Counterinsurgency Force Ratios: An Investigation into Military Logic

A Monograph

by

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The study of force ratios, particularly those intended for application in the counterinsurgency environment, reveals an element of the greater issue of military thinking. Within the context of the post-Vietnam era, John T. Quinlivan produced research suggesting that success in a counterinsurgency environment rested in an optimum force ratio applied to the problem. He produced the basis for US military planning models with the twenty troops to 1000 inhabitants ratio for counterinsurgencies. More recently, John McGrath expounded upon Quinlivan's work but largely reached a similar conclusion concerning the value of the force ratio. The application of both Quinlivan and McGrath's theories on specific historical anomalies like the French Algerian War and the Kenyan Emergency exposed gaps in the theories themselves; however, the study also revealed a potential historical continuity between the two historical occurrences in the realm of political actions and decisions. The revelation of qualitative analysis, which involved incorporating the political realm into military decisions in a counterinsurgency environment, produced several recommendations for future planners.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

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Abstract

Counterinsurgency Force Ratios: An Investigation into Military Logic, by MAJ David W Yi, US ARMY, 45 pages.

The study of force ratios, particularly those intended for application in the counterinsurgency environment, reveals an element of the greater issue of military thinking. After the failures of Vietnam, the US military machine reimagined their brand to exclude the intrusions of politics within military decision-making. These particular ideas manifested themselves in the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine and Samuel Huntington's theory of objective control of the military. Both of these popular modes of thinking provided similar intuitive outlets for military professionals to continue separating the political realm from military action. Within the context of this time period John T. Quinlivan produced research suggesting that success in a counterinsurgency environment rested in an optimum force ratio applied to the problem. He produced the basis for US military planning models with the twenty troops to 1000 inhabitants ratio for counterinsurgencies. More recently, John McGrath expounded upon Quinlivan's work but largely reached a similar conclusion concerning the value of the force ratio.

Quinlivan and McGrath missed a critical element when attempting to discover a historical continuity for success in a counterinsurgency environment. Using the method of popular military logic, they both left out the political realm and isolated the detection of a solution to solely military aspects of historical examples. In doing so, they both committed the miscalculation of using history as a dogmatic lessons learned model instead of employing history as an analytical tool for evaluating action. The application of both Quinlivan and McGrath's theories on specific historical anomalies like the French Algerian War and the Kenyan Emergency exposed gaps in the theories themselves. Additionally, the analysis displayed that a historical continuity did in fact exist; however, it occurred in the realm of political actions and decisions.

The revelation of qualitative analysis, which involved incorporating the political realm into military decisions in a counterinsurgency environment, produced several recommendations for future planners and operational artists. First, due to the political nature of a counterinsurgency, the military needs to structure military objectives to support core political objectives. Next, empathy toward the population is not equivalent to gaining popular support. The historical pattern suggests that leveraging the critical political aspects of war, such as the control and distribution of arable land in the case of the Mau Mau Rebellion, may be a more critical factor than treating the population with dignity and respect. Finally, in order to react properly to rapid changes in the environment, agents with political authority need to be at all levels of the fight. This may include a tactical action arm that is equivalent or comparable to the military's own response.

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Acknowledgements

Acronyms

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ALN	National Liberation Army
AMSP	Advanced Military Studies Program
AU	Air University
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
FLN	National Liberation Front
FM	Field Manual
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
JP	Joint Publication
KAU	Kenyan African Union
KCA	Kikuyu Central Association
LAPD	Los Angeles Police Department
NYPD	New York Police Department
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
SAMS	US Army School of Advanced Military Studies
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America

Introduction

The United States is currently entrenched in a violent protracted war against insurgents overseas. The duration of the conflicts and the growing discontent among both the public and private sectors of the United States continue to call strategies like counterinsurgency into question.[1] After sixteen years of countering a growing Islamist insurgency, experts continue to argue about the details of involvement and the scope of the actual realities that encompass the problem. Arguably, the US military, particularly its ground fighting forces, achieved very little in terms of strategic and operational gains against its enemies in the Middle East.[2] Some theorists, like David Kilcullen, even believe that the problem spread to a global scale while the United States focused on localized issues.[3] Unfortunately, the onset of counterinsurgency operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan caught the military machine largely off guard. As a result, initial planning and preparation to combat growing threats was haphazard at best.[4] Out of necessity, operational and strategic planners rapidly applied techniques such as historical counterinsurgency operations in colonial situations without conducting thorough research.[5] The omission of historical context in the development of counterinsurgency doctrine created a scenario where strategic leaders in the military applied historical examples as dogmatic lessons learned instead of

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[1] Eric Lichtblau, "Threats and Responses: Dissent; Tens of Thousands March Against Iraq War," *The New York Times*, March 16, 2003, accessed March 21, 2018, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/16/us/threats-and-responses-dissent-tens-of-thousands-march-against-iraq-war.html.

[2] Tara John, "Timeline: The Rise of ISIS," *Time*, October 9, 2015, accessed March 21, 2018, http://time.com/4030714/isis-timeline-islamic-state/.

[3] David Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 4 (2005), 1-4.

[4] William E. Rapp, "Civil-Military Relations: The Role of Military Leaders in Strategy Making," *Parameters* 45, no. 3 (Autumn 2015): 13-15.

[5] Thomas E. Ricks, "Kilcullen Speaks: On COIN Going out of Style, His Recent Book, Syria, and more," *Foreign Policy*, February 12, 2014, accessed March 21, 2018, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/12/kilcullen-speaks-on-coin-going-out-of-style-his-recent-book-syria-and-more/.

properly using history as an analytical tool for shaping thought. In the case of developing

counterinsurgency studies, scholars largely left out the political element of war as defined by

Clausewitz as all other elements of conflict outside the use of force.[6] In particular, the application

of a recommended force ratio for counterinsurgency environments was one method of historical

extrapolation that demonstrated the fixed perspective of unilateral military action apart from a

political goal.

During the course of developing a doctrinal approach to assist with tactical level actions,

planners presented a force-to-civilian population ratio as a measure of effectiveness. The twenty

combatants to 1000 inhabitants ratio rapidly solidified itself into doctrine, and it created a

simplified fixed methodology for recommending solutions for complex insurgent laden

environments.[7] Although the recent release of new doctrine removed the recommended force

ratio as a guideline, the logic of attempting to apply a linear military solution to a political

problem still largely exists within the framework of counterinsurgency.[8] The origins of the

generalized theory of applying twenty combatants to 1000 inhabitants given a counterinsurgency

scenario presents a potentially problematic frame of mind within military doctrine. A historical

template such as a generalized force ratio is not viable given particular counterinsurgency

operations of the past. Present day operational artists require a broader lens in achieving a greater

understanding of the use of military force in the complex threat environments of the future.

The misleading element of the recommended force ratio appeared in both its original

analysis and the greater application of thought to the problem of conducting a counterinsurgency.

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[6] Carl Von Clausewitz, *Carl Von Clausewitz: Two Letters on Strategy*, ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1984), 21-25.

[7] US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 1-13.

[8] OUSDP/SPC/DASD Plans, "OSD Planning Review Process White Paper," June 2015, accessed November 30, 2017, https://cgsc.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/pid-603324-dt-content-rid-5703530_1/courses/SAMS_AMSP_2018/OSD%20Planning%20Review%20Process%20White%20Paper%20-%20Jun%202015.pdf.

The major studies concerning the origins of the force ratio for counterinsurgencies stemmed from the thinking and writings of James T. Quinlivan and John J. McGrath among others.[9] Both of their arguments resulted from studies of past counterinsurgencies with a focal point placed on the necessity of a local constabulary force.[10] These studies, when viewed through the historical context of popular military thought at the time, incorrectly framed the analysis of potential metrics of success to the military response in a counterinsurgency. During the time of Quinlivan and later McGrath's published findings, a popular interpretation of Clausewitz' writings manifested itself as the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine.[11] Among other things, this unpublished canon essentially separated the politician from the actions of the general at war.[12] As a result, the popular movement of objective control of the military pigeonholed military scholars into forming solely military solutions and recommendations for the various forms in which war reveals itself in the present day.[13] The search for an optimal force ratio in counterinsurgencies stemmed from the idea that a solely military approach, separated from the political elements, could achieve success.

Interestingly, this project revealed the political nature of war as a continuity throughout the history of previous counterinsurgencies. Among many other things, the similarities between the French Algerian War (1954-1962) and the British Kenyan Emergency (1952-1960) included the time period, the continent in which the conflict occurred, and the eventual struggle of a

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[9] John J. McGrath, *Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2006), 94.

[10] James T. Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," *Parameters* 25, no. 4 (Winter 1995-96): 61.

