

Determining Who is Vulnerable to Radicalization and Recruitment

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

Determining Who is Vulnerable to Radicalization and Recruitment by MAJ Rachel Hoffman, Army, forty-seven pages.

This paper examines whether a common set of conditions exist, applicable to extremist groups of any potential ideology, which make a community or individual more vulnerable to radicalization and radical recruitment. This paper seeks to answer two key questions: what traits facilitate radicalization, and how do radical organizations recruit? After examining the variety of diverse causes, processes, and contributing factors, this study develops new models for the recruitment and radicalization processes. Using these two models, this paper analyzes a case study of the Muslim Brotherhood in two drastically different environments: the United States and the Middle East. By showing how the radicalization and recruitment processes are very similar in these two disparate locations, these case studies support the argument that the underlying framework of extremist radicalization and recruitment can be extrapolated across geography, and across ideology.

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Acronyms

AIFD	American Islamic Forum for Democracy
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation

GIMF	Global Islamic Media Front
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
NYPD	New York Police Department
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency International Development

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Introduction

In most contemporary research, the examination of radicalization processes is generally restricted to that of Islamic extremism and Islamist groups. Because most studies focus on the unique aspects of Islamic radicalization, the frameworks they develop only apply to Muslim communities and do not necessarily help explain radicalization outside of those communities. Additionally, the emphasis on Muslim communities establishes a confirmation bias that radicalization occurs mostly in Muslim communities and that the faith of Islam is part of the foundation for most radicalization. The prolific study of this one type of radicalization only fractionally improves the understanding of the radicalization process as it applies to any ideology. In order to examine radicalization and recruitment, this study draws from the current Islamist radicalization literature, but develops a framework for the paths to radicalization that is relevant regardless of ideology, and can be expanded to any type of extremist group.

Studies that examine the radicalization process tend to overlook the concept of recruitment; they either treat it as an integral part of radicalization, or they avoid mention of it entirely. Radicalization and recruitment are complicated and have a great variety of diverse causes, processes, and contributing factors. This paper will not attempt to distill the causes and processes to a single source and method. Rather, the intent is to discover the broad and general reasons for radicalization, and the routes of recruitment, with the goal of staying applicable to the methods of as many radical organizations as possible. As a policy publication notes, “The radicalization process is best depicted in broad brush strokes.”¹ Also, as radicalization scholar Brian Jenkins explains, “There is no easily identifiable terrorist-prone personality, no single path to radicalization and terrorism... The transition from radical to terrorist is often a matter of

¹ Jerome P. Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat*, CRS Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service, November 15, 2011), 13.

happenstance. It depends on whom one meets and probably on when that meeting occurs in the arc of one's life."²

The rising role of violent radicals in modern and future conflicts demands a close examination and understanding of how they contribute to what British General Rupert Smith has called 'war amongst the people', where conflicts include irregular forces who prevent the military from achieving a political end state.³ Current US Army doctrine agrees, noting that society is undergoing a paradigm shift, from wars between states to wars amongst people.⁴ As this type of conflict increases, violent radical organizations will be common actors in future conflicts. This requires strategists to understand how these organizations manipulate populations, grow, and affect the operational environment. Therefore, the goal of this paper is to provide a broad and general frame to examine the radicalization process, applicable to extremist groups of any potential ideology in any era. This paper will answer, in broad terms, two key questions: what traits facilitate radicalization, and how do radical organizations recruit?

Methodology

This paper will not show that there is a set of conditions that guarantee radicalization, just as radicalization does not guarantee terrorism. Rather, this study determines the conditions which most significantly and frequently contribute to effective recruitment and radicalization. Several studies show that members of radical organizations participate in various ways; these ways include leading the organization, recruiting 'soldiers', and providing a permissive environment for the propagation of radicalization and terrorism.⁵ This paper looks at what causes radicalization

² Ibid.

³ US Department of the Army, *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 4.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Magnus Ranstorp, ed., *Understanding Violent Radicalisation: Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe*, Political Violence (New York: Routledge, 2010), 23; Nasra Hassan, "Suicide Terrorism," in *The Roots of Terrorism*, ed. Louise Richardson, Democracy and Terrorism v. 1 (New York: Routledge, 2006), 21.

and focuses specifically on soldier recruitment, inspecting what recruit traits facilitate radicalization and how the groups recruit individuals.⁶

To understand how radical organizations recruit individuals, this paper investigates at the most common types of initial contact between radical organizations and individuals, including within small social groups, in social spaces, on the internet, and in prison. To examine the traits of who is recruited, this study looks at the population of known radicals to determine if there are linkages that supersede common demographics. In doing so, it examines how the recruiting conditions lend themselves to the conversion of individuals to a radical ideology. This study uses this information to construct a model for the conditions that most commonly lead to recruitment into radical organizations. In addition to the radicalization conditions model, this study develops a model for the recruitment process. Using these two models, this paper analyzes two case studies of radicalization and recruitment by the Muslim Brotherhood in two drastically different environments, the United States and the Middle East. The case studies will provide examples of how relative deprivation and identity conflict are woven into a narrative with globalized grievances, specifically targeted at potential recruits. They will also provide examples of the incentives offered to seduce recruits to join radical organizations, and the inducements used to keep them engaged. Additionally, the case studies will provide examples of recruits' commitment to the organization through their participation. By showing how the radicalization and recruitment processes are very similar in these two disparate locations, these case studies support the argument that the underlying framework of extremist radicalization and recruitment can be extrapolated across geography, and across ideology.

⁶ This paper assumes that the recruiting methods of radical organizations follow a process of careful selection and targeting standards, and are refined to maximize the effectiveness of recruitment efforts. There are different roles for radicals within an ideological movement: leaders, soldiers and enablers. Likewise, there are different shades of Islamists within the movement: political, revolutionary and militant. Enablers are the sympathizers, which a Gallup and Pew survey in 2010 showed were seven percent of the world's Muslim population, roughly 100 million people.

Literature Review

Why Does Radicalization Happen?

This section briefly describes the purpose of radicalization as a social movement and instrument of power. Understanding that radicalization is purposeful frames the two questions this paper focuses on: what recruit traits facilitate radicalization and how these organizations recruit individuals. The initiators of radical movements seek members who can empathize with their goals and contribute to their authority.

Eric Hoffer examined the causes, the converts, the members, the leaders, and the life cycle of mass movements occurring in the years immediately following World War II. His study is a straightforward examination and outline on the nature of mass movements, written without the burden of explaining modern day threats, such as radical Islam. He states that “religious and nationalist movements too can be movements of change.”⁷ He goes on to state that “the frustrated favor radical change.”⁸ The frustrated include the poor, societal misfits, the selfish, ambitious, minorities, the bored, and the sinners, as the people most likely to feel discontent and yearn for power.⁹ However, discontent and frustration are not reason enough for someone to initiate a movement, he must also perceive himself to be in a position of power.¹⁰ According to Hoffer, an individual who perceives himself to be in a position to change the conditions that frustrate him will recruit followers who sympathize with his frustration; radical social movements require purpose, leaders, and followers.¹¹

⁷ Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York: Perennial Library, 1989), 3.

⁸ Ibid., 7–10.

⁹ Ibid., xii–xiii.

¹⁰ Ibid., 7–10.

¹¹ Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York: Perennial Library, 1989), xii.

