Building Host Nation Police: A Study of Operations in Germany, Kosovo, and Iraq

A Monograph

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2018

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)*
	Master's Thesis	JUN 2018 - May 2018

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Building Host Nation Police: A Study of Operations in Germany, Kosovo, and Iraq	
	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
Major Russell Smith	
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301	

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
School of Advanced Military Studies	
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

The creation or reestablishment of a host nation police force, post-conflict, allows an intervening force to transition governance to home country rule. The US Department of Defense has demonstrated that it would rather other government departments and agencies, not the US Army, take on this task in the absence of a functioning host nation government. Data from the case studies of US and international efforts in Germany, Kosovo, and Iraq point to four key principles to observe when planning the restoration of public order in post-conflict environments. The data and principles offered herein will assist strategic planners when planning for future host nation police forces.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

United States Army, Planning, Host Nation Policing, Police Training, Military Police, Constabulary, Germany, Kosovo, Iraq, Security Force Assistance, Stability Operations, Lessons Learned

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			Major Russell Smith
					19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER *(Include area code)*
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	51	

Monograph Approval Page

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Monograph Title: Building Host Nation Police: A Study of Operations in Germany, Kosovo, and Iraq

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Abstract

Building Host Nation Police: A Study of Operations in Germany, Kosovo, and Iraq by MAJ Russell B. Smith, US Army, 44 pages.

The creation or reestablishment of a host nation police force, post-conflict, allows an intervening force to transition governance to home country rule. The US Department of Defense has demonstrated that it would rather other government departments and agencies, not the US Army, take on this task in the absence of a functioning host nation government.

Data from the case studies of US and international efforts in Germany, Kosovo, and Iraq point to four key principles to observe when planning the restoration of public order in post-conflict environments. Assessing and understanding the security situation help planners decide whether to reform the existing police organization or create an entirely new one. Intervening police forces, civilian or military, must have sufficient authority to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment. Planners must mitigate the enforcement gap by rapidly deploying law enforcement professionals with the capabilities to maintain or reestablish law and order in a post-conflict environment. Finally, planners must plan for building the capacity of the newly formed force. These steps allow planners to generate an environment for the creation of a viable host nation police force.

The decision to recreate or reestablish a police force is political. Providing thorough analyses and recommendations to decision-makers is the job of the strategic planner. The data and principles offered herein will assist strategic planners when planning for future host nation police forces.

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Acknowledgements

Acronyms

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
CJTF-7	Coalition Joint Task Force 7
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CPATT	Civilian Police Advisory Training Team
DOD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
FM	Field Manual
INP	Iraq National Police
IPS	Iraqi Police Service
JP	Joint Publication
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
KPS	Kosovo Police Service
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MP	Military Police
MSC	Major Subordinate Commanders
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
PTT	Police Transition Team
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
TIP	Transitional Integration Training
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission Kosovo
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

Introduction

On March 20, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began with a shock and awe campaign that paralyzed Saddam Hussein's Army. Coalition forces' successes continued throughout the month of March with Iraqi Army forces in retreat from Basra to the outskirts of Baghdad. When American forces arrived in Baghdad in early April they expected to find an intact 60,000-member Iraqi police force, able to maintain law and order throughout the capital city. Unfortunately, this is not what occurred; instead, the Iraqi police and all other government authority disappeared with the arrival of US forces.

This flawed assumption of stability meant that prewar planning made no provision for an interim law enforcement capability. Thus, a general lawlessness consumed the city, compelling US forces to address this lack of security. With limited Military Police (MP) and no constabulary force, US Army commanders had no option but to use combat forces to quell the violence. However, limited authorities meant that these forces could only stand by and watch looters and mobs destroy the city. Failure to address the violence in Baghdad did little to instill public confidence in the ability of US forces to provide for their security. As a result, kidnapping, rape, murder, assaults, and robberies went unreported by residents who could find no one in authority.[1]

Under customary international law and in accordance with the 1907 Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention, an occupying force must ensure the security and safety of the civilian population and take every measure to restore public order.[2] Without public order and internal security, an intervening force will be unable to reestablish civil rule. Fundamental to the restoration of security is an effective host nation police force. Consequently, one of the most important initial tasks facing an intervening force is the development or reestablishment of a

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[1] Robert M. Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger? America's Search for a Stability Force* (Washington: US Institute for Peace, 2013), 166.

[2] International Committee of the Red Cross, "Occupation and Humanitarian Law," last modified May 8, 2004, accessed September 1, 2017, https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/634kfc.htm.

viable civilian police force. Despite this importance, the US Department of Defense's (DOD) current preference is for other government agencies and departments to take the lead when developing host nation law enforcement capabilities. However, as the brief vignette above demonstrates, ground forces, particularly the US Army, will likely be initially responsible for reestablishing security. Given this assumption, planning for security prior to an intervention is crucial for the strategic military planner.

Strategic planners focus on the employment of national power to achieve national objectives and face countless challenges when planning stability operations. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, *Stability* lists five primary tasks the joint force land component must do to ensure successful operations, and the first of these is to establish security.[3] At the operational level, Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* highlights the importance of reestablishing law and order to the Army's ability to consolidate gains.[4] As such, one of the primary challenges facing planners, particularly Army planners, is the development or reestablishment of a civilian police force. Despite the importance of police to establishing security, there are no Field Manuals or Joint Publications to assist strategic and operational planners. However, the United States, particularly the Army, has taken part in numerous operations where they have developed or reestablished police forces. Each operation posed specific challenges for the strategic planner, yet the similarities between them suggest there are fundamental principles to incorporate into Army doctrine.

In his book *From Zero to Blue*, Colonel Robert Byrd highlights some of the lessons he learned when standing up and organizing the Iraqi police force. He proffered that planners should start with determining the size of the force required, identify who will conduct training, and then

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[3] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, Stability (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), II-10.

[4] Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 8-2.

outline how to equip the force.[5] Experiences such as Colonel Byrd's are extremely valuable, as they can demonstrate that there are certain principles gleaned from studying the success or failure of previous operations when establishing a viable police force. As such, through an assessment of US and international efforts in Germany, Kosovo, and Iraq, this monograph provides lessons learned that can act as a guide for strategic planners when planning the development or reestablishment of a viable host nation police force.

When dealing with both pre-and-post-conflict environments, the strategic planner faces a multitude of tasks. Research of US operations in Germany and Iraq, and international efforts in Kosovo, reveal that despite the different missions associated with each operation, there were several tasks that were common when building host nation police. The first task facing a planner is to understand the security situation in the country. The preferred method for gaining situational understanding is for the planner to visit the country and assess the capabilities or lack thereof, of the host nation police forces firsthand. If this is not possible, as will be the case most instances, the planner must depend on security assessments and intelligence reports to form an understanding of police force capabilities.

With these capabilities in mind, the strategic planner must provide a recommendation on whether to reconstitute or eliminate the current police force. These are decisions that the planner should not take lightly, as the complete removal of a police force could obligate the intervening force to remain in the host nation for a considerable time post-conflict. To make such a decision, the strategic planner should consider local history, social and political culture, traditions, and the authorities vested to the intervening force. International operations in Kosovo provide a notable example where planners took these variables into consideration. Understanding the atrocities committed on ethnic-Albanians by Slobodan Milosevic's forces, to include the Serb dominated police force, UN Security Council mandate 1244 called for the "verifiable withdrawal from

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[5] Robert K. Byrd, *From Zero to Blue Creating the Iraqi Police Service: Lessons Learned* (Bloomington: AuthorHouse, 2006), 11.

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Kosovo of all military, and police forces."[6] While this left the country devoid of a standing police force for a short period of time, it allowed the United Nations Interim Administration Mission Kosovo (UNMIK) to ultimately establish an indigenous Kosovo police force that could administer the rule of law, and was not feared by the public. Deciding whether to keep or reestablish a host nation police force is a critical decision facing the strategic planner, as it will form the foundation for all follow-on planning efforts.

With the decision whether to keep or disband an existing police force made, the strategic planner then faces what authorities to vest to the intervening force. Research shows that intervening forces with wide ranging police authorities such as the ability to arm itself, make arrests, and conduct investigations leads to a more viable host nation police force. In Germany, the United States used a constabulary force made up of US Army Soldiers to maintain law and order while the German police forces became operational, resulting in a viable host nation police force. In Iraq, the intervening forces did not immediately seek policing authorities, and as a result widespread criminal activity took hold in the country. The decision whether to grant an intervening force wide ranging police authority can have a direct impact on the initial security situation facing the intervening force.