[11] Janine A. Davidson, Emerson T. Brooking, and Benjamin J. Fernandes, "Mending the Broken Dialogue: Civil-Military Relations and Presidential Decision-Making," Council on Foreign Relations, December 2016, accessed March 21, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2016/11/Discussion_Paper_Davidson_Brooking_Fernandes_Civil_Military_OR.pdf.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, UK: Harvard University Press, 1957), 80-97.

government attempting to disentangle itself from previous eras of imperialism. Many scholars indicated that the Algerian War was a loss while the Kenyan Emergency was a victory even though the idea of success was wide ranging and variable.[14] The continuity throughout historical examples of victory within counterinsurgency appeared to rise above the military response within the environment when comparing these two examples. In the Algerian War, the military sidelined the political effort in order to root out the enemy in the most efficient manner possible.[15] In many cases, the military attempted to establish political lines of effort without understanding the true root of the political problem. As a result, the French in Algeria attacked symptoms of the problem instead of the problem itself.[16] Even with marked successes against an armed enemy, the French government ended the war on unfavorable terms with Algerians and lost a measure of credibility with the international community.[17] On the contrary, the British in Kenya employed its military and political efforts in synchronization with each other. The British correctly, yet accidentally, identified the root political cause of rebellion as the ownership and control of arable land.[18] Using this root cause as a weapon and bargaining tool, the British were able to effectively kill the resistance.[19]

The error of applying a fixed force ratio like the twenty troops to 1000 inhabitants proportion revealed itself throughout the course of this study in the historical analysis of the

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[14] Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 44.

[15] Martin Evans and John Phillips, *Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 60.

[16] Edgar O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-62* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1967), 53.

[17] Ibid., 81.

[18] Daniel Branch, *Defeating the Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 16-27.

[19] Huw Bennett, *Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 23-32.

French Algerian War and the British Kenyan Emergency. In strict application of the recommendations for force ratios suggested by Quinlivan and McGrath, both the French Algerian War and the British Kenyan Emergency stood in contrast with the particular methodology due to their separate outcomes. The French applied forces to the war in excess of the recommended twenty troops to 1000 inhabitants ratio yet lost the effort; however, the British applied single digits worth of troops for every 1000 inhabitants and won. These anomalies in history, which Quinlivan and McGrath left out of their studies, question the reliability of a solitary focus on the military effort in counterinsurgencies. The interpretation of Clausewitz that encourages a dialectic between politics and the operational artist may be vital to success in these environments.[20]

Additionally, the bloody nature of both of these conflicts reshapes our understanding of the statement "winning hearts and minds."[21] Although the troop levels were different for each conflict, they both shared the egregious use of torture and coercion to accomplish their goals.[22] Sterilizing the historical brutality only adds to the present belief that a counterinsurgent can achieve success through a zero margin of error model.[23] Using history as a lens, recommendations for future planners involve a focal point placed on finding the root political cause of the conflict rather than alleviating a symptom of the conflict by applying a certain amount of troops to the war. The inherent risk involved with wielding the root cause as a political weapon is a factor that politicians and operational artists alike must consider prior to initiating wars of this kind.

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[20] Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 605.

[21] Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 354.

[22] Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005), 152-153.

[23] James Mackenzie, "U.S. Investigation Finds No Afghan Civilian Casualties in Kunduz Strike," *Reuters*, November 6, 2017, accessed March 21, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-casualties/u-s-investigation-finds-no-afghan-civilian-casualties-in-kunduz-strike-idUSKBN1D706V.

Origins and Discussions on the Force Ratio for Counterinsurgency

Practitioners and scholars of war currently wrestle with the correct level of force to apply for a counterinsurgency or stability scenario in order to set the conditions for success.[24] The continuing struggle to answer how many troops to deploy in these circumstances often leads to disagreement and dissenting counter-arguments that have neither assisted in completely answering the question nor quieted the apparent military necessity of such an answer for future conflict environments.[25] The current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq also continue to add to interesting counter factual arguments moving backwards in time to initial planning for troop deployments.[26] Some scholars argue that minimum force requirements are a determining factor for the eventual successful outcome of a counterinsurgency environment.[27] Unfortunately, even these findings cannot answer the fundamental question of what actually determines a victory in these situations. Even with the ongoing debate, many scholars agree that force ratios are only one part of a very complex question of victory in scenarios other than conventional warfare.[28] The attempt to find the optimal force ratio for counterinsurgencies lies in a greater understanding of the modern US way of waging war. It is very possible that by focusing on numbers such as optimal force ratios in counterinsurgency environments scholars and operational artists are generalizing the picture at the expense of necessary details. Failures in the Vietnam War created

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[24] Riley M. Moore, "Counterinsurgency Force Ratio: Strategic Utility or Nominal Necessity," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 24, no. 5 (2013): 856.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Conrad C. Crane, *Facing the Hydra: Maintaining Strategic Balance While Pursuing a Global War on Terrorism* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2003), 13-14.

[27] Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," 63.

[28] McGrath, *Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations,* 109.

an environment of popular thought within military circles that attempted to separate politics from military decision.[29] Prevalent sentiment at the time, which included the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine of the 1980s, heavily influenced the US Army's belief that a military only response could achieve a favorable outcome in Afghanistan and Iraq.[30] The development and transformation of the twenty to 1000 inhabitant force ratio for counterinsurgency settings displayed the continued US Army bias toward unilateral military operations; it prohibited thinkers and practitioners from viewing the true historical continuity in counterinsurgency as the successful blending of politics within military operations.

Many scholars traced the roots of the twenty to 1000 inhabitant force ratio for counterinsurgency operations to James T. Quinlivan and his article entitled, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations."[31] This article, which first appeared in 1995 in *Parameters* captured Quinlivan's analysis of multiple historical stability operations throughout the globe including the Malayan Emergency and British operations in Northern Ireland.[32] Although he clarified an already existing argument from the anti-colonial era, Quinlivan's discussion became popularized and cited as the origination of the idea at the onset of US contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.[33] His popularized force ratio even found its way into the Army's Counterinsurgency Manual, FM 3-24 in 2006.[34] The premise of the argument narrowed the counterinsurgent role to providing security and stability for the population; thus, the size of the population determined the size of the force employed to protect and control the area. The analysis moved further by

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[29] Gregory A. Daddis, *Westmoreland's War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 168-181.

[30] Davidson et al., "Mending the Broken Dialogue: Civil-Military Relations and Presidential Decision-Making."

[31] McGrath, *Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations*, 94.

[32] Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," 63-69.

[33] Moore, "Counterinsurgency Force Ratio: Strategic Utility or Nominal Necessity," 857-858.

[34] US Army, FM 3-24 (2006), 1-13.

determining the necessity of a local police or constabulary force in order to ensure protection.[35] In his examination, Quinlivan used the average ratio of police to population in the US and UK and transposed those requirements onto the counterinsurgency atmosphere. This is how he determined the minimum ratio of troops to inhabitants to be 2.3-3.1 per 1000 inhabitants of the target population to cover the minimum necessity of a standing constabulary.[36] Since Quinlivan's initial research findings in 1995, several other scholars and practitioners published their own deductions mostly revising and reforming Quinlivan's original argument.

John McGrath's findings in his 2006 work entitled, "Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations" further developed Quinlivan's original claims concerning the use of a force ratio in counterinsurgencies.[37] In his assessment, McGrath used a more detailed analytical assessment of the required force ratios in order to set the conditions for success in a counterinsurgency environment. Instead of using population as the only factor in the most general terms, McGrath used a series of different and interrelated factors in his analysis including size of the geographic area, population density, troops available, troop rotations, troops recruited, intensity of the conflict, availability of substitute forces, and indigenous forces.[38] Some of the critical differences between Quinlivan and McGrath included the introduction of indigenous forces and even contractors to the total aggregate number of troops on the ground. Where Quinlivan only included deployed combatants into his twenty to 1000 force ratio, McGrath incorporated both contractors and local security forces into his cumulative count per inhabitant.[39] McGrath's historical research found that a continuity existed between different examples of

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[35] Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," 60-61.

[36] Ibid., 61.

[37] McGrath, *Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations,* 94-96.

[38] Ibid., 102.

[39] McGrath, *Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations,* 147.

counterinsurgencies with the effectiveness of using indigenous forces in the lead. He generalized the established pattern by determining that using indigenous forces instead of outside combatants was far more effective than unilateral military action by an outside nation.[40] As a result, McGrath's findings determined the most effective force ratio to be 13.26 combined counterinsurgents to 1000 inhabitants in a given stability scenario.[41] Even with the slight difference in numbers, both Quinlivan's and McGrath's analyses shared more commonality than differences.

