

Lost Tigers: The Failure of Unconventional Warfare in the Korean War

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

Lost Tigers: The Failure of Unconventional Warfare in the Korean War, by LTC Jeremy Lane, United States Army, 46 pages.

The Eighth Army began supporting the Korean partisans of the 8240th Army Unit “White Tigers” with the intent that the force would support a return to unified Korean governance after an end to the conflict. Yet the limited impact of the unconventional warfare campaign demonstrated the Army’s lack of capacity to support partisans, despite the impact of the Office of Strategic Services in Europe and Asia during World War II. Protracted negotiations in the years leading up to the armistice further complicated the Eighth Army’s difficulty and negated the contribution of the United Nations Partisan Infantry, Korea. A critical analysis of the campaign using the criteria of end state, mission command, and synchronization provides a lens to understand and learn from the failure of UW in the Korean War. As recent UW campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have not faced an adversary with the capabilities of the People’s Republic of Korea, the experience of the Korean conflict remains relevant to future UW campaigns against state actors.

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Acronyms

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
AFFE	Army Forces, Far East
CCRAFE	Combined Command, Reconnaissance Activities, Far East
CCRAK	Combined Command, Reconnaissance Activities, Korea
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
EUSA	Eighth United States Army
FEAF	Far East Air Forces
FEC/LD (K)	Far East Command/Liaison Detachment (Korea)
FEC/LG	Far East Command/Liaison Group
FECOM	United States Far East Command
JACK	Joint Advisory Commission, Korea
NKPA	North Korean People's Army
OCPW	Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PAIR	Partisan Airborne Infantry Regiment
PIR	Partisan Infantry Regiment
ROK	Republic of Korea
UNPFK	United Nations Partisan Forces, Korea
UNPIK	United Nations Partisan Infantry, Korea
UW	Unconventional Warfare

Illustrations

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Prologue

On July 13, 1952, a company sized detachment of 118 partisans with a single American advisor boarded four Chinese fishing junks to conduct a raid behind North Korean lines. The team, known as Donkey 4, would infiltrate through North Korean coastal defenses near Changsan-got to seize and destroy the artillery bunker which had repeatedly bombarded their base on the island of Wollae-do. Pak Ch'ul, Korean partisan leader of Donkey 4, and his American advisor, Lt. Ben Malcom, jointly planned and led the patrol based on intelligence developed by Pak's agents on the mainland.¹ With United States Marine Corps Corsairs and a British destroyer in support, the partisans of the 8240th Army Unit would return the next day having achieved their objectives of destroying the coastal artillery bunker, defeating a numerically superior enemy battalion, and gaining valuable intelligence on North Korean defenses.²

Under cover of darkness, the partisan force landed on the shore and safely infiltrated past North Korean People's Army security forces on the coastline, maneuvering 500 yards inland without detection to out-flank the enemy artillery position.³ At 5:00 a.m., the Korean partisans and their sole American advisor initiated the raid with naval gunfire from British ships assigned to Carrier Task Group 95.1 and Marine Corps close air support, enabling the assault to breach the NKPA perimeter from the rear and achieve surprise.⁴ After clearing a machine gun nest which had survived the initial bombardment, the partisans of Donkey-4 demonstrated the results of

¹ Richard L. Kiper, "Unconventional Warfare in Korea: Forgotten Aspect of the Forgotten War," *Special Warfare* 16, no. 2 (August 2003): 28; Col Ben S. Malcom, Ret., and Ron Martz, *White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1996), 62; Ed Evanhoe, *Darkmoon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 69-70.

² Malcom and Martz, *White Tigers*, 83-84, 92.

³ *Ibid.*, 86-87.

⁴ Kiper, "Unconventional Warfare in Korea," 28; Frederick W. Cleaver, George Fitzpatrick, John Ponturo, William Rossiter, and C. Darwin Stolzenbach, *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951-1954* (Chevy Chase, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Operations Research Office, 1956), 154.

months of training as they methodically cleared the bunker using grenades, small arms, and hand to hand fighting. Suffering only six killed and seven wounded out of 118, the assault force destroyed the enemy 76mm artillery piece and primed the bunker for detonation before initiating their withdrawal. Returning with captured enemy maps, documents, and supplies, the assault force, with the addition of ten refugees, fought through the enemy battalion's counterattack to reach their fishing junks before the tide went out.⁵ With timely support from the Marine Corsairs and British destroyer, the partisans successfully exfiltrated to Wollae-do, having achieved their objective and killing up to 225 NKPA.⁶

This operation marked a great victory for the Donkeys of the 8240th Army Unit. The presence of an American advisor, Lt. Ben Malcom, on the raid into North Korea provided the partisan force with overwhelming firepower in the form of naval gunfire and close air support. Accurate partisan intelligence reports provided a clear understanding of NKPA disposition and enabled an unopposed infiltration. After only four months of training, the raid demonstrated that partisans had the potential to both defeat communist forces in combat and to redirect enemy resources away from the main conventional fight to the east.⁷ But tactical success, which Clausewitz calls "of paramount importance in war," is only of significance when strategy "assigns a particular aim" to the outcome.⁸ For Army Unit 8240, the Eighth Army's failure to effectively integrate partisan ends, ways, and means into the overall campaign plan ultimately

⁵ Kiper, "Unconventional Warfare in Korea," 28, 30.

⁶ Malcom and Martz, *White Tigers*, 89-105.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 83, 105, 107.

⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1989), 143, 228, Kindle.

prevented the guerrilla forces from realizing their potential, rendering unconventional warfare operations “essentially minor in consequence and sporadic in nature” during the Korean War.⁹

Introduction

The establishment of the United Nations Partisan Infantry Korea (UNPIK) represents a unique period in US special operations history, occurring during a gap in institutional capacity between the dissolution of the Office of Strategic Services and the creation of the United States Army Special Forces in 1952.¹⁰ Because the role of advisors in the Korean War remained classified until the early 1990s, first-hand accounts are limited and early histories of the development of Special Forces have failed to include this critical period. As a result, researchers have not fully analyzed the role of unconventional warfare during the Korean War and its impact is not well understood within the Army.

With a surplus of guerrilla volunteers and no organizational framework to conduct unconventional warfare, the Eighth Army called upon the veterans of World War II partisan warfare campaigns to develop an operational approach, enabling the Army to apply some institutional knowledge.¹¹ Yet the ad-hoc organizations developed in responses to crisis lacked the training, experience, and support structure required for the campaign to be effective. While forced to develop and implement a plan for partisan warfare, the Army failed to apply the theory and practice of the previous decade.

⁹ Alfred H. Paddock Jr., *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 209; John J. Tierney Jr., *Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2006), 227.

¹⁰ Will Irwin, *The Jedburghs: The Secret History of Allied Special Forces, France 1944* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), location 4471, Kindle. Though partisan force nomenclature shifted over the course of the conflict, this paper will use their final title, UNPIK, when discussing the organization without regard to a specific period of time.

¹¹ W. W. Quinn, *Memorandum for Commanding General, Headquarters, X Corps (Korea, 5 November 1950)*, 5 November 1950, Historical Documents, Combined Arms Research Library Archive, Fort Leavenworth, KS; Michael E. Haas, *In the Devil's Shadow: UN Special Operations During the Korean War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 208-209.

The employment of partisans by UN forces in the Korean War represents a failed unconventional warfare campaign in the context of a broader limited war. The case study of the Eighth Army provides a window into the institutional factors which led to failure in the employment of partisan warfare during the Korean War. As many of the challenges of unconventional warfare in Korea persist, these factors remain relevant to current doctrine and future conflict with North Korea.

The UW campaign during the Korean War demonstrated a failure to effectively integrate the partisan warfare experience of the previous decade into doctrine and practice. As in North Korea today, “the totalitarian enemy was well protected against underground resistance.”¹² Compounding these factors is the reality that recent experience with unconventional warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan leveraged nearly total air superiority in the defeat of dramatically overmatched regimes, potentially limiting the development of the means required for UW to succeed in the more challenging context of an adversary with a robust early warning and air defense network.¹³ The Korean War’s unconventional warfare campaign also provides a cautionary example of the employment of partisans in a modern conflict of limited aims, when indigenous forces and an external sponsor may not have compatible end states.¹⁴ While unconventional warfare operations in the Korean War exhibited significant tactical success, the gaps and shortfalls in the application of UW limited the impact of the United Nations Partisan Infantry Korea.

¹² Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 20.