Reestablishing security following military operations is one of the most important and difficult tasks facing the strategic planner since failure to establish security at the outset of operations puts all other stability efforts on hold. When planning the size and composition of intervening forces, planners must ensure to include police, either civilian or military, in the force structure. As the following case studies demonstrate, those operations where police forces were part of the initial push of forces fared better, such as in Germany and Kosovo. In Iraq, limited policing capabilities at the outset of operations led to a general lawlessness that consumed much of the country. Furthermore, with no viable police force or interim policing capability, organized

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[6] United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1244* (New York: U.N., 1999), 4.

criminal networks and other nefarious actors took full advantage of the initial security vacuum throughout Iraq, preying on the country's citizens.[7] To prevent situations such as what took place in Iraq, planners must ensure the rapid introduction of policing capabilities into post-conflict environments.

In addition to assisting with the restoration of security, initial policing forces provide the strategic planner with the backbone from which to begin to build host nation police capacity. When building host nation police capacity, the strategic planner must focus on how to organize, train, and equip the force, efforts which require time, resources, and commitment. In Kosovo, the intervening UN police force was the same force that mentored the newly established Kosovo Police Service (KPS). As the KPS became a more viable police force and took on more of a policing role, the UN police force slowly began to withdraw. By providing a mentoring force responsible for providing security, the KPS could ease into its new role, allowing the creation of the most trusted institution in the country.[8] While the exact organization, training, and equipment required varies upon the given situation in the host country, the strategic planner can gain a greater understanding of the situation by studying historical examples.

The purpose of this research is to analyze and compare the three specific case studies of Germany, Kosovo, and Iraq to garner lessons learned that might assist the strategic planner in planning the development or reestablishment of host nation police forces. The three cases examined provide a wide-ranging view of different interventions, and subsequently describe how each country approached rebuilding police capacity. The case study on post-World War II Germany provides an example of the United States as an occupying power, using the US military to provide every function of an interim government including policing, while rebuilding the

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[7] Robert M. Perito, "Special Report: U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations," *United States Institute of Peace*, August 2007, 9.

[8] Morgan Greene, Johnathan Friedman, and Richard Bennet, "Rebuilding the Police in Kosovo," *Foreign Policy*, July 18, 2012, 6.

country. Kosovo provides a unique perspective, as the United States was not an occupying power; rather, it was a part of an international coalition working under a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) to rebuild the country's governmental institutions. The final case study of Iraq provides another perspective of the United States working as an occupying power. However, the US military did not act as an interim government or police force; rather implemented a whole of government approach in its effort to rebuild the governmental institutions of the country.

The research conducted into Germany, Kosovo, and Iraq indicated that planners faced common challenges in virtually all stability operations, requiring the application of four principles, including an initial security assessment, deciding what authorities to grant the intervening force, how to establish security, and finally, how to rebuild host nation police capacity. By examining the initial security assessment for each case study, the reader gains a deeper appreciation for how permissive the security environment was in each country, and how the environment either enabled or hindered police development. An examination of the authorities vested to the intervening force demonstrates how the use of interim police forces, such as constabulary forces, allow for a more stable security environment conducive to reestablishing the civilian police force. An examination of the restoration of security in each country, particularly the speed of accomplishment, provides the reader with an understanding of why crime and violence plagued certain operations and not others.

When examining the cases in Germany, Kosovo, and Iraq, it is also important to have a general understanding of the degree of political and cultural factors that impact the rebuilding of security institutions within failed or fragile nations, significant variables that are oftentimes beyond the control of the US military, particularly the military planner. The emergence of nations from prolonged conflict where the security environment is volatile, and complex creates a delicate situation for post-conflict host nation police reconstruction. Arguably, the success of a police force depends on the state of the government prior to conflict. Thus, the initial conditions of a weak central government and the lack of security and stability, coupled with a history of

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corrupt and repressive police authority, pose difficulties for intervening forces who wish to gain the support and confidence of the local populace. To regain societal trust, police must guarantee security and prevent internal conflict, as well as improve conditions for reconciliation and reconstruction.[9]

To determine the security needs of unstable nations post-conflict, it is important to understand the political and cultural climate when attempting to reestablish rule of law.[10] Rather than imposing western ideologies on security models for police reform, military leaders must give special consideration to local societal values to avoid cultural mismatches. The chosen policing model must incorporate a degree of socio-political cohesion with existing police culture so that the newly reformed security system is locally applicable and more importantly, sustainable.[11] Achieving the successful recovery of a stable and reformed host nation police force is one of the greatest challenges of stability operations but is ultimately the ideal end-state condition.[12]

By employing the best practice approach, this study will assess the factors that contributed to the success or failure for each case based on the policing principles of prevention, public support, legitimacy, and transparency set forth in FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations*.[13] Prevention refers to a police force's ability to prevent and deter crime and stop the disruption of civil order. The principle of public support refers to how supportive the citizenry is to the activities of the police force. For a police force to be legitimate, a competent authority must sanction it and apply laws or mandates in a fair and impartial manner. Transparency refers to the

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[9] Johannes Loh, "Success factors for police reform in post-conflict situations" (Master's Thesis, Hertie School of Governance, 2010), 6.

[10] Richard J. Ball, "Military Police as the Lead Phase IV Policing Strategy" (Master's thesis, US War College, 2016), 4.

[11] Loh, "Success factors for police reform in post-conflict situations," 7.

[12] Dennis E. Keller, "U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap," *Strategic Studies Institute* (August, 2010), 42.

[13] Field Manual (FM) 3-39, *Military Police Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), 1-5.

level of public awareness of police policies, established principles, and corrective action that affect police operations.

The case studies do not assess or measure against a more broadly defined United Nations' benchmark because, frankly, one does not exist. Instead, an analysis of each country against the US Department of State's 2016 Human Rights Report will act as the standard. An evaluation of the human rights report for each country in comparison to the previously mentioned policing principles will determine if each respective police force can meet those principles. The evaluations will help uncover any correlations between US and international host nation police building and the dominant characteristics of police activities influenced by western societies. The case study methodology reveals a set of lessons learned and provide the required principles for the strategic planner to use while planning for either pre-or-post conflict operations.

The section immediately following this introduction provides an analysis of the efforts undertaken in post-WWII Germany to rebuild the nation's police forces. Further, the second section of this paper includes an exploration into the international efforts employed to create the KPS. Finally, the third section of the paper provides an evaluation on US efforts to reestablish the police service in Iraq. Each section concludes with a set of lessons learned from each respective case study. The paper concludes with a summary of key principles derived from the analysis of each case study, serving as a guide for the strategic planner in future operations to plan for the development or reestablishment of host nation police forces.

<center>Germany</center>

Security Assessment

The US occupation of Germany post-WWII, revered as the last true example of a successful military occupation in modern American history, established the benchmark for post-conflict nation building.[14] These experiences reveal the first time the US Army effectively employed military force to change society by rapidly and fundamentally modifying its organization and mission for post-combat operations. As early as 1942, the United States and its allies began conducting extensive post-Hitler planning in the anticipation of a failed, demobilized German state, a critical move to outline strategic objectives.

To better analyze the security situation in post-war Germany, it is first important to understand the nature of the German police force under Nazi rule. In 1933 when Hitler came to power, Germany transitioned from a democracy into a dictatorship. The economic effect of WWI caused funding cuts in hiring, training, pay raises, and equipment for police. This fed into the demoralization and frustration of existing police forces. Thus, many in the police force welcomed the deep pockets of the Nazis who fully funded the police, while increasing staff numbers, training, and equipment modernization. German police became unified and controlled under the Nazis, essentially acting as an extension of the Nazi radical mindset. The Nazis granted police with wide ranging powers, including the ability to make arrests without evidence and incarcerate those in opposition to the regime in the promotion of state security. Nazi influence on the police was great, becoming a significant part of all police activities. Simply, the German police fused

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[14] Paul Hughes, Linwood Ham, and Linwood Q. Ham, Jr., "A Post-War Transition That Works: A Lesson for Afghanistan…from Kosovo," The United States Institute for Peace Blog, October 21, 2014, accessed September 20, 2017, https://www.usip.org/blog/2014/10/post-war-transition-works-lesson-afghanistan-kosovo.

with Nazi security forces – the SS or *Schutzstaffel* and SD or *Sicherheitsdienst* – blurring delineation between the two.[15]

Throughout several key conferences taken place at Casablanca and Tehran in 1943, Yalta in February 1945, and Potsdam in August 1945, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union (and later, France) discussed the fate of post-war Germany, the boundaries and division of Germany into four occupation zones, and later the reforming of the German government back into a democracy.[16] During these conferences, there were flaws in the planning process, fueled mainly by a power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the Allies' most important objective in Germany was to provide stability through the post-war administrative period until a new civilian German government could assume its role.[17] In an effort to ensure Germany never again became the powerful aggressor, disarmament and denazification were prime objectives for the United States and its allies in post-war planning. In addition to dismantling the Nazi state, the prosecution of war criminals, and reparations was to also be an important measure after the war.