Jessica Stern looks at the way in which a person transforms into a killer and a terrorist. She examines the concept of doubling; when individuals join violent or fanatical groups they “become two people: the self they were, and the new, morally disengaged killer self.”¹² In her book, *Terror in the Name of God*, she studies how terrorists use doubling to radicalize a recruit and prepare for extreme violence by “encouraging him to create an identity based on opposition to the Other.”¹³

Both Hoffer and Stearn attempt to understand why and how radicalization occurs. Radicalization is a way to initiate movement toward a goal to foster change, and gain power. Terror is a tool that radicals abuse, while change and power are the foundation of the narrative used to recruit individuals and foster sympathy. Hoffer and Stern suggest that ‘discontent’ or ‘grievances’ underlie the motivations of individuals to radicalize.¹⁴ Individuals must sense displeasure that can be fabricated, manipulated, or amplified and exploited, to nest with the narrative of forcing change and gaining power. In sum, radicalization happens because leaders exist who recognize and exploit the discontent of their environment to create a narrative for change that attracts like-minded individuals; the secondary purpose is to achieve power.

What Traits of the Recruit Facilitate Radicalization?

¹² Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*, 1st ed. (New York: Ecco, 2003), xv.

¹³ Ibid., xvi.

¹⁴ Hoffer, *The True Believer*; Stern, *Terror in the Name of God*.

Many studies show that there is no demographic profile for potential radicals or terrorists.¹⁵ The attributes among radicals vary greatly, representing diverse ages, education, occupations, origins, experiences, incomes, ethnicities, etc.¹⁶ The following section examines the diverse demographics of known radicals, and then shows how each of three reoccurring conditions—progress, identity, and grievance—may identify individuals susceptible to radicalization.

Demographics of ISIL collected in 2016 show a diverse population, as does the *Global Terrorism Index 2016*.¹⁷ The Global Terrorism Index assembles global terrorist data collected from several other studies and open sources over the last sixteen years and is a reputable, comprehensive database.¹⁸ The Global Terrorism Index findings are corroborated by data recovered on ISIL members in 2016. These two data sets both show that the ages of known terrorists range from fifteen to seventy, although the average is twenty-six.¹⁹ Within this group, a

¹⁵ Hassan, “Suicide Terrorism,” 3; Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter, *Guide to the Drivers Violent Extremism*, US Agency for International Development, February 2009, 51; *Preventing Violent Extremism*, Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence, Sixth Report of Session 2009-10 (London: House of Commons, Communities and Local Government Committee, March 30, 2010), 23; *Global Terrorism Index 2016*, IEP Report, Global Terrorism Index (New York, NY: Institute for Economics & Peace, November 2016), 45, www.economicsandpeace.org; Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat* (New York City Police Department, 2007), 8; Brian Dodwell, Daniel Milton, and Don Rassler, *The Caliphate’s Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State’s Foreign Fighter Paper Trail* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, US Military Academy, Department of Defense, April 2016), 7; John Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism,” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 618, no. 1 (July 2008): 82–84, accessed August 29, 2017, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0002716208317539>.

¹⁶ Hassan, “Suicide Terrorism,” 3; Denoeux and Carter, *Guide to the Drivers Violent Extremism*, 51; *Preventing Violent Extremism*, 23.

¹⁷ *Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism*, 2.

¹⁸ Gary LaFree, Laura Dugan, and Erin Miller, *Putting Terrorism in Context: Lessons from the Global Terrorism Database*, 2015, 23, accessed April 2, 2018, <http://public.eblib.com/choice/PublicFullRecord.aspx?p=1864775>.

¹⁹ *Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism*, 48; Dodwell, Milton, and Rassler, *The Caliphate’s Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State’s Foreign Fighter Paper Trail*, 12.

preponderance of the youth are looking for upward movement to propel them away from their present reality.²⁰

The broad age range of radicals from under eighteen years old to seventy demonstrates that radical organizations will recruit anyone who they can manipulate to serve their purpose.²¹ Recruiters may assume under-age recruits are more malleable, or easier to manipulate and isolate.²² They may also assume young minds do not have a complete understanding of the religion they are manipulating for malicious purposes. An example of this phenomenon is the youth recruited to Boko Haram in Nigeria.²³

However, while the individuals who radicalize are disparate, there are a few similarities: a desire for personal progress, a conflict of identity, and a sensitivity to the globalization of group grievances. The desire for personal progress may take the form of material benefits, power, authority, glory, respect or inclusion. Identity conflict occurs among people who do not feel assimilated into their societies due to conflict with their faith or culture. Globalization links people across the world, highlighting the contrast between poverty and prosperity, and establishing group grievances and helping to spread them.²⁴

Radical recruits commonly desire progress. This may come in the form of material, emotional or positional benefits. Poor economic and educational conditions, as well as relative deprivation, provoke a desire for progress that nests within the radicalization and recruiting

²⁰ Zachary Abuza, "Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment in Southeast Asia," in *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes*, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 145; *US Government Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism* (US Government Printing Office, 2010).

²¹ *Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism*, 48.

²² Alice LoCicero and Samuel J. Sinclair, *Creating Young Martyrs: Conditions That Make Dying in a Terrorist Attack Seem like a Good Idea*, Contemporary Psychology (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 40–43.

²³ Freedom C. Onuoha, *Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?*, Special Report (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, June 2014), 5, accessed October 28, 2017, www.usip.org.

²⁴ Atanas Gotchev, "Terrorism and Globalization," in *The Roots of Terrorism*, ed. Louise Richardson, Democracy and Terrorism v. 1 (New York: Routledge, 2006), 103–105.

narrative.²⁵ Even though several studies have dismissed the idea that radicalization prospers only in impoverished, undereducated communities, these factors may contribute to a sense of relative deprivation.²⁶

The romanticizing of radical movements preys on the vulnerability of individuals seeking progress by portraying opportunities for excitement and adventure while offering advancement, achievement, or empowerment.²⁷ As early as 2006 the idea of “jihadi cool” was introduced. It is the narrative of jihad and brotherly comradery expressed through western style rap lyrics and videos.²⁸ This perpetuated a glamorized idea of jihad.²⁹ Material enticements such as uniforms, weapons, money, commodities, and immaterial enticements such as training, personal connections, and the respect that accompanies the material gains, embody glamorized jihad.³⁰

The most susceptible recruits commonly experience identity conflict. Identity conflict may appear as a clash between their faith and/or their culture, and the modern or Western society they live in.³¹ Immigrated, second generation, or born-again Muslims make up this particularly vulnerable group. Second or third generation children of immigrants perceive their parents’ Islam to be a less pure form of ‘village Islam’, the religion of their native village.³² Immigrants and

²⁵ *Preventing Violent Extremism*, 24.

²⁶ Ted Gurr, “Economic Factors,” in *The Roots of Terrorism*, ed. Louise Richardson, Democracy and Terrorism v. 1 (New York: Routledge, 2006), 85–87; Ranstorp, *Understanding Violent Radicalisation*, 2–3; Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat*, 14; Hoffer, *The True Believer*, 25; Denoeux and Carter, *Guide to the Drivers Violent Extremism*, 11.

²⁷ Denoeux and Carter, *Guide to the Drivers Violent Extremism*, 9–10; *US Government Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism*, 13–43.

²⁸ Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat*, 20–21.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Abuza, “Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment in Southeast Asia,” 89; Kamal Saleem and Lynn Vincent, *The Blood of Lambs: A Former Terrorist’s Memoir of Death and Redemption* (New York: Howard Books, 2009); Denoeux and Carter, *Guide to the Drivers Violent Extremism*, 9–10.

³¹ *US Government Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism*, 35–36.

