

# Problems with Transitioning the US Army Reserve (USAR) From a Strategic to an Operational Reserve Force

A Monograph

by

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## Abstract

Problems with Transitioning the US Army Reserve (USAR) from a Strategic to an Operational Reserve Force, 55 pages.

The US Army Reserves (USAR) have a long and proud history of providing defense at first to the states and eventually to the nation. As early as 1636, the state militia of Massachusetts served to defend the colony against Indian raids. In the early 1900s, the US government established a federal reserve force for times of national emergency, which was for all intents a strategic force. Over the next century, the Reserve Component (RC), those in either the National Guard (NG) or the USAR, were called upon increasingly for operational missions. Reservists and Guardsmen began deploying to support humanitarian and peace keeping missions abroad. This evolution of use also required more focus on readiness, both of personnel and equipment. To meet the increased demands, RC soldiers were expected to complete more training and spend more time working for their units.

Unexpectedly, the laws and army regulations did not keep pace with the increased use of the RC. The same laws and protections provided by the military acts of 1916, 1920, and Title 10 to the US Code of 1956 have not changed with regard to time requirements placed on these soldiers. While the military has adapted the RC to increased missions and responsibilities, the US government has not adapted these changes into law to assist and protect the reservist and guardsman.

The results can be observed in the reservist's civilian career but not their military career. There are many accounts of reservists and Guardsmen being passed over for civilian promotions. In more extreme cases, soldiers have lost their employment due to their service as a member of the RC. In all cases, the reservist loses financially. These are captured in media articles, court cases, and most recently, in proposed changes to the current law governing reservist/employee relationships.

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## Acronyms

AAR	After Action Review
AC	Active Component
ALC	Advanced Leader Course
AR	Army Regulation
AREC	Army Reserve Engagement Cell
ARET	Army Reserve Engagement Team
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
ASCC	Army Service Component Command
ASI	Additional Skill Identifier
AWA	Army Warfighter Assessment
BFT	Blue Force Tracker
BLC	Basic Leader Course
BOLC	Basic Officer Leader Course
CCC	Captain's Career Course
CCMD	Combatant Command
CGSC	Command General Staff College
CONUS	Continental US
CPOF	Command Post of the Future
CROWS	Common Remote Operated Weapon System
CSTX	Combat Support Training Exercise
CTC	Combined Training Center
CUSR	Commander's Unit Status Report
DA	Department of the Army
DoD	Department of Defense

GAO	Government Accountability Office
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
IDF	Israeli Defense Force
IDT	Individual Duty Training
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
JBPDS	Joint Biological Point Detection System
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
KBR	Kellogg Brown and Root
MOS	Military Occupational Skill
NBCRV	Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle
NCO	Non-commissioned Officer
NG	National Guard
NTC	National Training Center
OBJ T	Objective T
OCONUS	Outside Continental US
ODT	Overseas Deployment Training
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OR	Organized Reserve
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PME	Professional Military Education
RA	Regular Army
RC	Reserve Component
RMA	Readiness Management Assemblies
SLC	Senior Leader Course
SRM	Soldier Readiness Model



SRP	Soldier Readiness Processes
SSD	Structured Self-Development
TACSAT	Tactical Satellite
TFP	Total Force Policy
TRM	Tiered Readiness Model
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
USAR	US Army Reserve
USARC	US Army Reserve Command
USERRA	Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
WAREX	Warrior Exercise

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## Introduction

There is no component of more importance to the security establishment than the organized Reserve Corps. The new Reserve Corps can and must become the well-trained citizen Army Reserve required to supplement immediately, in an emergency, our small regular Army and our National Guard.

- General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower

Military reserve forces have been used to sway the battle in favor of their side for centuries. The military theorist Carl von Clausewitz dedicated an entire chapter, as well as numerous references throughout his books, to the concept of the strategic reserve. Clausewitz understood a strategic reserve to, “[have] two objects which are very distinct from each other, namely, first the prolongation and renewal of the combat, and secondly, for use in case of unforeseen events.”<sup>1</sup> For Clausewitz, this was presented as a reserve force on the battlefield, not necessarily an entire reserve component (RC) that the US military maintains today.

Although differing in size, reserve forces were traditionally sent to the decisive point on the battlefield in the hopes of forcing the enemy to the point of culmination. Thus, the reserve force has been a key component and factor for the commander when planning and executing missions. Numerous politicians and flag officers have echoed this sentiment over the years. Most recently in 2014, Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ray Odierno stated that with the looming budget cuts, it would be necessary for the RC to make up the majority of the army, going from forty-nine percent to fifty-four percent of the overall strength of the Army.<sup>2</sup> This small percentage increase represents a continued shift in the strategy and employment of reserve forces in the future compared to both the army reserve and National Guard’s (NG) original missions. So where did the US RC start and how was it presented?

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<sup>1</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds Michael Howard, Peter Paret, and Bernard Brodie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 210.

<sup>2</sup> Lisa Ferdinando, “Odierno: Army Faces ‘Tough’ Choices in Uncertain Fiscal Times,” US Army Official Website, April 8, 2014, accessed October 10, 2017, [https://www.army.mil/article/123612/odierno\\_army\\_faces\\_tough\\_choices\\_in\\_uncertain\\_fiscal\\_times](https://www.army.mil/article/123612/odierno_army_faces_tough_choices_in_uncertain_fiscal_times).

While the NG was established in 1636, they were state militias and not a federal force. Control and use of the militia were determined by the state legislatures; authority rested with the state governor. Massachusetts formed the first three-regiment state militia on December 13, 1636 to protect the colony from the Indians.<sup>3</sup> The focus of the militia was purely internal to the colony. It was not until 1903 that the Militia Act created a forerunner to today's army reserve. Over the last 115 years, the number of requirements and missions given to the army reserve have steadily increased.<sup>4</sup> During the same time period, the regulations and laws protecting reservists have not kept pace. This has never been more evident than in today's army reserve which supports global contingency operations at an unsustainable rate. The burden placed upon the reserves has received an enormous amount of attention on traditional news outlets, social media, as well as within the halls of Congress. Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) introduced a bill on March 15, 2017 that attempts to, "expand judicial venues for an action against a private employer."<sup>5</sup> Clearly, laws and regulations have not kept pace with the increased use of the reserves. By looking at the evolution of both the use of the RC as well as the laws governing their use and protections, a gap has been identified that requires extensive research to better understand the breadth and depth of the situation.

This study walks the reader through the history of the US Army Reserve (USAR) from the militia of the 1600s through today's Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) participating force. The analysis focuses on the original intents of the NG and the Army Reserve. Once the purpose of both forces is understood, the report walks the reader through specific periods of change for both the active component (AC) and RC. These changes are manifested in army regulations as

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<sup>3</sup> Michael D Doubler, *I am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636-2000* (Army National Guard: Washington DC, 2001), 26.

<sup>4</sup> William Schneider, *Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism* (Washington DC: US Government Printing, 2007), 6.

<sup>5</sup> Richard Blumenthal, "Justice for Servicemembers and Veterans Act of 2017," 115<sup>th</sup> Congress (2017-2018).

well as US laws. Next, the study evaluates the current state of the USAR with relation to personnel, equipment, readiness, and training requirements. This then leads the reader to understand today's USAR, how the current laws and regulations in place impact it, and how additional requirements have been placed against the reservist. Finally, the paper provides a conclusion of facts and recommended future analysis of potential topics to increase knowledge of the topic and offer solutions for the growing gap between capabilities and requirements.

## USAR History

### Pre-1908 Thru 1915

The Militia Act of 1908 established the Medical Army Reserve for the dual purpose of serving as a medical reserve body of physician and surgical capabilities, and as the strategic reserve force in the event of national emergency.<sup>6</sup> This first reserve force was comprised mainly of medical officers that would support future war efforts, and included very few enlisted soldiers. The US was in the early stages of leaving behind the isolationist policies of the mid-1800s and embarking on the expansionist policies of President Theodore Roosevelt.<sup>7</sup> To ensure the nation was able to defend its growing empire, a strong military and a strong reserve would be required. However, the Militia Act of 1903 was only the first step towards creating this force. Both would be greatly expanded after the outbreak of World War I in Europe.

### World War I Thru World War II

Before US involvement in World War I, the NG and Army Reserve were not used with regularity. However, as the US became a global power, the need for a more robust military capability became apparent. President Woodrow Wilson signed the National Defense Act of

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<sup>6</sup> "Army Reserve: A Concise History," US Army Reserve Official Website, last modified February 23, 2018, accessed February 23, 2018, [http://www.usar.army.mil/Portals/98/Documents/historycorner/Concise%20History%20Brochure\\_FA\\_revised%20April%202013\\_web%20version.pdf](http://www.usar.army.mil/Portals/98/Documents/historycorner/Concise%20History%20Brochure_FA_revised%20April%202013_web%20version.pdf).

<sup>7</sup> Theodore Roosevelt, *Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography* (Charles Scribner's Sons: New York, 1922), 47.

1916, expanding both the regular army (RA) and the Army Reserve. The majority of US citizens desired neutrality from World War I, however President Wilson also understood that the United States would be able to remain uninvolved for only a finite period of time.<sup>8</sup> The 1916 act continued to build and shape the structure, equipment, and personnel strength of the Army Reserve, while at the same time expanding the role of the NG to become a more responsive organization versus their traditional role of state militia.<sup>9</sup> Of particular note was the increase in troop numbers and Military Occupation Specialty (MOS). Similarly, the Army Reserve was no longer primarily a medical reserve; it was now a pool from which to draw officers and enlisted soldiers to serve in combat.<sup>10</sup>

Within a year, the first reserve soldiers were mobilized to support World War I. Soldiers supported the war effort initially within the US by augmenting Continental US (CONUS) based units, but eventually deploying to serve on the battlefields of Europe. At first, the US Army mobilized over 90,000 officers, of which one-third were medical doctors. A second mobilization provided an additional 80,000 enlisted soldiers, though again most remained stateside and were not sent to Europe.<sup>11</sup> While the initial Army Reserve's purpose was to provide medical officers, this had proved to be short lived. The Army Reserve was now a strategic instrument that the Department of the Army (DA) could wield.

Four years later, the National Defense Act Amendments of 1920 established the Organized Reserve (OR). The amendments were so robust, they basically rewrote the framework of the 1916 Act. Among the changes that directly affected the OR was the establishment of the Officers' Reserve Corps, Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) and the Enlisted Reserve

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<sup>8</sup> Glenn Williams, *National Defense Act 1916*, Center for Military History, last modified May 2016, accessed December 27, 2017, [https://history.army.mil/news/2016/160500a\\_natDefAct1916.html](https://history.army.mil/news/2016/160500a_natDefAct1916.html).

<sup>9</sup> National Defense Act of 1916, § 30-56, 2d sess. (June 3, 1916), 187-197.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 196.

<sup>11</sup> "Army Reserve: A Concise History," US Army Reserve Official Website.

Corps. Interestingly, the OR received a large increase in the number of officer slots, further enhancing what the 1916 Act provided.<sup>12</sup> This gave the War Department the ability to maintain a relatively small active army of RA troops. According to Lieutenant Colonel Marvin Kreidberg, the author of the book, *History of Military Mobilization in the US Army 1775-1945*, the anticipated RA troops would remain at a base of 169,000, the NG and Volunteers would make up another 220,000 troops, and the draft would provide 100,000 men per month. With officers already in both the AC and RC to serve as cadre, the 1920 Act had created a formidable army capable of responding quickly to a national emergency.<sup>13</sup> This gave the President a greater pool from which to draw trained leaders to place in command of draftees or the enlisted reserve corps. This also provided the army with trainers and instructors able to prepare draftees for combat.

