for command, what defines a successful command tour, and their thoughts and recommendations on the CSP writ large.

C. LINE OF EFFORT #3: FY19 CSB OBSERVATIONS

1. Data Description

I was afforded the opportunity to observe the first week of the FY2019 Lieutenant Colonel Command Selection Board. The board was comprised of 19 Board Members, 2 General Officers and 17 Colonels. During this time, I observed board room dynamics and discussions between board members, in addition to information used in case preparation, voting iterations, and selection outcomes for multiple MOS sub-boards. I observed ground MOS sub-boards only, to include both combat arms and combat service support MOSs. Because I was only present for the first week of the board, I cannot speak to the subsequent weeks. I use my board room observations to develop my perspectives and recommendations presented in this thesis.

2. Methodology

The command selection board is highly secretive due to the sensitivity and significance of the board outcomes. Other than what is briefed during the MMOA Roadshow and/or discussions with previous board members, not much is known about the board process and board room dynamics. I use my board observations to gain a firsthand understanding of the board process and interactions between board members. To maintain integrity of the board, I only provide general observations about what I saw and heard. I use my observations of the process and board room dynamics to develop my perspectives and recommendations presented in this thesis.

D. LINE OF EFFORT #4: CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS

1. Data Description

Amazon. As part of the September 2018 NPS Internship Program, I spent one week with Amazon Human Resource personnel to learn how Amazon hires its people; specifically, to learn how Amazon hires its mid-level managers with military experience. Furthermore, I spent a preponderance of my time in discussion with senior- and mid-level military recruiting teams to gain an understanding of their hiring processes, and what they look for during their screening processes.

Seattle Seahawks. In November 2018, I had the opportunity to speak with Seattle Seahawks General Manager (GM) John Schneider regarding their processes for hiring their coaches, athletes, and support personnel. The conversation was approximately 30 minutes in duration and was conducted via telephone. Additionally, I supplement the conversation with the book written by Seattle Seahawks Head Coach Pete Carroll titled "Win Forever."

2. Methodology

Amazon. The Marine Corps Operating Concept describes the need for Marines who can think creatively and provide adaptive solutions in a complex environment (Neller, 2016). Amazon wants and needs the same kinds of people (Amazon, 2019). More importantly, Amazon attracts these kinds of people. I use my Amazon internship experience to compare Amazon's hiring processes and organizational values with those of the CSP.

Seahawks. The Commandant's guidance to the FY2019 LtCol CSB Board President was to "choose the best athlete" for command (heard during FY2019 LtCol CSB observations). The purpose behind this conversation was to gain insight into how a professional athletic organization—well-known for turning low-level and/or undrafted players into dominant athletes in their respective positions—selects its players and coaches to enable consistent dominant team performances from year to year. As with Amazon, I use this discussion with GM Schneider and Coach Carroll's book to compare the hiring processes and organizational values with those of the Marine Corps and how these influence their hiring decisions.

E. ECONOMETRIC MODELS

I use two multivariate regression models in my analysis as part of LOE #1: Logistic Regression and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). I use these models to determine the relationships between 1) personnel data and officers that are selected for command, 2) board composition and those selected for command, and 3) board voting iterations and an officer's performance while in command. These models demonstrate how certain variables influence the outcome of those selected for lieutenant colonel command. These variables include data on both the board members and the eligible officers screened for command,

and range from demographic data and experience to Fitness Reports and unit history. I discuss these models below.

1. Logistic Regression Model

$$G(z) = \frac{\exp(z)}{[1 + \exp(z)]}$$

Logistic regression models are appropriate when the outcome is binary (Wooldridge, 2016). As such, I use logistic regression models for most of my analysis because the desired outcome is whether or not an officer is selected or selected to a certain command type. However, because only the direction of the coefficients can be interpreted in logistic regression models, I use odds ratios to discuss the magnitude of the effect that the independent variables have on the dependent variables.

Odds ratios are always interpreted in relation to 1. If the odds ratio is greater than 1, an event is more likely to occur. If the odds ratio is less than 1, an event is less likely to occur. If the odds ratio equals 1, the event is equally as likely to occur. The following is an example of a Logistic Regression model used in my analysis (I only include one example for brevity):

$$\text{P(Primary Selection)} = G\,(\,\beta_0 + \beta_1(Performance) + \beta_2\big(Demographics\big) + \beta_3(Career) + \beta_4(PMOS\ Categories) + \beta_5(Training\ and\ Education) + \beta_6(Awards)\,)$$

By controlling for these specific factors—performance, demographics, etc.—I am able to examine the how these factors influence an eligible officer's odds of being selected to a specific outcome.

2. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Model

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \ \beta_3 x_3 + \cdots + \ \beta_k x_k + \ \varepsilon$$

OLS models are appropriate when looking at the linear relationship between variables. I use the OLS model when estimating the relationship between voting iterations and an officer's performance in command. The estimates (β) are interpreted as the effect on Y from a one unit change of x. The following is an example of my OLS model:

$$\text{LtCol Performance} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(Number\ of\ Voting\ Iterations) + \beta_2(Control\ Variables)$$

In this particular model, the coefficient of interest is β_1, which depicts the relationship between the number of board voting iterations used to select an officer as a Primary and how that officer performs while in lieutenant colonel command. If there is a relationship, I expect a negative value on this coefficient because the highest-performing officers are typically selected in earliest voting iterations.

F. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION

1. Dependent Variables

The dependent variables change in the models depending on the specific research questions I am answering in my analysis. The selection outcomes and command type outcomes are binary variables, and the performance outcomes are continuous. Table 4 is list of the dependent variables used in all of the models in my analysis, followed by a brief description of each.

Table 4. List of Dependent Variables Used in Analysis

Dependent Variables In Analysis	
Selection Outcomes	
Variable Name	**Variable Value**
EO_TotalSel	= 1 if ElgOff Selected as Primary or Alternate, = 0 Otherwise
EO_SelPri	= 1 if ElgOff Selected for Command as Primary, = 0 Otherwise
EO_SelAlt	= 1 if ElgOff Selected for Command as Alternate, = 0 Otherwise
Command Type Outcomes	
Variable Name	**Variable Value**
EO_SltCmd_PRIMARYTOTAL	= 1 if ElgOff Command Slated to a Primary MOS Command, = 0 Otherwise
EO_SltCmd_STRUNGTOTAL	= 1 if ElgOff Slated to any Strung Command, = 0 Otherwise
EO_SltCmd_OPFOR	= 1 if ElgOff Slated to any Operational Forces Command, = 0 Otherwise
EO_SltCmd_SPTEST	= 1 if ElgOff Slated to any Supporting Establishment Command, = 0 Otherwise
CmdType_PMOS_OPFOR	= 1 if ElgOff Command Slated to a Primary MOS Command in the OpFor, = 0 Otherwise
CmdType_PMOS_SPTEST	= 1 if ElgOff Command Slated to a Primary MOS Command in the SptEst, = 0 Otherwise
CmdType_Strung_OPFOR	= 1 if ElgOff Slated to any Strung Command in the OpFor, = 0 Otherwise
CmdType_Strung_SPTEST	= 1 if ElgOff Slated to any Strung Command in the SptEst, = 0 Otherwise
LtCol Command Performance	
Variable Name	**Variable Value**
pctLtCol_RS_RV_Cum	ElgOff Average FitRep RS Cumulative Value while in LtCol Command
pctLtCol_RO_CV_Cum	ElgOff Average FitRep RO Cumulative Value while in LtCol Command

Selection Outcomes. All three of these variables indicate whether or not an officer is selected for command by the board. MMOA-3 provided the data for the Primary and Alternate selection outcomes as part of the board results for the sample. I create the Total Select variable to represent if an officer is selected as either a Primary or an Alternate.

Command Type Outcomes. These indicator variables are created from the command slating data provided by MMOA-3 as part of the board results. To create these variables, I first categorize each board-slated command into four distinct indicator variables: Primary MOS (PMOS), Strung, Operational Forces (OPFOR), and Supporting Establishment (SPTEST). I then interact those four distinct indicator variables to create four interacted command-type indicator variables as shown in Table 4. The results of the analysis using the four interacted command types are listed in the main body of this thesis. The results using the four distinct indicator variables are in Appendix E.

LtCol Command Performance Outcomes. These two variables are continuous and represent the average Reporting Senior (RS) and Reviewing Officer (RO) cumulative values of each officer's Fitness Reports (FitRep) while in lieutenant colonel command. MMRP-30 sent me every FitRep of all officers included in this sample. I delete all FitReps that are not identified as being in a slated lieutenant colonel command billet using the billet description and unit description of each FitRep. I then calculate both the RS and RO mean cumulative values for each officer during his or her command billet and use each of those mean values in my analysis.

2. Independent Variables

Table 5 is a list of the independent variables used in all of my models. Table 6 is the list of all of the additional variables added to my models when assessing whether or not the board members select eligible officers that are similar to them. Table 7 is a list of the independent variables added to my models when looking at the relationship between voting iterations and performance in command. A description of the variables follows each table.

Table 5. Independent Variables Used in All Models

Independent Variables Used In Analysis

Fiscal Year Board

Variable Name	**Variable Value**
fy_board_Num	Depicts the Fiscal Year during which the Selection Board Convened

Demographics

Variable Name	**Variable Value**
EO_Female	= 1 if ElgOff is a Female, = 0 if Male
EO_Maj	= 1 if ElgOff is Major, = 0 if LtCol
EO_RaceNotWhite	= 1 if ElgOff Race is Not White, = 0 if Race is White

Career

Variable Name	**Variable Value**
EO_TIS_Num	ElgOff Time In Service
EO_dep	ElgOff Number of Deployments
EO_SptEstUnit	= 1 if ElgOff Assigned to a SptEst Unit, = 0 if OpFor Unit

PMOS Categories

Variable Name	**Variable Value**
EO_AviationPMOS	= 1 if ElgOff has Aviation PMOS, = 0 Otherwise
EO_GndCmbtPMOS	= 1 if ElgOff has Ground Combat Arm PMOS, = 0 Otherwise
EO_CSSPMOS	= 1 if ElgOff has Combat Service Support PMOS, = 0 Otherwise

Training & Education

Variable Name	**Variable Value**
EO_STEMDeg	= 1 if ElgOff has STEM Degree, = 0 Otherwise
EO_PFTOther	= 1 if ElgOff does not have a 1stClass PFT, = 0 if has a 1stClass PFT
EO_HighPFT	= 1 if ElgOff PFT Score >= 285, = 0 Otherwise
EO_CFTOther	= 1 if ElgOff does not have a 1stClass CFT, = 0 Otherwise
EO_HighCFT	= 1 if ElgOff CFT Score >= 285, = 0 Otherwise
EO_rifle_Other	= 1 if ElgOff does not have a Expert Rifle, = 0 if is an Expert Rifle
EO_pistol_Other	= 1 if ElgOff does not have a Expert Pistol, = 0 if is an Expert Pistol

Awards

Variable Name	**Variable Value**
EO_awards_MSM	= 1 if ElgOff received MSM, = 0 Otherwise
EO_awards_BZSTR	= 1 if ElgOff received Bronze Star, = 0 Otherwise
EO_awards_MCRC	= 1 if ElgOff received Recruiting Ribbon, = 0 Otherwise

Performance

Variable Name	**Variable Value**
pctCapt_RS_RV_Cum	ElgOff Average FitRep RS Cumulative Value as a Captain
pctMajor_RS_RV_Cum	ElgOff Average FitRep RS Cumulative Value as a Major

Fiscal Year Board. This categorical variable is provided by MMOA-3 and depicts the fiscal year for which each eligible officer was screened by respective board members.

Demographics. These variables are from the data provided by TFDW. I create the indictor variables Female, Major, and Race to represent the gender of the eligible officers in the sample, their rank at the time of the board, and whether or not they are white.

Career. Time in Service and Number of Deployments are both continuous variables provided by TFDW. I create the Supporting Establishment indicator variable to depict whether or not the eligible officer is assigned to a supporting establishment unit at the time of the board. To create this variable, I categorize all supporting establishment units using the unit description as provided by TFDW.

PMOS Categories. I create these indicator variables using the Primary Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) of each eligible officer. For simplicity, I separate all MOSs into three categories: Ground Combat Arms (03XX, 08XX, 18XX), Combat Service Support (01XX, 02XX, 04XX, 06XX, 13XX, 30XX, 34XX, 43XX, 44XX, 45XX, 58XX), and Aviation (60XX, 66XX, 72XX, 73XX, 75XX).

Training and Education. These variables are created using the data provided by TFDW. STEM Degree is an indicator variables that includes any degree description that contains words such as “engineering,” “mathematics,” or one of the sciences. Additionally, this variable includes any officer that graduated from one of the military academies. (Of note, I cannot use PME because many observations are missing this data.) The PFT and CFT variables are indicator variables, as are the Rifle and Pistol variables. Both PFT Other and CFT Other include 2nd Class, 3rd Class, Fails, and any waivers such as medical or deployment. Rifle Other and Pistol Other include Sharpshooter and Marksman classes.

Awards. The three indicator variables for awards are created using the TFDW data. These variables indicate whether or not an officer has these awards, not the number of each award an officer may have.

Performance. These two continuous variables are created using the FitRep data provided by MMRP-30. To create these variables, I calculate the mean RS cumulative values for every FitRep each eligible officer has at both the ranks of captain and major.

Table 6. Additional Independent Variables Used to Analyze Similarities between Board Members and Eligible Officers

Independent Variables In Analysis

Gender

Variable Name	Variable Value
BM_Female	= 1 if Board Member/Briefer is a Female, = 0 if Male
pctBM_Female	Percent of the Board that is Female
EOBM_Female_FF	Interaction between Female ElgOff and Female Briefer
EOBM_Female_FpctF	Interaction between Female ElgOff and Percent of the Board that is Female

Race

Variable Name	Variable Value
Coll_BM_OtherRace	= 1 if Board Member/Briefer is Not White, = 0 if White
pctColl_BM_OtherRace	Percent of the Board that is Not White
EOBM_Race_nWnW	Interaction between Non-White ElgOff and Non-White Briefer
EOBM_Race_nWpctNW	Interaction between Non-White ElgOff and Percent of Board that is Not White

MOS Categories

Variable Name	Variable Value
BM_Col_GndCmbtAMOS1	= 1 if Board Member/Briefer has Ground Combat Arm AMOS1, = 0 Otherwise
BM_Col_CSSAMOS1	= 1 if Board Member/Briefer has Combat Service Support AMOS1, = 0 Otherwise
BM_Col_AvtnAMOS1	= 1 if Board Member/Briefer has Aviation AMOS1, = 0 Otherwise
BM_GenOffPMOS	= 1 if Board Member/Briefer has General Officer PMOS, = 0 Otherwise
pctBM_Col_GndCmbtAMOS1	Percent of the Board that is Ground Combat Arm AMOS1
pctBM_Col_CSSAMOS1	Percent of the Board that is Combat Service Support AMOS1
pctBM_Col_AvtnAMOS1	Percent of the Board that is Aviation AMOS1
pctColl_BM_GO	Percent of the Board that is General Officer PMOS
EOBM_MOS_GndCS	Interaction between Ground Combat PMOS ElgOff and CSS AMOS1 Briefer
EOBM_MOS_GndA	Interaction between Ground Combat PMOS ElgOff and Aviation AMOS1 Briefer
EOBM_MOS_GndGO	Interaction between Ground Combat PMOS ElgOff and GenOff PMOS Briefer
EOBM_MOS_CSGnd	Interaction between CSS PMOS ElgOff and Ground Combat AMOS1 Briefer
EOBM_MOS_CSCS	Interaction between CSS PMOS ElgOff and CSS AMOS1 Briefer
EOBM_MOS_CSA	Interaction between CSS PMOS ElgOff and Aviation AMOS1 Briefer
EOBM_MOS_CSGO	Interaction between CSS PMOS ElgOff and GenOff PMOS Briefer
EOBM_MOS_AGnd	Interaction between Aviation PMOS ElgOff and Ground Combat AMOS1 Briefer
EOBM_MOS_ACS	Interaction between Aviation PMOS ElgOff and CSS AMOS1 Briefer
EOBM_MOS_AA	Interaction between Aviation PMOS ElgOff and Aviation AMOS1 Briefer
EOBM_MOS_AGO	Interaction between Aviation PMOS ElgOff and GenOff PMOS Briefer
EOBM_MOS_GndpctCS	Interaction between Ground Combat PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board that CSS AMOS1
EOBM_MOS_GndpctA	Interaction between Ground Combat PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board that Aviation AMOS1
EOBM_MOS_GndpctGO	Interaction between Ground Combat PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board that General Officer PMOS
EOBM_MOS_CSpctGnd	Interaction between CSS PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board Ground Combat AMOS1
EOBM_MOS_CSpctCS	Interaction between CSS PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board CSS AMOS1
EOBM_MOS_CSpctA	Interaction between CSS PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board Aviation AMOS1
EOBM_MOS_CSpctGO	Interaction between CSS PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board GenOff PMOS
EOBM_MOS_ApctGnd	Interaction between Aviation PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board Ground Combat AMOS1
EOBM_MOS_ApctCS	Interaction between Aviation PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board CSS AMOS1
EOBM_MOS_ApctA	Interaction between Aviation PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board Aviation AMOS1
EOBM_MOS_ApctGO	Interaction between Aviation PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board GenOff PMOS

Physical Fitness

Variable Name	Variable Value
BM_HighPFT	= 1 if Board Member/Briefer PFT Score >= 285, = 0 Otherwise
pctBM_HighPFT	Percent of the Board that has a High PFT
EOBM_PFT_HH	Interaction betweeen High PFT ElgOff and High PFT Briefer
EOBM_PFT_HpctH	Interaction between High PFT ElgOff and Percent of Board that is High PFT
Coll_BM_PFTOther	= 1 if Board Member/Briefer does not have a 1stClass PFT, = 0 if has a 1stClass PFT
pctColl_BM_PFTOther	Percent of the Board that does not have a 1stClass PFT
EOBM_PFT_OO	Interaction betweeen PFT Other ElgOff and PFT Other Briefer
EOBM_PFT_OpctO	Interaction between PFT Other ElgOff and Percent of Board that is PFT Other

Deployments

Variable Name	Variable Value
BM_dep	Board Member/Briefer Number of Deployments
pctBM_dep	Percent of the Board Number of Deployments
EOBM_Dep	Interaction betweeen ElgOff Deployments and Briefer Deployments
EOBM_pctDep	Interaction between ElgOff Deployments and Percent of Board Deployments

STEM Degrees

Variable Name	Variable Value
BM_STEMDeg	= 1 if Board Member/Briefer has STEM Degree, = 0 Otherwise
pctBM_STEMDeg	Percent of the Board with STEM Degrees
EOBM_STEMDeg	Interaction betweeen ElgOff STEM Degree and Briefer STEM Degree
EOBM_pctSTEMDeg	Interaction between ElgOff STEM Degree and Percent of Board STEM Degree

Table 7. Additional Independent Variables Used to Analyze Relationship between Voting Iterations and Command Performance

Independent Variables In Analysis	
Board Member Number	
Variable Name	**Variable Value**
bm_number_Num	Number assigned to each board member
Voting Iterations	
Variable Name	**Variable Value**
countPri	Total number of voting iterations to result in selection as Primary
VI1_Primary	= 1 if ElgOff selected as a Primary in the first voting iteration, = 0 Otherwise
Performance	
Variable Name	**Variable Value**
pctCapt_RS_RV_Cum	ElgOff Average FitRep RS Cumulative Value as a Captain
pctMajor_RS_RV_Cum	ElgOff Average FitRep RS Cumulative Value as a Major

Board Member Number. I create this categorical variable using the board results and board documentation provided by MMOA-3. As described in Chapter II, board members are assigned their board numbers in accordance with rank superiority. The board precepts list the board member names but not the assigned numbers. Therefore, I assign the board member numbers to each board member using the FY2019 board precepts and my board observations regarding how the board members were seated within the board room as a guideline.

Voting Iterations. Both of these independent variables are created using the board result data provided by MMOA-3. Count is a continuous variable that represents the number of times the board voted on an eligible officer to select him or her as a Primary. This number aggregates the sub-boards in which each eligible officer appeared, as applicable. I do not analyze by specific sub-boards because the sub-boards and voting structures vary each year as the Board President directs. As such, this variable counts only the number of voting iterations in a which an eligible officer appeared, not the number of votes in each voting iteration and is not specific to any sub-board. The second variable represents whether or not an eligible officer was selected as a Primary in the first voting iteration vice any other voting iteration.

Performance. These continuous variables are created using the FitRep data provided by MMRP-30. To create these variables, I calculate the mean RS cumulative values for every FitRep an eligible officer has at both the ranks of captain and major.

G. CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter provides a discussion of the four lines of effort used to answer my primary and secondary research questions. Additionally, I provide a description of my data sources, the two models used in my analysis, and a detailed description of the variables included in all of my models. In the next chapter, I present my analysis and findings.

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V. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

> Any doctrine which attempts to reduce warfare to ratios of forces, weapons, and equipment neglects the impact of the human will on the conduct of war and is inherently flawed.
>
> —*MCDP 1 Warfighting*

The Marine Corps champions the idiom "situationally dependent." Whether in combat or in academic analysis, an outcome always depends on the specific variables included in the situation or model. When presenting my analysis and findings, my intent is not to convince the reader that my methods and outcomes are absolute. Rather, my intent is to cause the reader to think about and better understand the situational dynamics influencing CSP outcomes and determine if the Marine Corps can—or should—improve its processes.

As stated in the previous chapter, I use four lines of effort to answer my research questions. This chapter is organized to provide a sequential analysis of each research question using the applicable lines of effort. I find that I cannot currently conclude whether or not the CSP is meeting its intent and selecting the best and most fully qualified eligible officers for command. Instead, I do find that board members generally agree on what defines the phrase "best and most fully qualified," and what constitutes a successful command tour. Furthermore, I find that the board is much more conclusive when selecting Primaries than Alternates, and what matters for selection varies by Command Type and even across time in some cases. The findings also show that on average commanders perform well in their billet regardless of when they were selected by the board. Lastly, I find that the briefer experience and board composition in many cases do not statistically matter; however, board members believe that certain variables with respect to board composition have the ability to impact the selection outcomes.

A. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION

Does the USMC Command Screening Program select the best and most fully qualified eligible officers for LtCol Command? I cannot answer this question. But before

discarding this thesis, first consider that the Marine Corps cannot answer this question either. There is simply no data available or evaluation metric in place to definitively answer this question. This fact is a definitive statement in itself.

To reiterate, the board members understand the importance of their position and have selected a number of phenomenal lieutenant colonel commanders using the current process. I would prefer to emphatically state that the Marine Corps does, in fact, select the best and most fully qualified eligible officer for command. Moreover, I would like to prove the CSP merits of selecting outstanding lieutenant colonel commanders time and again. I just cannot back up any statement with data. As such, I use my additional lines of effort to examine what board members think about the CSP while also comparing the hiring practices of civilian organizations against the Marine Corps' command screening process.

(1) Observations from Past Board Members

Best and Most Fully Qualified. This phrase—"best and most fully qualified"—is not only ambiguous, but it is also used as selection criteria for almost every Marine Corps board. As such, I ask the survey respondents to define what this phrase means to them in the context of the CSP.

Many respondents explicitly state that measures of past performance are used for predicting future success in command. "Best" is most commonly defined by two elements found in Fitness Reports: 1) some sustained level of performance, and 2) demonstrated leadership. Of significance though, "best" is comparatively defined and is relative to an officer's peer group being considered. "Most fully" is often referred to as having the necessary experience and key billets held throughout an officer's career.

Whereas most board members agree on the need for experience, there are minor—yet significant—differences in what constitutes necessary experience. Some board members believe an officer should have well-rounded experiences across the MAGTF, HQMC, and Supporting Establishments; others state it is more important that an officer displays strong performance in "key billets within their primary MOS." Of note, these differences of opinion exist within MOSs and across MAGTF elements. In addition to performance and leadership, a few board members speak to an officer's intangible qualities

such as having “institutional vision” and “character,” and being “morally and ethically sound” as necessary attributes of being best qualified for command.

One survey respondent provides a particularly thorough response that captures the sentiments of many of the other respondents:

> By a careful and deliberate screening of the member’s OMPF and any additional information submitted, that the record clearly and consistently demonstrated, consistently throughout his/her career that they have demonstrated through observed leadership and billets held that they have the necessary experience, performance and demonstrated proclivity to command marines and sailors at the O5 level. The essence of best and most fully qualified is measured as a comparison to officers of similar grade and experience.

Top Three Criteria for Command Selection. Next, I ask the survey respondents to provide their top three criteria for selecting an officer for command. Though many of the answers are similar to the previous question (e.g., “experience” and “performance”), there is substantial variation in how these terms are described and valued. The variation in these responses provides insights into the differences between what board members value and how they determine what defines “best and most fully qualified” for command.

Some board members use specific definitions of performance to describe their criteria. For example, one board member lists the top three criteria as such: “1) overall performance; 2) performance in previous command billets; and 3) performance in key billets that highlights leadership potential (OPFOR, HQMC, Special Duty, Supporting Establishment).” Another board member lists: “1) performance in other command (Company Command, Det OIC, RS CO, etc.) or command-like positions (SPC at TBS, OCS, etc.); 2) performance in combat and deployed assignments; and 3) performance in MOS assignments.”

Additionally, there are themes throughout these responses, including: an officer’s leadership, RS/RO command recommendations, strength of billet assignments, and MOS credibility. A few board members also provide a couple of unique responses that include an officer’s “appearance,” “exceptional performance in basics (PFT, CFT, PME, MCMAP,

etc.)," and "Time in grade." However, there are responses from two separate board members that stand out amongst the others. They are as follows:

> "1. High scores on profiles based on those who rated them I know."

> "3. Recommendations from previous commanders and the credibility of those commanders in the board room. Most Colonels know most Colonels and their reputation. If they are known and have a good reputation, their recommendation goes a long way."

These two responses might give merit to the idea that those sitting on the board, in addition to the strength of an eligible officer's record, influence board selection outcomes.

A Successful Command Tour. A successful command tour can be characterized by a myriad of factors depending on the type of command. As such, I ask the survey participants to define what it means for an officer to have a successful lieutenant colonel command tour.

On average, many respondents define success as a commander's ability to consistently accomplish the unit's mission, improve readiness, establish a healthy command climate, and take care of the Marines and gear under his or her charge. Additionally, some respondents define success as comparatively better than something else. For example, a few respondents state success is "leaving a unit in a better place" or "both the organization and CO emerge from the experience better than when the command tour began." Moreover, some respondents add that "a change of command ceremony (not a relief)" is a sign of a successful command tour. Furthermore, a few respondents add that servant leadership, good retention, solid morale, and notable safety and force preservation results are also good indicators of a successful command tour.

Promotion versus Command. Warfighting states that the Marine Corps should recognize "those officers who are best suited to command assignments and those who are best suited to staff assignments—without penalizing one or the other by so recognizing" (HQMC, 1997, p. 64). The command screening board is structured to mirror the promotion boards. Though many qualities of command and promotion overlap, I am interested in knowing how the board perceives the two. As such, I ask the survey respondents to provide their thoughts regarding the similarities and differences between promotion and command

criterion and the institutional emphasis placed on both. Table 8 provides the response rates to those survey questions.

