

Adaptation in Multinational Organizations: The Multinational Force and Observers Transformational Change in the Face of ISIS in Sinai

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

Adaptation in Multinational Organizations: The Multinational Force and Observers
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Acronyms

ABM	Ansar Beit Al Maqdis
BGFAO	Border Guard Force Area of Operations
BN	Battalion
CENTCOM	US Central Command
CP	Checkpoint
DHC	Direct Hire Civilian
HMMWV	Highly Mobile Multi-Wheeled Vehicle
HQs	Headquarters
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
MATV	Mine resistant All-Terrain Vehicle
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers
NORTHBATT	Northern Battalion
OP	Observation Post
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
RAID	Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment
SFM	Sinai Field Mission
SOUTHBATT	Southern Battalion
TACON	Tactical Control
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WS	Wiliyat Sinai

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Introduction

Whosoever desires constant success must change his conduct with the times.

—Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*

On September 4th, 2015 two improvised explosive device attacks, set off by insurgents, injured four US and two Fijian soldiers and destroyed their vehicles.¹ This incident occurred not in Iraq or Afghanistan, but in the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula. This was only one recent interaction between soldiers of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) and insurgents. The incident demonstrated how the operational environment in Sinai had changed over time since the initial roots of the MFO in the Camp David Accords.²

This study aims to understand how the operational environment in Sinai changed from 1982-2016, and how the MFO adjusted their organization to meet the challenges posed. This examination uses the lens of an organizational change model, asking: to what extent has the MFO adapted in order to meet the strategic goals of the Treaty of Peace, while adjusting to the changing complexities within the operational environment? Exploring and addressing this question will help the personnel involved with multinational military institutions to understand some of the impediments to change and will provide recommendations on how to implement change in multinational organizations.

Not much writing exists to document or understand the changes in the MFO, with no official history and only cursory notes in the international media. Beyond the narrow context of the MFO, there is little writing about enacting change in multinational military organizations and the difficulties that accompany those efforts. Understanding the specific instance of the MFO will help reveal the dynamics of organizational change in relation to multinational military

¹ “Four U.S. Troops, Two International Peacekeepers Wounded in Sinai Blasts,” accessed September 21, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/09/04/four-u-s-troops-two-international-peacekeepers-wounded-in-sinai-blasts/?utm_term=.f7957302b88c.

² Support of Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel, 22 U.S.C. § 49 (1979).

organizations. With the knowledge developed by this project, an operational level planner will be able to understand more clearly how multinational military organizations adapt, and what difficulties may arise as part of a change effort.

This paper will explain what the MFO is, and then compare the adaptation seen in the organization to the rate of change in the operational environment of the Sinai. The paper will first examine four distinct time periods: initial conditions (1979-1982); the first two decades until the events of 9/11 (1982-2001); the beginning of the war on terror through the Arab spring (2002-2012); and the growing insurgency through rapid organizational change (2013-2016). The second section will apply the Burke-Litwin Model of organizational change to the MFO to explore how the change occurred, and where there were impediments to change. The final section will draw conclusions from this case study for future application in other multinational military organizations.

What is the MFO?

If the Security Council fails to establish and maintain the arrangements called for in the Treaty, the President will be prepared to take those steps necessary to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an acceptable alternative multinational force.

—President Jimmy Carter in a letter to President
Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Begin of Israel

The MFO is an independent international organization, not affiliated with the UN or NATO, built specifically to monitor Egyptian and Israeli adherence to the Egypt/Israeli Peace Treaty agreed upon in the Camp David Accords.³ The road to peace in the Sinai began following the culmination of the 1973 War between Egypt and Israel. Both nations, burdened by the costs of continued wars, agreed in the Sinai I Accords to allow a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) to monitor the disengagement of the two forces in the Sinai.⁴ Over the next year, the two sides

³ Arthur Hughes, "Servants of Peace," March 1999, accessed February 1, 2018, <http://media.mfo.org/docs/document/Servants-of-Peace#page/2>.

⁴ Ibid.

continued talks and in 1975 signed the Sinai II Accords, which increased the role of the UN force, created UNEF II, and called for the United States to implement monitoring of key mountain passes in the central Sinai through a small mission called the Sinai Field Mission (SFM).⁵ The SFM began its operation in 1976, and through its efforts helped increase the trust between the nations regarding their respective intentions in the Sinai.

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat took the next step in 1977 when he conducted a dramatic visit to Jerusalem and initiated discussions for a lasting peace.⁶ The Camp David Accords followed in September of 1978. In March of 1979 Egypt, Israel, and the United States signed the Treaty of Peace as a tripartite agreement, concluding three decades of confrontation between Egypt and Israel.⁷ The main points of the treaty were: the normalization of relations between the nations, mutual recognition, cessation of the state of war that had existed between the two nations since 1948, and the withdrawal of Israeli military and civilians from, and demilitarization of, the Sinai Peninsula.⁸ During negotiations for the Treaty of Peace, it was recognized that due to Soviet opposition it would be difficult to gain UN Security Council (UNSC) approval for a UN Force to be a permanent monitoring force in the Sinai.⁹ Therefore, US President Carter sent letters to Egypt and Israel stating that if the UN could not approve a monitoring body, the United States would pursue the establishment of a separate multinational monitoring force.¹⁰

⁵ Hughes, "Servants of Peace,".

⁶ William B. Quandt, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics* (Washington, DC.: Brookings Institution, 1986), 147.

⁷ Ibid., 207-290.

⁸ Support of Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel, 22 U.S.C. § 49 (1979).

⁹ Mala Tabory, *The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai; Organization, Structure, and Function* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1986), 3.

¹⁰ Quandt, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics*, 406.

The Treaty of Peace divided the Sinai Peninsula into four zones with strict limits to the amount of military or paramilitary forces authorized in each zone. In Zone A, the treaty authorized the Egyptian Forces one mechanized infantry division; for Zone B, four battalions with light weapons and wheeled vehicles; and in Zone C only police. In Zone D (in Israel) the treaty provided authorization for four Israeli military infantry battalions, with no tanks or artillery. The zones depicted in Figure 1 placed a demilitarized buffer in the Eastern Sinai and made any attempts to amass forces on either side of the border a violation of the treaty. The treaty also specified that the tasks for a monitoring force would be to: conduct checkpoints and observation posts (OPs) in Zone C to monitor treaty compliance, conduct bi-monthly verification missions of the treaty, conduct additional verification missions within 48 hours upon request of one of the treaty members, and ensure the freedom of navigation of the Straits of Tiran.¹¹ Navigation through the Straits of Tiran was considered a vital interest of Israel, as the narrow waterway controlled the Israeli access to the Red Sea at the base of the Gulf of Aqaba.

¹¹ Support of Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel, 22 U.S.C. § 49 (1979).



Figure 1. Map of Treaty of Peace Security Zones. Thomas W. Spoehr, "This Shoe No Longer Fits: Changing the US Commitment to the MFO," *Parameters* 30, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 109–25.

Another round of negotiations solved the question of implementation of the treaty with the signing of the Protocol of Peace in 1981. This protocol established the MFO as a separate multinational entity specifically designed to verify compliance with the Treaty of Peace.¹² The protocol specified the force structure, funding, uniforms and postal regulations to govern the MFO. Egypt, Israel, and the United States equally shared the funding of the MFO.¹³ The Protocol of Peace also dictated the organization would be a force of 2,000 soldiers, led by a civilian Director General, with a General Officer as the Force Commander.¹⁴ The force consisted of three infantry battalions with only the weapons needed for their peacekeeping mission. The Protocol of Peace assigned a civilian observation unit to conduct the verification missions via land and air,

¹² Tabory, *The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai*, 11-12.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 146.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 148.

while the military force held responsibility for the OPs and checkpoints. The Protocol organized a liaison branch to facilitate communication between the parties for the purposes of adjusting the bounds of the treaty with “agreed activities” and to allow for notification of verified violations of the treaty.¹⁵

The MFO established the Director General’s headquarters in Rome, Italy where it provided direction and support to the force and observers. The Director General also maintained a representative and small staff both in Cairo and Tel Aviv to facilitate liaison and represent the Director General on policy matters.¹⁶ The rest of the Force and Observers were established in Zone C of the Sinai and began operations on 25 April, 1982.¹⁷

Operational Environment of the Sinai

In turbulent times, managers cannot assume that tomorrow will be an extension of today. On the contrary, they must manage for change; change alike as an opportunity and a threat

—Peter Drucker, *Managing in Turbulent Times*

This section will evaluate both the change in the operating environment and the adaptation in the MFO from 1982 to 2016. This section focuses on Zone C, which is the authorized area of operations for the MFO and contains all the associated HQs and OPs. This section will also include broader events from Egypt and the rest of the Middle East when they impacted the MFOs mission.

¹⁵ Support of Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel, 22 U.S.C. § 49 (1979).

¹⁶ “Organization of the MFO,” MFO.org, accessed September 15, 2017, <http://mfo.org/en/organization-of-the-mfo>.

¹⁷ Mira Avrech, “On the Sinai Border a Norwegian General Now Calls the Shots – Vol. 17 No. 18,” *PEOPLE.com* (blog), May 10, 1982, <http://people.com/archive/on-the-sinai-border-a-norwegian-general-now-calls-the-shots-vol-17-no-18/>.

Operational Environment at Initial Conditions (1979-1982)

The Sinai Peninsula is a 22,500 square-mile wedge shaped land mass which forms the land bridge between Africa and the Middle East. The Sinai has been part of a major invasion route between Asia and Africa for millennia. Since the 1948 Israeli Declaration of Independence, the Sinai has been the site of five wars between Israel and Egypt. The last of these wars ended with a cease fire in 1973.¹⁸ The Sinai Peninsula is at the far eastern edge of Egypt, with the Mediterranean Sea forming its northern boundary; the Suez Canal and Gulf of Suez representing the western boundary; Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba constituting the eastern boundary, with the Red Sea located south of the tip of the peninsula at Sharm el Sheikh. The terrain of the Sinai is a rocky desert with little vegetation. The Gulf of Aqaba coast has a mountain range that drops almost directly into the sea with sharp cliffs.¹⁹

Withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai dominated the military operational environment during the foundation of MFO in 1982. The Israel occupied the Sinai with both civilian settlements and military forces following their victory in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Based on the Treaty of Peace, Israeli forces began withdrawal in 1979 with a phased plan that incrementally removed soldiers and the settlements from the peninsula. The MFO established their Force HQs at one of the former Israeli airbases near the town of El Arish in the Northern Sinai, which meant that MFO personnel were building infrastructure as the Israelis were tearing their own infrastructure down. The MFO also established their South Camp in a small former Israeli airbase on the southern tip of the peninsula near Sharm el Sheikh. The only Egyptian forces permitted in Zone C were lightly armed police forces meant to maintain order.²⁰ During the transition period, the Sinai Field Mission (SFM) forces monitored the progress, and the MFO

¹⁸ David R. Segal and Mady Wechsler Segal, *Peacekeepers and Their Wives: American Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 82.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 81.

²⁰ Support of Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel, 22 U.S.C. § 49 (1979).

Forces moved in during the opening months of 1982.²¹ On April 25, 1982 the MFO assumed its duties and Israel officially returned the Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty as the final Israeli units left.²²

The border between North Sinai and South Sinai governates separates Zone C into two distinct areas at Taba. Access to the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea is the most important political concern in the South Sinai, particularly at the Straits of Tiran which controls access to the Gulf of Aqaba and the only southern Israeli port of Eilat.²³ By 1982 the Israelis had begun to develop the Gulf and Red Sea coastline, building the first hotels in the Sharm el Sheikh area. At the founding of MFO there were not even paved roads throughout much of the region. The road connecting Sharm el Sheikh with Taba (and further to El Gorah) was a dirt road that was reinforced by the MFO to act as a main supply route.²⁴ Over the next thirty years there was significant political and economic growth in this area. Politically, the importance of many of the MFO's remote sites during the founding of the MFO was concerned with access to the Red Sea for economic and military reasons. Without the port of Eilat, Israel was completely reliant on Mediterranean commercial ports, which Libya and other nations could easily affect.²⁵

North of Taba, in the North Sinai governate, the economy was based on subsistence farming, construction, and illegal smuggling. North Sinai encompasses the entire land border between Egypt and Israel, as well as the Egyptian border with Gaza. The Egyptian Government allocated few resources to the area and many of the small cities in the Zone C portion of North Sinai were remnants of the Israeli settlements established during the occupation following the

²¹ Tabory, *The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai*, 15.

²² Ibid., 16.

²³ Support of Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel, 22 U.S.C. § 49 (1979).

²⁴ Hughes, "Servants of Peace," 5.

²⁵ Indarjit Rikhye, *The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force Leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967* (London; Totowa, NJ: F. Cass, 1980), 67.

1973 War. The city of Rafah, at the Egypt/Gaza border, developed around both the illicit and legal trade with the Gaza Strip. The Treaty of Peace divided the town, splitting neighborhoods and families in half. The largest city in the Northern Sinai was and remains El Arish, a coastal town on the Mediterranean Sea with a population of 240,000. In 1982, Egyptian tourism to the Mediterranean Sea had a base in El Arish, with a political culture that encouraged both internal and international tourism into the area. Locals built several beach resorts in the El Arish area during the early 1980s.

Most of North Sinai population lives on the Mediterranean coast with Bedouin groups in the sparsely populated interior. The Bedouin population of the Sinai are culturally and historically distinct from the population of mainland Egypt. The Sinai Bedouin are composed of ten different tribes with a total estimated population of around 70,000. The five major tribes from north to south in Zone C were the Rmelat, Tarabin, Suwarka, Ahaywat, and the Mzenali.²⁶ The tribes each had generally acknowledged territories but tribes permitted intermarriage and movement across boundaries. The Bedouin traditionally moved across large swaths of land while herding animals while the mainland Egyptian culture was historically agrarian based in static farms in the Nile Delta.²⁷

The Bedouin were not direct participants in the Arab/Israeli Wars, but their territory in the Sinai traded hands multiple times and their families felt the effects of multiple conflicts. Bedouin smuggling traditions trace back thousands of years and their knowledge of the desert and their willingness to assist with the movement of any product across the desert made them effective assistants to many causes.²⁸ Cultural differences, in addition to the Bedouin's small

²⁶ Clinton Bailey, *A Culture of Desert Survival: Bedouin Proverbs from Sinai and the Negev* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).

²⁷ Dan Swale, "Discord in the Desert: Egypt's Sinai Peninsula in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring" (Massey University, 2015), accessed October 31, 2017, https://mro.massey.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10179/7883/02_whole.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y.

relative population (less than 0.7% of the Egyptian total population) contained on a separate land mass, made their marginalization easy for mainland Egyptians.²⁹

The North Sinai and the South Sinai governates were two of the poorest areas of all of Egypt with an economy of subsistence farming, fishing, and smuggling of goods into Gaza.³⁰ During the early 1980s, there was a small tourist industry in and around El Arish with small Mediterranean resorts and Israeli settlers established the first few hotels and beachside resorts in Sharm el Sheikh.³¹ In 1982 the infrastructure of the Sinai, outside of the few small towns along the Mediterranean coast, was nearly non-existent. Outside of the towns of Rafah and El Arish there was no electricity, running water, or sewage.³² The South Sinai portion of Zone C was relatively uninhabited except for a few small Israeli settlements in Nuweiba and Sharm El Sheikh. The MFO became one of the top three employers in the North Sinai governate and for thirty years remained one, if perhaps the only, steady source of income in the area.³³ The South Sinai was undeveloped and the least populated governate in Egypt, the steep mountains of the inner Sinai and harsh desert conditions made life in the Sinai unpalatable for all but the heartiest of Bedouins.

The Treaty of Peace required relocation of all Israelis living in the Sinai in settlements created after the 1967 war. Many chose to leave peacefully, accepting government funds to ease

²⁸ Joshua Gleis, "Trafficking and the Role of the Sinai Bedouin | Jamestown," accessed August 30, 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/trafficking-and-the-role-of-the-sinai-bedouin/#.ujx5JSek_pe.

