

By, With, and Through:
Capacity Building and the Canadian Armed Forces

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

By, With, and Through: Capacity Building and the Canadian Armed Forces, by COL Yannick Michaud, Canadian Army, 52 pages.

In November 2017, the Government of Canada announced a new capacity-building mission in support of the United Nations. When considering the employment of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) around the world, capacity building currently represents the vast majority of CAF operations. This raises two important questions. Why does the Canadian government favor capacity building operations? What drives the Canadian public support for international operations and does capacity building meet these expectations?

This monograph argues that capacity-building missions are uniquely suited to meet the current government's intent and the expectations of Canadians for the use of the Canadian military. By understanding why the government and people favor one type of mission over another, the CAF's leadership can shape military advice on the employment of military forces, drive force generation requirements, and provide a most likely scenario for the development of training, doctrine, and organizational structures.

To support this thesis, this monograph examines the government's intent for the CAF as stated in the foreign and defense policies. Research reveals five key objectives for the use of military force overseas: contributing to global stability, strengthening multilateral institutions, reinforcing Canadian-US military relationships, countering global threats, and maintaining a combat credible force. Using academic papers, research polls, and reports on CAF operations, the monograph also examines how Canadians influence government policies through public support in terms of three concerns. Canadians want to understand clear national security links and military objectives. They also judge CAF operations in terms of acceptable costs of risk of casualties combined with the length of the mission. The monograph concludes with why capacity-building best reconcile the Canadian government's intent while maintaining public support.

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Acronyms

ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
BPC	Building Partner Capacity
CA	Canadian Army
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
CANSOFCOM	Canadian Special Operations Forces Command
CSA	Chief of Staff US Army
CTAT	Canadian Training and Advisory Team
CTCBP	Counter-Terrorism Capacity-Building Program
DPR	Defence Policy Review
GAC	Global Affairs Canada
IAG	Illegally Armed Group
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
MTCP	Military Training and Cooperation Program
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORAD	North American Air Defense
OMLT	Observer Mentor Liaison Team
PM	Prime Minister
PSTC	Peace Support Training Centre
SFA	Security Force Assistance
UAF	Ukrainian Armed Forces
UN	United Nations
VEO	Violent Extremist Organizations

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Introduction

Canada is a strong supporter of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping and will continue to play an important role by contributing high-end capabilities and specialized training ... Canada has also made a new pledge to develop and implement innovative training for peace operations. The Canadian Armed Forces will help enhance the overall effectiveness of UN operations.

—The Honorable Prime Minister Justin Trudeau

In November 2017, the Government of Canada hosted the United Nations (UN) Defence Ministers Peacekeeping conference, where it announced a new Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) mission. As highlighted in the quote above, Prime Minister (PM) Trudeau said that the CAF will contribute to the UN peace support operations in an innovative way, by training UN forces instead of providing traditional peacekeeping forces.¹ According to the PM, “Training support will include a Canadian Training and Advisory Team (CTAT) to work with a partner nation before — and importantly, during — a deployment to enhance the partner nation’s contribution to a given mission.”² The Minister of National Defence, the Honorable Harjit S. Sajjan, added that the CTAT would have a greater impact by improving UN missions themselves by making peacekeepers more professional through Canadian expertise.³ Therefore, the new CAF mission not only fulfills Canada’s obligation to contribute to international peace operations with the UN, but also builds on Canada’s expertise in security force capacity building.⁴

¹ Traditional United Nations peacekeeping operations are defined as “an interim measure to help manage a conflict and create conditions in which the negotiation of a lasting settlement can proceed.” See United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines* (New York: United Nations Secretariat, 2010), 31, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng.pdf.

² Trudeau, “Canadian Contributions to United Nations Peace Support Operations.”

³ Harjit S. Sajjan, interview by Evan Solomon, “CTV Question Period: Where Would Peacekeepers Go?” (video), *CTV News*, November 18, 2017, accessed December 6, 2017, <http://www.ctvnews.ca/video?clipId=1264682>.

⁴ Capacity building includes provision of security, security sector reform (SSR), restoring essential services, improving police and prisons, support to governance, and economic development. This paper focuses on capacity building of host nation (HN) security forces, specifically the provision of security. See Canadian Department of National Defence, *Canadian Army, B-GL-322-010-FP-001, Stability Activities*

This new mission is a continuation of the Government of Canada's new policies articulated in three documents that direct the use of the Canadian military as an instrument of national power. The first is the Liberal Party Platform, *A New Plan for a Strong Middle Class*, which promises to “restore Canadian leadership in the world ... recommit to supporting international peace operations with the United Nations, and end Canada's combat mission in Iraq.”⁵ The second is the foreign policy statement given in Parliament by the Minister of Global Affairs Canada (GAC), the Honorable Chrystia Freeland. The third is Canada's Defence Policy, *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, commonly called the “Defence Policy Review” (DPR). In these policies, the Liberal government distances itself from previous engagements because it feels that the former Conservative government lost touch with Canadian values and judges that Canadians do not generally support combat missions.⁶ The Liberals base their assertions on the Canadian experience in Afghanistan, where public support dropped due to ambiguous political and military objectives combined with high number of casualties, and no real end in sight.⁷

This new UN mission adds to the vast number of current CAF operations focused on capacity-building missions overseas. The CAF has deployed troops conducting training missions in Iraq, Ukraine, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Palestinian Authority area, as well as in a number of other places as part of Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) operations and Canadian Army (CA) strategic engagements.⁸ A focus on capacity building started in 2006 with the deployment of the Observer Mentor Liaison Team

and Tasks (Kingston: Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre, 2012), 9-1-1.

⁵ Liberal Party of Canada, *New Plan for a Strong Middle Class* (Ottawa: Liberal Party of Canada, 2014), 68–69, accessed October 25, 2017, <https://www.liberal.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/New-plan-for-a-strong-middle-class.pdf>.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Charles A. Miller, *Endgame for the West in Afghanistan? Explaining the Decline in Support for the War in Afghanistan in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, France and Germany* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2010), 84.

⁸ Canadian Department of National Defence, “Operations,” National Defence | Canadian Armed Forces, accessed October 21, 2017, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations.page>.

(OMLT) and the Police OMLT that trained the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in Kandahar. It then became the sole focus of the Afghan mission in Kabul between 2011 to 2014 after a long and highly controversial debate in the Canadian Parliament.

The number of recent capacity-building missions raises two important questions. Why does the Canadian government favor these operations? What drives the Canadian public support for international operations and does capacity building meet these expectations? The answers are important since understanding why the government and people favor one type of mission over another allows the CAF's leadership to shape military advice on the employment of military forces, driving force generation requirements, and to provide a most likely scenario for the development of training, doctrine, and organizational structures. Better training, doctrine, and structures enable the CAF to be more effective in international operations. As this research will demonstrate, capacity-building missions are uniquely suited to meet the current government's intent and the expectations of Canadians for the use of the Canadian Armed Forces.

To support this thesis, the research will be broken down in three sections. The first chapter will examine the government's intent for the CAF as stated in the foreign and defense policies. The purpose is to dissect both policies to reveal the objectives for the use of military force overseas. Using academic papers, research polls, and reports on CAF operations, the second chapter will examine how Canadians influence government policies through public support. It will explain why Canadians will endorse missions when there are apparent national security concerns and clear military objectives. It will also examine why Canadians judge missions in terms of both risk of casualties and duration. The final chapter will demonstrate why capacity-building missions best reconcile the Canadian government's intent while maintaining public support.

Canadian Government Policies: Intent through Ideology

In the run-up to the 2015 Canadian federal election, the Liberals expressed their views on how they will use the CAF as an instrument of national power. They argued that the previous Conservative government's *Canada First Defence Strategy* did not reflect Canadian interests and values, was outdated, and unrealistic.⁹ They also mostly disagreed with the way the Conservatives employed the CAF over the last ten years, focusing mainly on "kinetic" operations instead of post-conflict resolution. Though the Liberals partially supported previous actions in Afghanistan and Libya, Liberal Party leader Justin Trudeau maintained that "Harper Conservatives have turned their backs on the UN and other multilateral institutions, while also weakening Canada's military, our diplomatic service, and our development programs."¹⁰ The Liberal platform clearly expressed the party's ideology when it stated, "We will lead an international effort to improve and expand the training of military and civilian personnel deployed on peace operations [and] to better help those affected by war and violent conflict, we will contribute more to the United Nations' mediation, conflict-prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction efforts."¹¹

Following the election of the Liberals, the new government announced a full review of the foreign and defense policies to provide a renewed focus for the CAF, the Department of Foreign Affairs,¹² and the Canadian International Development Agency.¹³ Through these

⁹ Liberal Party of Canada, *New Plan for a Strong Middle Class*, 70.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 68.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 69.

¹² Following the election of the Liberals, the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFATD) was renamed Global Affairs Canada in November 2015. It includes the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency.

¹³ Canadian foreign and defense policies are not reviewed based on a specific timeline, rather when governments decide a review is required based on a renewed focus, planned budgets, and the current national security situation. For instance, the Government of Canada only published five national defense policy statements in the last thirty years. See Government of Canada, "White Papers," Parliament of Canada, accessed October 21, 2017, <https://lop.parl.ca/About/Library/VirtualLibrary/research-for->

documents, the Government of Canada provides strategic intent for the employment of the Canadian military as an instrument of national power¹⁴ and guidance on priorities, missions, structures, equipment, and training.

In 2017, the Canadian government made a deliberate effort to provide the CAF with a unified approach to national security objectives. The government achieved this in many ways. First, it announced the two policies within twenty-four hours of each other, demonstrating a concerted synchronization effort. Second, the language in the two documents was consistent and each policy supports the other. For instance, the Foreign Minister wrote part of the forward in the DPR, which was the first time in Canadian history that both ministers of defense and foreign affairs cosigned a defense policy, indicating the close relationship between the two departments.¹⁵ Consequently, it is important to examine both documents to determine the CAF's role in protecting Canada's national interests on the international scene, since the foreign policy articulates the "why" and the defense policy provides the "how."¹⁶

The foreign and defense policies address five key elements that convey "how and why" the government will use the CAF in international operations. First, the Liberals want the Canadian military to take a more substantial role in preserving and strengthening the global order through conflict prevention. Second, the Canadian Forces will increase its participation in

parliament-e.html

¹⁴ The instruments of national power are "diplomatic, informational, military, and economic." For full definition, see Canadian Department of National Defence, *Canadian Armed Forces Doctrine Publication A-PA-005-000/AP-006, Leadership in Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, 2007), 2–1.

¹⁵ In the 1964, 1971, 1987, 1994, and 2008 defense policies, only the Prime Minister or Minister of National Defence provided a forward. See Government of Canada, "White Papers," Parliament of Canada, accessed October 21, 2017, <https://lop.parl.ca/About/Library/VirtualLibrary/research-for-parliament-e.html>.

