Blind Spot: The Logic that Stifles US Army Thinking

A Monograph

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2018

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED (From - To)
	Master's Thesis	July 2017 - May 2018

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Blind Spot: The Logic that Stifles US Army Thinking	
	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
MAJ Daniel T. Trost	5e. TASK NUMBER
US Army	
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
School of Advanced Military Studies ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2134	

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

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15. SUBJECT TERMS

Officer Education, All Volunteer Force, Large Scale Combat Operations, Field Manual 3-0 Operations, Enterprise, Professionalism

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)		19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

Monograph Approval Page

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Monograph Title: Blind Spot: The Logic that Stifles US Army Thinking

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Abstract

Blind Spot: The Logic that Stifles US Army Thinking, by MAJ Daniel T. Trost, US Army, 44 pages.

Today's US Army Enterprise accepts that the current All Volunteer Force, without national mobilization, can fight and win against a peer adversary in large scale combat operations. The US Army Enterprise's assumptions about threats and the accumulation of conditions, force size, and the officer education system constrain the current US Army Enterprise logic necessary to defend the nation. To remove the constraints, one must seek education and challenge the organization's assumptions and the underlying logic it uses to solve problems. This monograph condenses the last 100 years of US Army history to show how the assumptions about threats and the accumulation of conditions, force size, and the officer education system generated doctrine in 2017 that accepts that the US Army, without national mobilization, can fight and win against a peer adversary in large scale combat operations. If the US Army Enterprise retains large scale combat operations as its greatest challenge a dialogue amongst officers and politicians is necessary regarding conscription, planning for national mobilization, and the execution of a war of national mobilization.

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Acknowledgements

Acronyms

AEF	American Expeditionary Forces
AMSP	Advanced Military Studies Program
AR	Army Regulation
ATLDP	Army Training and Leadership Development Panel
AVF	All Volunteer Force
AWC	Army War College
CAS^3	Combined Arms and Service Staff School
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
DOPMA	Defense Officer Personnel Management Act
GSS	General Staff School
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
ILE	Intermediate Level Education
LSCO	Large Scale Combat Operations
NSA	National Security Act
NSC	National Security Council
O-ILE	Optimized-Intermediate Level Education
QDR	Quadrennial Review
RETO	Review of Education and Training for Officers
SAMS	School of Advanced Military Studies
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
US	United States
VOLAR	Volunteer Army
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

Introduction

> I think there is no activity more important in a man's preparation for war than his periodic return to school…For in that period he is given an opportunity to think, to think in terms of war, without limit upon the scope of his ideas.
>
> — Dwight D. Eisenhower
> National War College Address
> October 30, 1950

General Dwight D. Eisenhower understood the power and freedom that education offered military officers.[1] Education is the bedrock used to free one's mind of constraints and imposed limitations. The inability to remove mental constraints leads people and their organizations to accumulate ideas and ways of doing things that restrain them. To remove the restraints, one must seek education and challenge the organization's assumptions and the underlying logic it uses to plan and then solve problems.

The US Army is comprised of an organizational structure and logic or its enterprise. An enterprise is a group of smaller separate organizations controlled by a larger central organization formed as the central organization enters new fields.[2] Each US Army Enterprise period outlined in this monograph identified a threat. That threat was informed by the conditions of the period. The period's conditions coupled with the threat informed the force structure as directed by legislation. The force structure then generated education requirements. The four factors of threat, conditions, forces, and education converge over the last 100 years to stifle thinking within the US Army. The current US Army Enterprise accepts that the All Volunteer Force (AVF), without national mobilization, can fight and win against a peer adversary in large scale combat operations (LSCO).[3] The US Army Enterprise's assumptions about threats

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[1] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Command in War" (speech, National War College, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, October 30, 1950), 295, accessed November 18, 2018, https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches/pre_presidential_speeches.pdf.

[2] Adolf A. Berle, "Theory of Enterprise Entity," *Columbia Law Review 47*, no. 3 (April 1947): 343, accessed February 15, 2018, https://www.scribd.com/document/369794727/The-Theory-of-Enterprise-Entity-a-Berle#download. A more detailed definition and framework for an "enterprise" follows in a subsequent section.

and the accumulation of conditions, force size, and the officer education system stifle the current US Army Enterprise logic necessary to defend the nation.

Detailed in this monograph is the story of how the US Army Enterprise changed, was configured, and accumulated a logic while it strove to meet the needs of the time and of the nation. The paper begins after World War I (WWI) in 1919 when the US Army Enterprise reverted from a nationally mobilized army back to a constabulary force. The US Army Enterprise allocated its meager resources to educate officers to prepare them for the next war of national mobilization. The Interwar US Army Enterprise prepared the officer corps to execute LSCO during World War II (WWII).

Following WWII, the US Army again reduced in size. This reduction was short lived as the United States' strategy oriented on the Soviet Union. The US Army fought in wars to contain Communism and postured itself to defend against a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The large standing US Army enterprise became an effective bureaucracy of military professionals working to implement logistics systems and procure weapons.[4] The military profession moved away from a profession that specialized in the management of violence to one that maintained, measured, and prepared a large standing army.[5] The modern officer had to organize, train, and equip the military force, plan its activities, and direct its operations in and out of combat.[6] By 1973 conscription ended, a large standing force was maintained with an AVF, and the US Army

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[3] US Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), ix.

[4] Patricia M. Shields, "The Bureaucracy in Military Sociology*," Armed Forces and International Study: Global Trends and Issues*, ed. Jean Callaghan and Franz Kernic (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 181.

[5] The "management of violence" comes from Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State," *American Journal of Sociology 46*, no. 4 (January 1941), 455-457, accessed February 15, 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2769918.

[6] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 11.

Enterprise dedicated its efforts to defeat the Soviet threat in Europe with a limited force not reliant upon national mobilization.[7]

The next period, from 1974-1991, is characterized by a deliberate movement away from the Vietnam War experience. The US Army Enterprise needed to defend Western European, new weapon systems were acquired, and large-scale combat training was developed to prepare for LSCO.[8] A core group of officers also realized that officer education was insufficient to meet operational needs, which prompted an officer education reevaluation. That reevaluation created the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) and returned to the officer education system a small program focused on LSCO and the development of a select group of capable officers who thought clearly, logically, and rapidly to create high performing staffs.[9] The AMSP created lasting effects within the US Army Enterprise, but the majority of officer education remained within the confines of military professional management.[10]

From 1992-2016 the Soviet threat in Western Europe disappeared and the US Army Enterprise reduced its size. However, the US Army Enterprise retained a large standing force with many institutions beyond combat forces that required management. This US Army Enterprise with its large standing army focused on global responsiveness, reshaped into a brigade centric

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[7] US Department of the Army, *Education of Army Officers Under the Officer Personnel Management System Volume II*, by Training and Doctrine Command Officer Personnel Management System Task Group (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), II-1.

[8] Romie L. Brownlee and William J. Mullen III, *Changing an Army: An Oral History of General William E. DePuy, USA Retired* (Carlisle, PA: US Military History Institute, 1989), 187-191, accessed November 12, 2017, https://history.army.mil/ html/books/070/70-23/CMH_Pub_70-23.pdf.

[9] Huba Wass de Czege, *Final Report - Army Staff College Level Training Study* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1983), 11, B-1, accessed October 10, 2017, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll11/id/1378/rec/12.

[10] US Department of the Army, *Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study Report to The Army 2003* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003), OS-12; Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), 21-22. Morris Janowitz describes "military professional managers" as "an officer with business type skills to manage an organization, measures the organizations readiness, and then educates the organization in the same manner".

force, and engaged in counterinsurgency wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Officer education at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) focused on educating officers for the next ten years of their careers.[11] The AMSP continued to turn out a small officer cohort educated beyond management skills. The US Army Enterprise continued to solidify the logic that there would be no more large wars and a tailored and responsive AVF US Army would solve global contingencies.

The current period is again defined by a threat, the current conditions, authorized forces, and how officers are educated. The October 2017 Field Manual (FM) 3-0 *Operations* outlines how LSCO is the US Army's most significant readiness requirement. The doctrine establishes the condition that the US Army must deter and fight a peer threat with the forces and capabilities available today.[12] This stifled logic is supported by decades of reliance on the AVF to resolve the United States' conflicts without national mobilization.