The major similarity between the two studies included the identification of the critical necessity of local law enforcement to capitalize on securing the population in a counterinsurgency environment.[42] Both of these scholars recognized the minimum necessity of a standing and effective constabulary apart from any other military endeavor due to their focus on the population as the key to victory.[43] McGrath departed slightly from Quinlivan's analysis of the police requirement but remained within the original parameters of the research. Instead of using the average amount of police to population in both the US and UK for his model, McGrath used the level of law enforcement within a series of major urban areas within the US for his study.[44] He found that the average law enforcement ratios within major cities like New York and Boston were 4.1 police to 1000 residents.[45] Interestingly, much like Quinlivan, he greatly generalized the existence of training, western standards of law, and structure in these US urban areas for his research and simply transposed the average aggregate number onto an overseas environment

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[40] McGrath, *Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations,* 102-106.

[41] Ibid., 147.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," 60-61.

[44] McGrath, *Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations,* 76-106.

[45] Ibid., 106.

devoid of these aspects.[46] As a result of his findings, McGrath recommended a slightly increased

number than Quinlivan for the level of law enforcement necessary to set the conditions for

success within a counterinsurgency setting.[47] In his research, McGrath had a tendency to bend

history in order to support his thesis; however, he expanded on Quinlivan's original research,

simplified the comparisons, and made the information more useable for planners at all levels.

Both of the studies conducted by Quinlivan and McGrath appeared to be a search for a

true historical continuity within the context of the counterinsurgency fight in order to enable the

future military planner with the proper conditions for success; unfortunately, both scholars

stretched their arguments to fit into a pattern that did not truly exist. In order to find a historical

continuity between multiple seemingly like occurrences throughout history, the investigation

requires a more comprehensive approach than isolating research to revolve around the idea of

population security alone. In Quinlivan's approach, only Malaya and Northern Ireland truly fit

into his ratio of twenty counterinsurgents to 1000 inhabitants.[48] Unfortunately, for these two

examples, Quinlivan's recommended ratio was either not strictly achieved or only momentarily

attained.[49] Additionally, many other existing factors for success lessened the value of Quinlivan's

argument of applying a force ratio for success. In Malaya, the ratio of deployed forces never

strictly achieved the twenty to 1000 ratio.[50] The more important factor for a successful outcome

in this conflict was arguably the composition of the insurgent population and the fact that the

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[46] Jared Keller, "The DoD Has Barely Made a Dent in Afghan Security Forces' Child Sex Abuse Problem," *Task & Purpose*, November 16, 2017, accessed March 21, 2018, http://taskandpurpose.com/afghanistan-child-sex-abuse-report/.

[47] McGrath, *Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations,* 106.

[48] Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," 63.

[49] Moore, "Counterinsurgency Force Ratio: Strategic Utility or Nominal Necessity," 857.

[50] Ibid., 864.

British reduced the insurgent political platform by granting independence prior to the conflict.[51]

These aspects gave more credence to the reason for a successful outcome than the amount of

forces deployed to meet the threat.[52] Quinlivan's use of Northern Ireland as evidence for his

thesis was also inadequate when observing the conflict from a wider lens than one snapshot in the

struggle.[53] Historical records actually displayed that deploying more troops into Northern Ireland

had the opposite effect and acted more as an agent of de-stabilization.[54] Arguably, in Northern

Ireland, the British won by the method in which they employed their troops, not in the amount

engaged.[55]

       McGrath's use of evidence was also lacking due to the omission of data that ran contrary

to the author's argument. On the topic of historical case studies, McGrath specifically omits

examples of past counterinsurgency operations like Algeria and the US involvement in

Colombia.[56] These two examples specifically highlighted a failure with the use of forces well

above the recommended force ratio and a relative success using a force ratio model well below

McGrath's proposed minimums.[57] By overlooking these examples and choosing to use others,

McGrath effectively shaped and morphed history to fit his assessment of the problem.

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[51] Albert Lau, *The Malayan Union Controversy 1942-1948* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1991), 222-223.

[52] Leon Comber, *Malaya's Secret Police 1945-60: The Role of the Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency* (Victoria, Australia: Monash University Press, 2008), 147.

[53] David Pearson, "Low-Intensity Operations in Northern Ireland," in *Soldiers in Cities: Military Operations on Urban Terrain*, ed. Michael C. Desch (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2001), 104-105.

[54] Moore, "Counterinsurgency Force Ratio: Strategic Utility or Nominal Necessity," 866.

[55] Rod Thornton, "Getting it Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes Made in the Early Stages of the British Army's Deployment to Northern Ireland (August 1969 to March 1972)," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, no. 1 (February 2007): 81-94.

[56] Moore, "Counterinsurgency Force Ratio: Strategic Utility or Nominal Necessity," 868-872.

[57] Dennis M. Rempe, *Implementing Plan Colombia Special Series: The Past as Prologue? A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia, 1958-66* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2002), 12-36.

Additionally, the metric that McGrath used to measure the amount of police forces needed in a counterinsurgency environment was also lacking. He specifically mentioned the average police force ratio within the US, but he failed to fully make the connection to counterinsurgency environments.[58] Simply transposing a force ratio from a relatively stable environment in a western country like the US to a counterinsurgency environment overseas completely over generalizes the situation. In doing this, McGrath missed particular details within the system that may have affected the force ratio research such as established legal structure, accepted procedures, and standardized western modes of conduct.[59] There were further problems within McGrath's analysis as well, particularly with the data from the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) as the outlier. According to McGrath's study, the LAPD, as an outlier to other large metropolitan areas of the US, maintained a 2.5 police to 1000 resident force ratio.[60] The additional indicator of success being crime also contributed to the possible unreliability of the comparison made by McGrath. In an evaluation to other large urban populations of the US, Los Angeles maintained a relatively low crime rate at the time of McGrath's research.[61] Unfortunately, outliers and omissions may have made McGrath's study incomplete at best and overly polemical at worst.

Historical context for the time when scholars produced these theories is another important consideration when attempting to ascertain the reasons behind their development. The seminal military thought at the time of Quinlivan's work in 1995 was the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. Although never formally published as a policy, this popular belief resulted from the US military

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[58] McGrath, *Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations*, 106.

[59] New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, "NYPD Patrol Guide," accessed December 3, 2017, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/ccrb/investigations/nypd-patrol-guide.page.

[60] McGrath, *Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations*, 76-77.

[61] Ibid., 77.

failures of Vietnam and rapidly gained military-wide acceptance. [62] The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine interpreted the Clausewitzian ideology of war being an extension of politics in terms of politics and the military having separate but supporting roles in war. [63] This popularized credence latched onto what Samuel P. Huntington described as objective control of the military, which encompassed a belief that required a military that was separate from politics in order to allow for a professional fighting force. [64] By 1995, the successful military actions of Desert Storm legitimized this ideology and ingrained it into future generations of planners and scholars alike. The commonly held bias viewed Vietnam as a conflict that failed due to political micromanagement and Desert Storm as a success due to the infallibility of the separation of politics and the strategic employment of the military. [65] The belief within military circles that politics should remain outside of the realm of military decision-making continued to persist even into the recent Global War on Terror. The transformation of this belief at the time of the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan also included an inculcation into political rhetoric. President George Bush famously demonstrated how ingrained this ideology had become in his congratulatory remarks for a job well done during the invasion of Iraq. In his address, he stated among other things "I do the politics, you do the fighting." [66] This statement highlighted how deeply the effects of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine reached even into the present era of military operations.

The separation of military operations from the realm of politics proved particularly distressing when applied to the counterinsurgency model due to its innate political nature. An

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[62] Jeffrey Record, "Back to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine?," Air University, accessed December 3, 2017, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2007/Fall/Record.pdf.

[63] Clausewitz, *On War*, 148-149.

[64] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State,* 80-97.

[65] Davidson et al., "Mending the Broken Dialogue: Civil-Military Relations and Presidential Decision-Making."

[66] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 3-4.

interesting historical perspective during the time of Quinlivan's 1995 research also included the parallel development of doctrine for former colonial powers in how to resolve counterinsurgency conflicts. Following the end of World War II, the British suffered a series of uprisings throughout their settlements in Asia and Africa culminating on their own homeland in Northern Ireland.[67] During the course of these conflicts, the British military recognized that counterinsurgency was about political ends, and that the military alone could not attain these political goals.[68] British Doctrine reflected the importance of politics in military operations around the time that the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine became popular in the United States. British Doctrine in 1989 proposed a dissenting view to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine in this excerpt by stating:

> The response [to the threat of insurgency] should be based on clear aims supported by a range of social, economic, legal, and administrative measures as well as military activity. This is usually in support of or combined with police action. The task of developing the response and coordinating its supporting overall plan will be complex. Military measures should only form part of the plan since by themselves they are unlikely to defeat insurgency. The military contribution therefore will be designed to defeat violent activity and provide security so that the political process can take place.[69]

Unlike their US counterparts, the British recognized that all the instruments of national power played a vital role under the clear establishment of a political aim.[70] Even more radical for the time, this line of logic proposed that military operations fall subordinate to the other instruments of national power, as well as politics, when involved against an insurgency in certain circumstances.