¹³ Stephen D. Biddle, “Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq,” *International Security* 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/2006): 166, accessed March 15, 2018, doi:10.1162/016228805775969555; Isaac J. Peltier “Surrogate Warfare: The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces,” in *Contemporary Security Challenges: Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches*, ed. James D. Anderson (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2009), 74, accessed November 13, 2017, <https://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a495779.pdf>; Richard B. Andres, Craig Wills, and Thomas E. Griffith, “Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model,” *International Security* 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/2006): 127, 140, accessed March 15, 2018, doi:10.1162/016228805775969591.

¹⁴ Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 24.

The Army's development of unconventional warfare doctrine was in part a reaction to requirements to support partisans in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. ADRP 3-05 defines unconventional warfare as "activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area."¹⁵ The current definition will be used throughout this analysis, as it remains consistent with the contemporary understanding of partisan warfare outlined in FM 31-21, *Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare*, and FM 100-5, *Operations*, and aptly describes the partisan warfare activities conducted by Eighth Army and Far East Command during the Korean War.¹⁶ Despite the emergence of a requirement to implement unconventional warfare on a large scale, the Army did not integrate the experience of its application during earlier conflicts. Practitioners of unconventional warfare during the Korean War note that the professional military education of the time did not include the lessons learned by the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. As a result, American advisors in the Korean War, to include the original Special Forces units, had to learn these lessons all over again.¹⁷

Institutional shortcomings in the United States Army alongside the structural factors of the conflict led to the failure of unconventional warfare during the Korean War. This monograph is an in-depth study of the unconventional warfare campaign during the Korean War as a means to demonstrate the consequences of improperly applied UW doctrine. By examining the evolution

¹⁵ US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-05, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 2-2.

¹⁶ US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 31-21, *Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1951), 2-3; US War Department, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Field Service Regulations, Operations*, 1941 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College Press, 1992), 228. FM 31-21 defines guerilla warfare as "operations carried on by small independent forces, generally in the rear of the enemy, with the objective of harassing, delaying, and disrupting military operations of the enemy." The expanded discussion in the manual includes the additional aspects of organized resistance which are now considered the role of the auxiliary and underground and goes on to address the role of external support to partisans.

¹⁷ Malcom and Martz, *White Tigers*, 197-198, 203.

of UW theory and practice prior to the Korean War and its application through the lens of operational art, this analysis will expose errors in the conduct of the campaign that should inform the planning of future UW campaigns. An examination of partisan warfare operations during the Korean War may also provide important insights into future conventional or hybrid conflict with North Korea. Despite the advances in the Army's intellectual framework and institutionalization of a capability for unconventional warfare since the Korean War, a modern conflict with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would face many of the same constraints endured by the partisans of 1951. This monograph's analysis of partisan warfare against North Korea will provide insights relevant to future threats and contribute to the effectiveness of future Special Operations Forces (SOF) planning efforts.

A review of partisan warfare theory and doctrine leading up to the Korean War reveals the experiences available to inform the Army's approach to the training and conduct of unconventional warfare. While the experience during World War II should have resulted in the legitimization of unconventional warfare as a capability for the United States Army, politics within the United States government and institutional resistance prevented this from occurring. As a result, most advisors during the Korean War lacked training or experience in unconventional warfare.

Clausewitz's approach to critical analysis provides a lens through which to examine the unconventional warfare campaign during the Korean War. This method focuses on discovery of facts, analysis of cause and effect, and assessment of other possible approaches using theory to aid in judgment.¹⁸ Clausewitz's *kritik* supports an examination of events from the level of an engagement to the broader strategy, while adjusting the scale of analysis to best understand the

¹⁸ Antulio J., Echevarria II, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 47.

campaign.¹⁹ This approach further emphasizes the importance of the proper scope in analysis. Clausewitz states that “a single thoroughly detailed event is more instructive than ten that are only touched on.”²⁰ *Kritik* also enables the analyst to distinguish between an apparent victory and one which has no impact on the result of the overall campaign. In Clausewitz’s oft cited example, he notes that Napoleon’s seizure of Moscow had no impact on the final result of his campaign in Russia.²¹ While there are some notable limitations to this approach in that a student of history cannot conduct experiments to validate her analysis, Clausewitz primarily developed *kritik* as a formal system through which to increase the ability and comprehension of his students, which enables a more accurate assessment of historical events.²² Through critical analysis, the examination of the case study brings to light the failed application of unconventional warfare which negated the tactical successes of the UNPIK in Korea by using contemporary UW theory and practice as the basis for criticism.

The concepts of end state, mission command, and synchronization outlined in current doctrine for the operational art help to analyze the gaps and shortfalls in the execution of unconventional warfare during the Korean War. These criteria provide a useful theoretical lens as they embody key concepts in the integration of an unconventional warfare operation within the broader campaign. Not only are these criteria outlined in modern doctrine, but the Army also addressed aspects of these concepts in the 1951 version of FM 31-21, *Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare*, thus recognizing their importance in prior UW campaigns.²³ Unfortunately,

¹⁹ Garry Wills, “Critical Inquiry (‘Kritik’) in Clausewitz,” *Critical Inquiry* 9, no. 2 (December 1982): 292-293, accessed August 23, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1086/448201>.

²⁰ Clausewitz, *On War*, 173.

²¹ Wills, “Critical Inquiry in Clausewitz,” 294-295.

²² Echevarria, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War*, 48-49.

²³ US Army, FM 31-21 (1951), 11-12; US Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-05.1, C1, *Unconventional Warfare* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 2-5, 2-12, 2-15, 5-19.

these doctrinal changes were too late to influence the conduct of partisan warfare in the Korean War.

Alongside the political context of the campaign and broader Korean conflict, the UNPIK case study enables understanding of the development and conduct of partisan warfare by United Nations Partisan Forces during the Korean War. After a brief discussion of the initial months of the conflict, the case study is further subdivided into three time periods that reflect changes in the employment of partisans in the conflict. The first period traces the formation of UN partisan units under the Far East Command G2 and Eighth Army G3 from January of 1951 through December of 1951. The second period includes the primary windows for employment of partisans from December of 1951 through March of 1953. The third period outlines the transition and demobilization phase starting in March of 1953 and ending in April of 1954. Qualitative research based on primary and secondary sources supports a thorough description of unconventional warfare operations during the conflict.

The application of the above analytical framework serves as an aid to understanding the UW campaign. Current concepts of end state, mission command, and synchronization outlined in joint and Army doctrine for the operational art provide a lens through which to analyze the gaps and shortfalls in the execution of unconventional warfare during the Korean War. Analysis of the end state for the UW campaign helps determine appropriateness in light of contemporary UW theory and the objective of UN forces in Korea. Examining the UNPIK structure for mission command through the lens of doctrine provides the means to understand the adequacy and appropriateness of the construct. Finally, scrutinizing the effectiveness of mechanisms for synchronization of the UW campaign with UN forces shows the degree to which the Eighth Army and Far East Command integrated partisan warfare efforts into the broader campaign.

The failure to integrate contemporary unconventional warfare theory and doctrine prior to the Korean war set the conditions for the limited impact of the Eighth Army's partisan warfare efforts. A review of the Army's unconventional warfare experience leading up to the Korean War

and detailed study of partisan warfare in the Korean War provides the basis for a comprehensive understanding of the campaign using Clausewitz's approach to critical analysis. Through this method, an examination through the lens of doctrine will demonstrate the flaws in the campaign which contributed to its failure. Analysis of the UNPIK case study will also bring to light the doctrinal implications for the conduct of unconventional warfare with a state actor such as North Korea.

Unconventional Warfare from World War II to Korea

While significant expertise remained from the partisan warfare campaigns of World War II, an examination of the period demonstrates that this experience was not considered important and unconventional warfare was not a priority for the Army until the requirement to counter Soviet partisan warfare arose in the decade after World War II. A review of unconventional warfare theory, doctrine, and practice leading up to the Korean War provides a means to understand the knowledge and experience which should have existed at the time of the conflict. These factors contribute important context in the analysis of the campaign that emerged from Eighth Army headquarters. Despite the publication of the first dedicated manual covering the *Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare* as FM 31-21 in 1951, contemporary accounts note that this knowledge did not inform the partisan warfare effort in Korea.²⁴

Contemporary Doctrine and its Origins

The 1941 publication of Field Manual (FM) 100-5 reflects the “doctrinal thought of the Army at a critical moment in history.”²⁵ The Special Operations chapter of the manual marked the first instance of published Army doctrine to address partisan warfare.²⁶ Developed prior to the

²⁴ Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 120; Malcom and Martz, *White Tigers*, 34-35; Michael McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), 36.

²⁵ US War Department, FM 100-5 (1941), Preface.