So, is the US Army truly prepared to engage in LSCO to defend the nation? The simple answer is no, as the current force does not rely on the national mobilization to fight LSCO. The current doctrine assumes that a peer threat will work across multiple domains to diminish the United States' military advantages.[13] Also, LSCO against a peer adversary may not be as constrained or limited as assumed. The US Army Enterprise is best served to realize that today's AVF is not enough to execute LCSO and win a peer threat war that results in national mobilization. If the US Army Enterprise retains LCSO as its greatest challenge a dialogue amongst officers, citizens, and politicians is necessary concerning conscription, plans for national mobilization, and the execution of a war of national mobilization.[14]

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[11] US Army, *ATLDP 2003*, OS-12.

[12] US Army, FM 3-0 (2017), ix.

[13] Ibid, 1-9.

[14] National Commission on the Future of the Army, *National Commission on the Future of the Army: Report to the President and the Congress of the United States* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2016), 2, 35, 52.

Through each of these periods the US Army Enterprise grew and changed to meet the United States' needs. The US Army Enterprise's assumptions about threats and the cumulative effect of conditions, force size, and the officer education system stifles the current US Army Enterprise logic that is necessary to defend the nation. The US Army Enterprise is confined within its own logic that the volunteer large standing army it possesses is all there is to defend the nation.

What is an Enterprise and its logic?

Adolf A. Berle in his "Theory of Enterprise Entity" defines an enterprise as "a single large-scale business conducted, not by a single corporation, but by a constellation of corporations controlled by a separate holding company, the various sectors being separately incorporated, because they were formed as the central concern (the holding company) entered new fields."[15] For this monograph the US Army Enterprise is the "holding company" and US Army forces, schools, and other administrative institutions are the "constellation of corporations" created as the US Army expanded into new areas. Lastly, the holding company's shareholders are the citizens of the United States.

As the number of US Army constellations or its institutions increased the need for separate entities within the large organization to perform specific functions and services increased.[16] A logic is then imposed to manage the specialized functions and services of the enterprise's growing institutions. A logic is a system or set of principles underlying the arrangements of elements in a system to perform specified tasks.[17] The logic of an enterprise is

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[15] Berle, "Theory of Enterprise Entity," 343.

[16] Ibid.

[17] "English Oxford Living Dictionary," *Oxford Dictionary*, accessed February 15, 2018, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/logic. This definition of logic is associated with computer systems and processes and is useful to describe how a system and its underlying institutions are built, accumulate parts, and operate with a logic. In this case the US Army Enterprise's logic imposed by Congress or itself through assumptions, conditions, force size, and education can stifle the US Army Enterprise.

developed to prevent information and organizational fragmentation. The logic underpins the

enterprise and drives organizational identity, operations, and thinking.[18] An organization's

enterprise logic can therefore impose limits on strategy, structure, organization, and culture.[19] The

logic also creates system wide assumptions within the enterprise about threats and accumulates

the effects of the conditions, organization size, and the education system. The US Army

Enterprise and its logic developed as the US Army gained permanent institutions, force structure,

and responsibilities to manage bureaucratic functions and services. This logic then informs the

citizens of the United States about the US Army Enterprise's capabilities.

So, how is the US Army Enterprise built, configured, and maintained? United States'

Code (USC) Title 10 "intends for Congress to provide a land army to preserve peace and security,

provide for the defense, support national policies, implement national objectives, overcome

nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the United States' peace and security."[20] In

addition, the US Army "shall also be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and

sustained combat incident to operations on land" and "for the expansion of peacetime

components of the Army to meet the needs of war."[21] It should be noted that the USC Title 10

organizational narrative does not specifically include how the US Army Enterprise should be

built, configured, or maintained. The US Army's current codification of Title 10 is expressed in

its mission statement as "to fight and win the nation's battles."[22] This simple logic seems to lack

the Title 10 emphasis on force expansion to meet the needs of war and political objectives.

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[18] Thomas H. Davenport, "Putting the Enterprise into the Enterprise System," *Harvard Business Review* (July-August 1998): accessed February 15, 2018, https://hbr.org/1998/07/putting-the-enterprise-into-the-enterprise-system. The enterprise logic idea is from business information systems designed to improve information access and sharing to control production/services and support analytics.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Armed Forces, US Code 10 (2011), § 3062, accessed February 13, 2018, http://uscode.house.gov/browse/ prelim@title10/subtitleB/part1/chapter307&edition=prelim.

[21] Ibid.

[22] "Organization – Who We Are," US Department of the Army, accessed January 23, 2018, https://www.army.mil/info/organization/.

How does an enterprise evolve, gain constellations, and develop a logic? The US Army Enterprise developed its logic by interpreting its Title 10 mandate and developed a mission statement to provide prompt and sustained land combat operations. It has done this continuously over time by identifying threats and then accumulating conditions and a force size associated to that threat. These conditions and forces then inform the US Army Officers Corps who subsequently design the officer education system to meet the enterprise's needs.

Why are Officers and their Education so Important?

Conflicts are fought and won by officers directing combat operations. A modern officer's duties are to organize, train, and equip the military force, plan its activities, and direct its operations in and out of combat.[23] Professional officers need to be educated to execute these duties to conduct modern war. The two phases of officer education are: imparting a broad, liberal, cultural background and imparting the specialized skills and knowledge of the profession.[24] The first education phase is accomplished during primary education, but the second portion is completed within and by the military officer profession. How and what the profession deems important drives how the profession's members are then educated or specialized. Specialization is necessary to create an intellectualized skill that is mastered through intense study.[25]

The US Army's fundamental role is to wage war. The intellectualized skill needed to achieve success on a modern battlefield is extensive.[26] Arthur L. Wagner, an important US Army reformer from 1875-1905, extoled the value of the specialized knowledge or the intellectualized skill necessary for military professionals to fight a nation's wars. Wagner believed that only

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[23] Huntington, 11.

[24] Ibid, 8-9.

[25] Ibid, 15.

[26] Todd R. Brereton, *Educating the US Army: Arthur L. Wagner and Reform, 1875-1905* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 56; see also Arthur L. Wagner, "Military and Naval Policy of the United States," *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States,* no. 7 (December 1886): 397.

through extensive education and a firm understanding of the theory of war could officers ensure success in war.[27] The modern battlefield's scale and speed also precludes any one person from commanding its entirety. So, dispersed groups of officers and their staffs need to coordinate the whole and prepare the detailed orders that met the commander's and ultimately the national objectives.[28] The only way to achieve such a high level of function is through rigorous officer education, peacetime exercises, and professional journals that generate officers confident in their ability to make decisions, solve problems, and handle large formations to meet the nation's needs.[29]

Lastly, military officers play a critical role in US Army Enterprise logic generation. Officers are critical to the development of threat assumptions through discourse with politicians as politics decides who gets what and how they get it.[30] The strategic interaction between civilian principals and military agents drives a period's threat assumption, conditions and the subsequent force size.[31] Military officers then configure officer education to meet the needs of that derivative logic. Therefore, the accumulation of improper assumptions, conditions, and force size can stifle officer thinking. This constrained thinking is carried over into the officer education system and confines the US Army Enterprise logic and subsequent generations of officers.

A Small Enterprise Prepares and Executes, 1919-1945

The US Army Enterprise prior to WWI was an army ill prepared to execute modern battlefield operations. The 20th century's modern wars are defined by combined arms tactical systems using motorization, mobile heavy field artillery, tanks, mechanized forces and

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[27] Brereton, 56.

[28] John Masters, *The Road Past Mandalay* (London: Michael Joseph Limited, 1961), 87-89.

[29] Peter J. Schifferle, *America's School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 63.

[30] Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants*: *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 11.

[31] Ibid, 2-3.

airpower.[32] Before WWI the western frontier constabulary forces focused on small unit tactics and the force was smaller than needed to fight the 20th century's large-scale wars.[33] Prior to the United States' involvement in WWI the US Army was involved in Native American actions in the west, stopping Pancho Villa's incursions, and putting down the Philippines' insurrection. None of these conflicts prepared the US Army to execute large formation operations on a modern war battlefield.

The impetus for extensive officer education post-WWI developed due to officer experiences of incompetence fighting US Army divisions and corps.[34] The officer corps' incompetence fighting these large formations encompassed all aspects of organization, planning, and logistics. The unpreparedness and ineffectiveness led to the wasting of soldiers and materiel. This drove the post-WWI resource constrained small constabulary US Army Enterprise to develop an education system to prepare for the next war. The logic was developed to prevent the professional incompetence and operational indecisiveness that allowed such slaughter and waste in WWI.[35] The US Army Enterprise created an officer education system that generated graduates able to make decisions, solve problems, and handle large formations to win the next war of national mobilization.[36]

The US Army Enterprise demobilized the majority of its forces post-WWI.[37] The National Defense Act of 1920 codified a preparatory force capable of expanding when

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[32] Schifferle, 39.