¹⁶ For the discussions on the importance of linking foreign and defense policies, see Sir Antony Acland and General Sir Harry Tuzo, "The Relationship Between Foreign and Defence Policy," *The RUSI Journal* 128, no. 2 (June 1, 1983): 3–6, accessed October 25, 2017. As in other western nations, the Canadian government does not always align foreign and defense policies. For examples of inconsistent Canadian foreign and defense policies, see David L. Bashow, "Reconciling the Irreconcilable? Canada's Foreign and Defence Policy Linkage," *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 1 (2000): 21.

multilateral institutions and international cooperation, such as UN peace support missions. Third, they will support American national security interests to protect Canada's strong relationship with the United States. Fourth, the CAF will counter the threats of terrorism and specific state actors to promote a rules-based international order. Fifth, the CAF will maintain a full-spectrum-capable force to deter and defend against these threats.

Strengthening Global Stability

The new policies outline Canada's views on failed and failing states, guiding the use of military force and signaling Canada's role in promoting global stability to protect national values and interests. Foreign Minister Freeland stated, "We can and must play an active role in the preservation and strengthening of the global order from which we have benefited so greatly. Doing so is in our interest, because our own open society is most secure in a world of open societies. And it is under threat in a world where open societies are under threat."¹⁷ Freeland's speech also emphasized the links between global stability and Canada's national values and interests, "The path we choose must be one that serves the interests of all Canadians and upholds our broadly held national values; that preserves and nurtures Canadian prosperity and security; and that contributes to our collective goal of a better, safer, more just, more prosperous, and sustainable world."¹⁸ Hence, the government acknowledges that in today's interconnected world, Canada cannot be an island. Freeland also made this clear in the forward of the DPR: "Canadians have always been ready to share the burden and responsibility of making the world a safer place. We have a long history of working collaboratively with partners to prevent and respond to conflicts and crises abroad, including our support for peace and stabilization operations."¹⁹ The

¹⁷ Chrystia Freeland, "Address by Minister Freeland on Canada's Foreign Policy Priorities," Global Affairs Canada, June 6, 2017, accessed October 3, 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/06/address_by_ministerfreelandoncanadasforeignpolicypriorities.html.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Government of Canada, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2017), 7.

Canadian government clearly believes that instability have a considerable impact on Canada's national security and Canada must step up to protect its interests and values.

The DPR reinforces the foreign policy statement by making the case to support international peace and security, conveying the links between national security and global stability, and to leverage the military as an instrument of national power.²⁰ As illustrated in Figure 1, the DPR states, "Global stability, the primacy of the rules-based international order, and the principle of collective defence underpin Canadian security and prosperity."²¹



Figure 1. Canadian Strategic Interests. Government of Canada, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*, 59.

Consequently, the Canadian government provides the CAF with an unambiguous position on how it views stability operations as a core task to protect Canadian security and prosperity.

One of the ways to support global stability and a rules-based international order is through conflict prevention. The foreign policy highlights that force should only be used in last resort.²² DPR reinforces this message, arguing that conflict prevention is a key enabler for global

²⁰ Government of Canada, *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, 61.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 59.

²² Freeland, "Address by Minister Freeland on Canada's Foreign Policy Priorities."

stability. It argues that the CAF need to achieve “a deeper and more sophisticated understanding of the root causes of conflict with a view to playing a greater role in conflict prevention, intervening earlier in the conflict cycle when necessary, and minimizing the effects of prolonged conflict.”²³ Therefore, the two policies underscore the need for the CAF to enable conflict prevention through early intervention to improve security to minimize the chances that the situation escalates into intrastate or interstate violence.

Strengthening Multilateral Institutions

To support international institutions, the foreign and defense policies emphasize the need to return to UN peace support operations. Canada has a strong record of participation in UN peacekeeping missions, which started in 1957 when Canadian minister Lester B. Pearson led the creation of United Nations Forces to end the “Suez Canal Crisis.” For his efforts, he received the Nobel Peace Prize and earned the title of “Father of the United Nations Forces.”²⁴ The Canadian Forces actively participated in every UN operation since the first mission in the Suez and ranked amongst the top ten troop contributors up to the late 1990s, deploying 1,000 to 3,000 soldiers annually.²⁵ However, the Canadian military considerably scaled back its involvement in UN missions over the past ten years, down to approximately thirty soldiers in 2016.²⁶ This decline

²³ Government of Canada, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy*, 105.

²⁴ In 1956, Great Britain, France and Israel launched an attack on Egypt aimed at removing President Nasser. The United States had not been informed, and the Soviet Union threatened to use atomic weapons against the assailants. The “Suez Crisis” found its solution when the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson, who had served as President of the United Nations General Assembly in 1952, won support for sending a United Nations Emergency Force to the region to separate the warring parties. This gained him the Peace Prize for 1957. “Lester Bowles Pearson - Facts,” Nobelprize.org, accessed October 17, 2017, https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1957/pearson-facts.html.

²⁵ Lucia Kowaluk and Steven Staples, eds., *Afghanistan and Canada: Is There an Alternative to War?* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2009), 281–82.

²⁶ United Nations, “United Nations Peacekeeping - Troop and Police Contributors,” United Nations, accessed October 21, 2017, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>.

was primarily because the CAF was committed to other missions outside the UN framework, such as US-led and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.²⁷

The Government of Canada views UN participation as a key enabler to leverage the instruments of national power, since as a middle power, multilateralism allows Canada to pull much more weight on the global stage given its credibility as a coalition builder.²⁸ In August 2016, the Liberal government pledged a commitment of 600 CAF soldiers, 150 police officers, and \$450 million to UN missions.²⁹ Although this contribution did not bring it back to pre-2000 levels, it did indicate willingness to re-engage in stability operations under the UN mandate.

Strengthening the CAN-US Relationship

Both policies express the importance of the relationship between Canada's national interests and the United States' national security and signal the need for Canada to maintain a strong relationship with its closest ally.³⁰ The Liberals believe in using the CAF as an instrument of national power to help maintain strong Canadian-US relationships for a number of reasons. First, Canada cannot solely depend on US military power to protect the nation.³¹ In the words of Minister Freeland, "To rely solely on the US security umbrella would make us a client state. And although we have an incredibly good relationship with our American friends and neighbours,

²⁷ Walter A. Dorn, "Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 12, no. 2 (2005): 23.

²⁸ Sebastien Hierl, "Questioning Canada's Middle Power Status and Its Possible Impact on the UNSC Bid," *Affairs Canada*, January 5, 2017, accessed December 7, 2017, <http://www.iaffairscanada.com/2017/questioning-canadas-middle-power-status-and-its-possible-impact-on-the-unsc-bid>. See also Government of Canada, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*, 84.

²⁹ Murray Brewster, "Liberals Unveil New UN Peacekeeping Force with Hundreds of Troops, Police Officers," *CBC News*, August 26, 2016, accessed October 21, 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-peacekeeping-announcement-1.3736593>.

³⁰ Freeland, "Address by Minister Freeland on Canada's Foreign Policy Priorities."

³¹ *Ibid.*

such a dependence would not be in Canada's interest."³² Second, Canada needs to do its fair share in increasing global stability, contribute to the North American Air Defense (NORAD) system, and defend its NATO allies.³³

DPR further emphasizes the US relationship, highlighting the commonalities between the two countries that make the relationship so critical to Canada's defense interests and prosperity.³⁴ The defense policy also states the importance of collaborating with US stabilization efforts abroad.³⁵ Both the foreign and defense policies highlight a key takeaway: Canada's credibility in the eyes of its American ally as a defense partner depends predominantly on how effectively the Canadian military supports national security objectives. Therefore, the CAF should conduct missions that the United States believes to be worthwhile in promoting US national security interests.

Countering Global Threats

The fourth element of the policies is the need for the Canadian military to deter and defend against a wide range of threats. These include violent extremist organizations (VEO) and nation-states that defy the rules-based international order, such as North Korea, Russia, and Syria.³⁶ Minister Freeland named these threats in her speech: "The dictatorship in North Korea, crimes against humanity in Syria, the monstrous extremists of Daesh, and Russian military adventurism and expansionism also all pose clear strategic threats to the liberal democratic world,

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Government of Canada, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*, 90.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid., 50.

including Canada.”³⁷ By unambiguously naming these four threats, Freeland expressed the Canadian government’s direction to the CAF to be ready to counter them.

In responding to these threats, the DPR listed the three main objectives: “Strong at Home, Secure in North American, and Engaged in the World.”³⁸ Considering these mission sets, the new defense policy provides strategic direction and guidance to the CAF by setting out the innovative framework of “Anticipate, Adapt, and Act” in responding to these threats.³⁹ Anticipation enables the CAF to intervene early in a conflict and mitigate its effects, further reinforcing the government’s goals of conflict prevention. By “Adapt” the Government of Canada seeks to adjust “to the rapid pace of change in today’s fluid security environment [which] is fundamental to operational success.”⁴⁰ The defense policy defined “Act” as “decisive military capability across the spectrum of operations to defend Canada, protect Canadian interests and values, and contribute to global stability.”⁴¹ Illustrated in Figure 2, the new defense policy listed the core missions under “Act.”




Figure 2. Canadian Armed Forces Core Missions. Government of Canada, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy*, 82.

³⁷ Freeland, “Address by Minister Freeland on Canada’s Foreign Policy Priorities.”

³⁸ Government of Canada, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy*, 6.

³⁹ Government of Canada, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy*, 6.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 63.

The eight missions highlight the importance of being ready to respond to a full spectrum of threats, from humanitarian missions to defense and deterrence operations. These eight missions are important when describing how capacity building supports the majority of these mission sets.

Maintaining a Combat Credible Force

The Canadian government understands that its NORAD and NATO commitments require “a capable, professional, well-funded and well-equipped Canadian military”⁴² to deter and defend Canada and its allies, while contributing to global stability. The Liberals will increase funding from Can\$18.9 billion in 2016/17 to Can\$32.7 billion in 2026/27, an increase of more than 70 percent of the defense budget.⁴³ The increase in military spending will increase the CAF’s ability maintain a combat capable force ready to react to a wide range of scenarios, from war fighting on the Korean peninsula to countering VEO.⁴⁴ This is imperative since the CAF cannot be only a constabulary force conducting peacekeeping missions, which was a potential scenario during the 1990s.⁴⁵ If the government cut its military capabilities such as armored forces, fighter jets, and naval combat surface and sub-surface ships, Canada would not be able to contribute to common defense arrangements such as NORAD and NATO.⁴⁶

By having a combat-credible force capable of carrying out its eight core missions (Figure 2), the Canadian government has the flexibility to respond to a multitude of situations, from a

⁴² Freeland, “Address by Minister Freeland on Canada’s Foreign Policy Priorities.”

⁴³ Canadian Department of National Defence, “Canada Unveils New Defence Policy,” Government of Canada, June 7, 2017, accessed December 12, 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2017/06/canada_unveils_newdefencepolicy.html.