The amendments also organized the US Army into three separate components that are present today. They are: “Compo 1” or the AC, “Compo 2” or the NG, and “Compo 3” or the OR.<sup>14</sup> The change allowed the two new components (Compo 2 and Compo 3) the ability to manage their own forces, while also being linked to the AC for wartime use. After the National Defense Act Amendments of 1920, a great expansion of the army and OR brought additional skill sets to future conflicts.<sup>15</sup> Branches that are familiar today such as Signal, Transportation, and Chemical were either added or reorganized to fall into combat arms or combat support unit structure.<sup>16</sup>

During World War II, OR soldiers deployed to both the European and Pacific theaters. The army activated twenty-six Reserve Divisions from 1943 to 1944 that had been built on paper

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<sup>12</sup> Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *History of the Military Mobilization in the US 1775-1945* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1955), 378-395.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 383.

<sup>14</sup> National Defense Act of 1920, § 2 (June 4, 1920), 1.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

from the National Defense Act of 1920. These divisions came from the structure established by the NG and OR that made corps-sized units responsible for each state. The purpose was to be able to mobilize quickly and deploy with a pre-built command structure. According to the act, “the Organized Reserves, shall include all of those divisions and other military organizations necessary to form the basis for a complete and immediate mobilization for the nation defense in the event of a national emergency declared by Congress.”<sup>17</sup> This mobilization of reserve forces accounted for fifty-two percent of all US officers participating in World War II.<sup>18</sup> Overall, more than 200,000 OR soldiers served in one of the two theaters during the war.<sup>19</sup> This represented over twice as many reserve soldiers deployed during World War II than had been deployed during World War I. The reliance on the RC would continue to build into the late 1940s as a Cold War with the Soviet Union was forming and tensions on the Korean peninsula would explode into war.

## The Korean and Cold Wars

Post-World War II downsizing of the active military left the US with a large gap in capabilities to fight the nation’s wars. President Truman desired to reduce the US Army and Army Air Corps from the nearly 8.2 million soldiers and airmen down to just over 500,000.<sup>20</sup> In large part to maintaining a monopoly on nuclear weapons, the US government felt there was less need of a large land force.<sup>21</sup> From 1945-1949, the army lost seventy-two divisions as US

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<sup>17</sup> National Defense Act of 1920, § 2 (June 4, 1920), 2.

<sup>18</sup> “Army Reserve: A Concise History,” US Army Reserve Official Website.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> David McCormick, *The Downsized Warrior* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 9.

<sup>21</sup> Carl A. Posey, “How the Korean War Almost Went Nuclear,” *Air and Space Magazine*, July 2015, accessed 23 February 2018, <https://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/how-korean-war-almost-went-nuclear-180955324/>.



politicians sought to reduce government spending and the military budget.<sup>22</sup> The result was an AC force that was ill-prepared or equipped to conduct extensive overseas combat operations. Additionally, a large number of veterans who were demobilized after World War II were placed in the OR. Any outbreak of war would require a substantial draw from the OR.

Within a year of the completion of the post-World War II draw down, the US was fighting another war in Korea. As expected, the depleted AC required significant personnel from the OR. During the Korean War, the largest mobilization of reserve forces up to that point of American history brought 240,000 reserve soldiers onto active duty for fighting on the Korean Peninsula.<sup>23</sup> Initiated near the end of the Korean War, President Eisenhower's, "New Look," relied on further decreasing the funding for conventional forces while strengthening and increasing the nation's nuclear weapons to serve as a deterrent to any enemy willing to fight the US.<sup>24</sup> As a result, the Korean War would be the last extensive call up of RC forces for combat operations over the next forty years.

The US Army would significantly mobilize reserve soldiers only two more times after the Korean War and before the Gulf War of 1990. The US Army mobilized 68,500 OR soldiers for the Berlin Crisis from 1961-1962 and another 6,000 OR soldiers during the Vietnam Conflict.<sup>25</sup> During the Berlin Crisis, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and President Kennedy mobilized one hundred and thirteen reserve units as a show of force against the Soviet Union.<sup>26</sup> Reserve soldiers augmented AC combat arms units in West Berlin, as well as provided additional

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<sup>22</sup> Roy K. Flint, *Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 269.

<sup>23</sup> "Army Reserve: A Concise History," US Army Reserve Official Website.

<sup>24</sup> Saki Dockrill, *Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy* (MacMillan Press LTD, London, 1996), 64.

<sup>25</sup> "Army Reserve: A Concise History," US Army Reserve Official Website.

<sup>26</sup> Donald A. Carter, "The US Military Response to the 1960-1962 Berlin Crisis," The US Army Center of Military History, accessed January 19, 2018, <https://www.archives.gov/files/research/foreign-policy/cold-war/1961-berlin-crisis/overview/us-military-response.pdf>.

military police capabilities. The relatively small number of mobilized reservists for duty in Vietnam served as a catalyst for all use of the RC going forward and requires extensive review to understand the shift in policy.

## The Vietnam Conflict and Total Force Policy

The OR was not extensively used during the Vietnam Conflict. Of the 6,000 reserve soldiers mobilized for Vietnam, only 3,500 deployed to Vietnam. Of those that deployed, the majority fell into either transportation units or composite service units. Although eleven medical units were mobilized, their relative strength was less than fifteen percent of the deployed force.<sup>27</sup> Instead of using an existing capability, President Lyndon Johnson opted to use the draft to achieve the desired troops levels of his generals for duty in Southeast Asia. According to his memoir, President Johnson did not want to use the RC for two main reasons. First, President Johnson had a valid concern that a large call up of the OR, a strategic asset, could provoke the Chinese or Russians into further increasing support for North Vietnam by calling up their reserves as well.<sup>28</sup> The second, more ambiguous reason was politically motivated. Members of the RC were politically more affluent than the pool of draftees available and thus the move to avoid mobilizing the RC was in his mind less likely to increase negative public perception of the war.<sup>29</sup> A third reason identified in a 1992 RAND Report stated that, “Nearly half of unit [reserve] personnel were not fully trained or qualified, and [17] percent were totally unqualified for their

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<sup>27</sup> Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, “Twice the Citizen: A History of the US Army Reserve, 1908-1983” (Washington, DC: US Government Printing, 1984), accessed March 24, 2018, [https://archive.org/stream/twicecitizenahis00wash/twicecitizenahis00wash\\_djvu.txt](https://archive.org/stream/twicecitizenahis00wash/twicecitizenahis00wash_djvu.txt).

<sup>28</sup> Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 149.

<sup>29</sup> Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss, *Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the Vietnam Generation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 50.

assigned positions.”<sup>30</sup> Once again, budget cuts and reduced military spending served as a forcing mechanism to change army policy.

As the Vietnam Conflict wound down following the election of Richard Nixon in 1968, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird introduced The Total Force Concept Defense in 1970 as a way to save military spending and leveraging an existing resource. The idea was that the RC would augment AC forces to form a “total force.”<sup>31</sup> The concept was made policy in 1973. Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams wanted to ensure that by placing the majority of logistics support within the RC, the president would be forced to mobilize the RC and thus, require the support of the American people.<sup>32</sup> However, General Abrams’ plan immediately came under fire for being too extreme. In an effort to retain the core principles of the total force, General Abrams responded to the this criticism and incorporated the reserves as a “round out” force.<sup>33</sup> Under this structure, reserve units would receive the same priority for equipment fills as their active duty counterparts assigned to the same mission or operation. This still ensured that the RC would be linked to the AC going forward. The limited involvement of the RC during the Vietnam Conflict would be the last extensive use of the RC until Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, but there would be additional changes made to the linking of active and reserve forces for war.

In November of 1984, President Ronald Regan’s Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger established a set of conditions or tests that should determine if the US should use military force in the future. The intent of the Weinberger Doctrine was to ensure that the US was

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<sup>30</sup> Bernard D. Rostker, *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), 32.

<sup>31</sup> Alice R Buchalter, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Component* (Washington, DC Federal Research Division, 2007), 15.

<sup>32</sup> Conrad C. Crane and Gian Gentile, *Understanding the Abrams Doctrine: Myth Versus Reality*, December 9, 2015, accessed March 11, 2018, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2015/12/understanding-the-abrams-doctrine-myth-versus-reality.html>.

<sup>33</sup> Buchalter, 15.

not stuck in another Vietnam scenario, without clear political and strategic ends in mind. In essence, he wanted to ensure that if the nation went to war, it was in the best national interest to fight. One of the key tests that the Weinberger Doctrine required, was that, “before a commitment is made, there must be ‘some reasonable assurance’ of popular and congressional support.”<sup>34</sup> Eight years later in 1992, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell further refined the Weinberger doctrine to include the terms “broad international support” and a “clear exit strategy.” Together, this became the Weinberger-Powell doctrine, and it continues to guide US military policy.<sup>35</sup>

## The Gulf War Thru 9/11

After fifteen years of relative peace, US interests in the Middle East were shocked by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The well known, “half million men in the desert,” comment by author and defense strategist Dr. Richard Haas was a combination of AC and RC units.<sup>36</sup> The US Army began using the reserves as an operational rather than a strategic asset during both Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm just as the Total Force Policy (TFP) intended.<sup>37</sup> Over 80,000 USAR soldiers served in support of the defense of Saudi Arabia, the liberation of Kuwait, and the fight against Iraq.<sup>38</sup> After the conclusion of the Gulf War in February of 1991, the Soviet Union would dissolve less than ten months later, officially ending the Cold War policy for the use of the RC. The RC would now be a part of the military cost cutting measures by President Clinton. He

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<sup>34</sup> Associated Press, “The Weinberger Doctrine,” *The Washington Post*, November 30, 1984, accessed March 12, 2018, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1984/11/30/the-weinberger-doctrine/c7f20ffe-b591-4189-ad05-a704aac1935d/?utm\\_term=.ba1dc87a2a39](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1984/11/30/the-weinberger-doctrine/c7f20ffe-b591-4189-ad05-a704aac1935d/?utm_term=.ba1dc87a2a39).

<sup>35</sup> “The Trouble With Exit Strategies,” *World Politics New Review*, December 24, 2011, accessed March 12, 2018, <https://worldpoliticsblog.wordpress.com/tag/weinberger-powell-doctrine>.

<sup>36</sup> Richard Haas, “The Gulf War, Part A,” *Frontline*, aired January 28, 1997, on PBS, accessed on December 30, 2017, [https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/script\\_a.html](https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/script_a.html).

<sup>37</sup> “Army Reserve: A Concise History,” US Army Reserve Official Website.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin believed that with the Cold War over, there was no longer a need to retain a large, conventional force.<sup>39</sup> Their desire was to reduce the overall strength of the military while spending more money on technologies for future conflict. The result was the “Peace Dividend” that President Clinton saw as a way to transition military spending to job creation for products and services.<sup>40</sup> The budget was to reduce the number of active army divisions by sixteen percent and Air Force fighter wings by over thirty percent.<sup>41</sup>

The fall of the Soviet Union, however, created instability in many eastern European countries, some resulting in conflict. War broke out in the former Yugoslavia with the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts. A number of USAR and NG units mobilized to support operations both CONUS and OCONUS. In 1993, the Clinton Peace Dividend was beginning to erode as US military involvement was spiraling out of control across Europe and the Middle East.<sup>42</sup> The goal of reducing the defense budget in the absence of potential military intervention had backfired as the 1990s became a turbulent decade of small armed conflicts. With a small AC force, the Department of Defense (DoD) was forced to rely more and more on the RC. The TFP would get its second trial run in Bosnia and Kosovo.