[33] Walter E. Kretchik, *U.S. Army Doctrine: the American Revolution to the War on Terror* (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 2011), 107-108.

[34] Schifferle, 9.

[35] Ibid, 15.

[36] US Department of the Army, *Report of the Proceedings of a Board of Officers Appointed to Study the Army School System*, February 4, 1922, 7.

[37] Allan R. Millet and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense* (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 385-386, 396-397.

necessary.[38] The United States relied on its military potential and a national mobilization rather than a large standing force.[39] From these conditions grew the Interwar US Army Enterprise education system that educated officers at the United States Military Academy, in Reserve Officer Training Corps programs, at National Guard schools, branch schools, the General Staff School (GSS), and the Army War College (AWC).[40]

The Interwar US Army Enterprise set about to educate officers with the ability to plan, organize, and manage large formations. The process to meet this need was not straight forward nor without reviews to ensure the US Army was properly using its meager resources. In February 1922, General John J. Pershing, by now the Army Chief of Staff, appointed Major General E.F. McGlachlin to review the US Army's military education system. The board's scope was to report on the entire system to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and to improve National Guard and Army Reserves instruction.[41] The board's immediate result was the establishment of basic and advanced branch schools. Officers began their careers at branch specific schools and could later be selected for a one-year program general staff education at the GSS.

Major General McGlachlin disagreed with the board results and believed that a one-year GSS brigade through corps operations course was insufficient.[42] McGlachlin believed that the educational depth and breadth needed to manage, organize, and plan for large formation operations could not be accomplished in one year. McGlachlin recommended that the most qualified officers attend a second-year division and corps operations course at the GSS.[43]

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[38] US War Department, *Act of Congress – Amendments to National Defense Act – Articles of War*, Bulletin no. 25 (Washington, DC, 1920), 2.

[39] Millet and Maslowski, 382.

[40] Schifferle, 33.

[41] US Army, *Report of the Proceedings of a Board of Officers Appointed to Study the Army School System*, 4-6.

[42] Ibid, 6.

[43] US Army, *Report of the Proceedings of a Board of Officers Appointed to Study the Army School System*, 4.

Additionally, selected graduates of the two-year GSS program would attend a final year at the AWC in Washington, DC.[44] The third year spent at the AWC was focused on War Department supplied strategic problem-solving exercises.

The GSS's mission was to train officers: in the use of combined arms within divisions and corps, commanders in the functions and techniques to exercise command of divisions and corps, and staff officers in the staff functions of divisions and corps.[45] The GSS was not to prepare an officer for general service in the US Army. The GSS educated officers to manage, organize, and plan large formation operations for the next national mobilizing war.

The focus on education over training within the enterprise was not without detractors. General George C. Marshall, the future WWII Army Chief of Staff, understood the modern battlefield's complexities and chaos from his American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) service. Marshall sought to eliminate the focus on time consuming technique and production of complex written orders he believed occurred at the GSS.[46] Marshall believed that the methodical planning structure created a liability to the force.[47] The education was useless without exercising the lessons with troops in the field, i.e. training. Marshall believed that field training and large exercises to apply the knowledge gained at school guaranteed success. The theoretical application on the ground was paramount to an army's success and thus education was irrelevant if it was not validated through physical application.[48] Marshall believed that exercises were the key to the intellectual readiness needed to face the next war's complexities. This extension of the

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[44] Timothy K. Nenninger, "The Fort Leavenworth Schools: Post-Graduate Military Education and Professionalization in the U.S. Army, 1880-1920" (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 1974), 336-339.

[45] US War Department, Army Regulation (AR) 350-5, *Military Education* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1925), 8.

[46] Paul F. Gorman, *The Secret of Future Victories* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994), I-11-I-12.

[47] Ibid, I-6.

[48] George C. Marshall, *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Volume 2: "We Cannot Delay" July 1, 1939-December 6, 1941,* ed. Larry I. Bland, Sharon R. Ritenour, and Clarence E. Wunderlin Jr. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 182.

applicatory method permitted officer education validation and prepared the units to execute their missions.

The GSS's large formation operations education and practical application were its cornerstone Interwar Period education outcomes, but the modern battlefield's chaos and friction could not be resolved through classroom application alone. The officer corps needed practical applications to rehearse command functions, staff functions, and tactics. Unfortunately, for much of the Interwar Period there were not sufficient soldiers or units available to train large formation operations.[49] So, much of the work to prepare officers for the next war was done through intensive classroom education and subsequent teaching assignments.

In addition to classroom instruction the GSS developed the doctrine and manuals to support its large formation operations education. In 1928, the GSS published the Staff Officers' FM.[50] The 1928 manual codified the staff's principles, its functions, and responsibilities to the commander. The 1928 FM was superseded by a more expansive manual in 1932 that included reports, forms, and order formats, but retained the core staff function doctrine.[51] The Staff Manual was again updated in 1940 and went through WWII and into the 1950's with only minor modifications.[52] These staff manual products standardized an army staff's functions, scope, and procedures to create a common language for US Army operations, processes, and its officers. These doctrinal works demonstrate that even without soldiers or materiel the US Army Enterprise and its officer corps built an army's intellectual and doctrinal framework.

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[49] Schifferle, 25.

[50] US War Department, *Staff Officers' Field Manual* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1928).

[51] US War Department, *Staff Officers' Field Manual* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1932), 4.

[52] US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 101-5, *Staff Officer's Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1950).

The next war would test the GSS's graduates operational and intellectual acumen. In WWII the US Army simultaneously fought in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Pacific, and Asia. The doctrinal work led by an educated officer corps built the doctrine that provided the organization and structure necessary to prevail and win across this operational expanse.[53] Also, a core group of the US Army's leaders were prepared to execute, plan, and manage the large formations created during WWII's national mobilization. However, there was still a shortage of GSS educated officers available to meet all US Army and US Air Corps' expansion needs. Despite the Interwar Period officer corps' efforts the system was never able to achieve the throughput necessary to populate WWII's expansive force structure. However, the system did provide the educated officers that served as the critical senior leadership for the US Army's divisions, corps, and armies.[54]

The US Army Enterprise during the Interwar years was underfunded and chose officer education as the means to achieve preparedness and eventual success. The enterprise built the GSS as a selective school to educate officers to manage, organize, and plan for large formations and prepared those officers to manage combat on an immense scale. The years at Fort Leavenworth between WWI and WWII were not an education to become the professional military managers of a large standing army. The education was to prepare officers to fight LSCO to win the nation's next war. The enterprise logic was not stifled by the period's current conditions or its force size. The US Army Enterprise logic instead created an officer education system that generated graduates able to make decisions, solve problems, and handle large formations to win the next war of national mobilization.[55] These Interwar US Army Enterprise

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[53] Kretchik, 159.

[54] Schifferle, 168-172. The US Army was able to populate its officer corps with a cohort of officers that would work at the highest organizational and operational levels during WWII even though it was challenged by education throughput challenges throughout the period.

[55] US Army, *Report of the Proceedings of a Board of Officers Appointed to Study the Army School System*, 7.

officers proved critical in steering and building the US Army Enterprise that expanded in WWII and waged war across the globe.

The US Army Grows, 1946-1973

The National Security Act of 1947 (NSA 1947) created the National Military Establishment and is regarded by some as the beginning of the United States' Cold War with the Soviet Union.[56] NSA 1947's pivotal legislation created and developed a large US Army Enterprise during a time when the US Army was not fighting an active war. The United States had four strategic choices concerning the Soviets and global communism: continue as it was, retreat into isolationism, wage a preventative war, or increase its and its allies military strengths to deter the Soviet Union.[57] In April 1950 the National Security Council (NSC) published a report detailing its recommendations for the United States' strategic objectives and programs. NSC 68 argued that the United States needed to roll-back the spread of global communism through a rapid build-up of political, economic, and military strength in the free world.[58] At first NSC 68 was deemed too expensive and politically unviable due to the increased defense expenditures its roll-back recommendation entailed. This all changed two months later on June 25, 1950 when North Korean communist forces invaded South Korea and United States set about increasing its and its allies military strength.[59]

The National Military Establishment, in conjunction with the Korean War, and the adoption of NSC 68's communist roll-back strategy created the need for a large standing army.[60]

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[56] National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253, 80th Cong. (July 26, 1947), 499-506, accessed January 23, 2018, http://legisworks.org/congress/80/publaw-253.pdf.

