Joint Irregular Warfare Capability and a Special Operations Forces Joint Task Force Capable Headquarters

A Monograph

by

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2018

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
0MB No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED (From - To)
	Master's Thesis	July 2017 - May 2018

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Joint Irregular Warfare Capability and a Special Operations Forces Joint Task Force Capable Headquarters

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)

Maj Ryan M. Pearce
US Air Force

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

School of Advanced Military Studies
ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2134

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Advanced Military Studies Program

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

A problem facing the US military is that, while future Irregular Warfare (IW) requirements exist, US leaders see large-scale combat operations or Traditional Warfare (TW) as a more significant threat. There is also a requirement from leaders for the military to maintain capability in IW not just for the current fight, but also for future threats. The US military has one primary answer for the organization of both TW and IW, the Joint Task Force (JTF). A Conventional Force (CF) headquarters (HQ) typically commands a JTF through the phases of a campaign, but this may not be the best command option for IW. Based on different objectives within TW and IW campaigns, this paper argues that joint doctrine should specify the creation of a three-star Special Operations Forces HQ capable of commanding IW-focused operations. This institutionalizes IW capability and enables CF to refocus to readiness for large-scale conflict and TW. This argument is supported by two case studies from Afghanistan and Iraq, which examine CF HQ transitioning from TW-focused to IW-focused phases; these studies outline shortfalls in using a CF HQ to lead an IW-focused JTF.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Irregular Warfare, Traditional Warfare, Conventional Forces, Special Operations Forces, Joint Task Force, Joint Task Force Capable Headquarters, Phase IV Stabilize, Joint Phasing, Large Scale Combat

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			Pearce, Ryan M.
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	61	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) 865-607-6792

Monograph Approval Page

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Monograph Title: Joint Irregular Warfare Capability and a Special Operations Forces Joint Task Force Capable Headquarters

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Abstract

Joint Irregular Warfare Capability and a Special Operations Forces Joint Task Force Capable Headquarters, by Major Ryan M. Pearce, US Air Force, 61 pages.

A current problem facing the US military is that, while future Irregular Warfare (IW) requirements exist, US civilian and military leaders see large-scale combat operations or Traditional Warfare (TW) as a more significant threat to the nation than IW. However, there is also a requirement from US civilian leaders for the military to maintain competency and capability in IW not just for the current War on Terror, but also for future threats. Currently, the US military has one primary answer for the organization of both TW and IW, the Joint Task Force (JTF). A Conventional Force (CF) headquarters (HQ) typically commands a JTF through the phases of a campaign, but this may not be the best command option for IW. Based on the different objectives and required activities within TW and IW campaigns, this paper argues that joint doctrine should specify the creation of a standing three-star Special Operations Forces HQ capable of commanding IW-focused phases and operations. This institutionalizes long-term IW capability and enables CF to safely refocus efforts to training and readiness for large-scale conflict and TW. This argument is supported by two case studies from Afghanistan and Iraq, which examine CF HQ transitioning from a TW-focused phase to an IW-focused phase; these studies outline the potential shortfalls in using a CF HQ to lead an IW-focused JTF.

Contents

Acknowledgement

Many people helped me write this monograph. First, I would like to thank my seminar leader, Colonel Christopher McGowan. Your guidance, mentorship, and editing were extremely helpful over the last year. Second, thank you to my monograph director, Dr. Patricia Blocksome. I appreciate you selecting me, and providing the direction and civilian perspective that helped me bring the paper together. Finally, thank you to my family, my wife Ashley and my three daughters, Penelope, Jolene, and Loretta. I appreciate your patience and support while working on this project.

Acronyms

1 SFC	1st Special Forces Command
BPC	Building Partner Capacity
CCMD	Combatant Command
CENTCOM	Central Command
CF	Conventional Force
CFC-A	Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CPA	Coalition Provincial Authority
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
HQ	Headquarters
IW	Irregular Warfare
JTF	Joint Task Force
ORHA	Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
SFA	Security Force Assistance
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOJTF	Special Operations Joint Task Force
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
TW	Traditional Warfare
US	United States
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command

Illustration

Introduction

> The Department of Defense must develop new operational concepts and capabilities to win . . . including against those operating below the level of conventional military conflict. We must sustain our competence in irregular warfare, which requires planning for a long-term, rather than ad hoc, fight against terrorist networks and other irregular threats.
>
> — 2017 National Security Strategy

The primary impetus for senior United States (US) Military leadership's desire to improve Irregular Warfare (IW) originated with Al Qaeda's 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. The attacks started a sustained fight by the United States against Islamic extremists that required the extensive use of IW against a variety of actors. Deemed the "Global War on Terror," the struggle against Islamic extremists placed US forces all over the Middle East and throughout the world in countries such as Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and the Philippines.

The 2017 National Security Strategy, quoted above, highlights the requirement facing US forces to maintain competency and capability in IW to effectively address these ongoing conflicts. The US faces a sustained fight against Islamist extremists across the globe. Research and forecasting of potential adversaries suggest that IW will continue into the foreseeable future, and will encompass not just conflicts against extremists, but also conflicts that blend approaches, such as hybrid warfare and gray zone conflicts. In these types of conflicts, aggressive actions regularly occur by both states and non-state actors conducting IW outside clearly defined areas of war and peace; such conflicts require strong integration between different US Military capabilities and potentially new organizational approaches from the US.[1]

[1] US Special Operations Command, "Special Operations Forces Operating Concept" (White Paper, USSOCOM, MacDill AFB, FL, February 2016), 2, accessed September 5, 2017, http://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/SOF-Operating-Concept-v1-0_020116-Final.pdf; US Special Operations Command, "The Gray Zone" (White Paper, USSOCOM, MacDill AFB, FL, September 9, 2015), 1, 6.

In recent past campaigns, such as Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and the initial invasion in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the US Military demonstrated overmatch against conventional opponents. The overwhelming US victories motivated adversaries to develop capable options outside of conventional military means.[2] Subsequently, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan provided militarily less-capable opponents opportunities for success against the United States via IW. The US military's IW Joint Operating Concept highlights this challenge:

> The strategy of our adversaries will be to subvert, attrite, and exhaust us rather than defeat us militarily. They will seek to undermine and erode the national power, influence, and will of the United States and its strategic partners. Our adversaries will continue to wage IW against us until we demonstrate the same competency in IW that we demonstrate in conventional warfighting.[3]

Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare*, reflects IW's prioritization by noting, "IW is as strategically important as Traditional Warfare and DoD must be equally capable in both."[4] The famous military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz asserts, "No one starts a war . . . without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."[5] As non-state and state actors continue to focus on IW as a way to conduct war against the United States in future conflicts, the United States requires flexible options and capabilities to overcome and mitigate the challenges of IW.[6] This paper supports the 2017 National Security Strategy by examining the complexity and challenges of the future operating

[2] David A. Fastabend and Robert H. Simpson, "The Imperative for a Culture of Innovation in the US Army: Adapt or Die," *Army Magazine* 54, no. 2 (February 2004): 2; US Special Operations Command, "The Gray Zone," 9.

[3] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Operating Concept (JOC), Irregular Warfare Version 1.0. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 11, 2007), 16.

[4] Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare*, Change 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2017), 1.

[5] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Indexed ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 579.

[6] Geoff Demarest, *Winning Irregular Wars* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies, 2017), ix-x.

environment, and argues that long-term IW capability improvements will require changes to US Special Operations Forces (SOF) military organizational structure and forces.[7]

In order to make this argument, this monograph first defines and explains the critical differences between IW and Traditional Warfare (TW). Then, it examines how the US Military organizes for warfare. Currently, the US Military has one primary answer for the organization of warfare, the Joint Task Force (JTF). A Conventional Force (CF) headquarters (HQ) typically commands JTFs, but this may not be the best command option for IW campaigns.[8] Instead, IW and TW operations may each require a different type of organizational structure, sometimes with CF HQ in the lead, and sometimes with SOF HQ in the lead. Traditionally a CF command HQ leads the JTF through the entirety of an operation, regardless of the number or type of phases and transitions. However, for IW-focused phases, a standing SOF HQ possessing prioritized IW capability and expertise offers a more capable JTF command staff than a CF HQ and provides the US Military an organizational option to institutionalize long-term IW capability. After developing this argument, this monograph examines two case studies, one from Afghanistan and one from Iraq, in which a JTF executed a phase transition that required a shift from TW to predominately IW activities. These transitions are analyzed to better understand the limitations posed by current JTF HQ organizational structures.

Literature Review

The literature review examines available IW organizational options with a view to the associated challenges of an uncertain future operating environment. First, it outlines the ways IW differs from TW, and how the military organizes its forces to plan and execute both forms of warfare. Next the literature review compiles recent studies on SOF and CF integration, followed

[7] The President, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017), 29; Demarest, *Winning Irregular Wars*, 69.

[8] Another term commonly used for Conventional Forces is General Purpose Forces. Joint Special Operations University, *Special Operations Forces Reference Manual*, 4th ed. (MacDill AFB, FL: JSOU Press, 2015), 2-24.

by a discussion of SOF's efforts to build HQ capability at the operational level.[9] Finally, it highlights the continuing conflict to maintain long-term IW capability within the joint force while also prioritizing skill and readiness in large-scale conflict and TW.

Types of Warfare

Before examining organizational and planning options, this paper must clarify and distinguish between the two main types of warfare: IW and TW. Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces*, defines IW, "as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)."[10] The core joint activities of IW include, "Counterterrorism (CT), Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Counterinsurgency (COIN), or Stability Operations (StabOps), as well as relevant Security Force Assistance (SFA) and Counterthreat Finance (CTF)."[11] Within a given conflict, all seven of IW's

[9] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), I-13. The operational level of war "links the tactical employment of forces to national strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on the planning and execution of operations using operational art."

[10] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, change 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), I-6.

[11] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3210.06A, *Irregular Warfare* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), D-1. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff IW assessment focuses on the primary activities of CT, UW, FID, COIN, and StabOps combined with relevant SFA and CTF to assess IW capability and capacity. US Department of Defense, DODD 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare* (2017), 1. IW can include any relevant DoD activity and operation such as counterterrorism; unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; counterinsurgency; and stability operations that, in the context of IW, involve establishing or re-establishing order in a fragile state or territory; Joint doctrine offers the following definitions for the seven IW core activities: Counterterrorism: Activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals. Unconventional Warfare: Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. Foreign Internal Defense: Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Counterinsurgency: Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. Stability Operations (Changed to Stability Activities): Various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Security Force Assistance: The Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign

core activities can be ongoing. The seven interrelated IW activities require expertise in operational precision, civil-military coordination, cultural awareness, and building partner or host nation capacity. IW is distinct from other forms of warfare in its focus on population-centric activities, such as influencing or gaining the support of the population.[12]

In contrast, the other doctrinal form of warfare, known as TW, involves "A violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions and alliances of nation-states."[13] Per doctrine, the conflict usually encompasses, "force-on-force military operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional forces and special operations forces (SOF) against each other in all physical domains."[14] TW centers on the defeat of the adversary's military forces. Both TW and IW involve violent conflict, however, in IW a less militarily-capable opponent must mitigate or defeat a militarily superior opponent through irregular ways and means in order to overcome the opponent's quantitative advantages or strengths across the instruments of national power.[15]

As a conflict progresses, achieving victory or success may require both TW and IW. Even in conflicts that start out conventionally, phases that follow the domination or defeat of the enemy may entail a transition from TW to IW. As Clausewitz notes, even in defeat, "the defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil."[16] However, these transitions may not involve a distinct shift and can be non-linear or gradual and blended, making it difficult for

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security forces and their supporting institutions. Counter Threat Finance: Activities conducted to deny, disrupt, destroy, or defeat the generation, storage, movement, and use of assets to fund activities that support an adversary's ability to negatively affect US interests.

[12] US Joint Staff, JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (2017), I-6; James B. Hickey, Land Warfare Paper No. 45, *Surprise, Shock, and Daring: The Future of Mobile, All Arms Warfare* (Arlington, VA: The Institute of Land Warfare Association of the United States Army, April 2004), 38.

[13] US Joint Staff, JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (2017), I-5.

[14] Ibid., I-5.

[15] US Joint Staff, JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (2017), I-12. Instruments of National Power are diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.