⁴⁴ Government of Canada, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy*, 36.

⁴⁵ For a detailed account of the state of the military during the 1990s, see Jack L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers, 2004), 161–98. This argument is also made in Rick Hillier, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War* (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers, 2009). For an account on the “renewed debate over the merits of a multi-purpose, combat-capable defence establishment”, see Martin Shadwick, “Public Opinion and Defence,” *Canadian Military Journal* 15, no. 3 (Summer 2015): 53–58.

⁴⁶ Freeland, “Address by Minister Freeland on Canada’s Foreign Policy Priorities.”

humanitarian crisis to full-scale war. Flexibility is very important since the government must find a balance of capabilities given the finite resources available. In Canadian politics, politicians understand that “the difficulty for the government in the current economic climate is that it cannot really afford to increase the defence budget without running a larger deficit or finding other ways to increase revenue.”⁴⁷ Consequently, the Liberal government found a compromise to ensure its flexibility: it is funding the military it can afford while maintaining sufficient military capabilities able to respond and contribute to its alliances’ obligations. The military must maximize all opportunities to maintain its effectiveness in responding to the eight core missions. One of the ways is to ensure flexibility is to participate in missions that maintain warfighting skills, enable learning opportunities, and operate with allies.

Overall, the new foreign and defense policies set out a number of objectives that the Government of Canada wants to achieve in pursuit of national objectives such as strengthening the global order through conflict prevention, a return to multilateralism, and the promotion of US national security interests. The government addresses the contemporary environment where instability affects national interests and how the government will employ the CAF to protect these interests. The government also provides the CAF with a new framework, “Anticipate, Adapt, and Act” centered on stability operations, while maintaining the flexibility to respond to high-intensity intrastate conflict through a combat-credible force that can defend its allies. Another interesting element of the DPR is that 20,200 Canadians engaged online and through public consultations during the policy review,⁴⁸ indicating that the Canadian people have a stake in what its military should do.

⁴⁷ Craig J. Stone, “Growing the Defence Budget: What Would Two Percent of GDP Look Like?,” *Canadian Global Affairs Institute*, March 2017, 4, http://www.cgai.ca/growing_the_defence_budget_what_would_two_percent_of_gdp_look_like.

⁴⁸ Canadian Department of National Defence, “Defence Policy Review: Public Consultations,” National Defence | Canadian Armed Forces, November 16, 2016, accessed December 12, 2017, <http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/index.asp>.

Canadian Public: Expectations on the Use of Force

Canadians have strong opinions about what constitutes worthwhile CAF missions, which influences the government's policy particularly during international operations. In the 2013 Statistics Canada survey on Canadian identity, Canadians viewed the CAF as the second most important source of Canadian pride.⁴⁹ The "2014 Tracking Survey on the Views of the Canadian Forces" reported that eighty-nine percent of Canadians had a positive impression of CAF members.⁵⁰ Because of this pride and respect for the CAF, Canadians indicate their support or opposition for CAF missions through public polls and demonstrations, which the government will most likely heed to get re-elected.

This monograph focuses on four key factors that shape Canadian support. The first two are links between the operation and national security interests and clear military objectives. The last two are the risk of casualties and the duration of the intervention. The public needs to understand the decisions made by the government, particularly when intervening militarily in regions that do not have apparent links to Canada's national security, and where end states are not clear to Canadians, especially if there are inherent risks of casualties or if the mission could last for decades. The missions in Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq provide useful examples in studying how the Canadian public perception considerably affected government policies, which shaped future CAF operations. During these missions, the lack of public support for military interventions drove the government to change or limit the type of mission based on the expectations of Canadians.

⁴⁹ Maire Sinha, "Canadian Identity, 2013," Statistics Canada, October 1, 2015, accessed October 30, 2017, <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-652-x/89-652-x2015005-eng.htm#a2>.

⁵⁰ Shadwick, "Public Opinion and Defence," 54.

Understanding Links to National Security

Today, it is hard to convince the population of the need to intervene in “wars of choice,” where the intervening country is not acting in defense of the homeland or there are no substantial connections to national security.⁵¹ For instance, Canada’s contribution to Afghanistan could be considered a “war of choice” since Canada was not attacked by Al-Qaeda. Recent research shows that “citizens of the intervening country will not tolerate the sacrifices required when national interests are not compelling.”⁵² Consequently, the government must gain public support for a military intervention. This comes by making it clear to Canadians why it matters to Canada. The character of Canadian society poses a challenge for the government in communicating national interests for two main reasons. First, Canadians do not typically like to discuss national interests when discussing foreign policy, preferring to refer to the values of humanitarianism and multilateralism.⁵³ Second, some Canadians believe what pundits have called the “good cop” allegory that the Canadian military does not and should not participate in combat.⁵⁴ However, subsequent sections will dispel these myths.

Understanding Political and Military Objectives

As in other democratic states, Canadian society struggles to accept interventions where military objectives are hard to define, even harder to achieve.⁵⁵ As Carl von Clausewitz stated in

⁵¹ See Stephen M. Walt, “How Do You Sustain Public Support for Wars of Choice?,” *Foreign Policy*, October 11, 2012, accessed September 6, 2017, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/11/how-do-you-sustain-public-support-for-wars-of-choice/>.

⁵² Christian H. Breede, “Defining Success: Canada in Afghanistan 2006–2011,” *American Review of Canadian Studies* 44, no. 4 (October 2, 2014): 485, accessed September 6, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02722011.2014.973425>.

⁵³ David R. Black, *A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralisms* (Routledge, 2016), 64.

⁵⁴ Miller, *Endgame for the West in Afghanistan?*, 70; Sean Maloney, “Lest We Forget.... The Canadian Army and UN Peacekeeping (Again),” *Canadian Military Journal* 17, no. 1 (September 2016): 122–23.

⁵⁵ Miller, *Endgame for the West in Afghanistan?*, 81–83; Sean Maloney, “‘Was It Worth It?’ Canadian Intervention in Afghanistan and Perceptions of Success and Failure,” *Canadian Military Journal*

his treatise *On War*: “no one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the later its operational objective.”⁵⁶ In today’s environment, governments struggle in defining the political purpose and military objectives of military interventions, and articulating them to the public.

Clausewitz’s assertion was very applicable for Canada’s mission in Afghanistan. Some academics argued that when the Canadian government changed the purpose and objectives of the mission, which varied considerably throughout the campaign, ranging from helping the United States after the attacks of September 11, 2001 to improve the lives of Afghans.⁵⁷ The result of these changing “narratives” or purposes was to create confusion in the minds of Canadians on why the CAF were there, which in turn reduced public support.⁵⁸ There was also a “disconnect between government wishes, the “reality” of the situation on the ground and the perception of the situation by the Canadian public.”⁵⁹ The government thought the goal was to contribute to a humanitarian mission, the military believed it was fighting a counterinsurgency, and the people judged neither were working.⁶⁰

The “Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan,” also known as the “Manley Report,” reinforce these academic claims. The report identified four different rationales for the mission and the need to clarify the overall objectives.⁶¹ The report went further by stating:

14, no. 1 (2013): 25–26.

⁵⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael E. Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 579.

⁵⁷ Breede, “Defining Success: Canada in Afghanistan 2006–2011,” 486.

⁵⁸ For examples of the debate on the Canadian political objectives and the loss of public support for the mission in Afghanistan, see Breede, “Defining Success”; Miller, *Endgame for the West in Afghanistan?*; Maloney, “Was It Worth It?”

⁵⁹ Colonel Bernd Horn and Dr Emily Spencer, eds., *No Easy Task: Fighting in Afghanistan* (Toronto: Dundurn, 2012), 16.

⁶⁰ Miller, *Endgame for the West in Afghanistan?*, 81–83.

⁶¹ John Manley et al., *Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan* (Ottawa: Public

In the turmoil of events in Afghanistan during the six years since 9/11, the nature and logic of Canadian engagement have not been well understood by Canadians. While public support for Canadian troops is strong, Canadians have been uncertain about Canada's evolving mission in Afghanistan. To put things bluntly, Governments from the start of Canada's Afghan involvement have failed to communicate with Canadians with balance and candour about the reasons for Canadian involvement, or about the risks, difficulties and expected results of that involvement.

The publication of the Manley report was a critical moment for the Conservative government, which was trying to get broad consensus for a mission extension in 2008. The lengthening of the Afghan operation nearly caused a loss of "confidence" in the Canadian parliament.⁶² In February 2008, the Conservatives tabled a motion for the extension of the Afghan mission and "if the motion [did not] pass a vote in the House of Commons, the minority Harper government would fall and Canadians would head to the polls for the third time in four years."⁶³ The Liberals and the New Democratic Party did not support the initial motion, quoting the loss of public support due to a number of factors including a poorly defined mission.⁶⁴ According to an Angus Reid poll, "a majority [of Canadians] believes the federal government has not effectively explained the mission."⁶⁵ Though the motion passed, the Conservatives learned

Works and Government Services Canada, 2008), 20.

⁶² A vote of confidence is based on the *Confidence Convention*: "The convention provides that if the government is defeated in the House on a question of confidence, then the government is expected to resign or seek the dissolution of Parliament in order that a general election may be held," Brian O'Neal, Michel Bédard, and James Robertson, "Current Publications: Government, Parliament and Politics: Government and Canada's 40th Parliament: Questions and Answers (PRB 08-12E)," Library of Parliament Research Publications, September 9, 2008, accessed December 12, 2017, [https://lop.parl.ca/content/lop/Research Publications/prb0812-e.htm#confidence2](https://lop.parl.ca/content/lop/Research%20Publications/prb0812-e.htm#confidence2).

⁶³ Meagan Fitzpatrick, "Government to Table Confidence Motion on Afghanistan," *Ottawa Citizen*, February 8, 2008, accessed October 29, 2017, <http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/government+table+confidence+motion+afghanistan/295576/story.html>.

⁶⁴ CBC News, "In Depth: the 39th Parliament - the Afghan Debate: Where the Party Leaders Stand on the Deployment of Troops," *CBC News*, accessed December 27, 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news2/background/parliament39/afghanistan.html>.

⁶⁵ Angus Reid Institute, "Canadian Majority Wants Troops out of Afghanistan before 2011," Angus Reid Institute, November 12, 2008, 2, accessed December 27, 2017, https://www.angusreidforum.com/Admin/MediaServer/3/documents/2008%2011%2016_AfghanARF.pdf.

from this experience to make military and political objectives clearer for future mission extensions.⁶⁶

Some academics examine the link between public approval and the fact that Canadian troops were conducting combat operations killing insurgents.⁶⁷ Some pundits perceive that Canadians are pacifists, wanting their military to be the “good cops” participating on peacekeeping missions instead of “killing people and breaking things.”⁶⁸ However, recent research has dispelled this myth: “Over seventy percent of Canadians believed that the legitimate use of military power was necessary to maintain world order, more than Britain and France, and almost as high as the United States.”⁶⁹ Other academics argued that the mission in Afghanistan “shattered the long-standing Canadian peacekeeper myth” that the CAF were only capable of conducting peace support operations.⁷⁰ Today, most Canadians are proud that Canadian soldiers were pulling their weight on combat operations.⁷¹ For instance, in Kandahar, Canadian troops engaged in heavy fighting where they killed the enemy, particularly in September 2006 where they inflicted an estimated fifteen hundred casualties on the Taliban.⁷² Recent Canadian public opinion polls on the role of the military demonstrate that “at the end of the Afghanistan mission, strongly positive impressions are the highest on record.”⁷³ In fact, “strong positive impressions”

⁶⁶ The final chapter will examine how the Canadian government based its decision to conduct capacity building in Iraq on the lessons learned from the Afghan experience.