[57] Millet and Maslowski, 507.

[58] US National Security Council, *A Report to the National Security Council - NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security* (Washington, DC, 1950), 54-55, accessed February 12, 2018, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf.

[59] Millet and Maslowski, 507-509.

[60] Adrian R. Lewis, *The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 77-78.

This period's US Army Enterprise and its large standing army had to be ready to defend and roll-back Soviet and global communist invasions and political movements in order to preserve the free world. This logic called for the generation and maintenance of large US Army forces to defend against a communist invasion in Europe and would also lead to the United States' involvement in Vietnam.

The US Army Enterprise expansion began with the United States' involvement in the Korean War. It size was maintained by the Cold War roll-back strategy and the need for conventional forces to defend Europe.[61] The large standing army needed soldiers, but there was a shortage of volunteers to fill and maintain the ranks. So, national conscription extended from 1948-1973 to provide the necessary forces to achieve the United States' strategy.[62] It should be noted that the national conscription program or the draft also generated volunteers as service aged males opted to serve over being conscripted.[63] Still, volunteers were not enough, so conscription remained for 26 years to support the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam while the US Army maintained its European defense.[64]

This period also saw the end of national conscription as the Vietnam War altered public opinion. President Richard Nixon appointed the Gates Commission in May 1969 to develop a transition plan to the AVF and end conscription.[65] The volunteer force took a market based

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[61] Millet and Maslowski, 513.

[62] Gus C. Lee and Geoffrey Y. Parker, *Ending the Draft: The Story of the All Volunteer Force* (Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research Organization, 1977), 23.

[63] George Q. Flynn, *Conscription and Democracy: The Draft in France, Great Britain, and the United States* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 235; and Eliot A. Cohen, *Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 156.

[64] US Department of the Army, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945,* by LTC Marvin A. Kreidberg and 1LT Merton G. Henry, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-212 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1955), 695.

[65] Lee and Parker, 38; The US Army experimented with all volunteer army (VOLAR) units beginning in 1971. For a further discussion and the results of those experiments, see US Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Research and Development, Summary and Review of Studies of VOLAR Experiment, 1971, by Robert Vineburg and Elaine N. Taylor (Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research Organization, 1972), accessed March 08, 2018, https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED068742.pdf.

approach that highlighted pay and benefits to entice enlistment and service.[66] These measures deflated campus protests against the Vietnam War and removed conscription from the national discourse as its political cost had become too high.[67]

The standing army requirement institutionalized many bureaucratic requirements and functions associated with maintaining a large organization and the officers needed to manage it. An army is divided into two main groups, which are the arms and services. The arms group fight and kill the enemy while the services supply the arms group with all that it needs.[68] A large standing army needed a large arms group to train and be ready, which required a large services group to manage everyday logistics and readiness. This created, as Morris Janowitz states, officers who were "professional military managers."[69] Professional military managers are described as officers with business type skills to manage an organization, measure the organization's readiness, and then educates the organization in the same manner.[70] These new professional military managers moved the US Army away from traditional military authority to bureaucratic authority.[71] The US Army Enterprise's newest constellation, a large standing army, required professional military managers to train, equip, and supply it and changed the nature of officers, their education, and duties.

Officer education from 1946-1973 faced three major challenges that altered the curriculum at the CGSC and education overall. The rapid expansion of professional jurisdiction and an inability to define the US Army's unique body of professional knowledge as the standing

[66] William M. Raymond, "Uncle Sam says, "I Want You!" - The Politics of the Draft and National Service" (monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2005), 38.

[67] Ibid, 33.

[68] Masters, 87-89.

[69] Janowitz, 21-22.

[70] J. John Palen, "The Education of Senior Military Decision Maker," *The Sociological Quarterly 13*, no. 2 (Spring 1972): 151-153, 156, accessed January 23, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4105772.

[71] Ibid, 159.

army grew created a curriculum vacuum at the CGSC.[72] There were also issues concerning US military strategy that slowed or stopped changes to the officer education system. The US Army officer corps struggled to understand the role of land forces on the atomic battlefield and lacked a working definition of modern war.[73]

The years from 1946-1973 were a period defined by national conscription, operations to contain communism, and officer education stagnation. The US Army Enterprise struggled to find direction even after the Soviet threat was identified. The large standing army supported Europe's defense while it fought to contain communism in Vietnam. The conditions were set for fundamental shifts in military thinking as conscription ended and the adoption of the AVF began. These shifts arrived at the end of the Vietnam War as the US Army Enterprise and its officers sought their place on the modern battlefield.

Following Vietnam the Enterprise Focuses, 1974-1991

The US Army Enterprise after Vietnam was no longer burdened by a limited war to contain communism in Southeast Asia. There were also fundamental concerns about US military strategy as the modern battlefield and the world had changed since WWII. The US Army Enterprise set out to reorganize and rebuild the US Army and focus on the Soviet threat in Western Europe.

During WWII, the United States' military strategy changed from attrition warfare to annihilation warfare, but the advent of nuclear capabilities made an annihilation strategy impossible against the Soviets.[74] Nuclear weapons created a need for conventional forces to deter adversaries and a large conventional force served as the first line of defense against a Soviet

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[72] Michael D. Stewart, "Raising a Pragmatic Army: Officer Education at the US Army Command and General Staff College, 1946-1986" (PhD diss., University of Kansas, 2010), 7, accessed October 12, 2017, https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1808/6390/Stewart_ku_ 0099D_10887_DATA_ 1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

[73] Ibid, 8.

[74] Russell F. Weigley, *American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973), 477.

invasion. Within this context the US Army Enterprise recognized and adopted the operational level of war. The operational level of war developed within the US Army due to the complexities of the Western European defense and how to fight large scale conventional nonnuclear wars in a post 1973 Yom Kippur War environment.[75] These changes generated a need for officers educated beyond military professional management using an AVF.

The US Army learned an immense amount from the nonnuclear conventional 1967 Arab Israeli and the 1973 Yom Kippur Wars. Following a decisive and crushing defeat in the 1967 Arab Israeli war, Egypt and Syria learned valuable lessons about Israel's capabilities. The Arab nations analyzed Israel's superior capabilities and set out to close equipment and intellectual gaps within the Arab forces. The forces Israel faced in the 1973 Yom Kippur war were quite different than the ones faced in 1967. The Egyptians neutralized Israel's tanks and aircraft to slow down Israel's ability to gain the initiative and the time needed to raise its reserve. The Egyptians accomplished this by concentrating antitank weapons and purchasing integrated missile air defenses.[76] The Arab's tactical adaptations posed serious threats to Israel as witnessed in the war's initial engagements.

The Arab nations countered Israel's military superiorities and Israel's experience on this modern battlefield was much different than the fight it expected to encounter. The Yom Kippur War turned into a conventional peer adversary war of national mobilization that was decided through a contest of wills between Israel, fighting for its survival, and the Arabs fighting for their

[75] Kevin C.M. Benson, "Educating the Army's Jedi: The School of Advanced Military Studies and the Introduction of Operational Art into U.S. Army Doctrine 1983-1994" (PhD diss., University of Kansas, 2010), 34, 42.

[76] Chaim Herzog, *The War of Atonement: October 1973* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975), 13-14, 28, 270. Herzog provides a comprehensive account of the conditions that led up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, warfare adaptations and technological advances, the war itself, and how the war changed the realities surrounding a modern nonnuclear conventional battlefield.

honor.[77] The US Army Enterprise took notice of this war and set out to build an army capable of meeting the challenges of modern war and the 1990s.[78]

The national and military environment following the Vietnam War the US Army officer corps grappled with the role of nuclear weapons on the battlefield, weapon system developments, and wars of limited aims that restricted military decisiveness. The idea that emerged from this intellectual grappling was the need for officers able to manage, organize, and plan for large formation operations. Military professional managers were not equipped nor prepared to fight the wars the US Army Enterprise foresaw. The US Army Enterprise needed to solve the Soviet Union conventional war problem in Europe, adjust its forces and capabilities to meet modern battlefield's increased lethality and rapidity, and return decisiveness to war.