The twenty troops to 1000 inhabitant force ratio for counterinsurgency settings, combined with ingrained biases from the Vietnam War, displayed the continued US bias toward unilateral

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[67] Charles Townshend, "The Irish Republican Army and the development of guerilla warfare, 1916-1921," in *Terrorism: British Perspectives*, ed. Paul Wilkinson (New York: G.K. Hall, 1994), 121.

[68] Pearson, "Low-Intensity Operations in Northern Ireland," 105-106.

[69] British Army, "Design for Military Operations," *The British Military Doctrine*, Army Code No. 71451, 1989, 28.

[70] Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942-1976* (Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2007), 132-137.

military operations; additionally, this prevented force ratio scholars from seeing the existence of the historical continuity of the intermixing of politics in military affairs. The origin of the recommended force ratio for counterinsurgency operations was a quest to find a specific pattern within historical examples that would assist planners of future similar conflicts. Unfortunately, ingrained biases, created by the US failures of Vietnam and the apparent validation of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine in Desert Storm, prevented these theorists from searching outside the realm of unilateral military action apart from the other instruments of national power.[71] As a result, both Quinlivan and McGrath had to reach back into well-established western models of law enforcement while omitting critical societal factors in assembling their findings. Both of these thinkers even had to omit certain outlier occurrences in history that did not fit their conclusions. These actions resulted in incomplete research that could not stand alone to establish conditions for success in a counterinsurgency environment. Both studies failed to address the fact that there was no historical precedent for unilateral military action leading to success within the counterinsurgency atmosphere.[72]

The most helpful historical continuity among counterinsurgency operations throughout time appeared to exist with a clear and all-encompassing political aim, which translated into the minimum use of legal force using a close cooperation between all branches of civil administration and the military.[73] The existence of this historical parallel validated the Clausewitzian belief that war was simply an extension of politics.[74] The symbiotic relationship between politics and the military exhibited by some governments of the past appeared to be the determining factor for

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[71] Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, 269.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Pearson, "Low-Intensity Operations in Northern Ireland," 118.

[74] Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 92.

success.[75] In some cases, the clear political aim and the military's subordinate role even

overcame the disturbing realities of atrocities committed against the population.[76] Unfortunately,

this historical continuity also acted as a strong dissenting view to the Weinberger-Powell

Doctrine, particularly the belief in objective control of the military. The fluid nature of

counterinsurgency executed throughout history required the complete integration of the political

realm into military decision-making. The necessity to rapidly respond to the shifting political

nature of the conflict often made military matters subordinate to the greater political goal.[77]

Interestingly, force ratios played a negligible part and often contributed to conflicting data when

using it as the anchor in order to determine conditions for success. In fact, the primacy of politics

within the counterinsurgency environment displayed that a clear political aim provided more

options for troop levels within the target environment.[78] In reality, force ratio scholars were

looking through too narrow of a lens to find the rhyme within history.[79] The actual link to success

rested outside anything within the realm of military actions; it existed within the dominion of

politics and policy.

Application of Theory in the Algerian War

The Algerian War for independence was not altogether different in its root causes

compared to many other occurrences of anti-colonial conflicts that ravaged the world shortly after

World War II. The commonality between France's Algerian colony and many other colonial

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[75] Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One,* 264.

[76] Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya,* 152-153.

[77] Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France*, 44.

[78] Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Ethnic Defection in Civil War," *Comparative Political Studies* 41, no. 8 (August 2008): 1053-1054.

[79] Paul Saffo, "Six Rules for Effective Forecasting," *Harvard Business Review* (July-August 2007): 8.

holdings across the world was the abundance of social inequality within one or more groups.[80] Unfortunately, for Algeria, the group that had to face rampant inequality was the physical majority within the region. The Muslim majority, from the very beginnings of the French colony in Algeria, far outnumbered every other ethnic or religious group. A major factor to conflict included the development of bigoted policies toward this physical majority group and eventually partially enabled transformation into the platform used by the National Liberation Front (FLN) to rally nationalistic sentiment against France.[81] The historical context and the root cause of conflict within the region displayed the primacy of the political aspects of counterinsurgency. This particular conflict exhibited a distinct departure from most scholars who advocate the existence of an established force ratio when approaching the problem of counterinsurgency. It further stood as an anomaly to other historical counterinsurgency campaigns that fell within the boundaries of the twenty troops to 1000 inhabitant force ratio.[82] In fact, French actions during the Algerian War showed that without a clear and achievable political aim, no amount of forces could achieve a successful outcome to the conflict. In essence, troop levels on the ground were irrelevant when applied toward a unilateral military goal that was divorced from answering the multitude of political problems including inequality. France's use of overwhelming military force, well above the recommended twenty troops to 1000 inhabitants ratio, demonstrated the futility of establishing such numbers if the military did not operate under a clear and achievable political aim.

France's conquest and subsequent colonization of Algeria began with a campaign against the city of Algiers in 1830.[83] The invasion was due to the rumored slight against the French

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[80] Rachid Tlemcani, *State and Revolution in Algeria* (London: Zed Books, 1986), 51-57.

[81] Joan Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), 33-54.

[82] Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," 63-69.

[83] Evans and Phillips, *Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed,* 1.

Consul by the Dey of Algiers involving a whip and a violent altercation; however, the actual justification was due to King Charles X using war to continue clinging to the last vestiges of his power.[84] France's military campaign was a landmark success against a Muslim enemy who was inferior in many aspects including troop numbers, tactics, and equipment. In fact, it only took General Bourmont a total of twenty days to capture the city of Algiers in its entirety.[85] King Charles' desperate and shortsighted attempt to cling to power through strong military action prevented foresight into answering the situation after France achieved victory. This led to a period of indecision for almost ten years before France decided to capitalize on its gains by colonizing the whole of Algeria in 1840. Colonization included the wholesale and indiscriminate confiscation of arable lands from the Muslim population.[86] Marshal Thomas-Robert Bugeaud spearheaded this effort against Muslim resistance fighters organized under Abd el-Kader. The fierce fighting lasted until 1847 when el-Kader surrendered. Although large scale fighting ceased with his surrender, smaller scale resistance against French occupation persisted until 1870.[87] With the military conquest of Algeria complete, France looked to subjugate the population to French rule through a series of unequal and bigoted policies aimed against the Muslim population.[88]

Inequality within the Algerian population began with the negative bias against Muslims; these feelings persisted throughout the early colonization process and beyond. During the stability period shortly after el-Kader's surrender, France initiated a plan to incorporate Algeria into a French-African conglomerate. This was France's attempt, led by Napoleon III, to branch out beyond the borders of France itself in order to establish an empire spanning the globe.[89] The first

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[84] Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution*, 6.

[85] Evans and Phillips, *Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed,* 1-6.

[86] Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution,* 20.

[87] Evans and Phillips, *Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed,* 29-30.

[88] Ibid., 33.

[89] Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France,* 26.

attempt at this plan in Algeria occurred in 1865 with a directive that allowed Algerian men to apply for citizenship with the caveat of a requirement to relinquish their local Muslim customs and traditions. This directive led to further instability and resistance to French rule. The directive was so unpopular that only 1309 men completed the application process out of four million at the time. Of the men that applied for citizenship, those born in Algeria still had no political rights like voting and running for office until 1919.[90] An interesting additional decision in 1870 called the Cremieux decree further inflamed the situation by granting full citizenship to those of Jewish decent in Algeria.[91] Additional economic factors also contributed to the problem of social inequality. With the confiscation of arable lands in 1840, the concentration of acreage quickly fell into the hands of the wealthy European settlers called colons. This created entire generations of impoverished peasants instilled with negative ramifications of inequality who were dependent on sharecropping by the 1950s.[92] The combination of rampant land confiscation in 1840, an obviously biased French policy against Muslims in 1865, and granting another minority group French citizenship without caveats in 1870 stoked an unquenchable flame of resistance within the Muslim population. External and internal security and diplomacy issues with France and its European neighbors further ripened the conditions for conflict within France's most prized African colony.

France's social struggles in Algeria between 1870 and the onset of conflict with the FLN in 1954 revealed the catalyst for eventual conflict by showing a crack in the veneer of French invincibility to its enemies. The first critical external event that encouraged resistance within Algeria was France's defeat by German nations during the Franco-Prussian war. France's

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[90] Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France,* 27-31.

[91] Evans and Phillips, *Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed,* 31.

[92] Tlemcani, *State and Revolution in Algeria,* 51.