⁶⁷ Stephen M. Saideman, “Afghanistan as a Test of Canadian Politics: What Did We Learn from the Experience?,” *The Afghanistan Papers* 10, May (2012): 14.

⁶⁸ For an account of perceptions of the CAF being a “good cop,” see Miller, *Endgame for the West in Afghanistan?*, 70–71; Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?*, 1; Horn and Spencer, *No Easy Task*, 13–15.

⁶⁹ Miller, *Endgame for the West in Afghanistan?*, 71.

⁷⁰ Horn and Spencer, *No Easy Task*, 13.

⁷¹ Ipsos Reid and Canadian Department of National Defence, *Qualitative & Quantitative Research: Views of the Canadian Forces : 2010 Tracking Study* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2010).

⁷² Horn and Spencer, *No Easy Task*, 189.

⁷³ Shadwick, “Public Opinion and Defence,” 54.

of the CAF rose from 34 percent to 60 percent between 2001 and 2014, with 89 percent of Canadians holding “positive views of the CAF.”⁷⁴

One of the main reasons for the increase in public opinion of the CAF in general was the “positive stories” coming out of Afghanistan.⁷⁵ For instance, Canadian news outlets were covering stories such as the “model village” in Deh-e Bagh where NATO commanders were praising Canadian efforts.⁷⁶ The model village used the strategy of “clear, hold, and develop,” where security was improved to enable reconstruction and development.⁷⁷ The purpose was to improve the lives of Afghans while reducing the Taliban’s freedom of maneuver. For instance, the Canadian Battle Group⁷⁸ cleared areas to close with and destroy insurgent groups. The OMLT trained and mentored the ANSF who remained in the villages, preventing the insurgents from returning.⁷⁹ The Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team then helped rebuild and develop both short-term and long-term projects to improve quality of life.⁸⁰ Although the CAF used force to achieve security, this approach was in line with Canadian values of humanitarianism and the objectives to improve the rule-of-law. This strategy was an instrumental element of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, attempting to win the hearts and minds both of Afghans and of Canadians back home in the “war of public opinion” where the opinion of both

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Horn and Spencer, *No Easy Task*, 74–75.

⁷⁶ Canadian Broadcasting Centre, “Canada’s Afghan ‘Model Village’ Praised by U.S. General,” *CBC News*, June 25, 2009, accessed December 12, 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/canada-s-afghan-model-village-praised-by-u-s-general-1.838092>.

⁷⁷ Manley et al., *Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan*, 13.

⁷⁸ A Battle Group is a Canadian combined arms formation typically based on an infantry battalion or armored regiment augmented with respective infantry, armored, engineer, reconnaissance, artillery, aviation, and combat service support.

⁷⁹ Lee Windsor and David Charters, *Kandahar Tour: the Turning Point in Canada’s Afghan Mission* (Mississauga: John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 92.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 92.

populations has considerable impact on military success in the field.⁸¹ If the battle for the “hearts and minds” of Afghans is lost, then the Taliban gains supporters. If the battle is lost in Canada, then the public protests and political opposition turns against the military mission.⁸² The objective of “clear, hold, and develop” was to promote positive actions to secure Canadian public support. This approach demonstrated that the mission was not just about killing the enemy, but to improve the overall lives of Afghans and advance global stability, an objective that Canadians could get behind.

Wanting Low Casualties

Though Canadians widely support the CAF, they have demonstrated that their support is proportional to the cost of the mission, particularly in terms of casualties. As previously mentioned, Canadians have a special relationship with the military. Consequently, Canadians care for the CAF and oppose interventions where the risks of casualties are too high, particularly in “wars of choice” where Canada is not under imminent threat of attacks. Though vague objectives and ambiguous links to national security also contributed to diminished public support, research shows the number of casualties was the other key reason for the poor public opinion of the Afghan mission.⁸³

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, three quarters of the Canadian population approved the CAF operation in Afghanistan.⁸⁴ Twelve years later, 158 soldiers had died, 2,071 were injured.⁸⁵ Of those casualties, eighty-seven percent of CAF deaths were due to hostile

⁸¹ Horn and Spencer, *No Easy Task*, 68-70.

⁸² *Ibid*, 69.

⁸³ Miller, *Endgame for the West in Afghanistan?*, 73–75.

⁸⁴ CBC News, “Fewer Canadians ‘Strongly Approve’ of Afghan Mission: Survey,” *CBC News*, November 9, 2006, accessed October 29, 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/fewer-canadians-strongly-approve-of-afghan-mission-survey-1.605606>.

⁸⁵ Canadian Department of National Defence, “Casualty Statistics (Afghanistan),” National Defence | Canadian Armed Forces, June 10, 2013, accessed December 28, 2017, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/>

actions.⁸⁶ Canadians had no recent experience witnessing CAF members returning in caskets due to enemy action.⁸⁷ The number of casualties was one of the reasons why public support dropped considerably.⁸⁸ In the “war for public opinion,” the government needed to maintain public support to continue the operation overseas.⁸⁹ In today’s twenty-four hour media cycle, constant news of Canadian deaths eroded public opinion for the mission, as most Canadians associated the mission with ramp ceremonies of coffins loaded in transport aircraft.⁹⁰ The government learned from Afghanistan to avoid repeating the experience in future missions.

Wanting a Quick Intervention

The length of an intervention is another factor that influences public support. Political and military leaders often underestimate the length and the cost of the intervention, causing public support to erode.⁹¹ The paper *Over By Christmas* echoes this argument: “A common factor in this appears to be the desire that campaigns should be short, decisive and cheap; and therefore with less risk but a greater likelihood of popular support—to be ‘home by Christmas.’”⁹² This is especially true when the length of the campaign also involves mounting death tolls and the lack of perceived progress.⁹³ This causes a significant challenge for the government in “selling” the

en/news/ article.page?doc=canadian-forces-casualty-statistics-afghanistan/hie8w9c9.

⁸⁶ iCasualties, “Operation Enduring Freedom | Afghanistan,” iCasualties.org, accessed October 29, 2017, <http://icasualties.org/OEF/index.aspx>.

⁸⁷ Horn and Spencer, *No Easy Task*, 13; Miller, *Endgame for the West in Afghanistan?*, 72; Breede, “Defining Success,” 488.

⁸⁸ Miller, *Endgame for the West in Afghanistan?*, 73–75; Maloney, “Was It Worth It?; Horn and Spencer, *No Easy Task*; Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, “Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq,” *International Security* 30, no. 3 (2005): 6.

⁸⁹ Horn and Spencer, *No Easy Task*, 68.

⁹⁰ Maloney, “Was It Worth It?,” 21.

⁹¹ This is the thesis of the book by Jonathan BA Bailey, *“Over by Christmas”: Campaigning, Delusions and Force Requirements* (Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, 2005).

⁹² *Ibid.*, 1.

⁹³ Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, “Success Matters,” 9.

intervention to its population, especially today when the public expects lightning wars such as the 1991 Gulf War, the 1998 Kosovo Air Campaign, and the 2011 Libya Intervention. In these conflicts, the military was back home in months,⁹⁴ versus years of protracted conflict in Afghanistan, where Canadian troops were dying or being wounded weekly.

To reduce the possibility of casualties during subsequent operations in Libya and Iraq, the Canadian government decided to limit the number of forces, particularly ground troops. The government believes that avoiding the deployment of the Army, often called “boots on the ground,” reduces the risk of loss of public support for a number of reasons. First, compared to air and maritime assets that control their respective domains, land forces face the greater challenge of controlling territory and its people, which brings greater exposure to opposing forces and greater risks of casualties.⁹⁵ Second, given the nature of their mission, ground forces typically have less clear-cut missions. For instance, the Navy and Air Force will normally fight other ships or aircraft, which are easily identifiable, whereas the Army fights people. This makes land operations inherently more complex where success is much harder to measure, especially when the Army is suffering casualties. Balancing success on the ground with keeping the number of casualties down is the considerable challenge for political and military leaders. As a result, “land power” is often considered as a force of “last resort” in today’s strategic environment since the Army faces a greater exposure to casualties than the other services.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ This paper does not assess or debate the long-term outcome of the wars in Iraq and Libya, rather argues that the enemy’s conventional forces were rapidly defeated in less than three months. In addition, these conflicts did require ground forces to stabilize the country, where they fought illegally armed groups (IAGs).

⁹⁵ Colin S. Gray, *Always Strategic: Jointly Essential Landpower* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2015), 12.

⁹⁶ This argument is made in two books. See Gray, *Always Strategic: Jointly Essential Landpower*, 37; Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Reconsidering the American Way of War: US Military Practice from the Revolution to Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 149.

The nature of the Army's mission is why the Canadian government limited the use of land forces for post-Afghanistan operations, such as Libya in 2011 and Iraq in 2014, refusing to commit soldiers on the ground in an effort to reduce casualties.⁹⁷ Although the government deployed Special Forces operators to train Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), PM Harper argued that they were not ground troops engaged in combat.⁹⁸ This deliberate decision to limit the risks of casualties, which the government believed was required to reassure the Canadian public. The government also limited the duration of the mission, with requirements to request extensions on a regular cycle.⁹⁹ By reviewing the mission periodically, the government ensures the risks are constantly assessed. These various examples illustrate how the public perception influenced government policy considerations in the use of the Army, by wanting to reduce the risk of casualties, particularly during a prolonged mission.

The four key factors that shape public support all compel the government to consider how Canadians view military interventions. As demonstrated, it can make or break a government based on poorly defined national security interests and objectives, high casualties, or open-ended missions with limited chances of success. The relationship between the CAF and Canadians is strong and the government has learned the hard lesson that support for the CAF does not permit them to ignore what matters to Canadians. Canadians are unlikely to forget in the near future the

⁹⁷ For Libya, see Steven Chase and Jane Taber, "Canada Won't Put Boots on the Ground in Libya, Harper Says," *The Globe and Mail*, March 31, 2011, accessed November 18, 2017, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-notebook/canada-wont-put-boots-on-the-ground-in-libya-harper-says/article613023/>. For Iraq, see CTV News Staff, "Fight against ISIS Continues, but No Canadian Boots on the Ground: Harper," *CTV News*, September 11, 2015, accessed November 18, 2017, <http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/election/fight-against-isis-continues-but-no-canadian-boots-on-the-ground-harper-1.2558659>.