By 2000, RC forces, mainly logistical units and military police, were rotating into both Bosnia and Kosovo, in addition to signal and logistical units supporting missions in Iraq during Operation Northern Watch.<sup>43</sup> RC soldiers found themselves conducting operational, not strategic,

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<sup>39</sup> Eric Schmitt, “Clinton Seeking \$14 Billion Cut By the Military,” *The New York Times*, February 4, 1993, accessed on January 9, 2018, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/02/04/us/clinton-seeking-14-billion-cut-by-the-military.html>.

<sup>40</sup> Ann Markusen, “How We Lost the Peace Dividend,” *The American Prospect*, July-August 1997.

<sup>41</sup> Schmitt, “Clinton Seeking \$14 Billion Cut By the Military.”

<sup>42</sup> Michael T. Klare, “US Aims to Win on All Fronts,” *Le Monde diplomatique*, May 1999, accessed on March 12, 2018, <https://mondediplo.com/1999/05/04klare>.

<sup>43</sup> Steven L. Myers, “Army To Shorten Tours of Reserves Serving Overseas,” *New York Times*, March 5, 2000. Operation Northern Watch (ONW) was the mission to enforce the no-fly zone over Iraq above the 36<sup>th</sup> parallel from January 1, 1997 to March 17, 2003.

missions from Eastern Europe to Asia. Clearly, the TFP and Weinberger-Powell doctrine were working in tandem. The 1990s served as a trial run for AR and RC forces working side-by-side; at the beginning of the new millennium, the US military landscape would be altered once again.

## Post 9/11

At 8:45am on the morning of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, a seismic shift in military policy occurred. With two planes striking the World Trade Center twin towers, and a third hitting the Pentagon, the US was about to embark on its longest war in US military history. Soon, US soldiers would land in Afghanistan and a year and a half later, invade Iraq. The results are contentious, but as of 2018, relations with Iraq are strained and the war continues in Afghanistan.<sup>44</sup> The RC has been a key contributor in both theaters to assist wearied AC units.

In early 2003, the signs of a tired force were already showing up in the media. When asked about the possibility of increasing the size of the Armed Forces, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed the Pentagon to, “exhaust every alternative,” before asking Congress to increase the active duty.<sup>45</sup> The Pentagon’s answer was to move away from the TFP that had worked so well during the Gulf War and towards the use of private contractors to handle the logistics effort to sustain the combat units. From 2003 through 2013, the US government paid out \$138 billion to contractors that handled logistics, with Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR) being awarded nearly \$40 billion of that sum.<sup>46</sup> In essence, the 2003 war in Iraq had divorced itself of the TFP by trying to fight the war with less US soldiers, but in the end, spending a vast sum of financial resources on capabilities that already existed within the army system.

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<sup>44</sup> Ben Westcott, “Afghanistan: 16 years, Thousands Dead and No Clear End in Sight,” *CNN*, October 31, 2017, accessed March 3, 2018, <https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/21/asia/afghanistan-war-explainer/index.html>.

<sup>45</sup> Paul Richter, “Rumsfeld Sees No Need to Increase the Size of the Armed Forces,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 6, 2003, accessed March 18, 2018, <http://articles.latimes.com/2003/aug/06/nation/na-army6>.

<sup>46</sup> Anna Fitfield, “Contractors Reap \$138B from Iraq War,” *CNN*, March 25, 2015, accessed March 18, 2018, <https://www.cnn.com/2013/03/19/business/iraq-war-contractors/index.html>.

By 2005, with wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the AC was stretched to the breaking point.<sup>47</sup> AC units were on back-to-back deployments. Some soldiers were on their third deployment as their normal assignment rotations had them depart a unit returning from deployment, only to immediately rotate overseas with their new unit.<sup>48</sup> In order to provide relief to the AC, both the NG and RC began missions of increasing responsibility in Kosovo. This meant that NG divisions replaced the AC divisions that had previously held the mission.<sup>49</sup> From 1999 through 2006, numerous company-level units from USAR, as well as divisions from the Pennsylvania, Indiana, California, Texas, and Virginia NGs, all served in some capacity for the missions in Kosovo. In fact, the NG divisions rotating into Kosovo set a new precedent for an operational RC. For the first time since the Korean War, a NG headquarters was responsible for an entire mission.<sup>50</sup>

At the same time, USAR and NG soldiers were also being called up to support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The numbers show rising and falling rates of mobilized guardsmen and reservists based on significant events in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Figure 1 illustrates the height of USAR and NG troop levels from 2001 through 2007.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Julian Borger, "US Military Stretched to Breaking Point," *The Guardian*, January 25, 2006, accessed November 16, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jan/26/usa.iraq>.

<sup>48</sup> Lawrence Korb, Peter Rundlet and Max Bergmann, "Beyond the Call of Duty," *Center for American Progress*, March 19, 2007, accessed on January 19, 2018, [https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2007/03/pdf/readiness\\_report.pdf](https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2007/03/pdf/readiness_report.pdf).

<sup>49</sup> Janet St. Laurent, "Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages," *US Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees*, July 12, 2005, 1, accessed November 28, 2017, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/250/247044.pdf>.

<sup>50</sup> Jeffrey J. Clarke, *Operation Joint Guardian: The U.S. Army in Kosovo*, accessed March 12, 2018, <https://history.army.mil/brochures/Kosovo/Kosovo.pdf>, 52.

<sup>51</sup> Schneider, 6.




Figure 1. Source. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, accessed March 24, 2018, <https://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2000s/ADA478163.pdf>.

What is important to note is that the number of reservists mobilized for both OEF and OIF is staggering: 400,000 reservists deployed from 2001 through 2004, with many soldiers deploying more than one time.<sup>52</sup> This alone is cause for concern, especially when considering the size of the reserve is shrinking. Figure 2 illustrates the declining population of the USAR selected reserve – actively drilling and participating reservists who typically deploy. In 1990, the USAR selected reserve had a strength of 310,071 soldiers. This strength remained relatively constant through the end of the Cold War until the middle of 1994. This was the result of President Clinton’s 1993

<sup>52</sup> Phillip Carter, “The Reserve Mutiny,” *Slate News*, October 18, 2004, accessed November 28, 2017, [http://www.slate.com/articles/news\\_and\\_politics/war\\_stories/2004/10/the\\_reserve\\_mutiny.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2004/10/the_reserve_mutiny.html).






Figure 2, Total USAR Select Reserve Strength from 1990 through 2011. Data compiled from GAO reports from 1990 through 2011.

desire to reduce the size of the entire military apparatus.<sup>53</sup> Additionally, the average reservist who, at one time rarely deployed now deploys in support of overseas operations more than once every four years.<sup>54</sup> The tempo for the average reservist is unsustainable when considering the effect this also has on the soldier’s civilian work life. To understand what this looks like, one must review the data for RC mobilizations.

Over the past century, the US Army has drastically increased its USAR utilization. Figure 3 shows the number of reserve personnel who have participated in each major conflict from World War I through the current GWOT. These are only major conflicts, and do not include Bosnia/Kosovo, Operation Northern Watch, or Humanitarian Relief efforts. One must keep in mind that major policy revisions after World War II, Vietnam, and the Gulf War affected the numbers of RC soldiers. What should immediately be evident is the exponential

<sup>53</sup> Schmitt, “Clinton Seeking \$14 Billion Cut By the Military.”

<sup>54</sup> Dennis Laich and Lawrence Wilkerson, “The Deep Unfairness of America’s All-Volunteer Force,” *The American Conservative*, October 16, 2007, accessed November 29, 2017, <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-deep-unfairness-of-americas-all-volunteer-force/>.




Figure 3. USAR soldiers mobilized for major conflicts from 1903-2016. Data compiled from multiple sources referenced in the introduction to this monograph.

reliance the DA has had for the RC from the Vietnam Conflict through today. With a shrinking RC strength and increasing mobilizations and deployments, how have the laws and regulations kept pace with the added pressure on the RC?

### The Current USAR Operating Environment

In the post-9/11 operating environment, the US Army has shifted the mobilization and deployment structure twice. The first shift occurred in 2005 when the army transitioned from the TFP created in 1973 to the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle. The purpose of this move was, “to create a continuous flow of trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of combat commander requirements and civil authorities.”<sup>55</sup> From an AC perspective, this made sense; however, for the RC, this would cause readiness and sustainability problems as soldiers are free to move from one unit to another unlike the AC where soldiers are assigned to units for generally two to three years. This then creates personnel instability for most reserve units. It is also complicated by “go to” soldiers who depart a unit and

<sup>55</sup> James J. Lovelace, Jr. “Planning Directive – Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Implementation Plan” (Department of the Army, Washington, DC, February 27, 2006), 1.

leave with institutional knowledge of that unit. In his “2012 Army Reserve Posture Statement,” Chief of Army Reserve LTG Jack Stultz stated that the reserves’ biggest challenge was manning, and that cross-leveling of soldiers to shape the force for deploying units is a long term negative solution.<sup>56</sup> The Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM) replaced the ARFORGEN cycle in 2016 after a decade of use. The SRM was developed to ease the burden placed on about one-third of the ACs combat power in the available pool for deployment.<sup>57</sup> By switching to the SRM, the active duty is able to shift some of the deployment requirements over to the RC. This increases the “pool” of units that are available for deployment during any given year. According to Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley, RC units will receive an increase in available training days beyond the statutory requirements to provide units with the ability to bring formations up to the minimum standard for deployment.<sup>58</sup> This represents a significant shift in how reserve units prepare for deployment, mobilize, and then deploy. With greater onus placed on the RC to deploy in place of AC units, careful analysis of personnel strength and training days is necessary.

USAR personnel end strength has dropped nearly fifty percent since the early 1990s to the current level of 195,000 for FY17. However, Figure 4 illustrates that the number of RC duty days (as measured on the graph in “M Duty Days” or Millions of Duty Days) has increased 7600% from just under one million duty days in 1990 to an Iraq War surge height of 68.3 million duty days.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Jack Stultz, “The US Army Reserve 2012 Posture Statement,” 112<sup>th</sup> Cong. (Washington, DC 2013).

<sup>57</sup> Editorial, “New ‘Sustainable Readiness Model’ Coming Soon,” *Association of the US Army*, last modified April 12, 2016, access March 3, 2018, <https://www.ausa.org/news/new-‘sustainable-readiness-model’-coming-soon>.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Reserve Forces Policy Board, “Improving the Total Force Using the National Guard and Reserves,” November 1, 2016, accessed December 19, 2017, [http://rfpb.defense.gov/Portals/67/Documents/Improving%20the%20Total%20Force%20using%20the%20National%20Guard%20and%20Reserves\\_1%20November%202016.pdf?ver=2016-11-17-142718-243](http://rfpb.defense.gov/Portals/67/Documents/Improving%20the%20Total%20Force%20using%20the%20National%20Guard%20and%20Reserves_1%20November%202016.pdf?ver=2016-11-17-142718-243).




Figure 4. Reserve Duty Days (Historical), accessed March 24, 2018, <http://rfpb.defense.gov/>.