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embarrassing defeat and their subsequent relinquishment of Alsace-Lorraine not only displayed

the myth of French invincibility to the Algerian Muslim population, but it also caused France to

pull its focus from its colonies to matters on the European continent.[93] After its defeat by

Germany, France relinquished financial control to the Algerian Assembly and even attempted to

reform citizenship laws for the Muslim population.[94] The next pivotal moment for the Algerian

Muslim resistance was France's rapid defeat by Germany in 1940 during World War II. This

defeat reinforced doubts concerning France's weaknesses, and it actually affected the

administration of French Algeria.[95] The change of French preeminence in Algeria to that of a

German loyal French Vichy deeply affected rebellious attitudes. The American North African

campaign, which involved landings against French forces, further emboldened the resistance

groups and led to the publication of the Manifesto of the Algerian People in 1943.[96] For the first

time, this declaration displayed a publicly declared Algerian form of nationalism by demanding

the right of self-determination.[97] The flashes of nationalistic resistance toward France eventually

climaxed in the city of Setif in 1944 where Algerian Muslims, fueled by nationalistic sentiment

and decades of social inequality, targeted European settlers killing 103. The French Army

responded to this through violent reprisals, which led to the death of 1020-1300 Muslims,

although nationalists claimed the number to be around 45,000.[98] These cleavages within colonial

society manifested themselves throughout French overseas holdings within Africa and beyond.

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[93] Geoffrey Wawro, *The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 256-279.

[94] Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution*, 10.

[95] Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France,* 40.

[96] Evans and Phillips, *Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed,* 49.

[97] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-62,* 32.

[98] Evans and Phillips, *Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed,* 52.

The French colonial failures in the early 1950s were critical for the maturity of the nationalist movement within Algeria. The main proponent for encouraging nationalistic resurgence in Algeria was French failures in Indo-China.[99] The Vietnamese movement to free themselves from French imperialism inspired insurgent movements within Algeria and created an added justification for the use of violence. In particular, the victory of indigenous forces over the French army at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 gave hope to the nationalist movements in Algeria.[100] Prior to this French disaster, other anti-colonial movements had not attained the level of success that Vietnamese forces had against the French. In the global eyes of anti-colonial insurgencies, Dien Bien Phu stood as a milestone in the fight against Western encroachment.[101]

The trend of resistance continued in neighboring North African nations controlled by France, which also inflamed Algerian nationalist sentiment. In 1952, nationalist movements in Tunisia and Morocco began to use subversive violence to pursue their ultimate goal of independence from France.[102] The gradual successes of these movements caused the French to conduct political back peddling through policy revision and extension of additional rights to citizenship. The steady increase and tempo of violence eventually led to both countries achieving independence from France in 1956.[103] Parallel anti-colonial movements during the time, particularly essential moments like Dien Bien Phu, encouraged previously closeted nationalist movements to lash out in violence for their political goal of self-determination.

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[99] Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), 14-17.

[100] Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (New York: The Viking Press, 1977), 67-68.

[101] Ibid., 68.

[102] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-62,* 36.

[103] Ibid.

All-Saints Day, 1 November 1954, witnessed a string of bombings throughout Algeria but mainly isolated in the eastern part of the country known as the Aures Mountain area.[104] The lack of established pattern for such hostility due to the relative quiet and calm during the 1940s caused confusion and doubt among French officials. Initially, the French government blamed the violent and coordinated attacks on armed bands from neighboring Tunisia.[105] Confusion turned into a swift military response by the French army when the FLN claimed responsibility for the attacks by publishing strategic goals on the same day. Among many other things, the FLN's established goals included the desire for self-determination and an internal objective of internationalizing the conflict to gain external support.[106] The FLN initiated action prior to gaining a united support from the population due to the existence of other Algerian nationalist groups throughout the country. In fact, even after the initial attacks of 1 November 1954, the FLN continued to fight other groups in order to wrestle control of the direction of the overall independence movement. In 1955, when France was still actively hunting the insurgency, the FLN finally gained primacy as the sole instrument for promoting Algerian nationalist goals.[107] In order to rally further popular support for the movement, the FLN staged a second Setif in 1955 by conducting targeted violent acts against colons in Constantine. The targeted violence caused 171 European settler deaths and had similar results as the 1945 Setif massacre.[108] Shortly after the Constantine killings, the French army, along with a mass of colons, conducted brutal reprisals against the local Muslim population regardless of affiliation. These acts against a majority population turned the tide of popular support and aligned the poor peasant population with the

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[104] Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France,* 43.

[105] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-62,* 39-40.

[106] Evans and Phillips, *Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed*, 57.

[107] Tlemcani, *State and Revolution in Algeria,* 63.

[108] Martin Thomas, *Fight or Flight: Britain, France, and their Roads from Empire* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014), 301.

FLN.[109] Violence on both sides continued to escalate and forced the French to gradually increase their troop strength through the duration of the war.

From the very beginning, French efforts in Algeria were almost solely military focused with a weak supplementary effort for attempting to address the ingrained social inequalities of generations of colonial occupation. Large-scale French military response to the All-Saints Day attack arrived in Algeria in May 1955 with a force package of 100,000 soldiers.[110] This martial reaction included wholesale reprisal attacks, torture, and indiscriminate killings as accepted methods for forcing compliance within the Muslim population.[111] When brutal military reprisals failed, the French government declared a state of emergency in Algeria in March of 1955.[112] This declaration allowed the military to forcefully take over elected political positions within Algeria in an attempt to better control the situation.[113] The other effect of the official declaration was the mobilization of a more robust military effort to endeavor to quell the rebellion. By 1956, France had a grand total of 400,000 soldiers on the ground in Algeria supplemented by an additional 180,000 indigenous forces called harkis.[114] When the French shifted focus to the FLN network in Algiers in 1957, the French army added to the total number of troops on the ground with 10,000 additional elite paratroopers from General Massu's 10th Paratroop Division.[115] During the height of the war, the French had a total of 590,000 soldiers in Algeria securing the population centers while simultaneously attacking to destroy insurgent forces.[116] These forces were better equipped,

[109] Thomas, *Fight or Flight: Britain, France, and their Roads from Empire,* 301.

[110] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-62,* 51.

[111] Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War,* 67.

[112] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-62*, 52.

[113] Ibid., 52-54.

[114] Thomas, *Fight or Flight: Britain, France, and their Roads from Empire,* 60.

[115] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-62,* 80.

[116] Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War,* 35-36.

better trained, and more experienced in fighting within other than conventional modes of war than the enemy; however, the lack of a feasible political aim relegated the total number of troops on the ground to the realm of the irrelevant.

The Algerian War continues to stand as one of many historical anomalies for scholars who recommend a set force ratio for counterinsurgencies. According to the official UN census records for 1954, the total population of Algeria during the time of conflict was 9,368,665.[117] Factoring in the troop densities of 1956 and 1957, this meant that according to Quinlivan's model, the force ratio was approximately forty-three troops to 1000 inhabitants in both 1956 and 1957. This number was well over his recommended force ratio of twenty troops to 1000 inhabitants.[118] According to McGrath's analysis of force ratios, which included indigenous forces, the overall quotient was much higher during the same time periods and stood at approximately sixty-three troops to 1000 inhabitants. The seemingly over-abundance of soldiers in this particular scenario according to both comparative force ratio models called into question the true existence of a historical continuity within the framework of isolating the military response apart from political decisions. Conveniently, both Quinlivan and McGrath, as well as many other advocates of force ratios in counterinsurgencies, left out the critical example of French actions in the Algerian War in their assessments.[119] The French should have achieved a successful outcome according to the military focused analysis of most force ratio scholars. The lack of recognition of the greater sphere of political influence within contingency environments made the force ratio analysis immaterial for this particular historical conflict and the greater category of conflicts labeled other than conventional warfare.

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[117] United Nations, "Demographic Yearbook Annuaire Demographique 1955," accessed December 3, 2017, https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dybsets/1955%20DYB.pdf, 99.

[118] Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," 63.

[119] McGrath, *Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations,* 95.

The French problem in Algeria in 1962 was not solvable simply with the number of troops applied to combat the insurrection due to failed politics in the realm of creating feasible and acceptable policy. France's political aim in Algeria involved a deep desire to retain the last vestiges of French honor by maintaining national integrity.[120] The string of defeats occurring in other colonial French holdings prior to the Algerian War heavily influenced this decision.[121] In rapid succession, France lost its colonies of Indo-China, Tunisia, and Morocco.[122] The French government, as well as the military, viewed Algeria as the last stronghold of the legacy of French global strength. Unfortunately, the string of abuses against the Muslim population reaching back over 100 years stood as the main political obstacle for continued French influence in the region. Existence of racist and bigoted sentiment against the Algerian Muslim population prevented the French political authorities from escaping the narrative that the Muslim population lived in subjugation.[123] The narrative of forceful suppression was one of the outlets that the FLN used to gain international support for their cause, including the passive support of the US. Even with a conflict categorized as unnecessarily brutal on both sides due to the use of rampant torture, the equally brutish FLN was able to win the international political battle by placing a focal point on the historic and continued lack of integration among the majority of Algerian Muslims.[124] French inability to address the political problem of socially engineered inequalities was the reason for

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[120] Stephen Tyre, "The Gaullists, the French Army and Algeria before 1958: Common Cause or Marriage of Convenience?," in *France and the Algerian War 1954-62*, eds. Martin S. Alexander and J.F.V. Keiger (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 114.