[16] Clausewitz, *On War*, 80.

the force to properly align their operations with the changing nature of the operational environment.[17] Both case studies highlight the difficulties planners and the joint force face when mitigating the operational risks associated with phase transitions between TW and IW. The main difference between phases is the switch in objective; for IW the critical needs are to influence or gain the support of the population, rather than to defeat the opponent's military forces.[18] An additional important difference is that IW often requires integration and building capacity outside the US Military, rather than being primarily concerned with the capability of the US forces as prioritized in TW.[19]

US Military Organizational Options

To execute multiple IW or TW operations that are geographically separated, the US Military employs JTF organizational solutions, which place personnel and equipment into autonomous organizations that plan and lead operations. The JTFs execute campaigns and operations to accomplish military objectives set by strategic leaders; these operations may be directed against a state, a terrorist group, and/or an insurgent organization. JTF planners use the elements of operational design as a framework for the conceptual and detailed planning that guides forces throughout a campaign.[20]

The joint force maintains three organizational options for employment. The Combatant Command (CCMD) is a standing command responsible for a geographic or functional area. Both

[17] US Joint Staff, JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (2017), I-4 - I-5; Conrad C. Crane, "Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won," *Military Review* (May-June 2005): 11, accessed April 3, 2017, https://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art006.pdf.

[18] US Joint Staff, JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (2017), I-6.

[19] Steven Metz, "Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy" (Research, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2007), 72, 74.

[20] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), IV-19. The Elements of Operational Design include termination, military end state, objectives, effects, center of gravity, decisive points, lines of operation and lines of effort, direct and indirect approach, anticipation, operational reach, culmination, arranging operations, and forces and functions.

a Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) and a Functional CCMD can employ forces within their organization to execute operations and meet military objectives. An example of a Geographic CCMD used in the case studies below is US Central Command (CENTCOM), which is responsible for twenty countries that comprise most of the Middle East. An example of a Functional CCMD is US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), which is responsible for "planning and conducting special operations."[21] Below the CCMD level, the second type of joint organization is the Subordinate Unified Command. With Secretary of Defense authorization, a CCMD can create a lower echelon command to execute functions and responsibilities similar to a CCMD within their functional or geographic area.[22] An example of a subordinate unified command is Special Operations Command Central. Special Operations Command Central is CENTCOM's Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) and a functional subordinate unified command. Special Operations Command Central is responsible for overseeing all special operations in CENTCOM's twenty countries.

The third organizational option for joint operations is the JTF. A JTF is formed to execute missions with specific and limited objectives; with the accomplishment of those objectives, the establishing authority dissolves the JTF. For example, following the initial defeat of Iraq in 2003 CENTCOM created Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-7 in Iraq to lead all military stability operations and facilitate the eventual transfer of security and stability to capable Iraqi forces.[23]

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[21] US Joint Staff, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (2017), IV-5, within CCMDs they can be divided into "unified" that include personnel from two or more military departments or "specified" that usually include forces from only one military department; US Department of Defense, "Unified Command Plan," accessed February 24, 2018, https://www.defense.gov/About/Military-Departments/Unified-Combatant-Commands/.

[22] US Joint Staff, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (2017), IV-5; Joint Special Operations University, "Joint Command and Control and Special Operations Command Relationships PPT," JSOU, Slide 10, accessed February 25, 2018, https://jsou.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/library/Library%20Content/JSOU%20References/JSOU-ISOF/Lesson%20Presentations/Lesson%202.1%20%2827Sept12%29/Lesson%202%20PowerPoint/L2%20C2%20Final%20PPT.pdf.

[23] Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 144-145, 157.

The JTF provides options and unity of action for the Joint Force Commander. JTF designating authorities include the Secretary of Defense, a Combatant Commander, or a subordinate unified commander.[24] The designating authority creates a JTF to meet crisis response, limited contingencies, or significant operations and campaigns, and aligns forces, delegates required authorities and relationships and establishes guidelines to begin operations.[25]

The US Military uses several options to build JTF HQ. Regardless of the generating force, the preferred method leverages an existing command and control organization.[26] The CCMD can employ a service component HQ such as the Army Service Component Command, or a standing HQ from the service's subordinate forces. An example of a service subordinate force includes the US Army Corps.[27] The final option to form a JTF is to create one from current personnel in an ad hoc fashion. While permissible, this last option is the least preferable, because the lack of prior training, internal procedures, administrative requirements, and personnel multiply the inherent challenges of forming a JTF HQ in response to a crisis or contingency.[28]

To ensure the availability and capability of existing HQ to fill the commander and core staff positions of a JTF, JTF designating authorities monitor the readiness of subordinate HQ to ensure that, if required, they are able to meet JTF HQ mission requirements. When existing HQ maintain readiness levels to take command of JTF HQ, the designating authority certifies them as JTF-capable HQ.[29] At the operational level, doctrine deems the lieutenant general-led US Army

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[24] US Joint Staff, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (2017), IV-5. Additionally, an existing JTF commander can create a sub-JTF within their organization.

[25] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), I-1.

[26] Ibid., II-1.

[27] US Joint Staff, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (2017), IV-5. Other examples include Marine Expeditionary Force and Numbered Air Force. For this monograph, the US Army Corps provides the primary Conventional Force organization based on historical use in past conflicts.

[28] US Joint Staff, JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters* (2018), II-1, B-1.

[29] Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff 7, *Forming a JTF HQ: Insights, and Best Practices Focus Paper* (Suffolk, VA: Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff 7, March 2013), 4-5; US Department

Corps HQ the organization of choice to lead a JTF.[30] This doctrinal practice helps Combatant Commanders mitigate the risks of building ad hoc HQ due to poorly forecasted crises or contingencies. However, this doctrine assumes that an Army Corps comprised of conventional, TW trained forces, is the right choice for any type of conflict. Currently, there are three standing Corps HQ in the US Army.[31] Historical practice and doctrine both show that that use of a Corps as the organization of choice to lead a JTF in large-scale campaigns is the accepted proclivity of senior US Military leaders, regardless of the character of the conflict.

A perfect example highlighting the traditional doctrine-based solution for sourcing a JTF HQ occurred with Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq. In June 2014, political leaders directed CENTCOM to begin military operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. In response to the building crisis, CENTCOM created the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve in October and placed their US Army Service Component Command CENTCOM (ARCENT) HQ in charge of it.[32] As the conflict increased in scale, time, and requirements beyond what ARCENT could handle, the commander requested additional support from the Joint Staff. In September 2015, US Army III Armored Corps HQ provided the command structure to fill the JTF HQ, replacing ARCENT.[33] A JTF-capable HQ, III Corps HQ, assumed command of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, a multinational

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of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 2012), B-1.

[30] US Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-92, *Corps Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2016), 1-2.

[31] Timothy C. Davis and Robert M. Balcavage, "Regionally Aligned Forces: Concept Viability and Implementations" (Carlisle Compendia of Collaborative Research, US Army War College Student Publications, 2015), 124, accessed April 2, 2018, http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs /carlislecompendia/issues/mar2015/RAF9.pdf.

[32] Before the formation of CJTF-OIR, CENTCOM used ARCENT as the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC). This made ARCENT responsible for all land operations in the region.

[33] Center for Army Lessons Learned, 16-10, *ARCENT Transition to Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, March 2016), 1-2, accessed September 5, 2017, http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/16-10.pdf.

force conducting a limited war against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in both Iraq and Syria, until its replacement by XVIII Airborne Corps HQ in August 2015.[34] This example outlines not just HQ options, but also displays the JTF HQ progression and connection between an organic CCMD HQ like ARCENT to the service-based HQ of III Armored Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps. As this example shows, in the current operating environment, Combatant Commanders may require multiple organizational options to handle JTF HQ requirements.

Phasing Joint Operations

This section examines the operational design element of "arranging operations" to outline phasing requirements and how a JTF HQ can be sequenced and arranged to meet changing military objectives. The elements of operational design allow commanders and staffs to develop conceptual plans to solve complex military problems.[35] One of the elements, "arranging operations," involves the sequencing and arranging of joint forces to best execute tasks and activities to meet military objectives.[36] A vital tool for arranging forces is phasing. Phasing provides a way to manage complex joint operations by integrating and synchronizing similar activities.[37] A phase offers, "a definitive stage during which a large portion of the forces and joint/multinational capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities."[38] Planners distinguish phases based on time, purpose, and activities, but must ensure synergy across all phases to accomplish the overall campaign objectives. Figure 1 from Joint Publication 3-0 provides an example of joint phasing for a six phase operation outlined at the top of the figure:

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[34] Fort Hood Sentinel, "III Armored Corps Transfers CJTF-OIR Command," August 25, 2016, accessed March 20, 2018, http://www.forthoodsentinel.com/news/iii-armored-corps-transfers-cjtf-oir-command/article_57b2111a-6a19-11e6-bc7c-d7e8d73548b6.html.

[35] US Joint Staff, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (2017), II-4.

[36] US Joint Staff, JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (2017), IV-36.

[37] US Joint Staff, JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (2017), IV-38. Others tools for arranging operations: branches and sequels, operational pauses, and the development of a notional Time-Phased Force Deployment Data.

[38] US Joint Staff, JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (2017), IV-40.

Phase 0-Shape, Phase I-Deter, Phase II-Seize the Initiative, Phase III-Dominate, Phase IV-Stabilize, and Phase V-Enable Civil Authority. Phase transitions often include a distinct "shift in focus by the joint force, often accompanied by changes in command or support relationships."[39]



Figure 1. Phasing an Operation Based on Predominant Military Activities.
Source: US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), V-13.

The JTFs use phasing as a tool to "visualize, plan, and execute" operations and "define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose to achieve objectives."[40] The latest version of Joint Planning 5-0 removed the conceptual joint phasing model outlining the six phases of an operation. While not eliminating the definition or use of phasing, it attempted to add

[39] US Joint Staff, JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (2017), V-14.

[40] US Joint Staff, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (2017), V-13.

flexibility by not limiting planners to the six specific phases outlined in figure 1.[41] Although recently removed from Joint Publication 5-0, the six-phase joint phasing model serves as a "common reference point" between commanders and planners and provides a framework for the two case studies.[42]

In regards to IW, an essential aspect of the Joint Phasing Model involves the transition between Phase III-Dominate and Phase IV-Stabilize. At this transition, regardless of the character of the war, friendly forces have dominated or defeated the enemy, which facilitates a transition from primarily offensive operations to primarily stability operations.[43] The change involves dealing with a now-defeated enemy that faces the decision to capitulate, continue conducting an IW campaign, or transition to IW from TW. In all three situations, the JTF handling the transition must maintain a position of advantage over the dominated adversary. An operation executed flawlessly from Phase 0-Shape to Phase III-Dominate can be derailed in Phase IV-Stabilize when the priority objective changes from defeating the enemy's forces to gaining the support of the population through IW activities.[44]

The challenge for military leaders is creating a force at the operational level that is uniquely tailored to accomplish shifting objectives within a campaign. The US Military maintains organizational options with GCCs and functional component commands, but the most likely option is the creation of a JTF led by an existing HQ. As the JTF leads the campaign, the character of the conflict can change from TW to IW as it progresses. To accommodate such changes, JTF planners arrange operations through the use of joint phasing. As mentioned above, these phase transitions indicate the need for adjustments in time, purpose, activities, forces, and

[41] US Joint Staff, JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (2017), iii; The Decisive Point, "Reviewing Joint Publication 5-0," August 26, 2017, accessed February 25, 2018, https://www.thedecisivepoint.org /news/2017/8/26/reviewing-joint-publication-5-0.

[42] The Decisive Point, "Reviewing Joint Publication 5-0."

[43] US Joint Staff, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (2017), V-10.

[44] Crane, "Phase IV Operations," 12.

resources. However, under the current construct, the military has limited HQ options for IW outside of a CF JTF-capable HQ such as the US Army Corps HQ. Such conventionally-focused HQ may be more adept at executing Phase I-Deter, Phase II-Seize the Initiative, and Phase III-Dominate operations, but less adept at Phase 0-Shape, Phase IV-Stabilize, or Phase V-Enable Civil Authority.[45] Therefore, the military's current JTF organizational structure may bring inherent limitations in its ability to execute IW.