³² *The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2009), 10, accessed October 30, 2017, <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html>.

born-again Muslims are caught between Islamist ideology and the Western society they live in, causing them to they seek the ‘pure’ Islam.³³ Jessica Stern suggests that modernity provides too many choices, and those in conflict seek discipline from their religions to shelter themselves from the confusion.³⁴ They are isolated by identity conflict and their grievances, real or perceived, furthering their segregation; this creates a circular struggle, as portrayed in Figure 1, Cyclic Nature of Disenfranchisement. The less these individuals feel integrated with the western society they live in, the more they feel affiliated with the globalized Muslim community. The more they sympathize with grievances from their globalized community, the more they disassociate from their resident society. If their personal grievances don’t exist, they may still feel kinship with the global community that expresses them.³⁵




Figure 1. Cyclic Nature of Disenfranchisement. Source: Rachel Hoffman.

³³ *US Government Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism*.

³⁴ Stern, *Terror in the Name of God*, 69.

³⁵ *The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It*, 11–12; *Preventing Violent Extremism*, 26; *US Government Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism*, 35–36.

Expert knowledge of the faith of a radical ideology is not prerequisite for recruitment. Among the personal data collected on 4,188 Islamic State personnel in 2016, two percent, or 83 people, did not have any knowledge of Sharia Law and five percent, or 210 people, had only a basic knowledge.³⁶ In the same thread, many Western home-grown terrorists are converts to Islam who have fledgling religious educations.³⁷ Recent converts to the religion or those reliant on others to explain their faith, are particularly vulnerable to predators who appear to have expert knowledge.³⁸ These new converts do not possess enough knowledge of their faith to contradict the radical messaging. The demographic ISIL study finds that individuals more acquainted with Islam were less likely to volunteer for suicide missions.³⁹ This ignorance can manifest in a wide range of education levels, as it encompasses the illiterate Muslim who cannot read the Quran for himself and the Western-educated convert who is not capable of discerning positive religious networks and mentors from bad, or does not yet have an intimate understanding of his religion to contradict or question dubious pontifications.⁴⁰

Lastly, a preponderance of recruits experienced either individual or group grievances. Radical groups incorporate individuals into a global community by leveraging globalized group grievances. Radical Islamists can generate momentum for an ideological movement by linking fellow Muslims with the global Muslim community, and generating sympathy for the group's global grievances. This strategy is comparable to how Communists sought to mobilize the

³⁶ Dodwell, Milton, and Ressler, *The Caliphate's Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State's Foreign Fighter Paper Trail*, 28.

³⁷ *The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It*, 15.

³⁸ Ibid., 15; Dodwell, Milton, and Ressler, *The Caliphate's Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State's Foreign Fighter Paper Trail*, 16–20.

³⁹ *Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism*, 48.

⁴⁰ Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat*, 138–139; Dodwell, Milton, and Ressler, *The Caliphate's Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State's Foreign Fighter Paper Trail*, 15–18; Abuza, "Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment in Southeast Asia," 78.

working class around the world.⁴¹ The global jihadi movement seeks to protect the *Ummah*, the global Muslim community, against western incursion, a David and Goliath struggle.⁴² Islamists believe they are in a struggle between good and evil, much as Marx and Engels believed society was in a struggle of the classes.⁴³ As Maajid Nawaz described to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security, Islamists' political ideology is in direct conflict with capitalism, just as Communism saw itself in direct conflict with capitalism. In this struggle there exists the "notion of a global political community that owes no allegiance except to itself."⁴⁴ Sympathizers' loyalties to the political ideologies of a global community supplants their loyalty to their own country, even when they feel integrated with their society.⁴⁵ As a Pakistani jihadi leader put it, "Our operation [suicide bombing western targets] is a balm for the aching hearts of our *umma* and brings them some relief."⁴⁶

A wide array of individuals are attracted to and find common ground within radical organizations. This means that the commonalities among recruits transcend factors such as age, race or religion, and are universal among various demographics. This is what makes it difficult to narrow vulnerability to a homogenous population. While the details vary by the specific radical ideology, the commonalities that surface appear to be a desire for progress, an identity conflict and grievances. These characteristics may be individually common, but when taken together provide an incentive for an individual to take action and become part of a radical organization pursuing change.

⁴¹ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels achieved the globalization of their ideas and the awakening of the proletariat.

⁴² *The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It*, 6; Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat*, 20.

⁴³ Ed Husain, *The Islamist: Why I Became an Islamic Fundamentalist, What I Saw inside, and Why I Left*, 2009 ed., with a new afterword. (New York, NY: Penguin Books USA, 2009), 48.

⁴⁴ *The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It*, 11.

⁴⁵ Paul Belkin et al., "Muslims in Europe: Promoting Integration and Countering Extremism," in *CRS Report for Congress*, 2011, 8–9; *Preventing Violent Extremism*, 25–26.

⁴⁶ Hassan, "Suicide Terrorism," 32.

How Do Radical Organizations Recruit?

Radical organizations recruit individuals in two general ways: through social relationships within their family and/or community, or via self-radicalization, where the individual seeks out information without any prior contact from a recruiter. For socialized recruitment, initial contact with radical ideologies can occur through various relationships or interactions in varied spaces. The most common places recruiters make first contact are in small social or familial groups, community or social spaces, and correctional institutions. The social incentive is important because it uses existing social networks.⁴⁷ In contrast, for self-recruitment, the internet has become the predominant radicalization pathway.⁴⁸

For most radical recruitment, the role of socialization is critical. A USAID paper used empirical analysis of several radicalization studies to conclude that most jihadist extremists entered violent extremist organizations due to relationships with family or friends.⁴⁹ The criticality of relationships is supported by several studies. Examining the recruitment and radicalization techniques of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the local Al Qaeda affiliate in southeast Asia, Zachary Abuza found that recruitment occurred when the factors of kinship, mosque, madrasa, or friendship were present. He cited the analysis of Sydney Jones and the International Crisis Group who found that marital ties “are the single most important determinant of membership in JI.”⁵⁰ The Institute for Economics and Peace found that friends and family were the most common

⁴⁷ Gabriel Weimann, “Terrorist Dot Com: Using the Internet for Terrorist Recruitment and Mobilization,” in *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes*, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 53–54.

⁴⁸ Madeleine Gruen, “Innovative Recruitment and Indoctrination Tactics by Extremists: Video Games, Hip-Hop, and the World Wide Web,” in *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes*, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 14–16; Weimann, “Terrorist Dot Com: Using the Internet for Terrorist Recruitment and Mobilization,” 62; Laura Rozen, “Forums Point the Way to Jihad | WIRED,” *Wired*, last modified August 6, 2003, accessed March 27, 2018, <https://www.wired.com/2003/08/forums-point-the-way-to-jihad/>.

⁴⁹ Denoeux and Carter, *Guide to the Drivers Violent Extremism*, 61.

⁵⁰ Abuza, “Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment in Southeast Asia,” 66–67.

recruiters for radical groups in Turkey.⁵¹ In a study of the Saudi militants who conducted attacks in Saudi Arabia between 2003 and 2004, researchers found that many militants aspired to be like their immediate family members (typically brothers) who martyred themselves during jihad in Afghanistan.⁵² Marc Sageman's examination of over 150 members of four terrorist networks found that sixty-eight percent of the members followed their friends into jihad, or they joined as a group, and twenty percent had family members in the organizations.⁵³ Peers, friends, and family members often provide the initial contact with radicalization. The power of the small group dynamic is a social incentive that overwhelms the individual and creates a need to buy-in to the ideological cause.⁵⁴

Recruiting also occurs not only where radicalized communities already exist, but also in areas where there is high potential for radicalization. Within a targeted community, radical authority figures cast their nets in religious centers, schools, youth living quarters, social centers, or hang-outs. Recruiters prey on easy opportunities, either capitalizing on radical inclinations or undermining weak authorities to establish new norms. In Abuza's examination of the role of educational institutions in radical recruitment, he found that JI has unexplained success recruiting from the middle-class student body at state universities and secular institutions.⁵⁵ Two reasons for this may be the religiosity of the individuals, in that they see their "religion as their most

⁵¹ *Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism*, 47.