While it had been normal to see a spike in the use of the RC for major operations, there was a distinct shift in the mid-1990s that can be attributed to President Clinton’s Peace Dividend. The original paradigm that the reserves were to be used only in the event of state on state conflict, as had been the examples throughout history, was changing. Following the chronological order of the chart, the number of days remained constant before the end of the Cold War, averaging fewer than one million duty days, which is to be expected given the reserves at this time were considered a strategic and not an operational reserve.<sup>60</sup>

The first observed spike occurred for one year during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. This is logical based on the perceived need for the strategic involvement of the RC during the first large scale war the US fought in nearly twenty years. With the quick collapse of the Iraqi military, the RC was demobilized and returned to pre-Gulf War status. The relative peace enjoyed by reservists was to be short-lived, as conflict in the Balkans drew US attention once again.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>60</sup> Reserve Forces Policy Board, 26.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

During the late 1990's, the US Army began using the RC to assist with peacekeeping missions throughout the world as a result of the continued shrinking of the active duty force at the end of the Cold War. Of these, the efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo garnered the most use of RC units and soldiers.<sup>62</sup> Individual reservists with engineer and civil affairs specialties augmented AC units. Eventually, the RC itself would send full units in support of the Bosnia and Kosovo peacekeeping missions.<sup>63</sup> As earlier discussed, division headquarters from four states were sent to provide mission command for the peacekeeping mission.<sup>64</sup> This participation of RC soldiers in the Balkans helped shape the need to change how the USAR prepared units for deployment. The lessons learned from this experience were put to the test after the events of September 11, 2001.

After 9/11, the DoD use of the RC skyrocketed from 12.7 million duty days to 41.3 million duty days in just one year. That number increased to 62.0 million duty days in the second year. In other words, in the post-9/11 world, the RC was being used more than five times as often than they were just two years prior. The number of reserve personnel deployed would hit its zenith during the intense fighting in Iraq from 2005 to 2006. Over the next eight years, the number of RC soldiers used for operations would trend lower as the war in Iraq ended. However, even during 2014, there were 17.3 million duty days served by reservists. This was still higher than the historic average number of duty days by roughly fifty percent, and considerably higher than the average duty days used during the early 1990s. At the same time as the rise in the number of troop mobilizations, there has been a drastic increase in the number of training days required all army personnel to include the RC.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Myers, "Army To Shorten Tours of Reserve Serving Overseas."

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Clark, 52.

<sup>65</sup> Reserve Forces Policy Board, 26.

When the USAR was established, and the statutory requirement of, “one weekend a month and two weeks a year,” was placed into law, the only unfamiliar technology a reservist encountered was his weapon.<sup>66</sup> There was no mention of Army Regulation (AR) 350-1 (Education and Training: Army Training) and the associated mandatory training requirements that compete for time with mission training events. The earliest version of AR 350-1 available at the Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) on Fort Leavenworth, KS is dated January 8, 1964.<sup>67</sup> Since the initial version, thirteen updates and amendments have been written and published. What is of importance is that in 1964, AR 350-1 was only four pages in length, while today’s version is 257 pages long.<sup>68</sup>

Today’s reservists are required to complete the mandatory training of today’s 257-page document just as they were required to complete four pages of requirements in 1964. The additions vary in complexity, but an additional 253 pages of requirements is impossible to complete if the amount of time to complete them is not also increased. Looking at only the administrative training requirements, such as Operational Security, Anti-Terrorism Level 1, and Combating Human Trafficking, none of these training events individually would shut down unit training for an entire drill weekend. However, combined, to complete each mandatory training event requires nearly three full days out of an available twenty-four annual drill days to complete. The concern is that twelve and a half percent of a reservist’s drill time is required to meet the classroom facilitated mandatory training. There is also however, more individual and field training today than reservists had to complete then in 1964.

Technology in today’s army requires advanced schooling for computer networks and communications systems. Equipment such as Command Post of Future (CPOF), Blue Force

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<sup>66</sup> Title 10 U.S.C. Armed Forces § B. 10001 (August 10, 1956) .

<sup>67</sup> US Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, *Education and Training: Army Training* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 8, 1964), 1-4.

<sup>68</sup> US Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 350-1 *Education and Training: Army Training* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 10, 2017), 1-257.

Tracker (BFT), or Tactical Satellite (Tactical Satellite) Communications are now monthly or quarterly events on unit training schedules. Today's USAR unit has the same or similar pieces of equipment as their AC peers, but with a fraction of the available time to train on the new, complex equipment. The AC typically conducts maintenance on equipment one to two days per week, based on the Preventative Maintenance Checks, and Services (PMCS) schedule for their vehicles.<sup>69</sup> For example, an armor company may spend two days on maintenance for their M1A3 Abrams tank while a light infantry platoon spends only an afternoon for rifle and communication equipment maintenance.<sup>70</sup> The Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV) Stryker used by active, reserve, and NG units is a good example of a complex piece of equipment that must be maintained to the same standard regardless the component to which it is assigned. Based on the Technical Manual (TM), the NBCRV requires the following maintenance schedule in order to keep the warranty up to date and valid. A total of between five and thirteen hours per week is required per NBCRV Stryker vehicle. The eight hour discrepancy is based on best and worst case scenarios for the PMCS. A five hour PMCS is based on all systems running properly with no faults. A thirteen hour PMCS reflects a number of faults were indicated on major system components. At a minimum, twenty hours per month (five hours per week and four weeks per month) are required to maintain each NBCRV Stryker within a company.<sup>71</sup> For active duty units, this does not represent a problem as PMCS is built into the weekly training schedule based on the TM. For the reserve units however, they must conduct both maintenance and training during the two days per month allotted to drill weekends.

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<sup>69</sup> John S. Kolasheski, "The US Army Armor 2017-2018 Training and Leader Development Strategy," Headquarters, MCOE-USAARMS, March 2017, 27.

<sup>70</sup> TRADOC, "Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide for Abrams Tank System Maintainer MOS 91A Skill Level 1,2,3, and 4," Washington, DC, May 20, 2010, 3-1 – 3-20.

<sup>71</sup> NBCRV Operator Technical Manual 9-2355-311-10-10-1, 2, & 3

The battlefield has also changed greatly since the establishment of the reserves. In 1908, trench warfare was still a decade away and maneuver on the battlefield was relatively simple. Over the next one hundred years, this too would change and become much more complex. Radios, computer networks, advanced targeting systems would all facilitate a deadlier method of warfare against the enemy, but at the expense of a simplified process. While the AC works and trains 365 days a year, the NG and USAR must accomplish this same training within their statutory requirement of one weekend a month and two weeks in the summer. Short of a national emergency, any time greater than the statutory requirement is not enforceable on the traditional reservist unless it involves a call up for a mobilization or national emergency.<sup>72</sup> This means that a reserve soldier is only required to complete twenty four days of weekend drill time and fourteen days of training at some point during the fiscal year. This satisfies their requirement based on the Title 10 RC section. This difference in requirements between the establishment of Title 10 and today, creates a number of issues as the law has not kept pace with the growing list of actions a reserve unit and reservist must complete during a fiscal year.

The applicable laws for reserve duty established in 1956 provided a solution for the problem set of the 1950s, namely state-on-state, and possibly, nuclear war. Amendments to Title 10 have adjusted the strategic and operational roles that the RC has played, but the mandatory outlay of time by the reservist has not changed. Just as in 1956, the 2011 version of the Title 10 code maintains twenty four drill days and an additional fourteen active duty days.

The shift from a strategic to an operational reserve has been an ongoing process since 1992 when the NG and USAR commands met to restructure both forces to better support global missions.<sup>73</sup> Finally, the DA was organizing the RC in the manner that the TFP mandated back in

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<sup>72</sup> Title 10 U.S.C. Armed Forces § B. 10001 (1956).

<sup>73</sup> Kathryn R. Coker, *The Indispensable Force: The Post-Cold War Operational Army Reserve, 1990-2010*, accessed December 10, 2017, <http://www.usar.army.mil/Portals/98/Documents/historycorner/IndispensableForce.pdf>.



1973! The “Off Site” meeting, called so because it was held outside of the Pentagon, brought together all three components of the army: the AC, the USAR, and the NG. Vice Chief of Staff, Army General J.H. Binford Peay III, MG Raymond F. Rees Chief, Army NG, and MG Roger W. Sandler Chief, USAR met with together with their senior staffs to restructure the Army as a whole, with specific focus on the RC.<sup>74</sup>

The Off-Site Agreement set the total strength of the RC at 575,000, with 367,000 serving in the NG and 208,000 serving in the USAR. The agreement also reorganized unit types by component. The NG received the majority of the combat arms units, while the USAR received the majority of combat service support units. With the clear delineation of duties between the NG and USAR, both components were able to focus specifically on the associated missions.<sup>75</sup> The AC also benefited from the agreement as it could focus on increased numbers of combat arms, relying on the USAR to provide the necessary combat support and combat service support units. The stage was set to incorporate the RC into a more operational role as all three: AC, NG, and the USAR each relied on the other to accomplish its wartime mission.

As the change from a strategic to an operational mission began to increase the requirements for NG and USAR forces, the number of days available for soldier participation did not keep pace. In an attempt to ensure the proper training and preparation were taking place, the army initiated the Tiered Readiness Model (TRM). The TRM was in effect from the 1980s until 2001, and was the initial method for providing a predictable deployment availability pool for the army while manning, equipping, and training units at different levels based on potential overseas adversaries.<sup>76</sup> The tiers initially provided those units with the highest metrics and who were most

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<sup>74</sup> Coker, *The Indispensable Force: The Post-Cold War Operational Army Reserve, 1990-2010*.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Andrew Feickert, “The Army’s Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM),” Congressional Review Service (Library of Congress), March 31, 2017, accessed December 1, 2017, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=800094>.

likely to be mobilized, the most resources, while those without metrics or potential missions received little funding. It created a system of “haves and have nots” within the USAR, meaning those units that were likely to receive deployment orders received all of the personnel, equipment funding, and training opportunities. These units received the updated equipment from either the program manager or from units less likely to deploy. The haves were given priority to train at the Combined Training Centers (CTC). The have nots were the counter to this, as they received little funding. They often had equipment transferred out to deploying units while receiving no backfill. Finally, they were not placed on any CTC rotations and were expected to conduct inexpensive home station training at their reserve centers.<sup>77</sup> The TRM affected units in each component, though the USAR was primarily in the lowest tier due to it being a strategic reserve.<sup>78</sup> As USAR units began to wither due to lack of attention and funding, the need arose to modify the TRM.

The events of 9/11 provided the catalyst to start the process. For the first time since the Korean War, reservists were mobilized and deployed en masse.<sup>79</sup> The individual augmentee process of Vietnam and the Gulf War would not support the need for entire reserve units to be mobilized as missions exceeded AC capabilities. The TRM provided for only a percentage of USAR units to be ready for deployment. As a strategic reserve, this made sense as USAR units would support the AC forces. Post 9/11, however, many of the force sustainers and enablers that the RC maintained were not ready for deployment. Many reserve units arrived at mobilization station unable to deploy forward for both personnel and equipment reasons. In a 2004 interview with NBC News, LTG James Helmly, Chief of the Army Reserve, said that, “We’re at war. This

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<sup>77</sup> Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Tiered Readiness Returns In the Army 2015 Budget; Not all Brigades Ready to Fight,” *Breaking Defense*, March 4, 2014, accessed on February 17, 2018, <https://breakingdefense.com/2014/03/tiered-readiness-returns-in-army-2015-budget-not-all-brigades-ready-to-fight/>.