Types of Forces

The discussion of different HQ options requires an examination of the differences between CF and SOF. CF comprise the predominance of US Military forces, and per doctrine "are characterized by lethal firepower, robust sustainment, extensive command and control capabilities, and relatively large numbers of personnel."[46] These attributes make CF the force of choice for TW where the mechanism for victory is the defeat of an adversary and focus on maneuver and firepower to achieve both operational and strategic objectives.[47]

The SOF encompasses specially trained forces under the Functional Combatant Command of USSOCOM Commander.[48] They perform Special Operations, which:

> Require unique modes of employment, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment. They are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments, and are characterized by one or more of the following: time-sensitivity,

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[45] US Special Operations Command, "Hybrid Structures" (White Paper, USSOCOM, MacDill AFB, FL, 2014), 8-9, accessed September 1, 2014, http://www.soc.mil/AUSA2014/Hybrid%20 structures%20White%20Paper.pdf; Brian S. Petit, *Going Big by Getting Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase Zero* (Denver, CO: Outskirts Press, 2013), 166-167.

[46] Air Land Sea Application Center, *CF/SOF Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability* (Ft Eustis, VA: Air Land Sea Application Center, March 2010), 1.

[47] US Joint Staff, JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (2017).

[48] US Joint Staff, JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (2017), xvii. Comprised of assets and personnel from all four services, designated SOF include: Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), US Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), US Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command (MARSOC), and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).

> clandestine or covert nature, low visibility, work with or through indigenous forces, greater requirements for regional orientation and cultural expertise, and a higher degree of risk.[49]

The SOF operational challenges necessitate flexibility and ready integration with interagency, partner nations and CF. SOF typically operate in constrained environments requiring cultural awareness, innovation, and the discriminatory use of violence. Their integration, partnering, and politically sensitive expertise and solutions provide a competent force to conduct IW.[50] Comparing these SOF expertise themes with previously discussed IW expertise needs of "operational precision, civil-military coordination, cultural awareness, and building partner or host nation capacity" offers a strong justification for employing SOF to execute IW activities.

When crises and contingencies require the creation of a JTF, both CF and SOF are called upon to support operations, but typically a CF HQ usually commands the JTF. The justification for CF command is the preponderance of personnel and readiness maintained by CF HQ to staff a JTF. Typically, "SOF Command and Control tends to be very lean, agile, and flexible, without much excess capacity. CF Command and Control tends to be robust, capable, and resilient, but it is also slower to respond to changing situations."[51] Within the CF HQ options, the US Army Corps is the most versatile organization and is the force of choice to command the JTF.[52] Corps HQ are tasked to retain readiness across the full spectrum of operations—offensive, defensive, and stability operations—normally conducted against enemy centers of gravity.[53] When called upon to form a JTF, the Corps adds augmentation from all of the services, the interagency, and

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[49] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), I-1.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Jason Wesbrock, Glenn Harned, and Preston Plous, "Special Operation Forces and Conventional Forces," *PRISM* 6, no. 3 (December 2016): 91.

[52] US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2014), 4-4.

[53] US Joint Staff, JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (2017); US Department of the Army, "Combined Arms Training Strategy for the Corps HQ 52410K300," September 20, 2017, accessed April 1, 2018, https://dtms-prt.army.mil/atnportalui/cats/, 4, 8, and 9.

contractors; joint organizations exist to specifically provide the Corps with increased JTF capabilities.[54]

While doctrinally and organizationally the Army Corps are set up take command of JTFs, the expansive readiness requirements for undertaking full spectrum operations limits CF specialization in any one area. Because of this, CF HQ's lack the ability to build and maintain long-term and preexisting relationships with the interagency and other relevant entities within the interorganizational community.[55] Corps simply do not have the time or resources to build relationships; their priority when not commanding a JTF is to maintain readiness in full spectrum operations.[56] A RAND study highlights this as a major shortfall for CF JTF HQ; these organizations wait until they are in theater or have been tasked to begin relationships with other external organizations, especially the Interagency, before they seek any integration.[57] With most CF HQ receiving five to six weeks of preparation and planning before employment as a JTF, the opportunity to build relationships pertinent to a specific conflict or geographic location is rather limited.[58] Additionally, with such a short notification timeline, there is usually up to a six-month

[54] US Army, FM 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations* (2014), 4-5 to 4-7.

[55] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2016), I-2; the interorganizational community is the "elements of DOD, relevant US government departments and agencies, state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; Nongovernmental Organizations; the private sector; and other mission partners."

[56] US Army, "Combined Arms Training Strategy for the Corps HQ 52410K300," 4.

[57] RAND Corporation, "Standing Up a More Capable Joint Task Force Headquarters" (Research Brief, RAND Corporation, 2011), 2, accessed April 3, 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs /research_briefs/RB9625/index1.html.

[58] RAND Corporation, "Standing Up a More Capable Joint Task Force Headquarters,"1; Patrick C. Sweeney, "A Primer for Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC)," United States Naval War College, February 2015, accessed April 3, 2018, https://navalwarcollege.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/pid-417470-dt-content-rid-2017029_1/courses/T.RES.JMO.SLC.UPDATES.2012/SLC%202017%20 Readings/JMO_SLC_2017/contents/Block%20II/NWC%20Readings/NWC%202003D%20JECC%20Primer%2009Feb2015.pdf, 3.

window for a JTF HQ to become fully staffed, which means HQ are assuming a JTF-command with minimal personnel in specialty areas and as liaisons.[59]

Available SOF HQ maintaining readiness as JTF-capable HQ are the TSOC found in each GCC and 1st Special Forces Command (1 SFC). A TSOC is a USSOCOM subordinate unified command that "perform broad, continuous missions uniquely suited to SOF capabilities" within their assigned GCC.[60] They have a unique command and control relationship, because while USSOCOM has Combatant Command of the TSOCs, the Secretary of Defense has given operational control of the TSOCs to their GCC.[61] There are seven TSOCs available to serve as JTF HQ.[62] 1 SFC is a SOF JTF-capable HQ based in the United States and a subordinate unit of United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC).[63] Its mission is "to organize, equip, train, and validated forces to conduct full spectrum special operations in support of USSOCOM, GCCs, American Ambassadors, and other governmental agencies."[64] The TSOCs and 1 SFC are organized to fill the role of the Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF), which is: "A modular, tailorable, and scalable SOF organization that allows USSOCOM to more efficiently provide integrated, fully capable, and enabled joint SOF to GCCs and subordinate Joint Force Commanders based on the strategic, operational, and tactical context."[65] The SOJTF provides command over all SOF within a joint force, and SOJTFs are often nested beneath a

[59] RAND Corporation, "Standing Up a More Capable Joint Task Force Headquarters," 1.

[60] US Joint Staff, JP 3-05, *Special Operations* (2014).

[61] Ibid., I-3.

[62] Ibid.

[63] US Department of the Army, John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and Office of Strategic Communication, "ARSOF Next: A Return to First Principles," *Special Warfare*, 9, accessed April 2, 2018, http://www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/archive/ARSOF_Next/ARSOF%20Next.pdf.

[64] US Army Special Operations, "1st Special Forces Command (Airborne)," Homepage, accessed April 2, 2018, http://www.soc.mil/USASFC/HQ.html.

[65] US Joint Staff, JP 3-05, *Special Operations* (2014).

larger JTF. Doctrine additionally notes that, when required, SOJTFs can also serve as the lead JTF, commanding both CF and SOF.[66]

However, one issue with current SOF HQ-commanded JTFs is that 1 SFC and the TSOCs are all commanded by "two-star" major generals.[67] In contrast, Army Corps are commanded by "three-star" lieutenant generals.[68] Lieutenant generals can command a higher level of echeloned forces than major generals. While TSOCs and 1 SFC provide JTFs with expertise in IW, these lower-level HQ simply do not offer the same capability in terms of integration with higher-ranking interorganizational partners. A 2011 RAND study highlights this difficulty, noting that Corps have an increased capability to command multiple units above the brigade level compared to a two-star command; this capability is critical in large-scale crises or contingencies, such as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.[69] Three-star HQ can handle operational level requirements such as interaction with strategic and political leaders; two-star HQ are better focused on overseeing and supporting tactical level commands, such as divisions and brigades.[70]

This difference in command level is particularly critical in IW. With political and whole of government solutions prioritized in IW, leaders must echelon the senior HQ with an appropriate level of political power. A lieutenant general differs from a major general in that the President of the United States directly appoints lieutenant generals.[71] In the heavily diplomatic

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[66] US Joint Staff, JP 3-05, *Special Operations* (2014), III-5.

[67] Joint Special Operations University, *Special Operations Forces Reference Manual*, 2-18, 3-2; US Special Operations Command, *SOF Campaign Planner's Handbook of Operational Art and Design*, Version 2.0 (Ft Bragg, NC: US Special Operations Command, 2014), IV-8, accessed March 25, 2018, https://community.apan.org/wg/aucoi/command__control_coordinating_activity_c2ca/m/mediagallery1/197013.

[68] US Army, FM 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations* (2014), 1-2.

[69] RAND Corporation, "Standing Up a More Capable Joint Task Force Headquarters," 2.

[70] US Army, FM 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations* (2014), 4-1 to 4-2, 4-4, 5-1 to 5-2.

[71] Section 601 of Title 10 states, "The President may designate positions of importance and responsibility to carry the grade of general or admiral or lieutenant general or vice admiral. . . . An officer

environment of IW, it helps to have the political power and experience of a lieutenant general, someone designated by the President, when dealing with US Ambassadors as well as leaders of other state governments and militaries. In Afghanistan, the CENTCOM commander, General Tommy Franks repeatedly stated his assumption that a lieutenant general could handle operational to strategic level requirements better than a major general based on greater experience and expertise in dealing with a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment.[72] Ultimately, the scale and scope of the crisis or contingency determines the force level requirements, but in IW a three-star command provides increased diplomatic power and influence critical to creating a political solution for a conflict.

In contrast to CF, which have competing requirements for large-scale full spectrum operations capability, and do not typically have time to build relationships prior to a JTF tasking, SOF organizations, as part of their ongoing requirements to be regionally oriented, culturally aware, and politically sensitive, routinely develop and maintain relationships with the interorganizational community.[73] SOF HQ focused on IW activities, and population-centric and political solutions share cross-organizational authorities, interests, and coordination with the interorganizational community.[74] This is due to similar SOF and interorganizational community objectives, such as "Defense, Diplomacy, and Development," which facilitate the development of critical and relevant relationships before conflict through a combination of the TSOCS, the

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assigned to any such position has the grade specified for that position if he is appointed to that grade by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate."

[72] Donald Wright and Martin E. Dempsey, *A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-September 2005* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 190.

[73] US Joint Staff, JP 3-05, *Special Operations* (2014), I-1, I-5; US Special Operations Command, *SOF Campaign Planner's Handbook of Operational Art and Design*, III-2.

[74] US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-05, *Army Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 4; US Army, "ARSOF Next: A Return to First Principles," 7.

Global SOF Network, and steady-state liaison positions.[75] As discussed above, one of the major shortfalls in the current JTF approach is the ability to build and maintain relationships with external organizations before a tasking or employment.[76] Therefore, SOF may be better aligned than CF to fulfill the necessity for coordination of whole of government approaches in IW.[77] Figure 2 outlines SOF JTF-capable HQs expertise and ubiquitous access within the interorganizational community when assuming command of the SOJTF.

[75] Joint Special Operations University, *Counterterrorism Reference Manual* (MacDill AFB, FL: JSOU Press, 2013), 4-6; David J. Kilcullen, "Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency" (Remarks delivered at the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington, DC, September 28, 2006), accessed March 31, 2018, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf. Three pillars of Defense, Diplomacy, and Development align with Kilcullen's similar concept of Security, Political, and Economic; US Joint Staff, JP 3-05, *Special Operations* (2014), I-1, I-8; US Special Operations Command, "Special Operations Forces Operating Concept," 7; US Department of the Army, John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and Office of Strategic Communication, "ARSOF 2022," *Special Warfare*, 20-22, accessed September 2, 2017, http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages /ARSOF2022_vFINAL.pdf; US Joint Staff, JP 3-05, *Special Operations* (2014), The Global SOF Network is viewed as an operational capability. "All SOF, whether in home station or deployed in support of the GCCs, are part of the global SOF network. Networking allows SOF to exchange information and intelligence and collaborate globally, which is essential to counter transnational and transregional terrorists and other enemies and adversaries. The global SOF network includes nodes and other liaison elements to coordinate and synchronize special operations. The key organization in each GCC's AOR is the TSOC"; US Army, FM 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations* (2014); Any mention of liaison elements for the Theater Army, Corps, and Division HQ deals with military to military liaison US or Multinational forces not interagency; US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2017), 2-6, Civil Military Operations centers can be established by Civil Affairs Commands, which supports each theater army.