⁹⁸ Andrea Janus, "Canada against ISIS: Motion Calls for Airstrikes, No Ground Troops," *CTV News*, October 3, 2014, accessed November 18, 2017, <http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/canada-against-isis-motion-calls-for-airstrikes-no-ground-troops-1.2037316>.

⁹⁹ Canadian Department of National Defence, "Operation IMPACT | Middle East," National Defence | Canadian Armed Forces, accessed December 19, 2017, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-impact.page>.

high number of casualties sustained during missions such as Afghanistan. They also need to understand the objectives of using force and the cost in terms of risks of casualties and duration. The government must then reconcile these factors with its own ideology and interests. Hence, the Canadian government must find a mission that will succeed abroad while being well perceived at home. Capacity building can achieve this.

Capacity-Building Missions: Finding the Middle Ground

In 2017, there were more than fifteen hundred CAF members deployed on international operations, with nearly seventy percent of those conducting capacity-building operations.¹⁰⁰ When adding the new CTAT commitment announced by PM Trudeau in November 2017, the number of training missions shows a trend: the Canadian government favors capacity-building missions in the pursuit of foreign and defense policies. This raises the important question: why capacity building? Using the previous analysis, this chapter will demonstrate why capacity-building operations reconcile all these facets. The research will illustrate how past and current capacity-building missions enable the Canadian government's policy objectives while meeting the public expectations for international operations.

Defining Capacity Building

Training of host-nation security forces goes by many names. The CAF defines capacity building as “the process of increasing a host nation’s ability to achieve self-sufficiency, typically through improved governance, security, human capital, development, and reconstruction.”¹⁰¹ The US Army recently changed the term “capacity building” to “building partner capacity (BPC),” however the definition is similar to the Canadian one.¹⁰² The United States uses a number of other


¹⁰⁰ Canadian Department of National Defence, “Operations.”

¹⁰¹ Canadian Department of National Defence, Canadian Army Doctrine Publication B-GL-322-010-FP-001, Stability Activities and Tasks, 9-1-1.

¹⁰² US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability (Washington, DC:

terms such as Security Cooperation, Security Force Assistance (SFA), and Foreign Internal Defense, which are complementary activities of BPC.¹⁰³ Academics use another term “capacity development” because “building could implicitly mean that you start from nothing to build up capacities, whereas development starts from what is already there and strengthens that.”¹⁰⁴ Regardless of semantics, this research views security force capacity building and development as synonymous, where the goal is to improve local security forces no matter how much capacity previously existed.

Capacity building also includes a wide range of activities, performed by civilian agencies, military forces, or by both, depending on the security situation. Figure 3 illustrates these disciplines where dark grey indicates military effort and white indicates civilian effort:



Government Printing Office, 2014), vi.

¹⁰³ Joint Doctrine Note 1-13 explains the differences between these terms: “SFA and DOD FID are both subsets of SC, but neither SFA nor FID are subsets of one another, because SFA activities serve other purposes beyond internal defense. See US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-13, Security Force Assistance (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), viii.

¹⁰⁴ See Andy Tamas, *Warriors and Nation Builders: Development and the Military in Afghanistan* (Kingston, Ont: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009).

Figure 3. Tasks Conducted by the Military in Relation to Permissiveness. Canadian Department of National Defence, Canadian Army Doctrine Publication B-GL-322-010-FP-001, Stability Activities and Tasks, 9-1-1.

This monograph focuses primarily on the provision of security, although it may be applicable to other areas such as governance, economic development, and judicial reforms. These other fields require a whole-of-government approach, involving departments such as Foreign Affairs, International Development, and Public Safety. In a non-permissive environment, the military can replace these civilian departments due to the increased risks, but it brings a number of challenges.¹⁰⁵

Reconciling Government Intentions

Capacity-building missions reconcile the five key elements of the foreign and defense policies in a number of ways. First, capacity building enables global stability and conflict prevention by developing local security forces that can provide their own security. Second, by enabling competent host nation forces, conflict prevention allows the Canadian government to use its military force as a last resort in countering the threats of VEO and state-actors. Third, since the United States is increasing its SFA capabilities, Canada can contribute to US national security by sharing the burden and consequently, maintain a strong Canadian-US relationship. Fourth, the CAF can participate in UN efforts using its specific capacities such as expertise in peace support training, thus generating increased capacity for other UN-contributing nations.

¹⁰⁵ For a comprehensive discussion of the challenges of whole-of-government support to stability operations include capacity building, see Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin, *Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2009); Nadia Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success Into Political Victory* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017); Patrick Travers and Taylor Owen, "Peacebuilding While Peacemaking: the Merits of a 3D Approach in Afghanistan," in *UBC Center for International Relations Security and Defense Forum Working Paper*, vol. 3, 2007; Jomana Amara, "The Role of the Military in Reconstruction: Examining Expeditionary Economics and Provisional Reconstruction Teams," Naval Postgraduate School, 2012, accessed August 17, 2017, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/404512012>; David S. McDonough, "The Paradox of Afghanistan: Stability Operations and the Renewal of Canada's International Security Policy?," *International Journal* 62, no. 3 (2007): 620–642. Tamas, *Warriors and Nation Builders*.

Fifth, capacity building reconciles all these demands while allowing the military to retain full-spectrum combat-credible forces since the only way to be effective in teaching joint and combined arms is to be experts on these operations. Capacity building also enables the CAF to gain insight into state-on-state conflict, which is instrumental in maintaining combat-credible forces, particularly to deter peer competition.

Building capacity has one key outcome: developing local security forces to provide their own security. As articulated in the phrase “by, with, and through,”¹⁰⁶ this approach enables the training of local forces where they can counter threats such as VEO and expansionist states by themselves, with coalition partners, and through coalition assets. The consequence of building local security forces is that the host nation is better prepared to counter internal and external threats of illegally armed groups (IAGs). Therefore, by enabling local forces to extend their security presence in their own country, host-nation forces improve regional security, which in turn promotes global stability, one of the primary goals of the Canadian defense and foreign policies.

The other benefit of conducting capacity building is the prevention of conflict and the use of force as a last resort, two other objectives of the Canadian government:

Building the capacity of weakened states is a critical component of crisis and conflict prevention policies. Rather than aiming to eliminate global conflict, Western conflict prevention should attempt to strengthen the structures of governance, justice, and security in weak states. Fragile or unstable societies are thus to be empowered with the tools to deal constructively with the violent potential of future conflicts.¹⁰⁷

By teaching local security forces ethics and obligations under the international law of armed conflict, security forces become more competent and responsible in the domain of the rule of law.

¹⁰⁶ “By, with, and through” is a Special Forces phrase adopted by Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Votel. See Linda Robinson, “SOF’s Evolving Role: Warfare ‘By, With, and Through’ Local Forces,” RAND Corporation, accessed December 14, 2017, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/05/sofs-evolving-role-warfare-by-with-and-through-local.html>.

¹⁰⁷ Sophie-Charlotte Brune et al., *Crisis and Conflict Prevention Strategies* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 4.

This is particularly important if the local population views local forces as “corrupt, ineffective, politicized, or brutal.”¹⁰⁸ By increasing their respect for the law of armed conflict, local forces gain the trust of the local population, helping to reduce the support to IAGs, especially during an insurgency. The CAF’s operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo provides a good example of training local security forces where the goal is to strengthen the Congolese army, particularly in the respect of its own citizens.¹⁰⁹ Through training these local forces, the CAF helps reduce conflict by defeating IAGs early, which mitigates the risk of the local conflict growing into a regional one.

The fight against the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Daesh provides a compelling example of using Canadian military force only in the “last resort.” In 2011, the United States and its allies left Iraq, which created a security void since the ISF did not have the capacity to maintain stability, allowing ISIS to capture large swaths of ground with near total impunity.¹¹⁰ To counter Daesh, the US formed a military coalition in 2014 primarily to train the ISF using the “by, with, and through” approach.¹¹¹ The Canadian conservative government promptly supported the coalition, deploying the CAF under “Operation Impact” in 2014 with CF-18 fighter aircrafts to bomb ISIS and sixty-nine CANSOFCOM troops to train, advise, and assist the ISF against Daesh.¹¹² Yet, PM Harper made it clear that this mission was not ground combat, since the CAF

¹⁰⁸ Marla C. Haims, ed., *Breaking the Failed-State Cycle* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 10.

¹⁰⁹ Kaitlin Buttrum, “Operation CROCODILE: Facilitating Peace and Preventing Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” National Defence | Canadian Armed Forces, March 29, 2017, accessed December 12, 2017, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=operation-crocodile-facilitating-peace-and-preventing-conflict-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/j0ts93ry>.

¹¹⁰ For arguments on the effects of the US pulling out of Iraq in 2011, see Eliot A. Cohen, *The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force* (New York: Basic Books, 2016), 181. See also Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, “Was the Rise of ISIS Inevitable?,” *Survival* 59, no. 3 (May 4, 2017): 9, accessed December 14, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2017.1325595>.

¹¹¹ Combined Joint Task Force, “Updated Mission Statement Fact Sheet,” Operation Inherent Resolve, July 7, 2017, <http://www.inherentresolve.mil/Portals/14/Documents/Mission/20170717-%20Updated%20Mission%20Statement%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf?ver=2017-07-17-093803-770>.

¹¹² Canadian Department of National Defence, “Operation IMPACT | Middle East.”

was not engaged on the front line.¹¹³ The Liberals disagreed, specifically with having the CF-18s conduct close air support. After the election in 2015, PM Trudeau argued, “While airstrike operations can be very useful to achieve short-term military and territorial gains, they do not on their own achieve long-term stability for local communities ... Canadians learned this lesson first-hand during a very difficult decade in Afghanistan, where our forces became expert military trainers renowned around the world.”¹¹⁴ In 2016, the Liberals pulled out the fighter jets but tripled the number of trainers and introduced new capabilities, nearly doubling the number of troops in Iraq as well as in Jordan.¹¹⁵ Once again, the government argued that the mission was not combat and that the CAF would only use force in the “last resort.” This capacity-building mission illustrates the willingness to engage in countering the threats of VEO while limiting the use of military force. The example of Operation Impact also shows that although the Conservatives and Liberals have different views of combat, both parties favor a “by, with, and through” approach, which is important given that the government may change every four years.

The counter ISIS mission also demonstrates how Canada can share the burden by joining US efforts and strengthen its defense relationship with the United States. As mentioned above, the government increased the CAF contribution in 2016, providing unique capabilities such as the coalition’s medical facility in northern Iraq and the Ministerial Liaison Team.¹¹⁶ With a total of 830 troops, the CAF currently represents almost ten percent of the military coalition of twenty-three nations engaged in the military fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Because of this

¹¹³ CTV News Staff, “Fight against ISIS Continues, but No Canadian Boots on the Ground: Harper.”