²⁶ Peter J. Schifferle, *America's School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 54; US War Department, Field

start of World War II and the establishment of the Office of Strategic Services, the manual includes just two pages of discussion on partisan warfare and offers only a very general intellectual framework for its application. Yet the concept of partisan warfare in 100-5 does establish conceptual continuity with the current doctrinal understanding of unconventional warfare. The manual describes partisan warfare as “carried on by small independent or semi-independent forces, operating against a greatly superior enemy.” Conceptually, 100-5 limits the role of partisan operations to “harassing or delaying larger forces, causing losses through attrition, destroying signal communication, or making incursions on the enemy's lines of communication and supply.”²⁷ In these two pages, the manual covers partisan operations in the abstract but does not detail techniques or the roles and functions of advisors.

While limited in the United States Army’s experience, the presence of partisans during the First World War necessitated the inclusion of the concept in FM 100-5 during the interwar period. For the United States Army, prior historical experience with partisan warfare was most characterized by the role of allied Indians in the frontier wars and guerrillas in the Philippines until the establishment of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in the 1940s.²⁸ Notably, the Special Operations chapter of 100-5 did not even mention partisan warfare before the draft of 1939.²⁹ While the Bolshevik revolution and British colonial wars of the early twentieth century included partisan warfare, neither of these foreign experiences were influential enough on the United States Army to lead to a robust doctrinal framework for support to partisans before World War II.

Manual (FM) 100-5, *Tentative Field Service Regulations, Operations, 1939* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1939), 228-231. Except for replacing the term “guerrilla” with “partisan,” the partisan warfare section of the 1941 version of 100-5 remained consistent with the unpublished draft of 1939.

²⁷ Walter E. Kretchik, *US Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 146, 148; US War Department, FM 100-5 (1941), 238.

²⁸ Andre J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History: 1998), 10-11, 116.

²⁹ US War Department, *Field Service Regulations, 1923* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1924), 114-120.

The vast majority of the Army's partisan warfare experience prior to the Korean War may be traced to the experience of Soldiers serving in the OSS during World War II. Loosely modeled on the British Special Operations Executive, teams executing unconventional warfare were charged with "setting Europe ablaze" through support to resistance elements behind German lines. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command outlined these experiences and recommendations on how to integrate this knowledge in a 1947 after action review, yet these experiences persistently failed to influence Army doctrine.³⁰

The political environment prior to the Korean War left little space for partisan warfare. Senior leaders considered partisans to be a mere annoyance, undisciplined outlaws fighting professional armies.³¹ The law of armed conflict maintained a state monopoly on the use of violence and defined partisan forces in purely criminal terms, limiting options for the support of resistance movements.³² As a result, contemporary doctrine included partisans solely in the context of their limited influence during conflicts among states.³³ Compounding these factors was the reality that military leaders such as MacArthur and Stilwell were extremely resistant to the use of partisans, due to both their socialization as military officers and their limited application by the Army prior to World War II.³⁴ As is made clear by the brief treatment of partisan warfare in FM 100-5, military leaders expected the role of partisans to be limited within the conduct of state conflict.

³⁰ US Department of the Army, *A Study of Special and Subversive Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 25 November 1947).

³¹ US War Department, FM 100-5 (1941), 238-239; Carl Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan* (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2007), 9-10.

³² Gregory M. Reichberg, Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby eds. *The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006), 508; Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan*, 10.

³³ US War Department, FM 100-5 (1941), 238-239.

³⁴ Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., "Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952: Origins of a "Special Warfare" Capability for the United States Army" (US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1979), 52-55, accessed March 15, 2018, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a086801.pdf>.

In addition to doctrinal treatments of partisan warfare, there were several theoretical sources available to influence the doctrine of the 1940s. These include that developed by T. E. Lawrence, Lenin's use of partisans in the Bolshevik Revolution, and the works of Clausewitz and Jomini.³⁵ From his experience in World War I, Lawrence established a widely published theory of support to partisan warfare by a Western nation.³⁶ While not providing Lawrence's level of insight on how to develop a partisan warfare capability, FM 100-5 encourages tactics such as attacks by small detachments to disrupt rail lines and raid supply convoys, but fails to deliver the depth of insight present in Lawrence's theory.³⁷ Publication of "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" by George F. Kennan in the late 1940s helped increase the level of policy attention given to Russian support to insurgency.³⁸ Lenin's use of a vanguard to bring about a revolution of the proletariat in Russia demonstrated the potential for the overthrow of a government through support to a partisan movement, a concept integral to communist strategy after World War II.³⁹ Finally, the dominant theories informing conventional Army doctrine in the 1940s derived from Clausewitz and Jomini. Writing in the context of the Prussian and Napoleonic wars, these theorists addressed guerrilla warfare, but only as the final refuge of a defeated people.⁴⁰ As a result of the Army's institutional resistance to the use of partisan warfare, doctrine did not evolve until further practice, policy shifts, and theoretical developments in the decades following the Korean War.

³⁵ Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 181-183.

³⁶ Peltier, "Surrogate Warfare," 59; T. E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (Lexington, KY: BN Publishing, 2010), 243-246; US Army, ATP 3-05.1 (2015), D-3.

³⁷ US War Department, FM 100-5 (1941), 239.

³⁸ George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 25, no. 4 (1947): 566-82, accessed August 11, 2017, doi:10.2307/20030065.

³⁹ Freedman, *Strategy: A History*, 181-180; Raymond L. Garthoff, "Unconventional Warfare in Communist Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 40, no. 4 (July 1962): 566, accessed August 7, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20029580>.

⁴⁰ Freedman, *Strategy: A History*, 179; Clausewitz, *On War*, 482; Echevarria, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War*, 137-138.

In the decades after World War II, the development of unconventional warfare doctrine advanced sporadically as the institution of the Army reluctantly adapted to face the new paradigm of Communist support to insurgency.⁴¹ Thomas in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* notes that anomalies not resolved by current practice must be discovered for the intellectual framework of a theory to adapt. As these anomalies mount, the practitioners within a field must decide whether to ignore the anomalies, adapt their approach, or replace it entirely.⁴² As the crisis in Korea arose, the Army sought to apply its experience in partisan warfare once again without replacing the dominant conventional approach by building upon the lessons of World War II.⁴³ It would take this crisis and the need to respond to Soviet partisan warfare to overcome the Army's institutional resistance to the unconventional warfare approach.

Institutional Resistance, Crisis, and the Emerging UW Requirement

I realized that although OSS had been deactivated, the employment of unconventional warfare would continue just as it had throughout the centuries – if not on one part of the globe then on another. What concerned me was whether or not the vacuum left by blindly dismantling an organization that had proved itself so indispensable as an essential component of total warfare would be properly filled. I was convinced that there was a requirement for an organization such as OSS preferably within the military - the Army.

—Col., Ret., Aaron Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets*

On 1 October 1945, President Truman ordered the disbanding of the Office of Strategic Services.⁴⁴ With this order, Army personnel no longer had the responsibility for partisan warfare activities. Army leadership, historically mistrustful of special operations, were notably happy to

⁴¹ Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 52-53, 68-69. Thomas Kuhn provides a lens through which to understand organizational change in the face of anomalies.

⁴² Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 52, 77-78.

⁴³ Aaron Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets* (New York: Pocket Books, 1986), 154-159; Quinn, *Memorandum for Commanding General*.

⁴⁴ Irwin, *The Jedburghs*, location 4471, Kindle; Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 31; McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, 27.

do away with the requirement.⁴⁵ As the cuts of the postwar Army came, the Army's leadership did not place a high priority on the unconventional warfare knowledge gained in Europe and the Pacific during World War II.⁴⁶ Secretary of the Army, Kenneth C. Royall was among those believing covert unconventional warfare operations to be "unsoldierly" noting that "he does not want the Army to get into covert operations or even to know anything about it."⁴⁷ Planners in United States Army Pacific echoed the perspective that the Army did not require a force designed to advise partisans, seeing no role for unconventional warfare unless there was no alternative to supporting a guerrilla force.⁴⁸

Despite ongoing attempts to downplay any Army role in unconventional warfare, discussion continued in light of the experience from World War II and the evolving Soviet threat. In the same year in which George F. Kennan published *The Sources of Soviet Conduct*, a 1947 War Department study of "Special and Subversive Operations" conducted by the OSS in World War II concluded that "special operations personnel should be assigned to the armed services to facilitate coordination with other military operations."⁴⁹ By late 1947, Kennan and others had already articulated the role of Russian "irregular and underground methods," noting in a letter to the Secretary of Defense that there were "cases where it might be essential to our security to *fight fire with fire*."⁵⁰ In what became known as the Truman doctrine after 1947, the United States made clear its determination to provide support to resistance movements in countries threatened

⁴⁵ Susan L. Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 11.