The culmination of post-combat planning also gave way for the development of Operation Eclipse, one of the most significant studies to emerge from the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). This study would evolve into a detailed plan for a formidable force with the capability of responding to all contingencies during the occupation of Germany by the western Allies. Operation Eclipse assigned special responsibilities to each of the sectors occupied by the western Allies, specifically addressing the terms of the surrender such as disarmament, the prosecution of war criminals, the management of transportation and

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[15] "Holocaust Encyclopedia," German Police in the Nazi State, September 29, 2017, accessed September 29, 2017, https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005464.

[16] Harley Notter, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation*, 1939-1945 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1949), 395-398.

[17] Hughes, "A Post-War Transition That Works: A Lesson for Afghanistan…from Kosovo."

communication networks, the reestablishment of law and order, and the role of a military government.[18]

Authorities

With the unconditional surrender of the German military in May 1945, one of Europe's bloodiest conflicts came to an end. The "Big 3" (Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union) assumed supreme authority (authority that would last for several years) and declared primary control over all political, economic, and cultural matters in Germany. The US sector fell under the command of the Office of the Military Government, United States; this group handled all the political and economic issues of occupying Germany with the assistance of the military to enforce directives of denazification, demobilization, and provide security within the US zone. Further, Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower held,

> supreme legislative, executive, and judicial authority in the areas occupied by the forces under [his] command. This authority will be broadly construed and includes authority to take all measures deemed by you necessary, appropriate, or desirable, in relation to military exigencies and the objectives of a firm military government.[19]

After the surrender, the initial security assessment revealed that the German courts and police all but disappeared. Those police officers not arrested or dismissed by Allied forces suffered a huge loss of status, authority, and most importantly, trust. To prevent a security vacuum immediately after the official surrender, the first order of business was to establish a military government and heavy security forces in each of the Allies' respective occupied sectors. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive 1067, otherwise known as the Morgenthau Plan, provided for the establishment of military government detachments, shifting responsibility of governing to tactical units within the American Zone, an area encompassing roughly 40,000 square miles. The

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[18] Kendall D. Gott, *Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1953* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 2005), 3.

[19] Alexander T.J. Lennon and Camille Eiss, *Reshaping Rouge States: Preemption, Regime Change and US Policy Towards Iran, Iraq, and North Korea* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), 129.

military governments would oversee denazification in addition to coordinating the revival of the German economy, but only to a level of basic subsistence. JCS 1067 served as preliminary guidance for the Army in the occupation of a failed Germany, treating Germany as an enemy state and instituting a nonfraternization policy between American Soldiers and German citizens. This document changed several times over the years however, as the realities of the occupation became apparent. The United States eventually realized how the successful economic and societal reconstruction of Germany could thwart Soviet expansion and exploitation, and laid the foundation for the Marshall Plan, an economic recovery initiative aimed at rapidly rebuilding Western Europe after WWII.

Reestablishing Security and Building German Police Capacity

Post-war Germany reconstruction posed several challenges. The United States and other Allied forces inherited a nation defeated, a far cry from the highly developed economic and advanced society of pre-war Germany. Devastated by years of fighting and destruction created a level of humanitarian and economic devastation for which the Allies did not plan. A lack of public safety led to an increase in criminal behavior and overall extreme civil disorder among the population. Looting was rampant, infrastructure destroyed by bombing, the economy suffered a total collapse, and there was an overwhelming humanitarian crisis within Europe with millions of civilians displaced. Additionally, transportation breakdown and restrictions among the four different zones created massive shortages in food and fuel, leading to an increase in black market activities.

With an overwhelming majority of forces in theater, combat units within the US Army, most notably the 4th Armored Division, shouldered the bulk of responsibility for the American Occupation.[20] Under Eisenhower, sixty-one divisions established control as the primary

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[20] Earl Ziemke, *The U.S. Army Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975), 320.

occupying force, assigned with manning checkpoints, jails, and the overall management of law and order, ultimately acting as an interim security force.[21] This type of occupation proved initially effective with its massive display of strength in numbers, however it lacked discipline and cohesiveness, and was unsustainable for any long-term occupation.

The publication of the Allied Control Council Proclamation dated 20 September 1945 required US forces to reform the German police system.[22] In an effort to reorganize and train a new German police force, SHAEF approved Special Project No.1, a program established to provide general training on democratic principles, the laws of the military government, and the English language to specially selected anti-Nazi German police and Prisoners of War.[23] Upon completion, these recruits returned to the American Zone to rebuild the German police, however this effort did not prove reliable as many simply followed their own interests after repatriation. Thus, later that same year the theater Provost Marshal implemented a subsequent program known as the "Sunflower Project," (Special Project No. 2). This allowed for a more careful, thorough screening and training of new police.[24] The Sunflower Project, much like its predecessor, focused on teaching recruits English in addition to several other important subjects such as US History, Government, and military law to produce a "corps of democratized police officers utilized by the military government in the American sector."[25]

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[21] Ibid.

[22] Public Safety, *The First Year of the Occupation*: *Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-1946* (Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, 1947), accessed September 21, 2017, https://ia801305.us.archive.org/1/items/1stYearPartV/1stYearPartV.pdf, 7.

[23] James R. Phelps, *What Happened to the Iraqi Police?* (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2010), 64.

[24] Ibid, 64.

[25] Ibid, 65.

The requirement emerged that every major city form their own police department and establish a police school congruent with US police practices.[26] By the end of January 1946, "twenty schools were in operation throughout the American Zone of Operation."[27] Placing a greater emphasis on training and promoting democracy within the police force eventually resulted in the German police gaining more independence, prestige, and trust from their respective communities. With this progression, the German police also began to receive more specialized training, and issued uniforms, and eventually arms, albeit by strict and limited means.

Initially after the surrender, the United States had a robust presence of roughly 1.6 million troops, a sizeable occupation force responsible for managing border crossings, maintaining checkpoints, and conducting patrols in the US sector.[28] These large numbers drastically reduced however with heightened tensions in the Pacific and mounting pressure from Americans back home to "bring back our boys." By July 1945, the demobilization of US troops in Germany and subsequent deployment to Japan, the United States realized that it could not sustain this type of occupation. By the end of 1945, 24,000 German police were actively working with their US counterparts within the American Zone, eliminating the need for additional soldiers.[29] In response to the need for a less dense occupation style, military leaders shifted efforts from an army-type occupation to more of a "police-type" occupational force.

At the recommendation of General George C. Marshall, General Eisenhower developed a constabulary force to fill the security gap because of the demobilization. Envisioned as an elite force of roughly 38,000, the premise for the constabulary was to establish a force highly trained,

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[26] Ibid.

[27] Public Safety, *The First Year of the Occupation*: *Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-1946* (Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, 1947), accessed September 21, 2017, https://ia801305.us.archive.org/1/items/1stYearPartV/1stYearPartV.pdf, 162.

[28] James Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 9.

[29] Phelps, *What Happened to the Iraqi Police?*, 67.

adaptive, and mobile to maintain primary control of the American sector, assist in achieving US objectives, and control borders. In his article, *Police Functions in Peace Operations: A Historical Overview*, Erwin A. Schmidl, defines a constabulary force as "a force organized along military lines, providing basic law enforcement and safety in a not yet fully stabilized environment."[30] Ultimately, the constabulary would serve as a temporary solution until the German police could once again fully regain authority over normal police operations. In July 1946, with the final approval from the War Department, Eisenhower announced the formation of the US Constabulary. Referred to by the Germans as the "Blitz Polizei," these forces acted like US police forces, reestablishing law and order in addition to guarding the new border to the east with the Soviet Union. Ultimately, the US Constabulary would help foster the relationship between American forces and the newly established German government.