²⁹ Nicolas Pelham, "In Sinai: The Uprising of the Bedouin," *The New York Review of Books*, December 6, 2012, accessed October 31, 2017, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2012/12/06/sinai-uprising-bedouin/>.

³⁰ Ahmed Shams, "Sinai Development 1980s to 2000s," *Al Ahram Weekly*, January 14, 2016, accessed January 28, 2017, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/15224.aspx>.

³¹ Magda Hassan, "Sharm El-Sheikh Is a Crucial Part of Egypt's Economy – but It Will Bounce Back from the Sinai Crash," November 10, 2015, accessed March 28, 2018, <http://theconversation.com/sharm-el-sheikh-is-a-crucial-part-of-egypts-economy-but-it-will-bounce-back-from-the-sinai-crash-50429>.

³² Hughes, "Servants of Peace."

³³ Zachary Laub, "Security in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula," Council on Foreign Relations, accessed October 31, 2017, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/security-egypts-sinai-peninsula>.

the financial burden of the move. However, the Israeli Army had to forcibly remove some Israeli citizens from the settlements in the Sinai, most notably the final 600 residents of Yamit in late April 1982.³⁴

MFO at Initial Conditions

As the MFO took shape in 1982, it consisted of over 3,000 soldiers, civilian observers, and support staff drawn from eleven nations under the supervision of a US diplomat as the Director General, and a Norwegian Lieutenant General as the first Force Commander. Fiji, Colombia, and the United States each provided infantry battalions. Italy provided the naval forces and France provided fixed wing aviation support.³⁵ The United States also provided the support battalion, Uruguay the transportation units, and a combined New Zealand and Australian squadron provided rotary wing support.³⁶

The Civilian Observation Unit (COU) consisted mostly of former members of the SFM who had been performing verification missions for several years in support of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai. The COU was comprised of 25 US civilians with previous State Department or military experience. They utilized both air and ground verification methods to establish whether each party was in compliance with the treaty. A liaison officer from the armed forces of the country under inspection accompanied the pair of observers on the verification mission.³⁷

³⁴ Yocheved Russo, "The Meatman of Yamit," *Jerusalem Post*, April 18, 2007, accessed January 18, 2017, <http://www.jpost.com/Features/Personal-Encounter-The-meatman-of-Yamit> and "Israel-Egypt Relations: The Yamit Evacuation (April 23, 1982)," Jewish Virtual Library, accessed January 18, 2018, <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-yamit-evacuation>.

³⁵ Segal and Segal, *Peacekeepers and Their Wives*, 37.

³⁶ "Assembling the Force," MFO.org, accessed September 15, 2017, <http://mfo.org/en/assembling-the-force>.

³⁷ Tabory, *The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai*, 72.

The military forces remained in Zone C with the headquarters at El Gorah in North Sinai (later known as North Camp). The Fijian infantry battalion deployed 500 soldiers in the northern sector, from the Mediterranean to approximately 80km south at the Nizzanna border crossing between Egypt and Israel.³⁸ They manned nine checkpoints and OPs and had their HQs at North Camp. The Colombian battalion manned the center sector from Nizzanna to Taba with 502 soldiers covering eight checkpoints and OPs and with a HQs in North Camp.³⁹ The US battalion of 670 soldiers from the 1-505th Infantry Regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division manned twelve checkpoints and OPs along the Gulf of Aqaba from Taba south to Sharm el Sheikh.⁴⁰ Their HQ was in a camp near Sharm el Sheikh commonly referred to as South Camp.⁴¹

During the start of the MFO there was no superordinate culture as the units came to the MFO with their own history, traditions and goals. The first US unit to arrive was from the 82nd Airborne Division which had a culture of hard fighting infantry. The US was relatively new to peacekeeping missions at the initiation of the MFO, so the mission of the Sinai was foreign to their experience. The ambiguity that came with the mission was vastly different from the norm of clearly defined missions in airborne operations.⁴² The Paratroopers of 1/505th Airborne Infantry Regiment established the initial conditions of the MFO culture for Americans through their interactions during the first nine-month tour in the Sinai. The paratroopers were accustomed to being combat oriented and considered themselves to be America's elite fighting force. These soldiers brought with them a focus on destroying the enemy that made the transition to static peacekeeping difficult. Additionally, the paratroopers knew they would return to the rapid

³⁸ "MFO in Numbers: MFO Military Personnel," accessed November 1, 2017, <http://mfo.org/en/mfo-in-numbers>.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Spoehr, "The Shoe No Longer Fits," 4.

⁴¹ Tabory, *The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai*, 71.

⁴² Segal and Segal, *Peacekeepers and Their Wives*, 52.

deployment force after their mission, and thus needed to maintain their combat training and attitude.⁴³ Little activity occurred in most of the area of US responsibility except for Bedouins and tourists. Unlike Korea or Germany at the time, there were no enemy border guards to observe, only shepherds and tourist beaches; not generally features of military deployments.⁴⁴

Conversely, Fijian forces had participated in several peacekeeping operations in the years leading up to the beginning of the MFO mission. Fiji sent a battalion of soldiers to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) beginning in 1978, and an observer group to Africa for peace monitoring in 1979.⁴⁵ Fijian forces had never deployed to the Sinai, but many of the first members of the Fijian MFO contingent had previously served in peacekeeping missions in other parts of the world. The MFO assigned the Fijians to the Northern sector of Zone C, with their area of operations centered around Sheikh Zuwaid and El Arish. The Fijians brought their military culture with them to the Sinai, often dressing during off time in traditional skirts and sandals and growing the popular kava root which, they brewed into an intoxicating beverage for ceremonial use.⁴⁶ Although the Fijian Army had participated in WWII, their military had not been involved in a major state conflict for more than forty years and the differing expectations between Fijian soldiers and the American paratroopers were vast.

The Colombian Army entered the conflict with some peacekeeping experience but also with the experience of fighting in the internal conflict in Colombia against the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Columbia (FARC). The Colombian Army had been fighting the FARC and other insurgent groups in the jungles of Eastern Colombia intermittently from the 1960s onward.

⁴³ Tabory, *The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai*, 37.

⁴⁴ Segal and Segal, *Peacekeepers and Their Wives*, 53.

⁴⁵ "Fiji Peacekeeping Mission Chronology," 2016, accessed November 13, 2017, <http://www.rfmf.mil.fj/history/>.

⁴⁶ "Fijian Kava Ceremony; Information for UN Delegates," June 5, 2017, accessed November 30, 2017, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/15348Fijian_Kava_Ceremony_Info_Leaflet.pdf.

Their forces had prior experience with working in small isolated teams from their jungle training and operational employment.⁴⁷

Rules for the use of force and restrictions on weapons were designed to ensure that members of the MFO could defend themselves, but would not have enough combat power or the authorization to enforce the peace treaty.⁴⁸ The MFO Protocol states “MFO units will have standard armaments and equipment appropriate to their peacekeeping mission.”⁴⁹ This ambiguous language was due to the conflict between the Israeli perspective that the units should bring all of their equipment, and the Egyptian view that the MFO should have no arms or only light armaments.⁵⁰ The result was forces that arrived primarily with only their personal weapons. The MFO restricted other equipment that was normally integral to an infantry battalion, such as mortars and heavy weapons. The MFO issued every military member an instruction card for the use of force with the following guidelines:

Your principle [sic] duty as a member of the MFO is to observe and report. You are armed with your individual weapon for self-protection. The firing of your weapon at another individual will be done only as a last resort and to protect your life or the life of another member of the MFO. Never use more force than necessary. Whenever possible request orders from your commander before you use force.⁵¹

A survey conducted by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research found that many of the US infantrymen assigned to the Sinai viewed this restrictive guidance on the use of force as

⁴⁷ Thomas Marks, “Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency” (Strategic Studies Institute; US Army War College, 2002), accessed January 28, 2018, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a399262.pdf>.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 77.

⁴⁹ Support of Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel, 22 U.S.C. § 49 (1979).

⁵⁰ Tabory, *The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai*, 77.

⁵¹ Cornelis Homan, “MFO: Peacekeeping in the Middle East,” *Military Review* 9 (September 1983).

adding difficulty to accomplishing their mission of peacekeeping. Over 33% of the soldiers believed that they would be ineffective in peacekeeping without the use of force.⁵²

Operational Environment 1982-2001: Relatively Static

From 1982 to 2001, the relationship between Egypt and Israel was relatively stable. There were no major conflagrations and few reported violations of the Treaty of Peace. Though Israeli conflicts with Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Lebanon caused multiple short-term rifts between Egypt and Israel, there was no fighting along the border between Egypt and Israel.⁵³ The greatest turmoil in the region during this time period was Operation Desert Storm (1991). Desert Storm was a limited international intervention that many Middle Eastern countries sanctioned and to which Egypt contributed 40,000 troops.⁵⁴ While important, Desert Storm did not adversely impact Egypt/Israeli relations, as both countries were ideologically aligned with the coalition against Iraq.

During this period, the Egyptian Government prioritized development in the South Sinai over the North Sinai. The economic divide between North Sinai and South Sinai began to grow as the burgeoning tourism market in the South increased the per capita income. The North received little investment and elements of infrastructure fell into disrepair, such as the rail from Cairo and general road networks. In South Sinai however, there was a concerted effort by the government and by multinational businesses to build Sharm el Sheikh into a resort town that would draw international tourists from Russia as well as Western Europe. Multiple large resorts opened in the

⁵² Segal and Segal, *Peacekeepers and Their Wives*, 70.

⁵³ Ray Sanchez, "Israel and Its Neighbors: Decades of Conflict," CNN.com, September 2014, accessed January 21, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2014/08/world/israel-neighbors/>.

⁵⁴ Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, "Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf," *International Organization* 48, no. 1 (1994): 37–75.

late 1990s and early 2000s.⁵⁵ In North Sinai, the primary source of income continued to be smuggling illicit materials into and out of Gaza.

The Egyptian military presence during this period was remarkably consistent with the Treaty of Peace. Through 2001, due to the stability in the Egypt/Israeli political relationship and the lack of major border violations, the Egyptian Government had little reason to change their force posture in the Sinai. The stability, with respect to Israel, allowed the border mission to continue as an economy of force. Premier Egyptian Army units (consisting of their 1st Corps and Republican Guard) were located closer to the capital. The locations of these forces were also a signal between the Egyptian Army and the Israeli Army of the lack of intent to attack, despite periods of intense rhetoric that occurred occasionally on the international stage.⁵⁶

The year 2001 brought many changes. The September 11th attacks on the United States and the reverberations in the Middle East caused by US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan had drastic effects. Additionally, in the last three months of 2000, the Second Intifada was initiated between Israel and the Palestinians. This regional upheaval was costly to the Egypt/Israel relationship, resulting in the withdrawal of the Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv.⁵⁷

MFO 1982-2001

Throughout the first eighteen years of the MFO it remained markedly stable. The organizational structure of the MFO remained nearly identical, as did the location of units. The Fijian Army still occupied the northern sector, the Colombians operated in the center and the US remained in the south. The contributing nations fluctuated with various smaller contributors entering and leaving while the main force providers remained static. The total force size dropped

⁵⁵ Shams, "Sinai Development 1980s to 2000s."

⁵⁶ "Egypt Army Summary," Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, October 2017, accessed January 28, 2018, <https://janes-ihs-com.lumen.cgscarl.com/Janes/Display/jwara147-nafr>.

⁵⁷ "Israel-Egypt Relations: Overview of Bilateral Cooperation," Jewish Virtual Library, accessed January 28, 2018, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/overview-of-israel-egypt-cooperation>.

over this period with a decrease from 2,692 to 1,836 total soldiers.⁵⁸ However, there were still a very similar number of remote sites and positions with a reduction of only three redundant locations.

Another source of stability was the direct hire civilians (DHCs) who formed the backbone of the logistical and financial side of the force. The MFO hired many of those DHCs in the early days of the MFO and they continued working with the organization for more than twenty years.⁵⁹ The expert power they developed through seniority and knowledge of how the organization operated was greatly expanded due to the transient nature of the military components in the Sinai.⁶⁰ Since some of the military contingents rotated their forces every 6-9 months, they spent several months learning the operational environment, leaving little time to make any real change before rotating out. The DHCs in charge of engineering, logistics, or finance operated over a greater time horizon. Therefore, for changes that spanned over a year, the DHCs had the tenure and experience in the system to push the change forward.⁶¹

The Fijian Army, with its relatively small size of only four battalions saw the MFO mission as one of its primary tasks. The Fijian military used the MFO as one of their main funding sources and with a smaller force saw many of their soldiers repeatedly return to the mission. This bred familiarity with the mission as well as the specific OPs and CPs and the people who lived adjacent to them. By 2001, some Fijian soldiers were on their sixth or seventh rotation through MFO and had known some of the local people for decades.⁶²

⁵⁸ “MFO in Numbers: MFO Military Personnel,” accessed November 1, 2017, <http://mfo.org/en/mfo-in-numbers>.

⁵⁹ *Presentation of MFO Force Commander, Maj Gen Warren Whiting to Tel Aviv University* (Tel Aviv, Israel, 2012), accessed January 28, 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jZi1Bdex61k>.

⁶⁰ Tabory, *The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai*, 44.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 72.

The Colombian Army focused heavily on fighting the FARC in their home nation. Support from the US, in the form of Special Forces units assisting both with counter-drug and counter-insurgency operations, meant a mixing of the cultures of the two militaries. The US significantly increased support for the Colombian military from 1989-1994, resulting in the dismembering of the major drug cartels.⁶³ This cooperation facilitated a tremendous cultural exchange between the US and Colombian militaries, extending a partnership that began in the 1940s. However, the small Colombian army (104,000 soldiers) had difficulties controlling the Colombian territory and employed various paramilitary groups to assist; some of whom were guilty of human rights violations. This situation caused a rift between the US and Colombian governments and the US withdrew most military aid from 1996-1998. At the same time the FARC went on a countrywide offensive and Colombian military forces sustained severe casualties.⁶⁴ Throughout this turmoil, the Colombians continued their commitment to MFO with their total number of soldiers only reduced from 401 in 1988 to 358 by 2001.⁶⁵ As a result, the forces who deployed to MFO had a culture closely aligned with the US military through their continuous engagement.

In 1991, concurrent with growth in requirements for forces in Operation Desert Storm, the US transitioned from utilizing active duty units for the MFO rotation to using a mix of Active Duty, Reserve, and National Guard forces.⁶⁶ This indicated a lower level of prestige associated

⁶² Jone Baledrokadroka, "The Unintended Consequences of Fiji's International Peacekeeping," *Security Challenges* 8, no. 4 (2012), accessed January 21, 2018 <https://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/Vol8No4Baledrokadroka.pdf>.

⁶³ Mark Moyar, Wil R Griego, and US Joint Special Operations University, *Persistent Engagement in Colombia*, 2014, 8.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 9-14.

⁶⁵ "MFO in Numbers: MFO Military Personnel," accessed November 1, 2017, <http://mfo.org/en/mfo-in-numbers>.

⁶⁶ David Segal and Ronald Tiggel, "Attitudes of Citizen-Soldiers to Military Missions in the Post Cold War World," *Armed Forces and Society* 23, no. 3 (1997), accessed January 21, 2018, <https://search-proquest-com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/docview/236489878/fulltextPDF/EB9837967A9849F2PQ/1?accountid=28992>.

with the mission, as well as being a reflection of the post-Cold War drawdown of the active US Army.

Operational Environment 2001-2012: Gradual then Accelerating Change

The period of 2001-2012 brackets several major events in the Sinai and the surrounding region. The attacks of September 11th and the US response, along with the turmoil of the Arab Spring, marked a transition to the next period. The operational environment in the Sinai changed drastically with the change in leadership in Gaza, the revolution in Egypt, and the beginning of insurgency in the Sinai. Additionally, the world view, and particularly the Muslim extremist view, of many nations participating in MFO changed due to over a decade of war in Afghanistan and nine years of war in Iraq. The US military became more of a worldwide target based on the perception of their actions in those two conflicts. The world outside of the Sinai had changed, the country of Egypt and the territory of Gaza had changed, and the Sinai itself had changed.