Table 8. Survey Responses

Survey Responses Regarding Promotion and Command

Survey Questions: Perspective	Agree	(%)	Disagree	(%)
The criteria used to promote an officer to LtCol is necessary for selecting an officer for LtCol Command	27	93.10%	2	6.90%
The criteria used to promote an officer to LtCol is sufficent for selecting an officer for LtCol Command	10	34.48%	19	65.52%
Officers selected for promotion are best qualified for selection to command	15	51.72%	14	48.28%
Officers selected for promotion are fully qualified for selection to command	12	41.38%	17	58.62%
Officers that have held prior command billets are more qualified for LtCol command than those that have not	18	62.07%	11	37.93%
Officers that have only held staff billets are successful LtCol commanders	12	41.38%	16	55.17%
Officers that have held command positions are better officers than those that have not	2	6.90%	27	93.10%
The Marine Corps appropriately values command billets	28	96.55%	1	3.45%
The Marine Corps appropriately values staff billets	22	75.86%	7	24.14%

A majority of the board members believe that the criteria used for promotion is necessary for command selection but only a third of the respondents agree that the same criteria is sufficient for command selection. Moreover, the respondents do not agree on whether or not those officers selected for promotion are best and fully qualified for command. Of further interest, the variations in responses regarding staff and command billets indicate that while board members understand the value of each billet, there is disagreement about how each qualifies an officer for command.

One respondent summarizes promotion and command criteria as such:

> Competition for promotion is across all eligible officers in grade, regardless of MOS. The aggregate is what is under consideration. Competition for command is largely within your respective MOS population. This places a premium on documented performance within their primary MOS key billets. Break out performance is critical. The level of depth of talent drives us this direction. For example, an officer who does well in HQMC staff jobs but did not break out in their MOS key billets tends to not compete as favorably as someone who does extremely well within their MOS billets.

The responses to these questions provide insight to not only how some board members view officer quality and career paths, but also how the Marine Corps might view them as well. Whereas the responses to the questions are interesting, more research is required before providing any valid conclusions on the differences and similarities between

the command and promotion processes and the variables impacting the selection outcomes of each.

Because I cannot answer my primary research question with data, this section is designed to provide insight into what past board members think about the CSP and the factors that influence selection outcomes. In the next section, I discuss the CSP in terms of hiring processes and how it compares and contrasts with methods civilian organizations employ when selecting their people.

(2) Civilian Comparison

The CSP is analogous to the resume portion of most civilian firms' initial hiring processes. The significant difference is the CSP already has the eligible officer resumes by default, whereas with civilian firms, applicants are required to submit them for screening. Civilian firm recruiters then screen the applications and select which applicants should be considered for further review and interviews (Bock, 2015). Most firms then personally interview the selected applicants to assess whether or not they are a good fit with the firm (Arvey & Campion, 1982). In contrast, the Marine Corps "hires" commanders directly from the resume.

Personnel economics describes applications in terms of signaling and self-selection. The inherent challenges with applications is that both the right and the wrong type of applicants apply, and the hiring committee is at a disadvantage to distinguish between the two types due to asymmetric information (Lazear & Gibbs, 2014). Hiring committees can overcome this challenge through signaling, meaning that high-quality individuals can separate themselves from the low quality by incurring some costs that the low-quality individuals are unwilling to incur (Lazear & Gibbs, 2014). Furthermore, those who are willing to incur those costs self-select into the application process, while those who are either unqualified or unwilling to incur the costs self-select out. Signaling and screening are most likely to be beneficial in jobs where "small differences between candidates, including intangibles such as drive, confidence, or interpersonal skills, may lead to large differences in effectiveness on the job." (Lazear & Gibbs, 2014, p. 32). In the same way,

the CSP would benefit from signaling and screening because the board members would only be preparing and briefing competitive eligible officer packages.

Most civilian hiring processes start with an application (Bock, 2015; Lazear & Gibbs, 2014). In fact, most Marine Corps selection processes start with an application as well. Consider the following examples. The Marine Corps requires prospective officers to apply to Officer Candidate School. Lance Corporals and Sergeants are required to submit application packages for Marine of the Quarter and Noncommissioned Officer of the Quarter, respectively. Marines who desire to be schoolhouse instructors must submit an application package for consideration. The list could easily go on.[6] Additionally, Marine Corps applications often require more than resumes, they can also include personal essays and chain of command recommendations. The Marine Corps—like most civilian firms—requires applications not because resumes are unnecessary, but because they are insufficient for assessing a Marine's preparation, commitment, and desire. In short, the Marine Corps incorporates applications when it wants see how badly a Marine wants something. Except when it comes to command.

As discussed in Chapter II, board members currently use three official inputs during the board screening process: Official Military Personnel Files, Fitness Reports, and command screening questionnaires. Of the three, eligible officers are only required to submit the questionnaire prior to the board convening; the other two inputs are provided by default in the DBR. More importantly, of these three, the board members spend most of their time reviewing and assessing the officers' Fitness Reports and Master Brief Sheets. These inputs are "statistics-" and "resume-driven" and though necessary, they are limited in their ability to provide board members with a holistic picture of an officer's fit for command. Furthermore, all three inputs fail to capture the subordinate perspectives (ironically, the same perspectives of those the CSP was intended to benefit). The Marine Corps needs to include inputs that not only require an officer to compete for screening opportunities, but also better capture an officer's qualitative attributes from an all-inclusive perspective. Civilian hiring processes already incorporate these methods. As such, I use

[6] I even had to apply for my one-week Naval Postgraduate School Internship with Amazon.

this next section to discuss the hiring processes of two civilian organizations—Amazon and the Seattle Seahawks—and how they compare with the CSP.

Amazon. Amazon has a very strong organizational culture. From building names and office decor to employee identities as "Amazonians" and codes named after failed inventions, Amazon's history and culture pervades every aspect of the globally dominant organization. To maintain this organizational emphasis, Amazon hires people that fit their culture and will raise the level of performance within the organization. To do so, Amazon implements an intricate hiring process that ensures each potential manager is scrutinized and assessed in full. The process I am about to describe comes from my observations with the military recruiters as it pertains to screening for operations and area managers (the warehouses and fulfillment centers throughout the country). As such, some of procedures I describe may not pertain to other businesses and sections within Amazon, though the reasons behind the procedures resonate throughout the entire organization.

The Amazon hiring process for managers is multifaceted and deliberate. As part of the application package, an applicant submits a resume and completes an online screening assessment. A recruiter screens the application and recommends a phone interview or rejects the application. The applicant then conducts a phone interview with an operations or area manager. If recommended by the phone interviewer, the applicant next conducts an in-person interview with multiple managers who are also trained interviewers (to include what is known as a "Bar Raiser"). The interviewers then deliberate over the applicant, and if the interviewers recommend the applicant, the recruiter then offers the applicant the position. The remaining of this discussion focuses on the interviews.

The purpose of the interviews is to determine whether or not an applicant has what it takes to lead and manage people. Interviews are less about the question and all about answer. As the former head of Google's People Operations eloquently states it, "[The] questions are bland; it's the answers that are compelling... You'll see a clear line between the great and the average" (Bock, 2015). The Amazon interviewer panel includes four area and operations managers that are "higher ranking" than the respective manager position for which the applicant is competing. Each interviewer is provided a pool of interview questions based on specific leadership principles they were assigned to assess, and each

interviewer spends about 45-60 minutes with the applicant. Once the interviews are complete, the interviewers submit their assessments electronically and then discuss the hiring decision amongst themselves. During the discussion, interviewers are empowered and encouraged to openly challenge each other's assessments and seek clarification regarding an interviewer's comments. Furthermore, there is one interviewer assigned to assess both the applicant and the interviewers; this interviewer is known as a "Bar Raiser."

Bar Raisers are highly trained interviewers who provide an unbiased, objective viewpoint that is in the best interest of the organization. Their sole purpose is to ensure interviewers are asking the right questions (e.g., those that focus on the 14 leadership principles only) and hiring people who are the right fit for Amazon, who will "raise the performance bar" of the organization, not simply the position for which they are applying. Potential Bar Raisers must be nominated by a high-level manager to begin the program. Once accepted into the program, they participate in a 16–22 week course that trains them how to interview. During this time, they must conduct approximately 25–40 interviews and receive feedback on each of them. Once their training is complete, they must appear before a Bar Raiser Committee from which they may or may not receive the official title of Bar Raiser. (Of note, Bar Raisers are also expected to fulfill the responsibilities of their primary job positions.) Bar Raisers ensure the process is meeting the intent of hiring leaders aligned with the organizational vision.

Amazon makes a significant investment in how it hires its leaders. Amazon recognizes the importance of hiring people who not only can effectively lead others, but who also align with their organizational culture and will raise the level of performance of the organization. Amazon further recognizes the importance of interviews in assessing that fit. From these interviews, these interviewers assess if an applicant can lead others, will continue to take risks and fail fast, can communicate clearly, knows how to properly prepare, understands and values the organizational culture, and has growth potential. From the application to the interview, Amazon understands the importance of being able to qualitatively assess whether or not someone is the right fit for a position and the organization. Amazon understands a resume is not sufficient.

Seattle Seahawks. The Seahawks are led by a head coach and general manager who are committed to making every aspect of the organization the best it can be. Head Coach Pete Carroll and General Manager (GM) John Schneider both joined the Seahawks in 2010. Since that time, the team has appeared in two Super Bowls (winning one), won multiple conference and division titles, produced nearly 20 pro bowl selections, and been consistently among the NFL leaders in multiple offensive and defensive categories (Seattle Seahawks, 2018). Moreover, they have done so by conducting over 1800 player transactions via draft picks, trades, and free agency acquisitions (Seattle Seahawks, 2018). In short, Coach Carroll and GM Schneider excel at selecting the right people who align with their organizational vision. And according to GM Schneider, what "experts" might consider the *best* athletes are not always the *right* athletes for the Seahawks (J. Schneider, personal communication, November 27, 2018).

The Seahawks' player selection process, while elaborate and methodical, is designed solely for the purpose of "picking guys that fit what we're looking for" (J. Schneider, personal communication, November 27, 2018). Players must not only possess the requisite skill required to play professionally, the players must also be coachable, confident and humble, and possess a level of grit that drives them to constantly improve themselves and those around them (J. Schneider, personal communication, November 27, 2018). In fact, according to Coach Carroll, the player's ability to make others around them better is just as important to evaluate as height, weight, and speed (Seattle Seahawks, 2019).

Using a combination of formal and informal processes, the Seahawks assess a player's tangible and intangible qualities through a series of observations and scouting methods, physical and psychological tests, and personal interactions such as interviews, phone calls, and site visits. For a player to be selected, the coaches must first collectively buy-in on that player's abilities and potential and whether or not they can be developed. They also decide if the player is an organizational fit (J. Schneider, personal communication, November 27, 2018). For the Seahawks, the *right* athletes are defined by more than just a statistics sheet; the right athletes have the necessary skill set, but also continuously strive to make themselves and those around them better. Moreover, the

approach and passion motivating this selection process also apply when the Seahawks hire coaches.

Great coaches have a vision for their team, understand and live their personal philosophy, understand and know their people (players and other coaches alike), and recognize how to maximize the strengths and complement the weaknesses of their people (Carroll, Roth, & Garin, 2011). GM Schneider refers to this as self-efficacy (J. Schneider, personal communication, November 27, 2018). He states that coaches must have a strong vision of who they are and want to be, understand people and their environment, and exude empathy, confidence, and humility. And he uses a variety of methods to examine and observe these qualities.

NFL head coaches are always in the spotlight, win or lose. According to GM Schneider, he can tell a lot about a coach's character by how he handles adversity, especially after a loss (J. Schneider, personal communication, November 27, 2018). A coach's stats matter, but they are not the entire story. He watches how coaches speak and respond to questions during press conferences and interviews; he listens to what they say about the players and the organization, in addition to the level of responsibility they take for their team's standing. He also speaks to other coaches who have worked with that coach. These coaches provide additional context and insight about the prospective coach that cannot otherwise be captured on a resume.

The Seahawks always compete. Whether on the playing field or in developing their draft strategy, the Seahawks are always looking to improve themselves and their processes (J. Schneider, personal communication, November 27, 2018). GM Schneider states that as an organization, the Seahawks pride themselves in not having all of the answers so they do everything they can to outwork the competition (J. Schneider, personal communication, November 27, 2018). As Coach Carroll puts it, they are always evaluating their programs and processes, making adjustments in order to maximize the capabilities of players, and find every way to become the most competitive organization that they can be (Seattle Seahawks, 2019).

In this section, I describe elements of two prominent and highly successful organizations' hiring processes. Both organizations emphasize that success comes from hiring the *right* people; people who not only possess the requisite skillset, but are also aligned with the organizational vision and fit within the organizational culture. Moreover, when making these selection decisions, both Amazon and the Seattle Seahawks place significant value on a person's qualitative attributes not found in resumes or player statistics. In contrast, the CSP gives board members statistics and resumes and expects them to be able to pick the best and most fully qualified officer for command. The Marine Corps could learn from these organizations, if it is willing to acknowledge the deficiencies in its processes and seek self-improvement. Instead of the best and most fully qualified officer, maybe the Marine Corps should be selecting the *right* officer for command. And to do this, the CSP must incorporate better methods of capturing an officer's qualitative attributes.

B. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTION #1

Does board composition influence selection? I approach this question from four perspectives. First, I look at what variables influence selection outcomes. Second, I examine if the board is consistent over time the variables influencing selection outcomes. Third, I examine whether or not the board members select officers who are similar to them. Lastly, I discuss what the survey respondents think about the impact of board composition on selection outcomes.

1. Deriving the Models

In my analysis, I attempt to replicate the information used by the board at the time the board convened. As such, I include Fitness Report data, training data, and awards. With respect to Fitness Reports, there is debate over which markings are more representative of a Marine's true performance, Reporting Senior (RS) markings or Reviewing Officer (RO) markings.[7] Furthermore, board members have access to the both the "at processing" values

[7] The Reporting Senior is typically the first officer in a Marine's chain of command and is responsible for evaluating a Marine's performance. The Reviewing Officer is responsible for supervising and reporting on the Reporting Senior.

and the "cumulative" values of each Fitness Report. To narrow down the performance variables in my analysis, I use the statistical software package Stata to analyze the selection outcomes using the following four Fitness Report categories: Reporting Senior at Processing, Reporting Senior Cumulative, Reviewing Officer at Processing, and Reviewing Officer Cumulative. From this analysis, there is no distinct difference in any of the selection outcomes. As such, I then look at the Fitness Report profile shapes to determine which of the four categories to use in my analysis.

At the beginning of each board, board members are encouraged to brief Fitness Report profile shapes as displayed on each Marine's Master Brief Sheet. These shapes are derived from the "upper," "middle," and "lower" Fitness Reports at each rank of a Marine's career. Board members brief these shapes using both the RS and RO markings (e.g., "Hourglass," "Diamond," "Home Plate over Inverted Triangle," etc.).[8] To replicate the "upper," "middle," "lower" categories on the Master Brief Sheets, I combine the RS and RO values in each category for each rank and analyze how they impact selection outcomes. I find that because most of the screened officers are in the "upper" category, these profile shape categories do not provide much insight into the relationship between Fitness Report performance and command selection outcomes.

I then create models to examine the effect of a point increase in the average RS and RO cumulative values at the ranks of captain and major, and find that there is still little difference in selection outcomes. This finding is confirmed when I cross-validate the models using the statistical software package JMP. As such, my analysis includes the RS Cumulative values at both captain and major.

To further validate my model, I perform cross-validation by building models and training sets using FY2015–FY2018 data to classify the FY2019 data. The high miscalculation rates are the same for both the RS and RO models. Additionally, I use all second order interactions in my models, and the models still do not perform much better.

[8] RS markings create the top half of these shapes; RO markings form the bottom half. For example, a high-performing officer would have an hourglass shape: an inverted triangle shape on top (most reports are above average) and triangle on the bottom (most officers ranked below this high-performer). In contrast, a less-competitive officer would have a diamond-shaped profile.

This suggests that my models are sufficient for analysis using the data provided by HQMC. From these initial analyses there is no difference in the outcomes in using RS cumulative or RO cumulative values. As such, I continue my analysis using the point increases in the RS cumulative values at the ranks of captain and major because.

2. The Quantitative Analysis

(1) What Variables Influence Selection Outcomes?

Table 9 provides the descriptive statistics of the total eligible officer sample, those who were selected for command, and those eligible officers who were not selected by the board. This table shows that variables matter differently with respect command selection, but not whether or not these differences are statistically significant.

The differences makes sense in variables such as performance, fitness, and awards. With that stated, there are some other results worth mentioning. For example, lieutenant colonels have lower selection rates even though there are more lieutenant colonels in the total sample. Non-white eligible officers are more underrepresented in those selected for command and more overrepresented in those not selected as compared to the number of non-white eligible officers in the total sample. Additionally, marksmanship appears not to matter much between those selected and not selected, nor do selection rates between those eligible officers with High CFTs and those without.

Table 9. Selection Descriptive Statistics (FY15–FY19)

Selection Descriptive Statistics (FY15-FY19)

	Total Eligible Officers (n = 2838)				Eligible Officers Selected (n = 1105)				Eligible Officers Not Selected (n = 1733)			
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min**	**Max**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min**	**Max**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min**	**Max**
Performance												
Captain RS Cumulative Values	91.437	2.659	83.883	100	92.506	2.529	84.565	100	90.755	2.513	83.883	100
Major RS Cumulative Values	92.476	2.751	83.672	100	93.773	2.502	84.440	100	91.649	2.579	83.672	99.450
Rank												
O4	0.403	0.491	0	1	0.560	0.497	0	1	0.304	0.460	0	1
O5	0.597	0.491	0	1	0.440	0.497	0	1	0.696	0.460	0	1
PMOS Category												
Ground Combat Arm	0.256	0.437	0	1	0.268	0.443	0	1	0.249	0.432	0	1
Combat Service Support	0.423	0.494	0	1	0.348	0.476	0	1	0.471	0.499	0	1
Aviation	0.321	0.467	0	1	0.385	0.487	0	1	0.280	0.449	0	1
Time In Service (Yrs)	20.1	3.5	13	34	19.6	3.4	13	32	20.5	3.5	13	34
Gender												
Male	0.952	0.214	0	1	0.965	0.185	0	1	0.944	0.230	0	1
Female	0.048	0.214	0	1	0.035	0.185	0	1	0.056	0.230	0	1
Race												
White	0.822	0.382	0	1	0.862	0.346	0	1	0.797	0.402	0	1
Non-White	0.178	0.382	0	1	0.138	0.346	0	1	0.203	0.402	0	1
Assigned Unit												
Operating Forces	0.394	0.489	0	1	0.450	0.498	0	1	0.358	0.479	0	1
Supporting Establishment	0.606	0.489	0	1	0.550	0.498	0	1	0.642	0.479	0	1
STEM Degrees	0.175	0.380	0	1	0.161	0.368	0	1	0.184	0.388	0	1
Number of Deployments	4.3	2.4	0	27	4.5	2.5	0	27	4.2	2.4	0	25
Fitness												
PFT 1st Class	0.895	0.307	0	1	0.933	0.250	0	1	0.870	0.336	0	1
PFT Other	0.105	0.307	0	1	0.067	0.250	0	1	0.130	0.336	0	1
High PFT (>=285)	0.185	0.389	0	1	0.241	0.428	0	1	0.150	0.357	0	1
CFT 1st Class	0.894	0.308	0	1	0.929	0.258	0	1	0.871	0.335	0	1
CFT Other	0.106	0.308	0	1	0.071	0.258	0	1	0.129	0.335	0	1
High CFT (>=285)	0.758	0.428	0	1	0.813	0.390	0	1	0.723	0.448	0	1
Marksmanship												
Rifle Expert	0.769	0.422	0	1	0.772	0.420	0	1	0.767	0.423	0	1
Rifle Other	0.231	0.422	0	1	0.228	0.420	0	1	0.233	0.423	0	1
Pistol Expert	0.649	0.477	0	1	0.679	0.467	0	1	0.630	0.483	0	1
Pistol Other	0.351	0.477	0	1	0.321	0.467	0	1	0.370	0.483	0	1
Awards												
Meritorious Service Medal	0.755	0.430	0	1	0.757	0.429	0	1	0.754	0.431	0	1
Bronze Star	0.210	0.407	0	1	0.240	0.427	0	1	0.190	0.393	0	1
Recruiting Service Ribbon	0.076	0.265	0	1	0.093	0.291	0	1	0.065	0.246	0	1

Next, I examine at the relationship between the rank seniority of each board member and selection outcomes. As described in Chapter II, Board Member #1 is the Board President and the senior Marine on the board, whereas the lowest ranking board member has the highest board member number. Figure 10 shows the means of all selection

outcomes based on the rank seniority of the board member as compared to the means of the selection outcomes of the entire sample.



Notes: This figure shows the relationship between the mean outcome for each board member number across FY15-FY19 boards and total mean of each outcome (as depicted by the respective line). Furthermore, the average Time in Grade (TIG) shows board members (BM) are numbered according to rank superiority. BMs 3, 20, and 21 are the exception due to the difference in BM assignment from year to year. The TIG averages for each BM are as follows: 1.2 yrs (BM 1), 1.4 yrs (BM 2), 4.4 yrs (BM 3), 6.6 yrs (BM 4), 6.2 yrs (BM 5), 5.4 yrs (BM 6), 4.6 yrs (BM 7), 4.2 yrs (BM 8), 4.0 yrs (BM 9), 3.2 yrs (BM 10), 2.8 yrs (BM 11), 2.2 yrs (BM 12), 2.4 yrs (BM 13), 1.6 yrs (BM 14), 1.4 yrs (BM 15), 1.2 yrs (BM 16,17,18), 0.8 yrs (BM 19), 4.0 yrs (BM 20), 0.0 (BM 21).

Figure 10. Board Member Selection Outcomes (FY15–FY19)

As shown in Figure 10, both the Board President and Board Member #19 average the mean number of selections of the entire board. However, it is important to mention that the Board President only briefs about half of the number of cases as the other board members. Due to the observable variation in Figure 1, I analyze whether or not an eligible officer's odds of being selected are affected as a result of being briefed by a particular board member. These results are shown in Table 10.

Table 10. Odds of Being Selected Based on Briefer

Odds of Being Selected Based on Briefer Rank Seniority

VARIABLES	(1) Selected At All	(2) Selected At All	(3) Selected As A Primary	(4) Selected As A Primary	(5) Selected As An Alternate	(6) Selected As An Alternate
Board Member #2	1.032	0.839	1.014	0.792	1.048	1.022
	[0.290]	[0.279]	[0.311]	[0.292]	[0.451]	[0.444]
Board Member #3	1.087	0.865	1.178	0.934	0.864	0.846
	[0.305]	[0.288]	[0.357]	[0.343]	[0.381]	[0.377]
Board Member #4	1.010	0.732	1.124	0.833	0.789	0.747
	[0.287]	[0.246]	[0.345]	[0.307]	[0.356]	[0.340]
Board Member #5	1.043	0.716	0.819	0.483*	1.507	1.437
	[0.295]	[0.240]	[0.257]	[0.182]	[0.627]	[0.604]
Board Member #6	0.894	0.688	0.917	0.722	0.908	0.852
	[0.255]	[0.231]	[0.285]	[0.270]	[0.401]	[0.380]
Board Member #7	1.082	0.932	0.938	0.778	1.325	1.341
	[0.305]	[0.306]	[0.290]	[0.286]	[0.556]	[0.568]
Board Member #8	0.830	0.636	0.795	0.615	1.002	0.951
	[0.239]	[0.213]	[0.252]	[0.231]	[0.439]	[0.420]
Board Member #9	1.206	1.215	0.826	0.816	1.897	1.814
	[0.340]	[0.399]	[0.260]	[0.303]	[0.775]	[0.748]
Board Member #10	0.936	0.756	0.944	0.776	0.957	0.940
	[0.268]	[0.254]	[0.296]	[0.290]	[0.423]	[0.419]
Board Member #11	1.062	1.032	0.923	0.839	1.309	1.355
	[0.315]	[0.362]	[0.302]	[0.330]	[0.577]	[0.602]
Board Member #12	1.032	0.772	1.128	0.853	0.833	0.819
	[0.292]	[0.256]	[0.345]	[0.311]	[0.372]	[0.369]
Board Member #13	0.774	0.749	0.598	0.561	1.328	1.358
	[0.225]	[0.254]	[0.197]	[0.217]	[0.565]	[0.584]
Board Member #14	0.985	0.730	0.962	0.711	1.041	0.992
	[0.283]	[0.245]	[0.302]	[0.265]	[0.456]	[0.439]
Board Member #15	1.026	0.853	0.904	0.759	1.265	1.192
	[0.294]	[0.287]	[0.285]	[0.284]	[0.542]	[0.515]
Board Member #16	0.919	0.762	0.953	0.827	0.897	0.860
	[0.264]	[0.258]	[0.299]	[0.311]	[0.401]	[0.388]
Board Member #17	1.152	1.087	0.818	0.697	1.785	1.765
	[0.327]	[0.361]	[0.258]	[0.262]	[0.735]	[0.733]
Board Member #18	0.848	0.698	0.936	0.801	0.755	0.730
	[0.244]	[0.236]	[0.293]	[0.300]	[0.346]	[0.337]
Board Member #19	0.997	0.738	0.938	0.672	1.120	1.059
	[0.286]	[0.249]	[0.295]	[0.254]	[0.487]	[0.465]
Board Member #20	0.879	0.897	0.606	0.636	1.620	1.604
	[0.314]	[0.369]	[0.254]	[0.305]	[0.804]	[0.805]
Board Member #21	0.774	0.913	0.589	0.683	1.353	1.369
	[0.363]	[0.504]	[0.327]	[0.456]	[0.875]	[0.900]
Control Variables	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Constant	0.646*	0***	0.386***	0***	0.129***	2.24e-05***
	[0.149]	[0.000]	[0.097]	[0.000]	[0.046]	[0.000]
N	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838

Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Board Member #1 is the base category, who is also the Board President and the senior ranking board member.

Table 10 shows that on average and holding all else constant, selection outcomes are not influenced by any particular briefer as compared to the Board President. Furthermore, Table 10 indicates that there is no statistically significant relationship between selection outcomes and the rank seniority of the board. I also analyze this impact

by each fiscal year, and the results indicate that for four out of the five years, selection outcomes are not influenced by particular briefers. It is difficult to make many conclusions from this table because board members are rarely the same from year to year, and the probability is even lower that repeat board members have the same board member number. The only constant each year is that board member number is based off of rank superiority, and as Table 10 indicates, rank superiority does not affect the selection outcomes.

Next, I examine any differences in variables that influence selection as a Primary versus selection as an Alternate. MMOA-3 publishes the board results with respect to overall selection rates. However, *selection* refers to both Primary and Alternate selections by the board (as a reminder, "Primaries" are selected and slated to a command, and "Alternates" are selected but not slated). Because MMOA-3 uses this terminology, I analyze the outcomes of those selected, but also distinguish between those selected as Primaries and those selected as Alternates. Figure 10 shows the selection outcomes for each board. Table 11 describes these results of the analysis. This table does not look at command type; it only considers whether or not someone was selected, selected as a Primary, or selected as an Alternate. As a reminder, these values are in relation to the base category as described in the table notes.