The US Army Enterprise set out on an equipment modernization program that provided the modern weapons needed to defeat the Soviet threat in Western Europe.[79] These weapon systems provided the large standing army the lethality and speed to return decisiveness to the modern battlefield.[80] The arms group was being modernized and so the services group became more robust to support more equipment of greater complexity. Beyond equipment, the US Army Enterprise recognized the need for better educated officers capable of operating in this more complex battlefield environment. A core group of officers set out to review and change officer education to support the expanded intellectual requirements in a post 1973 Yom Kippur War environment.

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[77] Herzog, 291.

[78] US Department of the Army, *A Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) Volume I*, by Study Group for the Review of Education and Training for Officers (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978), I-1, accessed October 20, 2017, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a070772.pdf.

[79] John L. Romjue, *The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army* (Washington, DC, Center of Military History, 1997), 2-4, accessed February 20, 2018, https://history.army.mil/html/books/069/69-4-1/cmhPub_69-4-1.pdf.

[80] Ibid, 2.

On July 1, 1973 General William E. DePuy assumed command of the new enterprise constellation known as the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). One of Depuy's first directives was that the CGSC field grade curriculum be centered on division operations and the remainder on corps and brigades operations.[81] This directive sent waves through the CGSC establishment as DePuy attempted to move CGSC curriculum back towards military operations.[82] The disharmony was due to the focus on military professional management education and the inclusion of Vietnam combat experience to the curriculum. This inclusion removed the instructor superiority aura from the classroom as experiences became important education models.[83] However, the US Army Enterprise needed to maximize investments in officer education to provide officers capable of performing the military operations to defend against the Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The only way to accomplish this was to change how officers were educated.

DePuy also believed the US Army needed to fight and win the first battle against a foe because national mobilization was no longer feasible.[84] The US Army's training and readiness status became institutional imperatives as available forces reduced and the AVF came into being.[85] The US Army was no longer designed to expand and would fight with the limited AVF. DePuy also believed that one of the major Vietnam War period shortfalls was serious training deficiencies at all levels and amongst officers.[86] The way to meet this limited force's readiness needs was to educate soldiers and officers, train them in collective tasks, and validate their performance operating in large formations during realistic training environments. The combat

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[81] John J. Hennessey, Memorandum for Record, Telephone Call from CG TRADOC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, July 20, 1973, Combined Arms Research Library.

[82] Boyd L. Dastrup, *The US Army Command and General Staff College: A Centennial History* (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1982), 121.

[83] Stewart, 245-246.

[84] Brownlee and Mullen, 187-188.

[85] Stewart, 238-239.

[86] Brownlee and Mullen, 187.

training centers (CTC) offered officers the ability to validate their education by training with the

soldiers they would direct in combat. The CTC provided realistic battlefield experiences, training

evaluation, and objective feedback to identify training strengths and weaknesses.[87] These training

centers alleviated the US Army readiness concerns following the Vietnam War.[88]

Beyond the CTCs the officer education debates continued. The "Review of Education

and Training for Officers" (RETO) was published on June 30, 1978. The RETO occurred because

the US Army Enterprise perceived that it was not educating officers to be successful on the lethal

modern battlefield against peer adversaries even with a large standing army.[89] Educating officers

as professional military managers was insufficient to defend the nation. The US Army Enterprise

had to educate officers to prepare for large scale conventional combat operations against peer

adversaries using large formations. The 1973 Yom Kippur War's large conventional nonnuclear

battlefield served as a case study for the environment officers needed to be prepared to operate

within.[90] Large formations needed to maintain much more situational awareness within the

modern deep, lethal, and fast-moving battlefield. This involved large amounts of competent staff

work to enable a commander to visualize and make decisions on a rapidly changing battlefield.

This required trained and competent staff officers, not managers. The RETO study identified this

shortfall and submitted recommendations to better educate the officers who would comprise these

staffs.

The first RETO recommendation was to establish the Combined Arms and Services Staff

School (CAS³). CAS³ would educate 100 percent of officers selected for promotion to major.[91]

This recommendation was made with the understanding that not all majors were selected to attend

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[87] Priscilla Offenhauer and David L. Osborne, *History of the U.S. Army Battle Command Training Program, 1986-2003* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 18-19.

[88] Ibid, 9.

[89] US Army, *RETO Volume I*, v.

[90] Kretchik, 195-196.

[91] US Army, *RETO Volume I*, 2.

the CGSC in residence.[92] However, all majors required staff officer training to support all other US Army institutional functions. The CAS[3] curriculum was focused on what staffs are, what staffs do and how staffs work.[93] The second RETO recommendation was to reduce resident CGSC attendance to 20 percent of the officers selected for major.[94] This recommendation was made knowing the need for highly trained officers to staff large formations existed, but a resource constrained environment required some sacrifices.[95]

At the same time as RETO 1978 was published a similar intellectual movement was ongoing within a small segment of the officer corps. This group believed that US Army officer corps suffered a lack of capable staff officers able to plan and execute large unit operations.[96] This belief came from the intellectual and doctrinal need to prepare to fight the Soviet Union with conventional forces in Western Europe. This conventional fight required the skills and expertise to manage, organize, and plan for large formations that the officer corps lacked following the Vietnam War and was not received within the current education system.[97] The lack of large formation trained staff officers was a two-fold problem. First, the Vietnam War experience offered little large formation combat experience as compared to WWII. Second, the CGSC and CAS[3] by this point were enterprise schools focused on educating officers to be managers and serve in the US Army Enterprise, not necessarily its combat units.[98]

Another important antecedent was the implementation of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) in 1980. The act served to standardize the appointment, promotion,

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[92] US Army, *RETO Volume I*, VI-3.

[93] Ralph Ekwall and Roland D. Griffith, *Constructing a Cube: A History of the Combined Arms Service Staff School* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1994), 1-6, accessed October 31, 2017, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p4013coll4/id/512.

[94] US Army, *RETO Volume I*, VI-3.

[95] Ibid, I-6.

[96] Benson, "Educating the Army's Jedi," 8.

[97] Ibid, 42.

[98] Stewart, 241.

separation, and mandatory retirement of regular commissioned officers within the Department of Defense.[99] DOPMA codified the bureaucratic system that officers were to be recruited into, promoted within, and received benefits from. It was the culminating legislation to solidify Janowitz's military professional manager.[100] The legislation brought stability to officer careers and bureaucratized the profession as the discussion of pay and employment benefits ensured the US Army Enterprise's ranks were filled.[101] Officer career bureaucratization created an institution that enabled this period's US Army Enterprise to manage a large standing army. However, officer career bureaucratization and professional military management were not the means to educate officers to fight a war of national mobilization.[102]

Beyond readiness initiatives and legislation to manage officer careers, the debate for a more extensive and intensive field grade officer education focused on large formations operations continued throughout the 1980s. There were attempts to return CGSC to its school for war foundations, but the need to educate officers to manage a large US Army Enterprise and legislation precluded this.[103] This reality is best summed up by the statistic that only 27.8 percent of CGSC graduates served in tactical units from battalion to corps within five years of graduation during this period.[104] The CGSC educated officers for positions far outside tactical large

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[99] Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, Public Law 96-513, 96th Cong. (December 12, 1980), 1, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-94/pdf/STATUTE-94-Pg2835.pdf.

[100] Janowitz, 21-22.

[101] Raymond, 38.

[102] Andy Rohrer, "Anti-Intellectualism in the Army: The Bureaucracy or the People?," *The Strategy Bridge*, January 14, 2014, accessed January 23, 2018, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2014/1/14/ anti-intellectualism-in-the-army-the-bureaucracy-or-the-people.

[103] Also, the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 required personnel management changes designed to select quality officers for joint duty assignments, increase the joint experience level of officers in joint assignments, and educate them appropriately. This act was in response to the joint military operational deficiencies following Vietnam, the Iranian hostage crisis, and Operation Urgent Fury. The third point regarding "educating appropriately" directed that the CGSC curriculum now include joint operations and that the curriculum would never return to full US Army control, see Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress, 101st Cong., 1st sess., HR, 1989, 50.

[104] Stewart, 250-251.

formation operations because that is where most of those officers served. Nevertheless, a core group of officers felt that the deviation from a warfighting education placed the US Army at an intellectual and tactical disadvantage. The perceived competence gap was so prevalent that senior leaders commissioned a study to identify ways to close it. The study authored by Colonel Huba Wass de Czege's was published on June 13, 1983 as the Final Report Army Staff College Level Training Study (from here referred to as the Wass de Czege Study 1983).