Between 2001-2004, the Sinai experienced a slow rise in violence, followed by a rapid increase in violence in North Sinai from 2004-2011. That escalation in violence preceded the tremendous upheaval of the Arab Spring, which brought the government of Mohammed Morsi, aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, into power through a popular revolution. The turmoil in the Sinai extended to the relationship between Egypt and Israel, with numerous cross border incidents near Gaza, as well as the Eilat area. Overall, the security environment in the Sinai declined, while an economic divide developed between the North and South Sinai. It was clear to members of MFO that the operational environment had changed as early as 2012 after an attack on the MFO base in El Gorah, Egypt.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ “Gunmen Attack Sinai HQ of MFO Peacekeeping Force, Four Injured,” *The Times of Israel*, accessed July 14, 2017, <http://www.timesofisrael.com/gunmen-attack-sinai-headquarters-of-mfo-peacekeeping-force-several-reported-killed/>.

Terrorism was on the rise starting in 2004 with bombings of the tourist resorts in central and southern Sinai at Taba and Nuwieba, killing 32 people.⁶⁸ Palestinian terrorists accepted responsibility for the attack, stating they had selected the Taba Hilton due to the high concentration of Israelis who vacationed there. The Egyptian government responded to the incident by arresting hundreds of mostly Bedouins from North and Central Sinai.⁶⁹

Those arrests created enmity between the government and the Bedouins. In 2005, terrorist groups detonated three bombs in Cairo, claiming they were in retaliation for the blanket arrests following the 2004 bombing. Shortly thereafter in July 2005, unknown militants detonated three bombs in Sharm el Sheikh, killing 88 people in the tourist area.⁷⁰ Multiple groups claimed responsibility for the killings in Sharm el Sheikh; investigators found that three of the suicide bombers were from Rafah, in North Sinai. The Egyptian government again made scores of arrests, further increasing the enmity with local Bedouins.⁷¹

In 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip to work towards peace with the Palestinian Authority. The initial Egyptian reaction to the withdrawal was to open the flow of personnel and goods between the Sinai and Gaza. However, they retreated from that position when Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007. The Israeli withdrawal left a power vacuum at the Gaza border that the Egyptians filled with the Border Guard Force. Remaining authorized military forces in the Sinai for the Egyptian Army were governed by the Treaty of Peace through 2005, with only low levels of police in the Zone C area. The 2005 Philadelphi accord with Israel

⁶⁸ “Death Toll Rises in Egypt Blasts,” *BBC News*, October 9, 2004, accessed December 14, 2017, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3728436.stm.

⁶⁹ “Egypt: Mass Arrests and Torture in the Sinai,” *Human Rights Watch* 17, no. 3 (February 2005), accessed December 14, 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/egypt0205/egypt0205.pdf>.

⁷⁰ “Toll Climbs in Egypt Attacks,” *BBC News*, July 23, 2005, accessed December 14, 2017, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4709491.stm.

⁷¹ Daniel Williams, “Egypt Gets Tough in Wake of Resort Attacks,” *Washington Post*, October 2, 2005, accessed December 14, 2017, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/01/AR2005100101293_pf.html.

gave the Egyptian military the requisite force to control the border at Rafah, following the unilateral withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. The new force allowed in the Border Guard Force Area of Operations (BGFAO) was: up to 750 personnel with 500 assault rifles, 67 light machine guns, ground radar and police type vehicles.⁷² The closures of the Rafah crossing (for which the Egyptians had once chastised the Israelis) became a regular fixture in 2007, as the risk of Hamas militants entering Egypt began to outweigh the advantages of trade.⁷³

In April 2006, three bombs detonated at another Sinai resort in Dahab, killing 23 and injuring 80. The Egyptian government placed the blame for the attack on Tawid Al Jihad, a Palestinian Sunni group with loose ties to Al Qaeda.

Though the attacks were hitting targets in the central and southern Sinai, the focus of the insurgency appeared to be in the underdeveloped and lawless North Sinai governorate. The Egyptian government came into closer contact with the Rafah area as their force structure in the Al Arish area grew in 2006-2007. Due to the changing leadership in Gaza, Israel approved additional agreed activities to allow the increase in troop levels. Both countries recognized the security threat posed by the Hamas takeover of Gaza. Thus, Israel and Egypt agreed to additional Egyptian forces in the area to reinforce their border security.⁷⁴

Ansar Beit Al Maqdis (ABM) began major attacks in 2011 with attacks focused on Israel, including a rocket attack into the resort town of Eilat, Israel, an attack on a major gas pipeline from Jordan to Israel, and an attack on Israeli border guards.⁷⁵ Egyptian military forces moved

⁷² Moshe Hirsch, "Treaty Making Power: Approval of the Israel-Egypt Philadelphi Accord by the Knesset," *Israeli Law Review* 39 (2006), accessed October 30, 2017, <http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/israel39&div=35&id=&page=>.

⁷³ Khaled Abu Toameh and Yakov Katz, "Egypt Closes Rafah Border Crossing," *Jerusalem Post*, February 2, 2008, accessed January 28, 2017, <http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Egypt-closes-Rafah-border>.

⁷⁴ "Multinational Force and Observers Annual Report 2007," accessed January 21, 2018, http://myos.mfo.org/media/mfo/documents/annual_report_2007.pdf, 13.

into Zone C of the northern Sinai beyond the original scope of the treaty as a response to the unrest.⁷⁶ Under the Mubarak regime, while the Egyptian government funneled large amounts of funds to develop the South in the Red Sea region, the Bedouins still lacked basic services.⁷⁷ The Egyptian government also blocked Bedouins from many jobs, such as police and military, two of the largest sectors of legitimate business in the North Sinai. Additionally, the government did not allow the Bedouins to work in the vetted areas of Sharm el Sheikh. This exclusion was based on a belief among some Egyptians that the Bedouin were either linked to the Israeli cause who had worked together during the Israeli occupation prior to Camp David Accords, or were terrorists who participated in the bombings in 2006.⁷⁸

An insurgency grew in the northern Sinai as the local populace, who felt disenfranchised by unequal investment and opportunity, began to regard the increasing levels of Egyptian Army forces in the North Sinai as oppressive. Attacks on the Egyptian forces started in earnest and Israel granted an additional agreed activity in 2011, authorizing Egypt to place 3,000 additional troops into Zone C, specifically in North Sinai.⁷⁹ Egypt made the request in response to attacks in the El Arish area, where insurgents burned four police stations and the local authorities did not have the weapons to fight back effectively.

In 2011, as the popular uprisings of the Arab Spring against standing governments were moving through the Middle East, Egypt had a popular revolution which culminated in a series of

⁷⁵ “The Islamic State - Sinai Province | Mapping Militant Organizations,” accessed August 30, 2017, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/557>.

⁷⁶ Support of Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel, 22 U.S.C. § 49 (1979).

⁷⁷ Laub, “Security in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula.”

⁷⁸ Lisa Watanabe, “Sinai Peninsula- From Buffer Zone to Battlefield,” ed. Christian Nunlist (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, February 2015), accessed December 14, 2017, <http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CSSAnalyse168-EN.pdf> and Amr Yossef, “Securing the Sinai,” *Foreign Affairs*, September 28, 2011, accessed January 25, 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2011-09-28/securing-sinai>.

⁷⁹ “The Bedouin of Sinai: Free but Dangerous,” *Economist*, June 23, 2011, accessed November 2, 2017, <http://www.economist.com/node/18867450>.

huge protests in Cairo's Tahir Square.⁸⁰ President Mubarak pulled security forces out of the Sinai to contend with areas of higher governmental priority, allowing the continued growth of smuggling in the area. Due to the withdrawal of security elements, governmental control of the area rapidly declined, and the power of Bedouin insurgent groups grew to fill the power vacuum.⁸¹ Insurgents attacked many governmental and establishment structures, ranging from prison breakouts to bank robberies. Tribes established low-level governance in many areas with security and arbitration conducted at the clan and tribe level without Egyptian government involvement.⁸²

Bedouins did not have the option of working in many of the legitimate businesses in the Sinai, so they continued to actively expand the black markets and smuggling operations to provide for their families.⁸³ President Mubarak eventually stepped down under pressure and the government of Egypt was in a state of transition from February 2011 until June 2012. Popular elections then brought Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood into power. When Mohammed Morsi took control, he struck a more conciliatory tone with some of the Muslim extremists in the Sinai, although he was still suspicious of the Bedouin.⁸⁴

In August of 2012, militants attacked an Egyptian border post near Gaza, killing sixteen Egyptian soldiers and stealing two Fahd armored vehicles. Using the stolen trucks, the militants rammed the border crossing, detonating one vehicle. The second vehicle drove into Israeli territory and stopped when an Israeli fighter jet destroyed it with a missile.⁸⁵ The attack drew

⁸⁰ Swale, "Discord in the Desert: Egypt's Sinai Peninsula in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring."

⁸¹ Laub, "Security in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula."

⁸² Nicolas Pelham and Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Sinai: The Buffer Erodes* (London, England: Chatham House, 2012), 5.

⁸³ Laub, "Security in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula."

⁸⁴ Mohannad Sabry, "Sinai Tribes Reject Morsi's Call to Surrender Weapons," *AL Monitor*, June 23, 2013, accessed February 1, 2018, <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/sinai-morsi-weapons.html>.

criticism from Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of the Palestinian Authority, who felt the terrorists had links to Hamas. Abbas used the incident to ask Egypt to close the underground tunnels into Gaza by stating they were only serving a few elite Hamas leaders, and dismissing that they were also used as a method for avoiding a humanitarian crisis.⁸⁶ In response to the attack, Mohammed Morsi stated, "Our forces will impose a full control on these area...Sinai is safe and fully under control -- those who did this will pay a high price."⁸⁷ At the urging of Abbas and Israel, Egypt deployed even more troops to the Sinai and began to explore methods to destroy the border tunnels to Gaza. Both Egypt and Israel recognized that the security environment had drastically changed in the North Sinai and adjusted their force structures and agreements to deal with the new reality.

In 2012, because of cross border security incidents involving Hamas, President Morsi stepped up a campaign to close the border tunnels into Gaza. The impact of that decision was to engender Israeli support, Hamas angst, and boost local insurgency.⁸⁸ The economic impact of closing the border was stark. Without the funding that previously came from smuggling into Gaza, this action caused the local populace in Northern Sinai to move towards the side of the insurgency. The area between El Arish and Rafah contained an estimated 1,200 tunnels into Gaza, moving \$500-600 million in supplies and weapons yearly across to Hamas.⁸⁹ The

⁸⁵ Yakov Katz, "IDF Thwarts Complex Terror Infiltration from Sinai," *Jerusalem Post*, August 6, 2012, accessed December 7, 2017, <http://www.jpost.com/Video-Articles/Video/IDF-thwarts-complex-terror-infiltration-from-Sinai>.

⁸⁶ Khaled Abu Toameh, "Abbas Urges Egypt to Destroy Underground Tunnels in Sinai," *Jerusalem Post*, August 11, 2012, accessed December 7, 2017, <http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Abbas-urges-Egypt-to-destroy-underground-tunnels>.

⁸⁷ Mohammed Fadel Fahmey, "15 Egyptian Soldiers Killed in Attack on Army Checkpoint," *CNN*, August 12, 2012, accessed December 7, 2017, http://articles.cnn.com/2012-08-05/africa/world_africa_egypt-violence_1_egyptian-soldiers-north-sinai-security-rafah-border.

⁸⁸ Ibrahim Barzak, "Gaza Prices Soar as Egypt Closes Crossings, Smuggling Tunnels," *Times of Israel*, August 8, 2012, accessed December 7, 2017, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/gaza-prices-soar-as-egypt-closes-crossings-smuggling-tunnels/>.

disaffected Bedouin population saw smuggling as one of the only ways to make a living in North Sinai. The smuggling trade was lucrative, particularly after Israel left Gaza and Hamas took charge. The desire for weapons increased while the requirement for day to day essentials remained.⁹⁰

Economically, the difference between the Northern and Southern Sinai governates grew starkly, with South Sinai having the highest per capita income in Egypt while the North Sinai had one of the lowest.⁹¹ Egypt considered South Sinai, particularly the city of Sharm El Sheikh, the preeminent Egyptian Red Sea tourist destination. Following the 2005 bombing, Egyptian security forces supplemented security in the Sharm el Sheikh area by adding additional checkpoints making the area a controlled zone. Security checkpoints screened each vehicle entering the city in to prevent terrorism and with the goal of returning European tourism to previous high levels.⁹² Tourism across Egypt dropped in 2011 due to the instability of the revolution. However, tourism for Sharm el Sheikh rebounded much quicker than the Nile region, making South Sinai tourism even more valuable to the Egyptian economy.⁹³

Sharm el Sheikh was the site of numerous international high level political and economic meetings to include those of the Arab League, the World Bank, and others.⁹⁴ Egypt utilized the

⁸⁹ “Economic Life Slows to a Crawl amid Crackdown in North Sinai,” IRIN, December 12, 2013, accessed October 30, 2017, <http://www.irinnews.org/feature/2013/12/12/economic-life-slows-crawl-amid-crackdown-north-sinai>.

⁹⁰ Michael Slackman, “Running Guns to Gaza: A Living in the Desert,” *New York Times*, June 19, 2007, accessed November 2, 2017, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/19/world/middleeast/19rafah.html>.

⁹¹ Heba Handusa, “Egypt Human Development Report 2010” (United Nations Development Program, 2010), accessed December 7, 2017, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/243/egypt_2010_en.pdf, 269.

⁹² Charles Starmer-Smith, “Ring of Steel for Sharm El Sheikh,” *The Telegraph*, October 22, 2005, accessed December 13, 2017, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/733859/Ring-of-steel-for-Sharm-el-Sheikh.html>.

⁹³ Shaimaa Fayed, “Egypt Tourism Revenues Seen Down by a Third,” *Reuters*, December 13, 2011, accessed December 7, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-egypt-tourism/egypt-2011-tourism-revenues-seen-down-by-a-third-idUSLNE7BC03720111213>.

Red Sea resort town as an important showcase for their country as well as an economic engine for international tourism. Politically, support for South Sinai did not wane during the turbulence in leadership and money continued flowing to the area to sustain growth in the tourist industry. When tourism in mainland Egypt collapsed due to the turmoil around the Arab Spring, the Egyptian government committed more funds to the Sharm el Sheikh region, as many saw it to be unaffected by the far away political and social issues.⁹⁵ This funding to South Sinai further widened the economic difference with the North. Living conditions of the average person demonstrated that gap, with twice as many households in the North Sinai living without connection to a sanitary system compared to the South.

MFO 2001-2012

The MFO recognized the rising issues and felt some of the specific impact of terrorism with incidents involving MFO soldiers. The MFO began to make small changes through investment in technology but did not make any changes to the overall structure of the organization or the placement of troops in the Sinai due to the changing operational environment. The MFO continued to pursue the “normal science” of their profession and continued to apply the logic of the past to the present situation, not recognizing there was a significant crisis. Thomas Kuhn, a leader in the mechanisms of paradigmatic shifts in thought, defines normal science as “research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements...supplying the foundation for its further practice.”⁹⁶ Kuhn contrasts normal science with a paradigm shift, where the old

⁹⁴ “Sharm El-Sheikh to Host 2012 IMF/World Bank Meetings - Economy - Business - Ahram Online,” accessed October 30, 2017, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/1908/Business/Economy/-Sharm-ElSheikh-to-host--IMFWorld-Bank-meetings.aspx>; “Yemen Crisis Tops Arab League Agenda in Sharm El-Sheikh - Region - World - Ahram Online,” accessed October 30, 2017, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/126211/Egypt/Politics-/Yemen-crisis-tops-Arab-League-agenda-in-Sharm-ElSh.aspx>.