Figure 11. Board Selection Outcomes (FY15–FY19)

Table 11. Odds of Being Selected (FY15–FY19)

Odds of Being Selected During Observation Period (FY15-FY19)

VARIABLES	(1) Selected At All	(2) Selected At All	(3) Selected At All	(4) Selected As A Primary	(5) Selected As A Primary	(6) Selected As A Primary	(7) Selected As An Alternate	(8) Selected As An Alternate	(9) Selected As An Alternate
Captain (RS Cumulative)	1.250***		1.236***	1.305***		1.286***	1.012		1.010
	[0.022]		[0.023]	[0.026]		[0.028]	[0.022]		[0.023]
Major (RS Cumulative)	1.334***		1.321***	1.362***		1.342***	1.076***		1.081***
	[0.024]		[0.026]	[0.028]		[0.030]	[0.023]		[0.025]
Rank O4		2.699***	1.691***		3.084***	1.789***		1.141	1.014
		[0.238]	[0.166]		[0.305]	[0.197]		[0.140]	[0.130]
Combat Service Support PMOS		0.937	0.913		0.985	0.943		0.889	0.887
		[0.109]	[0.115]		[0.130]	[0.135]		[0.143]	[0.143]
Aviation PMOS		1.911***	2.324***		2.110***	2.473***		1.062	1.089
		[0.245]	[0.327]		[0.300]	[0.387]		[0.185]	[0.191]
Time In Service		0.980	1.002		0.972*	0.993		1.003	1.010
		[0.013]	[0.014]		[0.015]	[0.016]		[0.018]	[0.018]
Female		0.825	0.889		1.192	1.375		0.464**	0.476**
		[0.176]	[0.207]		[0.281]	[0.358]		[0.166]	[0.170]
Race Other (Non-White)		0.774**	0.917		0.733**	0.842		0.962	1.003
		[0.088]	[0.115]		[0.098]	[0.125]		[0.150]	[0.157]
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit		0.724***	0.726***		0.718***	0.731***		0.908	0.914
		[0.061]	[0.067]		[0.068]	[0.076]		[0.106]	[0.107]
STEM Degrees		0.872	0.894		0.911	0.951		0.875	0.879
		[0.097]	[0.109]		[0.115]	[0.133]		[0.136]	[0.137]
Number of Deployments		1.058***	1.091***		1.082***	1.118***		0.979	0.984
		[0.018]	[0.021]		[0.020]	[0.024]		[0.024]	[0.024]
PFT Other (Not 1st Class)		0.659***	0.711**		0.532***	0.543***		1.020	1.055
		[0.100]	[0.118]		[0.102]	[0.114]		[0.202]	[0.210]
High PFT (>=285)		1.443***	1.345**		1.415***	1.324**		1.120	1.091
		[0.154]	[0.156]		[0.162]	[0.166]		[0.163]	[0.160]
CFT Other (Not 1st Class)		0.616***	0.662**		0.602***	0.646**		0.807	0.832
		[0.096]	[0.112]		[0.110]	[0.129]		[0.176]	[0.182]
High CFT (>=285)		1.224*	1.333**		1.246*	1.339**		1.079	1.088
		[0.132]	[0.155]		[0.154]	[0.180]		[0.161]	[0.163]
Rifle Other (Not Expert)		1.065	1.137		0.857	0.892		1.369**	1.376**
		[0.109]	[0.128]		[0.101]	[0.115]		[0.183]	[0.185]
Pistol Other (Not Expert)		0.941	0.973		0.838*	0.845		1.129	1.148
		[0.086]	[0.096]		[0.087]	[0.096]		[0.139]	[0.142]
Meritorious Service Medal		1.692***	1.477***		2.070***	1.802***		0.882	0.836
		[0.180]	[0.171]		[0.248]	[0.235]		[0.123]	[0.117]
Bronze Star		1.580***	1.488***		1.797***	1.679***		0.946	0.915
		[0.179]	[0.185]		[0.226]	[0.232]		[0.150]	[0.145]
Recruiting Service Ribbon		1.520***	1.466**		1.776***	1.770***		0.822	0.813
		[0.237]	[0.248]		[0.295]	[0.321]		[0.191]	[0.190]
Constant	0***	0.273***	0***	0***	0.118***	0***	5.73e-05***	0.154***	4.11e-05***
	[0.000]	[0.094]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.047]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.073]	[0.000]
N	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838

Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

On average and holding everything else constant, Table 11 results show that board members are much more conclusive when it comes to selecting Primaries than Alternates. This is evident in the number of statistically significant variables in Primary selections and lack of statistically significant variables with respect to Alternates. Furthermore, the results indicate that variables have different impacts on selection to Primary than on selection to Alternate.

Variables that matter to the board include FitRep performance, deployments, physical fitness, and awards. However, these variables are only statistically significant for Primary selection but are not statistically significant for selection as an Alternate. Both non-white officers and officers assigned to Supporting Establishment units at the time of the board are less likely to be selected as Primaries than white officers, even after accounting for performance. Moreover, being female does not matter when it comes to Primary selection, but it does with respect to Alternate selection rates, with females less likely to be selected as Alternates. One interpretation is that if a female is not selected as Primary, she has very little chance of being selected as an Alternate by the board. Further, majors are much more likely to be selected as Primaries than lieutenant colonels. Using the survey responses for context, majors might be selected over lieutenant colonels because board members cannot see whether or not an eligible officer has been screened for command on a previous board. As such, board members might assume that lieutenant colonels have been passed over for command before and conclude that the majors are more competitive.

With respect to awards, Meritorious Service Medals, Bronze Stars, and Recruiting Service Ribbons are statistically significant in increasing an eligible officer's odds of being selected as a Primary but have no statistically significant effect on selection as an Alternate. For example, the precept explicitly states that those officers who have been Recruiting Stations Commanding Officers should be considered exceptionally qualified for lieutenant colonel command. The findings show just that, but only as a Primary. Those who have successfully held these billets (as indicated by the Recruiting Service Ribbon) are much more likely to be selected as a Primary than those who have not. However, this billet does not matter when being selected as an Alternate. Again, this finding is in alignment with the Commandant's Precepts that these officers should be considered eminently qualified for command. It also demonstrates that the board follows the precepts.

Next, I perform the same analysis but use command type as the outcome instead of using only selection outcome. The Marine Corps does not explicitly state that one type of command is more important than another. However, the board votes on Primary MOS

commands before Strung commands and slates officers to Operational Force commands before Supporting Establishment commands. Figure 12 shows the number of validated command types for each board.



Figure 12. Command Type Distribution (FY15–FY19)

Table 12 shows the results of the analysis when I interact Primary MOS (PMOS) and Strung commands with Operational Forces (OPFOR) and Supporting Establishment (SPTEST) commands and use them as the outcome variables. These results look at those officers who were selected as Primaries and slated to one of these four command types. Furthermore, Column (5) indicates whether or not the respective variable's impact on the outcome statistically differs across command types.

Table 12. Odds of Being Slated to a Command Type (FY15–FY19)

Odds of Being Slated to Command Type (FY15-FY19)

VARIABLES	(1) Slated to PMOS-OPFOR	(2) Slated to PMOS-SPTEST	(3) Slated to STRUNG-OPFOR	(4) Slated to STRUNG-SPTEST	(5) P-VALUE
Captain (RS Cumulative)	1.259***	1.048	1.161***	1.143***	0.006***
	[0.032]	[0.056]	[0.045]	[0.049]	
Major (RS Cumulative)	1.255***	1.194***	1.252***	1.224***	0.797
	[0.032]	[0.064]	[0.053]	[0.055]	
Rank O4	2.349***	1.088	0.995	0.694	0.000***
	[0.307]	[0.321]	[0.225]	[0.169]	
Combat Service Support PMOS	0.365***	1.610	2.820***	4.203***	0.000***
	[0.063]	[0.601]	[0.794]	[1.769]	
Aviation PMOS	2.093***	2.162*	0.396**	5.635***	0.001***
	[0.352]	[0.893]	[0.169]	[2.495]	
Time In Service	1.016	1.061	0.958	0.906**	0.016**
	[0.020]	[0.040]	[0.031]	[0.035]	
Female	0.654	2.374*	0.977	2.261**	0.091*
	[0.265]	[1.215]	[0.430]	[0.855]	
Race Other (Non-White)	0.743	1.128	0.631	1.450	0.163
	[0.138]	[0.388]	[0.193]	[0.403]	
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit	0.992	0.597*	0.654**	0.569***	0.083*
	[0.120]	[0.160]	[0.136]	[0.124]	
STEM Degrees	1.161	0.646	0.448**	0.882	0.146
	[0.180]	[0.268]	[0.182]	[0.260]	
Number of Deployments	1.078***	1.111***	1.115***	0.999	0.206
	[0.025]	[0.043]	[0.036]	[0.043]	
PFT Other (Not 1st Class)	0.550**	0.572	0.348**	1.243	0.225
	[0.144]	[0.311]	[0.170]	[0.481]	
High PFT (>=285)	1.148	0.957	1.177	1.646**	0.568
	[0.164]	[0.326]	[0.283]	[0.409]	
CFT Other (Not 1st Class)	0.616**	1.057	1.186	0.405*	0.324
	[0.149]	[0.473]	[0.448]	[0.222]	
High CFT (>=285)	1.333*	0.963	1.235	1.084	0.813
	[0.214]	[0.316]	[0.338]	[0.310]	
Rifle Other (Not Expert)	0.951	0.342**	1.026	1.005	0.180
	[0.144]	[0.154]	[0.264]	[0.259]	
Pistol Other (Not Expert)	0.760**	1.043	1.136	1.049	0.434
	[0.102]	[0.307]	[0.254]	[0.249]	
Meritorious Service Medal	1.453***	2.887**	1.197	1.692*	0.369
	[0.207]	[1.236]	[0.366]	[0.493]	
Bronze Star	1.905***	1.342	0.705	1.104	0.042**
	[0.293]	[0.463]	[0.200]	[0.365]	
Recruiting Service Ribbon	1.929***	0.934	1.377	1.000	0.403
	[0.393]	[0.455]	[0.447]	[0.450]	
Constant	0***	0***	0***	0***	
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	
N	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	

Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

The results of this table indicate that on average, the board consistently prioritizes certain command types over others and stratifies the characteristics that are best and most fully qualified for each command type. These results are expected because the mission of the Marine Corps is centered on the operational forces. However, what is more interesting is that there are statistically significant differences in variables that matter across command types. These variables include performance as a captain, rank of major, CSS PMOS, aviation PMOS, time in service, female, being assigned to a SPTEST, and having a Bronze Star. Ideally, none of these variables would statistically differ across command types.

As stated previously, there is no official precedence set when it comes to determining whether or not one command type is valued more highly than another. However, the results of this table indicate that the definition of "best and most fully qualified" varies depending on the type of command to which an officer is slated.

(2) ***Is the Board Consistent over Time?***

In this next section, I examine the consistency of the board over time using Primary and Alternate selection as the two outcomes. Each board is comprised of randomly assigned board members who differ each year; however, there are some board members who appear twice in this dataset. The purpose of this section is to assess if each board values the same variables differently with respect to selection outcomes. I present two tables in this section; more tables are provided in Appendix E, which depict the by-year variations for command types. The results for Primary selection are shown in Table 13.

Table 13. Odds of Being Selected as a Primary (by Fiscal Year)

Odds of Being Selected as a Primary (by FY)

VARIABLES	(1) TOTAL	(2) FY2015	(3) FY2016	(4) FY2017	(5) FY2018	(6) FY2019	(7) P-VALUE
Captain (RS Cumulative)	1.286***	1.367***	1.330***	1.365***	1.265***	1.263***	0.623
	[0.028]	[0.068]	[0.065]	[0.077]	[0.066]	[0.065]	
Major (RS Cumulative)	1.342***	1.309***	1.330***	1.426***	1.478***	1.352***	0.691
	[0.030]	[0.066]	[0.069]	[0.080]	[0.082]	[0.070]	
Rank O4	1.789***	2.092***	1.640**	1.895**	1.899**	1.716**	0.471
	[0.197]	[0.521]	[0.411]	[0.530]	[0.496]	[0.454]	
Combat Service Support PMOS	0.943	0.822	1.022	0.827	0.785	1.338	0.964
	[0.135]	[0.284]	[0.322]	[0.287]	[0.256]	[0.473]	
Aviation PMOS	2.473***	2.443**	4.509***	2.231**	1.865*	3.197***	0.783
	[0.387]	[0.879]	[1.659]	[0.834]	[0.667]	[1.239]	
Time In Service	0.993	0.973	0.949	1.021	0.951	1.029	0.473
	[0.016]	[0.039]	[0.036]	[0.044]	[0.036]	[0.036]	
Female	1.375	2.722*	1.494	1.140	1.991	1.194	0.365
	[0.358]	[1.601]	[1.149]	[0.852]	[1.108]	[0.639]	
Race Other (Non-White)	0.842	1.710	1.858*	0.387**	0.629	0.587	0.776
	[0.125]	[0.571]	[0.662]	[0.166]	[0.209]	[0.194]	
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit	0.731***	0.952	0.491***	0.595**	0.673	0.881	0.007***
	[0.076]	[0.234]	[0.116]	[0.150]	[0.163]	[0.221]	
STEM Degrees	0.951	1.145	0.585	1.317	1.459	0.721	0.264
	[0.133]	[0.336]	[0.192]	[0.460]	[0.491]	[0.232]	
Number of Deployments	1.118***	1.142***	1.071	1.023	1.264***	1.178***	0.168
	[0.024]	[0.058]	[0.048]	[0.053]	[0.068]	[0.063]	
PFT Other (Not 1st Class)	0.543***	0.933	1.006	0.414	0.452*	0.364*	0.031**
	[0.114]	[0.397]	[0.569]	[0.234]	[0.195]	[0.191]	
High PFT (>=285)	1.324**	1.514	2.162***	1.197	1.635*	0.889	0.475
	[0.166]	[0.460]	[0.634]	[0.368]	[0.457]	[0.263]	
CFT Other (Not 1st Class)	0.646**	0.840	0.360*	0.548	1.242	0.379**	0.221
	[0.129]	[0.355]	[0.193]	[0.354]	[0.555]	[0.174]	
High CFT (>=285)	1.339**	1.814	2.201**	1.188	0.672	1.187	0.306
	[0.180]	[0.667]	[0.873]	[0.506]	[0.243]	[0.302]	
Rifle Other (Not Expert)	0.892	0.834	1.228	1.316	0.692	0.568*	0.249
	[0.115]	[0.236]	[0.349]	[0.428]	[0.216]	[0.183]	
Pistol Other (Not Expert)	0.845	0.967	0.977	0.729	0.670	0.700	0.272
	[0.096]	[0.244]	[0.245]	[0.202]	[0.183]	[0.192]	
Meritorious Service Medal	1.802***	1.251	4.485***	1.221	2.732***	1.445	0.765
	[0.235]	[0.348]	[1.547]	[0.360]	[0.891]	[0.439]	
Bronze Star	1.679***	1.071	1.354	2.163**	2.552***	1.588	0.012**
	[0.232]	[0.342]	[0.415]	[0.713]	[0.796]	[0.589]	
Recruiting Service Ribbon	1.770***	0.810	1.320	2.995**	2.216*	2.412**	0.251
	[0.321]	[0.388]	[0.551]	[1.355]	[0.913]	[0.997]	
Constant	0***	0***	0***	0***	0***	0***	0.212
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	
N	2,838	646	546	561	560	525	

Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

Column (7) indicates whether or not each board statistically differs from the others across all five years of the sample, as depicted in Columns (2) through (6). As shown in the Column (7), on average and holding all else constant, the boards are consistent with what they value when selecting an officer as a Primary. The three variables that statistically differ between the boards include if the officer was assigned to a supporting establishment unit, if the officer did not have a first class PFT, and if the officer had a bronze star at the time of the board. Additionally, the boards are consistent regarding the impact of each statistically significant variable, though both the magnitude of the coefficients and the level of significance might change. Race is the only variable where this statement does not hold true.

I run the same analysis using Alternate as the selection outcome. Table 14 displays the results of this analysis.

Table 14. Odds of Being Selected as an Alternate (by Fiscal Year)

Odds of Being Selected as an Alternate (by FY)

VARIABLES	(1) TOTAL	(2) FY2015	(3) FY2016	(4) FY2017	(5) FY2018	(6) FY2019	(7) P-VALUE
Captain (RS Cumulative)	1.010	1.017	0.931	0.954	1.048	1.125**	0.099*
	[0.023]	[0.051]	[0.050]	[0.051]	[0.056]	[0.065]	
Major (RS Cumulative)	1.081***	1.140***	1.052	1.117**	0.980	1.135**	0.175
	[0.025]	[0.056]	[0.055]	[0.060]	[0.051]	[0.064]	
Rank O4	1.014	0.978	2.134**	0.810	1.113	0.403***	0.004***
	[0.130]	[0.272]	[0.628]	[0.249]	[0.327]	[0.132]	
Combat Service Support PMOS	0.887	0.859	1.070	1.063	0.667	0.866	0.889
	[0.143]	[0.327]	[0.389]	[0.400]	[0.230]	[0.349]	
Aviation PMOS	1.089	1.456	0.992	1.300	0.677	0.979	0.679
	[0.191]	[0.585]	[0.406]	[0.527]	[0.254]	[0.430]	
Time In Service	1.010	1.065	1.132***	0.927	0.959	0.969	0.006***
	[0.018]	[0.044]	[0.047]	[0.044]	[0.041]	[0.042]	
Female	0.476**	0.653	0.515	0.577	0.436	0.348	0.982
	[0.170]	[0.513]	[0.552]	[0.458]	[0.336]	[0.268]	
Race Other (Non-White)	1.003	0.755	0.852	2.042**	0.621	1.086	0.120
	[0.157]	[0.290]	[0.331]	[0.666]	[0.233]	[0.398]	
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit	0.914	1.222	0.910	0.874	1.134	0.610*	0.465
	[0.107]	[0.333]	[0.248]	[0.233]	[0.294]	[0.176]	
STEM Degrees	0.879	0.919	1.208	1.029	0.525	0.834	0.615
	[0.137]	[0.299]	[0.414]	[0.366]	[0.228]	[0.311]	
Number of Deployments	0.984	0.891*	0.963	1.050	0.982	0.978	0.263
	[0.024]	[0.057]	[0.053]	[0.054]	[0.054]	[0.062]	
PFT Other (Not 1st Class)	1.055	1.764	0.505	1.335	0.875	0.945	0.491
	[0.210]	[0.708]	[0.326]	[0.616]	[0.396]	[0.428]	
High PFT (>=285)	1.091	1.323	1.096	0.853	1.127	1.234	0.938
	[0.160]	[0.471]	[0.393]	[0.317]	[0.329]	[0.437]	
CFT Other (Not 1st Class)	0.832	0.966	0.561	0.701	0.908	1.232	0.827
	[0.182]	[0.447]	[0.315]	[0.456]	[0.539]	[0.530]	
High CFT (>=285)	1.088	1.395	0.541	1.120	3.218**	0.791	0.089*
	[0.163]	[0.534]	[0.206]	[0.505]	[1.828]	[0.248]	
Rifle Other (Not Expert)	1.376**	1.785**	1.080	0.961	1.317	2.080**	0.393
	[0.185]	[0.517]	[0.369]	[0.318]	[0.385]	[0.656]	
Pistol Other (Not Expert)	1.148	0.947	0.949	1.494	1.392	1.072	0.673
	[0.142]	[0.260]	[0.280]	[0.419]	[0.373]	[0.324]	
Meritorious Service Medal	0.836	1.525	0.603	0.678	0.739	0.665	0.220
	[0.117]	[0.493]	[0.204]	[0.208]	[0.235]	[0.231]	
Bronze Star	0.915	0.754	0.952	1.160	0.843	1.088	0.935
	[0.145]	[0.283]	[0.344]	[0.413]	[0.289]	[0.451]	
Recruiting Service Ribbon	0.813	0.940	1.143	0.557	0.704	0.707	0.893
	[0.190]	[0.484]	[0.562]	[0.356]	[0.360]	[0.405]	
Constant	4.11e-05***	2.86e-08***	0.160	0.00143	0.0187	9.96e-11***	
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[1.022]	[0.009]	[0.119]	[0.000]	
N	2,838	646	546	561	560	525	

Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

These results indicate that the board broadly defines “best and most fully qualified” with respect to Alternate selections. As shown in the Column (7), on average and holding all else constant, the boards are consistent in how they select Alternates. However, this consistency must be qualified by the fact that very few variables predict this selection. A majority of the variables are not statistically significant, and those that are, appear as such on only one board.

According to these results, boards appear to be much less definitive about what matters when selecting Alternates as they are when selecting Primaries. For example, variables such as performance as a Captain, rank, and deployments, physical fitness, and awards do not affect the selection to Alternate; but these variables are important for selection to Primary. Furthermore, most of the variables that do seem to matter for Alternates are different than those that matter for Primaries. For example, variables such as being female, time in service, and rifle scores have a statistically significant impact on Alternate selection; these variables were not statistically significant for selection to Primary.

(3) Does the board select officers who are similar to them?

The purpose of this section is to examine whether or not the board members select officers who resemble the board members. This analysis originates from the literature that suggests that civilian hiring committees hire applicants who are similar to them. However, the literature suggests that besides physical features, these similarities are also apparent in hobbies, family details, and educational background. I do not have access to hobby information, family details, and educational background of both the board members and eligible officers; instead, I conduct this analysis using gender, race, PFT scores, deployment history, STEM degrees, and Bronze Star awards.

I use two different interactions in these models. The first interaction is between the eligible officer and the board member who briefed them. The second interaction is between the eligible officer and the percentage of the board. The purpose is to show any effect of

the individual board member/briefer on selection outcomes, as well as the effect of the percent of the board on selection outcomes.

Gender. The first model I run in this section examines gender similarities between the board and the eligible officers. Table 15 shows the results of the gender interactions.

Table 15. Selection Rates Based on Gender Composition of Board

Odds of Being Selected Based on Female Composition of the Board (FY15-FY19)

VARIABLES	(1) Selected At All	(2) Selected At All	(3) Selected As A Primary	(4) Selected As A Primary	(5) Selected As An Alternate	(6) Selected As An Alternate	(7) P VALUE (3)-(5)	(8) P VALUE (4)-(6)
Female Screened Officer	0.844	1.224	1.233	2.306	0.525*	0.353	0.082*	0.186
	[0.204]	[0.883]	[0.335]	[1.896]	[0.189]	[0.373]		
Female Briefer	0.971		0.773		1.253		0.187	
	[0.185]		[0.172]		[0.276]			
Female Screened Officer and Female Briefer	2.045		4.385*		--		0.018**	
	[1.711]		[3.896]					
Percent of Board Female		0.210		0.0794		1.123		0.510
		[0.446]		[0.192]		[2.960]		
Female Screened Officer and Percent of Board Female		0.00487		0.000172		124.4		0.533
		[0.056]		[0.002]		[1,973.817]		
Control Variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Constant	0***	0***	0***	0***	4.44e-05***	4.04e-05***		
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]		
N	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,826	2,838		

Standard errors Eform in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

As shown in Table 15, the only statistically significant interaction variable is that between female eligible offices and female briefers for selection to Primary. Figure 13 provides a graphical interpretation of the results.



Notes: The top row indicates the interaction between eligible officer and briefer. The bottom row indicates the interaction between the eligible officer and the percent of the board. The vertical red lines depict a likely range of this board percentage. The y-axis represents the probability of selection; the x-axis represents the percentage of the board. Furthermore, a 5 percent increase (e.g., 0.5) represents one board member, as there are approximately 19 board members on each board.

Figure 13. Interaction Plots of Gender Similarities (FY15–FY19)

As shown in the top row, female eligible officers benefit much more than male eligible officers from having a female briefer, and more than female eligible officers with male briefers. However, this is only relevant with respect to Primary selection. Male eligible officers with male briefers are more likely to be selected than females with male briefers; and female eligible officers do not get selected as Alternates if they have a female briefer, whereas males received a marginal benefit.

The bottom row indicates that both male and female eligible officers have the same probability of selection if the board members are all male. However, as the percent of the board that is female increases, the probability of a female eligible officer being selected at

all decreases more rapidly than for male eligible officers. Moreover, though female eligible officers have a higher probability of Primary selection than male eligible officers when the board members are all male, an increase in female board members yields an observable negative effect on Primary selection.

Race. The next model examines race similarities between the board members and the eligible officers. Table 16 shows the results of these interactions.

Table 16. Selection Based on Race Composition of Board

Odds of Being Selected Based on Race Composition of the Board (FY15-FY19)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
VARIABLES	**Selected At All**	**Selected At All**	**Selected As A Primary**	**Selected As A Primary**	**Selected As An Alternate**	**Selected As An Alternate**	**P VALUE (3)-(5)**	**P VALUE (4)-(6)**
Non-White Screened Officer	0.880	2.094*	0.779	0.832	1.004	3.507**	0.344	0.107
	[0.122]	[0.940]	[0.129]	[0.457]	[0.173]	[1.901]		
Non-White Briefer	0.964		0.956		1.029		0.772	
	[0.130]		[0.144]		[0.175]			
Non-White Screened Officer and Non-White Briefer	1.255		1.507		0.991		0.486	
	[0.394]		[0.554]		[0.394]			
Percent of Board Non-White		0.741		0.193		4.834		0.130
		[0.820]		[0.239]		[6.805]		
Non-White Screened Officer and Percent of Board Non-White		0.00525*		1.151		0.000284**		0.134
		[0.015]		[3.861]		[0.001]		
Control Variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Constant	0***	0***	0***	0***	4.16e-05***	2.89e-05***		
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]		
N	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838		

Standard errors Eform in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt., 1stLt., LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

There is a statistically significant relationship between non-white eligible officers and the percent of the board that is not white. As shown in Columns (2) and (6), non-white eligible officers are much less likely to be selected at all or as Alternates, respectively, as the number of non-white board members increases. Figure 14 shows the graphical depiction of this outcome.

The results in the top row indicate that non-white eligible officers benefit more from having a non-white briefer than white eligible officers. If the briefer is white, non-white eligible officers have a lower probability of being selected as a Primary than white eligible officers. However, if the briefer is not white, non-white eligible officers have a higher probability of Primary selection than white eligible officers. There is no observable effect with Alternate selection.



Notes: The top row indicates the interaction between eligible officer and briefer. The bottom row indicates the interaction between the eligible officer and the percent of the board. The vertical red lines depict a likely range of this board percentage. The y-axis represents the probability of selection; the x-axis represents the percentage of the board. Furthermore, a 5 percent increase (e.g., 0.5) represents one board member, as there are approximately 19 board members on each board.

Figure 14. Interaction Plots of Race Similarities (FY15–FY19)

The bottom row indicates that with every additional non-white board member, non-white eligible officers are much less likely to be selected at all, even though they initially have a higher probability of selection than white eligible officers when the board members are all white. Moreover, effect of additional non-white board members has the same effect on white and non-white eligible officers for Primary selection but has an opposite effect for selection as an Alternate.

MOS. Table 17 shows the results of the MOS interactions. Of note, I use the AMOS of the Colonels in this analysis because they are aligned with the PMOS of the eligible officer (the Marine Corps categorizes Colonel MOSs differently than at the ranks of second lieutenant through lieutenant colonel).