¹¹⁴ Susana Mas, “Trudeau Says Canada Will Pull Fighter Jets against ISIS by Feb. 22,” *CBC News*, February 8, 2016, accessed December 14, 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/justin-trudeau-canada-isis-fight-announcement-1.3438279>.

¹¹⁵ The capabilities deployed under Operation Impact in 2016 included intelligence, medical, counter improvised explosive device expertise, tactical aviation, command and control elements, and a Ministerial Liaison Team. See Canadian Department of National Defence, “Operation IMPACT | Middle East.”

¹¹⁶ Canadian Department of National Defence, “Operation IMPACT | Middle East.”

contribution, the US military views Canada as “punching above its weight,”¹¹⁷ instrumental to Canada’s defense relationship with the United States.

Demonstrating Canada’s commitment to capacity building is also particularly important as the United States continues to increase the number missions to build partner capacity. Chief of Staff of the US Army (CSA), General Mark A. Milley, made this clear: “It is my assessment, and the assessment of the Secretary and the assessment of the Army staff, that we are likely to be involved in train, advise, and assist operations for many years to come.”¹¹⁸ To achieve capacity building, the US Army will field six Security Force Assistance Brigades.¹¹⁹ A key priority of the CSA, this commitment demonstrates the importance of these missions to US national security.¹²⁰

In response, Canada has invested in capacity-building missions to support US national security. For instance, as part of Operation Naberius, the CAF is training the *Forces armées nigériennes* to counter VEOs in the Sahel through GAC’s Counter-Terrorism Capacity-Building Program (CTCBP).¹²¹ It is part of the larger US Africa Command-sponsored program of “reducing sanctuary and support for VEOs.”¹²² Consequently, Canada’s contribution to capacity building shares the burden, particularly in francophone areas where Canada’s bilingualism is an asset. Operation Proteus in Jerusalem is another example of partnering with the United States in

¹¹⁷ Matthew Fisher, “Canada Punching above Its Weight in Fight against ISIL Forces, U.S. Military Commander Says,” *National Post*, April 17, 2015, accessed December 14, 2017, <http://nationalpost.com/news/world/fisher-canadian-contribution-to-fight-against-isil-744123>.

¹¹⁸ Gary Sheftick, “First Security Force Assistance Brigade Training for Deployment,” *TRADOC News Center*, October 16, 2017, accessed December 14, 2017, <http://tradocnews.org/tag/sfab/>.

¹¹⁹ Todd Lopez, “Security Force Assistance Brigades to Free Brigade Combat Teams from Advise, Assist Mission,” US Army, May 18, 2017, accessed December 14, 2017, https://www.army.mil/article/188004/security_force_assistance_brigades_to_free_brigade_combat_teams_from_advise_assist_mission.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ Canadian Department of National Defence, “Operation NABERIUS | Niger,” National Defence | Canadian Armed Forces, October 20, 2017, accessed December 28, 2017, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-naberius.page>.

¹²² United States Africa Command, “Flintlock,” United States Africa Command, accessed December 28, 2017, <http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/exercises/flintlock>.

training the Palestinian Authority, where the CAF is the largest contingent under the Office of the US Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority.¹²³

By conducting capacity building, the CAF can also contribute to the UN in an innovative way by providing expertise in peace support training. As mentioned, the Liberals wanted to increase the Canadian contribution to UN peace support operations, yet they recently announced that Canada would not contribute to traditional peacekeeping. Rather, the government chose to contribute by training UN troops. Minister Sajjan explained the rationale for this approach:

We've done a very thorough analysis. We've been places where you could put a thousand troops and it will only have an impact on a small chunk of ground. What we're trying to do here is actually improve the missions... Some peacekeepers are actually part of the problem... Imagine a number of Canadian expert trainers training an entire [UN] battalion to be able to be more effective. That has a much more significant impact.¹²⁴

By training troop-contributing nations to be more competent and responsible, Canada increases the UN's effectiveness, which increases global stability and conflict prevention while still contributing to multilateral institutions, three policy objectives of the Canadian government.

To further support multilateral institutions, the government has invested an additional Can\$24 million in the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program, which includes a number of new projects to train UN senior leaders and peacekeepers.¹²⁵ The CAF also has a number of programs to increase capacity building at home. The first is the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) in Kingston, Ontario where it trains its own forces for peace support operations, as well as foreign military forces and security partners.¹²⁶ The second is the Military Training and Cooperation Program (MTCP), which provides foreign militaries with a series of educational

¹²³ Canadian Department of National Defence, "Operation PROTEUS | Jerusalem," National Defence | Canadian Armed Forces, February 20, 2013, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-proteus.page>.

¹²⁴ Sajjan, "CTV Question Period: Where Would Peacekeepers Go?"

¹²⁵ Trudeau, "Canadian Contributions to United Nations Peace Support Operations."

¹²⁶ Government of Canada, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*, 86.

courses, language, and skills training, focused on “democratic control over the armed forces, professionalism, and developing the capacity to undertake multi-lateral peace support operations.”¹²⁷ The two programs illustrate the CAF’s investments in capacity building to enable stability operations abroad by collaborating with foreign nations. All these initiatives demonstrate the government’s investment in capacity building while still contributing to peace support operations.

Capacity building also supports the last objective of the government’s policies: the need to retain full-spectrum capabilities. By training for high-intensity conflict, the CAF maintains the expertise to conduct joint and combined operations. A military force can only be credible in training others if it is highly competent. By conducting training internationally, the CAF maintains its ability to conduct joint and combined arms, which in turn helps deter threats from state actors, another Canadian defense objective.

The mission in the Ukraine called “Operation Unifier” provides a good example of this assertion. After Russia annexed Crimea and invaded the Donbass region, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence made a formal request for support to build the capacity of and train the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF).¹²⁸ The goal of Unifier is “to enhance Ukraine’s military capacity to deal with threats to its sovereignty.”¹²⁹ With more than two hundred CAF personnel from the CA, Royal Canadian Navy, and Royal Canadian Air Force, this mission focuses on providing tactical-level training to the UAF to be more effective through “doctrinal, institutional, and organizational level reform.”¹³⁰ Through a “train the trainer” approach, the CAF enables the UAF to train its

¹²⁷ Canadian Department of National Defence, “The Directorate - Military Training & Cooperation | DND CAF,” National Defence | Canadian Armed Forces, July 26, 2013, accessed October 21, 2017, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-international-policy/index.page>.

¹²⁸ Tim Dunne, “Operation Unifier: Canada’s Military Training Mission in Ukraine,” *Canadian Naval Review* 12, no. 3 (2016): 17.

¹²⁹ Dunne, “Operation Unifier: Canada’s Military Training Mission in Ukraine,” 16.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 19.

own forces, multiplying the Ukrainians' effectiveness on the ground in the Donbass conflict areas.¹³¹

The only way the CAF can be credible is to be experts in tactics. To build these competencies, troops undergo Level 5 live fire training prior to deployment.¹³² The Army Commander considers Level 5 as the Army's "vital ground," the most important level of training.¹³³ It is also expensive and the need to conduct live fire could be challenged in a fiscally constrained environment. However, the CAF can make the case to protect funding for these types of tactical exercises since it needs to demonstrate proficiency prior to deployment on capacity-building operations. By increasing its competencies, the CAF maintains its ability to conduct combined arms tactical operations in a wide range of scenarios.

Operation Unifier also has the advantage of allowing the CAF to gain insight into how Russian military operates:

We brought back a lot of lessons learned from the Donbass region, a lot about how Russian-backed insurgents conduct their fighting. We learned about the tactics that are being employed there. These are great lessons for the Canadian Army, and it's a bit of a wake-up call to what NATO is calling hybrid warfare. In Donbass the Ukrainians are facing conventional tank-on-tank, insurgents, road-side bombs, electronic warfare, unmanned aerial vehicles, and we are able to get a window on that, and bring it back to Canada.¹³⁴

Additionally, the operational environment provides great insight into a wide range of threats, such as cyber attacks and aerial combat with Soviet-era aircraft, which could be valuable in a hybrid conflict with North Korea or Russia.¹³⁵ Capacity-building missions offer a "win-win" situation

¹³¹ Ibid., 19–20.

¹³² Level 5 training is Combined Arms Sub-unit (Combat Team and Company Group). See Canadian Department of National Defence, Canadian Army Doctrine Publication B-GL-005-000/AC-001, *Advancing with Purpose: The Army Strategy* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre, 2014), 11.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Operation Unifier Task Force Commander Lieutenant-Colonel Jason Guiney quoted in Dunne, "Operation Unifier: Canada's Military Training Mission in Ukraine," 20.

¹³⁵ Murray Brewster, "Dog-Fighting with Mig Fighters and How Smartphones Can Be Hazardous to a Soldier's Health," *CBC News*, January 3, 2018, accessed January 3, 2018,

for the CAF since it trains itself, maintains those capacities by training others, and gains insight into threats that the CAF cannot replicate back in Canada.

For the government, capacity-building missions contribute to Canada's goals of strengthening global stability by enabling local forces to prevent conflicts from deteriorating, thus preserving global order. During these operations, the CAF contributes to US national security objectives through burden sharing as shown in Iraq and other countries fighting VEOs. The CAF participates in multilateral institutions in a meaningful way by improving the effectiveness of UN forces. Finally, the nature of capacity building provides advantages for the CAF since it drives the troops to be experts in their field so they can export this proficiency overseas. It also brings home lessons on state-actor capabilities, increasing the ability to gain insight on countering these threats.

Reconciling Public Expectations

As the previous chapter addressed, Canadians judge a mission valuable if it has clear objectives and links to national security. They start objecting to the operation when they consider it too costly in terms of casualties, especially if it drags on. Using recent operations, this section will illustrate how capacity building protects Canadians' expectations using the lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Capacity-building missions provide clearer military objectives since training local forces to provide an exit strategy is easy for Canadians to understand. Prior to the mission extension in 2011, public support in Canada for the mission was at an all-time low.¹³⁶ As mentioned, the Manley report criticized the government for the lack of clarity in its military objectives, one of

<http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-fighters-hacking-nato-1.4470361>.