⁹⁵ Sahar Aziz, “De-Securitizing Counterterrorism in the Sinai Peninsula” (Brookings Institution, April 2017), accessed November 2, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/de-securitizing-counterterrorism-in-the-sinai-peninsula_aziz_english.pdf.

rules no longer apply and reality is viewed through a new lens. The MFO still looked at the operational environment as they had for many years, pursuing their mission utilizing the methods that had been successful for almost two decades. To the MFO there was no paradigm shift required.

The relative strength of the MFO declined slowly throughout the first 20 years of the mission as the force removed redundant functions and positions. The total force by 2012 had dropped from 2,692 in 1982 to 1,656. However, there were no periods of drastic drawdown as the force never lowered strength by more than 11% per year.⁹⁷ The MFO remained under very similar restrictions with respect to rules of engagement and available weapons. Force protection risks due to insurgent actions was an understood threat and MFO funded some efforts to improve site security as early as 2010.⁹⁸

In August 2005, the first improvised explosive device (IED) strike occurred on an unarmored MFO vehicle injuring two Canadian soldiers. The Mujahedeen of Egypt, a local group with ties to Palestinian terrorists and Al Qaeda, claimed the IED.⁹⁹ The MFO acknowledged the security environment had changed and that the potential existed for the MFO to be targeted. However, they expanded their movements in the contested area with increased patrols in the new BGFAO to conduct additional verification missions.¹⁰⁰ In 2011, the MFO suffered an additional IED strike when a patrol near the Israeli border was hit by a small directional fragmentation

⁹⁶ Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 3rd ed (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 10.

⁹⁷ "MFO in Numbers: MFO Military Personnel," accessed November 1, 2017, <http://mfo.org/en/mfo-in-numbers>.

⁹⁸ "Multinational Force and Observers Annual Report 2010," accessed July 20, 2017, http://myos.mfo.org/media/mfo/documents/annual_report_2010.pdf.

⁹⁹ Evan Dyer, "ISIS Seen as Growing Threat to Canadian Peacekeepers in Sinai," accessed July 14, 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/global-affairs-briefing-peacekeepers-isis-1.3512727>.

¹⁰⁰ "Multinational Force and Observers Annual Report 2006," November 2006, accessed July 20, 2017, http://myos.mfo.org/media/mfo/documents/annual_report_2006.pdf.

device, damaging the vehicle but causing no injuries.¹⁰¹ Also, in 2011, there were three separate protests at MFO locations where the local Bedouin population tried to use MFO as leverage to gain concessions from the Egyptian government concerning the mass imprisonment of their people.¹⁰²

Both Fijian and Colombian force size and disposition remained static despite the sharp rise in instability in North Sinai. Across the MFO, some travel restrictions were added but the structure of the force, mission, daily activities, and management structures remained the same.¹⁰³ With the deployment of US forces to Operation Iraqi Freedom, units assigned to MFO were once again transitioned to the National Guard rather than active duty.¹⁰⁴ US experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan also had an impact on the upgrades in force protection that were funded through US Central Command (CENTCOM). Task Force Sinai was TACON to CENTCOM for force protection, and CENTCOM conducted several vulnerability assessments during this period. Pursuant to those assessments CENTCOM transferred both funds and equipment (HMMWVs and fully armored SUVs) to increase the safety of US personnel.¹⁰⁵ Despite the changes implemented mainly by US forces external to MFO, the disposition of US forces remained static with the same number of OPs and CPs throughout the period.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰¹ *Presentation of MFO Force Commander, Maj Gen Warren Whiting to Tel Aviv University.*

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ “Multinational Force and Observers Director General’s Report to the Trilateral Meeting 2010,” accessed July 20, 2017, http://myos.mfo.org/media/mfo/documents/annual_report_2010.pdf.

¹⁰⁴ Keith Rogers, “Guard Units to Head Overseas,” *Las Vegas Review Journal*, December 27, 2002, accessed January 28, 2018, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/021227-iraq02.htm>.

¹⁰⁵ “Multinational Force and Observers Director General’s Report to the Trilateral Meeting 2013,” accessed July 20, 2017, http://myos.mfo.org/media/mfo/documents/annual_report_2013.pdf.

¹⁰⁶ “Multinational Force and Observers Director General’s Report to the Trilateral Meeting 2010,” accessed July 20, 2017, http://myos.mfo.org/media/mfo/documents/annual_report_2010.pdf.

The operational environment endured several dramatic changes in the period from 2001-2012, including drastic increases in violence, the beginning of the US War on Terror, transitions of power in Gaza, a revolution in Egypt, and the growth of an insurgency which coalesced into the group ABM. While those changes occurred outside the gates of North Camp, the MFO's reaction did not keep pace with the current environment.

The MFO was a frugal organization that continuously searched for methods to cut costs and still accomplish its mission. Since funding through the tripartite agreement was difficult to increase, and to balance inflation, only cost savings could bring the budget into balance. The MFO looked for ways to reduce the number of personnel in the force to lower costs and was successful. The MFO also closed several redundant checkpoints to reduce the overall responsibilities to the force. Despite the rise in militant activity in El Arish and the surrounding area, the Fijians still maintained nine remote sites with some only having 7-10 personnel armed with only personal weapons, and the MFO had not closed any remote sites due to security concerns.¹⁰⁷

The infantry battalions maintained the same relative positions that they originally took over in 1982 and lived and worked at the same checkpoints and camps. The remote sites began a partial upgrade based on priority designated by CENTCOM force protection evaluations¹⁰⁸

In summary, despite the increasing turmoil in the operating environment between 1982 and 2012 the changes to the organization were minimal. MFO had not modified the structure of the organization and many of the same business practices remained. Refinement was beginning in the MFO, particularly concerning the cultural view toward force protection. Some increases in physical security of locations and the acquisition of lightly armored vehicles began to

¹⁰⁷ Michael Soyka and Bede Fahey, "MFO Reconfiguration Progression Briefing June 2016," PowerPoint presentation, June 26, 2016, slide 1.

¹⁰⁸ "Multinational Force and Observers Director General's Report to the Trilateral Meeting 2011," accessed July 20, 2017, http://myos.mfo.org/media/mfo/documents/annual_report_2011.pdf.

incrementally increase the safety of the force in response to the changes in the environment.

However, the MFO made adjustments to maintain the viability of the current strategy of conducting the mission, not because they realized the need for a new method.

Operational Environment 2013-2016: Rapid Change

The U.S. is concerned over deteriorating security conditions in an area of northeastern Sinai where Egyptian security forces as well as civilian and military elements of the MFO, including the U.S. military forces stationed at the MFO North Camp, are exposed to potential risk.

—Steve Toner, US State Department Spokesman, August 2015

During the period of 2013-2016, turmoil deepened in Egypt, with a coup d'état making the head of the military the president. This was followed by a concerted security effort to close tunnels into Gaza and crush the insurgency in North Sinai. After three years of deadly conflict with government forces, the leading insurgent group in Sinai, Ansar Beit Al Maqdis, declared allegiance to Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and renamed themselves the Sinai Province of the ISIS Caliphate, or Wiliyat Sinai.¹⁰⁹ These developments plunged North Sinai into economic despair and made movement in the area dangerous.

In 2013, with the ouster of Mohammed Morsi as the Egyptian President, President Sisi tried to stop the flow of supplies to Hamas. President Sisi blamed Hamas for instability in the Sinai due to their connections with local terrorists. Islamists deeply distrusted the new president who had seized power through a military coup.

President Sisi ordered a government crackdown on Islamic terrorists. In October 2014, the Egyptian government established a curfew and a state of emergency in North Sinai. The government gave 800 families only 48 hours' notice to vacate their homes and then destroyed them. This destruction was part of a plan to create a buffer zone between Gaza and the Rafah

¹⁰⁹ "Sinai Province: Egypt's ISIS Affiliate," Wilson Center, May 19, 2016, accessed July 20, 2017, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/sinai-province-egypts-isis-affiliate>.

region to make tunneling between the two areas more difficult.¹¹⁰ The campaign to stem the flow of goods into Gaza crushed the local economy by destroying the tunnels and the houses to which they connected.¹¹¹ The economic impact only served to increase the strength of insurgent groups in the El Arish area, creating a fertile recruiting pool of poor disenfranchised young men focused on revenge against their government.

Wiliyat Sinai began attacking Egyptian government forces in earnest.¹¹² With attacks centered in North Sinai, between Rafah and El Arish the Egyptian military brought more forces into the area and responded with bombing, tanks, and artillery. The attacks by Wiliyat Sinai became both more regular and deadlier. Wiliyat Sinai utilized IEDs, sniper attacks, vehicle borne improvised explosive devices, and even full-scale attacks to hold ground with large numbers of fighters.¹¹³

In October of 2015, members of Wiliyat Sinai claimed responsibility for the bombing of Metro Jet airlines flight 9268 from Sharm el Sheikh to St. Petersburg which killed 224 passengers and crew.¹¹⁴ Wiliyat Sinai claimed to have accomplished the attack with a bomb in a small soda can, resulting in multiple nations suspending air travel to the Sinai over airport security

¹¹⁰ Lisa Watanabe, "Sinai Peninsula- From Buffer Zone to Battlefield."

¹¹¹ Daniel Byman and Khaled Elgindy, "The Deepening Chaos in Sinai," accessed October 31, 2017, <http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/the-deepening-chaos-sinai-8957>.

¹¹² "Profile: Sinai Province Militant Group," *BBC News*, May 12, 2016, accessed October 30, 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25882504>.

¹¹³ "Dozens Killed in Egypt's North Sinai In Attacks Claimed By ISIS," *Huffington Post*, July 1, 2015, accessed 20 July, 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/07/01/egypt-terror-attack-sinai_n_7704142.html; and "ISIS Claims Attack in Egypt That Killed 23 Soldiers," ABC News, July 8, 2017, accessed July 20, 2017, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/claims-attack-egypts-sinai-killed-23-soldiers-48517014>.

¹¹⁴ MacFarquar, Neil, "Russia Allies with France Against ISIS, Saying Jet That Crashed in Sinai Was Bombed," *New York Times* (Online); New York, November 17, 2015, accessed July 20, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/18/world/europe/russia-plane-crash-bomb.html>.

concerns.¹¹⁵ As a result of the subsequent air travel embargoes, tourism plummeted.¹¹⁶ The occupancy rates in hotels fell below 30%, and many had to lay off workers or close their doors. Egypt put significant funds into security efforts and marketing campaigns to demonstrate that Sharm el Sheikh was safe. The Egyptian government also put efforts into increasing domestic tourism to Sharm el Sheikh as a method of keeping the businesses there viable.¹¹⁷ Although occupancy rates moved back into the 80% area by 2017, there was an estimated \$1 billion loss due specifically to the boycott of flights by Russian and British governments.

Wiliyat Sinai fired multiple Kornet missiles at Egyptian forces, causing serious damage to an Egyptian Naval ship in the Mediterranean.¹¹⁸ Wiliyat Sinai also fired surface to air missiles against Egyptian helicopters, shooting one down in January of 2014, and killing all five Egyptian soldiers on board.¹¹⁹ Wiliyat Sinai was attempting to limit the access of the government into the Northern Sinai and contest the control over the area. The Egyptian Army deployed as many as 22,000 additional soldiers with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles as well as Apache helicopters and F-16 jets to the North Sinai governate to fight the militant group.¹²⁰

¹¹⁵ “Russia Suspends all Flights to Sinai,” *The Economist*, November 6, 2015, accessed October 30, 2017, <https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21678112-after-berating-britain-mr-putin-follows-suit-russia-suspends-all-flights-egypt>.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Hussein, Walaa, “Can Egypt’s Tourism Industry Get Back on Track after Sinai Crash?,” *Al-Monitor*, January 15, 2016, accessed October 30, 2017, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/01/egypt-minister-tourism-interview-russia-crash-sinai-recovery.html>.

¹¹⁸ “Egypt Navy Ship Hit by Sinai Militants Missile,” *BBC News*, July 16, 2015, accessed December 14, 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33557180>.

¹¹⁹ Daniel Kirkpatrick, “Militants Shoot Down Egyptian Helicopter,” *New York Times*, January 26, 2014, accessed December 14, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/27/world/middleeast/militants-down-egyptian-helicopter-killing-5-soldiers.html>.

¹²⁰ “The New Triangle of Egypt, Israel, and Hamas,” accessed October 30, 2017, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-new-triangle-of-egypt-israel-and-hamas>.

MFO 2013-2016

The MFO made many significant changes from 2013-2016, such as abandoning or turning over ten OPs due to security concerns and moving their force headquarters from North Camp to South Camp. They moved all non-essential personnel from North Camp to South Camp, renaming the former HQs Forward Operating Base North, and started a process of automating the task of observing with camera sites.¹²¹ This process began slowly, but accelerated quickly in 2016, bringing transformational change to the MFO as they adjusted the strategies for accomplishing their core mission.

Prior to the Metro Jet attack, Wiliyat Sinai was similar in their choice of targets from the previous ABM, focused squarely on Egyptian forces. The possibility of ISIS pushing Wiliyat Sinai toward a different target set was worrisome to the MFO, as many of the nations that were participating in the force were also in conflict with ISIS in other theaters. The economic and social ties between MFO and the insurgents at the local level had given the MFO a protective shield, potentially preventing direct targeting of MFO forces.¹²² The combination of being one of the largest employers in an impoverished area, and the personal relationships the Fijian peacekeepers had established over multiple tours in the same area, had moderated the desire to attack MFO targets.¹²³

From 2013 onward, there were multiple incidents that injured and damaged MFO personnel and property. The most obvious indication that the operational environment had changed occurred on September 14th 2014, when over 150 Egyptians surrounded and attacked the

¹²¹ Michael Manner, "DA Form 638 Unit Award Recommendation; USBATT 61, 1/2 Cavalry Regiment," July 22, 2016.

¹²² Swale, "Discord in the Desert: Egypt's Sinai Peninsula in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring."

¹²³ Zack Gold, "Rebalancing International Forces to Safely Carry out Their Mission in Egypt's Sinai," Atlantic Council, accessed September 21, 2017, <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/rebalancing-international-forces-to-safely-carry-out-their-mission-in-egypt-s-sinai>.

MFO base in El Gorah, Egypt. This attack resulted in four injured soldiers, along with damage to guard towers and fencing. During the attack, militants breached the outer perimeter of North Camp, burned a guard tower, threw Molotov cocktails, and burned a fire truck.¹²⁴

In June 2015, Wiliyat Sinai officially claimed their first attack on the MFO. They fired multiple mortar rounds which impacted North Camp, resulting in minor damage and no injuries. Wiliyat Sinai claimed the attack on social media, framing it as an attack on Israeli interests as well as retaliation for Egypt arresting a local female. Wiliyat Sinai did not claim later attacks on the MFO publicly, unlike their attacks on Egyptian military. This may have been due to local pressures based on the economic and social ties to MFO.¹²⁵

The MFO began a rebalancing of forces in 2015, with the planned move of non-essential personnel from North Camp to South Camp to minimize exposure and potential risk. This process moved slowly. Although building was under contract for additional housing and a new Force HQs, after five months there were 15% percent fewer personnel on North Camp.¹²⁶ Additionally, British soldiers temporarily deployed to the MFO to begin a process of reinforcing North Camp to improve protection. The British built HESCO walls, refurbished concrete bunkers, and improved gates and defensive positions.¹²⁷ These changes showed an acknowledgement by the leadership of the MFO that risk had risen substantially. However, while MFO increased some force protection measures, they continued day to day operations in a very similar manner to the

¹²⁴ “Gunmen Attack Sinai HQ of MFO Peacekeeping Force, Four Injured,” *The Times of Israel*, accessed July 14, 2017, <http://www.timesofisrael.com/gunmen-attack-sinai-headquarters-of-mfo-peacekeeping-force-several-reported-killed/>.

¹²⁵ Zack Gold, “Rebalancing International Forces to Safely Carry out Their Mission in Egypt’s Sinai.”

¹²⁶ “Transforming Force Protection,” Sandpaper, April 2015, accessed January 25, 2018, <http://media.mfo.org/sandpaper/document/April2015#page/6>. and Evan Dyer, “ISIS Seen as Growing Threat to Canadian Peacekeepers in Sinai,” accessed July 14, 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/global-affairs-briefing-peacekeepers-isis-1.3512727>.