[76] RAND Corporation, "Standing Up a More Capable Joint Task Force Headquarters," 2.

[77] Demarest, *Winning Irregular Wars*, 70.



Figure 2. Leveraging Joint and Interagency Ties to the Joint Forces.
Source: US Special Operations Command, *SOF Campaign Planner's Handbook of Operational Art and Design.* Version 2.0 (Ft Bragg, NC: US Special Operations Command, 2014), IV-8, accessed March 25, 2018, https://community.apan.org/wg/aucoi/command__control_coordinating_activity_c2ca/m/mediagallery1/197013.

In addition to coordination with the interorganizational community in order to execute whole of government missions, the objective of Building Partner Capacity (BPC) may also more naturally fit with SOF's areas of expertise. One common requirement in IW is the training of allied security forces. Usually, the Department of State takes lead in establishing a plan to train security forces, but a lack of comparable resources and training expertise typically places responsibility for plan execution on the US Military.[78] In IW environments, the JTF HQ needs to design, plan, and resource the mechanisms and infrastructure to build a competent military and police force, but this process historically takes a long time.[79] A key component is prior understanding or awareness of local culture and language to ensure training and its

[78] US Special Operations Command, *SOF Campaign Planner's Handbook of Operational Art and Design*, IV-1, IV-7; US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), III-3.

[79] Crane, "Phase IV Operations," 19.

implementation will be effective and meet overall objectives.[80] Similar to the interorganizational community coordination discussed earlier, a CF HQ serving as a JTF HQ often faces the challenge of building security forces without prior training or preparation in large-scale FID or SFA. External agents entering a war-torn environment cannot use cookie cutter mechanisms to build capacity. They must tailor their approach based on how the culture or region operates.[81] In contrast, SOF maintain familiarity and expertise in training indigenous forces and through existing partnerships have the ability to gain awareness and implement a training approach faster than a CF HQ.[82]

SOF-CF Integration

The Global War on Terror's focus on IW activities required both CF and SOF to regularly integrate and offered opportunities to analyze best practices and lessons learned. Several studies conducted by military officers analyzed the integration of CF and SOF within operations and phases requiring IW activity. Finally, realizing the immense challenges facing the total force, USSOCOM, with USASOC as a lead component, is actively evolving its force and expertise to expand SOF capabilities and mission command at the operational level of war, which fuels the requirement to analyze command and control options and build on the body of knowledge.

Most researchers assert that IW activities require forces explicitly built to conduct them.[83] Many authors specifically mention SOF as the force of choice for IW activities, but the scale and frequency of irregular threats may necessitate additional capability or augmentation from CF.

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[80] Andy Tamas, *Warriors and Nationbuilders: Development and the Military in Afghanistan* (Kingston Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 170.

[81] Raymond A. Millen, "Afghanistan: Reconstituting a Collapsed State" (Report, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, April 2005); Tamas, *Warriors and Nationbuilders*, 170.

[82] Richard D. Newton et al., JSOU Report 09-3, *Contemporary Security Challenges* (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2009), 68.

[83] Demarest, *Winning Irregular Wars*, ix-x, 17-18; US Special Operations Command, "The Gray Zone," 9.

Research shows IW requires a force capable of discriminate use of violence, a whole of government approach, and a training capability to build partner capacity and local legitimacy.[84]

The challenges of the War on Terror fueled the requirement to integrate IW expertise across SOF and CF.[85] In the first stages of the fight against Al Qaeda, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld asked the question, "Does DoD need to think through new ways to organize, train, equip and focus to deal with the global war on terror?"[86] Most research on potential answers to this question involved a discussion of SOF integration into CF, since most IW expertise before the War on Terror came from within SOF.[87]

The sizable proportion of SOF employed in the two conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq allowed opportunities for integration case studies where CF and SOF shared battle space and objectives for sustained periods of time. Several military officers have researched and analyzed case studies where SOF and CF attempted integration to improve the forces' overall effects and capability. Many of the findings centered on the requirement for unity of effort between SOF and

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[84] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Operating Concept (JOC), Irregular Warfare*, Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2007), G-1, accessed September 5, 2017, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/joc_iw_v1.pdf; The requirements of discriminate use of violence, a whole of government approach, and a training capability to build partner capacity and local legitimacy falls in line with USSOCOM's largest component, USASOC's development of two new Army Doctrinal terms, special warfare and surgical strike; US Army, ADP 3-05, *Army Special Operations* (2012), 1, Defines *Special warfare* as "working with and through others to assess and moderate behavior, address local conditions, and/or build indigenous warfighting capability, typically in long-duration campaigns." *Surgical strike* is "a primarily unilateral, scalable direct action capability that is employed in counterterrorism, counterproliferation, hostage rescue, kill/capture operations against designated targets, and other specialized tasks of strategic importance."

[85] Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff 7, *Forming a JTF HQ*, 28; US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001, as amended through 17 March 2009), 113. Doctrine defines *Integration* as, "the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole.

[86] Donald Rumsfeld, "Global War on Terrorism," *USA Today*, May 20, 2005, accessed August 30, 2017, https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm.

[87] Newton et al., JSOU Report 09-3, *Contemporary Security Challenges*, 3-4; David Maxwell, "Unconventional Warfare Does Not Belong to Special Forces," *War on the Rocks*, August 12, 2013, accessed April 1, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2013/08/unconventional-warfare-does-not-belong-to-special-forces/. The term IW finds its origin in UW doctrine before the War on Terror, and the underlying view at that time supported UW as a SOF-centric mission set that remained a compartmentalized supporting activity to CF TW.

CF and the potential for unity of command.[88] Researchers identified ways to accomplish unity of effort through more flexible command and control structures and relationships, trained liaisons at the operational level between SOF and CF, and institutional education and exposure to the other's capabilities.[89] Underlying some of the research was the historical view that SOF existed to support CF. However, tactical missions during the War on Terror have helped to change this view.[90]

Several articles identify the need to support improvements in operational-level SOF command and control options capable of handling IW challenges.[91] In its Operating Concept, USSOCOM outlined the future of "integrated campaigning," with a focus on partnership and integration: "A campaign will expand from a series of related major military operations to a series

[88] US Joint Staff, JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (2017), V-1, *Unity of effort* means, "Coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure." *Unity of command* denotes, "All forces operate under a single commander with requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose." Grant M. Martin, "Special Operations and Conventional Forces: How to Improve Unity of Effort Using Afghanistan as a Case Study" (Monograph, US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2009), 51; Michael D. Hastings, "The Integration of Conventional Forces and Special Operation Forces" (Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2005), 6-7, 86-87, accessed September 5, 2017, http://docplayer.net/38249048-The-integration-of-conventional-forces-and-special-operations-forces.html; Gregory M. Stroud, "SOF Integration with Conventional Forces: A Doctrine Gap?" (Monograph, US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2012), 37-38; James M. Bright, "Operational Seam: The Command and Control of Conventional and Special Operations Forces" (Paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 2007), 2, 6-7.

[89] Hastings, 19, 86-87; Martin, 11, 49-50; Richard M. Finfera, "Leveraging Capabilities: The Integration of Special Operation Forces and Conventional Forces" (Monograph, US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010), 57-58, 62, accessed September 5, 2017, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a522952.pdf; 62; Bright, 14; Joel P. Ellison and Daniel G. Hodermarsky, "Conventional and Special Operations Forces Integration at the Operational Level" (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2012), 61.

[90] Hastings, 80-81, 88; Stroud, 28-30; Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn, *On Point* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Press, 2004), 145. A case study that highlights integration through SOF leading CF occurred during the opening invasion of OIF. Analyzed in two different studies, the mission involved the JSOTF-North gaining tactical control (TACON) of the 173rd Airborne Brigade while conducting Unconventional Warfare and partnering with Kurdish fighters in Northern Iraq. A successful mission, the command and control relationship proved unique by offering the first instance since the Vietnam War of a CF commander working for a SOF commander. The analysis supports this monograph's argument that when IW activities take priority, and political sensitivities exist, SOF Leadership provides a more capable command option to lead a joint SOF and CF effort.

[91] US Special Operations Command, "Special Operations Forces Operating Concept," 7; US Army, "ARSOF 2022," 23; US Army, "ARSOF Next: A Return to First Principles," 7.

of integrated JIIM activities to achieve operational and strategic objectives. . . . Campaign plans will be used to coordinate participation and support from partners when the US is in the lead, or will be developed to support partner led-campaigns."[92] Integrated campaigning invests in SOF partnerships to enable whole of government approaches. In addition to integration, to improve unity of effort during individual campaigns, USSOCOM intends to place all SOF under one special operations commander, instead of parceling out SOF to different CF units and organizations.[93] One of USASOC's long-term goals is examining the feasibility of an integrated SOF and CF US Army corps-level HQ with internal joint interagency intergovernmental and multinational liaison capabilities that focuses on executing IW activities.[94]Additionally, USASOC developed a SOF operational art and design concept that complements and builds on exiting joint operational art and design to improve SOF HQ integration, planning, and command and control.[95]

Current SOF organizational options reinforce a paradigm that SOF ultimately supports CF.[96] The rank structure of the TSOC and 1 SFC supports this assertion. As SOF's highest-level JTF-capable HQ, and the pre-identified organizations to fill the initial and longer-term SOJTF requirements, they both have two-star major generals as commanders.[97] US Army Doctrine denotes two-star commands as a tactical-level JTFs that are only capable of lead-JTF command in

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[92] US Special Operations Command, "Special Operations Forces Operating Concept," 3.

[93] Ibid., 5-7.

[94] US Army, "ARSOF 2022," 22-23; US Department of the Army, John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and Office of Strategic Communication, "ARSOF 2022 Part II," *Special Warfare*, 11, accessed December 10, 2017, http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/ARSOF%202022%20Part%202.PDF. The ARSOF 2022 vision of "Facilitate SOF Mission Command" covers this topic, and to vector research and discussion, offers potential mission command improvements under short-term, mid-term, and long-term outlooks.

[95] US Special Operations Command, *SOF Campaign Planner's Handbook of Operational Art and Design*, I-1.

[96] Thomas K. Adams, *U.S. Special Forces in Action* (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 293-294.

[97] Joint Special Operations University, *Special Operations Forces Reference Manual*, 2-18, 3-2; US Special Operations Command, *SOF Campaign Planner's Handbook of Operational Art and Design*, IV-8.

limited contingencies. The two-star command requires heavy augmentation and usually falls underneath an existing CF three-star Corps-led JTF.[98] Within the current force structure, a glass ceiling exists for SOF HQ to operate as a campaign's lead JTF, due to the scalable limit of the SOJTF's capabilities as a major general-led HQ.

A white paper titled "Hybrid Structures," written by USASOC in 2014, builds on the concept of improving SOF leadership at the operational level with a "hybrid (SOF/CF) corps-level HQ." The organization synergizes SOF and CF forces under one commander, but transitions from a CF to SOF commander based on the Joint Phase of the campaign. Joint Phases I-Deter, II-Seize the Initiative, and III-Dominate most likely necessitate a conventional commander, with SOF or some other US authority providing the lead during Phases 0-Shape, IV-Stability, and V-Enable civil authorities.[99] The hybrid command adjusts to the mission requirements based on the operation's phase. The whitepaper outlines several fundamental assumptions: the GCC's will request SOF to take lead of the JTF at the three-star level for "regional CONPLANS, OPLANS, contingencies, or crisis action planning," any SOF growth structure will be limited, and mission readiness levels of any HQ will be resourced and maintained. Finally, the whitepaper argues that future conflict will require expertise and capability in IW from a diverse force of SOF, CF, and Unified Action Partners."[100] The paper provides a well-researched argument for a hybrid CF and SOF command structure. It sets the foundation for potential SOF HQ options, but it was written before an institutional change in focus to reprioritize CF HQ to large-scale conflict and TW.[101] The shift in CF HQ focus warrants an answer for how the joint force can maintain IW expertise at the organizational level, which the "Hybrid Structures" concept could provide. However, this

[98] US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-90, *Offense and Defense* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2012), 2-16 - 2-17.

[99] US Special Operations Command, "Hybrid Structures," 11.

[100] Ibid., 4.