The Wass de Czege Study 1983 identified five factors as to why a gap in officer competence and education occurred. The factors are summarized as: an officer must arrive to a unit trained, more is demanded, do more with less, perform at a faster pace on complex and dangerous battlefields, and only better training and more education can maintain the US Army's edge.[105] The Wass de Czege Study 1983 arose from the US Army's doctrinal renaissance that began with publication of FM 100-5 1976.[106] FM 100-5 1976 stated the US Army's primary mission was to win the "land battle" and would do so with violent and massive firepower.[107] Combat power and firepower superseded maneuver in priority and technology replaced the emphasis on the Soldier.[108] FM 100-5 1976 was superseded by a 1982 edition that moved away from the doctrine of defense and executing battles. The US Army had grappled with the indecisiveness of single battles to bring about war termination before. FM 100-5 1982 transitioned to an offensive mindset and began the incorporation of the operational level of war.[109] The operational level of war was necessary to defend Europe with conventional forces and solve the modern battlefield dilemmas unveiled in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

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[105] Wass de Czege, 3.

[106] Benson, "Educating the Army's Jedi," 60.

[107] Kretchik, 198.

[108] US Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, *Operations, Change I* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977), i.

[109] Kretchik, 204-205.

The intellectual and doctrinal change signaled a need for trained practitioners at the operational level of war and the associated large formations. There was a consensus amongst senior leaders at Fort Leavenworth that the US Army needed more officers educated to manage, operate, and plan for divisions, corps, and armies.[110] The Wass de Czege Study 1983 echoed this assessment and called for "a rigorous program that provides better knowledge of the means, methods, and conditions of warfighting."[111] The study goes on to outline how the CGSC curriculum, in agreement with other commissioned studies, was too broad to meet the large formation tactical needs of the Army. The idea was that the "main effort" of CGSC should be to teach division and corps level operations to a highly selected cohort and then round out the year with US Army Enterprise level subjects. This focus would leave out non-basic branch officers, eliminate CGSC as an enterprise level school, and rededicate it as a school for war. However, the result of the Wass de Czege Study 1983 was not a rededication of the CGSC as a school for war or a movement away from teaching managerial outcomes. The Wass de Czege Study 1983 led to the creation of the AMSP to bridge the officer corps' operational competence gap.[112]

The AMSP emphasized educating officers that could plan, conduct, and supervise combined arms operations at battalion, brigade, and division level; apply theory and doctrine to a given situation; and adapt when conditions change, use hardware and weapons effectively, be an effective staff officer in combat up to corps level, and lead a battalion of their branch in combat.[113] The AMSP returned to the officer education system a program designed to develop warfighters for the US Army's large combat formations grounded in history, theory, doctrine, and

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[110] Benson, "Educating the Army's Jedi," 57.

[111] Wass de Czege, 6.

[112] Wass de Czege's 1983 study played an important role in generating education reforms aimed at officers to prepare them to fight in the modern war against the Soviets that the US Army foresaw. Many of report's recommendations were adopted, but the Command and General Staff College curriculum was not altered. So, the study's greatest impact was instead the creation of the Advanced Military Studies Program, see Wass de Czege, 6-8, 11, B-1.

[113] Ibid, F-8-F-9.

practice.[114] The CGSC general course remained an enterprise level school preparing officers to manage the US Army Enterprise. The AMSP reinstated the Fort Leavenworth "second year" last seen during the Interwar Period to develop officers who thought clearly, logically, and rapidly to create high performing staffs.[115] AMSP was a selective school that educated a small number of CGSC graduates. The US Army needed officers who were more than professional military managers to defend the nation. The AMSP graduates raised the level of understanding about the complexities of the modern battlefield and improved large formation operations planning and execution across the Army, but the majority of US Army officers remained educated as military professional managers. [116]

The US Army Enterprise added constellations and changed to defend against a Soviet invasion in Western Europe. The US Army Enterprise logic was shaped by the transition to the AVF, the bureaucratization of officer careers, and an intellectual move away from the ideas of national mobilization. The majority of officers remained educated as military professional managers. These conditions developed into a logic that stifled the US Army Enterprise into thinking that US Army could and would have to fight and win wars with only the AVF. This logic was confirmed as the US Army experienced tactical and operational successes when it employed conventional combined arms maneuver using the AVF throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.

A Reordering after the Cold War, 1992-2017

Following the success of Operations Desert Storm and the demise of the Soviet Union the US Army adopted mission requirements that supported civil authorities, stability operations, and an ability to transition from stability operations to combat operations continuously.[117] The US

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[114] Benson, "Educating the Army's Jedi," 101.

[115] Wass de Czege, 11, B-1,

[116] Benson, "Educating the Army's Jedi," 92.

[117] Ibid, 248.

Army Enterprise had for the last fifteen years focused its education, doctrine, training, materiel acquisitions, and intellectual efforts to counter the Soviet threat in Western Europe. Now that the Soviet threat was gone, FM 100-5 1986 was deemed insufficient to meet the US Army's expanded offense, defense, stability, and support civil authority missions.[118] The US Army Enterprise developed a new threat assumption, developed doctrine to support it, and changed the AVF force structure to meet the needs of combat and operations-other-than-war.[119]

The collapse of the Soviet Union generated debate regarding the size of the US Army.[120] Large conventional forces were no longer needed in Europe to defend against a Soviet invasion and Operation Desert Storm's success confirmed US military superiority.[121] The logic that was developed was that there no near-term peer threats and that the US Army would tailor itself to be responsive to global contingencies.[122] This new addition to US Army Enterprise logic reinforced the historical logic that the US Army's AVF could fight and win all of the nation's wars. This assumption led to significant changes within the US Army Enterprise.

A large instrument of change following the earlier force reductions was the Quadrennial Defense Report 2001 (QDR 2001) and its mandate to shift from a threat-based to a capabilities-based force able to answer global contingencies beyond large scale conventional operations.[123] The US Army established the US Army Transformation Campaign Plan, which encompassed

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[118] Kretchik, 217-220.

[119] Ibid, 226-227.

[120] Edwin F. Williamson, "A Comparison of the Post-Cold War Defense Budget Reduction to Prior Post-Conflict Reductions after World War II, Korea and Vietnam" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1993), 11, accessed February 7, 2018, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/40012/93Sep_Williamson.pdf?sequence=1.

[121] Feaver, 182-183.

[122] US Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Pamphlet 525-5, *Force XXI Operations* (Fort Monroe, VA: Government Printing Office, 1994), 1-1, accessed November 04, 2017, http://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/4240529/FID3171/ACDOCS/papers/B004.pdf.

[123] US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Report 2001* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), IV, accessed October 28, 2017, http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf.

organization, doctrine, and materiel reviews to support the QDR 2001's recommendations.[124] The organizational recommendations required a more responsive force. The responsive force mandate resulted in the US Army Enterprise's "Modular" reorganization.

The US Army Enterprise's modular reorganization dates to the close of the Cold War.[125] The assumption was that forces now needed strategic mobility to be "in the right place at the right time with the right capabilities."[126] This US Army would be more responsive with mission tailored units (brigades) and capabilities to meet specific requirements while it retained larger unit organizations (divisions and corps).[127] This assessment was in line with the QDR 2001's recommendation to meet the national security needs following the 9/11 attacks and support the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

The US Army's leadership believed modular reorganization needed to happen when it did because there would not be sufficient political capital nor funds to complete the transformation in the future. The US Army Enterprise began to transform in 2003 while it conducted combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The transformation also incorporated a US Army force structure expansion to support combat operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq while it maintained other global responsibilities.[128]

The US Army Enterprise supported two limited conflicts while it transformed its organizational structure to be more responsive. The institutional requirements to operate the US Army Enterprise weighed heavily on the whole organization as well. The US Army did not expand in the same magnitude as it did during WWI, WWII, or Vietnam. The US Army fought

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[124] US Army, *ATLDP 2003*, OS-1.

[125] William M. Donnelly, *Transforming an Army at War: Designing the Modular Force 1991-2005* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 4-5, accessed November 01, 2017, https://hist ory.army.mil/html/books/transforming_an_army/CMH_70-108-1.pdf.

[126] US Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Pamphlet 525-5, *Force XXI Operations*, 1-3-1-4.

[127] US Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Pamphlet 525–68, *Concept for Modularity* (Fort Monroe, VA: Government Printing Office, 1995), para. 3-6.