⁴⁶ Haas, *In the Devil's Shadow*, 33.

⁴⁷ McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, 29.

⁴⁸ Shelby L. Stanton, *Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia 1956-1975* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press), 1985, 2-4.

⁴⁹ US Army, *A Study of Special and Subversive Operations*, 2.

⁵⁰ McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, 28.

by Soviet domination.⁵¹ Despite his distrust for “cloak and dagger operations,” Truman supported the establishment of covert paramilitary capabilities under a new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) starting in 1947.⁵² In 1948, National Security Council (NSC) Directive 10/2 assigned the responsibility for covert operations, including assistance to guerrillas and underground movements, to the CIA.⁵³ By mid-1950, NSC-68 had cemented Truman’s view of American Cold War strategy as a global battle between good and evil which required a strategy of containment.⁵⁴

At the theater level in 1950, the Commander of the United States Far East Command (FECOM), General Douglas MacArthur, maintained a distrust for organizations like the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and unconventional warfare.⁵⁵ MacArthur is known to have prohibited the OSS from operating in areas under his command during World War II and held similarly negative opinions of the new CIA personnel.⁵⁶ Prior to the Korean conflict, there had been minimal preparation for potential partisan warfare activity, despite the threat of the Kim Il Sung regime in North Korea.⁵⁷ As a result, FECOM staff and Army forces deploying to Korea were unprepared for the planning and execution of operations in support of partisans. Despite increasing evidence of the need for an unconventional warfare capability, it took the crisis of the Korean War before the United States Army addressed the lack of a capability to conduct UW, though too late to influence the outcome of the campaign in Korea.⁵⁸

⁵¹ Tierney, *Chasing Ghosts*, 219.

⁵² Thomas D. Mays, *American Guerrillas: From the French and Indian Wars to Iraq and Afghanistan—How Americans Fight Unconventional Wars* (Guilford, CT: Globe Pequot, 2017), 218.

⁵³ Kiper, “Unconventional Warfare in Korea,” 26; McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, 29-30. The CIA originated with the National Security Act of 1947, but limited capacity for wartime support to guerrillas and underground movements led to NSC directive 10/2 assigning a supporting responsibility for guerrilla warfare to the Army through guidance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

⁵⁴ Tierney, *Chasing Ghosts*, 219.

⁵⁵ Kiper, “Unconventional Warfare in Korea,” 27.

⁵⁶ Evanhoe, *Darkmoon*, 7.

⁵⁷ McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, 17-18.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 20, 31-32.

As the political environment following World War II evolved into the Cold War, the need to counter or support partisan warfare became more apparent. This was reflected in the Army's development of the first manuals focused specifically on insurgency in the early 1950s. For the United States, the Korean War became the impetus for the establishment of an office responsible for unconventional warfare, initially known as the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, under Brigadier General McClure in September of 1950.⁵⁹ This organization served as the incubator for the unconventional warfare capability reflected in the creation of the 10th Special Forces Group in 1952, developments occurring in parallel with the challenge of supporting partisans during the Korean War.

The implementation of early counter-guerrilla doctrine reflected in FM 31-20 serves as one indicator that at least some portions of the Army understood the increasing role of partisans. At the direction of the Army Chief of Staff, units preparing for deployment to Korea used the newly developed manual as "the only literature available on counter guerrilla operations."⁶⁰ Changes in the political environment that influenced UW doctrine in the years after World War II include an emerging Soviet threat, developments in international law, and limitations on conflict resulting from nuclear proliferation. Despite the Army beginning to understand the requirement to counter partisans, the organization remained slow to accept the institutional changes necessary to support them. Critical analysis of the gaps in UW capacity during the Korean War demonstrates how these shortcomings resulted in a crisis for the Army which brought about renewed emphasis on the capability in doctrine and practice.

⁵⁹ Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 111; Richard L. Kiper, *Spare Not the Brave: The Special Activities Group in Korea* (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 2014), 27, accessed October 31, 2017, ProQuest Ebook Central.

⁶⁰ Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 164.

The United Nations Partisan Infantry, Korea (UNPIK)

The establishment of the United Nations Partisan Infantry Korea arose out of necessity after a surprise offensive by North Korea displaced thousands of non-communists loyal to the South Korean regime.⁶¹ With the “sudden emergence of 10,000 friendly partisans,” the Army had to rapidly determine how to support and enable their efforts within a military infrastructure not prepared for unconventional warfare.⁶² Examination of the UNPIK campaign through the lens of doctrine demonstrates that the Army’s lack of an unconventional warfare capability led to the failure of partisan warfare in the Korean War.

As the conflict in Korea evolved, the Army sought to develop the capacity to support partisan warfare by leveraging the experience of available officers with World War II partisan warfare experience. Once Eighth Army understood the requirement for partisan warfare, X Corps, at the behest of General MacArthur, requested assistance from Lieutenant Colonel Russell Volckmann to help design a campaign plan for partisan warfare. Admired by MacArthur for his success leading partisans resisting the Japanese on the Philippine island of Luzon during World War II, MacArthur recognized Volckmann as “one of the foremost authorities on guerrilla activities in United States Army.”⁶³ Despite this experience, the case of UNPIK makes it clear that the model for unconventional warfare employed to achieve an end state of final victory in World War II was not entirely conducive to success in the context of limited war in Korea.⁶⁴

Even in light of the irregular aspects of the Pacific campaigns of World War II, the Army failed to integrate the experience into training and doctrine, focusing instead on more conventional tactics. While the Army continued to resist participation in anything other than a

⁶¹ Evanhoe, *Darkmoon*, 37.

⁶² Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, vi.

⁶³ Guardia, *American Guerrilla*, 164-165; Quinn, *Memorandum for Commanding General*.

⁶⁴ Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets*, 154-159.

conventional war in Korea, requirements for guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare brought about the need for supporting infrastructure.⁶⁵ Upon discovery of North Korean partisans resisting communist rule, UN forces slowly developed the organizations and infrastructure to support them.⁶⁶ These organizations evolved over the course of the conflict to form the United Nations Partisan Infantry Korea. Figure 1 illustrates the transitions in mission command structure for unconventional warfare over the course of the Korean War. While not precisely identifying the nature of command relationships among units, those with higher authority and responsibility for the command or coordination of UW are closer to the top of the chart.




Figure 1. UN Forces Mission Command Structure for Unconventional Warfare, 1951-1954. Created by author with data from Richard L. Kiper, "Unconventional Warfare in Korea: Forgotten Aspect of the Forgotten War," *Special Warfare* 16, no. 2 (August 2003): 27-33; Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951-1954* (Chevy Chase, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Operations Research Office, 1956), 10-11, 38, 64-67, 112.

Given the embryonic nature of organized partisan warfare efforts in 1950 and General MacArthur's negative opinions of unconventional warfare, there are only small scale examples of partisan operations leading up to the September 15, 1950 amphibious landing at Inchon.⁶⁷ In the

⁶⁵ Tierney, *Chasing Ghosts*, 226-227.

⁶⁶ Kiper, "Unconventional Warfare in Korea," 27.

⁶⁷ Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 151.

weeks prior to the Inchon landing, a navy lieutenant attached to MacArthur's staff contrived and then executed a plan that set the conditions for the coming amphibious landing by seizing the lightly defended islands off the West coast of Inchon using naval superiority and irregular forces. In a failed September, 1950 effort by United Nations Command Forward, First Lt. William Harrison led a guerrilla battalion raid along the occupied South Korean coast North of the Pusan perimeter.⁶⁸ With the focus of FECOM planners centered on Operation CHROMITE and attempts to maintain operational security, these ad-hoc partisan efforts had a limited impact and MacArthur's priority remained the massing of conventional troops.⁶⁹ Despite the minimal impact on the initial counterattack, the occupation of these islands provided the secure bases necessary to support and train the North Korean partisans and provided a point of departure for the vast majority of the partisan warfare efforts during the Korean War.

Analysis of the UNPIK case study enables us to understand the institutional shortcomings which led to the failure of partisan warfare in the Korean War. Clausewitz's approach to critical analysis provides the means to accomplish this objective and to better understand the Korean War UW campaign. This method, outlined in book two of *On War*, focuses on discovery of facts, analysis of cause and effect, and assessment of other possible approaches using theory to aid in judgment.⁷⁰ Clausewitz's approach brings light to the failed application of unconventional warfare which diminished the success of the UNPIK in Korea by using contemporary UW theory and practice as the basis for criticism.

The concepts of end state, mission command, and synchronization outlined in current doctrine for the operational art provide a lens through which to analyze the gaps and shortfalls in the execution of unconventional warfare during the Korean War. An examination of the end state of the UW campaign helps to determine appropriateness in light of contemporary UW theory and

⁶⁸ Evanhoe, *Darkmoon*, 21-31.