[121] Ibid.

[122] Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War,* 14-17.

[123] Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962,* 41.

[124] Charles G. Cogan, "France, the United States and the Invisible Algerian Outcome," in *France and the Algerian War 1954-62*, eds. Martin S. Alexander and J.F.V. Keiger (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 151.

their eventual defeat.[125] Without a clear and feasible political aim, the French military efforts had no vehicle in which to shape their goals for anything but localized successes.

France's use of overwhelming military force failed due to the lack of a clear, feasible, and achievable political aim, which unified the efforts of all the instruments of national power. Contrary to the ideology of objective military control and the separation of military from politics found in the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, the Algerian War epitomized the Clausewitzian edict of the interrelated elements of politics and the military when applied to warfare.[126] The relationship between politics and military action was readily apparent when viewing the conflict through the lens of engineered social inequalities within the majority Muslim population of Algeria. When conflict eventually erupted, the French military led the charge targeting enemy forces while the political aspects of the war took a subordinate role. Often times, French military actions were successful in degrading and sometimes destroying insurgent elements in their various military sectors; however, the lack of a clear and achievable political goal failed to address the underlying reasons for conflict.[127] The French political machine continued to subjugate the majority Muslim population throughout the conflict while only addressing surface-level issues such as the lack of educational opportunities and the necessity of medical facilities. The political response to this conflict was so pathetic that many times it entrusted the build-up of schools and hospitals to the same group who was using brutish tactics such as torture and indiscriminate killings, the French military.[128] As a result, the combination of enduring bigoted citizenship policies, weak political attempts to remedy secondary social issues, and domination of the French military response over anything else caused the French efforts to fail in the region.

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[125] Cogan, "France, the United States and the Invisible Algerian Outcome," 153.

[126] Freedman, *Strategy: A History,* 92.

[127] Evans and Phillips, *Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed,* 61.

[128] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-62,* 53.

The Algerian War case study displayed the irrelevancy of applying troop numbers to the problem in an attempt to solve the issue through unilateral or military dominant postures. Arguably, the importance of politics within the realm of military action may be more visible in counterinsurgency operations than in conventional warfare because of the innate and immediate nature of political ramifications on military decision-making.[129] The historical continuity in this case was the political nature of counterinsurgency conflicts. The FLN displayed an informed understanding of this by shaping all military decisions, whether ethical or not, under the greater umbrella of a clear and feasible political aim. The FLN and their political entity, the National Liberation Army (ALN), never acted independently but always within the unity of purpose.[130] In the French model, politics and the military operated on separate goals that were not mutually supporting. French independent military actions often maintained a separate objective from the ill-advised political objective of maintaining Algeria as a part of France.[131] Many of these military actions, especially the use of torture, lost much needed external political support for the continuation of the conflict. The continued political policy of subjugation also ensured that any actions taken by the military would never achieve success.[132] In this manner, regardless of having twenty, forty-two, or sixty-three troops for every 1000 inhabitants, failures to make military efforts subordinate to a clear and feasible political aim made the situation doomed to failure regardless of applying a prescribed force ratio.

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[129] Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, 264.

[130] Evans and Phillips, *Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed*, 63-64.

[131] Tyre, "The Gaullists, the French Army and Algeria before 1958: Common Cause or Marriage of Convenience?," 105-114.

[132] Cogan, "France, the United States and the Invisible Algerian Outcome," 151-153.

Application of Theory in the Kenyan Emergency

The bloody British counterinsurgency expedition in Kenya against the Mau Mau rebellion shared many similarities, but also maintained distinct differences with the French experience in Algeria. Like many other colonial era conflicts of the time, the struggle involved insurgent groups that rose against socially constructed inequalities within the structures of European colonization of Africa. Similar to Algeria, much of the fighting was over what the dominion of land meant within the culture of the indigenous people of Kenya.[133] It also involved a majority-minority group, who far outnumbered the white European settlers and every other major ethnic group in the region, but enjoyed miniscule rights in terms of access to land and opportunity.[134] The two conflicts even shared the similar use of other than moral means to combat the insurgent threat. The Mau Mau experience for the British was one of the bloodiest conflicts that they were involved in after World War II in terms of the use of torture, coercion, and even the use of forced labor.[135] Although the French experience in Algeria shared many similarities with the British fight in Kenya, these two campaigns also contained many distinct differences. The Mau Mau rebellion was a civil war within the ethnic majority Kikuyu over the access to land.[136] This element was critical in understanding a conflict that was deeply rooted within the culture of the Kikuyu people and the importance of owning land within the established structures of an ancient belief system. The British were able to exploit this key element of the

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[133] Daniel Branch, "The Enemy Within: Loyalists and the War Against Mau Mau in Kenya," *The Journal of African History* 48, no. 2 (July 2007): 294-299.

[134] Anthony Clayton, *Frontiersmen: Warfare in Africa since 1950* (London: University College London Press, 1999), 11.

[135] John Newsinger, "Minimum Force, British Counter-Insurgency and the Mau Mau Rebellion," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 3, no. 1 (1992): 49-53.

[136] Bill Bailey, "Hearts and Minds, Pseudo Gangs and Counter Insurgency: Based upon Experiences from Previous Campaigns in Kenya (1952-60), Malaya (1948-60) & Rhodesia (1964-1979)," Edith Cowan University, November 2010, accessed March 21, 2018, http://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=act, 9-10.

Kikuyu culture, both politically and militarily, in order to successfully defeat a growing threat against its interests. In these similar conflicts, the major difference between French defeat and British success under similar circumstances involved a unified political and military effort shaped by a rather accidental yet keen understanding of the particulars of the Kikuyu culture.

The European occupation of African territories began with the Berlin Conference that occurred between 1884 and 1885.[137] At these proceedings, European nations decided to section Africa and draw boundaries in order to prevent anyone from going to war on the African continent. These conditions allowed Great Britain to occupy Kenya and begin the process of exploiting the fertile land using settler farms in 1895.[138] Many of the following colonial policies after settlement tore native lands away from the majority Kikuyu ethnic group and re-distributed those same lands to the white European settlers for cultivation.[139] This occurred under the guise of a British colonial concept of Pax-Britannica and the effort of civilizing unknown cultures while promoting an interest based platform for expansion.[140] The massive confiscation of native land, particularly in the historically Kikuyu regions of the Central Province and the Great Rift Valley, had severe ramifications on the culture of the people and established the initial spark of inequality and rebellion.[141] The nuances of the Kikuyu cultural tie to land displayed the catalyst for an unavoidable civil war within society, and the culturally unaware interest based policies of the British continued to add to the actual and perceived string of abuses that led to internal fallout.

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[137] Herbert M. Howe, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 32.

[138] Ibid.

[139] Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization,* 7.

[140] Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya,* 1-4.

[141] Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization,* 30.

The intricacies and particulars of the Kikuyu culture directly clashed with British land policies that stirred tension among the people. The masculine and male-dominated Kikuyu culture placed cultural preeminence in the ownership and development of arable land. Although many agrarian societies displayed a distinct tie to land out of necessity, the Kikuyu ingrained the idea of fertile land ownership deep into their culture, around a term called self-mastery, so that society could not function without it.[142] The Kikuyu idea of self-mastery particularly involved this concept as a way for a male in society to achieve the status of adulthood. Within the culture, the absence of land within your individual portfolio meant confinement to the status of childhood until the situation was remedied.[143] The idea of self-mastery was pervasive in society to the extent that land-based wealth was a qualification for political discussion and tribal leadership. This status even established the conditions for marriage, so without land, a Kikuyu tribesman could not marry and become a contributing member of society.[144] The limited British understanding of these cultural aspects of the Kikuyu caused them to move forward with their policy of indirect rule dividing remaining lands under the leadership of locally appointed chiefs and headmen.[145] From the very beginning, the British attempted to inculcate internal tension by exploiting preexisting social and political cleavages by investing in factions within the society. This approach created a centralized method for the distribution of land where the Kikuyu people relied on British appointed chiefs to fulfil promises of land ownership. The empty promises of the chiefs with the combination of famine and infighting between 1906 and 1907 caused a dispersal

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[142] Branch, "The Enemy Within: Loyalists and the War Against Mau Mau in Kenya," 294-302.

[143] Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization,* 17.

[144] Ibid., 16-17.