Organized into mechanized, cavalry-style troops of Brigades and Regiments with more fire power than military police units and greater mobility than the average infantry unit, each troop split further into teams.[31] Relying heavily on routine patrols to deter illegal activity and gain the trust of society, the teams worked closely with local civil authorities—essentially using the patrol as a training tool for new German police who were largely untrained and ill-equipped. The US Constabulary conducted criminal investigations; however, the German police were responsible for the arrest and incarceration of suspected criminals. A standard emerged where a German police officer would accompany the constabulary on patrols, assisting in all matters concerning German citizens, simultaneously learning the democratic ways of policing from their US counterparts. These patrols created opportunities for constabulary forces to build rapport with

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[30] Erwin A. Schmidl, "Policing Functions in Peace Operations: A Historical Overview," in *Policing the New World Disorder*, ed. Robert Oakley, Michael Dziedzic, and Eliot Goldenberg (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press), 22.

[31] "The U.S. Constabulary History Site," The U.S. Constabulary Forces in Germany, last modified September 24, 2017, accessed September 24, 2017, http://www.usconstabulary.org/?q=node/1.

the local populace and help regain the people's confidence in the newly reorganized German police. As the German police became more proficient in their policing abilities, they were soon able to conduct routine police duties. With the onset of the Cold War, as well as the demonstrated ability of the newly reorganized German police to maintain law and order on their own, the constabulary shifted from a police style occupational force back to conventional, combat operations and eventually eliminated in 1952.

Despite being much smaller than initially planned, the US Constabulary was a success and played an effective role in stability operations in West Germany. In his book "Mobility, Justice, Vigilance," author Kendall Gott describes how the US Constabulary was,

> an ever present, professional force, the troopers of the Circle C enforced the law and bridged the gap between the occupiers and the vanquished until Germany could maintain law and order for itself. The U.S. Constabulary existed as an organization for only six years, but it was a story of success. It had accomplished the mission of ensuring the successful American occupation of Germany and the lasting peace that followed.[32]

Assessment

Seventy-two years after the surrender and reconstruction of Germany, the 2016 Human Rights report reveals how Germany's police force is one of the most effective in Europe. Completely subordinate to the German government, the police service enjoys widespread public support and enacts the country's laws in a fair and impartial manner. Furthermore, the police service is completely transparent, and has effective mechanisms to investigate and punish officers found guilty of abuse and corruption.[33] In sum, the German police service is an organization fully able to enforce the country's laws and serves as an example for other countries to emulate.

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[32] Kendall Gott, *Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1953*, 29.

[33] United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2016 - Germany, accessed September 29, 2017, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265636.pdf.

Lessons Learned

The US occupation of post WWII Germany is widely instructive and when applied in a specific context, provides several lessons learned for future planners in post-conflict stability operations. Arguably, "the most important of these were the need for an adequate occupation force and a unified on-site command structure."[34] In Germany, the War Department (later renamed Department of Defense) ran both military and constabulary operations, which ensured a unified command policy and an overall agreement on the central objective of the occupation. Policy confusion can arise when too many organizations are tasked with leading portions of the nation-building mission.

Lessons from Germany reveal that the promotion of democracy can help in the reconstruction process, despite the political nature of the host nation immediately prior to and during occupation. Fundamental to the success of the reorganized German police were the efforts by the United States to train and democratize the force, working closely together and training new recruits much like they would US police forces. The use of military governance during regime change was necessary until the host nation could govern themselves as it provided for a centralized, legitimate government to administer authority during the transition phase. More importantly, with the creation of a German democracy, the new government remained steeped in German traditions and values, a critical factor to garner public support. It is also clear that because of the relatively high degree of homogeneity, such as the political, ethnic, and cultural unity in Germany prior to the war, policies and procedures that were successful in one area usually worked to produce results in another, making security efforts easier to enforce.[35]

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[34] Thomas W. Maulucci, "Comparing the American Occupations of Germany and Iraq," *Yale Journal of International Affairs* (Winter 2008): 121, accessed September 24, 2017, http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/083109maulucci.pdf.

[35] Gott, *Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1953*, 29.

Less successful was the nonfraternization found within an initial draft of the directive, JCS 1067. There was to be no interaction between the Germans and US military troops. Seemingly, some American leaders took a vindictive stance toward Germany instead of working towards the goal of nation building. Although JCS 1067 underwent several modifications, its later abandonment was inevitable as this harsh mindset did nothing to garner public support, nor ensure legitimacy, two key principles essential to creating stability in post-conflict societies.

The case study on Germany reveals how extensive planning is vital in preparation for combat operations, and the inevitable post-war economic, political, and social reconstruction. One of the most significant plans as a result was the Marshall Plan, developed to ensure the reconstruction of the German economy among other institutions. This helped create a stable democracy and firm ally, a longstanding asset to the United States.

Furthermore, although ample planning is critical for success, improvisation is key. This is most evident with the formation of the US Constabulary, developed as a measure taken to bridge the security gap during a time when large numbers of occupational troops were rapidly withdrawing from theater. The US Constabulary in Germany, the precursor of the police type occupation, is one of the best examples in American military history where efforts to enlist highly adaptive, trained forces were successful in achieving post-war legitimacy and influence over German citizens. The occupying force of the US Constabulary, consistently training and adjusting the mission to satisfy objectives, provided the necessary law and order so German citizens could focus efforts on rebuilding their war-torn country. Additionally, this idea of the incorporation of indigenous forces to aid in matters of interpretation, local governmental services, and law enforcement essentially brought the German people to the forefront of their own reconstruction.

Kosovo

Security Assessment

In the late 1990s, the wars that occurred following the breakup of Yugoslavia began to come to resolution. However, this was not the case in Kosovo where fighting continued and began to escalate with the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995. The continued violence, stemming from the serious ethnic and religious divisions in Kosovo, saw Serbian security forces attempting to destroy the newly formed Kosovo Liberation Army, which represented Kosovo's ethnic Albanians. This violence against Kosovo's ethnic Albanian population was part of a concerted effort by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to reduce the growing Albanian influence in Kosovo.

Milosevic, a Serbian politician and later president of both Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, rose to power by promising to protect the Orthodox Kosovar Serbs from the growing Muslim Albanian majority in Kosovo.[36] Based on this position, Milosevic ordered Serbian special police and the Yugoslav Army to forcefully resettle all ethnic Albanians to areas outside of Kosovo. Thus, in the spring of 1998, Serbian units used brutal force and harsh tactics to force the widespread exodus of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo.[37] Furthermore, Milosevic employed paramilitary squads to assassinate Albanian leaders. These actions caused a panic across the international community, resulting in the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199 which demanded all parties to end hostilities and observe a ceasefire.[38] Despite

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[36] William Shawcross, Deliver Us From Evil: Peacekeeping, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000).

[37] Peter A. Hucthausen, *America's Splendid Little Wars: A Short History of U.S. Military Engagements: 1975-2000* (New York: Penguin Group, 2003), 212.

[38] United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1199*, (New York: U.N., 1998), 2.

the Security Council Resolution, Serbian forces continued the forced resettlement of Kosovo's Albanian population.

Beginning on March 24, 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began an air campaign seeking the end to the ethnic violence taking place in Kosovo. NATO aircraft targeted Serb police, army, and paramilitary forces in Kosovo to compel these forces to withdraw from the region, setting the conditions for the arrival of an international peacekeeping force. On June 10, 1999, the bombing campaign halted when Milosevic allowed an international peacekeeping force into Kosovo. The United Nations subsequently passed Security Council Resolution 1244, which created the UN Interim Mission Administration Kosovo, and required the complete withdrawal of all Serbian military, police, and paramilitary forces from Kosovo.[39]

Like operations in Germany, Resolution 1244 tasked the NATO-led intervening peacekeeping force known as Kosovo Force (KFOR) with "establishing a secure environment…and maintaining law and order."[40] Given the broad nature of the KFOR mission, the complete lack of a local police force, and the volatile conditions the intervening police force would encounter, the strategic planners chose to include constabulary units as a part of the initial forces. In his book, *Where is the Lone Ranger?* Robert Perito credits the planners' decision to include a robust constabulary capability with lessons learned from operations in Bosnia.[41] In fact, based on the lessons learned from Bosnia, four of the five NATO nations commanding multinational brigades deployed with a constabulary unit.[42] The inclusion of constabulary units as

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[39] United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1244*, (New York: U.N., 1999), 2.