Table 17. Selection Based on MOS Composition of Board

Odds of Being Selected Based on MOS Composition of the Board (FY15-FY19)

VARIABLES	(1) Selected At All	(2) Selected At All	(3) Selected As A Primary	(4) Selected As A Primary	(5) Selected As An Alternate	(6) Selected As An Alternate
CSS PMOS Screened Officer	1.460	0	1.122	48,053	1.623	5,935
	[0.874]	[0.000]	[0.762]	[5154413.495]	[1.151]	[689,140.490]
Aviation PMOS Screened Officer	1.558	0	0.859	0*	2.461	4.637e+12
	[0.987]	[0.000]	[0.630]	[0.000]	[1.940]	[5.562e+14]
CSS Colonel Briefer	1.058		2.044		0.389	
	[0.653]		[1.454]		[0.304]	
Aviation Colonel Briefer	1.421		2.291		0.551	
	[0.899]		[1.677]		[0.432]	
General Officer Briefer	0.667		0.916		0.513	
	[0.400]		[0.624]		[0.373]	
Ground Combat PMOS Screened Officer and CSS Colonel Briefer	0.979		0.498		2.584	
	[0.640]		[0.374]		[2.138]	
Ground Combat PMOS Screened Officer and Aviation Colonel Briefer	0.531		0.351		1.481	
	[0.357]		[0.272]		[1.244]	
Ground Combat PMOS Screened Officer and General Officer Briefer	1.254		0.783		2.237	
	[0.847]		[0.605]		[1.841]	
CSS PMOS Screened Officer and Ground Combat Colonel Briefer	0.557		0.789		0.487	
	[0.329]		[0.530]		[0.341]	
CSS PMOS Screened Officer and CSS Colonel Briefer	0.604		0.434		1.383	
	[0.514]		[0.422]		[1.447]	
CSS PMOS Screened Officer and Aviation Colonel Briefer	0.359		0.264		1.039	
	[0.312]		[0.264]		[1.094]	
CSS PMOS Screened Officer and General Officer Briefer	-		-		-	
Aviation PMOS Screened Officer and Ground Combat Colonel Briefer	1.674		3.380*		0.426	
	[1.054]		[2.461]		[0.333]	
Aviation PMOS Screened Officer and CSS Colonel Briefer	-		-		-	
Aviation PMOS Screened Officer and Aviation Colonel Briefer	-		-		-	
Aviation PMOS Screened Officer and General Officer Briefer	2.543		4.598		0.501	
	[2.200]		[4.518]		[0.555]	
Percent of Board CSS Colonel		0		0*		4.006e+08
		[0.000]		[0.000]		[2.573e+10]
Percent of Board Aviation Colonel		1.843e+69		1.534e+118		0
		[2.851e+71]		[2.598e+120]		[0.000]
Percent of Board General Officer		1.549e+72		0		0
		[7.283e+74]		[0.000]		[0.000]
Ground Combat PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board CSS Colonel		1.197e+29		1.344e+47*		3.57e-07
		[6.590e+30]		[8.095e+48]		[0.000]
Ground Combat PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board Aviation Colonel		0		0*		3.225e+19
		[0.000]		[0.000]		[6.011e+21]
Ground Combat PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board General Officer		0		1.870e+07		9.858e+09
		[0.000]		[1.045e+10]		[5.985e+12]
CSS PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board Ground Combat Colonel		7,353		2.01e-06		0.000555
		[333,818.075]		[0.000]		[0.032]
CSS PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board CSS Colonel		5.956e+15		3.018e+43		2.58e-08
		[4.275e+17]		[2.449e+45]		[0.000]
CSS PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board Aviation Colonel		0		0		3.941e+14
		[0.000]		[0.000]		[1.009e+17]
CSS PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board General Officer		-		-		-
Aviation PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board Ground Combat Colonel		4.486e+21		2.178e+36		3.15e-07
		[2.228e+23]		[1.186e+38]		[0.000]
Aviation PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board CSS Colonel		-		-		-
Aviation PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board Aviation Colonel		-		-		-
Aviation PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board General Officer		1.147e+169				0
		[7.994e+171]		[.]		[0.000]
Control Variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	0***	0***	0***	0***	3.34e-05***	0.00120
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.012]
N	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838

Standard errors Eform in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

The results of Table 17 indicate that neither the MOS composition of the board nor the MOS similarity between the eligible officer and the briefer has an effect on the selection outcomes. These results indicate that there is no evidence against the notion that the board is fair and equitable when it comes to command selection. However, one explanation for this result is that the MOS categories are too broad and do not allow for enough variation in the analysis. I do not provide plots of these results due to the density of this particular model and lack of statistical significance between the interactions.

High PFT. The next two models examines physical fitness similarities between the board members and the eligible officers. Table 18 shows the results of the interactions based on eligible officers and board members having High PFT scores.

Table 18. Selection Based on High PFT Composition of Board

Odds of Being Selected Based on High PFT Composition of the Board (FY15-FY19)

VARIABLES	(1) Selected At All	(2) Selected At All	(3) Selected As A Primary	(4) Selected As A Primary	(5) Selected As An Alternate	(6) Selected As An Alternate	(7) P VALUE (3)-(5)	(8) P VALUE (4)-(6)
High PFT Screened Officer	1.200	1.370*	1.322**	1.463**	0.919	1.000	0.142	0.230
	[0.155]	[0.228]	[0.185]	[0.263]	[0.155]	[0.214]		
High PFT Briefer	0.843		0.984		0.762		0.343	
	[0.116]		[0.151]		[0.141]			
High PFT Screened Officer and High PFT Briefer	1.797**		1.011		2.218**		0.131	
	[0.514]		[0.311]		[0.751]			
Percent of Board High PFT		1.246		1.166		1.286		0.864
		[0.372]		[0.395]		[0.483]		
High PFT Screened Officer and Percent of Board High PFT		0.875		0.578		1.487		0.441
		[0.572]		[0.409]		[1.190]		
Control Variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Constant	0***	0***	0***	0***	3.90e-05***	5.29e-05***		
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]		
N	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838		

Standard errors Eform in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

There is a statistically significant relationship between eligible officers with High PFTs and briefers with High PFT scores. As shown in Column (5), eligible officers with High PFTs are much more likely to be selected as Alternates if their briefer also has a High PFT. Figure 15 shows the graphical depiction of this outcome.



Notes: The top row indicates the interaction between eligible officer and briefer. The bottom row indicates the interaction between the eligible officer and the percent of the board. The vertical red lines depict a likely range of this board percentage. The y-axis represents the probability of selection; the x-axis represents the percentage of the board. Furthermore, a 5 percent increase (e.g., 0.5) represents one board member, as there are approximately 19 board members on each board.

Figure 15. Interaction Plots of High PFT Similarities (FY15–FY19)

The top row indicates that with respect to Alternate selection, eligible officers with High PFTs benefit greatly from having a briefer with a High PFT but eligible officers who do not have High PFTs are negatively affected. Furthermore, eligible officers with High PFTs have a higher probability of being selected as a Primary than those eligible officers who do not, but there is no briefer effect on for either group.

The bottom row indicates that an increase in board members with High PFTs actually has an opposite effect on eligible officers in both categories with respect to Primary selection, and a positive effect on eligible officers in both categories when it comes to Alternate selection.

PFT Other. Table 19 shows the results of the interactions based on eligible officers and board members who do not have a 1stClass PFT.

Table 19. Selection Based on PFT Other Composition of Board

Odds of Being Selected Based on PFT Other Composition of the Board (FY15-FY19)

VARIABLES	(1) Selected At All	(2) Selected At All	(3) Selected As A Primary	(4) Selected As A Primary	(5) Selected As An Alternate	(6) Selected As An Alternate	(7) P VALUE (3)-(5)	(8) P VALUE (4)-(6)
PFT Other Screened Officer	0.719*	0.833	0.520***	0.473**	1.102	1.528	0.025**	0.030**
	[0.124]	[0.231]	[0.116]	[0.167]	[0.226]	[0.512]		
PFT Other Briefer	1.286		1.189		1.240		0.889	
	[0.203]		[0.207]		[0.240]			
PFT Other Screened Officer and PFT Other Briefer	0.915		1.544		0.587		0.399	
	[0.507]		[0.981]		[0.464]			
Percent of Board PFT Other		7.994***		11.73***		1.680		0.094*
		[4.878]		[7.982]		[1.298]		
PFT Other Screened Officer and Percent of Board PFT Other		0.223		6.561		0.0147		0.219
		[0.546]		[19.654]		[0.048]		
Control Variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Constant	0***	0***	0***	0***	4.08e-05***	3.79e-05***		
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]		
N	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838		

Standard errors Eform in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

There is a statistically significant relationship between selection outcomes and the percent of the board that does not have a 1stClass PFT. There are no statistically significant relationships with the interaction variables. Figure 16 shows the graphical depiction of this outcome.



Notes: The top row indicates the interaction between eligible officer and briefer. The bottom row indicates the interaction between the eligible officer and the percent of the board. The vertical red lines depict a likely range of this board percentage. The y-axis represents the probability of selection; the x-axis represents the percentage of the board. Furthermore, a 5 percent increase (e.g., 0.5) represents one board member, as there are approximately 19 board members on each board.

Figure 16. Interaction Plots of PFT Other Similarities (FY15–FY19)

Eligible officers with 1stClass PFTs have a higher selection probability than those eligible officers who do not have a 1stClass PFT. With respect to Primary selections, eligible officers without 1stClass PFTs benefit more from having a briefer who does not have a 1stClass PFT but are actually at a disadvantage for Alternate selection. However, these results are not statistically significant.

The bottom row is also interesting considering the only statistically significant variable in this model is the percent of the board without 1stClass PFTs. Eligible officers who do not have a 1stClass PFT are impacted more by an increase in number of board members who also do not have a 1stClass PFT than those eligible officers with 1stClass PFTs, though this impact is positive for Primary selection and negative for Alternate selection.

Deployments. The next model looks at the deployment similarities between eligible officers and board members. Table 20 shows the results of the deployment interactions.

Table 20. Selection Based on Deployment Composition of Board

Odds of Being Selected Based on Deployments Composition of the Board (FY15-FY19)

VARIABLES	(1) Selected At All	(2) Selected At All	(3) Selected As A Primary	(4) Selected As A Primary	(5) Selected As An Alternate	(6) Selected As An Alternate	(7) P VALUE (3)-(5)	(8) P VALUE (4)-(6)
Deployments of Screened Officer	1.073**	0.805	1.153***	0.819	0.925*	0.961	0.000***	0.485
	[0.036]	[0.109]	[0.043]	[0.120]	[0.040]	[0.156]		
Deployments of Briefer	1.009		1.051		0.960		0.085*	
	[0.028]		[0.033]		[0.032]			
Deployments of Screened Officer and Deployments of Briefer	1.004		0.994		1.012*		0.104	
	[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.007]			
Number of Deployments of Board		0.853		0.828		1.057		0.271
		[0.111]		[0.120]		[0.165]		
Deployments Screened Officer and Number of Deployments of Board		1.061**		1.063**		1.004		0.201
		[0.028]		[0.030]		[0.031]		
Control Variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Constant	0***	0***	0***	0***	4.80e-05***	3.77e-05***		
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]		
N	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838		

Standard errors Eform in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

There is a statistically significant relationship between the number of times an eligible officer has deployed and a briefer's number of deployments with respect to selection as an Alternate. Additionally, there is a positive relationship between an increase

in both the number of eligible officer deployments and number of deployments of the board members. Figure 17 shows the graphical depiction of this outcome.



Notes: The top row indicates the interaction between eligible officer and briefer. The bottom row indicates the interaction between the eligible officer and the percent of the board. The vertical red lines depict a likely range of this board percentage. The y-axis represents the probability of selection; the x-axis represents the percentage of the board. Furthermore, a 5 percent increase (e.g., 0.5) represents one board member, as there are approximately 19 board members on each board.

Figure 17. Interaction Plots of Deployment Similarities (FY15–FY19)

The top row indicates that for Primary selection, eligible officers with more deployments have a higher probability of being selected, though those with 4–5 deployments benefit marginally from having a briefer with more deployments. However, eligible officers with less deployments initially have a higher probability of being selected as an Alternate than those eligible officers with more deployments; but as the briefer's number of deployments increase, those eligible officers with less deployments experience

a decrease in probability of selection to Alternate, whereas those eligible officers with more deployments experience an increase in selection probability.

The bottom row results indicate that officers with more deployments benefit from an increase in percentage of the board with more deployments. However, those eligible officers with 0–3 deployments are more likely to be selected as Primaries than any other group, and equally likely to be selected as Alternates as those with 4–5 deployments.

STEM Degree. The next model looks at the education similarities between eligible officers and board members. I include this analysis to address the increased attention the Marine Corps has placed on attracting and retaining Marines with STEM Degrees. Table 21 shows the results of the STEM Degree interactions.

Table 21. Selection Based on STEM Degree Composition of Board

Odds of Being Selected Based on STEM Degree Composition of the Board (FY15-FY19)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
VARIABLES	**Selected At All**	**Selected At All**	**Selected As A Primary**	**Selected As A Primary**	**Selected As An Alternate**	**Selected As An Alternate**	**P VALUE (3)-(5)**	**P VALUE (4)-(6)**
STEM Degree Screened Officer	0.935	0.410*	1.006	0.628	0.874	0.437	0.583	0.716
	[0.123]	[0.217]	[0.152]	[0.375]	[0.147]	[0.299]		
STEM Degree Briefer	1.170		1.263		0.926		0.252	
	[0.161]		[0.190]		[0.164]			
STEM Degree Screened Officer and STEM Degree Briefer	0.739		0.696		1.040		0.514	
	[0.252]		[0.267]		[0.463]			
Percent of Board STEM Degree		0.265		1.039		0.0884		0.406
		[0.411]		[1.810]		[0.173]		
STEM Degree Screened Officer and Percent of Board STEM Degree		222.9		17.61		128.1		0.765
		[791.198]		[70.747]		[581.208]		
Control Variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Constant	0***	0***	0***	0***	4.10e-05***	8.49e-05***		
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]		
N	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838		

Standard errors Eform in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

There are no statistically significant relationships with the interaction variables. Figure 18 shows the graphical depiction of this outcome.



Notes: The top row indicates the interaction between eligible officer and briefer. The bottom row indicates the interaction between the eligible officer and the percent of the board. The vertical red lines depict a likely range of this board percentage. The y-axis represents the probability of selection; the x-axis represents the percentage of the board. Furthermore, a 5 percent increase (e.g., 0.5) represents one board member, as there are approximately 19 board members on each board.

Figure 18. Interaction Plots of STEM Degree Similarities

The top row indicates that eligible officers with STEM Degrees have a lower selection probability than eligible officers without STEM Degrees. Furthermore, eligible officers without STEM Degrees benefit more from having a briefer with a STEM Degree than eligible officers with STEM Degrees with respect to Primary selection.

However, the bottom row indicates that eligible officers with STEM Degrees benefit much more than eligible officers without STEM Degrees as the number of board members with STEM Degrees increases.

There are a few possible reasons for this outcome. First, there may not be that many officers or board members with STEM degrees, so the sample size needs to be expanded. Second, STEM degrees may not be good indicators for "quality officers" as currently defined by the Marine Corps, so those with STEM degrees are not performing well in other areas. Lastly, the manpower databases do not accurately reflect an officer's degree, and therefore the analysis does not accurately capture the effect of STEM degrees on the selection outcome. The important takeaway from this model is that these results seem to indicate that STEM degrees are either irrelevant or have the opposite effect that the Marine Corps states it wants, unless it also increases the number of board members with STEM Degrees.

Bronze Star Award. The next model looks at the similarities between eligible officers and board members with Bronze Stars. Table 22 shows the results of the STEM Degree interactions.

Table 22. Selection Based on Bronze Star Composition of Board

Odds of Being Selected Based on Bronze Star Composition of the Board (FY15-FY19)

VARIABLES	(1) Selected At All	(2) Selected At All	(3) Selected As A Primary	(4) Selected As A Primary	(5) Selected As An Alternate	(6) Selected As An Alternate	(7) P VALUE (3)-(5)	(8) P VALUE (4)-(6)
Screened Officer with Bronze Star	1.729***	3.959	1.557**	2.523	1.214	1.781	0.480	0.834
	[0.335]	[3.398]	[0.336]	[2.365]	[0.285]	[1.944]		
Briefer with Bronze Star	1.103		1.086		1.041		0.833	
	[0.116]		[0.130]		[0.137]			
Screened Officer with Bronze Star and Briefer with Bronze Star	0.792		1.115		0.636		0.194	
	[0.181]		[0.282]		[0.183]			
Percent of Board with Bronze Star		8.112***		11.12***		1.386		0.081*
		[5.036]		[7.844]		[1.084]		
Screened Officer with Bronze Star and Percent of Board with Bronze Sta		0.205		0.504		0.346		0.886
		[0.275]		[0.738]		[0.595]		
Control Variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Constant	0***	0***	0***	0***	4.10e-05***	8.49e-05***		
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]		
N	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838		

Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category for Eligible Officers is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

There is a statistically significant relationship between selection outcomes and the percent of the board that has a Bronze Star. There are no statistically significant relationships with the interaction variables. Figure 19 shows the graphical depiction of this outcome.



Notes: The top row indicates the interaction between eligible officer and briefer. The bottom row indicates the interaction between the eligible officer and the percent of the board. The vertical red lines depict a likely range of this board percentage. The y-axis represents the probability of selection; the x-axis represents the percentage of the board. Furthermore, a 5 percent increase (e.g., 0.5) represents one board member, as there are approximately 19 board members on each board.

Figure 19. Interaction Plots of Bronze Star Similarities

The top row indicates that eligible officers with Bronze Stars have a much higher selection probability than eligible officers without Bronze Stars, and benefit equally from a having a briefer with a Bronze Star for selection as a Primary. However, if the briefer has a Bronze Star, eligible officers with Bronze Stars are less likely to be selected as Alternates than eligible officers without Bronze Stars. This makes sense considering eligible officers with Bronze Stars are much more likely to be selected as Primaries.

The bottom row indicates a similar effect. However, even eligible officers who do not have Bronze Stars benefit from having more board members with the award.

(4) Survey Respondents on Board Composition

I include a section in the survey that asks the participants to answer questions regarding the relevance of board composition on selection outcomes. Table 23 lists these questions and respective response rates.

Table 23. Survey Responses on Board Composition

Survey Responses Regarding the Influence of Board Composition on Selection Outcomes

Survey Questions: Board Composition	Agree	(%)	Disagree	(%)
Board member composition is relevant in determining those selected for command	28	96.55%	1	3.45%
Board member composition is relevant in determining those slated for command	24	82.76%	4	13.79%
My board had adequate MOS representation	29	100%	0	0.00%
My board had adequate minority representation	28	96.55%	1	3.45%
My board had adequate gender representation	25	86.21%	4	13.79%
My board had adequate distribution of board member experience	29	100%	0	0.00%
Board members with previous board experience were better briefers than those without	11	37.93%	18	62.07%
My voting was influenced by a board member's briefing ability	11	37.93%	18	62.07%
My voting was influenced by the opinions of more senior ranking board members	3	10.34%	26	89.66%
My voting was influenced by the opinions of more experienced board members	5	17.24%	24	82.76%

Board members report valuing diversity of thought, experience, and perspective when it comes to reducing biases and ensuring the best and most fully qualified are selected for command. The respondents further believe that a diverse MOS cross-section within the board is essential in ensuring all MOSs are given a fair and equitable opportunity to command. With respect to slating, the board members believe composition is still relevant, but identify that MOS and experience is more important than gender and race. However, MMOA-3 currently has a greater role in slating commanders, so this question may be less relevant altogether. Also, all respondents believe there was adequate distribution of board member experience. As stated throughout this thesis, board members are selected for their vast experience and proven performance.

Many of the respondents believe that their boards had adequate minority and gender representation, considering that on average boards have only 1–3 board members who represent each of these categories. These responses might be associated with the fact that these categories are adequately represented on the board given the demographic makeup of the Marine Corps officer ranks and/or the population of the eligible officers screened by their respective boards. However, what I find most intriguing about this section of

questions is the responses surrounding briefing experience, board member experience, and voting. The respondents were able to provide open-text responses throughout this survey; the following provides discussion of those specific responses.

As shown in Table 23, the respondents do not agree about board member experience and briefer experience. Many of the survey respondents express that briefing experience matters initially, but once the board settles in after a couple of days, briefing experience and board member experience even out and no longer matter. Some respondents also state that the board members hold each other accountable to ensure every eligible officer receives a fair screening. Additionally, one respondent states that a briefer's influence does not matter because all board members have access to the eligible officer's record and can decide on their own how to vote.

In contrast, a few respondents state that MOS experience and knowledge influenced their voting at times, but board member and/or briefer experience did not. Another respondent stated that briefer quality is important in the later stages of the board when board members might be fatigued. There were also a few other recurrent themes in the comments worth discussing separately.

The first theme centers on board members advocating for their packages.

"This said, it is not a competition to see who can get the most packages selected. Board [members] need to call it as objectively as possible."

"It's easy to think that 'personality' in the board room can help with advocating … it is not necessarily true … at least not for me … we keep each other honest in the board room."

"Clearly…some board members viewed their role to "advocate" for their guy they were briefing… (NOT necessarily) calling 'balls & strikes.' I disagreed with this approach … first and foremost you need to start by 'calling balls & strikes' fairly on behalf of the institution."

The second theme highlights the impact of senior ranking board members on board room discussions and voting outcomes.

> "I also found that most of the Marines in the room were comfortable in making statements with the exception of GO involvement. When the GOs spoke, debate was quelled. My impression is that this did not change the voting, it only stopped the debate."

> "Although I do not believe I was influenced in my decisions, board presidents and senior members absolutely must be cognizant of the timing of their opinion comments, because unintentionally they could influence decisions."

> "The board president's comments changed the outcome of the many votes with a simple sentence whether accurate or inaccurate. Powerful. The endurance of the board [members] especially at the end waned and thus the longer the board the more powerful the impact."

There is little way of knowing how much advocacy and rank seniority actually influence the voting process and selection outcomes. The point of this discussion is to provide information regarding what board members think about board room dynamics and factors that might influence selection decisions. This feedback could potentially benefit future board rooms by understanding what past board members experienced and observed and any impact those experiences may have had on the selection outcomes.

C. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTION #2

Is there a correlation between the number of voting iterations required by the board to select an officer and that officer's performance in command? The purpose of this question is to assess whether or not there is a difference in officer quality of those who get selected as Primaries and slated to command, as determined by how many voting iterations the board used to select an officer and how that officer performed while in command.

The number of voting iterations varies by board. Not only does the board president determine the cut lines in each iteration, he or she also determines the number and types of

sub-boards used in each board (the voting process is explained in detail in Chapter II). As such, these sub-boards are inconsistent across all of the boards in this sample. Instead of analyzing the voting iterations within each sub-board, I aggregate the total number of times an eligible officer appears in a voting iteration per fiscal year board. The logic behind this course of action is that the board selects the highest quality officers in the first voting iteration, but it takes more iterations to decide on those officers who might be less obviously qualified.

There are two models that I use to answer this question. First, I look at the total number of voting iterations it takes for the board to select an officer as a Primary. The second model compares performance of those selected in the first voting iteration against those selected in all other voting iterations. Furthermore, I run these models using both the Reporting Senior and Reviewing Officer cumulative values to determine if one is a better predictor than the other. As a reminder, I use an Ordinary Least Squares regression model in this analysis, so the coefficients are interpreted differently than those in the previously used Logistic, Odds Ratio models.

Table 24 provides the descriptive statistics for all Fitness Reports during lieutenant colonel command. Additionally, Figure 20 shows the distribution of FitRep performance while in command. Most of the observations are from those officers selected on the FY2015–FY2017 boards. This is due to the difference in timing between when each board convenes and when officers typically assume command the following year.

Table 24. Descriptive Statistics of LtCol Command Fitness Reports

Command Performance Summary Statistics (FY15-FY19)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
LtCol RS Cumulative	523	93.820	4.635	80	100
LtCol RO Cumulative	521	0.360	0.683	-3.989	2.099



Figure 20. Distribution of Performance during LtCol Command

Table 24 and Figure 20 show that, on average, officers receive above-average Fitness Reports as lieutenant colonel commanders.

Next, I examine when the board selects eligible officers as Primaries. Figure 21 shows the distribution of Primary Selection by voting iterations for each fiscal year board and the total sample.



Figure 21. Primary Selection Distribution by Voting Iteration

As shown, on average the board makes about 55 percent of Primary selections in the first voting iteration, though the distribution varies with each board. For example, the FY2017 board made over 70 percent of its Primary selections in the first voting iteration; in contrast, the FY2015 board made its Primary selections throughout many more voting iterations.

To begin the statistical analysis, I examine the correlation between how an officer performs in command (as measured by FitReps) and how many voting iterations the board used to select that officer as a Primary. Table 25 shows the results of the model.

Table 25. Relationship between LtCol Command Performance and Number of Voting Iterations (FY15–FY19)

Relationship Between LtCol Command Performance and Number of Voting Iterations (FY15-FY19)

VARIABLES	(1) LtCol Command RS CV	(2) LtCol Command RS CV	(3) LtCol Command RS CV	(4) LtCol Command RO CV	(5) LtCol Command RO CV	(6) LtCol Command RO CV
Number of Voting Iterations to be Selected as Primary	-0.082	-0.040	0.038	0.012	0.019	0.026
	[0.129]	[0.126]	[0.140]	[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.023]
Captain (RS Cumulative)		0.121	0.093		0.013	0.013
		[0.090]	[0.093]		[0.015]	[0.015]
Major (RS Cumulative)		0.398***	0.340***		0.071***	0.064***
		[0.093]	[0.100]		[0.015]	[0.016]
Control Variables	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Constant	94.01***	45.31***	51.62***	0.273***	-7.590***	-6.837***
	[0.349]	[10.460]	[11.433]	[0.058]	[1.726]	[1.878]
N	409	409	409	410	410	410
R-Squared	0.001	0.059	0.099	0.001	0.060	0.104

Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

The results of Table 25 indicate that there is no statistically significant relationship between the voting iteration in which an officer was selected as a Primary and how that officer performed while in command.

The second model examines the relationship between those eligible officers selected as Primaries in the first voting iteration and how they performed in command as compared to the performance of those who were selected as Primaries in any other voting iteration. Table 26 displays these results.

Table 26. Relationship between LtCol Command Performance and Officers Selected in the First Voting Iteration (FY15–FY19)

Relationship Between LtCol Command Performance and Officers Selected in the First Voting Iteration

VARIABLES	(1) LtCol Command RS CV	(2) LtCol Command RS CV	(3) LtCol Command RS CV	(4) LtCol Command RO CV	(5) LtCol Command RO CV	(6) LtCol Command RO CV
Selected as Primary in Voting Iteration #1	0.766*	0.341	0.148	0.052	-0.013	-0.044
	[0.404]	[0.404]	[0.452]	[0.066]	[0.066]	[0.074]
Captain (RS CV Point Increase)		0.096	0.079		0.010	0.008
		[0.082]	[0.084]		[0.013]	[0.014]
Major (RS CV Point Increase)		0.405***	0.352***		0.066***	0.058***
		[0.086]	[0.092]		[0.014]	[0.015]
Control Variables	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Constant	93.30***	46.60***	52.01***	0.260***	-6.879***	-5.845***
	[0.263]	[9.770]	[10.579]	[0.043]	[1.596]	[1.730]
N	519	519	519	521	521	521
R-Squared	0.007	0.057	0.099	0.001	0.049	0.088

Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

The results of Table 26 indicate that there is no statistically significant difference in command performance between those eligible officers selected as Primaries in the first voting iteration and those who were not. Column (1) shows that when looking only at those selected in the first voting iteration, those selected in the first voting iteration have a 0.766–point higher RS cumulative value while in command than those who are not selected in the first voting iteration. However, any statistical significance disappears once other variables are included in the model, as shown in Columns (2) and (3). RO cumulative values are never statistically significant.