⁶⁹ Kiper, *Spare Not the Brave*, 29-32.

⁷⁰ Echevarria, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War*, 156.

the objective of UN forces in Korea. An analysis of the UNPIK structure for mission command through the lens of doctrine demonstrates the utility of the construct for UW operations. Finally, inquiry into the effectiveness of mechanisms for synchronization of the UW campaign with UN forces helps us to understand their impact on the success of the broader United Nations effort. As R.W. Komer outlines in a 1972 analysis of institutional failure in the Vietnam War, institutional constraints to include the lack of institutional memory were a key contributing factor to the failure of US strategy.⁷¹ In the case of the Korean War, the Army's failure to integrate institutional knowledge of unconventional warfare had a similarly negative impact on the conduct of partisan warfare.

Establishment of UNPIK (January 1951 - December 1951)

Korea was a vacuum for special operations and unconventional warfare. Few people wanted to do it. Fewer still knew how to do it.

—Col., Ret., Ben Malcom, *White Tigers*

On January 7, 1951, ROK Navy Task Force 95.7, operating off of North Korea's western coast, informed Eighth Army of over 10,000 partisans continuing to fight communist forces in Hwanghae-do province.⁷² As described by South Korean Naval Forces, these resistance forces were "desperate, hungry, poorly armed . . . and mad as hell."⁷³ Since the issue pertained to guerrilla forces, the Eighth Army called upon Lieutenant Colonel John H. McGee, a staff officer from the G-2 with experience in partisan warfare from WWII in the Philippines.⁷⁴ Col. McGee

⁷¹ R. W. Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-CVN Performance in Vietnam*, Rand Corporation, 1972, 64-74, accessed August 6, 2017, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R967.pdf>.

⁷² Rod Paschall, *A Study in Command and Control: Special Operations in Korea, 1951-1953* (U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, June 1988), 3; Evanhoe, *Darkmoon*, 36-37; Kiper, *Spare Not the Brave*, 236; Lawrence V. Schuetta, *Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 1950-53* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1964), 94.

⁷³ Haas, *In the Devil's Shadow*, 32.

⁷⁴ Evanhoe, *Darkmoon*, 20; Robert W. Black, *Rangers in Korea* (New York: Ivy Books, 1989), 13.

proposed that “a combined headquarters . . . be established to conduct attrition-type warfare” and received permission to establish the Eighth Army’s “Attrition Section” to provide training and logistical support to the partisans.⁷⁵ It took only two weeks from initial contact for FECOM to approve McGee’s plan and for the Attrition Section to begin supplying the partisans with weapons and equipment in preparation for employment on the mainland.⁷⁶ Figure 2 depicts the initial task organization for unconventional warfare under the Far East Command.




Figure 2. Initial Attrition Section Organization, January 1951. Richard L. Kiper, “Unconventional Warfare in Korea: Forgotten Aspect of the Forgotten War,” *Special Warfare* 16, no. 2 (August 2003): 27.

By January 23, 1951, McGee’s attrition section had produced “Operations Plan Able,” which created three partisan units and directed partisans to prepare for a U.N. counteroffensive.⁷⁷ Plan Able focused on establishment of the units through recruitment of loyal partisans and

⁷⁵ Mark Moyer, *Oppose Any Foe: The Rise of America's Special Operations Forces* (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 108-109; Kiper, *Spare Not the Brave*, 236.

⁷⁶ Paschall, *A Study in Command and Control*, 5-6.

⁷⁷ Richard L. Kiper, “Unconventional Warfare in Korea: Forgotten Aspect of the Forgotten War,” *Special Warfare* 16, no. 2 (August 2003): 27. Kiper describes partisan task organization as follows: “William Able Base” (soon renamed Leopard), which would operate off the west coast of Korea; “Kirkland,” which would operate off the east coast; and “Baker Section,” which would conduct airborne operations throughout North Korea. The plan included a fourth unit, “Task Force Redwing,” which was actually a company of Republic of Korea Marines that was organized for conducting raids and sabotage.”

leaders, with the express purpose of further recruiting and employment in their home regions, eventually “in conjunction with a major effort of UN forces.”⁷⁸ The initial task organization stationed eleven US Army advisors and 125 Korean personnel at the Paengnyong-do headquarters.⁷⁹ As the vast majority of partisan operations took place in the western regions and originated from the islands off the west coast of North Korea’s Hwanghae province, most partisan activities originated from the units located on the five islands known as Leopard base.⁸⁰ These islands provided safe haven behind the United Nations naval blockade, while enabling partisan cooperation with underground resistance elements on the mainland.⁸¹

MacArthur’s relief and subsequent replacement with Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgeway in April of 1951 brought additional organizational turmoil to already ad-hoc unconventional warfare efforts, though Ridgeway was more supportive of the employment of partisans.⁸² By late 1951, Far East Command shifted control of partisan activities shifted from the G3, Eighth Army, to the theater G-2 and established the Far East Command/Liaison Group (FEC/LG) in Tokyo.⁸³ With no operational level organization designed to support and conduct the UW campaign, the FECOM relegation of partisan warfare to the G-2 reflected the view that partisans were best employed in an intelligence gathering capacity. Though this directly conflicted with the experience of unconventional warfare in World War II, it took until 1952 for

⁷⁸ Schuetta, *Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea*, 158-159.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 71.

⁸⁰ Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 46. ORO analysis states that nearly 97 percent of partisan operations from May to December of 1951 took place in Hwanghae Province.

⁸¹ Schuetta, *Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea*, 195.

⁸² S. L. A. Marshall, *The Military History of the Korean War* (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1963), 59-61; Evanhoe, *Darkmoon*, 37.

⁸³ Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 11.

FECOM to resolve this gap through the creation of the Seoul based Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK) as an element of the FEC/LG.⁸⁴

In May of 1951, Lieutenant General James Van Fleet took over command of the Eighth Army and the Far East Command designated the Attrition Section as the “Miscellaneous Group” or 8086th Army Unit. By July, the Far East Command/Liaison Group (FEC/LG) and Far East Command/Liaison Detachment (FEC/LD) became known as Army Unit 8240. This reorganization reflected the new commander’s increased openness to the role of partisans, and shifted tactical level control from a staff section to an Army unit, reflecting a more traditional mission command structure.⁸⁵

Partisans of the 8240th Army Unit spent the first months of 1951 training and organizing, with Eighth Army orders directing them to establish bases on the mainland as soon as possible for the purposes of recruiting, intelligence collection, and harassment of the NKPA. An analysis by the Johns Hopkins University Operations Research Office notes that 86 percent of partisan operation from May through December of 1951 occurred in the area of Hwanghae Province.⁸⁶ Attrition Section guidance to partisans remained focused on sabotage and intelligence operations while preparing for guerrilla support to a large scale United Nations offensive.⁸⁷ As that offensive never materialized, the guerrillas continued to conduct harassing attacks within their operational reach, mainly focused on the western coaster areas.⁸⁸

Shortcomings in the personnel system continued to plague efforts to support the partisans at all echelons. The United States Army selected advisors to Korean forces without regard to special screening or specific training. This led to significant variance in the capability of ad-hoc

⁸⁴ Kiper, “Unconventional Warfare in Korea,” 32.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 32.

⁸⁶ Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 46.

⁸⁷ Schuetta, *Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea*, 195.

⁸⁸ Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 54-55.

advisor teams. Despite the unconventional warfare experience gained by the primarily United States Army personnel in the OSS during World War II, less than ten OSS veterans were assigned as advisors to the Attrition Section.⁸⁹ As Colonel McGee completed his tour in July of 1951, another veteran of unconventional warfare in the Philippines, Lieutenant Colonel Jay Vanderpool, took his place.⁹⁰

Alongside the formation of Eighth Army's partisan warfare capability, the Far East Command and Air Force established their own capabilities. Far East Air Forces (FEAF) efforts included development of partisan warfare infrastructure designed to support intelligence collection and guerrilla warfare, until the Far East Command directed elimination of Air Force support to guerrilla warfare in March of 1951.⁹¹ These redundant formations were often at odds, fighting for scarce resources, advisors, and partisans. Lieutenant Colonel Volckmann served as the Executive Officer for the Far East Command's Special Activities Group until its dissolution in April of 1951, while Eighth Army tasked Lieutenant Colonel McGee with screening replacements to re-establish Ranger companies on the World War II model to help counter communist partisan warfare.⁹² These independent units all competed for the same limited numbers of advisors, planners, and capable partisans.