[40] Ibid, 4.

[41] Robert M. Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger? America's Search for a Stability Force* (Washington: US Institute for Peace, 2013), 122.

[42] Ibid, 123.

a part of the initial troop push into Kosovo provided both UN and NATO commanders with a force capable of reestablishing the rule of law.

Authority

Constabulary units contributing to KFOR included, the British *Royal Military Police*, French *Gendarmes*, Italian *Carabinieri*, Spanish *Guardia Civil*, and a company of US Military Police. Each of these units provided capabilities ranging from dealing with civil disorder, to investigating serious crimes. At the outset of operations however, they all focused on reestablishing public order. Reestablishing public order would require KFOR constabulary units to possess the authority to patrol communities, search for weapons, disarm combatants, control riots, and investigate crimes; which UNSCR 1244 provided.[43]

Given the executive authority to arm themselves and make arrests, constabulary units initially filled the void left by the departing Serbian police forces and assisted with the reestablishment of security in Kosovo. Though these authorities did much to assist with the reestablishment of the rule of law in Kosovo, there were too few constabulary personnel to fully reestablish security across the entire region. Thus, strategic military planners struggled in the establishment of a new Kosovo Police Service.

In addition to the constabulary units deployed to Kosovo, the UN also employed a force of 3,155 UNMIK police, composed of international law enforcement professionals from France, Egypt, Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The UNMIK police assisted the constabulary forces by filling the vacuum left by the departing Serbian security forces.[44] Additionally, the UNMIK police force had the primary responsibility for the overall supervision of the KPS, while the responsibility to provide training fell to the Organization for

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[43] Ibid, 22.

[44] Robert M. Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger? America's Search for a Stability Force* (Washington: US Institute for Peace, 2013), 125.

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This was the first time in the history of the United Nations that it found itself responsible for providing an armed police mission where there was no host government and no local police force. [45] As such, at the outset of operations in Kosovo, the UN struggled to find a cadre of police officers with the credentials required to assist with the establishment of the new KPS. As a result, training of the KPS did not begin immediately. Instead, it took several weeks to establish as the UNMIK and OSCE training force trickled into Kosovo.

Reestablishing Security and the Creation of the KPS

The complete absence of a local police force coupled with the slow arrival of UNMIK police meant that the thinly spread constabulary forces were the only police force in the country for several weeks. Thus, during the summer of 1999, violent clashes took place between the returning Albanian refugees and the Serb population; additionally, organized criminal networks used the enforcement gap as an opportunity to pillage vehicles, smuggle weapons, and engage in both drug and human trafficking.[46] However, once the UNMIK police force arrived and combined with KFOR's constabulary units, crime became manageable. Achieving this manageable level was key to providing the KPS room to grow as an organization and allowed for the gradual reestablishment of the rule of law.

Beginning in 2001, the KPS assumed the responsibility of patrolling across the region from the UNMIK police force. As the KPS began providing greater law enforcement capabilities with the assistance of OSCE trainers, serious crimes and ethnic violence began to decline. Despite these positive trends, there were two factors threatening the development of a neutral, apolitical police service. The first factor was the history of corruption amongst public officials in the region. To combat public corruption, including within the KPS, the UNMIK created the Financial

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[45] Ibid, 126.

[46] Richard Caplan, *International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rules and Reconstruction* (Oxford: University Press, 2005), 49.

Inspection Unit (FIU), which stood up in 2003. Trained by the Italian Guardia di Finanza, the mission of the unit is to perform investigations wherever public money is involved. Since its creation, the FIU has made innumerable arrests of public officials and through its investigations facilitated the arrest and prosecution of several organized crime bosses, closing their extremely lucrative criminal networks. Not only does the FIU provide the region with a first-rate financial crime investigation capability, it also provides oversight of KPS financial activities. This illustrates the KPS' ability to act impartially and gave the organization creditability in the eyes of the public.

The second, and perhaps most difficult challenge threatening the KPS was interethnic conflict, both in the region and in the police service. To address interethnic conflict, the UNMIK sought to create a multi-ethnic KPS to serve as a representation of the region's population. As such, UNMIK recruiting officers conducted rigorous background checks on candidates to ensure the proper representation in all training courses. At the end of 2004, the ethnic makeup of the KPS was eighty-four percent Albanian, nine percent Serbian, and seven percent other minorities. Additionally, women made up sixteen percent of the force, a figure that is higher than in all other Western European police forces.[47] While the multi-ethnic makeup of the KPS cannot guarantee impartiality, it has taken a great step towards ethnic integration and has assisted in the police service being identified as the most trusted Kosovan institution in 2010.[48] These steps taken to increase the legitimacy of the KPS, aided in the reestablishment of a secure environment in the region.

[47]Thorsten Stodiek, "*The OSCE and the Creation of Multi-Ethnic Police Forces in the Balkans*," Center for OSCE Research (2006): 19, accessed September 21, 2017, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/25548/CORE_Working_Paper_14.pdf.

[48] Richard Bennett, Johnathan Freidman, and Morgan Greene, "*Building the Police Service in a Security Vacuum: International Efforts in Kosovo, 1999-2011*," Princeton University (2012), 14, accessed September 21, 2017, https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/successfulsocieties/files/Policy_Note_ID121.pdf.

When he took over as the UN police commissioner in Kosovo in 1999, Sven Frederiksen, a Danish policeman with extensive regional experience, encountered multiple challenges, but none more important than how to train Kosovans on democratic policing. Before he could begin training the new KPS, Frederiksen first had to coordinate efforts across the different international institutions providing trainers. These institutions included NATO, the European Union, and the OSCE. What he found was that these organizations had multiple overlapping security mandates and responsibilities, and essentially lacked a coherent strategy for the development of the KPS.[49]

To address this lack of strategy, UNMIK laid out a plan for the development of the KPS. This plan had two overarching objectives, to provide an interim law-enforcement capability, and the "rapid development of a creditable, professional and impartial Kosovo Police Service."[50] To achieve these goals, UNMIK in conjunction with OSCE developed a three-phased operation. For phase one, the NATO led constabulary would maintain law and order while the UNMIK police forces prepared to assume responsibility. Phase two saw the UNMIK police force taking over policing responsibilities in Kosovo, as well as beginning to recruit, train, and deploy the KPS. In phase three, the UNMIK police forces would slowly transfer policing responsibilities over to the KPS; however, prior to the transfer taking place, the KPS had to have an effective internal monitoring agency. Key to making this operation work was the training of the KPS during phase two.

Responsibility for providing classroom training fell to the OSCE, who selected Steve Bennett, a retired US Marine and police officer, to head up the effort. Bennett and his cadre of trainers developed their curriculum prior to the intervention, something unique to previous UN police training efforts in Haiti and Bosnia. The original curriculum required each class to attend six weeks of both academy and field training with the UNMIK police officers. However, after the

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[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid, 3.

graduation of the inaugural class, Bennett extended classroom and field training to twenty weeks. The revamped curriculum required cadets to rotate between the classroom and field training, allowing trainers to slowly immerse the new officers into the Kosovan streets. However, the new training immediately pointed to a problem, procedures taught to cadets in the classroom were different than the ones practiced in the field. This difference led to limited success from the inaugural classes.

The differences in techniques were the result of the diverse nationalities of forces conducting the various aspects of training. At the academy, the OSCE police training cadre consisted of mostly officers from the United States. The UNMIK forces responsible for the on-the-job training, on the other hand, was comprised of police advisors from more than fifty-five countries.

With this problem identified, UNMIK and OSCE worked together to come up with a standardized training curriculum. The new curriculum rectified the problem, and cadets now received in the classroom what trainers required in the field. In 2006, UNMIK suspended police recruitment and basic training when the KPS reached its service quota of 7,335 officers. Because of this process, UNMIK and OSCE could create a viable police force by employing what Robert Perito deemed "the best international training effort that has ever been done."[51] The results of the training efforts were also evident in the crime statistics. As the OSCE trained officers began working and patrolling the region, crime rates began to fall. From 2000 to 2001, murders fell from 245 to 136, abductions from 190 to 165, and arson cases from 523 to 218.[52] This was a considerable accomplishment considering that just three years prior, security forces under Milosevic, including the police, were the perpetrators of many of the crimes taking place in Kosovo.