¹²⁷ “UK Temporary Deployment of Military Personnel,” MFO News, March 19, 2015, accessed January 25, 2018, <http://mfo.org/en/news/article/uk-temporary-deployment-of-military-personnel>.

previous 30 years. Despite the threat to movements from incidental contact, convoys still moved daily between remote sites. While the insurgency raged around them, the Fijian forces still manned OPs in the El Arish area with 8-10 soldiers with minimal armaments.

Maj. Gen Denis Thompson, the MFO Force Commander stated “We have seen the changes that have been happening in the environment outside the wire, and the MFO has been adapting to the change...realigning our standard operating procedures and applying continuous improvement to our operations.”¹²⁸ This statement reveals there was recognition of the change in operational environment, and that the MFO adjusted with continuous process improvement. This shows the organization was trying to react to a major fluctuation in the environment with only incremental transactional change.

On September 3rd 2015, the impact of the insurgency to MFO grew as a Fijian resupply truck struck an IED wounding two soldiers and the responding US patrol struck another IED wounding four soldiers.¹²⁹ A stray bullet wounded another Fijian soldier during an attack by Wiliyat Sinai on the Egyptian forces who were guarding North Camp on 11 September 2015. This was the second assault on Egyptian forces surrounding North Camp and consisted of small arms fire, heavy machine gun fire, mortar fire, and the destruction of an Egyptian M60 tank with an anti-tank guided missile assessed to be a Kornet Missile.¹³⁰

The IED attack, as well as the emplacement of an additional eight IEDs on the route to two of the Fijian OPs, led the Force Commander to order the withdrawal of all troops from OP 1F and temporary OP 1H on 21 September 2015. These two OPs were the first alterations of the

¹²⁸ Harriet Protos, “Medics Receive Advanced Lifesaving Kits,” Sandpaper, April 2015, accessed March 14, 2018, http://myos.mfo.org/media/mfo/documents/sandpaper_april_2015.pdf.

¹²⁹ Daniel Lamothe, “Four U.S. Troops, Two International Peacekeepers Wounded in Sinai Blasts - The Washington Post,” accessed September 21, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/09/04/four-u-s-troops-two-international-peacekeepers-wounded-in-sinai-blasts/?utm_term=.f7957302b88c.

¹³⁰ Michael Soyka, Christopher Gilluly, and Amanda Choate, “Brief to 2CR Commander Reference 1/2CR Deployment to MFO,” PowerPoint presentation, September 18, 2015, slide 42.

MFO footprint due to the insurgent activity, turned over because the risk of resupplying the two locations was considered too high.¹³¹ The Egyptian Army reported that they had cleared over 40 IEDs in the vicinity of the OPs in the previous two months, with one of the OPs located within 5kms of North Camp.¹³² Maj. Gen Thompson considered both of the OPs to have redundant coverage stating “neither closure poses a material hindrance to the ongoing conduct of the MFO mission.”¹³³ Though the act of giving up territory seemed significant, the mission would continue to be accomplished in the normal manner.

To increase force protection in response to the attacks and threats of attacks, the US added additional equipment through force protection funds in CENTCOM. The North Camp response team exchanged their highly mobile multi-wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) for mine resistant ambush protected all-terrain vehicles (MATVs), some with automated turrets for .50cal machine guns and Mk19 automatic grenade launchers. US forces, utilizing CENTCOM funding, added three RAID (rapid aerostat initial deployment) camera systems with high powered thermal cameras mounted on tall masts, and three containerized weapon systems, which gave soldiers the ability to remotely control and fire machine guns and grenade launchers from a distance.¹³⁴ Soldiers placed barriers along potential high-speed avenues of approach and regular and unscheduled drills of a synchronized base defense plan began to occur more often.¹³⁵ The Force

¹³¹ “Multinational Force and Observers Director General’s Report to the Trilateral Meeting 2015,” November 19, 2015, accessed July 20, 2017, http://myos.mfo.org/media/mfo/documents/annual_report_2015.pdf, 2.

¹³² Ibid., 3.

¹³³ Ibid., 4.

¹³⁴ Maxwell Flannagan, “2nd Cavalry Regiment Spearhead Remote-Operated Force Protection Systems in Sinai,” April 27, 2016, accessed November 1 2017, https://www.army.mil/article/166865/2nd_Cavalry_Regiment_spearhead_remote_operated_force_protection_systems_in_Sinai/.

¹³⁵ “Multinational Force and Observers Director General’s Report to the Trilateral Meeting 2015,” November 19, 2015, accessed July 20, 2017, http://myos.mfo.org/media/mfo/documents/annual_report_2015.pdf, 4.

Commander established a goal to have all movements in the North AO conducted in armored vehicles, but by the end of 2015 there were still some unarmored pickup trucks and vans conducting resupply or personnel movement.¹³⁶ These changes showed the beginnings of the recognition that the previous ways of operating the MFO would no longer work. The addition of the cameras and accurate longer-range weapons, while still defensive in nature, were contrary to the protocol and required approval from Egypt and Israel.

The threat to convoy movements through the potential of incidental and intentional contact with IEDs as well as potential anti-air threats, limited the ability of the MFO to resupply several of the northern remote sites in April and May 2016.¹³⁷ Additionally, multiple incidents of friendly fire landing on North Camp from Egyptian forces as well as rockets launched at or near North Camp by insurgent forces, greatly increased the risk to all soldiers at North Camp.¹³⁸ Additionally, MFO received credible imminent security threats to North Camp and to the northern area of operations.¹³⁹

Due to what they assessed as unacceptable risk, the Force Commander in conjunction with the Director General, first approved the closing of three Fijian remote sites. Following the turnover of those remote sites, Operation Bluefish commenced, moving large numbers of non-combat forces from North Camp. The operation utilized both US military and contracted rotary wing support to move personnel to Israel and further to South Camp using Czech fixed wing

¹³⁶ “Multinational Force and Observers Director General’s Report to the Trilateral Meeting 2015,” November 19, 2015, accessed July 20, 2017, http://myos.mfo.org/media/mfo/documents/annual_report_2015.pdf, 7.

¹³⁷ David Schenker, “The MFO 2.0,” Washington Institute of Near East Policy, March 16, 2016, accessed February 25, 2018, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-mfo-2.0>.

¹³⁸ Tom Bowman, “Because Of ISIS, Pentagon Rethinks Deployments to Sinai Peninsula,” *Morning Edition* (National Public Radio), accessed November 13, 2017, <https://www.npr.org/2016/04/14/474185160/because-of-isis-pentagon-rethinks-deployments-to-sinai-peninsula>.

¹³⁹ Michael Manner, “DA Form 638 Unit Award Recommendation; USBATT 61, 1/2 Cavalry Regiment,” July 22, 2016.

assets.¹⁴⁰ The MFO conducted the large rebalance of personnel in one night, moving 378 soldiers and civilians from North Camp to South Camp under the cover of darkness. On the return flights US forces moved Snipers, Joint Tactical Air Controllers, and additional weapon systems into North Camp to bolster the defenses.¹⁴¹

The MFO conducted Operation Quicksand 1 and Quicksand 2, which transferred the authority of eight remote sites to Egyptian security forces, with no remote sites remaining north of the newly title FOB North (previously North Camp). The Force Commander began the process of transitioning even more of the remote sites into remote camera sites. The operation to complete that transition, called Quicksand 3, planned for soldiers to man only six of the original twenty-three sites while the rest were to be unmanned communications sites or unmanned camera sites.¹⁴²

By September 2016 the force had completed Operation Quicksand 2.5, which transitioned the forces from a three-battalion set, to two-battalions. In the north, a combined US/Colombian Battalion formed with Colombians in the lead becoming known as NORTHBATT. In the south a US/Fijian BN formed with the US leading, known as SOUTHBATT.¹⁴³ The Fijian battalion sent more than half of their forces home and left their BN Executive Officer as the highest-ranking Fijian in the force. The Fijians formed a company inside

¹⁴⁰ Michael Soyka and Bede Fahey, "MFO Reconfiguration Progression Briefing June 2016," PowerPoint presentation, June 26, 2016, slide 2.

¹⁴¹ Michael Manner, "DA Form 638 Unit Award Recommendation; USBATT 61, 1/2 Cavalry Regiment," July 22, 2016.

¹⁴² Michael Soyka and Bede Fahey, "MFO Reconfiguration Progression Briefing June 2016," PowerPoint presentation, June 26, 2016, slide 4.

¹⁴³ Sondra Settingington, "U.S. Soldiers Work with Fijian Forces to Form Peace-Keeping Battalion," July 21, 2016, accessed January 25, 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/171895/us_soldiers_work_with_fijian_forces_to_form_peace_keeping_battalion.

of the southern battalion and manned two of the remote sites in the Sharm el Sheik AO.¹⁴⁴ The Colombians took responsibility for the remaining sites which were previously part of the Fijian AO and the US left one company in North Camp as the North Camp response team.¹⁴⁵ This dramatic shift was unprecedented in the MFO history and set the stage for future drawdowns when the technology was able to be implemented to move to a more camera based observation system.

Overall, the environment of the Sinai remained static until 2003 but steadily became more dangerous. By 2013, the environment reached levels of violence that posed a serious risk to forces in the MFO, but the organization chose to make only small adjustments. The MFO endured a crisis from September 2015 to April 2016, when they realized that the previous ways of operating were not compatible with the world outside the wire at North Camp.

The MFO began transformational change in 2015-2016 as they altered their strategy due to the challenges presented by the operational environment. The decision to close all remote sites in the northern AO due to the enemy threat was the initial response to crisis posed by the inability to resupply the remote sites. This led to a much larger change as the force structure was drastically reorganized. The new strategy was to pursue means of remotely monitoring sectors through camera systems, and potentially Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). This strategy would continue to accomplish the mission of the MFO while mitigating the threat to personnel.

Application of Organizational Change Model

Applying an organizational change model to the MFO over the described time periods will help guide an understanding of the level of change in the MFO. This approach also allows for analysis of whether that change kept pace with the evolving operating environment. Since the

¹⁴⁴ Michael Manner, "DA Form 638 Unit Award Recommendation; USBATT 61, 1/2 Cavalry Regiment," July 22, 2016.

¹⁴⁵ Michael Soyka and Bede Fahey, "MFO Reconfiguration Progression Briefing June 2016," PowerPoint presentation, June 26, 2016, slide 3.

previous sections in this paper have explained the content of the change, the focus of this section is on the process of change, both how it worked in practice and where potential issues existed.

Many models were considered for use in this exploration, but some did not fully capture the complexity of the change effort in a multinational coalition environment. For example, the widely espoused Kotter Model, while instructive for understanding some of the adaptation, does not take culture into account as a variable and cannot adequately explain the sources of resistance to change that manifested in this instance. Additionally, Kotter's model focuses on how to change an organization but does not place much emphasis on the environmental issues that drive that change, which is integral to this analysis.¹⁴⁶ The Weisbord Six Box method, often used in organizational diagnosis and change efforts, uses six categories to compare the way things are versus the way things should be. This model only describes where issues of fit between current state and ideal exist, and it does not provide an explanation of what process to take to rectify the differences.¹⁴⁷

The model chosen for discussion and use in this paper is the Burke-Litwin model, a causal model of organizational performance and change. This model provides the ability to examine both the level of change (transformational or transactional), and to uncover the portions of the organization that changed (or did not change) over time.¹⁴⁸ This model breaks the organization down into twelve organizational variables which interact with each other. The level of change is determined based on the specific organizational variables that exhibit change and the interactions between the variables show how to influence each specific variable. The causal

¹⁴⁶ John Kotter, "Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail," *Harvard Business Review*, April 1995, accessed January 25, 2017, <https://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/resources/marketing/docs/95204f2.pdf>.

¹⁴⁷ Marvin Weisbord, "Organizational Diagnosis: Six Places to Look for Trouble with or Without a Theory," *Group and Organizational Studies* 1, no. 4 (December 1976): 430–47.

¹⁴⁸ W. Warner Burke and George Litwin, "A Causal Model of Organizational Performance and Change," *Journal of Management* 18, no. 3 (September 1992).

relationships between the variables allow you to see the process and to understand that to change one thing, you must change others.




Figure 2. Burke-Litwin Causal Model for Organizational Performance and Change. W. Warner Burke, *Organization Change: Theory and Practice*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2010), 214

The Burke-Litwin model is an open system model, meaning the operational environment has a large impact on the organization and generally flows from top to bottom when trying to describe change with transformational factors located at the top. The purpose of the Burke-Litwin model is to determine what needs to be altered to affect other portions of an organization in order to effectively change. The arrows between portions of the model represent the relationships between various components and which components affect each other. For example, to change the culture of an organization you would adjust leadership, management practices, or the mission

and strategy. The model is an open system and the external environment is a big driver of change, potentially transformative change.¹⁴⁹

The application of this model to the MFO case study will be more descriptive rather than normative. The aim is to assess the changes in the MFO as they relate to the external environment, and to understand what portions of MFO changed at what time. This will demonstrate whether the MFO kept pace with the changes in the operational environment and identify places the organizational change may have lagged to the detriment of the organization. The change begins with the top of the model, the operational environment. As discussed in section two, the operational environment of the Sinai was initially static and then became more dangerous with the inclusion of militants and insurgents into a system not designed to account for security threats from non-state actors.

Webster's Dictionary defines bureaucracy as "government characterized by specialization of functions, adherence to fixed rules, and a hierarchy of authority."¹⁵⁰ While the MFO is not a government, they certainly fit the definition of a bureaucratic institution. The adherence to specific rules and authorities given to the MFO through the Treaty of Peace and the Protocol, allowed the organization to effectively conduct their mission with limited incidents for decades. The need to change a bureaucracy or any organization generally begins with changes in the environment that the organization operates within, or with directive leadership who determines a need for change (usually also reflecting a perceived or potential change in the operating environment).¹⁵¹ Understanding that the environment influences the organization and can be a driving factor for its change is inherent in any open systems model of organizations. The

¹⁴⁹ Burke and Litwin, "A Causal Model of Organizational Performance and Change."

¹⁵⁰ "Definition of Bureaucracy," Merriam Webster Dictionary, accessed February 1, 2017, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bureaucracy>.

¹⁵¹ F.E. Emery and E.L. Trist, "The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments," *Human Relations* 18 (May 1965): 21–32.

organization in an open system model has an input-throughput-output and feedback loop that connects the organization with the operating environment.

As shown in the previous sections, the operational environment of the Sinai began to evolve in 2003 with rapid change beginning in 2011. Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salancik, the founders of Resource Dependence Theory, state that the external environment for an organization is not just the competition they have to meet, but that they are embedded in social relationships and resource dependent.¹⁵² Concerning the MFO, while the personnel may want to make changes to the way they operate, they are necessarily constrained both by the relationship that brought their organization into being (the Treaty of Peace) and the resources provided by the funding sources of the organization (primarily the US, Egypt, and Israel, but also Japan, Denmark, Australia and other donating nations).¹⁵³

There were reports that the leadership of the MFO wanted to reduce their risk through a larger adaptation earlier than they did, but the construct of the Treaty of Peace required both Egypt and Israel to agree to alterations.¹⁵⁴ The reported discussions occurred between MFO and the tripartite members in 2015 but were not approved.¹⁵⁵ The Egyptian and Israeli governments would likely oppose such a move as it would embolden the militants and presented as a victory for Wiliyat Sinai if MFO withdrew.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵² Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, *The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective*, Stanford Business Classics (Stanford, Calif: Stanford Business Books, 2003).

¹⁵³ “Multinational Force and Observers Director General’s Report to the Trilateral Meeting 2014,” accessed July 20, 2017, http://myos.mfo.org/media/mfo/documents/annual_report_2014.pdf.

¹⁵⁴ Eric Trager, “Securing the Sinai MFO Without a U.S. Drawdown,” Washington Institute of Near East Policy, August 26, 2015, accessed February 25, 2018, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/securing-the-sinai-mfo-without-a-u.s.-drawdown>.