The failure to synchronize these efforts through a unified mission command structure at the theater level contributed to the failure of partisan warfare during the Korean War, despite being recommended in contemporary doctrine.⁹³ While Army doctrine had placed little emphasis on partisan warfare prior to the Korean War, 1951 saw the completion of FM 31-20, *Operations*

⁸⁹ Edward Hymoff, *The OSS in World War II* (New York: Richardson & Steirman, 1986), 16.

⁹⁰ Paschall, *A Study in Command and Control*, 11.

⁹¹ Schuetta, *Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea*, 73-74.

⁹² Guardia, *American Guerrilla*, 166-167; Black, *Rangers in Korea*, 13-14, 196-197; Robert W. Boose, Jr., *US Army Forces in the Korean War 1950-53* (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2005), 30-31. The Eighth Army ordered the Ranger companies inactivated in August of 1951.

⁹³ Haas, *In the Devil's Shadow*, 38-40.

Against Guerrilla Forces, and FM 31-21, *Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare*. But as one advisor notes, these manuals were not available to advisors in Korea, so the partisans and their advisors were forced to learn from experience.⁹⁴ Among other insights derived from unconventional warfare in World War II, the manual recommended the establishment of a single headquarters at the unified command level with responsibility for the employment of guerrillas, which partially occurred with the creation of the FEC/LD in December, 1951. Unfortunately, control at the unified command level did not consolidate command responsibility and failed to resolve the “bewildering maze of staff organizations, overlapping responsibilities, and ambiguous relationships” that plagued the unconventional warfare campaign.⁹⁵

Conduct of Unconventional Warfare (December 1951 - March 1953)

Any nation that uses [partisan warfare] intelligently will, as a rule, gain some superiority over those who disdain its use.

—Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

From late-1951 through mid-1953, the broader political context of the UW campaign shifted during the conduct of cease-fire talks. As a result, North Korean forces enjoyed freedom of action and the ability to consolidate control over rear areas, hindering partisan warfare operations.⁹⁶ At the same time, UN forces became entirely reliant on partisans for their ability to operate behind enemy lines as conventional forces shifted to a role of active defense, focused on patrolling and inflicting casualties with artillery and airpower instead of offensive maneuver into North Korea.⁹⁷ The partisans, whose original incentive had been to return to their ancestral homes, could no longer expect to serve as liberators. Even in light of the changing strategic end state, guidance from the new theater level command (FED/LD (K)) did not vary significantly, but

⁹⁴ Kiper, “Unconventional Warfare in Korea,” 34-35.

⁹⁵ Paschall, *A Study in Command and Control*, 14-15, 18.

⁹⁶ Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 61.

⁹⁷ Boose, *US Army Forces in the Korean War*, 7, 11.

continued to focus on harassment of the enemy while conventional forces remained on the defensive.⁹⁸

Despite the significance of the cease-fire talks, this period showed little change in Eighth Army guidance to UNPIK. Partisan units continued recruiting, training, and attacking targets of opportunity on the mainland. As North Korean units consolidated their position on Hwanghae province, the partisans, with support from airstrikes and the United Nations naval blockade, fought off communist attempts to seize some of the more accessible island bases. While partisan units grew and the United Nations Command sought ways to maintain pressure on North Korean forces, FEC/LD (K) encouraged the guerrillas in the execution of larger, more audacious offensive operations.

A further series of changes to mission command arrangements occurred in 1952 with the activation of United States Army Forces Far East (AFFE) under General Mark Clark. AFFE took operational control of CCRAK away from FEC/LG, while directing that partisan forces expand to 40,000 by July of 1953. This change led to the November, 1952 re-designation of the operational elements within FEC/LD (K) to United Nations Partisan Forces Korea (UNPFK) and renamed the original partisan units as Partisan Infantry Regiments and Partisan Airborne Infantry Regiments. An additional two regiments and the designation as United Nations Partisan Infantry Korea (UNPIK) came in the fall of 1953 along with the re-designation of CCRAK as Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Far East (CCRAFE).⁹⁹ Figure 3 shows the final task organization for unconventional warfare under the Far East Command and Army Forces Far East in 1953.

⁹⁸ Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 62.

⁹⁹ Kiper, "Unconventional Warfare in Korea," 33-34.




Figure 3. Final UW Organization, September 1953. Richard L. Kiper, "Unconventional Warfare in Korea: Forgotten Aspect of the Forgotten War," *Special Warfare* 16, no. 2 (August 2003): 32.

Alongside orders to expand partisan forces to 40,000 in 1953, the Far East Command published a revised campaign plan for the 8240th. These plans did not significantly change the role of the partisans and sporadic harassment efforts continued under the direction of partisan leaders and advisors.¹⁰⁰ Even as the first 10th Special Forces Group personnel deployed in 1953, they found their European focused unconventional warfare training inappropriate for the advisor mission in Korea. In addition, the Green Berets were sent as individual replacements rather than employed as organic detachments. This failure to integrate prior experience in the effective employment of cohesive, regionally oriented teams of advisors further compounded gaps in the UW campaign's design.¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 62-63.

¹⁰¹ Haas, *In the Devil's Shadow*, 67-68.

Airborne operations, conducted primarily by Baker section, were limited to a dozen executed from 1951 through 1953. Alongside attempts to establish clandestine infrastructure for future guerrilla activities, the primary objective for these operations was the destruction of NKPA logistical capabilities. In reality, rail lines were too heavily guarded for small groups of partisans to conduct effective sabotage operations. Though these operations were an attempt by Far East Command planners to leverage partisan capabilities to a greater depth than permitted by coastal infiltration, the failure to understand the risk of the operations resulted in consistent compromise due to the effectiveness of North Korean counterinsurgency efforts.¹⁰² In addition, air force bombing efforts impacted North Korean sustainment on a much larger scale. As a result, UNPIK airborne operations are judged to be a failed effort at any level of analysis.¹⁰³

Transition (March 1953 - April 1954)

The final phase of United States Army unconventional warfare doctrine is the transition phase, detailed in the first edition of FM 31-21 as demobilization.¹⁰⁴ Regardless of the campaign's outcome, planners must consider how partisan forces will demobilize or otherwise integrate into the post-conflict society. This phase is widely recognized as one of the more difficult phases in unconventional warfare, and is marked by an increase in risk to the force and mission.¹⁰⁵ The UNPIK transition was no exception. Despite reluctance in the South Korean government to receive additional, trained partisans on their territory, the partisan infantry grew to over 22,000 by February of 1953.¹⁰⁶

This final period was characterized by uncertainty for the Korean partisans. While UN forces maintained their strategy of active defense, the United Nations Command and South

¹⁰² Evanhoe, *Darkmoon*, 160.

¹⁰³ Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 91-93.

¹⁰⁴ US Army, FM 31-21 (1951), 228.

¹⁰⁵ US Army, ATP 3-05.1 (2015), 2-15.

¹⁰⁶ Moyar, *Oppose Any Foe*, 112-113.

Korean government had not yet clarified the legal status of the partisans. From April through July of 1953, partisan operations continued in an attempt to maintain pressure on North Korean forces through attrition and by imposing the requirement to secure coastal regions. At the same time, South Korean concerns over the plan for partisan demobilization led to a halt on recruiting and efforts to remove “undesirable elements” from the units.¹⁰⁷ Beyond the risk of communist infiltration inherent to North Korean recruits, the final phase of expansion resulted in the recruiting of South Koreans, some of whom were criminals fleeing the authorities or using entrance into a partisan unit as a means to escape the draft.¹⁰⁸ In order to integrate partisans into ROK society, UN forces began efforts at conventionalization of UNPIK units, which both kept the partisans occupied before the impending armistice and provided time for the United States and ROK governments to negotiate their status as part of the transition plan.¹⁰⁹

Also of note, this period marks the gradual transfer of authority for the partisans to the Republic of Korea, the integration of seventy-five additional Special Forces personnel into the allocation of advisors, and efforts to shift some partisan capacity toward post-armistice covert operations.¹¹⁰ The formation of the 8250 ROK Army Unit, with administrative responsibilities over partisans, helped garner South Korean support for the recognition of the irregular forces.¹¹¹ Covert operations, two of which were code-named Beehive and Camel, began in mid-1953 and were active through the start of 1954. These efforts, intended to leverage partisan capabilities for the establishment of underground resistance infrastructure, mainly focused on intelligence collection rather than creating stay-behind organizations. Unfortunately, both operations were deemed a failure, suffering desertions and significant casualties before their extraction in

¹⁰⁷ Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 109-110.


¹⁰⁸ Evanhoe, *Darkmoon*, 163.

¹⁰⁹ Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 141-142.

¹¹⁰ Evanhoe, *Darkmoon*, 164-165; Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 111-113.