⁵² Denoeux and Carter, *Guide to the Drivers Violent Extremism*, 10.

⁵³ Weimann, "Terrorist Dot Com: Using the Internet for Terrorist Recruitment and Mobilization," 53–54; Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

⁵⁴ Belkin et al., "Muslims in Europe," 48; Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*, The CERI series in comparative politics and international studies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 45–49; *US Government Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism*, 34; Denoeux and Carter, *Guide to the Drivers Violent Extremism*, 75–80.

⁵⁵ Abuza, "Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment in Southeast Asia," 78–79.

important personal value,” or in their compulsion to be leaders in their society.⁵⁶ Abuza references the example of Osama bin Laden who his followers highly regarded because he sacrificed his wealth and position for jihad.⁵⁷ When evaluating madrasas for their potential to provide radical recruits, JI looks for schools which focused “entirely on Arabic language training and Koranic study,” through memorization, and which offered a militant interpretation of the Koran.⁵⁸ These conditions indicate an education focused on devotion to Islam, a core value for JI, and a lack of diversity in their curriculums.⁵⁹

Examples of targeted recruiting in vulnerable communities abound. In the rural terrain of China and Vietnam, Communists targeted whole villages, regardless of a lack of Communist sympathies, and probed for weaknesses in order to undermine family and social structures and exploit grievances with the goal of converting the village to Communism.⁶⁰ A Dutch intelligence report from 2007 warned that radical organizations are beginning a strategy to occupy civil service and administrative positions in Western communities to undermine local authority and institutionalize radical ideologies.⁶¹ In another example, the founder of the Laskar Jihad in Indonesia, Ja’far Umar Thalib, notes that some organizations still feel it is better to recruit in person at universities and mosques, “from one person to another,” rather than recruiting via the internet.⁶²

⁵⁶ Ibid., 79–80.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 80.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 70.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 69–83.

⁶⁰ Joseph Felter, “Recruitment for Rebellions and Terrorism in the Philippines,” in *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes*, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 89.

⁶¹ Abuza, “Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment in Southeast Asia,” 89; *The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It*, 26.

⁶² Stern, *Terror in the Name of God*, 76.

Prisons have also become a place of interest for radical recruitment. Within a prison there is little room to contradict misleading radical interpretations of faith.⁶³ An Islamist extremist only needs to be the sole Muslim in prison, or sound more authoritative than anyone else, to establish himself as an undoubtable authority. Additionally, a recruiter only needs to demonstrate the potential for advancement (which has a low standard in prison), and opportunity after release. Money and connections are tempting incentives.⁶⁴

In contrast to targeted efforts in previously-identified communities by recruiters, many recent studies explore the role of the internet in modern radical recruitment. The internet provides a way for individuals to self-recruit, regardless of geographic location or social group. The internet has broken down barriers which previously limited the audience of radical ideological preaching.⁶⁵ The virtual community can accomplish what the real community could in a fraction of the time. The network of chat rooms seamlessly integrates radical jihadist agendas from around the world.⁶⁶ The reach of ideology over the internet is limitless; the possible forms of media that radical organizations can share and the broad audiences they can reach are infinite. They include online publications, circulars, YouTube videos and channels, websites, chat rooms, video games, and music and videos; they can publish in many languages and tailor their message to many different communities and cultures.⁶⁷ One example of this is published in a US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs report, which notes how organizations such as the

⁶³ J. Michael Waller, "Prisons as Terrorist Breeding Grounds," in *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes*, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 36.

⁶⁴ Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat*, 23–24.

⁶⁵ Gruen, "Innovative Recruitment and Indoctrination Tactics by Extremists: Video Games, Hip-Hop, and the World Wide Web," 13–15; Weimann, "Terrorist Dot Com: Using the Internet for Terrorist Recruitment and Mobilization," 53.

⁶⁶ Joseph Lieberman and Susan Collins, *Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat* (US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, May 8, 2008), 3–13.

⁶⁷ Gruen, "Innovative Recruitment and Indoctrination Tactics by Extremists: Video Games, Hip-Hop, and the World Wide Web," 16; Lieberman and Collins, *Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat*, 9.

Global Islamic Media Front adapt their messages to target a variety of online audiences; they take the form of speeches, texts, and, most popularly, video games.⁶⁸

Madeleine Gruen draws a connection between the recruitment tactics of Neo-Nazis in the mid-1980s and modern Islamists. Neo-Nazis successfully identified the punk Skinhead culture as a ripe recruitment opportunity due to the dominantly angry male teenage audience. Neo-Nazis recruited from this population and quickly transformed the whole Skinhead culture, including their Oi music, into one with a racist agenda.⁶⁹ Gruen associates the Neo-Nazi success with modern Islamist efforts to capitalize on hip-hop culture and music, carefully spreading political ideas and glorifying terrorism through their lyrics. Their target population, males between sixteen and twenty-two, spend the most time on the internet, socializing, gaming, and downloading music, making them easy targets for such tactics as jihadi hip-hop music.⁷⁰ In sum, the internet provides a way out of geographic or social isolation and enables the globalization of radical agendas.⁷¹ The internet also provides a decentralized recruiting platform and resources.⁷²

While many radicals are actively recruited, there are an increasing number who are self-starters. They become interested in radicalism for numerous reasons. These include retribution for things done to them or their communities. They may have attempted to commit violence before, but were unsuccessful, and therefore seek the support and resources of an organization.⁷³ The internet is an avenue through which radical organizations can identify candidates who are

⁶⁸ Lieberman and Collins, *Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat*, 9.

⁶⁹ Oi music is a punk hybrid form of music that became popular in Europe in the mid-1980s and developed with Oi culture, “shaved heads, leather jackets with chains, combat boots and tattoos.” Oi culture and music became known as Skinhead music and culture; Waller, “Prisons as Terrorist Breeding Grounds,” 16–17.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Hassan, “Suicide Terrorism,” 6; Denoeux and Carter, *Guide to the Drivers Violent Extremism*.

⁷² Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat*, 22–23.

⁷³ Raymond H. Hamden, “Unresolved Trauma and the Thirst for Revenge: The Retributional Terrorist,” in *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes*, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 175–176.

exploring their websites, chatrooms, and message boards. Once they have collected information on potential recruits, radical organizations may contact them more directly and securely to complete the recruitment and radicalization process.⁷⁴ The internet facilitates recruitment through a “bottom-up self-selected process.”⁷⁵

Some self-radicalized individuals may never truly join a group, even if they consider themselves affiliated. Rather, these individuals may perpetuate lone-wolf terrorism, where they carry out attacks without support from a larger group, but inspired by their ideology and narrative.⁷⁶ Like other types of radical recruits, lone-wolf terrorists seek a purpose they can participate in. The internet provides anonymity to radical self-starters, people who are looking to join like-minded radical groups. Radical organizations ‘recruit’ these individuals to their ideological cause because lone-wolves seek guidance, information, and training to carry out violence in the name of their ideology.⁷⁷

Self-radicalized lone-wolf terrorists are perhaps the hardest form of attack to prevent, since the radicalized individual may not communicate with anyone or give any warning prior to carrying out the attack.⁷⁸ Because of this, lone-wolf acts are an easier way to conduct a terrorist act in a foreign country where the radical organization doesn’t have a presence.⁷⁹ The US Congressional Research Service’s report on *American Jihadist Terrorism* suggests that the reasons for hierarchical radical groups to resort to lone-wolves is that, since 9/11, US law enforcement has been successful in thwarting organized terrorist plots, but lone-wolf plots have

60. ⁷⁴ Weimann, “Terrorist Dot Com: Using the Internet for Terrorist Recruitment and Mobilization,”

⁷⁵ Ibid., 54; Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, 145.