These models may not be that strong over half of the eligible officers are selected as Primaries in the first voting iteration. Furthermore, there is only a small number (1–3) of command Fitness Reports on each commander. Moreover, of those in my sample, most of the command Fitness Reports are from those officers selected as Primaries in FY2015–FY2017 command selection boards. There are only a few selected on the FY2018 board with command Fitness Reports, and none from FY2019 because they have not yet taken command at the time this thesis was written. Additionally, not all of those officers with

command Fitness Reports had RS and/or RO cumulative values so I remove them from my analysis.

These models show that on average, all commanders receive above-average Fitness Reports, regardless of when the board selects them. As shown in the descriptive statistics, there are those who receive RS cumulative values of 80 and those who receive 100s, but on average, there is no distinction between officer quality and the voting iteration in which someone is selected to command. As such, Fitness Reports—or how a commander performs while in command—are not an adequate measure of how well the command screening program is working.

The importance of Table 25 and Table 26 cannot be overstated. Voting iterations are not an indication of officer quality and how an officer performs while in command. Furthermore, Fitness Reports as a major are still highly statistically significant after controlling for all other observable factors. Combining these results with the fact briefer does not matter either, this means we are taking 19 board members away from their primary billets and responsibilities to make decisions that could essentially be done by a computer.

D. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTION #3

How should the Marine Corps measure CSP effectiveness? According to JP 3-0, measures of effectiveness (MOEs) reveal whether or not desired conditions or effects are being created within an operating environment (Department of Defense, 2018). When it comes to the CSP, the desired effect is "that Marines receive the best possible leadership and to provide all eligible officers with a fair and equitable opportunity to command" (USMC, 2017, p. 1). Using board observations and survey results, I believe the CSP generally meets the desired condition of providing a fair and equitable opportunity for officers to command. As such, the MOEs discussed in this section focus on the other desired effect: ensuring Marines receive the best possible leadership.

One hundred percent of the survey respondents believe that the CSP is effective, but there is a clear divide between the respondents when asked how to measure the CSP's effectiveness. According to survey results, 45 percent of the respondents agree the Marine

Corps has well-established measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for the CSP, whereas the other 55 percent disagree.

From those who agree, the responses include statements such as:

"Slating high quality officers."

"Performance of commanders and their units."

"How many commanders get fired."

"Successful MCCRE, MCCAT, CGI, and FSMAO."

"Selection to TLS and O6 promotion."

In contrast, those who disagree provide the following responses:

"I'm not sure we have an objective measure."

"I don't know."

"Do we measure effectiveness?"

"If we have MOEs, I don't know about them."

"It doesn't."

Furthermore, though there is debate on whether or not the Marine Corps has CSP MOEs, only eight percent of the respondents believe the Marine Corps should create better CSP MOEs. Many of the respondents convey the difficulty—and danger—in trying to tie statistics and metrics to subjective and intangible qualities associated with leadership; others state that it would not be worth the time and effort to create MOEs. Moreover, a few of the respondents state that the Marine Corps should use existing MOEs such as an officer's record and command climate surveys rather than create new MOEs. Of those who believe better MOEs are necessary, they recommend including peer reviews, adding sections into Fitness Reports, and analyzing trends and causal factors of reliefs. To further highlight the difficulty of this question, a few respondents believe better MOEs are necessary but plainly state that they do not know what those MOEs would be. Implementing MOEs might imply that the CSP needs to be changed in some manner, or that it is not currently effective. Although that is possible, the more significant value of

MOEs is that they provide the Marine Corps a means to seek self-improvement and determine whether or not the desired conditions of the CSP are being met.

As part of this analysis, I ask the survey respondents to answer two questions about the information provided to them on the board. Table 27 displays the questions and respective responses.

Table 27. Survey Responses Regarding CSP Inputs

Survey Responses Regarding CSP Inputs

Survey Questions: Perspective	Agree	(%)	Disagree	(%)
As a board member, I had sufficient quantitative information to screen the officers	28	96.55%	1	3.45%
As a board member, I had sufficient qualitative information to screen the officers	28	96.55%	1	3.45%

The responses are as expected. A few of the respondents mention that a 360-degree review or interview should be added to the process to enable the board members to evaluate an eligible officer's character. One respondent states further that "often the true personality of an individual does not come thru in [an] OMPF or board room." Even so, nearly every respondent states that they had sufficient quantitative and qualitative information during the screening process. Many of the respondents believe the CSP is as objective as it can be, and Fitness Reports provide the best quantitative and qualitative assessment of an officer.

As discussed throughout this thesis—and repetitively expressed by survey respondents—commander reliefs are not a holistic means of capturing the CSP's effectiveness. Likewise, a low relief rate can also be a great indicator that the CSP is functioning well. With that stated, commander reliefs are still worth examination, especially in the context of understanding the information used by the board to select them.

Board members make selection decisions based on the information given to them (Chapter II presents a discussion of the CSP inputs and voting process in detail). As previously mentioned, whereas board members have sufficient information to measure the quality and performance of an eligible officer, they cannot always ascertain the character of that officer. As such, I explore the voting results of the 11 officers selected on the

FY2015–FY2019 boards and subsequently relieved. Table 28 is a summary of those voting results.

Table 28. Voting Results of Commanders Selected on FY15–FY19 LtCol CSBs and Subsequently Relieved

Voting Results for Relieved Commanders (FY15-FY19)

			VI #1			VI #2			VI #3		
FY Board	**PayGrade**	**Select Status**	**Yes**	**No**	**Status**	**Yes**	**No**	**Status**	**Yes**	**No**	**Status**
2015	O5	PRIMARY	19	2	S						
2015	O5	PRIMARY	20	1	S						
2015	O5	PRIMARY	21	0	S						
2015	O4	PRIMARY	18	3	S						
2016	O4	PRIMARY	20	0	S						
2016	O5	PRIMARY	14	6		18	2		19	1	S
2016	O5	PRIMARY	16	4		18	2	S			
2016	O4	PRIMARY	19	1	S						
2016	O4	PRIMARY	17	3		19	1	S			
2017	O4	PRIMARY	15	4	S						
2017	O5	PRIMARY	15	4	S						

Note: Each commander's PMOS, slated command, and respective briefer are deliberately removed from this table. This table only includes commanders selected on the FY15-FY19 LtCol CSB. It does not include Colonel commanders, or those LtCol commanders relieved during FY15-FY19 but were selected on previous boards.

Of the 11 officers relieved, eight were selected as Primaries in the first voting iteration with a significant number of “Yes” votes; the other three were nearly unanimous selections in their respective voting iterations. All 11 were selected on their Primary MOS sub-boards, nine were slated to PMOS-OPFOR commands, and the other two were slated to Strung-OPFOR commands. Of further interest, the commander’s rank at the time of the board (e.g., O4 or O5) seems to not matter.

These commanders were not selected as Alternates and then “fleeted-up.” They were not selected in the fifth voting iteration, and the board members were not hesitant in their selection decisions. This sample size is too small to accurately analyze any relationships between command reliefs and contributing factors, but the message is clear:

these relieved commanders were considered to be the "best of the best" by the board given the information provided.

As shown, there is enough debate surrounding this question to again acknowledge there are no simple—or comprehensively correct—answers. With that understanding in mind, I provide the following considerations regarding how the Marine Corps can and should measure the effectiveness of the CSP, if only as a means to know our processes better and seek self-improvement.

1. Change the Paradigm: Sustainment versus Improvement

The Marine Corps needs to re-examine its paradigm surrounding what it means to be a successful commander. Just because a commander is a high-quality officer and his or her respective unit accomplishes its mission, should not mean that commander is successful. Commanders at any level can receive great Fitness Reports regardless of how well or poorly we lead our Marines, and Marines will always find a way to accomplish the mission regardless of how well or poorly we are led. The Marine Corps should focus less on the fact the mission was accomplished and focus more on the manner in which it was accomplished and the effects of accomplishing the mission on the unit. In short, the Marine Corps should be asking whether or not the commander has improved the operational, training, and administrative readiness levels of their unit and their Marines, not simply sustained these levels.

This principle of "seeking self-improvement" extends beyond the Marine Corps. Take Amazon and the Seattle Seahawks for example. These two organizations hire their people using two similar principles: 1) will this person make our organization better; and 2) does this person want to be better? Amazon's 14 Leadership Principles and the Seahawks' commitment to character, passion, and excellence make it very clear: there is no room for complacency and resting on past successes, only a commitment to improve and be better in everything. As such, these two organizations hire individuals who not only meet the current standards and fit within the established organizational culture, but also have a vision to take themselves and the organization to the next level.

Amazon wants people who have vision and take bold risks. In fact, two of Amazon's guiding leadership principles include "Learn and Be Curious" and "Hire and Develop the Best." This means there is an organizational expectation that leaders are constantly seeking ways to improve themselves and the organization while raising their own level of performance and the performance of those around them. Amazon expects boldness, creativity, and relentless improvement from its people; sustainment is neither accepted nor allowed. The Seattle Seahawks are guided by the same mindset.

Seahawks General Manager John Schneider defines the Seahawks as a "developmental organization" (J. Schneider, 2018). His vision is to attract people who fit within the organization culture, understand their role, buy into the vision, and will help the organization consistently perform at a high level. This vision applies to players, coaches, trainers, and staff alike. For example, the Seahawks hire assistant coaches who have visions to be head coaches, players who want to be starters and all-pros, and trainers who want to be head trainers. Seahawks Head Coach, Pete Carroll, echoes this vision in his coaching philosophy. To "Win Forever," every member of the organization must always compete and be committed to "doing things better than they have ever been done before" (Carroll, Roth, & Garin, 2011, p. 80). As with Amazon, the Seattle Seahawks expect every member of their organization to be committed to the constant pursuit of excellence in every area of life. In this same way, the Marine Corps must redefine its standard of success when it comes to commanders.

Successful commanders not only accomplish the mission and take care of their Marines, but they do so in a manner that is better than what has ever been done before. Successful commanders develop their Marines and provide opportunities for them to succeed. Successful commanders demand the best from themselves and inspire their Marines to do the same. Successful commanders create positive change, they are not complacent with simply sustaining or checking a proverbial career progression box. If the Marine Corps embraces this paradigm, then it becomes simple to implement Measures of Effectiveness, especially since many of these MOEs already exist.

2. Use Existing Metrics

As stated previously, MOEs answer whether or not the CSP is creating the desired environment. The CSP is fair and equitable when compared to prior methods or other services; however, we also need to understand if Marines are receiving the best possible leadership. Leaders accomplish the mission and take care of their Marines; both of these actions are measurable and are able to be tied to the CSP. As such, I recommend establishing CSP MOEs to assess three areas: the Command Screening Board, unit performance, and performance of the commander.

Command Screening Board. Board members should receive briefs detailing the outcomes of past boards and any trends in commander and unit performance. For example, board members do not receive any information about how or why commanders are relieved. As previously stated, command reliefs are not a direct reflection of the CSP's effectiveness, but the board should be made aware of any trending factors that might be something to consider during the selection process. Additionally, the board should be made aware of the types of officers selected by past boards to reinforce good practices and reduce any negative practices or biases.

Board members need this feedback; we are doing them a disservice if we are not learning from our organizational successes and failures. Feedback is an essential aspect of organizational strength and development. The data and analytical tools already exist, we only need to implement them into the CSP. The Marine Corps should want its board members to be able to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the board and be empowered to improve it. In fact, some board members expressed this sentiment to me directly while I was observing the board, and others mention the need for feedback in the survey responses as well.

Contrast the CSP review to organizations like the Seattle Seahawks. The Seahawks are constantly re-evaluating their draft and hiring processes and re-assessing how and why they made certain decisions in order to better refine the process and achieve the desired outcome. This is how the Seahawks compete in selecting "the best athletes" or the best coaches; they consistently strive to understand their processes and make them more

effective and efficient. In the same way, CSP board members should receive feedback on past board dynamics and selection trends to ensure they are achieving the Marine Corps' desired endstate.

Unit Performance. Currently, there is no known correlation between how a unit performs and the officer selected by the board to command it. A few of the survey respondents state that the Marine Corps uses existing evaluation tools to measure the effectiveness of the CSP. These tools include, but are not limited to: MCCREs, MCCATs, CGRIs, DRRS, WTIs, ITX, and FSMAOs. Whereas I agree these tools are good metrics for unit performance and readiness, I disagree that they are directly tied to the CSP. Board members do not currently receive briefs on how well units are performing as a result of the commanders. Again, this could go back to the fact that very few commanders are relieved and very few units fail their various evaluations and readiness exercises; using these successes (or failures) as metrics may not reveal much. Instead, the Marine Corps should look at whether or not the unit did better at these exercises and evaluations under the respective commanders. To implement this properly, "better" must be defined as well to ensure the baseline is set appropriately. However, not only should the Marine Corps assess unit performance as measured by the evaluations and readiness exercises, we should also be examining how the commander performs.

Commander Performance. Many of the themes presented in the survey results—and past research regarding "officer quality"—center around the individual officer. However, quality officer is not necessarily synonymous with quality leader. But leadership is not about the leader, it is about the led. Warfighting states "Commanders should see the development of their subordinates as a direct reflection on themselves" (HQMC, 1997, p. 63). So, if we really want to know how effective the CSP is at providing Marines with the best leadership, we should also be looking at the development of a commander's Marines.

Fitness Reports provide an opportunity for evaluation in this area, but I question its accuracy as a holistic measure. The truth is much better seen in other existing metrics within a unit. I recommend that we look at the following as measures to determine how well a commander performs: officer and enlisted retention rates (and associated reasons for

separation), meritorious promotions, Marines/NCOs of the Quarter at the Regiment or Group levels, SDA packages and school house instructor packages submitted, and Marines sent to PME and career-enhancing schools. These measures are a better depiction of how well Marines are developing and the emphasis a commander puts on ensuring Marines are taken care of. Furthermore, there are more common methods to assess how well a commander is developing and taking care of his or her Marines, these include: timeliness of Fitness Reports and Pros & Cons, awards approved for Marines in the unit, and Command Climate Surveys. These are existing metrics that communicate how well a commander takes care of his or her Marines, develops them, and rewards them for their performance.

A commander's performance is much more than a Fitness Report and whether or not the unit passed an evaluation. If the CSP is truly designed to ensure Marines have the best leadership, it is time we considered a more comprehensive means for evaluating its effectiveness at doing just that. In Chapter V, I discuss the factors that define a successful command tour. To many survey respondents, success is defined as a commander's ability to consistently accomplish the unit's mission, improve readiness, establish a healthy command climate, and take care of the Marines and gear under his or her charge. If there is still any question about what or how to measure the effectiveness of the CSP, I recommend the Marine Corps start right here.

E. CHAPTER SUMMARY

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the CSP and factors that influence selection outcomes. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, my intent is to challenge the reader to think about and better understand the situational dynamics influencing the CSP outcomes.

I find that I cannot currently conclude whether or not the CSP is meeting its intent and selecting the best and most fully qualified eligible officers for command. I do find that board members generally agree on how to define "best and most fully qualified" and what characterizes a successful command tour. Furthermore, I find that the board is much more conclusive when selecting Primaries than Alternates, and what matters for selection varies

by Command Type and even across time in some cases. The findings also show that on average commanders perform well in their billet regardless of when they were selected by the board. I also find that similarities between the board and the eligible officer sometimes do matter; further supporting the board members' beliefs that board composition has the ability to impact the selection outcomes.

I further find that the CSP is analogous to the resume portion of most civilian firms' initial hiring processes. Whereas civilian organizations place significant emphasis on being able to assess a person's qualitative attributes through interviews and other means, board members are required to make command selection decisions directly from a resume. Lastly, I find that the Marine Corps should implement measure the effectiveness into the CSP to better understand the process and continually discover ways to improve it.

The next chapter offers a few recommendations on how to improve the CSP while better supporting the intent of the process and the board members who make the selection decisions.

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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CSP

> Seniors must encourage candor among subordinates and must not hide behind their grade insignia. Ready compliance for the purpose of personal advancement—the behavior of ‘“yes-men”—will not be tolerated.
>
> *—MCDP 1 Warfighting*

As stated in Chapter II, the Command Screening Program is non-statutory though it is structured to mirror the statutory boards. Therefore, the Marine Corps has a significant amount of flexibility both in actions leading up to the board and those occurring while the board is convened. However, there is debate whether or not the CSP requires any revisions. Slightly less than half of the survey respondents believe that the CSP should not be changed, while the others responded that they would modify the CSP in some way.

Those who believe the CSP is good as-is provide the following statements:

“I think the board process is as fair as it could be.”

“No program with a human element to it is perfect[,] but the Marine Corps command screening program is very good. I believe the other services would concur.”

“The system works.”

“I felt the process was efficient and very fair.”

“Absolutely convinced that we do this about as well as it can be done.”

“Pretty darn effective as it stands. You have to have credibility to be on this board.”

“Messing with it scientifically would probably lead to it going sideways.”

“It is impossible to design a ‘perfect’ program. The Marine Corps’ current program is under constant review and refinement for process improvement… That said, I believe we have the process as close to “right” as we can.

Respondents that think changes should be made provide the following statements:

"The program seems fine, it's the information that they have that needs work."

"…simply make the electronic system more efficient so board members can spend more time getting into the weeds and discerning the proverbial wheat from the chaff."

"Require GO-level interviews and letters from those GOs."

"I think the precept is [too] narrowing and does more damage than good."

"…I would have all Marines pre-screened and pull anyone without a picture or PME."

"I would allow the board to know if someone had never been screened for command…"

"Tell the Board why you believe your career experience and performance has demonstrated that you are 'best and most fully qualified' for command."

"Add a 360 degree survey, to be completed within 12 months of a board convening."

In Chapter V, I provide a detailed analysis and discussion of the process. I am of the opinion that the CSP needs revision to more effectively and efficiently achieve its desired endstate. The purpose of this chapter is to provide pragmatic recommendations that will only serve to make the CSP that much stronger. My recommendations focus on improving the CSP in four specific areas: 1) augmenting the information available to the board, 2) randomizing the board briefing order, 3) making the CSP an application process, and 4) adding Cornerstone as the final phase of the CSP.

A. AUGMENT INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE BOARD

The CSP needs two significant changes to the information available to the board. First, board members should be provided with an analytical summary of each eligible officer that compares them to the other eligible officers on the board, both within their MOS and with the entire population. Second, the CSP should leverage all applicable HQMC elements for qualitative information on the eligible officer.

Analytical Summary. One of the most recurrent comments by the board members—both in the survey and during my board observation period—is that the board members want the ability to spend more time going into the details of an officer's record rather than figuring out the electronic system (DBR). In effect, the board members spend most of their time compiling and making sense of data that could be aggregated and analyzed by a machine. A majority of this information is quantifiable and comes from the eligible officer's OMPF and MBS. Additionally, board members spend time recreating and copying information that already exists into the briefing template rather than spending more time assessing the eligible officer's competitiveness. An analytical summary would enable board members to reallocate their time to the actual screening and assessment of the eligible officers. In addition to affecting how the board members prepare their briefing packages, an analytical summary would also improve the accuracy of the briefing and voting process.

Board members and board rooms have learning curves. During my one-week observations of the board, it was clear that briefing and voting improved as the board members began to better understand the systems and the other board members. Some board members even state—both in the survey and in the board room—that eligible officers briefed at the beginning of the board are at a disadvantage than those briefed in the middle or at the end. One of the most significant board room dynamics is watching how the briefing and rankings change within a sub-board as more board members brief their packages. A reason this happens is because as more packages are briefed, the other board members gain context of how eligible officers compare to the rest of the sub-board. This is no fault of the board members; anyone in their positions would be affected in the same manner. However, the Marine Corps could better inform the board members to minimize the effect of this phenomenon. The board members would be more confident in their briefs and rankings at the start if they had a document that gave them the within-MOS comparison and comparison to the rest of the eligible officer population. An analytical summary like this benefits both the eligible officers and the board members.

M&RA has manpower analysts that could provide MMOA-3 with a statistical analysis of every eligible officer being screened by the board. In doing so, board members

would be able to focus on qualitative information in the Fitness Reports and other qualitative information provided to the board. By implementing this analytical summary, the Marine Corps can better inform and equip the board members by providing them a baseline comparison of each eligible officer and then allow the board members to use their experience and judgment to make the final selection decisions.

Leverage HQMC Resources. The CSP exists and operates in isolation from the rest of HQMC. M&RA provides and controls the data used to inform the board, and M&RA releases the results of the board. Whereas M&RA should maintain control of the CSP, it should also leverage the information controlled by other HQMC elements to provide a more holistic and qualitative picture of an officer. For example, Training and Education Command (TECOM) maintains data on the training and education of all Marines. TECOM can provide M&RA with summary of each officer's PME documents, including command philosophy, papers written during PME, transcripts, and any published articles. TECOM has the resources to provide the board members with a broader perspective of who an officer is, M&RA just needs to leverage those existing resources.

Additionally, every MOS should have an advocate represent them during the board. Chapter II briefly describes the use of MOS advocates prior to the board members preparing packages for each MOS. This practice is an effective means of informing board members about the attributes and career paths important to each MOS community. However, not all MOSs are briefed by an officer within that MOS (I observed this during the board). Many MOS advocates reside within the National Capital Region. If there is not a sitting board member with a particular MOS who can advocate for his or her community, M&RA should require the other elements of HQMC to provide them with an advocate of that MOS. Furthermore, all advocates should be required to provide the board members with a reference document that outlines the characteristics that are valued and essential to their respective MOS community with respect to command. In the survey, some respondents expressed that they relied heavily upon the views of board members with MOSs that they were unfamiliar with when it came to voting. A reference document provided by an MOS advocate would only continue to better inform board members about the eligible officers upon which they are selecting for command.

The board members make the best selection decisions they can with the information presented to them. The CSP simply needs to provide more comprehensive information about the eligible officers to the board members.

B. RANDOMIZE THE BOARD BRIEFING ORDER

The mechanics of the process and board room are sound. Commands are validated, board members are vetted, packages are randomly assignment to board members, voting is anonymous and methodical, and the board members are allowed to openly deliberate about each eligible officer as necessary. However, there is one aspect of the board that can be revised to ensure selection outcomes remain fair and equitable: the briefing order of sub-boards and packages within those sub-boards.

The FY2015–FY2019 boards briefed MOS categories in the same order, ground MOSs followed by aviation MOSs (MMOA personnel, personal communication, July 2018). MMOA provides a recommended briefing order to the Board President; however, the Board President makes the final decision. As such, each board varies with respect to when specific MOSs and sub-boards are briefed within those categories (e.g., 1302 PMOS sub-board prepared and briefed on Days 1 and 2 on one board and on Days 8 and 9 on another). Furthermore, the Board President decides the order in which eligible officer packages are briefed, and this order is often alphabetical (see Chapter II). I do not have the data to assess any correlations between briefing order and selection outcomes, but there is a profuse amount of existing research surrounding the relationships between those who make repetitive decisions and factors that influence those decisions (Danziger, Levav, & Avnaim-Pesso, 2011). This research directly applies to the board members who make repetitive decisions on which eligible officers are selected for command.

Briefing order matters. In 2011, a seminal study found that "judicial rulings can be swayed by extraneous variables that should have no bearing on legal decisions" (Danziger et al., 2011, p. 6889). For example, the study shows that lunch-breaks may lead to different judicial rulings even when the cases are similar (Danziger et al., 2011). They further present evidence that suggests "when judges make repeated rulings, they show an increased tendency to rule in favor of the status quo" (Danziger et al., 2011, p. 6892).

As stated previously (and supported by survey respondents), the board has a learning curve and is susceptible to both mental and physical fatigue. Warfighting refers to this in part as the impact of friction and the human dimension, and further states that "the greater requirement is *to fight effectively* despite the existence of friction" (HQMC, 1997, p. 6). These factors—friction and the human dimension—have the propensity to influence CSP selection outcomes. However, they can be effectively mitigated through randomization of the board briefing order, to include removing the standard "alphabetical" briefing order of the sub-boards. And by making the MOS and sub-board briefing order random, the CSP can better meet its intent of a fair and equitable opportunity for all eligible officers to command.

C. MAKE THE CSP AN APPLICATION PROCESS

As discussed in length in the previous chapter, the CSP is analogous to a civilian firm screening resumes and lacks the means to provide qualitative information to the board members. To make the CSP similar to civilian hiring processes, the Marine Corps should require all eligible officers who desire to be screened for lieutenant colonel command to submit an application. Furthermore, the Marine Corps demands a lot from its board members in a condensed amount of time. Not only do board members commit three weeks to the board, they are also expected to simultaneously fulfill the daily requirements of their assigned billets. Fatigue undoubtedly plays a factor as the board continues throughout the weeks. Currently, the board screens the package of every eligible officer who has not elected to RBR (those numbers are discussed in Chapter II). This includes eligible officers with incomplete packages and/or non-competitive packages (e.g., packages without updated pictures, without completed questionnaires, PME incomplete, and low physical fitness scores). To address these issues and streamline the process, I recommend the CSP require every eligible officer to submit an application if they desire to be screened for command by the board.

Board members enthusiastically profess that one of the hardest requirements of their job as board members is choosing commanders from among so many high-quality eligible officers. As discussed more thoroughly in Chapter V, personnel economic theory

would suggest implementing a screening mechanism to narrow the screening pool and signal to the board which eligible officers desire to command (Lazear & Gibbs, 2014). The application would be designed to encourage the best and most fully qualified officers to apply for command screening while discouraging unqualified and/or uninterested eligible officers from applying (Lazear & Gibbs, 2014). In requiring an application, there is the possibility the board would screen fewer packages altogether, but the screened packages would be of higher quality. However, most board members do not like the idea of the turning the CSP into an application process.

When surveyed, over 72 percent of the respondents disagreed with the idea of an application requirement. Furthermore, over 86 percent disagreed that eligible officers should be required to go through an interview process before being screened by the board. Though in stark contrast, over 86 percent of the board agreed that eligible officers should be required to submit the command questionnaires before being screened by the board. My interpretation of this contrast in responses is that board members value the qualitative information provided by the command questionnaire but do not think additional screening requirements are necessary. With that stated, the command questionnaire does not currently provide a qualitative perspective on an officer (see Appendix C). To do so, it would require revision. As such, this contrast could also be caused by the fact that board members do not want to leverage additional requirements on eligible officers. If that is the case, I respectfully disagree. The Marine Corps needs to demand more from its best and most fully qualified, not simply allow them to be considered by default.

This application should include the following documents: command philosophy, command questionnaire, 360-degree feedback, and interview results. The command philosophy and command questionnaire would be submitted directly to MMOA-3 by the eligible officer; the 360-degree feedback and interview results would be submitted electronically to MMOA-3 by the interviewing panel. MMOA-3 would then compile each submission and include as part of the eligible officer's package to the board.