¹⁵⁵ Tamar Pileggi, “Reducing Sinai Peacekeepers Rewards Terrorism,” *Times of Israel*, November 19, 2015, accessed February 25, 2018, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-reducing-sinai-peacekeepers-rewards-terrorism/>.

Thus, while there were definite signals from the operational environment to change as early as 2006, there were also constraints that made rapid change more difficult. However, the pace of change in the operational environment was well ahead of the pace of change within the organization. The external environment included IED attacks on MFO vehicles and suicide bombings across the peninsula in 2006 and yet ten years later the MFO still had 7-10 man OPs living in what had effectively become a war zone. This demonstrates that while the external environment was a driver for the change, there must have been elements in the system that produced some resistance to the adaptation of the MFO to meet the challenges of the evolving operational environment.

Leadership

The external environment is directly linked to leadership, individual and organizational performance, organizational culture, and mission and strategy in the Burke-Litwin model.¹⁵⁷ Leadership is multi-layered in the MFO as under the Director General (appointed diplomat from the United States) the Force Commander (a General Officer not allowed to be American) is in command of the Force and Observers in the Sinai. The Force Commander receives support through an operational chain of command, which resembles the diagrams usually understood in military organizations, and by national chains of command. Those national chains of command are in place for administrative purposes to maintain national control of the respective troops deployed to the Sinai. These national chains of command can punish, promote, and reward soldiers based on their performance which takes many of the traditional levers of management practices away from the operational chain of command.

¹⁵⁶ David Schenker, "America's Least-Known Mideast Military Force," Washington Institute of Near East Policy, November 1, 2015, accessed February 25, 2018, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/americas-least-known-mideast-military-force>.

¹⁵⁷ Burke, *Organization Change: Theory and Practice*, 220.

The high rate of turnover in the MFO, particularly in the force with units rotating every 6-9 months, limited the effect a military leader could have. Those who maintained continuity for years had levels of influence that may have outweighed their respective positions. As discussed in the 1982-2001 section, the inordinate amount of power the DHCs have in the organization limits the military leadership's ability to influence change.

The leadership during the period of the most change in the operational environment was relatively static, as Director General Satterfield led the organization from 2005-2017.¹⁵⁸ Additionally, the Force Commander was static from 2014-2017 with Major-General Thompson leading the force through the most tumultuous time.¹⁵⁹ The leadership of the Director General was vital to pushing the transition forward, starting with the 2015 decision to rebalance forces by establishing an alternate HQ in South Camp.¹⁶⁰ This transformation was made possible through the leadership of the Force Commander in accomplishing Operations Bluefish and Quicksand, and by the Director General convincing the parties that the treaty change was needed.¹⁶¹ Major-General Thompson personally conducted briefings to each contingent that explained the need for changes in 2016, stating that the effort required to transform the MFO would be outweighed by the benefits of the new paradigm. This thought process of making the case for change or increasing the dissatisfaction with the status quo is in line with David Gleicher's formula for overcoming resistance to change.¹⁶² While Major-General Thompson did not explicitly utilize the

¹⁵⁸ "MFO Appoints New Director General," MFO.org, accessed December 7, 2017, accessed December 7, 2017, <http://mfo.org/en/news/article/appointment-of-new-mfo-director-general>.

¹⁵⁹ "Multinational Force and Observers Director General's Report to the Trilateral Meeting 2014," accessed July 20, 2017, http://myos.mfo.org/media/mfo/documents/annual_report_2014.pdf.

¹⁶⁰ "Multinational Force and Observers Director General's Report to the Trilateral Meeting 2015," November 19, 2015, accessed July 20, 2017 http://myos.mfo.org/media/mfo/documents/annual_report_2015.pdf.

¹⁶¹ Michael Soyka and Bede Fahey, "MFO Reconfiguration Progression Briefing June 2016," PowerPoint presentation, June 26, 2016.

formula, his actions demonstrated an understanding of the underlying concept and its application to overcoming resistance to change.

Mission and Strategy

Although the mission of the MFO has remained static throughout its entire existence, as prescribed in the Protocol of Peace, the strategy of the MFO changed. The Department of Defense (DOD) Dictionary defines strategy as “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”¹⁶³ Applied to the MFO, that definition would be an idea for employing both the force and observers to accomplish the mission of supervising the implementation of the Treaty of Peace.

The initial strategy involved the placement of OPs and check points physically along the entire length of the Zone C in the Sinai. The COU then conducted verification missions to Egyptian military sites to count the number of vehicles in accordance with the treaty and any agreed upon activities. The change occurred with the implementation of Operation Quicksand in 2016, as the squad level remote sites in the Northern AO were no longer suitable or acceptable, based on the increased level of risk.

The resultant strategy was to move to an interim solution where only verification missions would account for the Northern AO until unmanned camera sites could assume a large portion of the mission throughout all AOs.¹⁶⁴ This changed the strategy for the MFO from a soldier based to technology based. The new strategy changed the elements of power that the MFO

¹⁶² Mark Eaton, “Why Change Programs Fail,” *Human Resource Management International Digest* 18, no. 2 (2010): 37–42.

¹⁶³ “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms” (US Department of Defense, August 2017), accessed December 15, 2017, <http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf?ver=2017-12-23-160155-320>, 220.

¹⁶⁴ Michael Soyka and Bede Fahey, “MFO Reconfiguration Progression Briefing June 2016,” PowerPoint presentation, June 26, 2016

employed to conduct the mission, and the changes had drastic impacts to the force structure required. Therefore, despite being a primarily technical implementation, which would ordinarily fall into the category of systems, it is a change to strategy. Strategy change in the Burke-Litwin Model means the organization is undergoing transformational change, and to effectively manage that change, all other blocks connected to strategy must also adjust.

Culture

Culture is “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved problems of external adaptation, and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way to think.”¹⁶⁵ Edgar Schein examined culture in organizations from a leadership perspective both as a consultant and researcher for over thirty years, and focused on how leaders create and change cultures. Culture defined by Schein has three levels: artifacts, espoused beliefs and values, and underlying assumptions.¹⁶⁶ The first level, artifacts, are visible manifestations of the culture. The uniforms the soldiers wear, the terracotta color of the MFO beret, and the image of the dove symbolizing peace on the MFO emblem are all artifacts of the MFO Culture. Those artifacts can lead you to the espoused values of the organization, which are explicit ways that an organization communicates intent. For the MFO, those values include the impartiality of the force and observers, and being beholden only to the ideals of the Treaty of Peace. The underlying assumptions of culture are things that a group understands as the ‘way we do things around here,’ they are not questioned.¹⁶⁷ These assumptions are implicit: they guide behavior and they tell group members how to perceive and what to feel. Anything that goes against those assumptions is

¹⁶⁵ Schein, Edgar H., *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 3rd ed. (San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons, 2004), 29.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 29.

¹⁶⁷ Terrence E. Deal and Allan A. Kennedy, *Corporate Cultures: The Rites and Rituals of Corporate Life*, (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publications, 2000).

very difficult to understand and will face resistance. An underlying assumption for many in the MFO would be that unless an MFO member sees a violation in person, there should be no report.

The central difficulty in talking about a culture in the MFO is the situation of many nationalities and backgrounds working together for a short time period. This makes it a difficult task to demonstrate that a superordinate culture does exist. Using all three levels of Schein's culture analysis, there are problems with asserting that there is a unified MFO culture. At the artifacts level, the participating nations continue to wear the uniforms of their respective countries with the addition of the MFO headgear. The contrast between nations is instantly recognizable, and the interactions between them starts with the differences rather than similarities. Espoused beliefs and values are vastly different by nation and the rapid rotation of forces ensures there is not enough time to create or transition a unified culture. Although relieving units of a nation can transfer some measure of culture, explaining the way the MFO works. The transmission would have difficulty overcoming the culture the unit brings forward from their home country. Two examples of espoused values that can vary a great deal between nations include views toward female soldiers and views about the proper levels of power distance between ranks.

Underlying assumptions also vary by nation, as each country and military have a different history, which generates specific assumptions on how to best accomplish their mission. For example, with the US view as the hegemonic power, many questions are answered with more troops and more force. These answers may not match the expectations from a soldier of a different nation, particularly those which usually must accomplish their mission with more restricted assets and less force. The MFO has celebrated the cultures of the various nations, with each of the forces hosting parties celebrating the distinct culture of their nations. The Fijians hosted a Kava ceremony on Fijian Infantry day, and the Australian and New Zealand forces

hosted ceremonies and games for ANZAC day.¹⁶⁸ However, there was little to no celebration surrounding the anniversary of the founding of the MFO.¹⁶⁹ The US military culture is certainly not the same as the Fijian military culture, and that same challenge exists between all 13 nations, as well as the civilians hired by MFO.

The closest thing to an MFO culture would probably be that of the DHCs because they have been in the organization long enough to take on some of the same underlying assumptions. Therefore, there is natural conflict between the DHCs and the military contingents. The DHCs have been in the environment long enough to see what does and does not work in the long term.¹⁷⁰ To the DHCs, the desire to vary from those established paths violates some of the underlying assumptions that have been socially constructed through shared experiences of multiple years. Since each military does not ascribe to the same underlying assumptions, when they arrive in Sinai, a natural conflict occurs. It could be said that an underlying assumption with DHCs is that the military will always want to change things when they arrive. Another assumption by the DHCs may be that because units rotate out so quickly, the best thing to do is to simply wait them out.

With the difficulty that comes from trying to define the culture in a multinational quick turn-over organization, considering how to change the culture of that organization is just as daunting. Schein states there are two keys to successful culture change: the management of the significant anxiety that accompany any relearning at this level and the assessment of whether the genetic potential for the new learning is even present.¹⁷¹ Managing the anxiety may have been

¹⁶⁸ “Sinai Soldier to Mark Anzac Day in Jerusalem” (Australian Government Department of Defence, April 20, 2017), accessed January 25, 2018, <https://news.defence.gov.au/media/stories/sinai-soldier-mark-anzac-day-jerusalem>.

¹⁶⁹ Setterington, “U.S. Soldiers Work with Fijian Forces to Form Peace-Keeping Battalion.”

¹⁷⁰ Benjamin Nelson, “Peacekeeping: Assessment of US Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers” (Government Accounting Office, August 1995), accessed January 25, 2018, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/155188.pdf>.

¹⁷¹ Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 32.

possible through a clear understanding of the end state along with an explanation of how the change would be better than maintaining the previous state. However, the lack of a central unifying culture complicates that process. With multiple cultures one would have to make the case for change in a different manner for each. With differing values and norms this becomes a daunting prospect. This is a point where the Burke-Litwin model does not aid in the conceptualization of the problem, because it is based on a single organizational culture rather than many.

The Burke-Litwin model requires culture change based on the variation in the external environment, the strategy, and the systems of the organization. The systems of the organization were in turn required to change because the structure of the organization changed. Culture change is not easy to observe because only the first layer (artifacts) is visible. To be able to determine change in the deeper cultural levels would require extensive longitudinal interviews.

Structure

The structure of the MFO remained remarkably static for its first 33 years. In its first three decades, the only major change to the organizational structure was the substitution of national contingents into the various roles based on the changes in the national support of some of the smaller nations (for example the Czech contingent assumed the fixed wing aviation mission from the French in 2013).¹⁷²

¹⁷² “CASA Flies in Sinai,” Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, November 16, 2013, accessed January 28, 2018, <http://www.army.cz/en/ministry-of-defence/newsroom/news/casa-flies-in-the-sinai-91689/>.




Figure 3. Organizational Structure of MFO in 2001. Thomas W. Spoehr, “This Shoe No Longer Fits: Changing the US Commitment to the MFO,” *Parameters* 30, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 109–25.

Just as static were the major locations of forces in the Sinai. The three infantry battalions had maintained their respective AOs since the inception of the organization and the array of forces in the beginning of 2015 composed the exact same boundaries between units that existed in 1982.




Figure 4. Force Array April 2015. Michael Soyka and Bede Fahey, “MFO Reconfiguration Progression Briefing June 2016,” PowerPoint presentation, June 26, 2016.

The transformational change in moving toward a more automated solution also necessitated changes in the overall structure of the organization and the arrayal of forces in the Sinai. The Force transitioned to a two-battalion structure with a Colombian led mixed Colombian/US battalion (referred to as NORTHBATT) and a US led US/Fijian mixed battalion (referred to as SOUTHBATT). That transition removed one of the standing BN HQs, reduced the size of the force, and set the stage for the eventual transition to a more automated force.¹⁷³




Figure 5. Force Array as of July 2016. Michael Soyka and Bede Fahey, “MFO Reconfiguration Progression Briefing June 2016,” PowerPoint presentation, June 26, 2016.

¹⁷³ Michael Manner, “DA Form 638 Unit Award Recommendation; USBATT 61, 1/2 Cavalry Regiment,” July 22, 2016.




Figure 6. End State Force Array as stated in Operation Quick Sand 3. Michael Soyka and Bede Fahey, “MFO Reconfiguration Progression Briefing June 2016,” PowerPoint presentation, June 26, 2016.

Management Practices

Burke defines management practices in terms of what managers do every day to accomplish the organization’s strategy.¹⁷⁴ However, when looking at an organization over a long period, daily managerial practice becomes an impractical dimension to observe. The amount of data required to observe the number of managers operating in an organization over a thirty-year period, particularly with the rapid turnover of various military units is unmanageable. That turnover itself is worthy of discussion as a management practice. The relatively complicated shuffle of various units in and out of Egypt based on timelines established by their national governments has affected the ability to establish a common culture, and to create effective and agile change. The US rotated their forces every nine to ten months, the Fijians every 6 months,

¹⁷⁴ Burke, *Organization Change: Theory and Practice*, 221.

and half the Colombians every 6 months. Those rotations presented both an opportunity and a challenge. When bringing new forces into the area, those forces had not been imbued with the old cultural values, making it easier to instill a new set of organizational values. Ensuring they received the new desired view of how things were done in the MFO was the only requirement.¹⁷⁵ That was true for most of the Colombian and US Soldiers, but not necessarily for the Fijian Soldiers. As described earlier in this paper, because of their relatively small army, many of the Fijian soldiers served multiple tours. As they returned, they could potentially handicap change efforts by bringing their historical view of the culture of MFO back into the organization. The reduction in the number of Fijian soldiers remaining in the MFO, as well as the subordination of the Fijian elements under the US contingent in the SOUTHBATT construct, effectively mitigated the potential future resistance to the new MFO culture.

The opportunity of the rotations to alter the pace of change due to the limited preconceived notions of the Sinai remains, but must be carefully managed. The recommended training, any training augmentations, and the initial introduction briefs during in-processing must align completely with the goals of the change effort to ensure the new members receive the leadership's understanding of the new culture.¹⁷⁶ The process of sending current members of the MFO to the incoming units for pre-deployment training, as occurs for the US and to a lesser extent the Fijian rotations, has the potential to either advance the organizational change or restrain it. This depends on the view of the soldiers selected to be the training teams. The Colombian model, with a six month overlap of new and old troops, is less desirable for a successful change effort because the number of persons transmitting the culture to the incoming unit is much higher and more difficult to control. The resulting transmission of culture to the incoming unit is thus

¹⁷⁵ Edgar Schein, "Kurt Lewin's Change Theory in the Field and in the Classroom: Notes towards a Model of Management Learning," *Systems Practice* 9, no. 1 (1996): 27-47.

¹⁷⁶ Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 245-271.

more likely to be a mix of the old culture and the desired end state culture if not all members of the veteran units have fully adopted the shared assumptions about the means to accomplish goals that are inherent in the new culture.¹⁷⁷

Individual and Organizational Performance

Individual and organizational performance is difficult to address in this case because there are no similar organizations with which to compare the MFO. Additionally, there are no objective criteria available to measure how well they accomplished their mission. While there is still peace between Egypt and Israel, that does not show that the MFO was successful. The peace is impressive when viewed alongside the number of incidents involving potential cross border terrorism and the relative enmity still expressed by the peoples of both nations. However, there is no way of proving that peace would or would not exist without the MFO. The only, and perhaps the most objective existing criteria is the records of violations of the treaty reported by the MFO. These violations are not public information and MFO only shares them with the governments of Egypt and Israel.¹⁷⁸

Systems

The Burke-Litwin model includes policies and procedures designed to help and support organizational members with their job and role responsibilities. These include the organization's reward system, performance evaluation, budgeting, and human resources allocation.¹⁷⁹ Prior to Operation Bluefish in May 2015, the MFO had a reward system that was structured against the more gradual change effort of rebalancing the force. There was an incentive of 20% of the

¹⁷⁷ Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 95.