⁷⁶ Stern, *Terror in the Name of God*, 181.

⁷⁷ Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat*, 138–139.

⁷⁸ Stern, *Terror in the Name of God*, 172–173.

⁷⁹ Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat*, 34.

been much more difficult to detect and prevent.⁸⁰ Organizations such as Al Qaeda deliver messages intended for would-be lone wolf terrorists, encouraging them in publications with titles such as “Do Not Rely on Others, Take the Task Upon Yourself.”⁸¹ Lone-wolf terrorists have conducted all four of the successful terrorist attacks in the United States between 9/11 and 2011.⁸²

In summary, radical organizations recruit both actively and passively. They actively pursue candidates using all methods of advertising and communication. Passively, they pursue candidates by making themselves accessible and ensuring the widest dissemination of their message, allowing the recruits to come to them.

Frameworks of Recruitment and Radicalization

This monograph posed two questions: how are people recruited to radicalization and what recruit traits facilitate radicalization? In order to answer those questions, this monograph develops two complimentary frameworks. The first framework focuses on how recruitment occurs, looking at the actions, perceptions, and influences of the individual. This framework seeks to provide a structure to answer the questions of why and what traits. The recruitment framework fits into a larger radicalization framework, which focuses on the entire process of radicalization, from initial recruitment, through training, to violent action. This second framework offers a structure that answers the question of what traits facilitate radicalization.

Ideal Radicalization Conditions Framework

What are the common recruitment techniques and contextual conditions that produce the greatest quantity of radical recruits? Thus far this paper has examined the vulnerability requirements for radicalization and the recruitment process. What is conclusive is there are many potential radicals, many paths to radicalization, and many recruitment techniques, none of which

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid., 8–9.

⁸² Ibid., 34.

are decisive. The reoccurring variables are a sense of disenfranchisement, a grievance, an adaptable context, and an opportunistic recruiter. A sense of disenfranchisement is evident in the search for personal progression, perceived relative deprivation, and identity conflict. The individual or group grievance provides an opportunistic recruiter the leverage to mobilize an individual to join the organization. The adaptable context frames the recruiter's narrative and explains how there is such a wide variety of routes leading to recruitment.

Perception of Disenfranchisement: Leaning Towards Radicalization

Many poor perceptions of group or self can contribute to disenfranchisement.⁸³ This study will examine the most common reasons that contribute to radicalization. This does not assume that other forms of disenfranchisement are less likely to lead to radicalization, only that they less frequently do. Disenfranchisement does not even have to be present with potential recruits, as radical recruiters can introduce it.⁸⁴

This paper will examine relative deprivation and identity conflict, the two most common contributors to disenfranchisement. Relative deprivation is the discrepancy between what an individual expects they should possess, and what they do possess.⁸⁵ This is exacerbated when an individual compares himself to other individuals and other social groups. Identity conflict can occur individually or collectively. For example, it can occur among marginalized Muslim youths who are either born-again Muslims, recent immigrants, or second or third generation Muslim immigrants.⁸⁶ What creates an identity conflict is the friction between the culture and social dynamic of their family and religion in an alien community and culture that appears to contradict

⁸³ Peter Waldman, Matenia Sirseloudi, and Stefan Malthaner, "Where Does the Radicalisation Process Lead?," in *Understanding Violent Radicalisation: Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe*, ed. Magnus Ranstorp, Political Violence (New York: Routledge, 2010), 55.

⁸⁴ *The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It*, 9.

⁸⁵ Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," *The American Political Science Review* 62, no. 4 (December 1968): 1.

⁸⁶ *The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It*, 10.

their values and norms. The same effect occurs where modernization occurs at a rapid rate and the dogma of faith does not maintain pace with the progress of the modern world.⁸⁷

Grievances: Making Radicalization Relevant

Several studies hesitate to use disenfranchisement to explain radicalization since there are disenfranchised communities and individuals worldwide who have not taken the path towards radicalization.⁸⁸ However, the perception of disenfranchisement combined with grievances can create the perfect conditions for radicalization. Grievances may be the result of a specific conflict, or as enduring as generations of repression against a minority group.⁸⁹ They may include systemic discrimination or gross socio-economic gaps.⁹⁰ These events serve to exacerbate existing points of friction and create unlivable conditions for people who desire change.

Context: Relating Grievances

The context is the narrative for relative deprivation and grievances. Religion, race, culture, economics, politics, etc., are all contextual factors that are superficial reasons for radicalization. A Muslim does not become a Jihadist, a Christian does not become a Christian fundamentalist, and a laborer does not become a Communist purely because of that one aspect of their character and environment. Intermediate events and conditions cause them to radicalize.

⁸⁷ Ranstorp, *Understanding Violent Radicalisation*.

⁸⁸ Kamaldeep Bhui, Nasir Warfa, and Edgar Jones, "Is Violent Radicalisation Associated with Poverty, Migration, Poor Self-Reported Health and Common Mental Disorders?," ed. Yong-hui Dang, *PLoS ONE* 9, no. 3 (March 5, 2014): 9, accessed October 29, 2017, <http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0090718>; Abuza, "Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment in Southeast Asia," 79; James Aho, "Christain Fundamentalism and Militia Movements in the United States," in *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes*, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 56; James A. Piazza, "Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 1 (January 25, 2007): 139, accessed February 14, 2018, [https://timedotcom.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/piazza_\(2006\)_poverty,_terrorism_and_eco_dev.pdf](https://timedotcom.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/piazza_(2006)_poverty,_terrorism_and_eco_dev.pdf).

⁸⁹ Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Taylor and Francis, 2015), xiii, accessed April 2, 2018, <http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=4096005>.

⁹⁰ Felter, "Recruitment for Rebellions and Terrorism in the Philippines," 85.

There is a reason each person who becomes part of a radical movement does so. Figure 2, Ideal Conditions for Radicalization provides a model of how a recruiter nests the conditions of disenfranchisement, grievance, and context into a cohesive narrative to lure individuals to participate or support a radical organization and its purpose. This paper argues that a sense of disenfranchisement must exist due to identity conflict, or relative deprivation within the context of an individual's cultural, economic, or political environment, and the individual must experience a grievance for him/her to be incentivized to radicalize.




Figure 2. Ideal Conditions for Radicalization. Source: Rachel Hoffman.

Radical Recruitment Framework

While the Ideal Conditions for Radicalization framework described above offers an examination of how an individual develops a radicalized mindset, this is not the end of the process. Radicalization is only one step in a larger framework of radical recruiting. Research varies on whether or not the process is linear, but existing models of radicalization depict it as a

generally linear progression, although individuals may enter and exit the process at any time.⁹¹

Other models also show recruitment and radicalization as one process.

This paper argues that, while substeps may vary, all radical recruitment processes follow a pattern of Seduce, Induce and Produce (SIP). Seduce describes how individuals initially become enticed to join a radical organization. Induce describes the benefits that materialize upon joining a radical organization and give members incentive to stay. Produce describes the outcome of recruitment and radicalization which completes the conversion of an individual into a violent actor.

Seduce

The seduce phase is the method by which any given radical organization attracts recruits, be it through advertising, propaganda, coercion, using existing trusted relationships, appealing invitations by charismatic leaders, or the appearance of shared beliefs.⁹² During the seduce phase recruiters focus on the recruit and attempt to find an exploitable weakness. It is comforting to assume that individuals with low levels of education are more vulnerable to the manipulative methods of radical organizations, but data shows that education is not a defining characteristic of the average radical or terrorist.⁹³ This finding supports the idea that radicals recruit through the exploitation of weaknesses that vary across every corner of society and recruiting susceptibility is not necessarily simple ignorance or naiveté.⁹⁴

⁹¹ Keith Vaz, *Roots of Violent Radicalisation: Nineteenth Report of Session 2010-12, Vol. 1: Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence*, vol. 1 (The Stationery Office, 2012), 27; Abuza, "Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment in Southeast Asia," 226–229; Aho, "Christain Fundamentalism and Militia Movements in the United States," 226–230; Silber and Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*, 19.