[145] Ibid., 29.

of Kikuyu as squatters on settler lands, particularly in the Rift Valley area.[146] They moved and dispersed under the auspices of better opportunities within their cultural frame of land ownership.

By the 1930s, a new faction rose within the Kikuyu who dispersed in search of greater opportunities after the initial British distribution of power. These new beneficiaries of the rural economic transformation under colonial rule united against the corrupt leadership of the British appointed network of chiefs and headmen. It was in 1924 that the opposition to the chiefs organized as the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA).[147] This first unification of Kikuyu against the chiefs displayed the ingrained tensions within the colonial system. Although the KCA was a moderate group who did not advocate violence, the British disbanded the organization due to their anti-colonial stance and opposition to British interests. In response to this, the same members of the KCA quickly re-organized under the same conditions while assuming a different name, the Kenyan African Union (KAU).[148] The subsequent shrinking access to land in the 1930s and the 1940s added strength to the message of the KAU; however, it also encouraged the formation of more radical groups who felt slighted by the empty promises of the chiefs. The much younger cohort of newly formed radicals during this time felt the need to exact violence on the origins of their problems, which they viewed as the chiefs and the European colonial establishment.[149] Without opportunities for land ownership, these original radical fighters found no other alternative to achieving their cultural necessity of self-mastery and subsequent adulthood. Immense limitations on land ownership in the 1940s closed off opportunities for the poor to escape their lots in life.[150] This displayed a failure in promises from both the chiefs and

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[146] Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization*, 28-30.

[147] Ibid., 31.

[148] Ibid., 32.

[149] Thomas, *Fight or Flight: Britain, France, and their Roads from Empire*, 224-225.

[150] Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization,* 33-35.

the moderate group known as the KAU; thus, failures of more moderate groups at changing

society spurred the rapid growth of radical groups into the early 1950s.

The declaration of Emergency status in Kenya arrived on 20 October 1952 because of an

apparent uncontrollable string of murders within the Kikuyu areas and arson attacks against

settler farms.[151] The initial British response typified their misguided biases against the Kikuyu

population as an ethnicity of troublemakers and the attacks as the workings of an organized

rebellious group. Operation Jock Scott was the first operation of the Emergency targeting the

seemingly anti-colonial radical extremism against the settler population.[152] Without the luxury of

having a well-integrated intelligence apparatus, the British operated based off assumptions that

widely generalized the Kikuyu population.[153] In an effort to decapitate the leadership of these

radical attacks, the British targeted the only other organized group outside of chiefs and headmen,

the KAU. Even though several members of the KAU had no affiliation with the extremist attacks,

the British authorities placed them on target lists for detention and interrogation. This political

and military misstep caused the isolation of the only moderate group in Kenya to disintegrate

leaving the extremist Mau Mau as the only dissenting voice to the chiefs.[154] The military forward

method of engaging in a counterinsurgency with misguided political objectives directly

contributed to the growth of the insurgent movement within Kenya and successfully ostracized

the population.

Removal of the moderate dissenting group further inflamed violence throughout the

Kikuyu areas of Kenya and relegated Operation Jock Scott as a relative failure. Political missteps

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[151] Clayton, *Frontiersmen: Warfare in Africa since 1950,* 14.

[152] Bennett, *Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency,* 13.

[153] David Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), 62.

[154] Bennett, *Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency,* 16.

such as the counter-oathing effort, which forced locals to publically denounce Mau Mau

affiliations, led to violent reprisals against the population and acted as a factor in further

alienating the population from British influence.[155] Failed initiatives along with the continued and

cumulative effect of political failures eventually left space for the Lari Massacre in 1953. After

luring some local village defenders away from the loyalist village of Lari, the Mau Mau brutally

attacked an undefended village of mostly women and children resulting in the deaths of hundreds

of Kikuyu.[156] In response to the lack of effective strategy, the British sent General Erskine to

Kenya in 1953 followed shortly by an additional military force of 700 soldiers.[157] General

Erskine immediately went to work formulating and employing a strategy to root out the insurgent

threat through bold offensive actions. In order to enable success, Erskine restructured all security

forces under a single command and established a network of intelligence gathering throughout the

country sectioned off by districts or zones of responsibility.[158] Additionally, the military

strengthened the use of local security forces called the Home Guard as an integral part of the

military plan.[159] The deliberate plan to use heavy military force eventually shifting to local police

efforts like the Home Guard was specifically coordinated within the political aim of British

interests in Kenya.

British efforts to raise a local constabulary force to provide security to Kikuyu residents

involved a two-pronged plan. This two-pronged plan involved raising a local security force called

the Home Guard to protect local relocation village projects throughout Kenya and using

[155] Thomas, *Fight or Flight: Britain, France, and their Roads from Empire,* 224-225.

[156] Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization,* 58.

[157] Bennett, *Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency,* 20-22.

[158] Ibid., 23-24.

[159] Kalyvas, "Ethnic Defection in Civil War," 1053.

infiltration tactics within Mau Mau formations by turning members of their own organization against them.[160] The Home Guard concept involved incentivized recruitment techniques that used various means of reward as well as coercion by British forces; however, toward the latter point of hostilities, the Home Guard grew largely apart from British influence.[161] The manifestation of successes of British political measures within the Kikuyu population encouraged a growth of loyalist sentiment among the troubled ethnic majority. The Home Guard grew rather rapidly and was most effective against the insurgency when viewed through the lens of casualties produced. By 1953, the Home Guard exploded to a size of 25,000 standing security personnel, and by the end of the conflict, this force claimed responsibility for over half of enemy casualties attributed to the war.[162] The additional tactic of raising local security forces involved Frank Kitson's concept of using pseudo-gangs to turn former Mau Mau fighters into counter-guerilla elements.[163] The effective use of multiple means of coercion on captured enemy fighters, namely torture, allowed the British to employ infiltration tactics, which produced vital intelligence and relatively successful results.[164] The final act of armed conflict against the Mau Mau deeply involved the employment of pseudo-gangs to find the location of remaining leadership and hunt them down.[165] Both of these aspects of building local security capacity were vital to the success of the military aspects of the counterinsurgency fight; however, they paled in comparison to the bold British political measures that both allowed their existence and enabled their success.

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[160] Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire,* 286.

[161] Kalyvas, "Ethnic Defection in Civil War," 1053.

[162] Ibid., 1053-1054.

[163] Wunyabari O. Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya: An Analysis of Peasant Revolt* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 94.

[164] Newsinger, "Minimum Force, British Counter-Insurgency and the Mau Mau Rebellion," 53.

[165] Howe, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States,* 32.

The British political arm displayed a high degree of involvement in the conflict during Erskine's plan of bold offensive actions. In fact, the political aspects, enabled by military successes against Mau Mau fighters, established the conditions for progress toward a stable environment within Kenya. During General Erskine's offensive operations, the Swynnerton Plan in 1953 allowed the British to fulfil their promises of land reform and opportunity for upward mobility for those loyal to the Crown. This bold politically motivated plan consolidated land, mostly to the detriment of Mau Mau affiliates, and granted these properties to the elite class among those loyal to Britain.[166] The plan also incorporated the most destitute population among loyalists by rewarding them through wage earning jobs with the colonial government.[167] Although there was no clear forethought on this matter, the Swynnerton Plan removed the effectiveness and reach of the insurgent narrative. The British politically created a narrative that made the colonial government and its affiliates the most likely and preferable route toward achieving even a semblance of self-mastery.[168] Political maneuvering such as the Swynnerton Plan made later more draconian policies like the British termed villagisation in 1954, which including uprooting the rural population and resettling them in close communities of 500 Kikuyu a piece, more tolerable for the population and did not result in a loss of relative popular support over the Mau Mau.[169]

Although many scholars posited that the use of the Home Guard or more invasive techniques like Frank Kitson's pseudo-gangs were the lynchpin for eventual success in Kenya, other counterinsurgency operations that used similar methods like Algeria ended in utter

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[166] Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization,* 121-122.

[167] Ibid., 127.

[168] Ibid., 130.

[169] Bennett, *Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency,* 24-25.

failure.[170] These aspects and even the argument that David Anderson used that torture was a factor in the eventual British victory in Kenya misses the larger aspect of the successful symbiotic relationship between politics and the military aim.[171] The Mau Mau Rebellion also stands as another dissenting argument against the application of a specified force ratio in counterinsurgency operations. During the height of operations in Kenya, the British maintained a standing force of 7,700 soldiers, 700 police, and 25,000 Home Guard.[172] According to the UN Census of 1955, the total population for Kenya was 5,405,966.[173] This meant that the total force ratio in 1954 was approximately six troops to 1000 inhabitants according to McGrath's analysis and only about two troops to 1000 inhabitants according to Quinlivan's model. The fact that the British emerged from the Kenyan Emergency with a successful outcome called both Quinlivan's and McGrath's analysis into question. It further displayed that a solely military focused analysis of counterinsurgency typically falls well short of the attempt at investigating historical continuities between like or similar events.[174] The nature of warfare, especially in the counterinsurgency environment, exhibited the interconnected relationship between politics and the military.[175] In this particular example, the campaign that did well to facilitate this dialogue ended with a successful outcome to the war.