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[51] Ibid, 6.

[52] Ibid, 15.

Assessment

The 2016 Human Rights report on Kosovo reveals the country still possesses its share of problems, but one area of little concern is the police service. It is worth noting that the European Union's Rule-of-Law Mission, working under the UNMIK umbrella established with UNSCR 1244, is still in the country and conducts active monitoring of the police and the justice sector, thus potentially affecting the glowing report received by the KPS. The report cites that Kosovo Inspectorate of Police is actively conducting investigations into officer maleficence, and of the 1,246 citizen complaints received 748 received disciplinary action with 498 resulting in criminal charges.[53] The report further reveals no complaints of abuse at the hands of the police prior to turning a suspect over for pretrial detention. Furthermore, there is no mention of any ethnic violence conducted by the police, a vindication of the challenging work that went into creating a diverse KPS. In sum, the report clearly indicates that the police service in Kosovo is viable, legitimate, and garners public support.

Lessons Learned

The Kosovo case study demonstrates significant developments made by the KPS and offers multiple lessons that can enable the strategic planner when planning for the development of a viable host nation police force. As was the case in Germany, intervening forces in Kosovo received wide ranging authorities. The ability to arm themselves, conduct investigations, and make arrests, provided interim UNMIK police and constabulary forces the means to provide security to the population. While there was not an immediate restoration of security across the region, the ability of the UN and KFOR to conduct law enforcement operations provided the KPS with ample time to train and establish itself in a relatively secure environment.

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[53] US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2016 - Kosovo, accessed September 29, 2017, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265648.pdf.

In addition to the enabling security, the use of interim police forces provided the OSCE trainers the opportunity to select and recruit a multi-ethnic force representative of the Kosovo population. Given the atrocities committed by the Serbian police under the Milosevic regime, this consideration went along way to restoring public confidence in the police force. As these diverse police forces began to increase in effectiveness, the public began to see them as a legitimate force. Two other factors contributing to the increased legitimacy of the KPS were the organization's ability to enforce the law, and the fact that, it was a transparent institution in a country ravaged by corruption.

Despite the successes of the UN efforts in Kosovo, there were some areas requiring improvement. The slow deployment of UNMIK and the relatively small number of constabulary units at the outset of operations meant that there was a span of time where enforcement was incomplete or absent. This small gap in enforcement capability allowed organized criminal networks and other nefarious actors to exploit the population. One way for planners to alleviate this problem is to ensure the provision of a robust law enforcement force package with the initial troop deployment.

While training of the KPS was largely a success, the heterogeneity of both the populous and the occupying force created challenges. Unlike Germany, Kosovo was ethnically more complex, creating an underlying communal hatred that made reconstruction efforts difficult. Additionally, the diverse nature of law enforcement trainers led to differences in the techniques taught by classroom and field trainers. The discrepancy was ultimately a minor setback, but demonstrates that when using multinational trainers, all trainers must adhere to a commonly agreed upon set of standards, regardless of nationality.

The training and development of the KPS provides a powerful example of a successful international effort to produce a viable host nation police force, post-conflict. As with efforts in post-WWII Germany, the creation of this force occurred from the ground up. While the KPS was in its developmental stages, the interim UNMIK worked with the constabulary forces of KFOR to

ensure the maintenance of public order, and the provision of a semi-permissive environment in

which the budding force could train. The effect also showed significant adaptation of the German

model to deal with the multi-national nature of the force and diversity of the affected populace.

The significant efforts to create a multi-ethnic force went far to correct the long-held distrust of

the police in the region.

Security Assessment

In the mid-1970s, Iraq was one of the most prosperous states in the Middle East, with a budding middle class, and a gross domestic product larger than that of Spain. During this time, the Ba'ath Party ruled the country headed by President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. While Bakr was the president, Saddam Hussein, the party's chief of intelligence was the country's de facto ruler.[54] In 1979, Saddam Hussein replaced al-Bakr as president and immediately began undertaking actions to create an Iraqi-centered Arab world. One year later in the wake of the Iranian Revolution, Saddam ordered the invasion of Iran. The Iran-Iraq war lasted eight years, leaving half a million Iraqis dead and bringing the country's brief period of prosperity to an end.[55] Furthermore, the conflict increased tensions between the regime's Sunni Arab elite and the country's Shi'a and Kurdish populations, much like the ethnic and religious divisions witnessed in Kosovo. In 1990, Saddam ordered the invasion of Kuwait leading to the 1991 Gulf War, where Iraqi forces suffered defeat by a broad international coalition of forces led by the United States. By 2000, Iraq was a broken country and an international pariah, mainly because of the actions of its regime, the impact of multiple wars, severe international sanctions, and repressive rule.

In Iraq, Saddam exercised power through a complex security apparatus which included a vast network of informers, using extreme brutality and violence to quell discontent.[56] By establishing an interlocking network of civilian and military security organizations, Saddam overcame both internal and external challenges. There were three main civilian security

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[54] Jeb Sharp, "History of Iraq Part II: the Rise of Saddam Hussein," *PRI's The World*, February 12, 2003, accessed September 9, 2017, https://www.pri.org/stories/2003-02-12/history-iraq-part-ii-rise-saddam-hussein.

[55] Ian Black, "Iran and Iraq remember war that cost more than a million lives," *The Guardian*, September 23, 2010, accessed September 9, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/23/iran-iraq-war-anniversary.

[56] Robert M. Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger? America's Search for a Stability Force* (Washington: US Institute for Peace, 2013), 159.

organizations which assured regime survival: the Special Security Directorate, responsible for

sensitive security tasks such as concealing the regimes' WMD program; the General Security

Directorate, which ensured internal security by placing operatives in every jurisdiction to keep

abreast of events transpiring around the country; and the Ba'ath Party Security Agency, which

oversaw the activities of Iraqis through branches in organizations at universities, factories, and

trade unions. Located below these secret police were the Iraqi National Police (INP).

Established with assistance from the British in the early 1950s, the INP was a

representative force made up of all ethnic groups and religious denominations in the country.

Under the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry, the INP performed all routine police functions

across the country. Prior to the rise of the Ba'ath Party and Saddam, the INP was an organization

known for professionalism, political neutrality, honesty, and enjoyed widespread public support.

However, after the rise of Saddam, legislation was enacted that led to the militarization of the

INP, and eventually caused the marginalization of the force as other security organizations

assumed responsibility for internal security. Thus, by the beginning of 2003, Iraq's National

Police, numbering approximately 60,000 personnel, had little authority or competence, were

notoriously corrupt, and were seen by the populace as the least trusted security service in Iraq.[57]

Prior to the invasion of Iraq by coalition forces in March 2003, there were intense debates

within the Pentagon regarding the number of and types of, troops required to provide post-

conflict security. When Congress questioned General Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army,

he stated that "somewhere on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers … would be

required to ensure a safe and secure environment [post-conflict]."[58] Larry Diamond, a senior

fellow at the Hoover Institution and former senior advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority

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[57] Nora Bensahel et al., *After Saddam Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 125.

[58] Eric Shinseki, testimony to Senate Armed Service Committee, February 25, 2003, accessed October 28, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a_xchyIeCQw.

(CPA), agreed with Shinseki stating that "around 300,000 troops might have been enough to make Iraq secure after the war, [adding] that different kinds of troops were needed to include vastly more military police and troops trained for urban patrols, crowd control, civil reconstruction, and peace enforcement."[59] Despite calls for a significant number of ground forces for OIF, Bush administration officials, particularly Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, pushed for lower troop numbers. Thus, in response to persistent objections by Secretary Rumsfeld, troop numbers reduced to only 200,000 at the outset of OIF.

Operation Iraqi Freedom began on March 20, 2003, and by April 9 that same year, US forces entered Baghdad. Prewar planning conducted by the DOD presupposed that coalition forces would inherit a fully functioning state with most governmental institutions intact, to include the police and army.[60] However, upon arrival to Baghdad, US forces found that all Iraqi security forces and government authorities vanished. The fast pace of the campaign up to that point meant that the representatives for the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), predecessor to the CPA, responsible for rebuilding Iraq's governmental institutions to include the police, were still in Kuwait when the first US combat brigades reached the city center. The absence of the Iraqi security forces, and the organization tasked with its oversight – ORHA – meant that US forces had only 12,000 soldiers to police a city of 4.5 million and were thus unable to prevent the chaos and destruction that consumed the city, and later much of the country.