<sup>78</sup> Jeremy Gray and Rickey Smith, “A Resource Constrained Environment: A Primer to Thinking About Force Structure Change,” *Military Review*, November-December 2011, 14-15.

<sup>79</sup> “US Army Reserve History,” US Army Reserve Official Website, last modified February 23, 2018, accessed February 23, 2018, [http://www.usar.army.mil/Portals/98/Documents/historycorner/Concise%20History%20Brochure\\_FA\\_revised%20April%202013\\_web%20version.pdf](http://www.usar.army.mil/Portals/98/Documents/historycorner/Concise%20History%20Brochure_FA_revised%20April%202013_web%20version.pdf).

is a hard war and we, frankly, inside the Army Reserve, have not been properly prepared for it.”<sup>80</sup> A similar interview was given by the Chief of the NG Bureau LTG H. Steven Blum in 2005 with *The Washington Post*, explaining that he told Congress that, “We were woefully underequipped before the war started. That situation hasn’t gotten any better. As a matter of fact, it gets a little bit worse every day, because we continue to cross-level.”<sup>81</sup> These were two opinions from the very top level of command within the USAR and NG. They saw that in the post-9/11 conflict, their two components (Compo-2 and Compo-3) would need to address training and equipment readiness before they were able to contribute at a sustainable level. While cross leveling of personnel and equipment would eventually bring these units to full strength, the effects were felt over the next few years as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continued and units were broken a part in order to use the pieces to make other units whole. The ARFORGEN cycle was the US Army’s answer to the problem of breaking one unit to fill two others for deployment.

ARFORGEN affected the USAR in much the same way as the AC, but to a greater extent. The Commander’s Unit Status Report (CUSR) provides company commanders and higher the opportunity to report both the current status of personnel, readiness, equipment, and training and their observations in a narrative format. This gives each commander a forum to discuss issues that are directly affecting his or her ability to complete their assigned missions.<sup>82</sup> AR 220-1 (The Commander’s Unit Status Report) provides guidance for each commander in terms of preparing and explaining their unit’s CUSR. Unlike the AC, the RC competes for their personnel. Soldiers are not assigned to units like the AC. USAR guidance to units in the “available” year of the ARFORGEN cycle was authorized to cross-level soldiers from other units in order to meet the

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<sup>80</sup> Associated Press, “Reserve Chief: Forces Not Prepared,” *NBC News*, September 16, 2004, accessed November 11, 2017, [http://www.nbcnews.com/id/6022234/ns/world\\_news-mideast\\_n\\_africa/t/reserve-chief-forces-not-prepared/#.WosmM2aZOCQ](http://www.nbcnews.com/id/6022234/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/reserve-chief-forces-not-prepared/#.WosmM2aZOCQ).

<sup>81</sup> Ann Scott Tyson, “Two Years Later, Iraq War Drains Military,” *Washington Post*, March 19, 2005, Page A01.

<sup>82</sup> US Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 220-1, *Commander’s Unit Status Report* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 7.

required readiness metrics for personnel.<sup>83</sup> The unit receiving the cross-leveled soldiers improves their metrics. At the same time, the unit providing the cross-leveled soldiers loses a fully qualified soldier, and their metrics and readiness decline. Basically, the problem was never addressed or fixed, but rather pushed off to be solved at a later date.

For most of the GWOT, the army utilized the ARFORGEN cycle to determine unit rotations. The cycle, “adjusts forces as operational requirements mature over time. As part of the process, army units flowed through three pools: Reset, Train-Ready, and Available.”<sup>84</sup> The purpose of the ARFORGEN cycle was to give units greater predictability of upcoming deployments. For the RC, this cycle was over a five-year glide path towards availability.<sup>85</sup> Each unit was required to meet “aim points” that served as a glide path to mobilization.

Figure 5 shows the three pools within the ARFORGEN cycle that units would fall into during any given part of the cycle. Deeper into the ARFORGEN cycle, the “train-ready” (T/R) category was broken into three levels of readiness, labeled “T/R-1”, “T/R-2” and “T/R-3.” Beginning with the reset pool, units were given an “off” year of collective unit training.<sup>86</sup> During this phase of the ARFORGEN cycle, units focused on individual training and readiness. This was the ideal time for soldiers to complete required military schools for Professional Military Education (PME), MOS, or Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) training. Following the Reset year, units moved into the T/R-1 phase of the ARFORGEN cycle. From T/R-1 through T/R-3, units goals centered on improving their personnel strength, equipment on hand, equipment readiness, and training readiness. The target was to meet the assigned aim points

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<sup>83</sup> USARC OPORD 17-056, *Ready Force x*, (Fort Bragg, NC, USARC, 2016), 1-4.

<sup>84</sup> Stultz, “The US Army Reserve 2009 Posture Statement.”

<sup>85</sup> Alexandra Hemmerly-Brown, “ARFORGEN: Army’s Deployment Cycle Aims for Predictability,” US Army Official Website, November 19, 2009, accessed on December 30, 2017, [https://www.army.mil/article/30668/arforgen\\_armys\\_deployment\\_cycle\\_aims\\_for\\_predictability](https://www.army.mil/article/30668/arforgen_armys_deployment_cycle_aims_for_predictability).

<sup>86</sup> Stultz, “The US Army Reserve 2009 Posture Statement.”




Figure 5. The ARFORGEN Cycle, 2009 Army Reserve Posture Statement, accessed March 24, 2018, [https://www.army.mil/aps/09/addenda/addenda\\_e.html](https://www.army.mil/aps/09/addenda/addenda_e.html).

within each of the pools and be available in year five of the ARFORGEN cycle.<sup>87</sup> The ARFORGEN cycle failed the AC. By the nature of the cycle, they were burdened with more deployments early on. In order to fix this and distribute deployments to the RC as well, the army developed the SRM.

FORSCOM leadership saw the negative aspects of the ARFORGEN cycle and replaced it with the SRM in 2015, and moved from a reset, train-ready, and available model to a plan, prepare, and provide readiness model. The SRM linked RC units to deployments. This allowed the DA to share the burden of deployments among all three components, giving a break to the AC forces. NG and USAR units now had priority equipment fills similar to the TFP of the 1970s. A major change that distinguishes the SRM from the ARFORGEN, is the alignment of USAR units to Active Service Component Commands (ASCC) and Combatant Commands (CCMD).<sup>88</sup> Through the use of Army Reserve Engagement Teams (ARETs) and Army Reserve Engagement Cells (ARECs), ASCCs and CCMDs are able to assess the capabilities of USAR forces assigned

<sup>87</sup> Stultz, “The US Army Reserve 2009 Posture Statement.”

<sup>88</sup> Jeffrey W. Talley, “The 2016 Posture of the US Army Reserve: A Global Operational Reserve Force,” US Army Reserve Official Website, March 22, 2016, accessed December 3, 2017, [http://www.usar.army.mil/Portals/98/Documents/resources\\_docs/2016ArmyReservePostureStatement.pdf](http://www.usar.army.mil/Portals/98/Documents/resources_docs/2016ArmyReservePostureStatement.pdf).

to support them.<sup>89</sup> The use of the ARETs and ARECs thus facilitates better coordination of RC units and the AC unit they are deploying to support. A second effect is that the reserve unit can coordinate with the active unit years out instead of months out, as had been the case during the ARFORGEN cycle. Combined with a more proactive coordination of AC to RC and the change in cycle definitions and requirements, the SRMs goal is to have two-thirds of units combat ready for global missions by 2023.<sup>90</sup>

Personnel are the life-blood of any organization, and the USAR is no different. Its mission statement is, “America’s Army Reserve generates combat-ready units and soldiers for the Army and Joint Warfighter that are trained, equipped, and lethal to win our Nation’s wars.”<sup>91</sup> The emphasis is placed primarily on soldiers and their units, with training being the first criteria of what designates a “combat-ready unit.” However, to meet the qualification of being trained is more than the original social contract of one weekend a month and two weeks in the summer. In fact, it takes much more to be trained, including MOS training, PME requirements, and medical readiness metrics.

MOS training for reserve soldiers is identical to their AC counterparts. Basic training for all USAR enlisted soldiers lasts ten weeks, where recruits are trained on a standard set of skills across all MOS sets.<sup>92</sup> Broken into three phases, recruits transition from basic tactical training through marksmanship training and field training exercises. Upon graduation, new soldiers are sent to Advanced Individual Training (AIT) that trains soldiers on their MOS specific requirements. AIT lasts anywhere from a month to just short of one year depending on the branch

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<sup>89</sup> Jeffrey W. Talley, “The 2016 Posture of the US Army Reserve: A Global Operational Reserve Force.”

<sup>90</sup> Feickert, “The Army’s Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM).”

<sup>91</sup> US Army Reserve Official Website, “The US Army Reserve Vision and Mission,” accessed January 7, 2018, <http://www.usar.army.mil/About-Us/>.

<sup>92</sup> TRADOC Regulation 350-6, *Enlisted Initial Entry Training Policies and Administration* (Fort Eustis, VA, March 20, 2017), 19.

of the soldier. What is important to remember, is that unlike the AC soldier, who after graduation will be assigned to an active duty unit, the reserve soldier returns to his or her civilian employment where they have been absent for up to a year. A reservist's military education requirements do not end after their initial training. Officers and enlisted each have a steady pipeline of training schools that each must complete before being promoted. Failure to complete these schools halts a soldier's career.

PME requirements for the USAR have always been similar to the AC. Set as milestones, officers and enlisted are required to attend additional courses to prepare them for the next rank and responsibilities. For officers, this includes the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC), Captain's Career Course (CCC), Command and General Staff College (CGSC). BOLC is completed in the resident format, with a length of three to eleven months depending on the branch of the officer.<sup>93</sup>

From this point forward, the majority of reserve officers complete their PME through a combination of distance learning (computer based) classes and short in-person classes at their branch's home post. Most officers take two years to complete the CCC, which consists of one to two phases of computer-based distance learning and another one to two phases of two-week resident training at their proponent's home post.<sup>94</sup> Each branch within the US Army has a different curriculum and duration for the CCC. For example, the Maneuver CCC has a total of four phases. Phase I is a distance learning common core consisting of seventy-five hours of classwork at a student's own pace. Phase II is a resident phase at Fort Benning, GA for two weeks. Phase III is a second distance learning phase also for seventy-five hours of classwork at

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<sup>93</sup> TRADOC Regulation 350-36, *Basic Officer Leader Training Policies and Administration* (Fort Eustis, VA, August 9, 2017), 26.

<sup>94</sup> TRADOC Regulation 350-10, *Institutional Leader Training and Education* (Fort Monroe, VA, August 12, 2002), 36.

the student's own pace. Phase IV is a second resident phase at Fort Benning, GA for two weeks.<sup>95</sup> Illustrating that each branch within the US Army determines their own CCC, the Logistics Branch completes their CCC in three phases. Phases I and III are both two week resident phases, while Phase II is a distance learning phase of seventy-five hours.<sup>96</sup>

CGSC has the most options available to fit a reserve officer's personal life. Promotable captains and majors are eligible to compete for the one-year resident version taught at Fort Leavenworth, KS. With a limited number of quotas available for the USAR and NG, those seats are highly competitive, only providing an opportunity for approximately sixty-four soldiers combined.<sup>97</sup> The more traditional routes are completed in three phases using either one hundred percent distance learning, also known as, "the box of books" method, or conducted in three in-person phases which includes a two-week in-person class, a ten-month one-weekend per month in-person class, and a final two-week in person class.<sup>98</sup> This is a program with both positive and negative impacts. For most commanders, the positive is that their officers can be PME complete via multiple avenues – there are options to facilitate completion, not just one. The negatives however, are for the first and last options, which the unit loses the officer for a year as they complete CGSC in-person in lieu of the monthly unit training. Enlisted soldiers are not immune to the volume of PME training requirements either.