¹¹¹ Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 118.

February of 1954.¹¹² This period leading up to the armistice also saw the requirement to evacuate partisans from the islands off the coast of North Korea to locations south of the 38th parallel, a significant organizational and logistical problem with tens of thousands of partisans and refugees. By April 30, 1954, CCRAK considered the transition phase complete, and officially disbanded UNPIK's 8240th Army Unit.¹¹³ The map in figure 4 shows the concentration of partisan warfare operations over the course of the Korean War.



Frontispiece—Based on islands off the west coast of North Korea following the UN retreat from the Yalu, the partisans conducted most of their actions in nearby areas of the mainland. The map shows where the actions occurred during the period December 1951 to March 1953.

Figure 4. Map reproduced from 1956 Operations Research Office study depicting irregular force withdrawal from North Korea and operations from December 1951 through March 1953. Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951-1954* (Chevy Chase, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Operations Research Office, 1956), ii.

¹¹² Evanhoe, *Darkmoon*, 166-167; W. Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 142.

¹¹³ Moyar, *Oppose Any Foe*, 112-113; Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 116; Evanhoe, *Darkmoon*, 167.

Analysis

As demonstrated through the case study, the partisan warfare campaign during the Korean War represents the failure to institutionalize the Army's prior unconventional warfare experience into doctrine. The critical analysis approach, outlined by Carl von Clausewitz in *On War*, uses theory as the lens through which to understand the details of the campaign.¹¹⁴ The criteria of end state, mission command, and synchronization help to expose the institutional gaps in the United States Army's capacity for unconventional warfare during the Korean War and illuminate other possible approaches that could have prevented the failure of partisan warfare.

An examination of the Eighth Army and Far East Command partisan warfare campaign provides a means to understand if the UW campaign end state is appropriate for the method and supportive of the broader campaign. Department of Defense Joint Publication 5-0 defines end state as "the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives." Doctrine further delineates between the nation's strategic end state and the military end state, defined as "the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all military objectives." A campaign's unity of effort and synchronization are direct products of a clearly articulated end state.¹¹⁵

An analysis of the Eighth Army's partisan warfare campaign through the lens of mission command provides a means to determine if the structure used to integrate the Eighth Army's partisan warfare campaign was adequate and appropriate for the conduct of unconventional warfare. The mission command warfighting function is defined in ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, as "the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander

¹¹⁴ Clausewitz, *On War*, 156.

¹¹⁵ US Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), IV-19, IV-20. JP 5-0 goes on to note that the military end state "normally represents a point in time and/or circumstances beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining national objectives."

to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions (ADRP 3-0).”¹¹⁶ Unity of command is the most effective means to integrate the warfighting functions, though not always possible, given the independent nature of unconventional warfare activities. As a result, doctrine recognizes that the complexity and strategic impact of special operations requires its own mission command structure.¹¹⁷

Evaluating the UNPIK case study through the lens of synchronization helps to determine whether the operational artists effectively integrate the UW campaign into the broader conflict. Synchronization is defined in doctrine as “the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.”¹¹⁸ While not necessarily collocated with conventional operations, an unconventional warfare operation must still support the objectives of the overall campaign to achieve the higher commander’s end state. The Joint Staff irregular warfare concept notes the importance of synchronization for the integration of special warfare and conventional operations.¹¹⁹ As partisan forces are frequently employed in small numbers, effective synchronization with conventional operations may provide a relative advantage not achieved when these small tactical actions are not coordinated within the broader campaign.

¹¹⁶ US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 3-1. ADRP 6-0 further states that the mission command warfighting function “consists of the related tasks and a mission command system that support the exercise of authority and direction by the commander.”

¹¹⁷ D. Jones, “Ending the Debate: Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense and Why Words Matter” (MMAS thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006), 78; US Army, FM 31-21 (1951), 23-27.

¹¹⁸ US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 3-15.

¹¹⁹ US Department of Defense, Joint Operating Concept (JOC), *Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats, Version 2.0* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 17 May 2010), 23-24.

End State

Clausewitz argues against conquest for its own sake. A tactical advantage that cannot be used for the state's larger purposes is a strategic setback. A strategist must judge conquest in terms of control. To take what one cannot put to use is wasteful, if not self-defeating.

—Garry Wills, *Kritik in Clausewitz*

In 1951, the Eighth Army directed UN partisan forces to prepare for tactical employment as part of broader conventional operations. Upon the initiation of armistice negotiations, a shift in the military aim toward strictly defensive conventional operations removed the incentive for Chinese forces to come to a rapid agreement.¹²⁰ Despite this significant change in the political aim, Eighth Army leadership guidance on the partisan warfare effort remained stagnant. After two years of stalemate, 1953 guidance for partisans focused on “defense of the guerrilla-held islands, harassing operations, and reconnaissance activities.”¹²¹ As a result, the partisans focused operations on enemy forces and infrastructure of minimal military significance.¹²²

Examination of Eighth Army’s UW campaign makes it clear that the end state of the partisan warfare effort was not appropriate for the method or supportive of the broader campaign. North Korean UNPIK partisans lacked a unifying leader and coherent political aim. Their main focus was to remove the communist regime from North Korea, but as a predominantly military organization, the partisans expressed this through military means. The ad-hoc nature of the partisan organization made it difficult to develop a unifying political structure and end state. The fact that the ROK government saw the partisans as a potential threat only exacerbated these divisions.¹²³

¹²⁰ Gideon Rose, *How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 179, Kindle.

¹²¹ Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 21.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 8.

¹²³ Malcom and Martz, *White Tigers*, 38.

The application of an unconventional warfare capability with limited aims created a tension between the United Nations's end state and that of the partisans. As defined above, the objective of unconventional warfare is to "coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power," but the United Nations's use of partisans for coercion in armistice negotiations did not mesh with the interests of the partisans to overthrow the occupying power.¹²⁴ To partisans, the catalyst for resistance remained the potential for the return to their homes in North Korea. Cease-fire negotiations reduced the chances that this would happen and removed the liberation of their homeland as an incentive to conduct operations. With an unclear status in South Korea and no clear path home, advisors had only material incentives to encourage continued operations.¹²⁵ This mismatched end state and resulting conflict between UNPIK partisans and their United States sponsors greatly diminished the effectiveness of partisan warfare operation and calls into question the applicability of unconventional warfare in the Korean War.

Mission Command

The conduct of partisan warfare by the Eighth Army demonstrates that the structure for integrating the partisan campaign was not adequate and appropriate for the conduct of unconventional warfare. Despite the potential for a large scale unconventional warfare component of the strategy in North Korea, Eighth Army initially created what one author termed an "absurdly small" attrition section, responsible for command and control of the entire partisan warfare effort.¹²⁶ Despite Lieutenant Colonel McGee's early recommendations to create a joint, combined headquarters for the planning and execution of partisan warfare at the theater level, the Attrition Section continued as a small staff element within the Eighth Army G-2, further exacerbating the lack of a clear hierarchy for the mission command of unconventional warfare

¹²⁴ US Army, ADRP 3-05 (2012), 2-2.

¹²⁵ Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 12.

¹²⁶ Haas, *In the Devil's Shadow*, 209.

operations.¹²⁷ This lack of capacity hindered effective command and control of partisan forces and exacerbated the consequences of inadequate structures for the support of clandestine operations at the FECOM level.

The dysfunctional nature of the Army's command structure for unconventional warfare operations in Korea was only exacerbated by the existence of parallel structures within the Air Force and CIA. This led to disputes among the agencies tracing back to NSC directive 10/2, which the CIA saw as a mandate for unconventional warfare responsibilities.¹²⁸ While contemporary doctrine called for centralized command and control of partisan warfare efforts under the combatant commander, partisans in Korea served under a variety of organizations with no responsible command node at FECOM.

At the operational level, Eighth Army's Attrition Section served as a staff section with administrative responsibilities. When the Attrition Section became Miscellaneous Group, 8086th Army Unit in May of 1951, it remained a subordinate staff section, though now under the Eighth Army G-3, with responsibility to coordinate with a superior staff section of the FECOM G-2, reflagged as FEC/LG.¹²⁹ It wasn't until December of 1951 that FECOM established a mechanism for control of partisan warfare operations at the theater level. Even then, CCRAFE maintained only operational control and never had command responsibility.¹³⁰

The leadership responsibilities of selected advisors should not be overlooked in its impact on the effective mission command of partisan forces. Even after the integration of the first Special Forces into the UNPIK organization, CCRAFE staff noted that advisors were not effectively prepared for the mission, did not understand the region and unit organization, and may not have

¹²⁷ Paschall, *A Study in Command and Control*, 8-9.