[101] Mike Lundy and Rich Creed, "The Return of US Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations," *Military Review* (November-December 2017): 14.

whitepaper only looks at this issue from an ARSOF lens. This whitepaper does identify the utility of a three-star command in leading a JTF, but mainly for the purposes of better integration between CF and SOF. The paper does not address the benefits of a more IW-capable JTF to the joint force. This paper also does not discuss the need for a JTF that can focus on whole of government and training partner security forces on a large scale.

Changes in US Senior Leader Priorities

The current problem facing the US Military is that, while future IW requirements exist, US civilian and military leaders see large-scale combat operations or TW as a bigger threat to the nation than IW.[102] The last seventeen years of IW experience and knowledge improved the US military's capabilities in this area, but those capabilities may easily diminish with personnel changes and an institutional shift in priorities to addressing peer threats and large-scale conflict.[103] The 2018 National Defense Strategy outlines the new priority; "Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security."[104] New doctrine reflects this shift in importance: "As the Army and the Joint Force focused on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism at the expense of other capabilities, our adversaries watched, learned, adapted, modernized and devised strategies that put us at a position of relative disadvantage in places where we may be required to fight."[105] Lieutenant General Michael Lundy asserts that focusing on IW capabilities throughout the War on Terror came at a cost to TW and large-scale

[102] US Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (2017), 1-2-1-3.

[103] US Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (2017), 1-1. A peer threat is "An adversary or enemy with capabilities and capacity to oppose US forces across multiple domains worldwide or in a specific region where they enjoy a position of relative advantage." Large-scale conflict means, "Major operations and campaigns aimed at defeating an enemy's armed forces and military capabilities in support of national objectives."

[104] US Department of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America*, accessed April 6, 2018, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf, 1.

[105] US Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (2017), Foreword.

conflict capabilities.[106] The new US Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, reflects this logic with significant changes in the role of echelons at division and corps, from HQ operations to large-scale maneuver of formations.[107] In sum, the US Army is reprioritizing the role of its CF away from IW activities and towards TW and large-scale combat operations.

With a prioritized requirement to prepare for and address near-peer adversaries like China or Russia, sustained IW activities could inhibit the training and readiness required for a CF HQ to adequately prepare to defeat its primary adversary. SOF HQ do not have the same requirements to maintain readiness in the maneuver of large-scale formations like a CF HQ. General Lundy's statement implies that past IW activities inundated CF with requirements that detracted from their preparation and expertise in large-scale combat operations.[108] The logic is that IW activities such as Counterterrorism, Counterinsurgency, and FID may overwhelm CF HQ with mission requirements that detract from their readiness for strategic near peer threats like Russia and China. Inverting this logic, a reprioritization to large-scale conflict will over time reduce readiness in IW activities and expertise. However, this requirement to balance competing priorities is an issue for CF HQ that does not exist for SOF HQ. SOF are doctrinally required to focus on IW activities and expertise.[109] With military leaders and CF HQ shifting their focus to large-scale conflict and TW, increasing the growth structure and resourcing of SOF JTF-capable HQ could mitigate risk to the joint force's institutional IW capability and expertise.

Theory

As described in the previous section, civilian and military leaders have conflicting demands to maintain long-term IW capability and expertise, while also increasing proficiency and readiness in large-scale conflict and TW. With a change in senior leaders' priority to TW and

[106] Lundy and Creed, "The Return of US Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations," 15.

[107] Ibid.

[108] US Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (2017), Foreword.

[109] US Joint Staff, JP 3-05, *Special Operations* (2014), II-2.

large-scale conflict, a risk exists that the valuable expertise and capability in IW current in US forces will diminish. The problem is that, should IW proficiency decline, but then be required in future crisis or contingency, the regaining of such skills takes time.

Increasing SOF growth at the operational HQ level, consistent with USASOC's "Hybrid Structures" whitepaper recommendations, can institutionalize the joint force's IW capability via SOF structures, while enabling CF HQ to prioritize readiness and proficiency in large-scale conflict and TW. A SOF HQ resourced, trained, and prepared to lead the JTF in operational phases focused on IW activities, prioritizing integration with the interorganizational community and training partner nation security forces, provides senior leaders flexibility and risk mitigation for other priorities. With this capability, senior leaders can redirect CF-led JTF HQ to TW activities and large-scale maneuver, while also improving the joint forces overall capability. However, available doctrinal JTF-capable options for SOF only exist up to the major general two-star commands of the TSOCs and 1 SFC. Therefore, transitioning a HQ between phases based on changes in the type of warfare predominating also means a transition in the level of HQ; handover to a SOF HQ most likely decreases the command level from lieutenant general to major general.

To more effectively organize for future conflicts, this monograph argues that joint doctrine should specify the creation of a standing three-star SOF HQ capable of commanding an IW-focused JTF. Developing a three-star SOF HQ command offers three major benefits. First, the command is better organized and echeloned to integrate with the interorganizational community's forces. Second, the command's expertise and specialization in developing allied state's security forces enhances the support and coordination of large-scale partner nation security forces training. The final benefit is that such an organization would mitigate risk to the joint force's readiness in IW-focused phases and operations, as CF HQ refocuses on training and readiness to TW.

Long-term success in IW requires whole of government solutions more than military solutions.[110] In joint operations focused on IW, military leaders and organizations must seek and build relationships with the interorganizational community prior to conflict.[111] Doing so allows the US Military to understand and develop shared objectives and regional awareness with these organizations even though they may not fall under one single chain of command. Building relationships prior to conflict allows a HQ to learn and better address the different needs and desires of the interorganizational community.[112] This fuels unity of effort and improves overall US organizational performance. CF organizations and leaders usually initiate these relationships and build subsequent coordination after the conflict begins, and only when their organizations get tasked to participate. CF HQ do not have the same preexisting organizational relationships to the interorganizational community or forces that SOF maintains through a combination of the TSOCs, Global SOF Network, and liaison positions. A SOF JTF-capable HQ ability to leverage and improve these existing relationships with the key stakeholders in the interorganizational community can outperform a CF HQ in implementing whole of government solutions at the operational level in IW.

A three-star JTF-capable SOF HQ knows it most likely will not have responsibility to command in Phase I-Deter, Phase II-Seize the Initiative, and III-Dominate, which enables it to focus on Phase IV-Stabilize, and other IW activities. In theory, any JTF should forecast its deployment and develop regional expertise and preparation through the opening phases of an operation, but in reality, unforeseen crises and contingencies often reduce the available time to

[110] US Joint Staff, JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (2017), I-6; Metz, "Learning from Iraq," vii, 71.

[111] Crane, "Phase IV Operations," 11.

[112] Mary Jo Hatch, *Organization Theory: Modern Symbolic and Postmodern Perspectives*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 94; US Special Operations Command, *SOF Campaign Planner's Handbook of Operational Art and Design*, IV-3.

prepare.[113] SOF' existing organizational links to each GCC through the TSOCs, Global SOF Network, and liaison positions enable the best infrastructure and network to build regional expertise and relationships in a timely fashion.

The next benefit for a senior SOF HQ in IW is the expertise to build partner nation capacity and security forces on a large scale. In IW, the legitimacy of a partner nation's government and security forces offers the long-term solution for sustainable security and stability.[114] The goal is to transfer responsibility for security to a capable partner nation and redeploy US forces.[115] BPC requires an understanding of indigenous culture and dynamics to prevent civil wars, inadvertent delegitimization of the local government, and destabilization in neighboring countries. The resources requirements and in-depth planning needed to build partner capacity usually place the responsibility for BPC on the military, though again there is a requirement for interorganizational integration. As described above, SOF maintain proficiency and expertise in working with indigenous forces, conducting FID, and regional and cultural awareness. Leveraging a SOF HQ as the JTF lead in a phase requiring large-scale development of partner capacity focused on training security forces employs SOF expertise and relationships to improve the joint forces IW capability at the operational level of command.

As described in the preceding section, the final benefit to this new three-star SOF JTF-capable HQ is that such an organization would mitigate risk to the joint force's readiness in IW-focused phases and operations, as CF HQ refocuses on training and readiness to TW. Research and history support the belief that the United States will face IW requirements in the future, but with the change in prioritization, away from IW to the larger existential threat of TW and large-scale conflict, the military faces the real risk of losing the institutional knowledge built over the

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[113] RAND Corporation, "Standing Up a More Capable Joint Task Force Headquarters," 1.

[114] Joseph D. Celeski, Report 05-2, *Operationalizing COIN* (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2005), 73-75, accessed September 5, 2017, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=476311.

[115] Ibid., 75.

last seventeen years during the War on Terror.[116] Creating a three-star SOF JTF-capable HQ puts organizational ownership in an operationally employable entity and ensures long-term IW capability within the joint force.

In sum, to ensure proper capability and organization for future conflicts, joint doctrine should specify the creation of a standing three-star SOF HQ capable of commanding an IW-focused JTF. Developing a three-star SOF HQ command offers better coordination and integration with the interorganizational community, and provides expertise to support and coordinate large-scale partner nation security forces training. Finally, a three-star SOF JTF-capable HQ mitigates risk to the joint force's readiness in IW-focused phases and operations, as CF HQ refocuses on training and readiness to TW. In order to better understand the benefits of this proposed organizational change, this monograph now turns to analyze two cases studies of JTF command transitions. The study of transitions in Afghanistan and Iraq examine the HQ shortfalls with interorganizational community coordination and integration, and the conduct of large-scale BPC operations focused on the training of allied security forces.

Case Studies

The Afghanistan and Iraq case studies offer insight into CF JTF HQ commands leading IW efforts. Both studies are situated early in the War on Terror, when pre-conflict HQ focus was initially not on IW but on large-scale conflict and TW, and minimal IW expertise existed outside of SOF. Given the current environment, where senior military leaders are prioritizing HQ away from IW and towards large-scale conflict and TW, the case studies offer insight into challenges the force might face in the future if the current IW capabilities are lost. Each case study is analyzed through a qualitative review of after action reports, open source intelligence reports, and applicable doctrine. The first case study examines the Phase IV transition of a US Army Corps

[116] Steven Carlton-Ford and Morten G. Ender, ed., *The Routledge Handbook of War and Society: Iraq and Afghanistan* (New York: Routledge 2011), 86-87.

HQ during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The second case study focuses on the Phase IV transition of another US Army Corps HQ during Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq.

Operation Enduring Freedom Case Study

This paper's first case study looked at the US senior command HQ and associated IW activities in Afghanistan from the spring of 2002 to the fall of 2003, during the transition from Phase III-Dominate to Phase IV-Stabilize. Both Phase III and Phase IV involved IW activities, but as the conflict progressed closer to the full Phase IV transition in May 2003, the rise in IW activities challenged the CF senior command in Afghanistan. The command had to meet requirements for civilian and military coordination and resourcing and build large-scale partner capacity in what could be considered a failed state and dysfunctional military. The analysis covers the CJTF-180 change of command between CF Lieutenant General Dan McNeill and his US Army Corps HQ, and Major General John Vines and his US Army Division HQ during the start of Phase IV operations. Additionally, the case study examines the requirement to create Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) after a two-star HQ took command of CJTF-180. The case study starts by briefly outlining the conflict's background and initial command HQ. The case study then examines issues in all three HQ' ability to integrate with both interorganizational forces, and ability to support and coordinate partner nation capacity building on a large scale.

Operation Enduring Freedom Background

The US war in Afghanistan, known as Operation Enduring Freedom, occurred in response to terrorist attacks by members of Al Qaeda within the United States on September 11, 2001.[117] Initial operations involved a heavy SOF component partnered with friendly Afghan forces known as the Northern Alliance; pairing these troops with US technology and air power

[117] Wright and Dempsey, *A Different Kind of War*, 27.

provided an overwhelming military advantage over Al Qaeda and the Taliban.[118] Al Qaeda and the Taliban suffered devastating defeats in the opening phases of the war. The defeats kept violence levels down for eighteen months, and built a false assumption in the US Government on the defeated status of Al Qaeda and the Taliban.[119] This false assumption allowed US political and military leaders to disregard counterinsurgency preparation and focus on transitioning to stability operations.[120] An additional false assumption by the US Government in Afghanistan involved the expected full support of Pakistan.[121] While Pakistan provided limited support to US forces, it also continued to offer a sanctuary location for Al Qaeda and Taliban forces.[122] In Pakistan, the defeated enemy consolidated in areas uncontrolled by the government, and built the material and personnel support for an insurgency campaign that gained strength in 2003.[123] This went unnoticed by the US; on May 1, 2003, a visit by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to Afghanistan makes this clear. He noted, "We have concluded we're at a point where we clearly have moved from major combat activity to a period of stability and stabilization and reconstruction activities. The bulk of this country today is permissive, and it's secure."[124] It was in this context of low levels of violence and desire to transition to Phase IV-Stabilize that preceded the change of JTF command levels.