After enlisted soldiers complete their basic training and AIT, they arrive at their reserve units and begin improving on the skills acquired during their first year in the army. The focus for both the soldier and the unit is to get each of the newly-arrived soldiers integrated into the unit,

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<sup>95</sup> Allen D. Leth, Reserve Component Maneuver Captains Career Course (RC-MCCC) Policy Memorandum (Fort Benning, GA, May 2, 2017), 2.

<sup>96</sup> Army Logistics University, "Reserve Component Captains Career Course (RC-CCC)," last modified December 5, 2017, accessed February 22, 2018, <http://www.alu.army.mil/officers/cctd/>.

<sup>97</sup> CGSC Circular 350-1, "US Army Command and General Staff College Catalog 2016," accessed February 22, 2018, [https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cace/350-1\\_CGSCCatalog.pdf](https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cace/350-1_CGSCCatalog.pdf).

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.



capable of performing their mission, and gaining institutional knowledge of their unit and the USAR. As the soldier progresses in rank, they encounter similar time requirements for promotion.

The first Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) PME course is Basic Leader Course (BLC). This is a short one-month course honing basic soldier skills and learning how to serve in staff positions. The Advanced Leader Course (ALC) is conducted in two phases and focuses on squad and platoon level leadership skills. There is an additional course requirement which all NCOs must complete through distance learning called Structured Self-Development (SSD).<sup>99</sup> Finally, the Senior Leader Course (SLC) is completed in four phases and serves to train the senior NCO for staff and company-level leadership positions. Like ALC, there is an additional distance-learning course called SSD3.<sup>100</sup> As of January 1, 2015, completion of BLC, ALC, or SLC is a requirement for promotion to the next rank.<sup>101</sup> This is a change from the previous policy that allowed soldiers to be promoted before they completed their PME.

This enforcement is not without consequences. One of the greatest challenges reserve units face is ensuring that its soldiers participate in the unit's collective training exercise each year. These originally occurred predominately in the summer, but as the AC and USAR units have integrated increasingly more during exercises, reserve units find themselves participating in events during previously fenced-off months.<sup>102</sup> College students now find themselves being forced to miss two to four weeks of school during February for exercises such as Operation Cold Steel and JRTC Rotation 03-17. High school and elementary teachers are required to attend exercises in late April through May during finals periods for Red Dragon, Warrior Exercise (WAREX), and Combat Support Training Exercise (CSTX). Last year, CSTX 78-16-01 took

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<sup>99</sup> TRADOC Regulation 350-10, 42.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, 43.

<sup>101</sup> Jeffrey Talley, *Army Reserve Policy for Management of Active Duty for Operational Support – Reserve Component (ADOS-RC) and Active Duty for Training (ADT)*, Published October 1, 2014.

<sup>102</sup> Jeffrey Talley, Collective Training Series Workshop (CTSW) Memorandum, September 2016, FY17-20.

place at Fort Hunter Liggett, CA from February 27, 2016 to March 18, 2016.<sup>103</sup> These are not anomalies within the USAR exercise program. For FY18, the number of exercises that are conducted during the school year versus the summer is forty-eight to nineteen.<sup>104</sup> While the WAREXs and CSTXs are evenly split between school year and summer, the functional exercises, CTC rotations, and Overseas Deployment Training (ODT) missions are evenly distributed throughout the year.<sup>105</sup> While the training opportunity is excellent, these dates are right in the middle of high school and college classes.

However, more important is the amount of time that the soldier is spending away from his/her civilian employer. As illustrated above, the PME requirements for officers and enlisted are robust. A soldier can expect to be in some portion of the PME pipeline at least every other year, if not more frequently based on the expected time a soldier spends at a certain grade and the amount of schooling required. This training is in addition to their unit responsibilities in most cases. How this affects the unit or the soldier depends on the individual, but there are a number of examples discussed later in this monograph to illustrate the challenges facing them.

Once a soldier is educationally qualified, availability becomes the key metric on which units focus; after all, that supports the purpose of having a trained and ready-to-deploy force. In 2011, the US Army Medical Command reported that just seventy percent of the RC was medically ready or available to deploy.<sup>106</sup> Dental availability is just as problematic for the RC as well. The issue of solving medical and dental availability issues is much more challenging than the AC faces; however, the RC has made many strides in improving both metrics.

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<sup>103</sup> Debraiee Best, "CSTX Meshes Team for Mobilization," US Army Reserve Official Website, March 16, 2016, accessed on February 17, 2018, <http://www.usar.army.mil/News/Display/Article/694843/cstx-meshes-team-for-mobilization/>.

<sup>104</sup> Mission Analysis Readiness Resource Synchronization (MARRS), *FY17 Reports for CSTX, WAREX, ODT, and Functional Exercises*, accessed February 25, 2018, <https://mobcop.army.mil>.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Doug Sample, "Army Wants More Soldiers Back on Deployable Status," US Army Official Website, October 11, 2011, accessed December 28, 2017, [https://www.army.mil/article/67037/army\\_wants\\_more\\_soldiers\\_back\\_on\\_deployable\\_status](https://www.army.mil/article/67037/army_wants_more_soldiers_back_on_deployable_status).

Most reserve units conduct an annual Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP) during a two to three-day battle assembly. The goal is to identify and fix all of the unit's medical and dental issues, resulting in a substantially higher medical and dental readiness metric. The problem that occurs is when one of two things happens: a soldier misses the SRP during battle assembly or a soldier habitually misses battle assembly. Both instances result in a soldier becoming medically non-deployable. The easier of the two occurrences to address is that of the soldier who missed the SRP during battle assembly. The soldier is able to complete the necessary appointments but on their own time away from the reserve unit.

The USAR provides soldiers options to become medically and dentally available for deployment, but it comes at the cost of civilian jobs. Set aside each year are one-day sets of orders called Medical Readiness Management Assemblies (RMA). These RMAs provide one day of military pay for completing medical or dental appointments. As long as funding for Medical RMAs is available, units have an easy route to improving their medical and dental readiness.<sup>107</sup> Once the Medical RMA budget is zero, the unit must rely on the soldier to set up appointments with their own primary care provider. A 2012 RAND Study outlines the difficulties facing the RC and private medical and dental practices. The primary issue affecting the reserves is getting the right paperwork submitted from the private practice to the right department for military health records. A second issue is the lack of training for the private medical providers performing services.<sup>108</sup> Being unfamiliar with medical and dental classifications, private providers erroneously classify soldiers, thus preventing a soldier from being medically deployable.

The other occurrence previously mentioned is the unsatisfactory or non-participating soldier. These are soldiers who have not conducted any reserve duty in at least ninety days or have accrued nine unexcused absences from weekend drill training. RC soldiers during IDT

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<sup>107</sup> USARC Pamphlet 37-1, "Finance Guide for USAR Soldiers" (Fort Bragg, NC, 2017), 10.

<sup>108</sup> Marygail K. Brauner, Timothy Jackson, and Elizabeth K. Gayton, "Medical Readiness of the Reserve Component," *Center for Military Health Policy Research*, The RAND Corporation, 2012, 43.

periods are treated differently than AC soldiers. Missing a drill does not equate to an absent without leave (AWOL) status. Instead, reservists accrue unexcused absences. Once a reservist receives nine unexcused absences, it is up to the company commander to determine what he or she will do with the reservist. Options range from attempting to rehabilitate the soldier, to transitioning them to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), to Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) action to remove them from the RC.<sup>109</sup> While a minimal number of these soldiers are recovered through the work of their unit, the majority continues down the path of becoming a non-participant. At this point, it is difficult to even contact the soldier, let alone set up a medical or dental appointment.<sup>110</sup> It is a problem that the USAR has actively fought against through Operation Full Court Press, which was initiated in 2015 in an effort to either rehabilitate soldiers not meeting the standard or administratively separate them.<sup>111</sup> Discharging non-performing soldiers may seem counterintuitive to personnel end strength goals, but the result is less money spent on non-participating USAR soldiers. Additionally, underperforming officers and senior NCOs administratively removed through Operation Full Court Press allow soldiers awaiting the opening of an officer or senior NCO billet to fill them more quickly.

Promotion and duty assignments are a challenge for USAR soldiers as they attain higher rank. Unlike the NG, there may not be a position to be promoted into in their home state of residence. Many reservists are forced to find assignments, in the proper grade and MOS, in neighboring states and in many cases, multiple states away from home, which becomes both a

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<sup>109</sup> US Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 135-91 *Service Obligations, Methods of Fulfillment, Participation Requirements, and Enforcement Provisions* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), 13.

<sup>110</sup> Eric Samaritoni, "AAR for Operation Full Court Press," October 20, 2015. After Action Reports were submitted monthly from the brigade S1 sections to the division G1. These reports were consolidated with all other brigades. Additionally, these AARs were incorporated into Yearly Training Briefings and Monthly Commander's Conferences.

<sup>111</sup> Timothy Hale, "Operation Full Court Press: Still Room For Improvement," US Army Reserve *Command*, June 2, 2015, accessed November 30, 2017, <https://www.dvidshub.net/news/169281/operation-full-court-press-still-room-improvement>.

financial and time burden on the soldier and their family. The concern becomes, how can reserve units in remote areas, or areas with a sparse reservists population, fill their ranks? The answer has been that they typically do not. Units based in New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago are often plagued with low unit strength. Those that are successful in filling their billets often encounter trouble keeping these soldiers actively drilling and participating.

The USAR has similar incentives for participating reservists as the AC for their re-enlistment and MOS bonus structures. Enlistment bonuses are available to soldiers re-enlisting. Incentive bonuses are offered to soldiers with specific MOS/ASIs training completed. Student reservists are able to take advantage of loan repayment and the Montgomery GI Bill.<sup>112</sup> One of the greatest incentives to join and stay in the USAR is the ability to qualify for TRICARE Reserve Select insurance. This health and dental insurance costs less than \$200 per month when the average health care insurance cost for a family exceeds \$1,100 per month in America.<sup>113</sup> Taken together, the USAR offers soldiers, even at the lowest enlisted ranks, a combined benefits package of approximately \$1,500 per month when taking drill pay, health insurance, and life insurance into account.

Beyond the financial aspect, new reservists or re-enlisting soldiers have the ability to defer deployment up to twenty-four months in order to pursue their civilian goals.<sup>114</sup> This gives USAR soldiers the opportunity to complete school without fear of being deployed. This ability also provides potential employers with peace of mind that their new hire employee will not immediately be called up for a deployment.

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<sup>112</sup> "Careers & Jobs," US Army Website, last modified April 21, 2017, accessed December 14, 2017, <https://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/current-and-prior-service/continue-serving/army-reserve-prior-service/ps-benefits.html>.

<sup>113</sup> John Fritze, "Average Family Health Insurance Policy: \$13,375, up 5%," *ABC News*, 2009, accessed December 10, 2017, <http://abcnews.go.com/Business/average-family-health-insurance-policy-13375/story?id=8588952>.

<sup>114</sup> "Careers & Jobs".