¹²⁸ Kiper, "Unconventional Warfare in Korea," 33.

¹²⁹ Paschall, *A Study in Command and Control*, 9-10.

¹³⁰ Haas, *In the Devil's Shadow*, 42-43.

been sufficiently screened prior to training.¹³¹ This discord may be a consequence of the European focused model driven by United States policy and the failure to effectively adapt the unconventional warfare approach used to support a war of final victory in World War II to the requirement of limited war in Korea.¹³² From the inside perspective, advisors lamented the duplication of administrative requirements placed upon advisors by the overlapping layers of headquarters, which reduced the ability of partisan leaders on the ground to exercise initiative.¹³³

As operations in Korea shifted to the transition phase, the ambiguous status of partisan forces became a source of friction between US forces and their ROK counterparts.¹³⁴ South Korean authorities remained reluctant to take immediate command responsibility for 22,000 partisans originating from North Korea, rumored to include both communist infiltrators and potentially criminal elements of Korean society.¹³⁵ The ad-hoc nature of the UNPIK organization meant there had been no plan for the transition of mission command in initial plans, as the partisans were intended to return to North Korea after liberation of their homes. As a result, demobilization and conventionalization were the only remaining option. Throughout the campaign, the Eighth Army and Far East Command failed to implement the unified mission command structure dictated by emerging doctrine and the partisan warfare experience of World War II, further contributing to the failure of unconventional warfare in the Korean War.

Synchronization

After World War II, General Eisenhower lauded the efforts of French resistance forces supporting the Normandy landings as “worth 15 divisions to the Allies,” but these forces

¹³¹ Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 115.

¹³² McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, 44-45.

¹³³ Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 205.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹³⁵ Evanhoe, *Darkmoon*, 163.

succeeded only due to effective synchronization with the overall campaign.¹³⁶ While the Eighth Army expected partisan warfare efforts to draw enemy combat power away from the conventional fight by creating requirements for counter-guerrilla units, the above analysis demonstrates a clear lack of intentional efforts to coordinate the tactical actions of guerrillas with conventional forces in time, space, and purpose. An early architect of both Special Forces doctrine and the plan for UW in Korea, Lieutenant Colonel Russell Volckmann, noted that the majority of partisan engagements had been in direct combat against communist forces rather than in the more fruitful resistance efforts of sabotage and subversion.¹³⁷

The commanders and staff officers charged with development of the Eighth Army's UW campaign failed to synchronize the partisan warfare effort's phasing with the broader conventional campaign. While the buildup of a UW capability is doctrinally expected to remain on the strategic defensive until the force achieves adequate mass or can operate in a mutually supporting manner with a large conventional force, the use of partisans as an offensive, harassment force hindered the ability of the partisans to covertly increase their capabilities.¹³⁸ The employment of guerrilla forces in a direct-action role represented a divergence from the unconventional warfare doctrine outlined in FM 31-21, as the forces would have been better suited for development of clandestine networks capable of sabotage or offensive operations in conjunction with a larger conventional force rather than unilaterally.¹³⁹

The failure to synchronize the FECOM partisan warfare campaign with independent CIA efforts resulted in an ongoing conflict between the agencies and reduced the impact of

¹³⁶ Steve A. Fondacaro, "Strategic Analysis of U.S. Special Operations During the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953" (MMAS thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1988), 5.

¹³⁷ Guardia, *American Guerrilla*, 166-167.

¹³⁸ Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 22; US Army, FM 31-21 (1951), 159, 193, 204.

¹³⁹ Guardia, *American Guerrilla*, 167.

unconventional warfare during the Korean War.¹⁴⁰ Intelligence collection became an important secondary outcome of the partisan warfare campaign, yet a lack of synchronization between the CCRAK and the CIA resulted in the uncoordinated replication of collection efforts. One UNPIK advisor noted during his debrief that “many other agencies were duplicating his unit’s intelligence operations.”¹⁴¹ While the CIA saw compartmentalization of their covert operations under Hans V. Tofte as necessary to independent intelligence estimates and justified within the organization’s mandate as outlined in NSC 10/2, improved coordination during later campaigns demonstrates the error in this approach.¹⁴²

At the Eighth Army level, the lack of a component command responsible for special operations excluded the operational artists responsible for the partisan warfare effort from FECOM level commander’s conferences, limiting opportunities to synchronize with conventional plans.¹⁴³ For the ad-hoc staff elements responsible for the effort, this also meant that support from other services came only through relationships rather than as a deliberate requirement from the theater level. Alongside a mismatched end state and gaps in mission command structures, UNPIK’s unsynchronized partisan warfare operations prevented mutual support with conventional efforts, ensuring tactical actions did not support strategic effects and further contributing to the failure of unconventional warfare in the Korean War.

¹⁴⁰ Mays, *American Guerrillas*, 218.

¹⁴¹ Cleaver et al., *UN Partisan Warfare in Korea*, 205.

¹⁴² Joseph C. Goulden, *Korea: The Untold Story of the War* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982), 466-467.

¹⁴³ Paschall, *A Study in Command and Control*, 16-17.

Conclusion

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.

—Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

Since the Korean War, the United States unconventional warfare capability has evolved from an undeveloped, undesirable approach to a coherent intellectual framework, recognized as the “soul” of United States Army Special Forces.¹⁴⁴ As the first use of Special Forces for the unconventional warfare mission, the failure of partisan warfare in Korea’s limited war rendered the new organization nearly irrelevant in the following decade. It took President Kennedy’s intervention in 1962 before the unit gained the mandate needed to effectively develop the Army’s UW capability.¹⁴⁵

The American conception of war in the 1950s, which shaped the interventions in Korea and Indochina, demonstrated a preference for conventional conflict that contributed to the failure to integrate the lessons of partisan warfare.¹⁴⁶ Korean partisans were primarily employed as less capable conventional units, rather than partisans fighting for their own territory. As the political aim of the conflict shifted and the war of movement became a stalemate, the conflicting end state rendered the partisans an expensive liability instead of a unique asset.

This paper is not intended to repudiate the need for an unconventional warfare capacity, but calls for a deeper understanding of its application. As demonstrated by the above analysis, the Army failed to retain the experience of unconventional warfare used against state actors during World War II. As a result, the partisan warfare campaign during the Korean War suffered from an

¹⁴⁴ Robert Gates quoted in David S. Maxwell, “Why Does Special Forces Train and Educate for Unconventional Warfare?” *Small Wars Journal* (October 23, 2014), accessed August 7, 2017, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/421-maxwell.pdf>.

¹⁴⁵ Tierney, *Chasing Ghosts*, 9; Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 156; McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, 180-181.

¹⁴⁶ Tierney, *Chasing Ghosts*, 234, 253.

unclear end state, ineffective mission command structure, and was not synchronized at the tactical, operational, or strategic level. As the next unconventional warfare campaign may reflect a strategic context closer to the 1950s than in recent decades, the doctrine and theory of unconventional warfare must not fail to integrate the lessons of this campaign.

Given the renewed immediacy of the conflict in Korea and the limited attention paid to the role of partisan warfare there, this research has identified a number of areas that merit further study. First, what are the limitations of unconventional warfare doctrine against more modern capabilities in a state with nearly complete control over its citizenry? Second, how can the Army better educate SOF and conventional leaders on the design of interdependent campaigns that most effectively integrate special warfare and unconventional warfare capabilities? Third, what lessons can be gleaned from communist partisan warfare efforts in the South which applied the Maoist model for insurgency, described by T.R. Fehrenbach as a “nuisance” that “could not affect the war?”¹⁴⁷ Last, in a counterfactual example, had the Office of Strategic Services remained active after World War II, could the United States and Republic of Korea have better identified or responded to the North Korean invasion of 1950?

In spite of the failure of the unconventional warfare approach in the Korean War, military planners must remember that preparation for unconventional warfare may sometimes constitute a moral obligation. In limited warfare situations such as that of North Korea, partisans may emerge unexpectedly due to what Schmitt terms the telluric and autochthonous, or local and indigenous, nature of the partisan.¹⁴⁸ The institutional resistance to partisan warfare prior to the Korean War resulted in the stranding of partisans behind North Korean lines after the withdrawal of 1950.¹⁴⁹ Had the Army and Far East Command maintained the institutional capacity to support these

¹⁴⁷ T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War* (New York: Open Road Integrated Media, 1963), location 8884, Kindle.

¹⁴⁸ Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan*, 21-22.

¹⁴⁹ Kiper, “Unconventional Warfare in Korea,” 27.

forces rather than abandon them, the results may have been different. While unconventional warfare may not be the preferred strategy for future limited wars, we must plan with the understanding that the requirement may emerge nonetheless.

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