Every officer is required to write a command philosophy as part of Marine Corps PME, so this should not require any additional work on the eligible officer's part. Furthermore, MMOA-3 already requires that each eligible officer submit a command

questionnaire prior to the board. However, the command questionnaire should be revised to include a place for eligible officers to tell the board why they believe they should command Marines. New requirements levied on the eligible officers include an interview and the 360-degree feedback. Prior to the board convening, a panel comprised of superiors, peers, and subordinates (both officer and enlisted) would interview eligible officers and ask them a series of questions from an established list of questions. The interview panel, led by the first general officer in that eligible officer's chain of command, would aggregate the interview notes and responses and submit them to MMOA-3. Moreover, the eligible officer would be required to complete a 360-degree evaluation prior to the board. The participants of this evaluation would be selected either by the eligible officer's Reporting Senior or superior officer in his or her chain of command. Together, these four documents would provide the board members with a comprehensive and qualitative perspective of an officer.

An application process could also address the issue of submission timelines. Once the board convenes, eligible officers should not be allowed to submit and/or update any further information to the board. Timelines are in place for a reason; failing to meet them is failing to respect the process and the people involved. Eligible officers who submit late information to the board place unnecessary burden on the board and the support personnel and should not be tolerated. Moreover, nonstatutory boards that allow late submissions are effectually lowering standards from those of statutory boards, as statutory boards do not allow updates to the board once convened. Command board should only be raising the standards when selecting the best and most qualified eligible officers for one of the most important billets in the Marine Corps.

D. ADD CORNERSTONE AS THE FINAL CSP PHASE

I offer this final recommendation as a course of action if the first and third recommendations are deemed unfeasible and/or undesirable.

In FY2015, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) established Cornerstone: The Commandant's Combined Commandership Course "to prepare board selected commanders, sergeants major, and their respective spouses for the challenges of command"

(HQMC, 2018, para. 2). The President of Marine Corps University, acting as executive agent for the CMC and Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, annually conducts two Cornerstone Courses. The purpose of Cornerstone is to "educate commanders, sergeants major, and their spouses on the fundamental authorities, responsibilities, programs, and practices that contribute to a successful command tour" (HQMC, 2018, para. 3.A.1). Through the use of advocacy briefs, guided discussions, and mentorship opportunities, the end state of Cornerstone is to produce "successful command teams fully prepared to meet the challenges and demands of command" (HQMC, 2018, para. 3.A.3). For Cornerstone to become part of the CSP, it must fall under the command and control of M&RA. This is a logical transition for two reasons.

First, the mission of Cornerstone is inherent to the CSP mission. Cornerstone is meant to prepare commanders for the challenges and demands of command, whereas the CSP intends to provide Marines with "the best and most fully qualified commanders" (HQMC, 2017, p. 1). The CSP mission cannot be accomplished without also accomplishing Cornerstone's mission; the two are fundamentally connected. Second, Cornerstone can be a means to provide a qualitative assessment of each board-selected commander. As discussed throughout this thesis, the CSP uses Fitness Reports as its predominant decision tool and does not currently have an established qualitative means to assess prospective commanders. Though Cornerstone occurs after the CSP, Cornerstone can be the mode by which those board-selected commanders are subjected to interview panels and assessed qualitatively. Furthermore, if any assessed are deemed unsuitable, the CSP can procure replacements from the board-selected alternate lists.

As it stands, Cornerstone requires very little of its participants. Commanders register for the course, receive informational briefs, participate in a few discussions, and then assume command of their respective units. Furthermore, Cornerstone funds all travel costs, per diem, and course materials at no expense to the participants. There is no obligation or incentive for a commander to do anything but "show up." Similar to the CSP, Cornerstone assumes these commanders are "the best and most fully qualified" without question and without requiring any additional work from these board-selected commanders. Command is undoubtedly a reward for sustained performance, but it is also

a challenge worth competing for. If we want our commanders to be fully prepared for that challenge, we must assess their individual desire to be the best and push them beyond their comfort zones by *doing* rather than simply acquiring knowledge (Ericsson & Pool, 2017). The Marine Corps should require more from its best and most fully qualified, especially considering the organizational importance of their positions. As such, Cornerstone should be used as a qualitative assessment of each commander, to include a thorough review of each commander's command philosophy and mandated panel interviews for each commander. This is where Cornerstone can fill the gap in the Marine Corps' "hiring process" for commanders. There are challenges to this recommendation though.

E. CHAPTER SUMMARY

In this chapter, I provide a few recommendations to strengthen the effectiveness of the CSP by providing more comprehensive information to the board, randomizing the briefing order, requiring eligible officers to apply for command, and/or adding Cornerstone as the final phase of the CSP. The next chapter discusses the limitations of this thesis and provides recommendations for further research.

VII. CONCLUSION

> We must be prepared to adapt to changing circumstances and exploit opportunities as they arise, rather than adhering insistently to predetermined plans that outlived their usefulness.
>
> *—MCDP 1 Warfighting*

A. CONCLUSIONS

The Marine Corps can—and should—improve the CSP to achieve the desired outcome of providing Marines with the "best and most fully qualified" leadership. My findings illuminate aspects of the CSP where the Marine Corps can improve its understanding of existing biases and outcomes. These aspects include understanding what the board values with respect to selection outcomes and command types, and identifying other factors that influence selection outcomes such as board composition and similarities between the board and the eligible officers.

Likewise, the Marine Corps must give the board members a more comprehensive means to assess an officer's character and intangible qualities. The board members know the importance of their decisions and make every effort to select the right officers for command. Every board member puts in the time and effort required to ensure the mission is accomplished and the institution is taken care of. It is time the Marine Corps stopped placing the responsibility solely on the shoulders of the individual Marine, looked for ways to improve its processes, and started taking better care of its board members and its Marines. Furthermore, resumes and statistics are necessary but not sufficient in selecting commanders. The Marine Corps must incorporate analytics and applications into the CSP and give the board members the sufficient tools to determine the best and most fully qualified officers for lieutenant colonel command.

B. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

The Sample. My thesis only covers a five-year period and as such, the sample size is relatively small and similar when compared to the total number of board members and officers selected for lieutenant colonel command by the CSP since 1992. The same analysis

might produce different outcomes if the sample size spanned more years and/or covered periods involving significant events (e.g., 9/11 or a force drawdown). Furthermore, my data includes only those who were selected on the board, not those who were fleeted up or placed in command after the board results were published.

The Data. The data is only as good as the source. TFDW reflects an individual's record; if the officer's record is inaccurate or incomplete, so is the TFDW data. Additionally, I received the data from MMOA-3 in various formats and versions. The analysis could be wrong if I entered in the data incorrectly or made wrong assumptions about categorical variables.

The data used in my thesis is sourced using a combination of electronic systems and human input. As such, some of the quantitative data used in my analysis might be inaccurate as a result of my inputting errors, which would subsequently affect the analysis outcomes. If there were errors, the variables associated with the board voting results would be most significantly affected. A majority of the voting source documents were scanned files, and I had to enter the data manually. Additionally, I had to standardize the voting processes and sub-board categories in order to run the analysis. Because each board votes differently and records the results differently, it is possible I made incorrect assumptions when attempting to standardize the voting results.

Furthermore, my survey response size is small and only covers board members between FY2006–FY2019 lieutenant colonel command selection boards. I wrote the Likert questions to only allow binary answers (e.g., "Agree" or "Disagree"). A few respondents thought this was restricting, not allowing for situationally dependent responses. As such, I use the open text responses to add context to the binary answers. Additionally, I do not analyze the differences between those who responded and those who did not. There is always the inherent possibility of self-selection bias associated with surveys. In using these responses, I am cautious to claim their responses as representations of the entire board member population since the CSP's implementation in 1992. With that stated, these respondents provide an exclusive perspective on the process, and I use their responses to strengthen the validity of my thesis.

Lastly, I was only present for the first week of the board; therefore, I cannot speak definitively about anything that happened during the subsequent weeks. Furthermore, the board is different every year. Each board is comprised of new board members, new officer pools being screened, and new precepts. As such, I do not claim my observations as reality for every command board. The non-statutory nature of the board allows for flexibility and variation in the process that I cannot account for in my analysis.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The Lieutenant Colonel Command Selection Board is one of the most important boards in the Marine Corps. Therefore, the Marine Corps must continue to understand its processes and seek institutional improvement. My thesis contributes to the institutional knowledge, but the opportunities for continued research in this area are vast and immediate and must be pursued further. As such, I provide the following recommendations for consideration.

Incorporate Command Climate Surveys. I recommend comparing the results of Command Climate Surveys to board voting results. This would provide a bottom-up, retroactive perspective on a commander (e.g., what the Marines think) compared to what the top-down sees during the command selection process (e.g., what the board thinks). The findings could provide interesting insight into the similarities and differences between hierarchical perspectives on what defines a quality commander. The findings might also have policy implications affecting how Command Climate Surveys are used and valued in the Marine Corps.

Analyze RBRs. During my time observing the command selection board, it was apparent that there is significant senior-level interest in determining the reasons why officers are choosing to remove themselves from command consideration. Officers already give reasons for removal, but the response categories are vague and provide very little actionable intelligence from which to derive cultural and procedural change. I recommend further research be conducted to assess the relationships between those officers who are screened for command and those who self-select out of consideration. It would be interesting to see if there are officer quality differences between those who RBR and those

who are screened by the command board. Similarly, further research could assess the comprehensive quality of the "remaining" officers screened for command against those officers who have left the Marine Corps (e.g., "Are the best and most fully qualified officers still in the Marine Corps?").

Analyze Specific Commands. Do some commands need different types of leaders? Is "best and most fully qualified" the same for all commands? Does the CSP effectively match commanders to their respective commands? There is an ample amount of academic research pertaining to the importance of person-organizational fit in the hiring process. I recommend further research be done to examine the relationships between a commander's unit experiences and interests and the commands for which they are selected.

Incorporate a National Lens. National security threats change, economic stability fluctuates, and technological changes influence social and cultural norms. I recommend conducting research through the national lenses and analyzing whether or not the characteristics that define officer quality change through each lens. For example, does the Marine Corps select the same type of officer for command during times of peace as it does during times of war? Do command selection standards vary with the strength of the national economy? Is the Marine Corps purposely consistent or adaptable in its selection criteria, and does it matter? Through this analysis, the Marine Corps could better understand systemic trends and biases in the selection process to ensure the right officers are in command at the right time.

Colonel Command Selection. There are undoubtedly systemic similarities between how officers are chosen for both Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel Command (e.g., performance based on Fitness Reports). However, like lieutenant colonel command selection, not much research exists about the dynamics influencing selection to colonel command. I recommend a similar qualitative and quantitative analysis as this thesis to provide insight into that portion of the Command Screening Program.

D. FINAL THOUGHTS

Everything is a manpower problem in a profession where people are the institution's greatest assets. The solution to our holistic service problem starts with

leadership and understanding how and why we select our commanders. The Marine Corps has an incredible opportunity to seek self-improvement when it comes to this area. As evidenced by my thesis, there is still much to be learned. We only need the humility and willingness to learn it.

The Marine Corps owes *every* Marine its institutional best. Yes, the CSP might be working and be comparatively better than other processes, but we have an institutional imperative to understand the process and continuously seek out ways to improve it. The Marine Corps holds Marines at every rank accountable for knowing themselves and seeking self-improvement. It is time the Marine Corps held itself accountable for doing the same. Our institutional survival depends on it.

I conclude with an excerpt that captures the essence of my thesis in its entirety:

> The Marine Corps' vision of leading is less concerned with rank, self-identity, recognition, or privilege than the essence of our Corps: the individual Marine and the unyielding determination to persevere because Marines and the Corps do not fail. Our vision of leading is linked directly to our common vision of warfighting, which needs leaders devoted to leading, capable of independent and bold action, who are willing and eager to assume new and sometimes daunting responsibilities, willing to take risks—not because they may succeed, but because the Corps must succeed.
>
> —*FMFM 1-0 Leading Marines*

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APPENDIX A. COMMAND VALIDATION EXAMPLE

Command Validation Mechanics

HQMC (MMOA) uses various inputs to ensure the accuracy of the service's Col/LtCol command database. One verification method is using billet identification codes (BICs) for commanding officers. If commanders do not have the correct BICs assigned in MCTFS/MOL, this leads to data inconsistencies in the monthly verification. The following images reflect the correct validation steps.



BIC	MCC	LTCOL COMMAND	LOCATION	PARENT COMMAND	SENIOR COMMAND	MOS	CURRENT CMDR ASSUMPTION OF CMD	CURRENT CMDR NAME	SCHED COC DATE	NEXT SLATED CMDR	NEXT COC DATE W_O A CMDR ALREADY SLATED	FY19 SCREEN YES/NO
M1316100002	V37	3D BN, 7TH MAR	29 PALMS, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	0302	Jun 17	COMMANDER 1	Jun 19		Jun 19	YES
M1370100002	1GT	3D LAR BN	29 PALMS, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	0303	May 17	COMMANDER 2	Apr 19	COMMANDER 23	Mar 21	NO
M1133100003	1NG	3D BN, 11TH MAR	29 PALMS, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	0802	Jun 17	COMMANDER 3	Jun 19		Jun 19	YES
M1117100002	V25	2D BN, 5TH MAR	PENDLETON, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	0302	Jun 17	COMMANDER 4	Jun 19		Jun 19	YES
M1113100002	V31	3D BN, 1ST MAR	PENDLETON, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	0302	Jul 17	COMMANDER 5	Mar 19	COMMANDER 24	Feb 21	NO
M1116100002	V15	1ST BN, 5TH MAR	PENDLETON, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	0302	Jun 16	COMMANDER 6	Apr 18	COMMANDER 25	Mar 20	YES
M1121100002	V17	1ST BN, 7TH MAR	29 PALMS, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	0302	Jun 16	COMMANDER 7	Apr 18	COMMANDER 26	Mar 20	YES
M1118100002	V35	3D BN, 5TH MAR	PENDLETON, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	0302	Aug 16	COMMANDER 8	Feb 18	COMMANDER 27	Feb 20	YES
M1111100002	V11	1ST BN, 1ST MAR	PENDLETON, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	0302	Dec 16	COMMANDER 9	Dec 18	COMMANDER 28	Nov 20	NO
M1112100002	V14	1ST BN, 4TH MAR	PENDLETON, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	0302	Jun 17	COMMANDER 10	Jun 19		Jun 19	YES
M1321100002	V21	2D BN, 1ST MAR	PENDLETON, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	0302	Nov 17	COMMANDER 11	Oct 19		Oct 19	YES
M1322100002	V24	2D BN, 4TH MAR	PENDLETON, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	0302	Jan 17	COMMANDER 12	Dec 18	COMMANDER 29	Nov 20	NO
M1122100002	V27	2D BN, 7TH MAR	29 PALMS, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	0302	Dec 16	COMMANDER 13	Jun 18	COMMANDER 30	May 20	NO
M1323100002	V34	3D BN, 4TH MAR	29 PALMS, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	0302	Dec 17	COMMANDER 14	Nov 19		Nov 19	YES
M1170100002	1GR	1ST LAR BN	PENDLETON, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	0303	May 16	COMMANDER 15	May 18	COMMANDER 31	Apr 20	YES
M1101000003	1R1	1ST RECON BN	PENDLETON, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	0307	Jun 16	COMMANDER 16	Jun 18	COMMANDER 32	May 20	YES
M1131600003	1NE	1ST BN, 11TH MAR	PENDLETON, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	0802	Jun 16	COMMANDER 17	Jun 18	COMMANDER 33	May 20	YES
M1132100003	1NF	2D BN, 11TH MAR	PENDLETON, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	0802	Jun 16	COMMANDER 18	Jun 18	COMMANDER 34	May 20	YES
M1135100229	1NH	5TH BN, 11TH MAR	PENDLETON, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	0802	Jun 17	COMMANDER 19	Jun 19		Jun 19	YES
M1140100003	193	1ST CBT ENGR BN	PENDLETON, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	1302	Jun 16	COMMANDER 20	Jun 18	COMMANDER 35	May 20	YES
M2141100003	19D	1ST TK BN	29 PALMS, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	1802	Jun 16	COMMANDER 21	Jan 18	COMMANDER 35	Jan 20	YES
M2182100003	19F	3D ASLT AMPHIB BN	PENDLETON, CA	1ST MARDIV	MARFORPAC	1803	Jun 15	COMMANDER 22	Jun 18	COMMANDER 36	May 20	YES

In the graphic above, the command is correct to say that the FY19 command screening board should select a commander when the change of command is scheduled for May 2020. **However**, HQMC may decide to slate the commander on the FY20 CSB if necessary to reduce a high selection opportunity for a given MOS. The far slating window (May 20) is used to assist in balancing command opportunity year after year.

Figure 22. Command Validation Example. Source: HQMC (2018).

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APPENDIX B. FY2019 LTCOL CSB PRECEPTS

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000

IN REPLY REFER TO:
1300
MMOA-3
JUL 0 2 2018

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: President, Fiscal Year 2019 Lieutenant Colonel Command Screening Board

Subj: PRECEPT CONVENING A SCREENING BOARD TO RECOMMEND OFFICERS OF THE MARINE CORPS ON THE ACTIVE-DUTY LIST IN THE GRADE OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL (SELECT) FOR ASSIGNMENT AS COMMANDING OFFICERS AFLOAT AND ASHORE

Ref: (a) MCO 1300.64B

Encl: (1) Board Membership
(2) Guidelines for the Selection of Officers in the Grade of Lieutenant Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel (select) for Assignment as Commanding Officers Afloat and Ashore

1. Members. A board will convene at 0900 on 9 July 2018, or as soon thereafter as practicable, and at such other times as you direct, at Building 2008 aboard Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA, to select lieutenant colonels and lieutenant colonels (select) for assignment as commanding officers afloat and ashore. The board will consist of you as President and the members listed in enclosure (1).

2. Recorders. The below recorders are hereby appointed. A recorder will be present during all board deliberations.

Major Edward V. Holton	0302	USMC	Sr Rec
Major Christopher A. Denver	7532	USMC	Jr Rec

3. Administrative Personnel. The following administrative support personnel are hereby appointed.

Colonel Blake M. Wilson	8041/0802	USMC	MMOA
Colonel Leland W. Suttee	8041/0802	USMC	MMOA
Colonel Matthew T. Good	8041/0302	USMC	MMOA
Colonel Mark E. Vanskike	8042/7565	USMC	MMOA
Lieutenant Colonel Marven W. Brown	3002	USMC	MMRP-50
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher M. Murray	7523	USMC	MMOA-2
Lieutenant Colonel Richard H. Pitchford	0302	USMC	MMOA-1
Major Jamie L. Ash	0102	USMC	MMOA-1
Major Scott C. Culbertson	0802	USMC	MMOA-1
Major Brian T. Everett	0402	USMC	MMOA-3
Major Scott A. Humr	3002	USMC	MMOA-3
Major John J. Lim	0202	USMC	MMOA-1
Major Joseph J. McCaffrey	0602	USMC	MMOA-3
Major Thane A. Norman	7525	USMC	MMOA-2
Major Mark D. Nicholson	0102	USMC	MMOA-3
Major David B. Parker	0602	USMC	MMRP-50
Major Freddie Perez	6002	USMC	MMOA-2

Subj: PRECEPT CONVENING A SCREENING BOARD TO RECOMMEND OFFICERS OF THE MARINE CORPS ON THE ACTIVE-DUTY LIST IN THE GRADE OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL (SELECT) FOR ASSIGNMENT AS COMMANDING OFFICERS AFLOAT AND ASHORE

Major Norman L. Renfro	0302	USMC	MMOA-1
Major Craig A. Zoellner	0102	USMC	MMOA-3
Captain Eric D. Albin	0402	USMC	MMOA-1
Captain Ryan C. Anness	0802	USMC	MMOA-1
Captain Kyle A. Bookhout	7557	USMC	MMOA-2
Captain Todd A. Denton	7220	USMC	MMOA-2
Captain Larry W. Morris Jr.	0802	USMC	MMOA-1
Captain Timothy C. Nolan	7565	USMC	MMOA-2
Captain Patrick A. Skehan	0602	USMC	MMOA-1
Captain John M. Snyder	0202	USMC	MMOA-1
Master Sergeant Edward J. Tagle	0111	USMC	MMRP-60
Gunnery Sergeant Robert N. Glynn	0111	USMC	MMRP-60

4. The general procedures to guide you in your selection process are set forth in enclosure (2). Officers in the zone of consideration have been administratively screened according to eligibility criteria by the Director, Manpower Management Division. You are to consider only those officers who meet the prescribed eligibility criteria for selection. Clarification of these criteria, or other board processes, should be directed to the Director, Manpower Management Division.

Robert B. Neller

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BOARD MEMBERSHIP

FY19 LIEUTENANT COLONEL COMMAND SCREENING BOARD

1. The board will consist of the members listed below.

Lieutenant General Brian D. Beaudreault, President	
Brigadier General Paul J. Rock, Jr.	
Colonel Robert D. Curtis	8042/7565
Colonel Marcus B. Annibale	8042/7509
Colonel Seth L. Ocloo, Jr.	8040/0402
Colonel Reginald L. Hairston	8041/0102
Colonel George G. Malkasian	8041/0602
Colonel Robert C. Fulford	8041/0302
Colonel Paul R. Weaver	8041/7202
Colonel Joseph T. Allena, Jr.	8041/0802
Colonel Daniel T. Canfield, Jr.	8041/0302
Colonel Scott R. Johnson	8040/0402
Colonel Craig C. Leflore	8042/7532
Colonel Nicholas P. Vavich	8041/0202
Colonel Jeffery M. Morgan	8041/0802
Colonel Simon M. Doran	8042/7523
Colonel Michael A. Brooks, Jr.	8041/0370
Colonel Charles J. Moses	8042/7557
Colonel Maura M. Hennigan	8040/0402

Enclosure (1)

GUIDELINES FOR THE SELECTION OF OFFICERS IN THE GRADE OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL (SELECT) FOR ASSIGNMENT AS COMMANDING OFFICERS AFLOAT AND ASHORE

1. Oath for Recorders, Administrative Support Personnel, and Members

a. The following oath will be administered to the recorders by the President of the board:

> "Do you solemnly swear (or affirm) that you will keep a true record of the proceedings of this board and further, that you will not disclose the proceedings or the recommendations thereof pertaining to the selection or non-selection of individual officers except as authorized or required by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, so help you God?"

b. The following oath or affirmation will then be administered to the administrative support personnel by the President of the board:

> "Do you solemnly swear (or affirm) that you will not disclose the proceedings or recommendations thereof pertaining to the selection or non-selection of individual officers except as authorized or required by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, so help you God?"

c. The following oath or affirmation will then be administered by the Senior Recorder to the members of the board:

> "Do you solemnly swear (or affirm) that you will, without prejudice or partiality, and having in view both the special fitness of officers and the efficiency of the Marine Corps, perform the duties imposed upon you and further, that you will not disclose the proceedings or the recommendations thereof pertaining to the selection or non-selection of individual officers except as authorized or required by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, so help you God?"

2. The board will select those eligible officers in the grade of lieutenant colonel and lieutenant colonel (select) whom a majority of the board considers the best and fully qualified for command. The board will select a primary list of officers equal to the number of commands available between 1 June 2019 and 31 May 2020, and provide a recommendation for assignment for each of these officers. Additionally, the board will select and prioritize a list of alternates that will not exceed the number of required alternates as provided by the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. The alternate list will allow for an adequate number of officers to meet the command requirements when officers decline command or otherwise cannot take command. The skill requirements by PMOS or general billet MOS classification are defined by the list of projected command vacancies provided by the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

3. The Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs shall furnish the board the names and records of all officers who are eligible for consideration, a list of commanding officer billets, and MOS requirements associated with those billets.

a. Unless restricted by the exclusions below, all lieutenant colonels and officers selected for lieutenant colonel are eligible for lieutenant colonel command, including officers in their first year of an assignment.

Additionally, officers serving OCONUS on a 36-month accompanied tour are eligible to slate to CONUS commands no differently than officers serving in CONUS.

b. Not eligible for command screening:

(1) Officers with established separation and retirement dates.

(2) Officers with a mandatory retirement date prior to 1 June 2021.

(3) Officers above or in the promotion zone for the Fiscal Year 2020 Colonel Promotion Selection Board.

(4) Officers who have previously held command in one of the designated lieutenant colonel command billets for a period of at least 12 months; officers who are currently holding one of those billets; or officers who are slated for command as a result of a previous lieutenant colonel command screening board.

(5) Officers who have been relieved for cause from a designated lieutenant colonel command billet regardless of length of time in command.

(6) Officers who have requested, in writing or through the published questionnaire, to be excluded from consideration ('Remove by Request' or 'RBR').

(7) Officers who were selected for command and slated on previous command screening boards but subsequently declined command.

(8) Officers who were selected as alternates for command on previous command screening boards, fleeted-up for command due to vacancy, and declined following the command offer.

(9) Officers serving in a joint duty assignment who have not completed 12 months of a joint assignment by 31 July 2018.

(10) Limited Duty Officers.

(11) Officers with a PMOS of 8059/8061 (Acquisition Management Professional).

4. The officers selected will be those whom a majority of the board, giving due consideration to the needs of the Marine Corps for officers with particular skills, consider best qualified for command to meet the needs of the Marine Corps. In addition to the foregoing standard of best qualified, the officers shall be fully qualified. That is, the officer's qualifications and performance of duty must clearly demonstrate that the officer would be capable of performing the duties normally associated with the command to which slated. The standard of "best and fully qualified" shall be applied uniformly to all officers who are eligible for selection.

5. The following instructions concerning communications and information apply to board proceedings and will be adhered to during your deliberations.