One selling point that the USAR offers to soldiers coming off active duty is the ability to “reclass” or change their MOS.<sup>115</sup> This allows soldiers who either disliked or were bored with their current MOS, the opportunity to move into another specialty without going through a board process. This also presents an opportunity to many current USAR soldiers who are seeking promotion opportunities. By allowing reservists the ability to change freely or gain an MOS, soldiers are more likely to find billets of proper MOS and grade closer to home.

Congress first passed laws protecting USAR soldiers in 1940 under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. From then until today, there have been four changes or updates to the laws governing USAR and NG service and requirements.<sup>116</sup> Each alteration to the law was triggered by the preceding military engagement. As soldiers returned home from war, the government saw that protection of soldiers’ rights was important to ensuring that a viable pipeline of volunteers would continue to serve in the military.<sup>117</sup> What has generally remained constant is the notion of, “one weekend a month, two weeks in the summer.” That motto up until 9/11 was valid, as most USAR soldiers were able to serve as a strategic asset to the US Army. However, in the post-9/11 world, the USAR has been increasingly called upon to support contingency operations from the Balkans to the Middle East, while at the same time assuming responsibility for many military-to-military programs in South America and Africa. The result of these increased responsibilities being placed on the USAR is a tenuous relationship between the three stakeholders: the USAR, the USAR soldier, and the USAR soldier’s employer.

The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) is the US code that governs the treatment of reservists and the NG in the civilian workplace. USERRA

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<sup>115</sup> “Careers & Jobs.”

<sup>116</sup> Susan M. Gates et al., “Supporting Employers in the Reserve Operational Forces Era,” *Rand Corporation*, 2013, accessed on December 10, 2017, [http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhtm0.7?seq=1#page\\_scan\\_tab\\_contents](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhtm0.7?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents).

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*

provides legal protection for reserve soldiers completing duty and service obligations. Currently, USERRA guarantees reserve soldiers time to be absent from work for military duty for both short term (annual training and weekend battle assemblies) and long term (mobilizations, extended training for new systems and platforms, and voluntary active duty orders).<sup>118</sup> USERRA also provides rights for soldiers returning from extended orders.

Reservists are entitled to the same seniority, status, and pay as if they had not been completing their military requirements.<sup>119</sup> Additionally, protection is granted for health care coverage, pensions, and reemployment training once a soldier returns from duty and is back at their civilian occupation. What USERRA does not cover however, is advancement or promotion with the civilian employer.

One of the greatest concerns for reservists being mobilized is that of falling behind their civilian peers. While the reserve soldier is deployed, their co-workers are able to continue advancing their careers. This is an obvious disadvantage to the reservist who has nothing to gain from a mobilization but everything to lose. There is so much of a disadvantage in fact, that units who have deployed the most have unemployment and underemployment rates of greater than fifty percent.<sup>120</sup> Other reservists see these challenges, and it creates a natural reluctance to either mobilize or volunteer for additional training opportunities that would take them away from their civilian employer. At the end of the day, reservist pay does not provide the bulk of a family's income – it is the civilian employer.

For the first ninety year history of the USAR, employers understood and accepted that their employee (the USAR soldier) will be absent from work during two weeks, most likely

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<sup>118</sup> “Vets USERRA Fact Sheet 3,” US Department of Labor, accessed December 17, 2017, [https://www.dol.gov/vets/programs/userra/userra\\_fs.htm](https://www.dol.gov/vets/programs/userra/userra_fs.htm).

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Joshua Norman, “For National Guard, Civilian Jobs Hard to Come By,” *CBS News*, September 6, 2012, accessed December 29, 2017, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/for-national-guard-civilian-jobs-hard-to-come-by/>.

during the summer, and possibly one or two Fridays as the employee may have additional USAR requirements a couple of times of year. The current effect this is having on the USAR is still to be determined, but what is clear, is that the number of mobilizations and deployments have risen, the amount of individual and unit training has increased, and the number of available personnel within the USAR has dropped due to budget cuts and the turbulence of soldiers completing their terms and leaving the army.

## Impact on the USAR

Thus far, this monograph has focused on the inception of the USAR, its evolution through multiple periods of war and peace, and into the current operating environment. The reader has an appreciation of what the government expects of the reservist, as well as the expectation the reservist has for the government. To best understand and facilitate how all of the information presented thus far impacts the RC, a number of examples will be presented. The order of these cases moves from the largest of collective exercises down to squad-level training.

The first example involves the recently developed live-fire exercise, “Operation Cold Steel,” designed to increase all RC units’ ability to function as a team with live bullets being fired to simulate battlefield effects. The second example will break down the time requirements for units receiving and fielding complex equipment. The NBCRV Stryker is the latest major item of high-tech equipment being fielded to both the AC and RC. This vehicle serves as a mobile laboratory to detect and identify potential nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons use on the battlefield. Finally, an analysis of employers and legal cases involving reservists and their occupations will be reviewed.

In 2016, to increase the lethality of the USAR, a pilot program entitled, “Operation Cold Steel” was designed to force USAR, company-sized units and below to form crews for validation. This is much like the validation process used by AC squads and platoons. Hosted at Fort McCoy, WI, units from throughout the USAR took part in the forty-day event on a rotating



basis.<sup>121</sup> The time requirements placed on the unit and the individual soldier goes well beyond the fourteen-day live-fire event.

In its initial year, Operation Cold Steel was to be the proof of principle for “Objective T” (OBJ T) and the army’s intent to return to a qualitative approach to training and reporting. From April to May of 2017, 1,800 soldiers participated in the initial Operation Cold Steel.<sup>122</sup> Operation Cold Steel has expanded from the pilot in FY17 to a much larger and robust event for FY18.<sup>123</sup> The event is now spread across four installations: Fort Hunter Liggett, CA, Fort McCoy, WI, Fort Knox, KY, and Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, NJ. Over 10,000 soldiers from across the USAR are expected to conduct both mounted and dismounted crew-served weapons qualification in an effort to become a more lethal reserve force.<sup>124</sup> The question becomes, with such an increase in the quality and quantity of training for Operation Cold Steel, how was the event staffed and from where did all of the participants come? The answers to both are found in the OPORD for the event. The 84<sup>th</sup> Training Division, out of Fort Knox, KY, provided the staff for the exercise; however, there were numerous personnel requirements placed upon the subordinate units to provide their limited full time support personnel. The answer to fielding the correct participants was more difficult to ascertain.

The requirement stated that the unit must send complete teams of soldiers who would go through the exercise and be “validated” at the end.<sup>125</sup> However, this carried its own problems. In a number of instances, squads were thrown together from across a number of units within a

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<sup>121</sup> USARC OPORD 16-038, *Operation Cold Steel Collective Training Exercise* (Fort Bragg, NC, 2015), 1-28.

<sup>122</sup> Operation Cold Steel Strength and Feeder Report, February 2016.

<sup>123</sup> USARC OPORD 17-031, *Operation Cold Steel Collective Training Exercise* (Fort Bragg, NC, 2015), 1-24.

<sup>124</sup> Debralee Best, “Operation Cold Steel: More Vehicles, Weapons, Firepower” US Army Official Website, October 17, 2017, accessed December 22, 2017, [https://www.army.mil/article/195437/operation\\_cold\\_steel\\_more\\_vehicles\\_weapons\\_firepower](https://www.army.mil/article/195437/operation_cold_steel_more_vehicles_weapons_firepower).

<sup>125</sup> USARC OPORD 16-038, *Operation Cold Steel Collective Training Exercise* (Fort Bragg, NC, 2015), 2.

battalion to meet the personnel requirement. Once the training was complete, unit commanders were forced to figure out who was validated and how to now manage personnel who had been cross-leveled over to them for the exercise. In the end, the problem facing the reservist was exacerbated. Those who volunteered to support the exercise found themselves being asked to switch units, which could mean drilling two to three states away from where they normally drilled. It was an added pressure to the reservists' career and a continued attempt by the USAR to form and validate cohesive teams for deployment.<sup>126</sup>

The second example is an analysis of equipment procurement and training for USAR units. It is used to illustrate the highly technical aspects of equipment shared between both the AC and RC. Like many pieces of army equipment, the NBCRV Stryker requires extensive training on both the use and maintenance of the multimillion-dollar platform. The NBCRV platform is identical to that of the AC and NG units. The training process that the reserve soldiers complete is identical to that of the AC. To complete the fielding from the initial IPR through the delivery of the vehicle to home station is a process in the reserves that takes approximately eighteen months.<sup>127</sup> To understand the complexity of the system, it is best to breakdown exactly what it is to operate and maintain this two million dollar piece of equipment.

The NBCRV contains multiple scientific pieces of equipment, similar to those one would find in a university chemistry lab. The Chemical Biological Mass Spectrometer (CB Mass Spec) for example is taught in the L6 course, but takes months of regular use to master. The below illustration of the NBCRV provided by Joint Project Manager, NBC Contamination Avoidance, allows the reader to view each piece of equipment that a soldier assigned to an NBCRV must

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<sup>126</sup> Eric Samaritoni, "After Action Review: Operation Cold Steel," May 12, 2016.

<sup>127</sup> 209<sup>th</sup> RSG OPORD 15-010, "NBCRV Fielding" (Kansas City, MO, 2015), 1-15.

master before being a USAR resource for deployment.<sup>128</sup> To achieve that goal, units are required to adhere to a strict timeline of field exercises and classroom instruction.



Figure 6. NBCRV components within the reconnaissance vehicle. Joint Project Manager, NBC Contamination Avoidance 2015, accessed March 24, 2018, <http://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/cbd-nuclear-biological-chemical-reconnaissance-vehicle-nbcrv-stryker-sensor-suites/>

Beyond the CB Mass Spec, NBCRV operators are required to master the Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS) and Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector. Both systems use cutting-edge science technology that require the operator to have a basic understanding of chemistry and biology. A number of hand-held devices are also included in that NBCRV package that each require initial and recurring training to maintain proficiency.<sup>129</sup> Attempting to complete all of this required training during the standard one-weekend a month, two-weeks in the summer is impossible. The question then becomes, do reservists and guardsmen have enough time annually to complete all of the other required training plus the time to complete

<sup>128</sup> Army Acquisition Corps, "Nuclear Biological Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV) – Stryker Sensor Suite," US Army Acquisition Support Center, accessed March 24, 2018, <http://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/cbd-nuclear-biological-chemical-reconnaissance-vehicle-nbcrv-stryker-sensor-suites/>.

<sup>129</sup> Technical Manual, NBCRV Operator TM 9-2355-311-10-10-1, 2, & 3.

initial training on the NBCRV systems, driver's training and maintenance? While the USAR and Program Manager for the NBCRV are looking at alternatives, including off-site storage and maintenance of the vehicles, there has yet to be a codified order. This is an on-going issue for battalion-level maintenance personnel and company level operators of the equipment.

The two examples presented provide the reader with just a small indication of the volume of training placed on the reserve soldier. The stress that this training places on the individual reservist is tremendous. A reserve soldier must at some point decide which is more important: upward mobility of his or her civilian career or helping their reserve unit accomplish the near insurmountable number of tasks placed upon it.

From a broad perspective, reservists have a natural fear of keeping their employment while also attempting to satisfy the many requirements placed on the RC. The Michigan State University Extension has maintained a steady relationship with the local NG and USAR population since World War II.<sup>130</sup> With a long history of working with the RC in general, they are uniquely positioned to highlight, describe, and offer assistance to the reserve community across a number of fields of study. In this case, the article looked at employment and post deployment health experiences of returning NG and USAR soldiers.