Authority

Arriving twelve days after US forces entered Baghdad, retired General Jay Garner, went to work with his small ORHA staff to restore public order to the capital city. The flawed

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[59] David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker, *Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006)*,* 8.

[60] Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Richard Brennan, Heather Gregg, and Thomas Sullivan, *After Saddam Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 16-18.

assumption that the Iraqi security apparatus would continue to act as a viable force meant that US

planners had sought limited authorities for the intervening force. With limited authorities, no

constabulary, and very few MP assets, Garner and his staff were almost wholly dependent on the

now defunct INP. On May 2, ORHA made a countrywide announcement calling all police

officers to return to work. Initial calls only managed to summon a few officers, and so a month

later the CPA (replacing ORHA) and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) issued a directive

ordering the return of all police officers by July 3. Failure to do so would result in immediate

termination.[61] Given this ultimatum, the police were back to the streets, with approximately

38,000 returning to what was now the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) by the end of July. The nearly

five-month absence of the police across the country allowed organized criminal elements, gangs

of vandals, and sectarian violence to take root, particularly in Baghdad. As such, to combat the

growing criminal problem, and to bolster the small number of returning police officers, the CPA

in conjunction with the MOI determined that it must recruit additional forces.

To bolster the fledgling IPS, the Iraqi MOI granted Coalition Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-

7) and its Major Subordinate Commanders (MSC) the authority to recruit an additional 30,000

police. The object of this recruiting drive was to rapidly fill police ranks to get "boots on the

ground."[62] Thus, the CPA, MOI, and by extension CJTF-7, "enunciated minimal requirements for

entry into the IPS" rather than the more stringent vetting of recruits seen in Germany and

Kosovo.[63] The low standards utilized to quickly fill the IPS ranks meant that many recruits not

previously accepted due to inferior quality were now allowed into the organization. To address

the low quality of these recruits, the CPA designed a training program based on the one employed

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[61] Anthony H. Cordesman, *Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success* (Westport: CT, Praeger, 2006), 20.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.

in Kosovo. Training would consist of eight weeks of basic training followed by a structured on-the-job training program led by experienced, subject matter experts. It employed an additional vetting mechanism to remove unsatisfactory candidates. Unfortunately, the rapidly deteriorating security situation across the country necessitated the rapid infusion of recruits into the police forces across Iraq, meaning many hit the streets with either minimal training or none.

Reestablishing Security and the Continued Creation of the IPS

Unlike previous case studies examined herein, there was no constabulary forces, nor a large enough troop presence in Iraq, to take on the burden of providing for public safety while the coalition organized and trained the IPS. Rather, the organization and training of the IPS would take place simultaneously, while a raging insurgency took hold of much of the country, forcing the DOD, particularly the US Army, to take an active role in the effort. This revelation would come as a disappointment to many US Army senior leaders, such as Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, who as the Central Command spokesman stated, "that the U.S. military would help rebuild civil administration but expected the Iraqis to assume responsibility of public order. At no time, do we see the U.S. military becoming a police force."[64] In late 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, unhappy with the progress of the IPS, requested an investigation into the shortcomings of the CPA-led Iraq police assistance program. To lead this investigation, Rumsfeld selected Major General Karl Eikenberry, who reported that the CPA training effort was under-resourced, disorganized, and incapable of producing a competent Iraqi police force.[65] Furthermore, he pointed out that the development of the IPS was so far behind that the transfer of responsibility for security to the Government of Iraq would have to occur later than anticipated. Eikenberry

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[64] Robert M. Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger? America's Search for a Stability Force* (Washington: US Institute for Peace, 2013), 169.

[65] Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (U.S.), *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 133.

concluded his report with a recommendation that the US military should take responsibility for training the Iraqi police.

In May 2004, with the publication of National Security Policy Directive 36, responsibility for training the Iraqi police formally moved from the State Department to the DOD, a move that Robert Perito remarked as "unprecedented." [66] Congress also displayed reservations about the transfer of responsibility to the DOD, and "pressed hard to keep the U.S. military role in training paramilitary forces to a minimum, largely as a legacy of problems in Latin America and elsewhere during the Cold War."[67] Despite these reservations, the DOD assumed responsibility, finding just over 90,000 police on the books as of June 2004, with some two-thirds having not received training. For the roughly 21,000 that had received training it was of dubious quality, many having received the questionable Transitional Integration Training (TIP) instituted by the CPA in June 2003. TIP training was highly varied, giving tremendous latitude to trainers in designing and implementing the program, a problem like that experienced with the international trainers in Kosovo. While some officers received a full three-week complement, some only three days, and while a portion received classroom and field training, others had only a smattering of each.[68] In another attempt to expediate IPS training, the Multi National Forces-Iraq assigned units unfamiliar with police operations, such as infantry, field artillery, and armor, to train local police. While these units were able to take the IPS out on patrol, they were unequipped to train the IPS on the day-to-day functions a law enforcement institution is expected to provide the community. To address training inadequacies and begin building a viable IPS, Central Command established the Civilian Police Advisory Training Team (CPATT).

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[66] Robert M. Perito, "Special Report: U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations," *US Institute of Peace*, August 2007, 10.

[67] Anthony H. Cordesman, *Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 22.

[68] Nora Bensahel, *After Saddam Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 129.

CPATT consisted of representatives from the Departments of State and Justice, as well as their contracted advisors, limited number of police officers with varying backgrounds such as small-town patrol officers to money laundering investigators from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Despite the mission of police training tasked to the military, there was a fundamental disagreement on what function the IPS would perform. The State Department and Department of Justice (DOJ) wanted a force able to conduct community policing, while the military desired a force that could assist with the conduct of counterinsurgency operations.[69] Clearly missing from any discussions on policing models was what the Iraqi government wanted. Failure to come to an agreement, or failure of the military to enforce its will, ultimately caused a catastrophic mismatch of the training and employment of the police.

The police advisors from the Department of State and DOJ believed that the military did not appreciate the practical requirements for training law enforcement and simply focused on getting more guns on the street to reduce pressure on coalition forces.[70] As such, the State and DOJ led training programs in Amman, Jordan and Baghdad continued to train on community-policing techniques built around a lightly armed force.[71] Thus, when the newly trained police rejoined the force, facing a security environment characterized by a growing insurgency and sectarian militia forces, they did not have the proper training for the environment in which they worked. They could not combat heavily armed former military personnel, veteran security operatives, and foreign terrorists, all of which were duties the US military and their country required. As a result, from 2004 to 2006, Iraqi police operating from unprotected facilities, patrolling in thinly armored vehicles, and lacking body armor, suffered 12,000 casualties, including 4,000 killed.

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[69] Robert M. Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger? America's Search for a Stability Force* (Washington: US Institute for Peace, 2013), 173.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid.

The year 2006, known as the "Year of the Iraqi Police" by coalition forces, saw a redoubling of efforts to create a viable IPS. To develop closer partnerships with the police, Multi-National Corps – Iraq, commanded by Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, introduced Police Transition Teams (PTTs). Like Military Transition Teams, PTTs consisted of a mix of military police and civilian police advisors, who provided day-to-day advising and mentoring of the IPS. Distributed across Iraq, PTTs covered over 220 provincial, district, and local police stations, working side by side with the Iraqi police day in and day out. As with the training model witnessed in Kosovo, Department of State advisors and contractors provided standardized school training at one of the multiple police academies across Iraq while the PTTs provided the in-service field training. This model would remain in place up to the implementation of the SOFA in January 2009, and the subsequent redeployment of US troops. Undoubtedly, the IPS has grown as an organization with current DOD figures as of May 2010 placing the force at 412,000; however, the effectiveness of the force remains unclear.

Assessment

The 2016 Human Rights Report for Iraq reveals a country where civilian authorities cannot always maintain control of all security forces, including the police. Furthermore, the country divides along ethnic lines, a situation exasperated by the actions of Da'esh. While Iraqi security forces, including the police, have made momentous gains towards pushing this terrorist organization out of the country, they have made few gains toward becoming a legitimate policing organization that has public support of the Iraqi people. The State Department finds that severe human rights abuses, sectarian hostility, extrajudicial killings, and widespread corruption plague Iraq's policing services across the country.[72] The findings of this report are not surprising given the myriad of failures the United States has experienced in its attempt to reform and train the IPS.