The Kenyan Emergency, which included similar methods to the Algerian War like torture, coercion, and overall brutality, achieved a successful outcome through the use of a unified political and military effort shaped by targeted aspects of the Kikuyu culture.[176] British

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[170] Newsinger, "Minimum Force, British Counter-Insurgency and the Mau Mau Rebellion," 51.
[171] Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire*, 1-8.

[172] Clayton, *Frontiersmen: Warfare in Africa since 1950,* 14.

[173] Demographic Yearbook Annuaire Demographique 1955," 101.

[174] Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One,* 269.

[175] Clausewitz, *On War*, 605.

[176] Bailey, "Hearts and Minds, Pseudo Gangs and Counter Insurgency: Based upon Experiences from Previous Campaigns in Kenya (1952-60), Malaya (1948-60) & Rhodesia (1964-1979)," 9-10.

examples of military conduct and policy in this particular conflict epitomized the necessity for a symbiotic relationship between the use of military force and the application of feasible policy.[177] The early, yet accidental cultural understanding of the vital aspects of land to the Kikuyu people allowed the British to capitalize on ingrained and underlying conflict within the population. The British political efforts during the war were able to shape attitudes and pit unequal interests groups against each other. This led to ethnic violence among the Kikuyu people; however, it also led to the achievement of British political ends in eliminating rebellious factions to facilitate an independent Kenya.

Conclusion

The historically transposed idea of a fixed force ratio for counterinsurgencies stemmed from the popularized belief in the distinct separation of politics and war; however, the true continuity within a successful counterinsurgency was the political nature of the fight. The attempt to determine a historical pattern within successful counterinsurgencies was limited in scope due to the idea of proposing an exclusively military solution to war. Unfortunately, counterinsurgencies, as well as conflicts that are other than conventional, revealed the ageless nature of Clausewitz' understanding of the political factor in warfare. Apart from the political root cause of the conflict, it is difficult to establish a condition for success in these environments.[178] Quinlivan and McGrath's analysis of the troop levels in counterinsurgencies revealed that a focus on the military response in isolation could not expose the true nature of the conflict. Simply proposing recommended troop levels within these settings fell short of the necessity to develop a clear understanding of the civil foundational cause of conflict.

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[177] Matthew C. Gaetke, "Certainty is Illusion: The Myth of Strategic Guidance," (Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies, 2015), 48-50.

[178] Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, 269.

The historical examples of the French Algerian War and the British Kenyan Emergency further displayed the fallacy of a fixed force ratio for counterinsurgency environments. In the Algerian War, the French far exceeded both Quinlivan and McGrath's proposed troop numbers; however, their eventual failure forced observation from a larger perspective than the military effort. Likewise, in the British Kenyan Emergency, success with far fewer numbers than the recommended troop ratio by Quinlivan and McGrath offered a differing perspective for conditions for success. In both of these conflicts, the political nature of the fight proposed the focal point for analysis. The critical root cause of both of these conflicts appeared to be tied to the ownership and distribution of arable land.[179] An overly simplistic yet functional explanation revealed that the French failed to identify and target this political root cause while the British were successful in the same measure. Including both the military and political aspects of the counterinsurgency fight revealed that the French separated the two while the British incorporated both as mutually supporting positions to achieve a political end. More than the amount of troops on the ground, the symbiotic relationship between politics and military, or the lack thereof, proved more critical to identifying a historical continuity to assist future operational planners.

A critical similarity between the two historical conflicts appeared to be the bloody and coercive nature that embodied both the military and political responses to the situation. In both of the conflicts, the French and the British response included torture, using pseudo-gangs, and even employing forced labor camps in certain circumstances.[180] Even with these techniques, the British were still successful in their endeavors to rid Kenya of a rebellious faction. In the specific and particular instance of the Mau Mau Rebellion, using the political root cause of land ownership as a political weapon even outweighed the necessity of winning over the population

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[179] Gillespie, *Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution,* 20.

[180] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-62,* 81-83.

through the modern day technique of "winning hearts and minds."[181] In many situations, the

French were actually better in employing what resembles modern day US versions of winning

over the population by using soldiers to build hospitals and teach in schools.[182] The comparison

of the British and French responses to their respective conflicts may form an altogether different

technique in winning over popular support. The French method of responding to symptoms or

secondary societal issues largely failed to take hold in the desired form of popular support. On the

contrary, the British successes revealed that answering the primary cause of conflict might allow

a military force more of a margin of error when interacting among the people. This allowed a

realistic view of war as an inherently violent act instead of the sterilized version of

counterinsurgency, which allows for no margin of error in civilian casualties, that the US fights

today.

Proper policy and strategy in counterinsurgency circumstances requires a realistic view of

collateral damage and margins of error. This is not to specify that the US government should

encourage the military to create civilian casualties, but this project recommends that the

instrument of policy that includes violence also include all the realistic elements of warfare. In the

specific instance of British efforts in Kenya, the military sanctioned elements of torture and

coercion hardly swayed the people in a manner that experts predict in the present day. It was not

the extension of kindness toward the population that won popular support, but the use of political

capital in the form of economics that accomplished the task. Using this perspective, present day

operations in similar environments should discontinue the mentality that future small wars can be

accomplished by winning the population over through empathetic feelings. Although unfortunate,

a zero margin of error when exercising violence during a time of war is neither feasible nor

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[181] Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War,* 354.

[182] O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-62,* 53.

acceptable.[183] It is much more important to understand the underlying political issues of the operational environment and be able to manipulate those issues toward achieving political ends.[184] Wars, whether conventional or unconventional, will always include Clausewitz' unknown elements of fog and friction.[185] The current US casualty numbers from the Global War on Terror speaks to the impossibility of war as a sterilized business.

Additionally, the comparison between the two unconventional wars of the past describes the necessity of tactical level political responses to situations. The British successfully accomplished this in Kenya by properly using the modern operational term called transitions between the military and political efforts during the war.[186] Even still, at any given moment in the conflict, the military effort supported the political effort by establishing conditions to meet the political end. The British typically accomplished these tasks through unity of command created by a position called the High Commissioner, which essentially rallied all the instruments of national power under a temporary military dictatorship.[187] Unfortunately, this method is not aligned with our current Western value system in the United States. As a result, in order to accomplish similar outcomes, a politically focused entity must be prepared to assume the lead once the military establishes secure conditions to do so. Although the current US Department of State (DoS) already fulfills this role, the transition of operations from military control in Phase III to civilian control in Phase IV requires a much more robust response than what DoS currently implements. Furthermore, this method, in comparison to the British position of High

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[183] Rapp, "Civil-Military Relations: The Role of Military Leaders in Strategy Making," 17.

[184] David Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency," Air University, Summer 2006, accessed December 3, 2017, http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere/iosphere_summer06_kilcullen.pdf, 33-34.

[185] Clausewitz, *On War*, 119-122.

[186] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), III-40.

[187] John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 98-100.

Commissioner, must be robust enough to synchronize the entire effort from the very beginning in partnership with the Combatant Command responsible. The critical portion of more political involvement results from unifying all efforts, including the use of military force, not simply supplying more workers. The most controversial portion of this recommendation also requires the military to fall subordinate to a local civilian authority in determining courses of action, even from the outset of hostilities.

Even with a future division of labor and roles, it is important not to revert into the trap of antiquated military thought like objective control and the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. Influence needs to continue extending in mutual directions from both the military and the political entity. A more robust response from a political entity does not entail a division between policy and the military; it actually requires a more thorough integration with military leaders in order to facilitate shared understanding of the policy objectives. Military integration also facilitates a vital perspective for potential change to policy as the complex environment evolves with outside input. The recommended tactical level political establishment can effectively act as sensors to anticipate the series of developing events that connect into what Henry Mintzberg calls the emergent side of strategy.[188] A tactical level political organization, in concert with existing military structures, allows full military and civilian understanding of the situation in order to equip leaders with recommendations for potential policy changes in counterinsurgency environments. Flexibility, in both military decision-making and civilian policy creation, appears to be the potential pattern for success when implementing the use of violent force for political ends. As a measure of caution, even a well-integrated and fully functional structure cannot function without feasible and realistic

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[188] Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, Plans, and Planners* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 24-25.

political aims. The notions of strategic flexibility and the centrality of overarching political efforts cannot begin without first determining what needs to be accomplished.[189]

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[189] Gideon Rose, *How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 286.

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