GUIDELINES FOR THE SELECTION OF OFFICERS IN THE GRADE OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL (SELECT) FOR ASSIGNMENT AS COMMANDING OFFICERS AFLOAT AND ASHORE

a. Each of you (president, members, recorders and administrative personnel) is responsible to maintain the integrity and independence of this selection board and to foster careful consideration, without prejudice or partiality, of all eligible officers.

b. You must pay particularly close attention to the rules governing communications with and among other board members, the information authorized to be furnished to you, and the procedures you should follow if you believe that the integrity of this selection board has been improperly affected.

c. You are to base your recommendations on the material in each officer's military record, any information I have provided to the board, and any information about his or her own record communicated to you by individual eligible officers. In your deliberations, you may discuss your own personal knowledge and evaluation of the professional qualifications of eligible officers to the extent that the information is not precluded by Service regulation from consideration by a selection board or inclusion in an officer's military personnel record. You may not discuss the opinion of any person not a member of the board concerning an officer being considered unless that opinion is contained in material provided to the board.

d. All communications with this board, other than those that are clearly administrative, must be given to each of you and made part of the board's record.

e. After you sign the board report, only the recommendations of the board may be disclosed. Except as authorized, the proceedings of the board may not be disclosed to any person not a board member or board recorder.

f. If at any time you believe that you cannot in good conscience perform your duties as a member of the board without prejudice or partiality, you have a duty to request relief from me of this duty. I will honor any such request. If you believe that the integrity of the board's proceedings has been affected by improper influence of military or civilian authority, misconduct by the board president or a member, or any other reason, or believe someone is exerting or attempting to exert inappropriate influence over the board or its proceedings, you have a duty to request from me relief from your obligation not to disclose board proceedings and, upon receiving it, to report the basis for your belief.

g. Upon the completion of the board's deliberations, you will, at a minimum, certify in your report to me that:

(1) To the best of your knowledge, the board complied with all instructions contained in the precept and, as appropriate, other letters of guidance or instruction provided by me;

(2) You were not subject to or aware of any censure, reprimand, or admonishment about the recommendations of the board or the exercise of any lawful function within the authorized discretion of the board;

(3) You were not subject to or aware of any attempt to coerce or influence improperly any action in the formation of the board's recommendations;

(4) You were not party to or aware of any attempt at unauthorized communications;

(5) To the best of your knowledge, the board carefully considered the records of each officer whose name was furnished to the board; and

(6) The officers recommended for selection are, in the opinion of the majority of the members of the board, fully qualified and best qualified to meet the needs of the Marine Corps among those officers whose names were furnished to the board.

h. When discussing your own personal knowledge concerning the professional qualifications of eligible officers, the board is reminded that if personal remarks, based on a member's personal knowledge, could be considered "adverse," the member cannot discuss his/her personal knowledge or evaluation unless such matter is contained in the officer's official record or other material placed before the board in compliance with Service regulations. In addition, should an officer's record reveal the removal of a fitness report via the Performance Evaluation Review Board, Board for Correction of Naval Records, etc., and the member may not discuss their personal knowledge regarding the circumstances which resulted in the removal of the report from the officer's record, nor should any member conjecture or draw any inference as to the underlying circumstances involved.

i. In determining who is best qualified, you should consider that a balance of skills among Marine Corps leaders is necessary to maintain our ability to meet joint duty assignment requirements, acquisition professional program demands, and internal needs for top notch leaders in the ground combat, aviation, combat service support and air/ground communities.

6. Career Patterns. The Marine Corps has not established an expected or preferred career pattern for officers. In your deliberations, you should consider that assignments are made in the best interests of the Marine Corps. Officers rarely have direct influence over their assignments. As a result of assignment policies and practices in the best interests of the Marine Corps, some officers have developed skills and experience outside of their PMOS and may have been ordered to serve multiple tours in that sub-specialty. When reviewing an officer's qualifications, you should also consider that the Marine Corps benefits when the officer corps possesses a broad spectrum of experiences such as crisis operations, nation building, foreign language proficiency, and cultural awareness. Assignments to the operating forces, inspector-instructor duty, recruiting duty, joint and external billets, international exchange tours, the special education program or the advanced degree program, the training community and the supporting establishment, all contribute to the depth and breadth of experiences that are critical to the Marine Corps. In addition, in some instances, utilization policies or practices, such as those based on statutory restrictions on the assignment of women, may have had an effect on career opportunities. All assignments are important to the Marine Corps and successful performance of assigned duties is the key in measuring an officer's potential. In determining the qualification for selection of any officer who has been affected by such utilization policies or practices, performance in duty assignments should be given the same weight as that given to duty equally well performed by

officers who were not affected by such policies or practices.

7. Non-traditional Billets. Overseas Contingency Operations have seen the growth of billets traditionally not filled by Marine officers. Officers assigned to nation building and crisis operations billets are critical to the success of our Country's policies. The board should be especially diligent in weighing the qualifications of officers serving in Transition Teams and Joint Individual Augment billets. During board deliberations, service in these critical billets should weigh equal to traditional Marine Corps officer billets in the operational forces.

8. Faced with many well-qualified officers, there may be a tendency to simplify your task by summarily putting aside the folders of officers whose past records are less than perfect. However, to do this is to fall short of your obligation. Your charge is to find the "best qualified" officers. A judgment of the whole person and the whole record is required to determine whose future potential will serve the Marine Corps best. You may conclude that particular adverse information undermines an officer's ability to serve successfully in a position of increased authority and responsibility, despite an otherwise outstanding record. On the other hand, you may find that an officer's overall outstanding performance demonstrates such potential for future service that it outweighs any deficiency noted in the record. Some officers will have learned from their mistakes in ways that make them stronger; others will have strengths that outweigh relative weaknesses in their records. Please make the best, not simply the most obviously defensible, choices. By doing this you will not only fulfill your obligation, you will also better serve the Marine Corps.

9. Equal Opportunity

a. The Department of the Navy is dedicated to equality of treatment and opportunity for all personnel without regard to race, religion, color, sex (including gender identity), gender, sexual orientation, or national origin. The Marine Corps strives to maintain a professional working environment in which a Marine's race, religion, color, , sex (including gender identity), gender, sexual orientation, or national origin will not impact his or her professional opportunities. Accordingly, within this board's charter to select those officers who are "best and fully qualified," you must ensure that officers are not disadvantaged because of their race, religion, color, sex (including gender identity), gender, sexual orientation, or national origin.

b. Your evaluation of all officers must afford them fair and equitable consideration. You should be particularly vigilant in your evaluation to take care that no officer's command opportunity is disadvantaged by Service utilization policies or practices. The overriding evaluation factor is the performance of assigned duties and you are reminded that all assigned duties are important.

c. This guidance shall not be interpreted as requiring or permitting preferential treatment of any officer or group of officers on the grounds of race, religion, color, sex (including gender identity), gender, sexual orientation, or national origin.

d. The Marine Corps is composed of men and women representing different ethnic groups and hundreds of cultural heritages. Best and fully qualified

officers must be capable of leading and mentoring Marines while executing the Marine Corps strategic diversity initiatives. Best qualified officers have demonstrated a willingness and ability to lead and mentor men and women from diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds. The Marine Corps ability to meet this leadership challenge depends, in part, on having leaders who reflect our very best in performance, professional experience and education. These are factors for you to consider in selecting officers who are best and fully qualified for selection.

10. Joint Duty Assignments. Our ability to operate effectively with the other Services is vital to our warfighting capability. To foster this ability, a number of officers are assigned to joint duty with the Joint Staff, the other Services and joint organizations. Board members shall give appropriate consideration to the performance of officers who are serving or have served in such assignments. These assignments, critical for the future success of the Marine Corps, may have resulted in a career pattern different from officers who have served exclusively in their PMOS. In making your determination of those officers who are best and fully qualified for selection, you should view joint duty assignments as having the same value as similar assignments within the Marine Corps (e.g., Joint Staff/Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps and Combatant Commander staff/Marine Force staff).

11. Recruiting. A successful tour of duty with the Marine Corps Recruiting Command should be viewed as a significant accomplishment in an officer's career. Recruiting success demonstrates a broadened perspective and an ability to function in an intensely competitive, high pressure environment where accountability for mission accomplishment is closely observed.

12. Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS)

a. A FRS provides initial and refresher training to aviators for tactical aircraft and although the mission of an FRS is different than that of an operational squadron, it is equally complex. The span of control and emphasis on standardization requires a significant degree of oversight and supervision. A FRS may have significantly more aircraft and Marines assigned than an operational squadron. The FRS also has unique reporting requirements and fiscal responsibilities when compared to an operational squadron.

b. A FRS commanding officer should have prior FRS experience, should have been a Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 (MAWTS-1) Instructor, or should have been Top Gun Instructor, to the maximum extent possible. This preferred experience should not be prioritized over selecting the officer who is the best and most fully qualified to command.

13. Officers who have served as a MAWTS-1 Department Head shall be given the same consideration as those who have served a tour in an operational fleet unit as an operations officer.

14. The Marine Corps has TACAIR integration (TAI) squadrons allocated to U.S. Navy Aircraft Carrier (CVN)deployments. The board should strive to slate TAI squadrons with officers who possess TAI experience.

15. Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM)

a. PMOS 7532 officers should be given primary consideration for commanding VMMs. If a sufficient number of qualified 7532 officers are not

available, the board may consider top tier rotary wing pilots for selection to command VMMs. Such officers should possess, through operational experience, the requisite familiarity with the MV-22 platform and associated operations. An example would be having served as a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Aviation Combat Element (ACE) XO, OpsO, or AMO. If non-7532 pilots are selected, consideration in slating to a VMM command should account for time required to execute a FRS transition syllabus prior to assuming command.

b. Officers assigned to command a VMM in MAG-36 will also serve as the 31st MEU ACE CO for one year of their tour. The rapid transition to a reinforced squadron with multiple detachments and minimal time for integration prior to each underway period is unique to the 31st MEU. This operational tempo and turnover of manpower presents challenges that are best met by our most competitive officers that have demonstrated exceptional performance during previous MEU ACE deployments. The board should strive to slate VMMs in MAG-36 with officers who meet this criteria and have sufficient MEU ACE experience.

16. Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron (VMU). A PMOS 7315 candidate should be selected to the maximum extent possible for command of a VMU. Alternately, if a highly qualified PMOS 7315 is not available, the officer slated for command of a VMU should have VMU experience, and/or strong background in airborne fires coordination, integrated fire and/or digital integration/networking/electronic attack, as these skills best support the current and future missions executed by the VMU.

17. Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS). The officer slated for command of a MALS should have a strong background in aviation maintenance or aviation supply. Primary consideration shall be given to officers with a 6002 or 6602 PMOS. If there are not adequate numbers of qualified 6002 or 6602 officers, then Marines with a 75XX PMOS and a strong and relevant maintenance background, to include a tour as an Aircraft Maintenance Officer, may be considered.

18. Marine Fighter Training Squadron (VMFT). A highly qualified F/A-18 pilot (PMOS 7523), A/V-8B pilot (PMOS 7509), or F-35 pilot (PMOS 7518) can be slated for command of a VMFT. A candidate must be a Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course graduate (WTI), a Marine Division Course graduate (MDTC), an Air Combat Tactics Instructor Course graduate (ACTI) or a Top Gun Course graduate (SFTI). F-5 or prior adversary experience is desired but not required.

19. Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Kaneohe Bay. In order to be compliant with the C-20G T&R, which was changed in 2014, candidates screened for this command must have a minimum of 500 Fixed Wing hours in order to begin the C-20G training syllabus.

20. Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO). Due to the large population of Terminal Attack Controllers and the requirements to control supporting arms, conduct fire support coordination, and integrate the six functions of Marine Aviation, any aviation officer slated for command of an ANGLICO should have a strong background in airborne fires coordination and a previous tour as a Forward Air Controller (FMOS 7502).

21. Marine Reconnaissance Battalion. The officer slated for command of a Marine Reconnaissance Battalion should have a background in expeditionary

ground and amphibious reconnaissance. Officers will only be considered who possess both a PMOS of 0202 or 0302, and have the Necessary MOS of 0307 Expeditionary Ground Reconnaissance Officer or possess the primary MOS of 0370 Special Operations Officer.

22. Marine Raider Battalion/Marine Raider Support Battalion. Assignments as staff or commanders to the Marine Raider Regiment (MRR), Marine Raider Battalions (MRB), Marine Raider Support Group, and Marine Raider Support Battalions (MRSB) are equivalent to any comparable-level operational command. Assignment as an MRB Company Commander, Operations Officer (OpsO), or Executive Officer either in an MRB or MRSB, should be considered as significant billets in grade for 0370 majors. Assignments to the Marine Raider Training Center (MRTC) are equivalent to the Tactical Training and Exercise Control Group (TTECG), the school of Infantry (SOI), the Basic School (TBS), and the Infantry Officer Course (IOC). Assignment to the MARSOC Component Headquarters is comparable to MARFORs and MEF level-staff positions.

23. Financial Management Officers. The Commandant has directed that Financial Management Officers (3404) be selected for promotion via a separate competitive category. As such, 3404s will only be eligible for command of the Financial Management School, Camp Johnson, NC, and will not be eligible to compete for any of the "strung" lieutenant colonel commands (8006/7).

24. Command Slating. The below listed officers will receive a full brief in order to be slated for command. These officers were selected for command on a previous command selection board; however, due to circumstances beyond their control, were unable to assume command. Every effort should be made to assign these selected commanders to commands similar to the ones for which they were originally slated. Officers non-competitively selected are:

RANK	NAME	MOS	PREVIOUSLY SLATED COMMAND
LtCol	Costello, Timothy	7532	VMM-262, MAG-36
LtCol	Taylor, Robert	0402	CLB-4
LtCol	Walker Jr., Earlie	0302	3D LAR BN

25. Early Slate Commands. The commands listed below are highlighted because the projected change of command as identified through the command validation process will occur before 1 June 2019.

MCC	COMMAND	COC
1MU	1ST MRB	Apr 19
1T5	HMLA/T-303, MAG-39	May 19
1HM	HMLA-269, MAG-29	May 19
VLF	HMLA-469, MAG 39	Feb 19
G78	HT-28	Jan 19
G30	SITE COMMAND, BELLE CHASSE	May 19
VMC	VMM-164, MAG 39	Apr 19
1V1	VMM-262, MAG-36	May 19
VM3	VMM-263, MAG-26	May 19

26. The board is prohibited from considering the marital status of an eligible officer or the employment, education, color, sex (including gender identity), gender, national origin, or volunteer service of a spouse.

27. The board may request designation of a medical expert when interpretation of documents pertaining to the physical fitness of any officer under consideration by the board is desired.

28. As our Nation's expeditionary force-in-readiness tasked with accomplishing missions "in any clime and place," it is vitally important that selected commanding officers seek out and be assigned to locations across the Marine Corps enterprise. In making your slating recommendations, due consideration must be given to ensure that commanding officers are not routinely assigned to the same geographic locations.

29. The proceedings and recommendations of the board shall not be disclosed to any person by a member or recorder of the board, except as authorized or required by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Upon completion of its proceedings, the board shall forward its report to the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

30. The report of the board shall be in writing, shall be signed by each member of the board, as well as the recorders, and shall contain the names of the officers the board recommends for command. The report shall contain a recommended assignment, by type of command, for each of these officers. The report will also contain, at a minimum, the names of those officers recommended as alternates, listed in order of priority within their MOS and/or competitive category. The report shall contain statistics with respect to race, gender, and MOS. The report shall certify that the board has complied with all instructions contained in this precept. The report of the board shall certify that the board has carefully considered the record of each officer whose name was furnished to it and that, in the opinion of a majority of the members of the board, the officers recommended for selection by the board are fully qualified and best qualified for command to meet the needs of the Marine Corps from among those officers whose names were furnished to the board.

APPENDIX C. COMMAND QUESTIONNAIRE TEMPLATE

LtCol Command Questionnaire Template

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME:		MOS:	
EDIPI:		EMAIL:	

Current Billet:	
Personal/Family Issues:	
Deployed/Scheduled to Deploy? If so, return date?	
Deployment/family issues that would prevent you from taking command before May 2019? If so, explain.	
Specific Expertise/Areas to highlight:	

AVIATION ONLY	
Medically qualified for DIFOP status?	
Completed six month squadron CVN Deployment (7523 only)?	
MEU Deployment (7532 only)?	
Any fixed wing hours (R/W only)?	
FRS/MAWTS/Top Gun Instructor?	

Command Preference:

1	13
2	14
3	15
4	16
5	17
6	18
7	19
8	20
9	21
10	22
11	23
12	24

Preferences for Geographical Locations:

1
2
3
4

Intensity for Geographical Locations:

Overseas	East Coast:	
West Coast:	Hawaii:	None:

Most Important:

1
2
3

Intensity for Types:

Operating Forces:	Supporting Establishment:
Geographic Location:	None:

Additional Comments:

Figure 24. Command Questionnaire Template. Adapted from the actual FY19 Command Questionnaire

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APPENDIX D. LIST OF LTCOL CSB STRUNG COMMANDS

LtCol CSB Strung Commands

8006 (ANY MOS)	8007 (ANY GND COMBAT MOS)	0404/1302/3002	AVIATION
1ST RT BN, MCRD SD	1ST ANGLICO	CLB-1	H-HS, MCAS BEAUFORT
2D RT BN, MCRD SD	2D ANGLICO	CLB-11	H-HS, MCAS CAMPEN
3D RT BN, MCRD SD	5TH ANGLICO	CLB-13	H-HS, MCAS CHERRY PT
SPT BN RTR, MCRD SD	I-I 3D ANGLICO	CLB-15	H-HS, MCAS FUTENMA
1ST RT BN, MCRD PI	I-I 4TH ANGLICO	CLB-2	H-HS, MCAS IWAKUNI
2D RT BN, MCRD PI	I-I 6TH ANGLICO	CLB-22	H-HS, MCAS MIRAMAR
3D RT BN, MCRD PI	1ST MRSB	CLB-24	H-HS, MCAS NEW RIVER
4TH RT BN, MCRD PI	2D MRSB	CLB-26	H-HS, MCAS YUMA
SPT BN RTR, MCRD PI	3D MRSB	CLB-3	HT-18
8TH BN, USMEPCOM	1ST RECON BN	CLB-31	HT-28
HQBN, SOI, MCB CAMP PEN	2D RECON BN	CLB-4	NAMTRA MARUNIT, NEW RIVER
HQBN, SOI, MCB CAMP LEJ	3D RECON BN	CLB-5	MWHS-1
HQBN, MCB HAWAII	I-I 4TH RECON BN	CLB-6	MWHS-2
REGION 1 FRANKFURT	HQ BN, MAGTF TRAINING CMD	CLB-7	MWHS-3
REGION 2 ABU DAHBI, UAE	MCSF KINGS BAY, GA	CLB-8	MCAF QUANTICO
REGION 3 BANGKOK	MCSF BANGOR, WA	I-I, CLB-23	MCAS KANEOHE BAY
REGION 4 FT LAUDERDALE	WTBN, MCB CAMPLEJ	I-I, CLB-25	VMFT-401, MAG-41
REGION 5 FRANKFURT		I-I, CLB-451	VMR-1
REGION 6 JOHANNESBURG		I-I, CLB-453	VMU-2
REGION 7 FRANKFURT		MWSS-171, MAG-12	VT-6
REGION 8 FRANKFURT		MWSS-172, MAG-36	VT-22
REGION 9 FT LAUDERDALE		MWSS-271, MAG-31	VT-35
		MWSS-272, MAG-26	
		MWSS-273, MAG-31	
		MWSS-274, MAG-29	
		MWSS-371, MWSG-37	
		MWSS-372, MAG-39	
		MWSS-373, MWSG-37	
		MWSS-374, MAG-16	

Figure 25. List of LtCol CSB Strung Commands (FY15–FY19)

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APPENDIX E. SELECTION OUTCOMES BY FISCAL YEAR

Table 29. Slating to Command Types (FY15–FY19)

Odds of Being Slated to Command Type During Observation Period (FY15-FY19)

VARIABLES	(1) OPFOR	(2) SPTEST	(3) PMOS	(4) STRUNG	(5) P-VALUE
Captain (RS Cumulative)	1.271***	1.109***	1.243***	1.167***	0.010***
	[0.029]	[0.038]	[0.029]	[0.035]	
Major (RS Cumulative)	1.287***	1.226***	1.267***	1.256***	0.318
	[0.030]	[0.043]	[0.030]	[0.040]	
Rank O4	2.049***	0.827	2.214***	0.825	0.000***
	[0.242]	[0.158]	[0.273]	[0.141]	
Combat Service Support PMOS	0.659***	2.687***	0.454***	3.453***	0.000***
	[0.100]	[0.747]	[0.073]	[0.828]	
Aviation PMOS	1.734***	3.671***	2.261***	1.701*	0.043**
	[0.278]	[1.100]	[0.367]	[0.473]	
Time In Service	1.001	0.975	1.028	0.932***	0.019**
	[0.018]	[0.026]	[0.019]	[0.024]	
Female	0.778	2.431***	0.952	1.604	0.012**
	[0.248]	[0.764]	[0.318]	[0.484]	
Race Other (Non-White)	0.680**	1.338	0.803	0.954	0.121
	[0.113]	[0.295]	[0.136]	[0.203]	
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit	0.884	0.566***	0.911	0.589***	0.094*
	[0.098]	[0.097]	[0.104]	[0.092]	
STEM Degrees	1.012	0.801	1.086	0.683	0.465
	[0.149]	[0.195]	[0.162]	[0.165]	
Number of Deployments	1.106***	1.053*	1.096***	1.072***	0.599
	[0.024]	[0.032]	[0.024]	[0.029]	
PFT Other (Not 1st Class)	0.474***	0.910	0.535***	0.668	0.257
	[0.113]	[0.290]	[0.130]	[0.208]	
High PFT (>=285)	1.178	1.377	1.132	1.411*	0.772
	[0.155]	[0.280]	[0.155]	[0.253]	
CFT Other (Not 1st Class)	0.704	0.675	0.668*	0.764	0.977
	[0.152]	[0.235]	[0.148]	[0.242]	
High CFT (>=285)	1.370**	1.046	1.279	1.185	0.404
	[0.200]	[0.231]	[0.192]	[0.242]	
Rifle Other (Not Expert)	0.985	0.719	0.834	1.018	0.377
	[0.136]	[0.160]	[0.122]	[0.191]	
Pistol Other (Not Expert)	0.818*	1.037	0.778**	1.092	0.490
	[0.099]	[0.195]	[0.098]	[0.183]	
Meritorious Service Medal	1.457***	2.084***	1.619***	1.472*	0.400
	[0.197]	[0.506]	[0.224]	[0.320]	
Bronze Star	1.620***	1.220	1.911***	0.857	0.071*
	[0.232]	[0.297]	[0.281]	[0.191]	
Recruiting Service Ribbon	1.914***	0.950	1.814***	1.225	0.227
	[0.359]	[0.320]	[0.354]	[0.333]	
Constant	0***	0***	0***	0***	
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	
N	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838

Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

Table 30. Slating to Operational Forces Command (by FY)

Odds of Being Slated to OPFOR Command (by FY)

VARIABLES	(1) TOTAL	(2) FY2015	(3) FY2016	(4) FY2017	(5) FY2018	(6) FY2019	(7) P-VALUE
Captain (RS Cumulative)	1.271***	1.410***	1.243***	1.402***	1.231***	1.260***	0.238
	[0.029]	[0.077]	[0.062]	[0.086]	[0.066]	[0.071]	
Major (RS Cumulative)	1.287***	1.196***	1.310***	1.452***	1.367***	1.272***	0.161
	[0.030]	[0.061]	[0.072]	[0.091]	[0.076]	[0.070]	
Rank O4	2.049***	2.315***	2.005***	1.734*	2.221***	2.338***	0.946
	[0.242]	[0.617]	[0.530]	[0.533]	[0.614]	[0.680]	
Combat Service Support PMOS	0.659***	0.492*	0.812	0.512*	0.665	0.730	0.830
	[0.100]	[0.179]	[0.273]	[0.192]	[0.224]	[0.269]	
Aviation PMOS	1.734***	1.496	3.874***	1.409	1.436	1.643	0.313
	[0.278]	[0.545]	[1.485]	[0.541]	[0.519]	[0.652]	
Time In Service	1.001	0.969	0.979	0.995	0.993	1.034	0.799
	[0.018]	[0.041]	[0.039]	[0.047]	[0.039]	[0.039]	
Female	0.778	1.728	1.625	0.233	0.817	0.625	0.334
	[0.248]	[1.152]	[1.282]	[0.272]	[0.576]	[0.434]	
Race Other (Non-White)	0.680**	1.382	1.078	0.477	0.398**	0.556	0.109
	[0.113]	[0.498]	[0.432]	[0.225]	[0.150]	[0.212]	
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit	0.884	0.943	0.879	0.813	0.682	0.951	0.888
	[0.098]	[0.242]	[0.222]	[0.221]	[0.173]	[0.257]	
STEM Degrees	1.012	1.091	0.456**	1.737	1.597	0.932	0.050**
	[0.149]	[0.334]	[0.170]	[0.643]	[0.559]	[0.318]	
Number of Deployments	1.106***	1.107**	1.080	1.051	1.194***	1.139**	0.484
	[0.024]	[0.053]	[0.051]	[0.057]	[0.063]	[0.064]	
PFT Other (Not 1st Class)	0.474***	0.860	0.754	0.674	0.314**	0.152**	0.223
	[0.113]	[0.392]	[0.510]	[0.389]	[0.153]	[0.120]	
High PFT (>=285)	1.178	1.306	1.654*	1.016	1.379	0.913	0.651
	[0.155]	[0.415]	[0.503]	[0.336]	[0.396]	[0.285]	
CFT Other (Not 1st Class)	0.704	0.692	0.585	0.190*	1.284	0.527	0.499
	[0.152]	[0.316]	[0.342]	[0.175]	[0.580]	[0.268]	
High CFT (>=285)	1.370**	1.360	4.068***	1.143	0.528*	1.216	0.071*
	[0.200]	[0.526]	[2.033]	[0.532]	[0.201]	[0.333]	
Rifle Other (Not Expert)	0.985	0.749	1.700*	1.365	0.808	0.733	0.184
	[0.136]	[0.233]	[0.513]	[0.484]	[0.262]	[0.255]	
Pistol Other (Not Expert)	0.818*	0.726	0.819	0.754	0.680	1.013	0.893
	[0.099]	[0.198]	[0.220]	[0.228]	[0.194]	[0.296]	
Meritorious Service Medal	1.457***	0.999	4.150***	0.868	1.997**	1.080	0.006***
	[0.197]	[0.289]	[1.526]	[0.272]	[0.656]	[0.345]	
Bronze Star	1.620***	1.008	1.593	1.875*	2.683***	1.256	0.203
	[0.232]	[0.339]	[0.517]	[0.649]	[0.835]	[0.482]	
Recruiting Service Ribbon	1.914***	0.909	1.693	2.864**	2.330**	2.340**	0.557
	[0.359]	[0.466]	[0.722]	[1.377]	[0.972]	[1.014]	
Constant	0***	0***	0***	0***	0***	0***	
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	
N	2,838	646	546	561	560	525	

Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

Table 31. Slating to Supporting Establishment Command (by FY)

Odds of Being Slated to SPTEST Command (by FY)