¹⁷⁸ *Presentation of MFO Force Commander, Maj Gen Warren Whiting to Tel Aviv University* (Tel Aviv, Israel, 2012), accessed January 28, 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jZi1Bdex61k>.

¹⁷⁹ Burke, *Organization Change: Theory and Practice*, 221.

civilian worker's pay to remain at North Camp to offset the realized risks.¹⁸⁰ While recognizing the increase in danger, this well-intentioned reward handicapped the early efforts at altering force structure because individuals would lose a substantial portion of their salary to relocate to the safer South Camp.

The performance appraisal system was a less accessible lever for change than it would be in a civilian organization, as the MFO chain of command only controlled the evaluations for the DHCs. Military members received their respective evaluations through their national chains of command. If a specific nation was not fully aligned with the change effort, the potential existed for various military members to resist the changes at an individual level to ensure a positive evaluation.

MFO HQs controlled budgeting and the DHCs in charge of the engineering and sustainment operations in the Sinai managed allocation of funds. The issues with DHCs and changes over time were discussed earlier in this section. The budgeting process was a major way that the DHCs were able to wield the power to slow the process of change. The constraints of balancing a budget in the face of inflation and no increases in base funding left little resources for dynamic change. Solicitation of additional funds specifically earmarked for force protection and the building of additional South Camp infrastructure helped to overcome many of the structural issues but required a large amount of emphasis from senior leaders.¹⁸¹

Climate

Burke describes climate as the collective perceptions of members within the same work unit.¹⁸² Within the MFO context, this is difficult to describe over time due to the ever-changing

¹⁸⁰ "Multinational Force and Observers Director General's Report to the Trilateral Meeting 2013," accessed July 20, 2017, http://myos.mfo.org/media/mfo/documents/annual_report_2013.pdf, 4.

¹⁸¹ "Multinational Force and Observers Director General's Report to the Trilateral Meeting 2015," November 19, 2015, accessed July 20, 2017, http://myos.mfo.org/media/mfo/documents/annual_report_2015.pdf.

quality of climate in various groups over such an extended period. However, this is an appropriate place to describe some additional policies that were in place across the MFO. These were established to ostensibly help morale but may have run counter to the goals of the change effort. From the inception of the MFO, there were policies to allow the various nations to share their culture with others. Events such as the ANZAC day or other national days helped the climate of the individual nation, increasing their pride and raising morale of those attending, but did not help create and sustain a singular MFO culture.

The consumption of alcohol in limited quantities continued through the majority of the change effort at both North and South Camps. Soldiers and civilians perceived it as a pleasant departure from normal deployments and it helped raise morale. The consumption of alcohol had been a fixture in the MFO since its origins and the practice had continued throughout the history of the MFO despite its documented negative effects.¹⁸³ This practice was potentially counterproductive in the higher risk environment of North Camp. In the event of an attack, this raised the possibility that soldiers would be required to defend the camp after consuming alcohol. Units managed this risk as they dictated internal ready platoons. However, in the event of a large-scale attack, this could have become problematic. Both the intent to foster national pride and to allow soldiers to have a few alcoholic beverages were attempts to increase the morale and climate, potentially at the expense of the greater culture or the change required to address risk.

Additional Factors of Burke-Litwin

Burke states that there are three interconnected additional factors that should be discussed in the evaluation of a change effort: task requirements and individual skills/abilities, individual needs and values, and motivation.¹⁸⁴ All three would be very difficult to parse out in this specific

¹⁸² Burke, *Organization Change: Theory and Practice*, 222.

¹⁸³ Segal and Segal, *Peacekeepers and Their Wives*, 100.

¹⁸⁴ Burke, *Organization Change: Theory and Practice*, 222-223.

case without conducting extensive interviews with hundreds of personnel. These factors can affect a change effort but have more of an impact at the individual level rather than at the organizational level. Organizational change, particularly transformational change, may affect these factors, but leaders can address them at an individual level to mitigate any friction. Task requirements and individual skills are basically a job/skills match and within an organization, can moderate efficiency related to an individual's job satisfaction. The congruence of an individual's goals and the old or new values of the organization can connect individual needs and motivation. If the organization changes their goals, thereby making them less congruent with the goals of the individual, they will lose motivation. Additionally, if an individual is placed in a new role through a change effort and then has a poor job/skills match, they will have a similar loss of motivation.

Additional Sources of Potential Resistance to Change

Realizing the need to change can sometimes be difficult, and not all reasons for an organization lagging behind a changing environment are about resistance. Peter Senge writes about the 'boiled frog parable': a frog dropped into boiling water will immediately try to jump out, but a frog who is in a pot which is slowly brought to the boiling point will remain still.¹⁸⁵ This parable is particularly applicable in this case. due to the slow rate of change initially taking place in the MFO environment. Risks to the force began gradually increasing over a ten-year period from 2004-2014 in a manner that did not appear to be drastically different from day to day. This slow rate of change made a more gradual and evolutionary version of adaptation seem to be the answer, as demonstrated in statements by Major-General Thompson as late as 2015.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁵ Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization*, Rev. and updated (New York: Doubleday/Currency, 2006), 22.

¹⁸⁶ "Multinational Force and Observers Director General's Report to the Trilateral Meeting 2015," November 19, 2015, accessed July 20, 2017, http://myos.mfo.org/media/mfo/documents/annual_report_2015.pdf.

Thomas Kuhn, offers yet another lens as to why the change rate was slow: the pursuit of normal science. He writes that revolutions are generally a punctuated equilibrium and that practitioners will continue to adjust their current method of doing business, if possible to make it function. When someone attempts to shift the paradigm of how work is conducted, many will resist change as they hold on to the previous social construct. Once the paradigm shifts, practitioners will work to refine the new paradigm as their normal science and adjust it incrementally to meet small changes in the environment.¹⁸⁷ The MFO also reflects this form of resistance, in that the normal science of ground-based observation worked for years. Military practitioners in the force looked for ways to continue to fulfill the mission using the methods they had always used. The suggestion to change to more automation faced internal resistance because it was drastically different. Also, in many military cultures it is very difficult to say you cannot accomplish your mission with the means you have been given. For example, the US Army Soldier creed contains the lines “I will always place the mission first. I will never accept defeat. I will never quit”.¹⁸⁸ After MFO changed the prevailing paradigm, the military force began to refine the current process through additional cross training and other methods to improve on the new normal science.¹⁸⁹

Leadership consultants Richard Foster and Sarah Kaplan state that nothing breeds failure like success, meaning a successful organization is more likely than an unsuccessful company to try to react to a changed environment in the same manner that has worked for them in the past.¹⁹⁰ This is because the organization has an assumption of continuity in a discontinuous environment.

¹⁸⁷ Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 3rd ed (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 121-123.

¹⁸⁸ “Soldier’s Creed- US Army Values,” Army.mil, accessed February 1, 2018, <https://www.army.mil/values/soldiers.html>.

¹⁸⁹ Setterington, “U.S. Soldiers Work with Fijian Forces to Form Peace-Keeping Battalion.”

¹⁹⁰ Richard Foster and Sarah Kaplan, *Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last Underperform the Market--and How to Successfully Transform Them* (New York: Crown Business, 2013).

The MFO, as an organization over time, learned and adapted means of solving problems and created a socially constructed reality that helped them deal with day-to-day operations.¹⁹¹ The success of the social reality and the habits in dealing with daily problems led to the sedimentation of those habits and their legitimation as they were passed on to new members of the organization.¹⁹² That process of strengthening the social reality occurred iteratively over decades as the environment remained static. Since their habits of action worked for a long time, they were able to accomplish the mission. Thus, MFO was naturally resistant to change their methods.

Issues with using Burke-Litwin Model

Statistician George P. Box is credited with saying “all models are wrong, some are useful”¹⁹³ and that holds true in this case. The Burke-Litwin model has three major issues in application to the MFO: the difficulty of capturing the individual portions of the model, treating multiple cultures as one, and the categorization of automation in the model’s taxonomy. The inability to fully capture the data to describe the individual portions of the model in a large organization over time was discussed in the previous section. The lack of an ability to gather all the data requires a researcher or leader to only gather small bits of data which may not be representative of the whole. This could introduce issues if the leader extrapolates the data and acts upon it in a change effort.

The Burke-Litwin Model treats culture as a monolith, lacking discussion of multiple cultures and how they interact, as is naturally the case in multinational organizations. The field of study in multinational culture is still growing. Studies, such as the GLOBE study, have shown generalizable data about dozens of societies that may be a starting point for understanding where

¹⁹¹ Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Anchor Books, 1990), 129-138.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 92-104.

¹⁹³ George Box, “Science and Statistics,” *Journal of American Statistical Association* 71, no. 356 (December 1976): 791–99.

and how underlying assumptions of various cultures may come into conflict.¹⁹⁴ That information can then act as a baseline. From there, understanding cultural differences can be further refined using observations, with the understanding that a multinational organization will have more than one culture. A possible refinement to the model is in order, incorporating a deliberate process of overlaying key points of each culture (both national and the organizational superordinate) to find where there is congruence. Points of congruence demonstrate targets for creating a shared vision. Additionally, the work of John French and Lester Coch, researchers who focused on participative management, suggests that a collaborative process of determining the new end state and methods to reach the end state greatly reduces resistance to change.¹⁹⁵ Using a collaborative approach to planning, particularly in the multinational environment where there are potentially greater variations of values, can help improve buy in and reduce resistance.

The final issue with the Burke-Litwin model is that it does not have a category clearly meant for understanding the automation of a workforce. In the case of the MFO, this was related to strategy, as it had tremendous impacts across the organization and changed the entire approach that the force used to accomplish their mission. However, this may not always be the case. A factory already containing some automation and adds additional robots may see it as only a change to the systems, and thus a relatively minor alteration. With the increase in automation across many fields, implementation will be one of the more common change efforts in the next twenty years.¹⁹⁶ Finding a way to adjust the model in a manner that provides a guide to those change efforts would add to the utility.

¹⁹⁴ Robert J. House, *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies* (Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 2004).

¹⁹⁵ Lester Coch and John French, "Overcoming Resistance to Change," *Human Relations* 1, no. 4 (November 1948): 512–32.

¹⁹⁶ Michael Chui, James Manyika, and Mehdi Miremadi, "Four Fundamentals of Workplace Automation," *McKinsey Quarterly*, November 2015, accessed February 1, 2018, <https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/four-fundamentals-of-workplace-automation>.

Conclusion


Peacekeeping is a job not suited to soldiers, but a job only soldiers can do.

—Dag Hammarskjöld, UN Secretary General

The MFO made a significant transformational change in the face of a volatile operational environment. The MFO altered their strategy, structure, systems, and the type and quantity of members within their organization in only a few short months. This effort, though impressive, was well behind the pace of change in the external environment which had grown increasingly more volatile. Issues of culture, systems, recognition and resistance to change, delayed the MFO transformation, potentially putting lives at risk. A very visible crisis aided in overcoming that resistance but also required careful management by the leaders of the MFO.

The case study of the MFO is valuable due to the applicability of its lessons to other multinational military organizations. Notably, seeing gradual change is difficult, and understanding various cultures of multinational units is a challenge. Creating a superordinate culture can aid in change efforts and participative processes reduce resistance. Ensuring that your own recognition and pay systems are not holding back your change effort is important. In short, change efforts are complicated. When one part of a system is changed, it affects other parts and other systems. Having a clear blueprint for change is essential for sorting through complexity and to properly weigh efforts. Despite the issues described with the Burke-Litwin model, it is still very useful in helping to understand the interconnections involved in a large-scale change effort and is applicable with small changes to many multinational military organizations.

Appendix 1: Michael Soyka, Christopher Gilluly, and Amanda Choate,
 “Brief to 2CR Commander Reference 1/2CR Deployment to MFO,”
 PowerPoint Presentation, September 18, 2015. (Selected Slides)





MFO USBATT-61

POC: CPT Choate, Amanda SQDN 52

UNCLASSIFIED

as of 17SEP2015 41




Events of 11 SEP 2015



Summary of Events:

- At 0830B shortly after the U.S. C-17 departure, 7 x EAF Humvees traveling on the NC south runway were attacked by Small Arms Fire from militants located IVO GR 36R XV 1053 3562.
 - At 0838B Indirect Fire started impacting IVO North Camp, and continued until 11:14B. A total of 85 rounds impacted IVO NC. During that period 12x rounds were suspected to have impacted on North Camp, with 4 additional rounds impacting within 200m of the perimeter.
 - At 1025B an EAF M60 and M113 arrived at GR 36R XV 10203533. After being in position and engaging militants the EAF M60 was engaged and destroyed by 1x ATGM. EAF Evacuated casualties from the engagement to the Front Gate where those with serious injuries were taken to the dispensary, treated and then EVAC'd to CAIRO.
 - At 1122B a FUJBATT Soldier was hit by a stray bullet, he was taken to the dispensary and evacuated to Sokora Medical Facility in Israel.
- At 1327B CJ3 issued stand down and THREATCON BRAVO initiated.
- 1x FUJBATT Soldier WIA by Small Arms Fire
4x EAF wounded in Engagement



Multinational Force & Observers - Sinai Peninsula


MFO USBATT-61


POC: CPT Choate, Amanda SQDN 52

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
as of 17SEP2015 42

Appendix 2: Michael Soyka and Bede Fahey, “MFO Reconfiguration Progression Briefing June 2016,” PowerPoint presentation, June 26, 2016.





Timeline to Full Reconfiguration



Appendix 3: Michael Manner, “DA Form 638 Unit Award Recommendation; USBATT 61, 1/2 Cavalry Regiment,” July 22, 2016.

17. NARRATIVE: INTRODUCTION

1st Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment (1/2 CR) deployed to the Sinai, Egypt as the 61st United States Battalion (USBATT 61) in support of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission. The mission of USBATT 61 is to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace by observing, reporting, and verifying treaty violations.

From November 2015 to August 2016, the Soldiers of 1/2 CR played a vital role in the execution of the MFO mission by identifying and implementing additional mission requirements that have improved and will continue to benefit the security posture and operational environment within the Sinai.

During the deployed period, operations for 1/2 CR extended well beyond the core mission tenets of observing, reporting and verifying, to include the protection of North and South Camp, as well as participating in the full range of joint multinational operations; to include air transport, sea patrols, and ground support. 1/2 CR conducted its Southern Sinai mission with a peacekeeping force totaling over 600 service members from over 12 coalition nations, commanded by the Force Commander, Major General Dennis Thompson (Canadian Army) and operationally controlled through the MFO headquarters in Rome, Italy.

AREA OF OPERATIONS

Article 2 of Annex I of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty called for the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt to be divided into four zones; A, B, C and D. Throughout this zone, 1/2 CR operated nine squad sized remote sites, responsible for monitoring Sectors 5 and 7 within Zone C of the Sinai Peninsula. Sparsely populated with mountainous terrain and wadis that drain toward the Gulf of Aqaba, remote sites are difficult to travel to and were equipped for self-sufficient operations for up to two weeks at a time without resupply, with Soldiers stationed at the remote sites for up to a month at a time. Stationed throughout Zone C are the Egyptian Security Forces (ESF) that include police, army, and Egyptian Border Guards operating within the Rafah region of the Zone; as permitted by an Egypt and Israel agreement signed in 2005. 1/2 CR was responsible for mission command of the entire South Sinai area of operations in Zone C. 1/2 CR, positioned forces in Sharm el-Sheikh with a headquarters at South Camp, remote observation posts throughout the zone, including Sector Control Center-5, Check Point 3A, Check Point 3B, and Observation Post 3-1 in the USBATT Northern Sector; and Sector Control Center-7, Check Point 3C, Check Point 3D, Observation Point 3-10, and Observation Point 3-11 in the USBATT Southern Sector. Observation Point 3-11 is unique as one of the most strategically important remote sites in the MFO located offshore on Tiran Island observing and reporting on all vehicles, vessels, and aircraft trafficking the Strait of Tiran. In addition to its South Sinai responsibilities, 1/2 CR maintains a robust Tactical Assault Command Post with base defense command and control at combined multinational TOC in North Camp; located by El Gorah, 37 km southeast of El Arish, near the Israeli border.