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[118] Ibid., 88.

[119] Celeski, Report 05-2, *Operationalizing COIN*, 66; Wright and Dempsey, *A Different Kind of War*, 236-237.

[120] Henry Nuzum, "Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The False Hope of 'Unity of Effort' in American Counterinsurgency" (The Letort Papers, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, April 2010), 8-9.

[121] Wright and Dempsey, *A Different Kind of War*, 241.

[122] Celeski, Report 05-2, *Operationalizing COIN*, 69; Wright and Dempsey, *A Different Kind of War*, 240.

[123] Edgar O'Ballance, *Afghan Wars: Battles in a Hostile Land 1839 to the Present*, rev ed. (London, England: Brassey's, 2002), 249; Easton Ussery ed., *War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Congressional Issues* (New York: Nova Scotia Publishers, 2010), 76-77.

[124] CNN, "Rumsfeld: Major Combat over in Afghanistan," May 1, 2003, accessed December 17, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/central/05/01/afghan.combat/.

Command Analysis

First, from 2001 to the spring of 2002, the four-star CENTCOM commander was in charge of Phase I-III operations, with a two-star command as its forward HQ in Afghanistan.[125] In spring 2002, operations were still in Phase III-Dominate, but due to a defeat of Taliban and Al Qaeda forces and a desired transition away from offensive operations to more stability operations, CENTOM created CJTF 180, which was commanded at the three-star level. CENTCOM wanted a higher level of command in Afghanistan that could still maintain offensive operations against enemy remnants, deal with the political requirements of transitioning to Phase IV-Stabilize, and free up CENTCOM to address concerns outside the Afghanistan conflict.[126]

This transition, with the creation of CJTF-180 in Spring 2002, placed a US Army Corps HQ with a three-star general in charge of the CJTF in Afghanistan until May 2003, and offers the first HQ analyzed for this case study.[127] The first requirement for CJTF-180, staffed by the XVIII Airborne Corps staff and commanded by Lieutenant General Dan McNeill, was the HQ's ability to integrate with interorganizational forces. With the Taliban defeated and Afghan governmental services non-existent in the spring of 2002, many US leaders believed political and strategic imperatives needed more attention than military imperatives. CJTF-180 HQ sought to build relationships with US Ambassador Crocker, interorganizational personnel, and Afghan senior

[125] At the beginning of OEF, US CENTCOM and 'four-star' commander General Tommy Franks, with subsequent Combined Forces Land Component Commander Lieutenant General Paul Mikolashek, formed the core of the command and control structure for Afghanistan with command over all SOF and CF. During late 2001, the 10th Mountain Division and its commander, Major General Franklin Hagenback, led TF Mountain, which maintained the highest level of command in Afghanistan or CFLCC-Forward during the initial operations.; Lieutenant General (Retired) Paul T. Mikolashek, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Arlington, VA, 13 December 2006, 15. In retrospect, Lieutenant General Mikolashek voiced regret at not getting his HQ into the theater and using the 10th Mountain Division HQ as the senior forward command based on the conflict's geographical location and large-scale transportation and lift requirements.

[126] Wright and Dempsey, *A Different Kind of War*, 190-191.

[127] Ibid., 190-191, 210.

leaders because the task force believed that political action, as compared to military intervention, would produce long-term solutions.[128]

However, the XVIII Airborne Corps and Lieutenant General McNeill built the relationships and subsequent coordination after the conflict began, and only when their organizations were tasked to lead the CJTF. The HQ did not have preexisting organizational links to the civilian organizations or partner forces within Afghanistan, Pakistan or even within the US-based interorganizational support infrastructure. The HQ built solutions and relationships in theater and in response to the conflict. This lack of relationships before the CJTF tasking meant that the CF HQ had no civilian or partner force coordination readiness or capability to command IW activities in Afghanistan.

An example of XVIII Airborne Corps HQ innovation in developing Interagency, Intergovernmental, and military solutions was the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams proved useful in creating regional outreach and stability for the Afghan population and countryside.[129] The Provincial Reconstruction Teams, however, were limited by minimal financial resourcing and personnel manning from non-military organizations.[130] Better coordination, training, and integration with the interorganizational community before the conflict could have provided the organizational linkage and trust required to alter the interorganizational manning and resourcing to meet the needs and vision of the military organization's operational approach.

The second requirement for CJTF-180 was its ability to support and coordinate large-scale partner nation capacity building. The legitimacy of the Afghan government and its security forces combined with a whole of government approach to support the Afghan government offered

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[128] Wright and Dempsey, 210.

[129] Millen, "Afghanistan: Reconstituting a Collapsed State," 14.

[130] Millen, "Afghanistan: Reconstituting a Collapsed State," 14-15; Wright and Dempsey, *A Different Kind of War*, 229, 258.

the best chance for long-term security and stability.[131] The character of the war surprised both civilian and military leaders who planned on a tactical defeat of the Taliban followed by a handover to a newly formed Afghan Government. The dilapidated or nonexistent status of state infrastructure such as military, education, and health services immediately became critical requirements to build an Afghan security forces, develop ways and means of government, and provide interim security for the region.[132]

An emergency Loya Jirga on June 11, 2002 fueled these needs with the creation of an initial government and built political progress for Afghanistan.[133] However, CJTF-180 still needed to design, plan, and resource the mechanisms and infrastructure to build a capable Afghan military and police force.[134] The task required an understanding of Afghan culture and dynamics to prevent a potential civil war; the XVIII Airborne Corps HQ possessed none.[135] CJTF-180's McNeill mentioned his surprise at receiving the initial tasking to oversee the creation of Afghan security forces.[136] The Department of State and the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan were meant to handle BPC, but the immensity of the job dwarfed these organizations' capacities. The military's larger scale of personnel and resources meant that the US military's senior command was given ownership of this problem. Similar to the interorganizational community

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[131] Millen, "Afghanistan: Reconstituting a Collapsed State," 2; Michael G. Brooks, ed., *Eyewitness to War, Volume III, US Army Advisors in Afghanistan,* Interview with Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press), 16.

[132] Wright and Dempsey, *A Different Kind of War*, 202.

[133] Ibid.

[134] Wright and Dempsey, *A Different Kind of War*, 229-230, while the United States had responsibility for the Afghan Army and Germany had the Afghan Police, the overall security situation required effective training and synchronization for both to gain sustainable security and stability.

[135] Wright and Dempsey, *A Different Kind of War*, 192, 200.

[136] Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism* (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2008), 150.

issues facing CJTF-180, the top HQ was given the objective to build the entire Afghan security forces apparatus without prior training or preparation in large-scale FID or SFA.[137]

Then on May 27, 2003, facing increasing operational requirements in Iraq, CENTCOM transformed CJTF-180 to a two-star led organization.[138] Lieutenant General McNeill and his corps HQ staff had been in command of CJTF-180 for a little over a year, through the transition to Phase IV in May of 2003.[139] The demotion in command level occurred only weeks after the transition to Phase IV operations.[140] At this point, Major General John Vines and the HQ staff of the 10th Mountain Division took charge of CJTF-180.[141]

The change in the command level from three-star to two-star immediately reduced the JTF's capability in Afghanistan; it offers insight into the political power and resourcing required of JTF HQ command when dealing with the interorganizational community and building the capacity of partner security forces. The change from a US Army Corps-led three-star command to a US Army Division-led two-star command resulted in reduced HQ size, expertise, and capability to handle tactical, operational, and strategic level requirements. The requirements facing CJTF-180 quickly overwhelmed the smaller two-star HQ, and reduced its ability to handle the interorganizational community's concerns at the operational and strategic level. Maintaining the same responsibilities to provide tactical security with US forces, Major General Vines had to pick between political and military coordination at the strategic level or security at the tactical level. One would suffer and with new uptick in attacks at this time, it could not be the security

[137] Brooks, *Eyewitness to War*, 16; Wright and Dempsey, *A Different Kind of War*, 229-230.

[138] Wright and Dempsey, *A Different Kind of War*, 237.

[139] Ibid.

[140] Wright and Dempsey, *A Different Kind of War*, 237; James Fallows, *Blind Into Baghdad: America's War in Iraq* (New York: Random House, 2004), 134-135.

[141] Spencer C. Tucker, ed. *U.S. Conflicts in the 21st Century: Afghanistan War, Iraq War, and the War on Terror*, vol. I (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, December 2015), 237; Wright and Dempsey, *A Different Kind of War*, 237, 239, The HQ staff of CTF 82 who was Major General Vines staff from the 82 Airborne Division started redeploying in April 2003 with the 10th Mountain Division's HQ staff scheduled to replace them.

requirements.[142] Additionally, CJTF-180 continued to lead a multi-nation effort to train Afghan security forces. Using a "lead nation concept" the US took responsibility for the Afghan army, with Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom taking ownership of other security components.[143] Looking back on these plans, the "effort was poorly coordinated and later judged largely unsuccessful." [144]

By October 2003, CENTCOM realized that it had made a mistake in reducing the JTF command level, and it created a new ad hoc higher three-star level command to lead Phase IV-Stabilize operations in Afghanistan called Coalition Forces Command-Afghanistan. CFC-A, commanded by Lieutenant General David Barno, now oversaw the CJTF-180, which remained in existence, but CFC-A took lead, essentially functioning as the senior CJTF HQ.[145] Examining this HQ provides additional examples of the two requirements for a JTF HQ leading an IW focused operation or phase. The war in Iraq hindered the availability of any of the preferred US Army Corps HQ to take over CFC-A, so CENTCOM planners built an ad hoc organization with Lieutenant General Barno and an initial staff of six officers.[146]

Building a capable staff through joint augmentation and staffing took a long time, and in the interim, Lieutenant General Barno faced a resurgent Taliban and al-Qaeda that had shifted tactics to large-scale insurgency. In the fall of 2003, Afghanistan faced increased violence levels

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[142] Wright and Dempsey, *A Different Kind of War*, 239-241.

[143] Michael E. O'Hanlon and Hassina Sherjan, *Toughing It Out in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 24.

[144] O'Hanlon and Sherjan, *Toughing It Out in Afghanistan*, 24; Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2009), 237.

[145] Wright and Dempsey, *A Different Kind of War*, 237; Fallows, *Blind Into Baghdad*, 134-135. US leaders placed priority on Iraq over Afghanistan for resources and efforts, which affected the availability of another JTF-capable Corps HQ to take lead of coalition forces in Afghanistan.

[146] Wright and Dempsey, *A Different Kind of War*, 191-192, The initial plan included a subsequent increase to twelve, with reliance on subordinate staffs for additional support as needed. Realizing the unrealistic nature of the plan, Lieutenant General Barno built a joint manning document that asked for 400 additional staff personnel. The increase occurred slowly and by mid-summer-2005, his staff was up to only 270 personnel, which were still under the 368 staff members LTG McNeill, and the XVIII Airborne Corps, maintained while CJTF-180.

and the targeting of legitimate of Afghan Government forces, local civilians, and aid workers.[147] Lieutenant General Barno realized the change in the operational environment required a change in the coalition's operational approach to IW activities, but CENTCOM had created CFC-A HQ in an ad hoc manner with no organizational identity before Lieutenant General Barno assumed command. This does not mean that the CF-staffed CFC-A HQ was incapable of commanding the IW-focused phase, but it does suggest that the organization had minimal readiness in interorganizational coordination and relationships, or security forces training, before leading the all coalition forces in Afghanistan.[148] Similar to Lieutenant General McNeill and his Corps HQ staff, Lieutenant General Barno focused his HQ efforts on the political and military coordination and synchronizing efforts to train Afghan security forces, but the HQ's minimal organizational readiness and institutional expertise delayed these efforts.[149]

In summary, the study of these two transitions in Afghanistan shows CF HQ leading the JTF through a challenging operational environment heavily requiring IW activities, but the HQ were ill prepared for their requirements. While performing valiantly, each HQ lacked preexisting interorganizational relationships and cultural expertise to drive whole of government solutions and resourcing, and build and implement an effective plan to train Afghan security forces. A JTF-capable HQ, identified and trained to lead phases and operations that focus on IW activities and requirements, and maintaining a robust interorganizational network, could have potentially provided a better-prepared and more capable JTF HQ.