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[72] United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2016 - Iraq, accessed September 29, 2017, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265710.pdf, 1.

However, this was avoidable. If US planners reflected on operations in Germany and Kosovo, they would have realized the benefits of seeking wide-ranging policing authorities, as well as the need for a robust force to reestablish security and retrain the new police force.

In further reporting, Amnesty International has received multiple reports of men wearing police uniforms unlawfully killing men and boys in a village north of Fallujah, and in some cases torturing them beforehand. [73] Despite these allegations, there is little effort made to investigate police abuse across the country, and there is still a complete lack of transparency as the findings are not public. The International Committee of the Red Cross has also found the police service, "rel[ies] heavily on the evidence of secret informants or coerced confessions."[74] In sum, the State Department report points to an Iraqi Police Service that is completely ineffective due to high-levels of corruption, displays an inability to prevent crime, and demonstrates a complete lack of transparency of its practices.

Lessons Learned

The case study on Iraq provides notable examples of flawed planning assumptions affecting an entire campaign. Training of the IPS was a disaster mainly because of flawed assumptions but also due to the departmental disconnects in training requirements. By assuming that governmental institutions would remain intact, including the police, planners failed to provide adequate troop levels required to restore public order once major combat operations were complete. This initial planning failure meant that once the looting began in Baghdad, coalition forces did not have the troops with the requisite skills, nor the proper authorities to control the situation. This inaction on behalf of coalition forces created the perception of tacit approval for the destruction and chaos that consumed the capital city. The nearly five-month absence of Iraqi police, and failure of US forces to provide law and order created a situation where lawlessness

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[73] Ibid, 3.

[74] Ibid, 7.

took root across Iraq. Having the benefit of hindsight, if planners treated post-conflict Iraq like Germany or Kosovo, perhaps the results could have been different.

Much like Germany and Kosovo, Iraq would have benefitted from the use of a constabulary force. Following the forces invading Iraq, the constabulary force could have potentially provided the initial law enforcement capability to restore order in Baghdad and other cities across the country. Furthermore, ORHA would have benefitted from a force providing basic law enforcement capabilities until the reestablishment of the Iraqi police. Unfortunately, given the size of Iraq, a constabulary force would have limited capabilities in both active patrolling and static police training. Consequently, training the Iraqi police, another area that missed the mark, would require the assistance of an outside body.

Having a comprehensive plan, adequate troop levels, and a unified command structure like both Germany and Kosovo, prior to arrival in country, would have benefited those responsible for Iraqi police training. The training conducted was ad hoc at best and improperly prepared those trained to fulfill duty expectations. This disjointed training, a result of infighting between the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense, created an IPS trained for community policing; however, required to conduct the far more lethal counterinsurgency operations. Despite occurring late in the campaign however, one positive development in training occurred with the introduction of the PTTs. By using the PTTs, US forces could provide day-to-day in station training to substantial portions of the IPS across the country. Furthermore, the PTTs filled the in-service mentorship role, like those provided by the UNMIK trainers to the KPS, allowing training to go beyond the classroom and on to the streets. For a significant amount of time the IPS were receiving training that was not preparing them for the environment in which they were operating.

Conclusion

As the US Army begins to shift its focus from counterinsurgency operations to major combat operations, it is paramount to conduct further study on how to effectively reestablish or reform host nation police forces, and subsequently codify these findings in an FM or JP. As the case studies examined herein indicate, a functioning force able to provide for public security is critical to the reestablishment of security in a host country. The evidence provided in this monograph point to four primary principles that the strategic planner must consider prior to, or at the outset of hostilities. These principles include conducting a security assessment of the situation which will ultimately drive the decision to reform or replace the extant police organization. Subsequently, planners will need to determine the appropriate authorities to grant the intervening force and decide how to reestablish security while rebuilding the host nation's policing capability.

Focusing on the capabilities and the role existing police forces played as part of the country's security apparatus, the security assessment for both Germany and Kosovo revealed that the police forces were essentially an extension of the regimes in power. The Nazi and Milosevic regimes used the police to inflict harsh treatment on the public to ensure government survival. In Germany, the Nazi party used the police to ensure regime survival, while Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic used the Serb-dominated police forces to commit atrocities against ethic-Albanians in Kosovo. Thus, it was vital to replace rather than reform both forces.

The case studies on Germany and Kosovo clearly demonstrate how replacing a police force can be advantageous. Programs created by the United States, such as The Sunflower Project, helped to create a new, democratized German police force, void of Nazi rule that eventually regained authority and legitimacy among the public. In Kosovo, the intervening force managed the ethnic makeup of the KPS, creating a force that was more representative of the population for which it served. Additionally, starting anew allowed for the creation of an organization within the KPS to investigate corruption. This organization not only provided a

means for combatting public corruption, but also corruption amongst the KPS. While Kosovo serves as a positive example of completely reconstructing a police force, it is unknown how results would differ had intervening authorities chose to retain the existing force. As of the writing of this monograph, all indications point to the fact that planners made the right decisions in both Germany and Kosovo to rebuild rather than retain the existing police forces.

In Iraq, failure to understand that the public viewed the INP as the least trusted security institution in the country, led planners to reform rather than completely replace the existing force. Despite several opportunities, such as the transition from civilian led training to military led training, all parties failed to reevaluate the decision to reform the Iraq Police Service. Thus, despite intense US efforts to reform the IPS, the force has made little progress toward becoming a legitimate policing organization and enjoys little support from the Iraqi population.

When intervening forces assumed a greater security requirement at the outset of operations, a viable host nation police force was established by the end of the intervention. This was evident in the case studies of Germany and Kosovo where constabulary forces held policing authorities such as, the ability to arm themselves, make arrests, and conduct investigations.

Much like the authorities vested in the US Constabulary in Germany, the UN mandate for Kosovo provided UNMIK forces with wide ranging authorities that the assigned constabulary forces used to aid in the reestablishment of law and order. Furthermore, by providing the UNMIK forces wide-ranging authorities, they could provide interim law enforcement capabilities while the KPS received training, meaning there was no gap in law enforcement capabilities while the KPS formed as an organization.

Alternately in Iraq, forces possessed limited authorities at the outset of operations, creating a situation of general lawlessness from which coalition forces could not recover. In his book *What Happened to the Iraqi Police?*, James R. Phelps introduced a concept known as the Golden Hour, used to describe the time it takes to reestablish public order after a conflict falls into a nebulous period between the end of armed conflict and the beginning of functional

restoration of indigenous law enforcement.[75] In Iraq, Phelps argued that coalition forces failed to provide an interim law enforcement capability during the Golden Hour, most likely because of insufficient troop levels, which led to an enforcement gap where lawlessness took root. This security void in cities like Baghdad allowed criminal organizations, and other nefarious actors to prey on the vulnerable population.

To prevent an enforcement gap while reestablishing security as witnessed in Iraq, strategic planners must include both military and civilian law enforcement formations with the capability to deter crime and restore public order within initial force packages. One potential solution is to employ constabulary units like those in post-WWII Germany and Kosovo. An interim policing authority will allow for the rapid restoration of public order and create a secure environment for the newly formed host nation police force to work.

The sequential implementation of the principles, as indicated in Germany and Kosovo, allow the strategic planner to construct a viable concept for the restoration of law and order, and create a viable police force. A clear understanding of the security situation provides a foundation from which the planner can use as a guide when deciding whether the existing police force requires reformation, or it is necessary to create a new organization. The next step is to seek wide-ranging policing authorities for the intervening force, used to assist the existing force, or provide an interim force able to maintain law and order during reformation. Finally, forces capable of providing law enforcement capabilities must accompany the initial push of troops to mitigate any enforcement gap that may occur and allow for the rapid restoration of public order post-conflict.

While strategic planners are not policymakers, their recommendations do influence and shape how decision makers prosecute a situation. The principals derived herein can assist the planner when tasked with developing a plan for the reestablishment of a viable policing

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[75] James R. Phelps, *What Happened to the Iraqi Police?* (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2010), 5.

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organization in a host country and justifying that plan with decision-makers. Given the importance of a viable policing organization to the restoration of security and termination of military operations, it is paramount to conduct further study to add to the principles developed herein.

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