ORGANIZING FOR THE MISSION

USBATT is built around a Stryker Infantry Battalion from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, with a home station of Rose Barracks, Vilseck, Germany. The Task Force consist of one Headquarters and Headquarters Troop (HHT "Hawkeyes," 1/2 CR) and three Infantry Troops (Apache Troop, Bull Troop and Comanche Troop, 1/2 CR) totaling 382 Soldiers. The mission was divided into three phases, allowing each Infantry Troop to assume mission in a different area of operations every three months. During phase one of the mission, Comanche Troop stationed at North Camp to assume the North Camp Response Team (NCRT) and Force Protection mission, Bull Troop stationed at South Camp to assume the MFO Sector 7 mission in the USBATT South Sector, and Apache Troop stationed at South Camp to assume the MFO Sector 5 mission in the USBATT North Sector. Each Troop would execute their mission in their assigned Area of Responsibility (AOR) for three months of the nine month deployment, before rotating to another AOR. During this three month period, units with responsibility for either USBATT South or North sector internally rotated squads within their AOR. In phase two of this mission, Comanche Troop assumed USBATT South Sector, Bull Troop assumed USBATT North Sector and Apache assumed the NCRT and Force Protection mission. Phase three, the final rotation for the mission, involved Apache Troop assuming USBATT South Sector, Bull Troop assuming the NCRT and Force Protection mission and Comanche assuming USBATT North Sector. Throughout the deployment, each of the Infantry Troops became a force provider to HHT in the form of attached platoons that were responsible for the South Camp Base Defense and South Camp Reaction Team (SCRT). The SCRT and South Camp Base Defense served to control access to South Camp through the Entry Control Point (ECP) and to protect South Camp and its residents from a number of contingencies.

DEPLOYING TO THE MISSION

The Squadron started deploying its Torch and Advanced Party in late October and early November of 2015 by civilian aircraft out of Munich, Germany to Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. In the midst of its deployment, prior to the scheduled main body movements for the mission, Metrojet Flight 9268, a Russian Civilian Airliner that departed Sharm el-Sheikh on 31 October 2015, was bombed by the Islamic State. In light of this terrorist bombing, the Sharm el-Sheikh international airport's security rating was significantly downgraded and United States Army Central Command abruptly canceled the use of all civilian air charter, and scheduled airline movements for United States Service Members in support of the MFO mission. Based on the new travel restrictions, 1/2 CR had to rapidly rebuild the entire movement plan for the Squadron. The command team and staff of 1/2 CR planned, resourced, and implemented a revised plan to fly 1/2 CR Soldiers into Egypt, and to fly 1-112th (USBATT 60) out of the MFO. This plan involved significant coordination with the Joint Staff and US Transportation Command to establish a series of precisely timed events to load/unload incoming/outgoing personnel and equipment, all within a strict four hour period from when the aircraft landed. Through extensive coordination with the Department of Defense, Department of State, German and Egyptian authorities, 1/2 CR successfully executed the main body movements of the Squadron via C-17 into and out of Sharm el-Sheikh International Airport, thereby

18. PUNISHMENTS UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE DURING THE PERIOD OF RECOMMENDED AWARD (FOR MUC AND ASUA RECOMMENDATIONS ONLY):		
a. # ARTICLE 15: 6	b. # ABSENCE WITHOUT LEAVE: 0	c. # COURT MARTIAL: 0
<p>19. PROPOSED CITATION:</p> <p>For superior performance and service during the period 15 November 2015 through 15 August 2016 while in support of the Multinational Force and Observers Mission. 1st Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment "War Eagles" demonstrated the ability to innovate and accomplish the assigned mission of USBATT 61 beyond the call of duty, during a time of high risk from the Islamic State and through tremendous change within the MFO. Their ability to provide the peacekeeping force with operational capabilities whenever and wherever needed enabled the strategic success of the Multinational Force and Observers and represents an extraordinary effort. The dedication and outstanding performance of 1st Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment are in keeping with the finest traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon themselves, TASK FORCE SINAI, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command, United States Army Central, the United States Central Command, and the United States Army.</p>		

17. NARRATIVE (continuation):

FORCE PROTECTION UPGRADES

Over the course of the nine month deployment, the Force Protection Cell managed South Camp's Physical Security, Information Security, Personnel Security, Intelligence Oversight, and Unit Key and Lock Control programs. The section oversaw South Camp's Entry Control Point procedures, emergency response/base defense procedures and drills, force protection assessments and upgrades, and local atmospheric evaluations. The Force Protection cell designed and implemented a new base access control system on South Camp and USBATT's nine remote sites, resulting in a more streamlined process and enhanced security. The system was subsequently adopted in part by the higher headquarters for use at North Camp and all MFO remote sites in Egypt. A detailed review of the vetting processes for local nationals helped uncover a gap in procedures which immediately resulted in the reevaluation of over 400 personnel; this in-turn shifted the mindset of camp security measures and enforcement. The cell was also responsible for conducting detailed Threat Vulnerability Assessments of over 25 locations, with the results being used to produce a comprehensive Sharm el-Sheikh Security Guide for use by the MFO. In addition, these efforts resulted in the certification of five hotels, five restaurants, and 10 other facilities for approved use by MFO personnel and visitors that also proved critical and timely with the arrival of newly evacuated MFO members from North Camp to South Camp.

REINFORCING AND RETROGRADING OF NORTH CAMP – "Operation Blue Fish"

As a result of credible imminent security threats in the Northern AO to the residents of North Camp, an unprecedented decision was made to retrograde all non-essential personnel from North Camp and to place the camp on high alert. 1/2 CR led the effort to provide command and control of defensive operations while simultaneously planning for and facilitating on the in extremis retrograde of all non-essential military personnel and civilians from North Camp to Israel by rotary wing and follow on fixed wing flight to Sharm el-Sheikh to reposition members to South Camp. Ultimately on 22 June 2016, 378 members of the MFO were rapidly evacuated from North Camp in less than six hours on over six lifts of a combination of five MFO UH-60s and three US State Department CH-53 helicopters to Israel, and then follow on movement by Czech Republic C-295 CASA fixed wing aircraft from Israel to South Camp during the subsequent 36 hours. Concurrent to the evacuation, 1/2 CR led the way by receiving and embedding a team of nine snipers, two United States Air Force Joint Terminal Attack Controllers and ancillary weapons to mitigate against the risk and threat of attacks to North Camp. The adjustment to the security posturing at North Camp greatly enhanced the MFO's ability to continue the mission and protect personnel, equipment and infrastructure in this contested region of the Sinai.

REBALANCE AND RECONFIGURATION

In light of increasing security threats to personnel, equipment and the MFO mission in Northern Sinai, the MFO created and implemented a plan to Rebalance and Reconfigure the MFO forces. Throughout the deployment the efforts of Rebalance and Reconfiguration were to move personnel out of contested areas, reduce threat exposure, and to reconfigure how and where units conduct the MFO mission, with the end result being a reduction of manning across the contingents and a rationalization of the MFO's multiple command and control nodes. Rebalance and Reconfiguration had originally been designed to occur through a 12-18 month window, but due to the declining security situation was accelerated to occur within a 6-9 month window. Accelerated Rebalance and Reconfiguration kicked off with Operation Blue Fish in late May and continued through 1/2 CR's redeployment in August 2016. In support of Rebalance and Reconfiguration, USBATT planned and executed the closure of one remote site (OP3-1) on 05 June 2016, and the handover of three remote sites (SCC-5, CP3A, and CP3B) to Colombian forces from 19-26 June 2016. Additionally, in early June, immediately following the rapid closure of all remote sites in the MFO's Northern AO, USBATT received an OPCON Fijian company. This repositioned company was trained and integrated in the South Camp base defense plan as a part of the South Camp Towers and ECP, and to also operate two remote sites (CP3C and CP3D) which further postured the MFO for future force reconfiguration, and for reducing risk to the overall force. 1/2 CR demonstrated its resilience and flexibility by rapidly shifting its mission command structure and seamlessly transitioned the USBATT AO to a combined, COLBATT/FIJIBATT/USBATT AO in the Southern Sinai, thus ensuring the continuance of the MFO mission. As additional MFO contingents joined the USBATT AO, this enabled the early redeployment of nearly 140 members of 1/2 CR from 15 June to 05 July 2016 as the US Contingent reduced its assigned end strength in support of Reconfiguration. As the deployment drew closer to conclusion, 1/2 CR led the effort to re-design the MFO mission command structure of the future, creating two distinct combined multinational tactical operation centers to oversee the final reconfiguration of the MFO from a Soldier centric remote site operation, to a technological based, unmanned camera system centric operation. Immediately prior to the final relief in place and transition to USBATT 62, 1/2 CR created and provided critical manning billets to the new MFO Combined Joint TOC North at El Gorah Airfield – FOB North (former North Camp) and MFO Combined Joint TOC South at Sharm el-Sheikh – South Camp.

CONCLUSION

From November 2015 to August 2016, 1/2 CR performed at an exceptional level, setting a new standard for USBATT rotations for the future of the MFO. During the nine month deployment 1/2 CR responded to the deteriorating security situation due to the increasing threat by the Islamic State, by greatly improving the Force Protection systems and capabilities for North Camp and South Camp through realistic training and the development of new multinational standard operating procedures. 1/2 CR maximized their impact to the MFO through joint multinational training and rationalizing the capability of the Force as a whole. 1/2 CR planned and executed the largest movement in MFO history with the in extremis retrograde of non-essential personnel across international borders. In the spirit of the motto for 2nd Cavalry Regiment and War Eagle Squadron to be "Always Ready" and "Always First," 1/2 CR demonstrated the ability to innovate and accomplish the assigned mission of USBATT 61 beyond the call of duty, making contributions to the MFO that will benefit far beyond the Squadron's nine month tenure.

17. NARRATIVE (continuation):

proofing a new concept for deployment to the MFO that would be used throughout the duration of the deployment.

ADDRESSING NORTH SINAI SECURITY CONCERNS

In the years and months prior to the War Eagle Squadron's deployment to the MFO mission, security concerns continued to mount. From 2011-present, the Egyptian government continued to struggle with Islamic militants from the fall out of the Egyptian civil war and subsequent coup d'état. From 2014 and persisting throughout the 1/2 CR deployment, the conflict between the Egyptian government security forces and the Islamic State inspired militants continued to threaten MFO personnel and infrastructure caught in the crossfire. The US government responded by increasing the protection capabilities of the MFO through US provided technological assets and enhanced force protection equipment. 1/2 CR, through Comanche Troop at North Camp, spearheaded the effort to integrate new technologies to increase the safety and security of the entire force. This included the introduction of Mine Resistant Ambush Resistant All-Terrain Vehicles (M-ATVs), Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) Cameras, and Containerized Weapons Systems (CWS). The rapid introduction of the new systems and equipment greatly enhanced the security and force protection capabilities for all multinational forces in the MFO northern area of operations.

Multiple iterations of training and certification of MATV and Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station (CROWS) were conducted for the NCRT platoon to ensure unit readiness for each Troop's rotations through North Camp as the NCRT and Force Protection Troop. This was accomplished by conducting MATV gunnery live fire tables on Peacekeeper Range in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. Gunners conducted the MATV live fire training with the four SCRT MATV's at South Camp. Squad leaders received Operations Orders (OPORDs), conducted Troop Leading Procedures (TLPs) and rehearsals, and then executed live fire training. The live fire training consisted of ground movement to Peacekeeper Range, ground maneuver to the firing line, and engagement of enemy targets with CROWS mounted M2.50 cal and turret mounted M240L and .50 cal. The end state resulted in MATV gunners being trained on the employment of vehicle mounted crew-served weapons and fully prepared for future North Camp base defense and quick reaction force missions.

OPERATION BULL RUN

As the security situation in the Northern AO continued to degrade and a significant risk of personnel isolation or capture by Islamic State militants developed, the requirement for new capabilities in the NCRT ensued. Prior to assuming the NCRT mission from Apache Troop, at the halfway point of the deployment, Bull Troop developed a NCRT specific training plan (Operation Bull Run) that provided the MFO Force Commander with fully trained platoons capable of day or night mounted and dismounted operations in support of personnel recovery. The Troop deployed two platoons and the headquarters section to live at Peacekeeper Range for a week to execute the MATVs & CROWS gunnery, M240L Gun Team Competition, and squad day and night personnel recovery scenario live fire exercise as a training progression that culminated with a platoon mounted and dismounted day and night personnel recovery live fire exercise that fully tested the NCRT's ability to conduct mission command for two disparate elements in a complex enemy and civilian operational environment. Operation Bull Run prepared Soldiers to respond to a worst case scenario involving an isolated observer team, cut off and surrounded by enemy forces. The Platoons executed a full simulation of the personnel recovery planning process using Troop Leading Procedures before executing the live fire event. The Squad and Platoon live fires stressed tactical decision making, direct-fire employment, mounted and dismounted link up, air assault movement, and casualty treatment and evacuation. During the Squad live fire, Squads had to locate, secure and move a simulated casualty for 400 meters in an evacuation litter over rugged terrain. The Platoon live fire exercise also integrated UH-60 Blackhawks and the Platoon's mounted section in MATVs. The platoon leader had to control two maneuver elements separated by a major terrain feature while executing actions on contact. The week long certification exercise, the first of its kind in MFO history, was ambitious, innovative, and expertly executed. The planning and coordination of resources, along with a thorough training plan, returned time and resources to USBATT 61 and greatly reduced risk across the MFO by providing a critical personnel recovery capability to the force.

WATERBORNE REINFORCEMENT TRAINING

In addition to personnel recovery, and in light of terrorist activity at sea side resorts in the Red Sea area of Egypt, the MFO supported the development of new joint rescue operations capabilities between the US and Italian Coastal Patrol Unit (CPU). Recognizing the vulnerability of MFO members living in the Sharm el-Sheikh community and Soldiers stationed at seaside remote sites, 1/2 CR developed, resourced and conducted multiple variations of seaborne reinforcement training. The mission, tasked to the South Camp Response Team (SCRT), involved conducting waterborne reinforcement and casualty evacuation Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) exercises in conjunction with the MFO's Italian CPU. Training focused on the Tiran Island observation post, OP 3-11, as the most difficult MFO remote site to conduct a rescue or reinforcement. Working with the CPU, OPN Isola Forte (Italian for "Strong Island"), was used to validate the Squadron's plans to reach the seaside remote sites in extreme situations where air assets were not available due to weather or crew status, or the enemy situation was untenable. There were three key tasks for this event that were tested, to include testing the unit's ability to alert, notify, and deploy the SCRT with the CPU; the ability to use the Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) to reach the shores of Tiran Island; and finally OP 3-11's ability to CASEVAC down the Tiran Island mountain to the beach landing area, load casualties into the RHIB, and move the casualties from the RHIB to the CPU Ship, ending at the South Camp beach area for treatment. The series of training events was used to increase the joint readiness of both the US Army and Italian Navy to conduct contingency operations, enhance multinational cooperation, and rehearse Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for waterborne operations. This new capability proved critical as more MFO members moved from North Camp to Sharm el-Sheikh as a reaction to the enemy threat in the Northern AO. Most newly repositioned MFO members were temporarily placed into local seaside resort hotels as a temporary stop gap measure while the increased barracks construction at South Camp was completed. At its high mark, nearly 300 MFO members were staying in the local community at a higher risk to terrorism.

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