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[147] Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* (Penguin Books, 2009), 246; Wright and Dempsey, *A Different Kind of War*, 241. The leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, created committees focused on political objectives, most importantly gaining the support of the Afghan population.

[148] Tucker, *U.S. Conflicts in the 21st Century*, 150, Prior to taking command of CFC-A, Lieutenant General Barno was commanding Task Force Warrior, which was an army-training unit in Tazar Hungary "created to prepare free Iraqi forces before OIF."

[149] O'Hanlon and Sherjan, *Toughing It Out in Afghanistan*, 24.

Operation Iraqi Freedom Case Study

The second case study analyzes the US senior command HQ in Iraq in the spring of 2003. During this period, US forces transitioned from Phase III-Dominate to Phase IV-Stabilize, as the operational environment required increased IW activities. Similar to Afghanistan, the US Military had to meet requirements for coordination and resourcing with the interorganizational community, and building large-scale partner capacity by training indigenous security forces. A significant difference, however, was that Iraq, unlike Afghanistan, possessed a functioning state and military before the conflict, which should have facilitated a smoother transition of security and stability to the Iraqi Government and military. For this case study, the analyzed events include the creation of CJTF-7 with the start of Phase IV-Stabilize operations, and the three-star level Combined Forces Land Component Command change of command between Third Army HQ and V Corps HQ. The case study briefly outlines the conflict's background and then examines issues in these HQ's ability to integrate with both interorganizational forces and to support and coordinate large-scale partner nation capacity building.

Background

In 2003, the US Military and its allies invaded Iraq to bring about the regime change, removing Saddam Hussein from power. US leaders defined success in this conflict as the destruction of Saddam and his power base, the control or destruction of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction capability and assets, the maintenance of Iraqi Territory, the ensuring of the safety of surrounding nation-states, and the establishment of a western friendly government.[150] With an ongoing campaign in Afghanistan, the United States faced a two-front war against terrorism, which significantly affected the availability of resources and troops for the Iraqi theater. The campaign plan for the initial entry involved multiple lines of advance throughout Iraq, with the

[150] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), 67.

seizure of Baghdad as the primary objective.[151] The invasion and Phase III operations involved large-scale conflict with CF in the lead, combined with IW activities executed by SOF. Both CF and SOF executed highly successful operations resulting in the rapid defeat of Iraqi forces and the overthrow of the Saddam regime.

Command Analysis

In March 2003, similar to the start of conflict in Afghanistan, USCENTCOM, a four-star command, led all initial operations with Third Army HQ, a three-star command, serving as the Combined Forces Land Component Command. The Combined Forces Land Component Command, CENTCOM's forward command, was in charge of all ground operations through Phase III.[152] The initial plan called for a transition to a CJTF in charge of all Phase IV operations once Phase III ended.[153] Unfortunately but understandably, the priority for planning at CENTCOM and Combined Forces Land Component Command before the invasion was Phase III Operations; the specific details on the composition and ownership for the Phase IV CJTF were not completed before the invasion.[154] This prevented the available JTF-capable HQ from knowing if they would be the one tasked for Phase IV operations. Since none of the likely HQ were tasked,

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[151] Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, *On Point*, 101-102, From the south, V Corps led the main effort, with I Marine Expeditionary Force on its right flank as a supporting effort, to seize essential infrastructure and move on to Baghdad. British forces took responsibility for securing southern Iraq around Basra. SOF under CJSOTF-West led another supporting effort in Western Iraq to find and destroy SCUD missile launchers. In Northern Iraq, CJSOTF-North conducted the supporting effort of partnering with the Kurdish forces to find and fix Iraqi conventional military forces, while also checking any counterproductive or politically sensitive activities by the Kurds during the campaign.

[152] Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, *On Point*, 86.; Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 140. A shared understanding existed between joint commanders that after the defeat of the Iraqi military and deposition of Saddam Hussein, CFLCC and his staff would transition operations to Phase IV Stability.

[153] The initial organization would be called CJTF-Iraq and then eventually CJTF-7.

[154] Keven C. M. Benson, "OIF Phase IV: A Planner's Reply to Brigadier Aylwin-Foster," *Military Review* (March-April 2006): 63; Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 140, CFLCC provided unity of command for all coalition forces comprised of 1st MEF, V Corps, SOF, and British forces during the initial operations. The US Army's lead tactical HQ came from V Corps with an objective to take Baghdad. Accomplishing its objective quickly within an overall highly successful campaign by coalition forces to depose the Saddam Regime; V Corps consolidated its HQ north of Baghdad following the initial invasion.

there was no Phase IV coordination, planning, or training with the interorganizational community before the start of conflict.

Prior to March 2003, a civilian-led command existed for Iraq known as the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA).[155] In April 2003, with a rising insurgency and the potential loss of widespread Iraqi support for the new government, US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld replaced the ORHA with the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA). Ambassador Paul Bremer III led the CPA, which, compared to ORHA, maintained higher levels of authority and a broader mission set in Iraq.[156]

With a speech by President George W. Bush on May 1, 2003 noting the end of combat operations in Iraq, the United States transitioned to Phase IV, and CENTCOM decided to make Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez and the V Corps HQ the senior command in Iraq.[157] On June 15, 2003, the V Corps HQ, a three-star command, took charge of CJTF-7.[158] V Corps took

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[155] Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 150-151, Retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner led ORHA, the US government organization given governmental duties and responsibility in Iraq once the conflict stopped. Military leaders assumed ORHA would provide guidance and direction to their forces until Iraq could establish a functioning government. With an unconventional chain of command, OHRA reported directly to the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Established in Kuwait for the start of the campaign in Iraq, it became immediately clear ORHA was not ready to lead the reconstruction efforts. With the senior military focus on phase III operations, the lack of capability and dysfunctional chain of command for post-conflict operations did not raise immediate concerns.

[156] Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, *On Point*, 152; Michael DeLong and Noah Lukeman, *A General Speaks Out: The Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq* (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2007), 124; Elain Halchin, *The CPA: Origins, Characteristics and Institutional Authorities* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 2004), 4. The stated mission of the CPA was to: Restore conditions of safety and stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi people can safely determine their political future, and facilitate economic recovery, sustainable reconstruction, and development.

[157] Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 148, Two events occurred that signified the transition to Phase IV in May 2003: General Frank's visit to Iraq on 16 April 2003 where he declared an end to Phase III operations, but never issued an order for it. President George W. Bush's "mission accomplished" speech on 1 May 2003 that built the perception that the transition occurred. For this case study, May 2003 represents the transition timeframe; Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 145, This decision highlighted a disconnect between US Army Leadership and CCDR General Franks. US Army Leadership believed Lieutenant General Mckiernan and his CFLCC staff should have stayed in command through Phase IV due to regional expertise.

[158] Benson, "OIF Phase IV: A Planner's Reply to Brigadier Aylwin-Foster," 63.

command of all coalition forces in Iraq beginning Phase-IV Stabilize, shortly after its tactical mission to secure Baghdad during the initial invasion.[159]

About the same time as V Corps took command of CJTF-7, a large-scale and complex insurgency began to gain strength. In response, in the summer of 2003, CJTF-7 took on increased stability operations and IW requirements, as the capabilities of Iraqi governmental services and military forces were minimal.[160] In addition to facing a resurgent enemy beyond what had been planned for in Phase IV, the HQ was also minimally staffed and not trained to function at the operational level.[161] The V Corps HQ had a tactical mission during the initial invasion into Phase III-Dominate, prior to becoming the CJTF-7. Because of this history, which focused V Corps on large-scale conflict, initially CJTF-7 had little to no coordination with the interorganizational community in Phase IV-Stabilize. This prevented them from working with the interorganizational community before taking charge of all coalition forces.[162]

Combined Joint Task Force-7 faced problems with its ability to integrate with interorganizational forces. An example of this can be seen in the interorganizational coordination structure the organization had to deal with. Senior US civilian and military leaders set up a dual chain of command, with CJTF-7 answering directly to CENTCOM, but tasked to provide direct support to the CPA. CPA reported directly to the Department of Defense, not CENTCOM. This confused interoganizational cooperation for all involved.[163] The two organizations realized they both needed each other's expertise and capabilities, but a "cultural gap" formed between the two

[159] Benson, "OIF Phase IV: A Planner's Reply to Brigadier Aylwin-Foster," 63.

[160] Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 171.

[161] Ibid., 157.

[162] Crane, "Phase IV Operations," 12. Lack of coordination with the interorganizational community is a historic pattern of the US military, which is fueled by an institutional propensity for large-scale conflict and not stability operations.

[163] Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 154.

organizations.[164] An example of the potential downside to using a CF HQ was seen in the lack of appreciation by the staff to understand and value the CPA, and the eventual dismissal of its capabilities to effect change outside of Baghdad. Surprisingly, these coordination shortfalls did not transcend to the tactical level, where lower echelons within both CJTF-7 and the CPA created better working relationships.[165] The poor coordination and clash of cultures highlight an opportunity at the operational level where the political awareness, IW expertise, and prior interorganizational coordination of a SOF HQ might have smoothed out coordination and relationships between the two organizations. However, V Corps HQ did not have such existing organizational relationships or expertise to lead the CJTF through the transition of Phase III-Dominate to Phase IV-Stabilize and the associated prioritization from TW to IW requirements.

Combined Joint Task Force-7 also was limited in its ability to support and coordinate large-scale partner nation capacity building that was focused on the training of Iraqi security forces. The legitimacy of the Iraqi Government and its security forces offered the best chance for long-term security and stability.[166] US military leaders followed the false assumptions that they would not have to support large-scale law enforcement, and that OHRA, the State Department, Iraqi expatriates, the Iraqi Government, and International Organizations would take charge of the nation after they ousted the Saddam Regime.[167] Dismissing requirements for CJTF-7 to lead a large-scale training effort, when the US Military needed capable Iraqi military and police forces,

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[164] Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 155; Christopher M. Schaunabelt, "After the Fight: Interagency Operations," *Parameter* (Winter 2005/2006): 50-53, accessed April 1, 2018, https://www.strategicstudies institute.army.mil/pubs/Parameters/articles/05winter/schnaube.htm.

[165] Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 155.

[166] DeLong and Lukeman, *A General Speaks Out: The Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq*, 129. Steven, Metz and John R. Martin ed., "Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Strategic Shift of 2007" (Operation Iraqi Freedom Key Decisions Monograph Series, Strategic Studies Institute, May 2010), 4.

[167] Benson, "OIF Phase IV: A Planner's Reply to Brigadier Aylwin-Foster," 62; Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 140; Peter J. Munson, *Iraq in Transition*: *The Legacy of Dictatorship and the Prospects for Democracy* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2009), 62; Fallows, *Blind Into Baghdad*, 149.

they possessed minimal understanding of Iraqi culture required to lead the training effort.[168] Additionally, similar issues with effective interorganizational coordination were brought to the surface when developing capable Iraqi security forces. The CPA was the lead organization for creating both the military and police, but the plan and implementation proved a major point of contention between the CPA and CJTF-7.[169] Again, poor relationships and understandings of Iraqi culture and its population mitigated the joint force's effectiveness.[170]

Within Iraq, the US military's most knowledgeable organization on Iraqi culture and organization was the 10th Special Forces Group, who had existing relationships with the Iraqi Kurds going back to Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and who had developed an operational partnership with them in Northern Iraq during the initial Operation Iraqi Freedom invasion.[171] This cultural relationship was leveraged for tactical success, and could have been a leverage point to build further operational and strategic level understanding of the cultural dynamics within Iraq.[172] The shortfalls to training and building effective Iraqi Security Forces could be attributed to multiple factors in interorganizational coordination, troop numbers and cultural awareness.[173] These shortfalls demonstrate an area where a SOF HQ with organizational readiness, expertise, and existing relationships with other coalition and allied trainers could have provided a more effective organization to lead US efforts. However, this was not the case in Iraq. CJTF-7 would oversee operations in Iraq until the summer of 2004, when CENTCOM decided that the

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[168] Munson, *Iraq in Transition*, 2.

[169] Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 157.

[170] Munson, *Iraq in Transition*, 2.

[171] Newton et al., JSOU Report 09-3, *Contemporary Security Challenges*, 70.

[172] Munson, *Iraq in Transition*, 67; Fallows, *Blind Into Baghdad*, 152.