The study pointed out that unemployment of a RC soldier is not the only financial issue that reservists face. Of concern in the study was the loss of income due to a deployment.<sup>131</sup> While the USERRA protects soldiers from losing their employment due to military service, it does not protect a soldier's income.<sup>132</sup> For most officers, this issue does not cause friction for their families. For enlisted soldiers, however, the difference between what a sergeant makes compared

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<sup>130</sup> Barbara Ames, "Meeting the Needs of National Guard and Reserve Families: The Role of Extension," *Journal of Extension*, October 2011, Volume 49, Number 5, accessed January 5, 2018, <https://joe.org/joe/2011october/a7.php>.

<sup>131</sup> Ames, "Meeting the Needs of National Guard and Reserve Families: The Role of Extension."

<sup>132</sup> Title 38, U.S.C. § 4312, October 13, 1994.

to what he or she makes in their civilian employment can be considerable. Loss of income is not the only issue at hand though. Many RC soldiers find that upon returning from multiple tours of duty, that there are other ways in which a civilian company is able to terminate employment legally.

A December 5, 2012 decision by the US Court of Appeals Eight Circuit in Minneapolis, MN, for example, provides employers a loop-hole to terminate RC soldiers.<sup>133</sup> In the case of *Douglas Milhauser v. Minco Products, Inc.*, Mr. Milhauser was a member of the RC, who between 2007 and 2009, took three periods of military leave, each protected by USERRA. Upon returning early from his last deployment, Mr. Milhauser was terminated. His employer, Minco Products, Inc., stated that according to 38 U.S.C. § 4312(d)(1)(A), that due to a slow down in business and the need to terminate initially eighteen employees and growing to thirty-two employees, that Mr. Milhauser would have been terminated regardless of his RC status. The court sided with Minco Products, Inc. and found that Mr. Milhauser was terminated within the legal construct of USERRA; however, this decision opens up the possibility for further exploitation should a company in the future desire to terminate a RC employee.

In another example of a reservist terminated from their employment, Kevin Ziober was terminated from a real estate firm for which he worked, “several hours” after he notified his bosses of an upcoming deployment.<sup>134</sup> In this case, there was no performance-oriented reason for terminating employment. The firm was able to get around USERRA being having Mr. Ziober sign a contract requiring arbitration to settle any disputes, effectively eliminating his ability to take his case to court. Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) introduced a bill on March 15, 2017

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<sup>133</sup> *Murphy v. Minco Products, Inc.*, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Case No. 12-1756, December 5, 2012, accessed January 18, 2018. <http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/12/12/121756P.pdf>.

<sup>134</sup> Danielle Serino, “From Warfare to Welfare. Reservists Losing Their Jobs After Being Deployed,” *NBC News* Affiliate Cleveland, OH, October 5, 2017, accessed February 22, 2018, <http://www.wkyc.com/article/features/from-warfare-to-welfare-reservists-losing-their-jobs-after-being-deployed/481192688>.

that attempts to, “expand judicial venues for an action against a private employer.”<sup>135</sup> The bill has been read twice and referred to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs.<sup>136</sup>

To understand the impact of being a reservist has on one’s occupation potential, economist Theodore Figinski conducted a “resume study” to determine what affect being an current reservist had versus being a retired reservist. In his study, 8,000 resumes were sent to employers over a one year period from 2012-2013. He ensured the resumes were virtually identical except that one resume had the applicant as “current membership [in the reserves]” and the other had the applicant as “completed membership [in the reserves].” He found that those with a current membership in the reserves were eleven percent less likely to receive an interview. He further expressed concerns that the antidiscrimination provisions of USERRA may be ineffective in discrimination of hiring reservists.<sup>137</sup> As a whole, reservists are not only in a difficult position with their current employer when it comes to possible deployments, but also they may find it increasingly difficult to secure employment when looking for a new occupation.

The Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) began a series of stories in 2015 to help the American people better understand the military as a whole. On April 9, 2015, the third of a seven part series focused on returning RC soldiers and their integration back into civilian life.<sup>138</sup> The story goes on to explain the difficulties that reservists have when explaining duty requirements to their civilian employer. Employers’ human resources departments are required to know, understand, and implement the terms of USERRA for their RC employees. What the employers

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<sup>135</sup> Richard Blumenthal, “Justice for Servicemembers and Veterans Act of 2017,” 115<sup>th</sup> Congress (2017-2018).

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

<sup>137</sup> Theodore F. Figinski, “Research: Companies Are Less Likely to Hire Current Military Reservists,” *Harvard Business Review*, October 13, 2017, accessed February 22, 2018, <https://hbr.org/2017/10/research-companies-are-less-likely-to-hire-current-military-reservists>.

<sup>138</sup> Alison St. John, “Building Civilian Career is Challenge for National Guard Members,” *KPBS*, April 9, 2015, accessed January 23, 2018, <http://www.kpbs.org/news/2015/apr/09/building-civilian-career-no-easy-task-national-gua/>.

may not always understand is that the days of reserve commitments being one weekend a month and two weeks in the summer are in the past. This is the friction point between the employee and employer.

For students, reserve commitments are even more difficult. While USERRA protects the rights of employees, Title 32 offers no protection to students. Again, this is a case of the law being written during a different era than those RC soldiers face today. In 1994, the RC was not integrated into most active duty exercises taking place at one of the two US-based CTCs such as the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, CA or the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA. RC units would conduct their summer training at local training areas, or possibly at large reserve installations like Fort McCoy, WI or Fort Hunter Liggett, CA. Today, there is much more integration with the AC and their exercises. From a training perspective, this presents the opportunity for reservists to train in more realistic scenarios, with units that they will deploy with or replace in a combat zone. This comes at a cost, though, as the CTCs operate year round.

During fiscal year 2016, RC units participated in NTC and JRTC rotations. Reserve units were included in exercises at major AC installations such as the Army Warfighting Assessment (AWA) 17.1 at Fort Bliss, TX.<sup>139</sup> What is important to note for exercises such as these, is that the dates are not constrained to summers when students are typically free; the AWA was conducted during September and October.<sup>140</sup> JRTC and NTC rotations are held roughly monthly throughout the year, with reserve units participating for FY18 in January, March, April, May, and

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<sup>139</sup> USARC OPORD 16-016, *Army Warfighting Assessment 2017* (Fort Bragg, NC, USARC, 2016), 1-24.

<sup>140</sup> C. Todd Lopez, "Army Tests New Warfighting Tech at Army Warfighting Assessment," US Army Official Website, October 18, 2016, accessed February 23, 2018, [https://www.army.mil/article/176856/army\\_tests\\_new\\_warfighting\\_tech\\_at\\_army\\_warfighting\\_assessment](https://www.army.mil/article/176856/army_tests_new_warfighting_tech_at_army_warfighting_assessment).

September.<sup>141</sup> Increasing numbers of RC led exercises such as Operation Cold Steel, Red Dragon, and Golden Medic are being held throughout the year as well. College students find themselves in a precarious situation: miss two to four weeks of class, and in some cases finals week, or request to be exempt from the unit annual training event.

## Conclusion

The USAR is in a period of increased requirements and mobilizations while maintaining the smallest soldier pool in over seventy-five years. Reservists are pinched between the time demands of the USAR and their much-understood civilian employment standards. In a recent article for the American Conservative, retired Major General Dennis Laich and former Chief of Staff to Secretary of State, Colin Powell, co-authored a discussion on the impacts increased reserve duty had on its soldiers both from a military and civilian employment perspective. They raise the question, “What employer wants to hire a young man or woman who will be gone for a year every four years on average, when that employer can reach out and hire someone from the 99 percent who will likely not be absent?”<sup>142</sup> This is the crux of the current problem facing USAR soldiers. While laws protect these citizen soldiers from being terminated due to military duty, there is nothing forcing companies to look past their status as a reservist.

However, what happens when the laws are outdated, when they are from a different era in which much less was expected from both the RC and the drilling reservist? The world is becoming increasingly complex, and the US military will be expected to perform more missions. At the same time, funding for the military is always a contentious subject, and thus the DA is seeking ways to continue performing the increased number of missions at a lower cost. The RC is able to address this concern. The reservist answers the call, and volunteers to perform in lieu of an AC soldier.

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<sup>141</sup> Mission Analysis Readiness Resource Synchronization (MARRS), *FY17 Reports for CSTX, WAREX, ODT, and Functional Exercises*,” accessed February 25, 2018, <https://mobcop.army.mil>.

<sup>142</sup> Laich, “The Deep Unfairness of America’s All-Volunteer Force.”



Clearly there is a gap between the laws and army regulations that govern the use of the RC and reservist. As budgets become increasingly constrained, the DA will continue to rely more and more on the Guard and reserve. Eventually, volunteerism will cease if reservists fear for their civilian employment. It is this legal gap that should keep the senior leaders of the army and government awake at night. They may eventually realize that it is a hollow RC, incapable of providing relief to the AC or deploying into a combat theater when needed.

### Recommendations for Future Study and Analysis

The disconnect between the requirements placed on the USAR soldier and the associated time requirements and missions does not have a single step solution. A comprehensive review and adjustment of American laws is a starting point. The USAR, and possibly the DoD as a whole, should look at similar issues in the civilian sector during times of fiscal constraints. A revitalization of the AC/RC program that assigns AC soldiers to RC units should be reviewed and possibly expanded. This would at least address the concern of full time support and maintenance, but not the time required of reservists.

Current US laws simply do not provide enough protection to USAR soldiers. Although the law prevents employers from terminating a USAR soldier who misses work to attend training, the same laws do not protect the USAR soldier from being passed over for promotion in favor of an employee who is not in the RC. Additionally, there is evidence that employers are able to circumvent USERRA by having employees sign contractors that negate the protections that the law provides. Finally, the study conducted by Theodore Figinski illustrates that if an employee can be discriminated against by virtue of their active membership in the reserves, USERRA may not be complete enough to protect the individuals it was designed to protect.

Foreign militaries provide a number of examples of how to best manage, support, and utilize their reserve forces. In particular, Israel and Germany offer good starting points on researching the relationship between their reserve forces to their civilian employers. Germany

offers reimbursement of labor costs to both the reservist and his or her employer.<sup>143</sup> Employers in Israel are able to seek a refund through a claim system to offset the salary paid to the reservist while conducting IDF reserve duties.<sup>144</sup> This benefit is two-fold. First, employers are likely to be more amiable towards the reserves if they are being compensated for paying a reservists salary while the reservist is away on duty. Second, the employer is more likely to see themselves linked to the reserve system, and therefore having a favorable impression of their reservist employee.

The RC may be on the precipice of a significant change in the quality of participating soldier. A reservist who is forced to choose between providing a better life for his or her family, or advancement in the reserve or NG, will naturally choose the former. In a hyper-competitive world, employees must reduce or mitigate exposure to any perceived weakness in the eyes of their employer, either current or future. Both the RC and the US government must address the issues and concerns within this monograph before quality soldiers self-separate in favor of providing a steady life for their families.

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<sup>143</sup> National Reserves Forces Committee, "German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr)," *NATO Official Website*, accessed November 1, 2017, <https://www.nato.int/nrfc/database/germany.pdf>.

<sup>144</sup> National Institute of Israel, "Reserve Service," *National Institute of Israel*, June 1, 2004, accessed November 4, 2017, <https://www.btl.gov.il/English%20Homepage/Benefits/Reserve%20Service%20Benefit/Pages/יאנת%20ואכזת.aspx>.

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