¹³⁶ CBC News, "Public Support for Afghan Mission Lowest Ever: Poll," *CBC News*, September 5, 2008, accessed December 28, 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/public-support-for-afghan-mission-lowest-ever-poll-1.707644>.

the factors that led to poor public opinion. Yet, there was considerable pressure from the United States and NATO to stay and, reluctantly, the Conservative government kept the CAF in Afghanistan.¹³⁷ Finding a compromise between maintaining the support of allies and providing clear objectives, the government launched Operation Attention in 2011. The objective was to build the ANSF, enabling NATO's exit strategy. After five years of the CAF fighting insurgents, the CAF focused on building the ANSF and this strategy was one that Canadians could understand since local forces would fight for themselves.¹³⁸ As a result, the Canadian government was able to slow the momentum of the loss of public support when it focused on capacity building.¹³⁹

Based in Kabul, the mission involved training from a secure base or "inside the wire," which also reduced the risk of casualties, another factor influencing public opinion. From the start of operations in 2001 to the end of the combat mission in Kandahar in 2011, the CAF sustained 137 killed in action, yet during the three years of Operation Attention, the CAF sustained only one combat death.¹⁴⁰ When CAF members returned home at the end of the mission in 2014, Canadian public support had increased, rising from forty-one percent¹⁴¹ to forty-eight percent.¹⁴²

¹³⁷ Clark Campbell and Bill Curry, "Harper's Turnaround: PM Says He Felt He Had to Extend Afghan Mission," *The Globe and Mail*, March 26, 2011, accessed December 28, 2017, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/harpers-turnaround-pm-says-he-felt-he-had-to-extend-afghan-mission/article1259532/>.

¹³⁸ Misha Boutilier, "Canada's War in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned?," NATO Association of Canada, November 26, 2013, accessed October 30, 2017, <http://natoassociation.ca/canadas-war-in-afghanistan-lessons-learned/>.

¹³⁹ In August 2010, 39% of Canadians supported the mission in Afghanistan. In December 2010, that number rose to 48% after the mission extension. See Angus Reid Institute, "Majority of Canadians Still Oppose Military Mission in Afghanistan," Angus Reid Institute, August 10, 2010, accessed December 27, 2017, <http://angusreid.org/majority-of-canadians-still-oppose-military-mission-in-afghanistan/>; Angus Reid Institute, "Canadians Divided on Assuming Non-Combat Role in Afghanistan," Angus Reid Institute, December 13, 2010, accessed December 27, 2017, <http://angusreid.org/canadians-divided-on-assuming-non-combat-role-in-afghanistan/>.

¹⁴⁰ Canadian Department of National Defence, "Casualty Statistics (Afghanistan)."

¹⁴¹ CBC News, "Public Support for Afghan Mission Lowest Ever."

¹⁴² Marlene Leung, "Canadians Deeply Divided on Outcome of Afghanistan Mission: CTV Poll," *CTV News*, March 23, 2014, accessed October 29, 2017, <http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/canadians-divided->

Although it was not a considerable increase, it is highly likely that low casualties and clearer objectives stemmed the loss of public support. In today's contemporary media-dominated environment, "maintaining domestic support may be more important than bringing the enemy to death."¹⁴³

The current fight against Daesh provides another example of how a capacity-building mission can address Canadians' concerns regarding national security. Although terrorism was a rare occurrence in Canada prior to 2014, the ISIS-inspired attacks in St-Jean-sur-Richelieu and Ottawa where terrorists killed two CAF members made Canadians fearful of these incidents.¹⁴⁴ After the attacks, two-thirds of Canadians believed that "Canada is currently at war with terrorist groups."¹⁴⁵ In a 2015 poll, sixty-six percent of Canadians supported the CAF mission in Iraq and sixty-nine percent believed that Canada "should do everything possible to prevent ISIS from getting its own state, even if it means putting Canadian soldiers on the ground in Iraq."¹⁴⁶ In addition, when the Liberals announced the withdrawal of the CF-18s in February 2016, the majority of Canadians believed that the CAF should continue bombing ISIS or that the military should increase its contribution to the fight, according to a national survey.¹⁴⁷ These surveys may have galvanized the government to respond to public opinion, perhaps the reason why the Liberal

on-afghanistan-mission-poll-1.1742708.

¹⁴³ Michael A. Hennessy in Horn and Spencer, *No Easy Task*, 27.

¹⁴⁴ Jon Hembrey, "Half of Canadians Feel Less Safe from Terrorism Than 2 Years Ago: Poll," *CBC News*, March 4, 2015, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/terrorism-survey-50-of-canadians-feel-less-safe-than-2-years-ago-1.2978177>.

¹⁴⁵ Daniel Leblanc, "Canadians Support Increased Security Powers, Poll Suggests," *The Globe and Mail*, January 28, 2015, accessed October 22, 2017, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canadians-support-increased-security-powers-poll-suggests/article22694753/>.

¹⁴⁶ Ipsos Reid, "Two in Three (66%) Canadians Support Extension of Canadian Forces Mission against ISIS in Iraq," Ipsos Reid, March 23, 2015, accessed October 22, 2017, <https://www.ipsos.com/en-ca/two-three-66-canadians-support-extension-canadian-forces-mission-against-isis-iraq>.

¹⁴⁷ CBC News, "Majority of Canadians Want to Keep Bombing ISIS, Poll Suggests," *CBC News*, February 6, 2016, accessed January 18, 2018, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-fighter-jets-isis-poll-1.3437288>.

government increased the CAF's capacity-building mission in Iraq. By focusing on capacity building, the Liberals kept their campaign promise of pulling out the fighter aircrafts and avoided appearing weak in fighting terrorism, a major concern for the Canadian population.

Furthermore, the counter-Daesh mission illustrates how the Canadian government is reducing the risks of casualties by not deploying ground troops to engage in front-line combat operations. When the Conservative government launched Operation Impact in Iraq, it declared that the mission did not involve "boots on the ground"¹⁴⁸ and was not combat.¹⁴⁹ When the Liberals increased the CAF's capacity-building mission, they also declared that it was a non-combat operation.¹⁵⁰ Although the Iraq mission is not without risks as seen when a CANSOFCOM soldier died due to fratricide, the decision to train local forces to fight themselves reduces the risk of casualties since the CAF's objectives are not to close with and destroy the enemy.¹⁵¹ By making this clear to the Canadian population, the government reduces the chances that Canadians perceive the mission in Iraq as another "Afghanistan" and avoids conjuring up images of ramp ceremonies in the minds of Canadians.

Capacity building also reconciles the government's objective to re-engage in UN peace support operations while considering Canadians' opinion of UN missions. During the election, the Liberal Party advocated that Canada should have a greater role in UN peace support operations, returning to its tradition of being one of the main contributors.¹⁵² It based its assertion

¹⁴⁸ CTV News Staff, "Fight against ISIS Continues, but No Canadian Boots on the Ground: Harper."

¹⁴⁹ Steven Chase, "Canada's Iraq Mission Is Support, Not Combat, Top General Says," *The Globe and Mail*, February 19, 2016, accessed November 20, 2017, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-on-iraq-support-mission-not-combat-defence-chief/article28813367/>.

¹⁵⁰ Mike Blanchfield, "Canada to End Bombing Mission against ISIS by Feb. 22," *Global News*, February 7, 2016, accessed January 18, 2018, <https://globalnews.ca/news/2503213/trudeau-to-lay-out-canadas-future-contribution-to-the-fight-against-isis/>.

¹⁵¹ Chase, "Canada's Iraq Mission Is Support, Not Combat, Top General Says."

¹⁵² Liberal Party of Canada, *New Plan for a Strong Middle Class*, 68–69.

on Canada's strong tradition in UN peacekeeping. One public opinion poll indicates that Canadians strongly support deploying the CAF in a peacekeeping role.¹⁵³ In the words of one academic, Canada's role in peacekeeping has become a national symbol: "It is a celebrated part of what Canada is as a nation, and even who Canadians are as a people."¹⁵⁴ Yet, other surveys and academics dispute the assertion that Canadians strongly favor peacekeeping duties over other missions.¹⁵⁵ Examining a number of opinion polls, academics demonstrated that Canadians do not wholly support traditional peacekeeping efforts as the primary role of the Canadian Armed Forces on international operations, particularly since the Afghanistan mission.¹⁵⁶ In the words of one renowned Canadian academic, the return to traditional peacekeeping would be based on "a nostalgic perception of peacekeeping divorced from today's global realities and [is based on] the false belief that Canada either makes war or does peacekeeping."¹⁵⁷ Peacekeeping used to be the primary focus for the CAF through the last half of the twentieth century, becoming a Canadian icon as seen on a number of monuments, coins, and other Canadian public symbols. However, Canadians appeared divided on this issue in 2017.

The lack of consistency in public opinion is perhaps why the new Liberal government chose a capacity-building mission instead of traditional peacekeeping one, particularly since the latter mission involves greater risks of casualties.¹⁵⁸ As mentioned previously, the government

¹⁵³ Nanos Research, "Views on Canada's Role in Peacekeeping Missions," *CTV News*, October 1, 2016, accessed December 30, 2017, www.nanosresearch.com/sites/default/files/POLNAT-S15-T703.pdf.

¹⁵⁴ Dorn, "Canadian Peacekeeping," 7.

¹⁵⁵ Canadian Department of National Defence 2014 Annual Tracking Study quoted in Shadwick, "Public Opinion and Defence," 55.

¹⁵⁶ For instance, Jack Granatstein made the case that UN peacekeeping missions had an "unwarranted primacy" in Canadian society and that Canadians have a naïve view of peacekeeping. See Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?*, 11–34. Maloney also makes a case that the majority of Canadians no longer endorse traditional peacekeeping as a primary mission for the CAF. See Sean Maloney, "Lest We Forget... The Canadian Army and UN Peacekeeping (Again)," *Canadian Military Journal* 17, no. 1 (September 2016): 122.

¹⁵⁷ Maloney, "Lest We Forget... The Canadian Army and UN Peacekeeping (Again)," 122.

¹⁵⁸ United Nations, *At Least 32 United Nations Personnel Killed as Assailants Deliberately Attack Peacekeeping Operations in 2016*, Press Release, ORG/1643 (New York: United Nations, 2017), accessed

committed six hundred troops to the UN. The government was supposed to announce the specific deployment in 2016 but delayed the decision, stating “that’s a decision we’re not going to fast track. We’re making it responsibly and thoughtfully.”¹⁵⁹ A number of journalists reported that Mali was a potential destination, yet speculated that the high number of UN casualties in that country was a significant factor in the government decision.¹⁶⁰ The government needs to balance risks versus rewards. On one hand, the Liberals want to maintain their promise to re-engage in UN peace efforts. On the other, they want to mitigate losing public support if CAF members are killed in action.¹⁶¹ Capacity building allows the government to do both since a training mission does not pose the same risks as patrolling in a traditional peacekeeping role. Therefore, the CAF fulfills the government’s multilateralism objectives while avoiding considerable risks as seen in the UN mission in Mali and other countries.¹⁶² This is important given that Canadians may no longer consider participating in peacekeeping as a core Canadian value and may not want to see their military members die in the pursuit of this governmental objective.

Overall, capacity building reconciles public expectations particularly in terms of objectives and risks. The government must balance appropriate action with the overall objectives

January 18, 2018, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/org1643.doc.htm>.

¹⁵⁹ PM Trudeau quoted in Bruce Campion-Smith, “Canada Won’t Be Rushed into Military Peace Mission, Trudeau Says,” *The Toronto Star*, March 25, 2017, accessed October 30, 2017, <https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/03/25/un-peacekeeping-mission-possible-in-2017-trudeau-says.html>.