VARIABLES	(1) TOTAL	(2) FY2015	(3) FY2016	(4) FY2017	(5) FY2018	(6) FY2019	(7) P-VALUE
Captain (RS Cumulative)	1.109***	1.046	1.253***	1.005	1.092	1.109	0.336
	[0.038]	[0.086]	[0.098]	[0.085]	[0.091]	[0.084]	
Major (RS Cumulative)	1.226***	1.415***	1.137	1.138	1.311***	1.283***	0.106
	[0.043]	[0.127]	[0.089]	[0.097]	[0.108]	[0.104]	
Rank O4	0.827	1.036	0.686	1.572	0.866	0.591	0.621
	[0.158]	[0.484]	[0.297]	[0.791]	[0.377]	[0.256]	
Combat Service Support PMOS	2.687***	4.879*	1.874	3.517*	1.498	7.021**	0.449
	[0.747]	[4.131]	[1.023]	[2.390]	[0.864]	[5.350]	
Aviation PMOS	3.671***	9.836**	2.169	4.833**	1.923	12.04***	0.277
	[1.100]	[8.861]	[1.345]	[3.497]	[1.224]	[9.541]	
Time In Service	0.975	0.996	0.933	1.048	0.889*	1.010	0.365
	[0.026]	[0.072]	[0.058]	[0.069]	[0.059]	[0.057]	
Female	2.431***	3.406	0.756	3.744*	3.693**	2.816	0.840
	[0.764]	[2.604]	[0.907]	[2.944]	[2.416]	[1.827]	
Race Other (Non-White)	1.338	2.072	2.427*	0.350	1.814	0.898	0.185
	[0.295]	[1.190]	[1.217]	[0.273]	[0.819]	[0.433]	
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit	0.566***	1.312	0.212***	0.372**	0.830	0.743	0.013**
	[0.097]	[0.616]	[0.089]	[0.156]	[0.329]	[0.297]	
STEM Degrees	0.801	1.168	1.194	0.394	0.860	0.441	0.590
	[0.195]	[0.621]	[0.602]	[0.308]	[0.516]	[0.262]	
Number of Deployments	1.053*	1.070	1.017	0.956	1.119*	1.147*	0.470
	[0.032]	[0.066]	[0.073]	[0.095]	[0.070]	[0.089]	
PFT Other (Not 1st Class)	0.910	1.043	1.281		1.351	1.580	0.947
	[0.290]	[0.771]	[1.068]		[0.847]	[1.025]	
High PFT (>=285)	1.377	1.829	2.176	1.448	1.426	0.920	0.752
	[0.280]	[0.936]	[1.033]	[0.683]	[0.634]	[0.467]	
CFT Other (Not 1st Class)	0.675	2.405	0.194	3.038	0.585	0.252	0.049**
	[0.235]	[1.899]	[0.219]	[2.745]	[0.516]	[0.218]	
High CFT (>=285)	1.046	2.764	0.554	1.370	1.477	1.174	0.534
	[0.231]	[2.131]	[0.304]	[1.071]	[0.999]	[0.492]	
Rifle Other (Not Expert)	0.719	1.174	0.547	0.913	0.596	0.395	0.575
	[0.160]	[0.563]	[0.284]	[0.497]	[0.304]	[0.236]	
Pistol Other (Not Expert)	1.037	1.999	1.374	0.900	0.890	0.361*	0.152
	[0.195]	[0.923]	[0.571]	[0.416]	[0.395]	[0.192]	
Meritorious Service Medal	2.084***	2.262	1.635	2.365	2.627	2.353	0.969
	[0.506]	[1.284]	[0.883]	[1.390]	[1.618]	[1.251]	
Bronze Star	1.220	1.287	0.843	1.884	0.969	1.751	0.756
	[0.297]	[0.789]	[0.452]	[1.022]	[0.516]	[1.110]	
Recruiting Service Ribbon	0.950	0.702	0.526	1.418	0.920	1.872	0.795
	[0.320]	[0.761]	[0.415]	[1.013]	[0.729]	[1.292]	
Constant	0***	0***	0***	1.57e-08*	0***	0***	
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	
N	2,838	646	546	513	560	525	

Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

Table 32. Slating to a Primary MOS Command (by FY)

Odds of Being Slated to PMOS Command (by FY)

VARIABLES	(1) TOTAL	(2) FY2015	(3) FY2016	(4) FY2017	(5) FY2018	(6) FY2019	(7) P-VALUE
Captain (RS Cumulative)	1.243***	1.356***	1.216***	1.399***	1.147**	1.281***	0.095*
	[0.029]	[0.076]	[0.064]	[0.090]	[0.064]	[0.075]	
Major (RS Cumulative)	1.267***	1.207***	1.255***	1.434***	1.329***	1.251***	0.267
	[0.030]	[0.065]	[0.071]	[0.092]	[0.076]	[0.070]	
Rank O4	2.214***	2.404***	1.887**	2.191**	2.931***	2.408***	0.865
	[0.273]	[0.671]	[0.526]	[0.699]	[0.857]	[0.725]	
Combat Service Support PMOS	0.454***	0.462**	0.427**	0.363**	0.383***	0.560	0.943
	[0.073]	[0.179]	[0.152]	[0.146]	[0.138]	[0.218]	
Aviation PMOS	2.261***	2.372**	4.220***	1.689	2.006*	2.846**	0.494
	[0.367]	[0.896]	[1.624]	[0.671]	[0.738]	[1.163]	
Time In Service	1.028	1.009	0.996	1.009	1.024	1.057	0.845
	[0.019]	[0.044]	[0.041]	[0.050]	[0.041]	[0.041]	
Female	0.952	1.631	0.290	0.973	2.227	0.710	0.435
	[0.318]	[1.329]	[0.345]	[0.900]	[1.415]	[0.499]	
Race Other (Non-White)	0.803	1.287	1.687	0.255**	0.793	0.534	0.049**
	[0.136]	[0.490]	[0.666]	[0.141]	[0.287]	[0.210]	
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit	0.911	0.987	0.745	0.838	0.702	1.083	0.753
	[0.104]	[0.265]	[0.195]	[0.236]	[0.185]	[0.301]	
STEM Degrees	1.086	1.291	0.499*	1.747	1.244	1.027	0.165
	[0.162]	[0.400]	[0.188]	[0.672]	[0.450]	[0.351]	
Number of Deployments	1.096***	1.189***	1.008	0.994	1.207***	1.104*	0.011**
	[0.024]	[0.062]	[0.056]	[0.060]	[0.063]	[0.065]	
PFT Other (Not 1st Class)	0.535***	0.552	0.503	0.535	0.602	0.446	0.997
	[0.130]	[0.281]	[0.397]	[0.331]	[0.284]	[0.279]	
High PFT (>=285)	1.132	1.004	1.396	0.881	1.811*	1.044	0.446
	[0.155]	[0.335]	[0.445]	[0.300]	[0.549]	[0.340]	
CFT Other (Not 1st Class)	0.668*	1.405	0.561	0.847	1.010	0.121***	0.104
	[0.148]	[0.624]	[0.337]	[0.634]	[0.453]	[0.094]	
High CFT (>=285)	1.279	2.806**	2.899**	1.694	0.477*	0.897	0.013**
	[0.192]	[1.266]	[1.447]	[0.867]	[0.186]	[0.252]	
Rifle Other (Not Expert)	0.834	0.628	1.696*	1.125	0.502*	0.566	0.043**
	[0.122]	[0.209]	[0.536]	[0.422]	[0.177]	[0.212]	
Pistol Other (Not Expert)	0.778**	0.512**	0.895	0.648	0.901	0.874	0.610
	[0.098]	[0.152]	[0.249]	[0.207]	[0.265]	[0.266]	
Meritorious Service Medal	1.619***	1.078	6.011***	0.667	1.979**	1.750*	0.000***
	[0.224]	[0.318]	[2.416]	[0.214]	[0.664]	[0.585]	
Bronze Star	1.911***	1.679	1.571	2.378**	3.128***	1.611	0.494
	[0.281]	[0.574]	[0.531]	[0.862]	[1.002]	[0.645]	
Recruiting Service Ribbon	1.814***	0.763	2.109*	2.123	2.531**	1.838	0.599
	[0.354]	[0.421]	[0.911]	[1.088]	[1.070]	[0.859]	
Constant	0***	0***	0***	0***	0***	0***	
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	
N	2,838	646	546	561	560	525	

Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

Table 33. Slating to Strung Commands (by FY)

Odds of Being Slated to Strung Command (by FY)

VARIABLES	(1) TOTAL	(2) FY2015	(3) FY2016	(4) FY2017	(5) FY2018	(6) FY2019	(7) P-VALUE
Captain (RS Cumulative)	1.167***	1.287***	1.258***	1.092	1.254***	1.104	0.306
	[0.035]	[0.105]	[0.084]	[0.082]	[0.090]	[0.078]	
Major (RS Cumulative)	1.256***	1.363***	1.207***	1.184**	1.365***	1.327***	0.418
	[0.040]	[0.113]	[0.086]	[0.092]	[0.102]	[0.105]	
Rank O4	0.825	1.040	1.004	0.926	0.599	0.709	0.833
	[0.141]	[0.458]	[0.368]	[0.431]	[0.231]	[0.287]	
Combat Service Support PMOS	3.453***	1.868	4.301***	3.547**	2.809**	5.690***	0.794
	[0.828]	[1.356]	[2.215]	[2.060]	[1.403]	[3.393]	
Aviation PMOS	1.701*	1.567	1.761	2.242	0.962	2.859	0.832
	[0.473]	[1.233]	[1.079]	[1.493]	[0.555]	[1.897]	
Time In Service	0.932***	0.916	0.918	1.004	0.857**	0.980	0.339
	[0.024]	[0.067]	[0.051]	[0.062]	[0.054]	[0.055]	
Female	1.604	2.514	2.355	1.291	1.208	1.696	0.935
	[0.484]	[1.753]	[1.857]	[1.141]	[0.873]	[1.104]	
Race Other (Non-White)	0.954	2.465*	1.202	0.896	0.544	0.909	0.311
	[0.203]	[1.336]	[0.594]	[0.488]	[0.271]	[0.421]	
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit	0.589***	1.119	0.371***	0.397**	0.791	0.633	0.221
	[0.092]	[0.485]	[0.129]	[0.152]	[0.277]	[0.238]	
STEM Degrees	0.683	0.675	1.004	0.485	1.347	0.280*	0.418
	[0.165]	[0.388]	[0.484]	[0.325]	[0.690]	[0.211]	
Number of Deployments	1.072***	0.988	1.100*	1.089	1.090	1.190**	0.233
	[0.029]	[0.065]	[0.061]	[0.081]	[0.062]	[0.086]	
PFT Other (Not 1st Class)	0.668	1.812	1.813	0.393	0.369	0.346	0.217
	[0.208]	[1.209]	[1.265]	[0.415]	[0.256]	[0.288]	
High PFT (>=285)	1.411*	2.969**	2.824**	1.924	0.999	0.702	0.091*
	[0.253]	[1.444]	[1.140]	[0.862]	[0.398]	[0.315]	
CFT Other (Not 1st Class)	0.764	0.130*	0.275	0.326	1.125	1.582	0.170
	[0.242]	[0.151]	[0.247]	[0.379]	[0.753]	[0.881]	
High CFT (>=285)	1.185	0.462	0.929	0.570	1.358	1.949*	0.263
	[0.242]	[0.263]	[0.505]	[0.336]	[0.755]	[0.778]	
Rifle Other (Not Expert)	1.018	1.292	0.776	1.211	1.277	0.858	0.892
	[0.191]	[0.584]	[0.333]	[0.586]	[0.513]	[0.411]	
Pistol Other (Not Expert)	1.092	3.276***	1.135	1.166	0.606	0.611	0.049**
	[0.183]	[1.444]	[0.415]	[0.481]	[0.246]	[0.264]	
Meritorious Service Medal	1.472*	1.664	0.923	5.477**	2.217	0.934	0.250
	[0.320]	[0.888]	[0.427]	[4.217]	[1.208]	[0.430]	
Bronze Star	0.857	0.198**	0.905	1.193	0.797	1.044	0.391
	[0.191]	[0.158]	[0.441]	[0.609]	[0.366]	[0.581]	
Recruiting Service Ribbon	1.225	0.809	0.529	2.044	0.799	2.758*	0.251
	[0.333]	[0.693]	[0.360]	[1.207]	[0.552]	[1.517]	
Constant	0***	0***	0***	0***	0***	0***	
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	
N	2,838	646	546	561	560	525	

Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

Table 34. Slating to PMOS-OPFOR Command (by FY)

Odds of Being Slated to PMOS-OPFOR Command (by FY)

VARIABLES	(1) TOTAL	(2) FY2015	(3) FY2016	(4) FY2017	(5) FY2018	(6) FY2019	(7) P-VALUE
Captain (RS Cumulative)	1.259***	1.397***	1.224***	1.470***	1.148**	1.346***	0.025**
	[0.032]	[0.085]	[0.067]	[0.102]	[0.066]	[0.089]	
Major (RS Cumulative)	1.255***	1.160***	1.281***	1.421***	1.340***	1.215***	0.165
	[0.032]	[0.065]	[0.077]	[0.097]	[0.079]	[0.073]	
Rank O4	2.349***	3.021***	1.982**	2.092**	2.716***	2.982***	0.770
	[0.307]	[0.897]	[0.583]	[0.717]	[0.819]	[1.008]	
Combat Service Support PMOS	0.365***	0.281***	0.429**	0.224***	0.367***	0.362**	0.860
	[0.063]	[0.120]	[0.163]	[0.100]	[0.137]	[0.157]	
Aviation PMOS	2.093***	1.932*	5.447***	1.271	1.871*	2.345**	0.114
	[0.352]	[0.749]	[2.224]	[0.520]	[0.696]	[1.015]	
Time In Service	1.016	0.992	0.988	1.003	1.018	1.030	0.955
	[0.020]	[0.046]	[0.043]	[0.054]	[0.043]	[0.045]	
Female	0.654	1.368	0.451	0.508	0.954	0.610	0.903
	[0.265]	[1.233]	[0.536]	[0.625]	[0.778]	[0.515]	
Race Other (Non-White)	0.743	1.670	1.677	0.245**	0.516*	0.459*	0.017**
	[0.138]	[0.652]	[0.708]	[0.152]	[0.207]	[0.214]	
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit	0.992	0.877	1.024	0.972	0.781	1.182	0.872
	[0.120]	[0.246]	[0.285]	[0.292]	[0.212]	[0.358]	
STEM Degrees	1.161	1.226	0.501*	1.980*	1.565	1.233	0.128
	[0.180]	[0.397]	[0.199]	[0.797]	[0.575]	[0.450]	
Number of Deployments	1.078***	1.161***	0.997	0.994	1.159***	1.096	0.062*
	[0.025]	[0.061]	[0.060]	[0.064]	[0.060]	[0.071]	
PFT Other (Not 1st Class)	0.550**	0.817	0.659	0.759	0.452	0.219*	0.539
	[0.144]	[0.417]	[0.522]	[0.482]	[0.232]	[0.183]	
High PFT (>=285)	1.148	1.026	1.454	1.010	1.639	1.087	0.741
	[0.164]	[0.359]	[0.484]	[0.359]	[0.505]	[0.381]	
CFT Other (Not 1st Class)	0.616**	0.857	0.496	0.320	1.053	0.166**	0.320
	[0.149]	[0.416]	[0.328]	[0.310]	[0.489]	[0.132]	
High CFT (>=285)	1.333*	2.070	3.887**	1.645	0.440**	0.927	0.022**
	[0.214]	[0.962]	[2.218]	[0.903]	[0.179]	[0.283]	
Rifle Other (Not Expert)	0.951	0.736	1.855*	1.328	0.644	0.589	0.069*
	[0.144]	[0.255]	[0.616]	[0.520]	[0.228]	[0.241]	
Pistol Other (Not Expert)	0.760**	0.485**	0.797	0.779	0.797	0.944	0.683
	[0.102]	[0.153]	[0.235]	[0.262]	[0.244]	[0.314]	
Meritorious Service Medal	1.453***	0.998	5.441***	0.595	1.797*	1.382	0.000***
	[0.207]	[0.306]	[2.247]	[0.203]	[0.609]	[0.484]	
Bronze Star	1.905***	1.471	2.191**	2.113**	2.757***	1.508	0.656
	[0.293]	[0.534]	[0.775]	[0.805]	[0.895]	[0.645]	
Recruiting Service Ribbon	1.929***	0.672	2.373*	1.575	2.565**	2.546*	0.481
	[0.393]	[0.406]	[1.054]	[0.884]	[1.099]	[1.257]	
Constant	0***	0***	0***	0***	0***	0***	
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	
N	2,838	646	546	561	560	525	

Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

Table 35. Slating to PMOS-SPTEST Command (by FY)

Odds of Being Slated to PMOS-SPTEST Command (by FY)

VARIABLES	(1) TOTAL	(2) FY2015	(3) FY2016	(4) FY2017	(5) FY2018	(6) FY2019	(7) P-VALUE
Captain (RS Cumulative)	1.048	1.113	1.103	0.921	1.016	1.010	0.861
	[0.056]	[0.158]	[0.146]	[0.114]	[0.169]	[0.115]	
Major (RS Cumulative)	1.194***	1.437**	1.041	1.277*	1.076	1.238*	0.201
	[0.064]	[0.210]	[0.142]	[0.169]	[0.180]	[0.141]	
Rank O4	1.088	0.349	1.160	2.152	3.462	0.818	0.317
	[0.321]	[0.274]	[0.846]	[1.676]	[3.095]	[0.513]	
Combat Service Support PMOS	1.610	3.902	0.552	4.267	0.424	3.061	0.178
	[0.601]	[3.857]	[0.425]	[4.071]	[0.492]	[2.780]	
Aviation PMOS	2.162*	5.517	0.544	5.065	0.872	5.667*	0.205
	[0.893]	[6.133]	[0.514]	[5.148]	[1.113]	[5.378]	
Time In Service	1.061	1.115	1.036	1.010	1.018	1.115	0.885
	[0.040]	[0.118]	[0.099]	[0.105]	[0.096]	[0.077]	
Female	2.374*	3.168		3.817	27.14***	1.263	0.024**
	[1.215]	[4.696]		[5.006]	[32.439]	[1.432]	
Race Other (Non-White)	1.128		1.459	0.383	9.185**	0.828	0.114
	[0.388]		[1.312]	[0.426]	[8.220]	[0.542]	
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit	0.597*	4.767	0.123***	0.405	0.296	0.760	0.012**
	[0.160]	[4.587]	[0.100]	[0.253]	[0.253]	[0.438]	
STEM Degrees	0.646	1.698	0.460	0.413		0.431	0.597
	[0.268]	[1.336]	[0.515]	[0.451]		[0.357]	
Number of Deployments	1.111***	1.179*	1.127	1.031	1.310***	1.125	0.244
	[0.043]	[0.113]	[0.148]	[0.118]	[0.135]	[0.118]	
PFT Other (Not 1st Class)	0.572				2.743	1.831	0.597
	[0.311]				[2.882]	[1.582]	
High PFT (>=285)	0.957	1.012	0.830	0.548	1.891	0.901	0.897
	[0.326]	[0.910]	[0.723]	[0.455]	[1.663]	[0.654]	
CFT Other (Not 1st Class)	1.057	16.64***	1.168	6.543*	0.466		0.001***
	[0.473]	[17.484]	[1.454]	[7.201]	[0.690]		
High CFT (>=285)	0.963	17.04*	0.781	1.491	0.572	0.914	0.194
	[0.316]	[25.296]	[0.726]	[1.597]	[0.741]	[0.535]	
Rifle Other (Not Expert)	0.342**	0.220	0.553	0.295		0.366	0.031**
	[0.154]	[0.278]	[0.513]	[0.332]		[0.313]	
Pistol Other (Not Expert)	1.043	0.632	1.668	0.422	3.136	0.898	0.476
	[0.307]	[0.469]	[1.177]	[0.348]	[2.465]	[0.579]	
Meritorious Service Medal	2.887**	1.733		1.101	2.273	7.328*	0.365
	[1.236]	[1.639]		[0.804]	[2.773]	[8.145]	
Bronze Star	1.342	2.489	0.160	2.563	2.473	1.238	0.054*
	[0.463]	[2.046]	[0.185]	[1.923]	[2.437]	[1.091]	
Recruiting Service Ribbon	0.934	1.123	0.675	2.700	1.681		0.832
	[0.455]	[1.379]	[0.762]	[2.484]	[2.121]		
Constant	0***	0***	1.35e-07	9.01e-10	1.55e-07	0**	
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	
N	2,838	472	385	513	362	419	

Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

Table 36. Slating to Strung-OPFOR Command (by FY)

Odds of Being Slated to Strung-OPFOR Command (by FY)

VARIABLES	(1) TOTAL	(2) FY2015	(3) FY2016	(4) FY2017	(5) FY2018	(6) FY2019	(7) P-VALUE
Captain (RS Cumulative)	1.161***	1.396***	1.131	1.085	1.323***	1.033	0.171
	[0.045]	[0.141]	[0.097]	[0.106]	[0.132]	[0.102]	
Major (RS Cumulative)	1.252***	1.292**	1.252**	1.306**	1.263**	1.332***	0.993
	[0.053]	[0.134]	[0.131]	[0.142]	[0.125]	[0.145]	
Rank O4	0.995	0.642	1.976	0.790	0.891	1.005	0.603
	[0.225]	[0.372]	[0.996]	[0.504]	[0.452]	[0.574]	
Combat Service Support PMOS	2.820***	1.718	3.514*	4.270**	2.995*	3.104*	0.947
	[0.794]	[1.351]	[2.273]	[3.150]	[1.831]	[2.049]	
Aviation PMOS	0.396**	0.313	0.360	0.840	0.230	0.340	0.943
	[0.169]	[0.332]	[0.362]	[0.856]	[0.216]	[0.341]	
Time In Service	0.958	0.922	1.000	0.917	0.913	1.056	0.530
	[0.031]	[0.085]	[0.077]	[0.081]	[0.071]	[0.072]	
Female	0.977	1.756	2.726		0.667	0.555	0.628
	[0.430]	[1.558]	[2.443]		[0.760]	[0.642]	
Race Other (Non-White)	0.631	0.599	0.153	1.468	0.292	1.119	0.181
	[0.193]	[0.511]	[0.176]	[0.954]	[0.229]	[0.684]	
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit	0.654**	1.147	0.624	0.453	0.551	0.664	0.806
	[0.136]	[0.634]	[0.292]	[0.236]	[0.265]	[0.346]	
STEM Degrees	0.448**	0.614	0.271	0.563	1.085		0.631
	[0.182]	[0.497]	[0.295]	[0.477]	[0.870]		
Number of Deployments	1.115***	0.988	1.205***	1.202**	1.125	1.225**	0.045**
	[0.036]	[0.080]	[0.079]	[0.099]	[0.083]	[0.114]	
PFT Other (Not 1st Class)	0.348**	0.579	0.897	0.821	0.155*		0.495
	[0.170]	[0.527]	[1.006]	[0.905]	[0.172]		
High PFT (>=285)	1.177	2.872	1.817	1.028	0.791	0.632	0.458
	[0.283]	[1.846]	[0.961]	[0.688]	[0.449]	[0.357]	
CFT Other (Not 1st Class)	1.186	0.177	1.111		1.505	3.173*	0.235
	[0.448]	[0.219]	[1.083]		[1.141]	[2.160]	
High CFT (>=285)	1.235	0.297*	3.205	0.396	0.979	2.725*	0.075*
	[0.338]	[0.208]	[2.928]	[0.286]	[0.689]	[1.514]	
Rifle Other (Not Expert)	1.026	0.647	1.256	0.926	1.270	1.513	0.929
	[0.264]	[0.413]	[0.743]	[0.681]	[0.683]	[0.934]	
Pistol Other (Not Expert)	1.136	2.955*	0.780	0.860	0.734	1.602	0.435
	[0.254]	[1.669]	[0.402]	[0.504]	[0.407]	[0.849]	
Meritorious Service Medal	1.197	0.969	0.819	5.345	1.980	0.623	0.609
	[0.366]	[0.706]	[0.560]	[6.117]	[1.598]	[0.416]	
Bronze Star	0.705	0.205*	0.470	0.988	1.186	0.569	0.566
	[0.200]	[0.184]	[0.355]	[0.666]	[0.664]	[0.404]	
Recruiting Service Ribbon	1.377	2.004	0.516	4.126*	0.693	1.841	0.418
	[0.447]	[1.766]	[0.462]	[3.000]	[0.598]	[1.385]	
Constant	0***	0***	0***	0***	0***	0***	
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	
N	2,838	646	546	500	560	379	

Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

Table 37. Slating to Strung-SPTEST Command (by FY)

Odds of Being Slated to Strung-SPTEST Command (by FY)

VARIABLES	(1) TOTAL	(2) FY2015	(3) FY2016	(4) FY2017	(5) FY2018	(6) FY2019	(7) P-VALUE
Captain (RV Point Increase)	1.143***	1.094	1.311***	1.076	1.141	1.163	0.476
	[0.049]	[0.140]	[0.126]	[0.123]	[0.112]	[0.118]	
Major (RV Point Increase)	1.224***	1.512***	1.171*	1.026	1.430***	1.299**	0.045**
	[0.055]	[0.204]	[0.112]	[0.113]	[0.149]	[0.147]	
Rank O4	0.694	2.193	0.513	1.262	0.457	0.420	0.555
	[0.169]	[1.543]	[0.277]	[0.865]	[0.244]	[0.252]	
Combat Service Support PMOS	4.203***	4.147e+06	4.024*	2.324	2.880	25.75**	0.456
	[1.769]	[8.997e+09]	[3.095]	[2.209]	[2.432]	[34.629]	
Aviation PMOS	5.635***	1.900e+07	4.972*	4.033	3.167	36.57***	0.485
	[2.495]	[4.122e+10]	[4.272]	[3.982]	[2.819]	[50.170]	
Time In Service	0.906**	0.907	0.879	1.079	0.806**	0.860	0.018**
	[0.035]	[0.106]	[0.072]	[0.092]	[0.082]	[0.096]	
Female	2.261**	3.938	1.837	3.573	1.798	4.260*	0.843
	[0.855]	[4.066]	[2.301]	[3.500]	[1.572]	[3.498]	
Race Other (Non-White)	1.450	13.71***	2.784*	0.350	0.967	0.809	0.271
	[0.403]	[11.238]	[1.694]	[0.387]	[0.605]	[0.574]	
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit	0.569***	1.459	0.246***	0.319**	1.123	0.733	0.127
	[0.124]	[1.046]	[0.126]	[0.182]	[0.546]	[0.394]	
STEM Degrees	0.882	1.014	1.612	0.450	1.419	0.449	0.562
	[0.260]	[0.785]	[0.938]	[0.487]	[0.919]	[0.371]	
Number of Deployments	0.999	0.996	0.970	0.890	1.056	1.136	0.478
	[0.043]	[0.107]	[0.091]	[0.134]	[0.088]	[0.125]	
PFT Other (Not 1st Class)	1.243	4.738	2.747		0.853	1.555	0.738
	[0.481]	[4.696]	[2.449]		[0.719]	[1.478]	
High PFT (>=285)	1.646**	3.025	3.702**	3.051*	1.176	0.845	0.235
	[0.409]	[2.179]	[2.167]	[1.840]	[0.625]	[0.605]	
CFT Other (Not 1st Class)	0.405*			1.112	0.534	0.395	0.528
	[0.222]			[1.610]	[0.651]	[0.403]	
High CFT (>=285)	1.084	1.423	0.408	1.033	1.449	1.547	0.484
	[0.310]	[1.222]	[0.270]	[1.086]	[1.177]	[0.918]	
Rifle Other (Not Expert)	1.005	3.528*	0.475	1.610	1.138	0.464	0.478
	[0.259]	[2.381]	[0.303]	[1.073]	[0.632]	[0.392]	
Pistol Other (Not Expert)	1.049	3.981*	1.193	1.590	0.610	0.0908**	0.136
	[0.249]	[2.838]	[0.615]	[0.933]	[0.342]	[0.100]	
Meritorious Service Medal	1.692*	3.065	0.999	6.918*	2.153	1.072	0.345
	[0.493]	[2.439]	[0.605]	[7.602]	[1.529]	[0.668]	
Bronze Star	1.104	0.173	1.498	1.307	0.433	3.100	0.300
	[0.365]	[0.298]	[0.944]	[1.015]	[0.348]	[2.680]	
Recruiting Service Ribbon	1.000		0.567	0.706	0.832	5.275**	0.308
	[0.450]		[0.622]	[0.810]	[0.932]	[4.181]	
Constant	0***	0***	0***	8.27e-08	0***	0***	
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	
N	2,838	599	490	513	560	525	

Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major. All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert.

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