[173] Munson, *Iraq in Transition*, 66; Fallows, *Blind Into Baghdad*, 153; DeLong and Lukeman, *A General Speaks Out: The Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq*, 124. It is very difficult to attribute causality to one item in Iraq. Multiple authors discuss the impact of America's false assumptions on Iraqi Government and Security Forces Capacity combined with De-Baathification, and US political desires to keep troop levels low.

deteriorating security situation required the creation of a four-star command known as Multi-National Forces Iraq.[174]

In summary, the study of the transition in Iraq shows a CF HQ leading the JTF through a challenging operational environment heavily requiring TW in the initial phases, but quickly transitioning to IW activities. Similar to the Afghanistan case study, the CF HQ was not well trained or resourced for the requirements it would face. Focused on a tactical movement and maneuver mission, the HQ lacked preexisting interorganizational relationships, understanding of interorganizational culture, and Iraqi cultural expertise to drive whole of government solutions and build and implement an effective plan to train the Iraqi security forces. A JTF-capable HQ identified and trained to lead phases and operations focused on IW activities, requirements, and maintaining a robust interorganizational network and expertise on large-scale partner capacity development could have potentially provided a better trained and prepared HQ.

Analysis and Recommendations

Two principal findings emerge from analysis of the case studies. First, in both cases, the senior command lacked pre-conflict relationships with the interorganizational community to synchronize resourcing and efforts in whole of government approaches. Second, both CF HQ lacked an understanding of the indigenous population and existing dynamics in the countries they were operating in. They also lacked familiarity and expertise in FID and SFA to overcome the immense challenges and requirements for BPC on a large scale.

Based on the case studies, two problems exist with the readiness and capability of CF HQ to execute IW. First, CF organizational relationships with the interorganizational community before conflict onset are usually insufficient, due to pre-conflict prioritization of TW training. IW typically requires a whole of government approach, and political solutions may be easier to create with a force built to integrate and coordinate with the interorganizational community. One of the

[174] Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 173.

findings from the case studies is the importance of preexisting organizational relationships between the military and other relevant members of the interorganizational community; these relationships provide familiarity with interorganizational culture, and help to strengthen collaboration on complex problem before a conflict develops. Such collaboration may offer more flexible options and an improved understanding of the operational environment as the conflict progresses. The HQ in Afghanistan and Iraq built relationships and understanding with the interorganizational community after the conflict began and after their organizations were tasked to assume command of the JTF. Additionally, a lack of understanding and awareness of interorganizational culture and capability proved a detriment to unity of effort between the different organizations. This does not appear to be the most effective way to build a whole of government approach.

The second problem highlighted by the case studies dealt with a CF HQ's ability to lead the joint force in the large-scale development of a partner nation's security forces. US Military forces quickly defeated conventional adversaries in Afghanistan and Iraq during the early TW focused phases. Once defeated, the transition to Phase IV changed the focus to influencing and gaining the support of the population through primarily IW activities. The partner nations required legitimacy that a competent and capable security force could offer by providing security and stability. This capable partner force would also enable the redeployment of US forces to other theatres. The CF HQ in the case studies had minimal expertise in training and leading indigenous forces, combined with negligible cultural awareness and familiarity of the region's key stakeholders. Once in command they reached out to partner nation leaders and organizations, but they had to build their training plans and facilities with minimal partner nation familiarity or large-scale FID or SFA expertise.

This monograph argues that a solution to mitigate both issues for JTF-capable HQ in the future is building and resourcing a SOF JTF-capable HQ at the three-star level to lead the JTF through operations and phases focused on IW. The concept provides the joint force an

organization that can own the challenge of commanding IW activities and ensures long-term expertise and networking with the interorganizational community. The mission primacy for IW activities within SOF provides shared interest and lasting mission objectives with the interorganizational community. Such an organization would offer the US options and long-term capability to deal with crises and contingencies requiring IW.

One possible approach for resourcing a SOF three-star JTF HQ is to use the existing USASOC command structure and grow its personnel, facilities, and resourcing as the SOF JTF-capable HQ, but there are issues with this option. Even with the pioneering work of USASOC to drive the improvement of SOF command capability at the operational level, the organization shoulders more requirements than a US Army Corps HQ. As the USSOCOM service component provider for Army SOF, USASOC maintains a responsibility to modernize the force through research, development, training, and doctrine development and is the parent organization of 1 SFC.[175] While it maintains a preponderance of expertise and capability, tasking USASOC to function as a SOF JTF-capable HQ would inhibit its ability to accomplish all of these other requirements during war or conflict when they are needed the most.

Therefore, this monograph recommends that a better option for creating a three-star JTF-capable SOF command would be to generate the command structure at USSOCOM. This could be done in two different ways. First, USSOCOM could integrate the JTF-capable HQ into the USSOCOM staff, with a Deputy Commanding General as its commander. The advantage of this approach is that it reduces the requirement to build a new command structure, instead simply increasing an existing one. The disadvantage to this approach is the same issues that exists with leveraging USASOC to create a HQ; the new HQ would draw resources and attention away from other USSOCOM requirements. A mitigating factor, however, would be the ability of USSOCOM to draw personnel and resourcing from across joint SOF and CF to alleviate the

[175] US Special Operations Command, "Fact Sheet," accessed March 26, 2018, http://www.soc.mil/USASOCHQ/USASOCHQFactSheet.html.

increased requirements. Secondly, USSOCOM could create a new HQ organization similar to a Joint Interagency Task Force structure that leverages manning and expertise across the command to provide a SOF JTF-capable HQ focused on IW activities with strongly networked relationships across the interorganizational community.[176] This provides the ability to quickly pull the interorganizational community together for training or real-world requirements. While creating an entirely new organization would mitigate the issues posed by restructuring a current command, this approach would probably require additional resourcing.

Either approach would allow USSOCOM to create a SOF-led JTF-capable HQ to handle large-scale IW focused requirements. As the joint force refocuses its HQ to large-scale conflict and commanding tactical movement and maneuver of its subordinate forces against near-peer adversaries, the conditions from the early years of the War on Terror have the potential to repeat themselves. The CF JTF-capable HQ in Iraq and Afghanistan both found themselves struggling in IW focused Phase IV to leverage existing interorganizational relationships to create whole of government solutions and coordinate, build and implement successful options for effective partner capacity. An existing SOF JTF-capable HQ trained and ready to lead the joint force in IW phases and operations could provide a more capable JTF HQ and help mitigate risk for the joint force as it refocuses its HQ away from IW to commanding large-scale maneuver and TW readiness.

Conclusion

The current problem facing the US military is that, while future IW requirements exist, US civilian and military leaders see large-scale combat operations or TW as a bigger threat to the

[176] US Joint Staff, JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation* (2016), E-1, Joint Interagency Task Force is defined as "a force multiplier that uses a unique organizational structure to focus on a single mission. A JIATF, like most task forces, is typically formed for a specific task and purpose. JIATFs are formal organizations usually chartered by the DOD and one or more USG civilian department or agency, and guided by a MOA or other founding legal documents that define the roles, responsibilities, and relationships of the JIATF's members. The JIATF is staffed and led by personnel from multiple agencies under a single commander or director."

nation than IW.[177] The last seventeen years of IW experience and knowledge improved the US military's capabilities in this area, but those capabilities may easily diminish with personnel changes and an institutional shift in priorities, especially to CF HQ to addressing peer threats and large-scale conflict. The joint force must balance readiness for the greater threat of large-scale conflict and TW with the requirement to maintain IW capability gained from the War on Terror.

The military needs to maintain competency and capability in IW, not just for the current War on Terror, but also for the long term, especially with an uncertain future operating environment and the potential for hybrid warfare and gray zone conflicts. These potential conflicts require strong integration between different US military capabilities and potentially new organizational approaches from the US. As non-state and state actors continue to focus on IW as a way to conduct war against the United States in future conflicts, the United States requires flexible options and capabilities to overcome and mitigate the challenges of IW.

Currently, the US military has one primary answer for the organization of warfare, the JTF. Executing campaigns and operations to accomplish military objectives set by strategic leaders, JTFs use phasing to break up operations by time, purpose, and activities to guide the arrangement of forces and requirements. A CF HQ typically commands JTFs through all phases of a campaign, but this may not be the best command option for IW.

Instead, IW and TW operations and phases may each require a different type of organizational structure, sometimes with CF HQ in the lead, and sometimes with SOF HQ in the lead. Even in conflicts that start out conventionally, phases that follow the domination or defeat of the enemy may entail a transition from TW to IW. The main difference between phases is the switch in objective; for IW the critical needs are to influence or gain the support of the population, rather than to defeat the opponent’s military forces. An additional important

[177] US Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (2017), 1-2-1-3.

difference is that IW often requires integration and building capacity outside the US military, rather than being primarily concerned with the capability of the US forces as prioritized in TW.

The US military uses several options to build JTF HQ, but at the operational level, doctrine deems the lieutenant general-led US Army Corps HQ the organization of choice to lead a JTF. This doctrinal practice helps CCDRs mitigate the risks of building ad hoc HQ due to poorly forecasted crises or contingencies. These existing HQ maintain readiness levels to take command of JTF HQ, and maintain certification as JTF-capable HQ. However, this doctrine assumes that an Army Corps, comprised of conventional, TW-trained forces, is the right choice for any type of conflict

However, phases or operations focusing on IW activities and requirements require specially trained and prepared forces.[178] SOF operational challenges necessitate flexibility and ready integration with interagency, partner nations, and CF. SOF organizations, as part of their ongoing requirements, focus on regional orientation, cultural awareness, and political sensitivity, and routinely develop and maintain relationships with the interorganizational community.[179] Their integration, partnering, and politically sensitive expertise and solutions provide a better trained, and potentially more competent force to conduct IW.

In addition to coordination with the interorganizational community in order to execute whole-of-government missions, the objectives of BPC may also more naturally fit with SOF's areas of expertise. One common requirement in IW is the training of allied security forces. In IW environments, the JTF HQ needs to help design, plan, and resource the mechanisms and infrastructure to build a competent security forces. This is typically a slow process.[180] A key component of effective BPC is prior understanding or awareness of local culture and language to

[178] Crane, "Phase IV Operations," 18-19; Demarest, *Winning Irregular Wars*, 69.

[179] US Joint Staff, JP 3-05, *Special Operations* (2014), I-1, I-5.

[180] Crane, "Phase IV Operations," 19.

ensure that training will be effective and meet overall objectives. Similar to their interorganizational expertise, SOF's proficiency and knowledge in working with indigenous forces, conducting FID, and regional and cultural awareness make them a more capable force to lead IW.

One issue with current SOF JTF-capable HQ is that they are all commanded by two-star major generals as opposed to the Army Corps commanded by three-star lieutenant generals. The scale and scope of a crisis or contingency determines the force level requirements, but in IW a three-star command provides increased diplomatic power and influence critical to creating a political solution for a conflict. Additionally, three-star HQ can handle operational level requirements such as interaction with strategic and political leaders; two-star HQ are better focused on overseeing and supporting tactical level commands, such as divisions and brigades. Within the current force structure, SOF are only able to provide a two-star HQ to operate as a campaign's lead JTF, due to the scalable limit of the SOJTF's capabilities as a major general-led HQ. Therefore, the military's current JTF organizational structure may bring inherent limitations in its ability to execute IW.

A SOF JTF-capable HQ potentially offers a more capable organization to conduct IW activities at the operational level. As the case studies highlighted, in both Afghanistan and Iraq the senior command lacked pre-conflict relationships with the interorganizational community to synchronize resourcing and efforts in whole of government approaches, and second, both CF HQ lacked an understanding of the indigenous population and existing dynamics in the countries they were operating in. They also lacked familiarity and expertise in FID and SFA to overcome the immense challenges and requirements for BPC on a large scale.

Therefore, to ensure proper capability and organization for future conflicts, this monograph argues that joint doctrine should specify the creation of a standing three-star SOF HQ capable of commanding an IW-focused JTF to overcome the CF shortfalls highlighted in the two case studies, institutionalize long-term IW capability, and enable the joint force to safely refocus

efforts to training and readiness in large-scale conflict and TW. Increasing SOF capability at the operational HQ level can provide the joint force a more effective organizational solution for IW, and institutionalize IW capability via SOF structures, while enabling CF HQ to prioritize readiness and proficiency in large-scale conflict and TW.

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