[128] Donnelly, 19, 23, 25.

two limited wars while it maintained an organization not designed to expand. This created organizational and officer education challenges. The US Army Enterprise's institutional needs competed with its combat unit needs. The US Army Enterprise did expand during this period, but it was not a national mobilization and thus the logic continued that the limited AVF could win the nation's wars.

Modularity and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan also generated changes to officer education. The education necessary to manage, operate, and plan for large formations became secondary to the educational needs of a brigade centric army at war. The US Army's limited expansion also increased the need for majors to fill positions within the greater number of brigade combat teams.[129] The completion of key developmental positions, combat rotations, institutional US Army requirements, and the need for education proved difficult to manage in accordance with DOPMA's professional timelines. The perceived value of education waned during this period and the value of a major's experience in key developmental positions ascended. The increased need for officers generated by a modular force and the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq strained the US Army Enterprise's officer education system.

Another component of the US Army Transformation Campaign Plan that impacted officer education was The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to The Army 2003 (ATLDP 2003). The ATLDP 2003's purpose was to assess training and leader development, doctrine, doctrine's applicability and suitability, and determine the leader characteristics and skills required for operations in the future.[130] The ATLDP 2003 recommendations to cancel CAS[3] and to implement Intermediate Level Education (ILE) for field grade officers changed how officers were educated. These measures were meant to remove the strains on officer education within the enterprise.[131]

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[129] Donnelly, 6.

[130] US Army, *ATLDP 2003*, OS-2.

[131] Ibid, OS-10.

CAS[3]'s demise in 2004 was based on the belief that the school disrupted units by sending captains away for education as units deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq.[132] ATDLP 2003 also recommended the development and implementation of a new captains' career course. The new captain's course incorporated the CAS[3] curriculum and was deemed more efficient. The new career course educated future company commanders and staff captains to plan, prepare, execute, and assess combined arms operations and training at the company, battalion, and brigade level.[133]

The ATDLP 2003's second outcome was ILE implementation. Prior to ATDLP 2003, selection to attend resident CGSC served as a professional gate for continued service beyond an officer's twenty-year career. This "gate" mentality drove all branches and specialties to seek inclusion of their officers into the CGSC course. The CGSC admitted all officers for attendance at the resident CGSC course because this "gate" remained a primary mechanism for all officers to be promoted or selected for command.[134] The ATDLP 2003's recommendation removed the gate and established noncompetitive resident instruction at the CGSC.[135] ILE sought to create a shared common educational experience for all majors.[136]

The stated reason behind ATDLP 2003's recommendation was that all US Army majors needed common core operational instruction at resident CGSC to prepare them for future service.[137] The goal was to develop all officers for their next ten years of service and generate the professional military managers needed to manage the US Army Enterprise.[138] ILE provided resident education opportunities to all field grade officers and changed the CGSC curriculum,

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[132] US Department of the Army, Human Resources Command, *CAS[3] Termination Announcement*, May 19, 2004, accessed November 05, 2017, https://www.perscomonline.army.mil/opfam 53/cas3.htm.

[133] US Army, *ATLDP 2003*, OS-13.

[134] US Army, *RETO Volume I*, VI-4.

[135] US Army, *ATLDP 2003*, OS-13.

[136] Volney J. Warner and James H. Willbanks, "Preparing the Field Grade Leaders for Today and Tomorrow," *Military Review 86*, no. 1 (January-February 2006): 106.

[137] US Army, *ATLDP 2003*, OS-12-OS-13.

[138] Ibid, OS-12.

methods of instruction, and faculty makeup.[139] The CGSC curriculum also responded to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The curriculum changed by as much as 40% per year to keep pace with the changing Afghanistan and Iraq operational environments.[140] The school began to value combat experience in Afghanistan and Iraq over a dedicated curriculum, much the same as occurred during Vietnam War period officer education. Division and corps operations instruction remained within the CGSC Common Core curriculum, but was not the CGSC's priority.[141] The CGSC served as the US Army Enterprise's school to generate officers to operate across the whole enterprise, not only within its warfighting units.

The inclusionary nature of the CGSC resident education no longer presented a professional gate and the education's perceived value suffered. The devaluation reached such a point that the US Army Chief of Staff had to direct lieutenant colonels to complete ILE prior to taking battalion command.[142] As the perceived value of a CGSC education diminished the value of combat experience became paramount. A cultural trend developed that viewed combat experience and combat centric assignments as supreme to the classroom. The promotion and command selection discriminator moved from residence attendance at the CGSC to a successful and lengthy tenure in combat and combat units.[143] More specifically, service in brigade combat teams in combat became the career discriminator for promotion and future success.

The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan also often extended officers time spent below the division level working in key developmental positions. Key developmental positions for basic branch officers are defined as a position fundamental to the development of an officer in their

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[139] Warner and Willbanks, 106.

[140] Ibid, 108.

[141] US Army, *ATLDP 2003*, OS-13.

[142] Thomas Boccardi, "Meritocracy in the Profession of Arms," *Military Review 43*, no. 1 (January-February 2013): 21.

[143] Ibid, 19.

core branch competencies.[144] This pattern reduced the time spent outside key developmental positions in division or corps.[145] The opportunity for a field grade officer to serve for an extended period on division or corps staff was limited, fragmented, and not perceived as career enhancing. This is due to the perceived value of key developmental positions in units below the division.

The US Army Enterprise valued education less that combat experience and tenure in key developmental positions during this period. There were many discussions regarding the ramifications to the officer corps created by modular transformation, ILE, the perceived supremacy of combat experience, and repeated deployments. By 2012, the US Army Enterprise determined that noncompetitive resident selection to CGSC did not meet its intended goal of developing all officers for their next ten years of service.[146] The US Army created "Optimized Intermediate Level Education," which encompassed a three-tiered venue system.[147] The goal for the "optimization of ILE" was to reduce the CGSC attendance backlogs and ensure that all majors completed ILE whether in residence, satellite, or distance learning. Army Directive 2012-21 Optimization of Intermediate Level Education (O-ILE) reinstated a merit selection for residence at the CGSC.[148] Attendance at the CGSC resident course returned as a discriminator for future promotions and command selection for the officer corps. The course curriculum at CGSC still reflected the US Army's decision to educate professional military managers, but selectivity for resident attendance at CGSC returned to the officer corps.

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[144] US Department of the Army, Pamphlet (PAM) 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 14.

[145] Ibid, 12.

[146] US Army, *ATLDP 2003*, OS-12.

[147] US Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, *Army Announces Optimization of Intermediate Level Education* (Washington, DC, September 24, 2012), accessed November 04, 2017, https://www.army.mil/article/87406/army_announces_optimization_of_intermediate_level_education.

[148] US Department of the Army, Army Directive 2012-2, *Optimization of Intermediate Level Education* (Washington, DC, September 24, 2012), accessed November 20, 2017, https://www.apd.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ ARMY %20DIR%202012-21.pdf.

Through the reorganizations, combat, and force expansion the AMSP's purpose remained to raise the level of the understanding of warfare in the US Army officer corps.[149] The AMSP educated the primary source for capable and competent officers to serve on division and corps staffs and fight LSCO. The number of officers generated by AMSP was still small in comparison to the number educated at the CGSC. However, the second year of education at AMSP remained the school to educate officers in the art and science of large formation combat.

The years following Operation Desert Storm, the Soviet Union's demise, and the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq were a tremendous period of organizational change for the US Army Enterprise. The Enterprise's threat changed and therefore doctrine changed, which generated a review of US Army force structure and officer education. Officer education at the CGSC remained focused on preparing professional military managers to serve within the US Army Enterprise. The US Army Enterprise generated a global response force to meet the needs of combat and operations-other-than-war.[150] The US Army Enterprise's ability to reorganize, fight in Afghanistan and Iraq, change its officer education system, and remain globally engaged with its AVF confirmed the logic that national mobilization was no longer needed to defend the United States. The logic accounted for no more large wars and a tailored and responsive US Army to respond to global contingencies. This stifled US Army Enterprise logic was codified in October 2017 when FM 3-0 *Operations* was published and US Army doctrine acknowledged that the AVF, without national mobilization, would fight and win the next LSCO war against a peer adversary.[151]

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[149] Kevin C.M. Benson, *School of Advanced Military Studies Commemorative History 1984-2009* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 2009), 54, accessed October 31, 2017, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/cgsc/Events/SAMS25th/SAMS25YearsHistory.pdf.