¹⁶⁰ Campion-Smith; See also David Pugliese, “After Two Years of Dithering, Are Liberals Finally about to Decide on a Un Peacekeeping Mission?,” *National Post*, November 10, 2017, accessed December 28, 2017, <http://nationalpost.com/news/politics/liberals-under-the-gun-to-come-up-with-contribution-to-un-as-major-conference-in-vancouver-approaches>.

¹⁶¹ Although the CAF sustained 122 casualties on UN peacekeeping missions from 1957 to 2017, the vast majority was due to accidents. See Dorn, “Canadian Peacekeeping.”

¹⁶² Recent attacks against UN forces occurred in Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo. See Sewell Chan, “3 United Nations Soldiers Are Killed in Northern Mali,” *The New York Times*, September 24, 2017, accessed November 20, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/24/world/africa/mali-un-peacekeepers-blast.html>; See also Jason Burke, “Islamist Attack Kills at Least 15 UN Peacekeepers and Five Soldiers in DRC,” *The Guardian*, December 8, 2017, accessed December 28, 2017, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/08/peacekeepers-killed-in-attack-on-un-base-in-dr-congo>.

and the cost of in terms of “blood and treasure,” the ultimate challenge for the use of military force. Currently, there are more than fifteen hundred CAF members deployed on international operations and approximately a thousand of those members are participating in capacity-building operations.¹⁶³ The latter number represents a third of the size of the mission in Kandahar at its peak.¹⁶⁴ However, since 2011, there were only two combat deaths sustained during capacity-building operations, whereas the Kandahar mission saw casualties almost monthly. This low number reflects how capacity building can reduce risks, and therefore protect Canadian public support. Based on the lessons of Afghanistan, the government clearly understood that public attitudes about the use of force required a more deliberate analysis before intervening in subsequent conflicts to ensure that the images of flag-draped coffins would not dominate the narrative of CAF operations. The government chose capacity-building missions since it protects public support by reducing casualties and setting the clear objective of enabling local forces rather than having the CAF do the fighting.

Conclusion

Canada joins the partners of the Global Coalition Against Daesh in congratulating Iraqi and Iraqi forces on the liberation of Mosul from Daesh control. We salute Iraqi civilians, soldiers and police, who fought side by side against the threats posed by Daesh. Their sacrifices have made their country safer and the region more secure. We also wish to thank the women and men of the Canadian Armed Forces who trained, advised and assisted the Iraqi forces throughout this battle and served selflessly.

— The Honourable Chrystia Freeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs; the Honourable Minister Marie-Claude Bibeau, Minister of International Development and La Francophonie; and the Honourable Harjit S. Sajjan, Minister of National Defence

¹⁶³ Canadian Department of National Defence, “Operations.”

¹⁶⁴ There were nearly three thousand CAF members deployed between 2008 and 2011 in Kandahar. See Canadian Department of National Defence, “The Canadian Armed Forces Legacy in Afghanistan,” National Defence | Canadian Armed Forces, February 26, 2014, accessed October 21, 2017, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-past/cafla.page>.

When considering the history of the Canadian military, capacity building is a relatively new type of mission for the CAF. Yet, members deployed on capacity building constitute approximately seventy percent of the total CAF commitments to international operations in 2017.¹⁶⁵ Capacity-building missions provide clear advantages for the Canadian government. First, capacity building supports global stability through conflict prevention by training local forces to be more professional, ethical, and competent. Second, capacity building allows the Canadian government to use its own military force as a last resort since it trains local forces to provide their own security. Training missions also support the defeat of VEOs and, in certain cases, assist nation-states in their fight against other states' expansionist ambitions, thus supporting a rules-based international order. Given US national security objectives and the US Army's focus on SFA, the Canadian contribution to capacity building efforts in certain regions sustains Canada's standing as a reliable partner of the United States.

When considering the list of missions illustrated in Figure 2, capacity building can contribute to six of the eight core missions listed in the new defense policy. For instance, by maintaining a combat credible force through high-end training, the CAF is better prepared to deter and defend against threats to Canada (Mission 1) or North America (Mission 2). As shown in the case of the operations in Iraq, the Sahel, and the Ukraine, capacity-building missions contribute forces to NATO and coalition efforts to deter and defeat adversaries, including terrorists, to support global stability (Mission 3) [and] engage in capacity building to support the security of other nations and their ability to contribute to security abroad (Mission 5). In addition, capacity-building initiatives, such as CTAT, PSTC, and MTCP, contribute to international peace operations and stabilization missions with the United Nations (Mission 4). Finally, the CAF participation in CTCBP assists civil authorities and law enforcement, including counter-terrorism, in support of national security and the security of Canadians abroad (Mission 6).

¹⁶⁵ Canadian Department of National Defence, "Operations."

Capacity building achieves all these government objectives while protecting public support. This type of operation allows the deployment of larger forces without exposing them to front line combat, risking a high number of casualties, which can erode public support. By training “by, with, and through” local forces, the CAF support the fight against VEOs without using a large number of “boots on the ground,” thus avoiding the risks of close combat. The Canadian military also secures its exit strategy, reducing the chances of a protracted conflict with no end in sight, maintaining Canadian public approval. As shown through opinion polls of the mission in Iraq, training local forces is an objective that Canadians easily understand. Countering terrorists also contributes to protect Canada since it defeats those who instigate attacks against Canadians, which is an important preoccupation of the public given recent attacks on the homeland. Capacity building achieves these objectives all while reducing the cost of “blood and treasure.”

Capacity building also brings advantages to the Canadian military itself. These missions help to maintain a combat-credible force by “raising the bar” for the CAF’s training requirements. This in turn reinforces the rationale for conducting Level 5 live-fire and other high-end training since a “trainer” needs to be better than the “trainee” if capacity building is going to be credible. By providing unambiguous requirements, the Army is able to protect funding for expensive, yet critical, live-fire training. Through training missions in the Ukraine, the CAF also gain insights against a peer competitor, Russia. In Iraq, the CAF safeguarded its reputation as warriors in the eyes of American and coalition forces.¹⁶⁶ Maintaining its credibility as a fighting force is

¹⁶⁶ For instance, a CANSOFCOM member broke the world record for the longest confirmed sniper kill with a distance of 11,316 feet in June 2017, earning the praise of the US military. See Tom Rogan, “Why the Canadian Sniper Story Is Important,” *Washington Examiner*, June 22, 2017, accessed January 2, 2017, <http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/why-the-canadian-sniper-story-is-important/article/2626844>; see also Matthew Diebel, “Canadian Sniper Shattered World Record, Killing ISIS Fighter From 2 Miles Away, Report Says,” *USA TODAY*, June 22, 2017, accessed January 2, 2017, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/06/22/report-canadian-sniper-kills-isis-fighter-2-miles-away/418889001/>.

something it fought to do during the Kandahar mission after spending a half-century focusing on peacekeeping duties around the world.¹⁶⁷ This is why capacity building also reconciles the military's need to train for the worst-case scenarios, such as full-scale war.

Yet, one question remains. If capacity building is a recent experience for the CAF, what are the chances that they will remain the focus for the military, particularly after the defeat of ISIS? The answer may lie in the quote above. In July 2017, Iraqi forces liberated Mosul, a major victory in the fight against Daesh, winning the praise of the Government of Canada as highlighted in the ministers' statement. In addition, the Canadian ministers demonstrated their pride in the CAF contribution. In the wake of the recent memories of the Afghan mission, this is an important "win" for the Canadian government and a source of pride for Canadians. Although the fate of Iraq is far from certain as other terrorist groups could surface, the coalition is fighting violent extremists in a very novel and effective way. From the start of the campaign against ISIS, the coalition chose capacity building rather than capacity replacement. The problem with capacity replacement is that it "fills the many gaps with outsiders who will sooner or later leave and return home."¹⁶⁸ By developing the ISF, the coalition will be able to leave and thus making capacity building so attractive to the Canadian government and people. This positive outcome is why these missions will most likely remain the focus for the CAF in the near future.

Capacity-building missions are not flawless and the CAF needs to factor many considerations before participating in these operations. First, the CAF must determine "what constitutes good enough?" when measuring the effectiveness of training local forces.¹⁶⁹ Second,

¹⁶⁷ Horn and Spencer, *No Easy Task*, 13–14.

¹⁶⁸ Tamas, *Warriors and Nation Builders*, 72–73.

¹⁶⁹ For examples of the research on the effectiveness of capacity building, see Stephen Biddle, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker, "Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Military Effectiveness of Security Force Assistance," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, April 12, 2017, 1–54, accessed December 14, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2017.1307745>; Christopher Paul, *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and under What Circumstances?* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, National Defense Research Institute, 2013); Tamas, *Warriors and Nation Builders*; Alex D. Haynes in Horn and Spencer, *No Easy*

the CAF needs to consider the advantages of the “assist, advise, and *accompany*” approach to properly validate the training of local forces. “Accompany” missions expose Canadian troops to greater chances of casualties, but can be more effective in training local forces since the CAF mentors the “trainees” while on operations.¹⁷⁰ Political and military leaders should consider this in the “risks versus rewards” analysis. The third issue affecting capacity building is the possibility that western forces may train local security forces that could be involved in a later coup against the host nation government, turning the mission into a media relations crisis.¹⁷¹ Fourth, capacity building normally involves equipping the host nation with lethal aid, which other nations may protest, as seen in Iraq where the coalition is training Kurdish forces, upsetting Turkey and Iran.¹⁷² Fifth, these weapons could also be used against the coalition as seen in Iraq when ISIS captured vast amounts of military hardware from the ISF. All these considerations need to be addressed prior to any capacity-building operation. However, based on recent successes in Iraq and Ukraine, it is highly likely that these types of missions will be part of the CAF’s near future. For the Canadian government and its people, “by, with, and through” missions are uniquely suited for reconciling the various expectations for the use of the Canadian Armed Forces since they provide a “win at acceptable costs.”

Task, 199-232.

¹⁷⁰ There is strong research that supports the requirement to “accompany” in mentoring host-nation security forces during operations, which is much more effective than only training them in classrooms or “inside the wire.” See Alex D. Haynes in Horn and Spencer, *No Easy Task*, 199–232.

¹⁷¹ For instance, the coup d’état in Mali in 2012 illustrated how training local forces can go wrong, requiring capacity building to focus as much on democratic values and the rule of law as well as tactical operations. See Geoffrey York, “Training of Mali Soldiers Said to Lack ‘Values, Ethics and Military Ethos,’” *The Globe and Mail*, March 26, 2017, accessed December 31, 2017, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/training-of-mali-soldiers-said-to-lack-values-ethics-and-military-ethos/article7893675/>.

¹⁷² This is the case in Iraq where the coalition is training Kurdish forces upsetting Turkey and Iran. See Alireza Nader et al., *Regional Implications of an Independent Kurdistan* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), accessed December 31, 2017, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1452.html.

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