⁹² Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat*, 18–19.

⁹³ *Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism*, 47.

⁹⁴ Dodwell, Milton, and Rassler, *The Caliphate's Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State's Foreign Fighter Paper Trail*; Andreas Wimmer, "The Militancy of the Peoples' Democratic Party in Riau, Indonesia" (2012): 160, 226, accessed August 30, 2017, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2125755.

Weaknesses or vulnerabilities take many forms. Looking at who the groups recruit helps to explain what vulnerabilities are especially exploitable in a given context. As described above, recruits consist of individuals motivated by social networks, be they family, friends, or the global community. Recruits are people who feel isolated within the society they live, and who crave purpose and excitement. They are individuals in a conflict of identity, seeking definition from a purpose greater than themselves through which they can achieve a reputation or satisfy a compulsion for action. Some are educated and underutilized individuals, who feel segregated by their societally-imposed status, who feel grievances and maltreatment by their neighbors, authorities, and government.⁹⁵ Recruits may also be individuals attracted to the idea of comradery in combat.⁹⁶ These are those who perceive they are not reaching their full potential due to oppression, and seek validation of the power they believe they could otherwise wield. Radical ideologies explain perceived injustices, and joining radical movements gives individuals a way to affect injustices while satisfying personal desires.

Induce

The induce phase assumes that a recruit has fully committed to the radical organization. During this phase recruits are completely inculcated and assigned membership status and responsibility.⁹⁷ The focus during this phase is on the organization and how recruits can become contributing members to it and its goals. This phase ensures further participation since this is the point where the incentives begin to come to fruition. At this point in the process the organization

⁹⁵ *The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It*, 11–12; Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research,” *Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no. 4 (December 2011): 54–55, accessed October 29, 2017, <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss4/3/>.

⁹⁶ Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism II,” 45, 47; Thomas Hegghammer, “Terrorist Recruitment And Radicalization In Saudi Arabia,” *Middle East Policy Council* XIII, no. 4 (Winter 2006), accessed April 8, 2018, <http://www.mepc.org/journal/terrorist-recruitment-and-radicalization-saudi-arabia>.

⁹⁷ Thomas Hegghammer, “Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia,” *Middle East Policy* 13, no. 4 (December 2006): 50, accessed April 8, 2018, <http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2006.00269.x>; Abuza, “Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment in Southeast Asia,” 98.

must demonstrate that it can provide what it promised.⁹⁸ The organization's training program partially satiates the urgent need of the recruit, his/her urge to act, the issue of uniforms and weapons, and especially acceptance into a larger, like-minded organization which can offer protection and progress. This phase is completely intoxicating. Once in this phase, it is as if the group grants admission to an elite membership, gives access to resources that were once before unimaginable, and most attractive, an accepting fraternal group envelopes the recruit.⁹⁹

This phase is extremely important for ensuring control and influence over members. During this phase, the interests of the organization supersede those of the individual, making it much easier to pressure new members to perform. New members who have doubts, or fear, will subjugate their interests to the interests of the group.¹⁰⁰

Produce

The produce phase is the point from which a radical organization transitions a functioning recruit-turned-member into an active agent. From this phase in the process only a jolting event or another process of recruitment can awaken a recruit from the induction.¹⁰¹ This phase is focused on how the new member can provide a service to the organization. This is where members demonstrate their full commitment to their new radical family through their participation in events that contribute to the organization's goals such as missions or their own recruitment of others.¹⁰²

⁹⁸ Denoeux and Carter, *Guide to the Drivers Violent Extremism*, 4, 9, 20.

⁹⁹ Abuza, "Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment in Southeast Asia," 145.

¹⁰⁰ Gurr, "Economic Factors," 22–23.

¹⁰¹ Denoeux and Carter, *Guide to the Drivers Violent Extremism*, 79.

¹⁰² Abuza, "Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment in Southeast Asia," 226.




Figure 3. SIP Radical Recruitment Model. Source: Rachel Hoffman.

The SIP Radical Recruitment model proposed by this monograph is more generalized than other radicalization models. The following paragraphs will show how the major extant radicalization models—the NYPD model, the Christian Fundamentalist model, and the China Terrorist Movement of the Philippines’ model—fit within the larger SIP model.¹⁰³

An NYPD study of Islamist radicalization in the west describes a four-stage process beginning with Pre-Radicalization, then Self-Identification, Indoctrination, and concluding with Jihadization.¹⁰⁴ As compared to the SIP model, the NYPD’s Pre-Radicalization and Self-Identification stages fall into the seduce phase. Pre-Radicalization is setting the conditions that make seducing recruits possible. Self-Identification is the point where individuals explore the ideology by self-discovery or introduction; it is how individuals are initially attracted to the ideology. Indoctrination is where individuals put the ideology ahead of his personal desires and become committed to the movement. Compared to the SIP model, the Indoctrination and Induce phases are very similar, although at the end of the induce phase indoctrination is complete. In the NYPD model, indoctrination continues through the Jihadization stage, at which point individuals

¹⁰³ The SIP model is not intended to show that the path to radicalization has no outlets from which people can turn back, rather it is intended to show how a radicalizing individual completes their transformation process. Most studies make the disclaimer that the radicalization process appears linear, but not all people start and stop in the same place or even conclude the process.

¹⁰⁴ Silber and Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*, 6.

are ready to commit violence for their cause. This is when they become propelled by group thinking and planning. The Jihadization phase of the NYPD model and the Produce phase of the SIP model share many other characteristics, but planning and action characterize of this phase.¹⁰⁵ Despite these similarities, the NYPD model requires the individuals to begin the indoctrination process on their own, and does not easily account for external influences. The NYPD model is an inflexible process that shows radicalization and recruitment as consecutive linear steps, the SIP model includes non-concurrent and nonlinear pathways.

James Aho's model in *Christian Fundamentalism and Militia Movements in the United States* describes a multistep theory with five phases described by the acronym SIPPE: seeker, invitation, pull, push, and engulfment.¹⁰⁶ This model describes the self-seeking pursuits of individuals when they encounter a member of Christian Fundamentalism (CF) and are invited to the organization. Upon acceptance of the invitation, the organization begins to 'pull' the individual and initiate his/her conversion by using indoctrinating language and encouraging participation in isolating activities. This causes in a 'push' away from the recruit's old acquaintances, and results in a total engulfment by the organization. In the CF model, the seeker phase is the context which provides opportunity. The invitation and pull phases are relative to the Seduce phase in the SIP model, they are how these organizations recruit an individual using the magnetism of the social groups to propel someone into a radical organization. SIPPE and SIP are consistent with the progression of the group drawing recruits in and then enticing them to stay by offering opportunities and resources. The push and engulfment phases are similar to the SIP Induce phase, and are the acceptance of radical ideologies and acceptance of the necessity to act

¹⁰⁵ Lieberman and Collins, *Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat*, 1–4; Silber and Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*, 1–4.

¹⁰⁶ Aho, "Christain Fundamentalism and Militia Movements in the United States," 226–230.

in accordance with the organization's mission.¹⁰⁷ In contrast to the NYPD model, the CF model assumes recruits are not yet radicalized and invests more time in explaining the process in radicalizing an individual; this radicalization culminates in full acceptance of Christian Fundamentals, but not necessarily violence. Similar to the NYPD model, the CF model also assumes radicalization is fixed in the recruitment process, whereas in the SIP model radicalization can occur any time before the induce phase.