[150] Kretchik, 226-227.

[151] US Army, FM 3-0 (2017), ix.

Conclusion

Threats to the nation drove the US Army Enterprise. The threat was identified and developed within that period's specific conditions. Those conditions and the adopted threat assumption, enabled by legislation, generated the force structure. The officer education system was then built to enable the force structure. The 2017 and beyond US Army Enterprise logic accepts that the AVF, without national mobilization, will fight and win against a peer adversary in LSCO.[152] The US Army Enterprise's assumptions about threats and the cumulative effect of conditions, force size, and the officer education system stifle the US Army Enterprise logic needed to defend the nation.

As shown in this monograph, the threats, conditions, forces, and officer education accumulated over the last 100 years generated a stifled US Army Enterprise logic. The Interwar US Army Enterprise logic drove a constabulary force to allocate its meager resources to educate officers to prepare for the next war of national mobilization. The Interwar US Army Enterprise prepared the officer corps to execute LSCO during WWII without generating or maintaining that large standing force until it was needed.

The US Army again reduced its size following WWII, but the reduction was not permanent as the United States identified the Soviet threat. The US Army fought to contain Communism and defended Western Europe against a Soviet invasion. The large standing army necessary to stop global communism and deter in Europe created a bureaucracy of military professionals working to implement logistics systems and procure weapons.[153] The military profession changed from a profession characterized by the management of violence to one that maintained, measured, and prepared a large standing army.[154] At the end of the 1946-1973 period

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[152] US Army, FM 3-0 (2017), ix.

[153] Shields, 181.

[154] Lasswell, 455-457; Huntington, 11.

national mobilization was an afterthought for most officers.[155] The large standing force and its bureaucracy transitioned to an AVF that centered on the defeat of the Soviet Union in Europe without reliance on mobilization.[156]

After the Vietnam War the US Army Enterprise logic was predicated on a battle in Western Europe against the Soviets.[157] A core group of officers reevaluated the officer education system to meet the enterprise's new operational needs. From this reevaluation came the AMSP and a rededication to educate officers to execute LSCO.[158] AMSP generated capable officers, but the majority of the US Army Enterprise officers were still educated to be military professional managers at the CGSC.[159]

From 1992-2016 the Soviet threat in Western Europe dissolved and the US Army Enterprise again looked for a threat to build its logic upon. At the Cold War's end, the US Army, comprised of active duty, the National Guard and the reserves, contained ~2,400,000 soldiers prepared to wage war against the Soviets. Following the Soviet Union's collapse the US Army reduced its force size.[160] Large conventional forces were no longer needed in Europe and the success of Operation Desert Storm defined US military superiority.[161] The US Army tailored its structure into a small responsive global force.[162] The logic that the US Army's AVF could fight and win all of the nation's wars was set.

So, the US Army Enterprise again retained a large standing force that needed management. This US Army Enterprise concentrated on global responsiveness, reorganized into a

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[155] Brownlee and Mullen, 187.

[156] US Army, *Education of Army Officers Under the Officer Personnel Management System Volume II*, II-1.

[157] Brownlee and Mullen, 187-189.

[158] Wass de Czege, B-1.

[159] US Army, *ATLDP 2003*, OS-12; Janowitz, 21-22.

[160] Williamson, 11.

[161] Feaver, 182-183.

[162] US Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Pamphlet 525-5, *Force XXI Operations*, 1-1.

brigade centric force, and engaged in counterinsurgency wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Officer education at the CGSC continued to educate officers for the next ten years of their careers.[163] The AMSP continued to educate a small cohort for operations outside managing the US Army Enterprise. The US Army Enterprise developed a logic without large wars and a tailored and responsive AVF US Army would solve global contingencies.[164] This logic reached its most constrained point in October 2017 when FM 3-0 *Operations* was published. It outlined how LSCO is the US Army's most significant readiness requirement and that the US Army must deter and fight a peer threat with the forces and capabilities available today.[165] This doctrine served as a final contraction within the US Army Enterprise logic. This stifled logic is supported by decades of reliance on the AVF to resolve the United States' conflicts without national mobilization.

The US Army Enterprise grew and changed to meet the United States' needs over the last 100 years. The US Army Enterprise's assumptions about threats and the cumulative effect of the conditions, force size, and the officer education system stifle the current US Army Enterprise. A properly developed enterprise supported by a sound logic is necessary to defend the nation. The US Army Enterprise is now so stifled by its own logic that it educates officers and develops doctrine outlining how the US Army's all volunteer large standing army is all that the US Army possesses to defend the nation.

Recommendation

The US Army Enterprise beyond 2017 is again defined by an assumed threat, the current conditions, force size, and how officers are educated. After over ten years of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan the US Army adopted LSCO against peer adversaries as its threat assumption.[166] The

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[163] US Army, *ATLDP 2003*, OS-12.

[164] US Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Pamphlet 525-5, *Force XXI Operations,* 1-1.

[165] US Army, FM 3-0 (2017), ix.

[166] Mark A. Milley, 2017 Posture Statement of the United States Army, February 24, 2016, accessed November 5, 2017, https://www.army.mil/article/163/2017_posture_statement _of _the_us_army.

US Army Enterprise's shift away from counterinsurgency and contingency operations to LSCO against peer adversaries returned tactical and operational prominence to divisions and corps and resumed interest in large formation education and preparation.

The October 2017 FM 3-0 *Operations* outlines how LSCO is the US Army's most significant readiness requirement and that the US Army must deter and fight a peer threat with the forces and capabilities available today.[167] The US Army stated that it can resolve the United States' conflicts without national mobilization. This idea originates within a stifled US Army Enterprise logic that accumulated over the past 100 years and is supported by decades of reliance on the AVF.

The current US Army Enterprise is a global constabulary force that is not prepared to fight LSCO using today's forces. The current doctrine assumes that a peer threat will work across multiple domains to diminish the United States' military advantages.[168] The doctrine also assumes that a peer adversary will constrain or limit itself and fight LSCO with a force size comparable to what the US Army currently fields.

By 2017, the total US Army was approximately 1,000,000 strong.[169] For even more clarity, today's US Army Enterprise forces and capabilities are comprised of ~480,000 active duty soldiers. That equates to approximately 31 active duty brigade combat teams. This force, of which about 90,000 are in the institutional army, leaves approximately 310,000 soldiers to fight in LSCO.[170] That 310,000 contains 180,000 combat forces with the balance consisting of combat service and support soldiers. Of that 180,000 solider combat force how many are deployed, just

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[167] US Army, FM 3-0 (2017), ix.

[168] Ibid, 1-9.

[169] US Department of Defense, *Selected Manpower Statistics: Fiscal Year 1997* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), 53, 174.

[170] The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Ballance 2016," *The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics* (Oxfordshire: Taylor & Francis, 2016), 47; John Sloan Brown, *Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the US Army, 1989-2005* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2011), 257.

returned from deployment, or preparing to deploy in support of current missions or contingencies?

The US Army Enterprise is best served to realize that today's AVF is not enough to execute LCSO and win a war that requires national mobilization against a peer threat. United States Code Title 10 directs the army to prepare to expand to meet the needs of war.[171] The US Army leadership again recognized this in 2016 at the National Commission on the Future of the Army.[172] So, why did the US Army Enterprise write doctrine that stated the US Army could win against a peer adversary with only today's forces while other US Army leadership called for national mobilization plans? If the US Army Enterprise retains LCSO as its greatest challenge a dialogue amongst officers, citizens, and politicians is necessary regarding conscription, planning for national mobilization, and the execution a war of national mobilization.[173]

The US Army Enterprise grew during these periods and changed to meet the United States' needs. The US Army Enterprise's assumptions about threats and the cumulative effect of conditions, force size, and the officer education system stifle the current US Army Enterprise logic that is necessary to defend the nation. The US Army Enterprise is confined by accepting its own logic that the large standing army it currently possesses is all there is to defend the nation. This then allows officers to develop doctrine and communicate to the government and nation the myth that the AVF is capable of performing LSCO against a peer adversary without national mobilization. The assumptions and the accumulation of conditions, forces, and officer education formed a logic where the US Army Enterprise is stifled by a reality of its own making.

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[171] Armed Forces, US Code 10, § 3062.

[172] National Commission on the Future of the Army, *National Commission on the Future of the Army*, 2, 35, 52.

[173] Ibid.

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