The methods of the China Terrorist Movement of the Philippines are based on Maoist principles and employed by cadres against rural villages.¹⁰⁸ They begin by establishing a relationship with a resident to gain access to a village. Then they simultaneously analyze the population demographics, discern grievances, and agitate for change. Once they have done this, they begin restructuring the community, placing the best potential recruits in key positions. From there they complete the reorganization of the village. Their process consists of four phases: Infiltrate, Agitate, Exploit and Reorganize.¹⁰⁹ This model stands out because the radicalization and recruitment process it describes is more aggressive, more overt, and more targeted than the NYPD or SIPPE models. The model also describes a process that exploits one village at a time, rather than one that is open to multiple recruits from different areas. The SIP model is broad enough to encompass the more narrowly-focused CTM model, which is not as applicable in all environments.

In comparison to the SIP model this paper proposes, the NYPD model for Islamist radicalization, SIPPE model for CF radicalization and the China Terrorist Movement model show many shared characteristics. Figure 4, Comparison to SIP Model, is a matrix to display how the other models compare to the SIP model and each other. Each of these models describes a way in

¹⁰⁷ Abuza, "Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment in Southeast Asia," 89–90.

¹⁰⁸ Abuza, "Education and Radicalization: Jemaah Islamiyah Recruitment in Southeast Asia," 89–90.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

which the organizations make initial contact and recruit an individual, variously listed in the above models as Pre-Radicalization, Self-Identification, Invitation, Infiltration, and Agitation. The middle phases which ensure the recruits' participation in the organization, follow the initial phase and are described as Indoctrination, engulfment, or exploitation. The final phases are when a full-fledged member is capable of acting, and are described as produce, jihad, and reorganize. The China Terrorist Movement model excludes this last phase, but it is present in the NYPD and SIPPE models.

SIP Model	Seduce			Induce		Produce
NYPD Model	Pre-radicalization	Self-Identification		Indoctrination		Jihadization
Christian Fundamentalism Model	Seeker	Invitation	Pull	Push	Engulfment	
China Terrorist Movement Model	Infiltrate		Agitate	Exploit		Reorganize

Figure 4. Comparison to SIP Model. Source: Rachel Hoffman.

The SIP model has reduced the radicalization process into three phases: seduce, induce and produce. This model demonstrates how an individual becomes part of an organization. This includes the incentives that first attract them, how an organization trains and further indoctrinates individuals into the organization's ideology and purpose, and how they mobilize those individuals to act or support the radical organization. In contrast, the NYPD, SIPPE and China Terrorist Movement models all assume the relationship between radicalization and recruitment is fixed, and they do not separate the two processes. This paper argues that researchers cannot understand recruitment and radicalization in isolation because they are codependent processes, and how they relate to each other helps to explain the various ways individuals are attracted and converted to radical organizations. The interaction of the SIP recruitment model with the Ideal Radicalization

Conditions explains many radicalization and recruitment variations and therefore is a more relevant and useful model than the models specific to preexisting conditions.

Where Two Processes Intersect, Likenesses Emerge

Thus far this paper has examined two different processes, the radicalization process and the recruitment process. An examination of both processes reveals that they are interrelated. There are common conditions for radicalization to thrive and recruitment to be effective. These conditions are not exclusively required for radicalization and recruitment to occur, but they are the most fertile conditions. The ideal conditions for radicalization are when an individual or group perceive themselves to be disenfranchised, agitated by a grievance within the context of their reality. These are also the most permissive conditions for recruitment to be effective. Therefore, these are the conditions of vulnerable populations targeted for recruitment.




Figure 5. How Radicalization and Recruitment Interact. Source: Rachel Hoffman.

Where radicalization and recruitment intersect depends on the recruitment technique and how self-radicalized an individual is or is not. Figure 5, How Radicalization and Recruitment Interact, represents the relationship of radicalization conditions to recruitment; the conditions must be present in the beginning of recruitment, either prior to or during the seduce phase. For some, radicalization does not begin until recruitment does. For others, self-radicalization happens

first and then they seek organizations to join. By looking at how the radicalization and recruitment processes compliment and support each other, this paper offers a more nuanced approach to the many paths to radicalization and the many ways radical organizations recruit people. Figure 6, Varying Degrees of Radicalization and Recruitment Over-lap depicts how individuals may experience all of the radicalization conditions prior to recruitment, making them pre-radicalized, or they may be exposed to the radicalization conditions during their recruitment.




Figure 6. Varying Degrees of Radicalization and Recruitment Over-lap. Source: Rachel Hoffman.

The seduce phase of recruitment encapsulates many gradations of recruitment techniques, but they all still target an audience in similar ways. It includes aggressive and direct recruitment which targets specific individuals. It also includes passive and indirect recruitment techniques of advertising to the broader public with the intent of enticing members of the target audience. These recruitment techniques are similar to those of many more socially acceptable organizations.

Both direct and indirect recruitment techniques target an audience with similar vulnerabilities. Those who have self-radicalized are most likely to be recruited through the indirect recruitment techniques targeting individuals who are already sympathetic to radical ideologies and who seek membership into an organization. Direct recruiting techniques target individuals who meet the conditions for radicalization but have most likely not yet taken the first step, and require encouragement through direct relationships. Although recruitment and radicalization intersect in various places, there are common themes of vulnerability that can be applied universally to this process.

The Muslim Brotherhood: Case Studies of Recruitment and Radicalization

In order to test the applicability of these frameworks of radicalization and recruitment, this paper examines the radicalization and recruitment techniques of the Islamist extremist organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, in two environments: the Middle East and the United States. These case studies test the radicalization and recruitment frameworks in terms of differing geospatial and social environments, highlighting the similarities and differences in technique that one radical group uses. This case study is a first look at how the radicalization and recruitment frameworks are applicable in vastly different circumstances. Further research on different groups and in different contexts is still needed.

This paper compares case studies against the radicalization and then the recruitment model. First, the case studies look for examples of the radicalization framework: the individual's perception of disenfranchisement (either identity crisis or relative deprivation), narrative of grievance nested with the individual's social context (religious, social, economic, etc.). Second, they examine the larger recruitment process: SIP. To find evidence of the Seduce phase, this study looks for the promise of incentives that correlate with the recruit's disenfranchisement. To find evidence of the Induce phase this study will look for the transfer of enticements and acceptance into the organization. Evidence of the Produce phase appears as active membership in the organization, climaxing with assumed responsibility for a violent event.

Overview of the Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was founded in Egypt in 1928 after the abolishment of the Ottoman Caliphate. After the failure of Muslim leaders to establish a new caliphate, the founder of the MB, Hassan al-Banna, recognized the conflict between Islam and Western

democracies.¹¹⁰ The MB founding principles are: “(1) Islam as a total system, complete unto itself, and the final arbiter of life in all categories; (2) an Islam formulated from and based on its two primary sources, the revelation in the Qur’an and the wisdom of the Prophet in the Sunna; and (3) an Islam applicable to all times and all places.”¹¹¹ Furthermore, al-Banna invokes jihad as an obligation to reestablish Islamic Society.¹¹² In order to recruit new converts to Islam, the MB follows the rules of abrogation, and slowly reveals Islam to new followers with jihad being the final revelation.¹¹³ The following case studies will alternate between examining to who, and how, the MB applies its techniques in the Middle East and in the United States in order to show the similarities and differences in MB techniques in two different environments.

The Muslim Brotherhood Recruiting in the Middle East

Naturally, since the MB was founded in Egypt, the organization’s first recruiting also began in Egypt. From its epicenter in Egypt the MB has extended itself across the Middle East into Jordan, Palestine, Kuwait, Syria, Iraq, Sudan and Bahrain.¹¹⁴ The examples of radicalization and recruitment in the case studies will explore how the MB operates in Egypt, Palestine and Lebanon.

The Muslim Brotherhood Recruiting In The United States

The MB does not maintain a branch or known network under the name Muslim Brotherhood in the United States.¹¹⁵ However, the FBI discovered that the MB sponsors many

¹¹⁰ Stephen Collins Coughlin, *Catastrophic Failure: Blindfolding America in the Face of Jihad* (North Charleston, SC: Create Space Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), 150–151.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 151–152.

¹¹² Ibid., 152–155.

¹¹³ Ibid., 197–205. Abrogation describes the progressive revelation of text in the Quran. Later verses abrogate, or supersede earlier verses; Ibid., 35.

¹¹⁴ Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University, 2013), 20.

¹¹⁵ Gruen, “Innovative Recruitment and Indoctrination Tactics by Extremists: Video Games, Hip-Hop, and the World Wide Web,” 12–13; Coughlin, *Catastrophic Failure*.

other Muslim-American organizations.¹¹⁶ Experts also widely acknowledge the MB as the parent and origin of radical and Islamist organizations around the world.¹¹⁷ For this reason, the examples of radicalization and recruitment in the United States will examine how the MB recruits through Muslim-American organizations that it sponsors, affiliates, or associates with.¹¹⁸ In the words of Mohamed Habib, the deputy chairman of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, about his organization's informal transnational movement, "There are entities that exist in many countries all over the world. These entities have the same ideology, principle and objectives but they work in different circumstances and different contexts. So, it is reasonable to have decentralization in action so that every entity works according to its circumstances and according to the problems it is facing and in their framework."¹¹⁹ In the United States the MB is a decentralized organization that acts through proxies to recruit individuals to its radical ideology.

Radicalization

Perception of Disenfranchisement (Identity Conflict Or Relative Deprivation)

The MB use relative deprivation, the contrast of struggling Muslims with their successful neighbors, and identity conflict as a recruiting tool in both Eastern and Western environments. The following paragraphs show how relative deprivation is easily exploited in the United States and the Middle East by the MB with a simple offer of support and progress. Likewise, identity

¹¹⁶ "An Explanatory Memorandum: From the Archives of the Muslim Brotherhood in America" (The Center for Security Policy Press, 2013), accessed December 10, 2017, https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Explanatory_Memoradum.pdf.

¹¹⁷ Saleem and Vincent, *The Blood of Lambs*, 14–16, 31; Matthew A. Levitt, " Hamas Social Welfare: In the Service of Terror," in *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes*, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 121; Maha Azzam, "Political Islam," in *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes*, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 238; *Compilation of Hearings on Islamist Radicalization - Volume I* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2012), 113, accessed December 12, 2017, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72541/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg72541.pdf>.

¹¹⁸ *Compilation of Hearings on Islamist Radicalization - Volume I*, 113.

¹¹⁹ Lorenzo Vidino, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the United Kingdom*, Program on Extremism (George Washington University, December 2015), 5–6, accessed December 12, 2017, <https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/extremism.gwu.edu/files/downloads/MB%20in%20the%20UK.pdf>.

conflict is easily exploited, but it is a more commonly applied technique in the United States than in the Middle East.

In Ziad Munson's examination of Islamic mobilization, one of the reasons he gives for the MB's early success in Egypt is the association of group activities with the filling of societal needs.¹²⁰ The MB established branches within smaller communities to address local concerns and used existing relationships to subvert whole communities.¹²¹ They initiated many public service projects to construct schools, mosques, and clinics that both served the community and provided greater opportunity for contact with the MB.¹²²

Kamal Saleem is a former terrorist from Lebanon who describes his transformation to radicalization in his book, *The Blood of Lambs*, and today advocates for the awareness of Islamists' influence within the United States.¹²³ An opportunistic elder recruited Saleem to the MB when he was a young Muslim boy growing up in Beirut, Lebanon, a multicultural city in the 1970s.¹²⁴ The environment in Beirut during his formative years was that of a Muslim majority population, ruled by a Maronite Christian minority.¹²⁵ In the city, there were impoverished refugee camps of displaced Palestinians that received little attention or funding.¹²⁶ This created a perception of relative deprivation held by the Muslim community in Beirut. To exacerbate his sense of relative deprivation, Saleem's own poor family measured his value by his contribution to the household income.

¹²⁰ Ziad Munson, "Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," *The Sociological Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (2001): 507, accessed December 8, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4121130>; Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 21–23.

¹²¹ Munson, "Islamic Mobilization," 498.

¹²² Ibid., 500–502; Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 25.

¹²³ Saleem and Vincent, *The Blood of Lambs*.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 11.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 83.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 84.

When Kamal Saleem recruited for the MB in the United States he specifically targeted families who appeared disenfranchised by relative deprivation. He targeted the poor, needy families in the trusting ‘bible-belt’ of the country. He presented the appearance of a charitable, caring, and faithful individual who would bring hungry families food and bless them in the name of Allah. He appealed to their circumstances and took advantage of their poverty to deliver a message of hope in the form of Islam. He specifically frequented underprivileged communities and sought soft targets due to “poverty, family breakup, [and] illiteracy.”¹²⁷

Lorenzo Vidino, the director of the Program on Extremism at George Washington University, highlighted the challenge facing of Muslim-Americans, noting that “living in two cultures at once is very enriching for most people, but very unsettling for others. You have a message at home that’s very conservative, and a completely different message from the society around you when you’re growing up.”¹²⁸ Olivier Roy asserts in *Globalized Islam* that the identity conflict of western-born or second-generation Muslims is the soft-spot that leads to radicalization, for “what is at stake is more the reconstruction or recasting of a lost identity than the expression of a depressed social or economic situation.”¹²⁹

In a statement to the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, several witnesses belonging the American-Muslim community gave testimony. Mr. Zuhdi Jasser, M.D., President and Founder of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy (AIFD) told the committee that he believes radicalization is due to “the lack of identification and the separatism and the disenfranchisement of certain Muslims from this society that makes them not bond, makes them not trust the Government, makes them distrust the FBI, and creates a culture of a lack of

¹²⁷ Ibid., 243–249.

¹²⁸ Scott Shane, Richard Pérez-Peña, and Aurelien Breeden, “‘In-Betweeners Are Part of a Rich Recruiting Pool for Jihadists,” *The New York Times*, September 22, 2016, sec. U.S., accessed December 11, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/23/us/isis-al-qaeda-recruits-anwar-al-awlaki.html>.

¹²⁹ Roy, *Globalized Islam*, 315.

cooperation.”¹³⁰ He further explained how the radicalization process includes “estrangement, separatism, and isolation into Islamism and away from Americanism.”¹³¹ Dr. Jasser cited a 2007 Pew poll which showed that twenty-four percent of young Muslims between 18-29 years of age thought there was a justification for suicide bombing, arguing that this demographic should be the focus of counter-radicalization efforts “because their minds are being shaped, they are being pulled.”¹³²

Mr. Abdirizak Bihi, Director of the Somali Education and Social Advocacy Center, gave testimony on the Somali children from his community in Minnesota, including his son, who were radicalized by the leaders in their own mosque and recruited into fighting for al-Shabaab back in Somalia.¹³³ Al-Shabaab is an Islamist movement in Somalia that has foundational ties to the MB.¹³⁴ Mr. Bihi asserts that the radicalization process takes years and that a recruiter on the ground exploits an individual’s weaknesses, whether or not they have a father or mentor, or whether they are smart or weak.¹³⁵ He compared the Somali sons taken from Minnesota to others taken from Europe, finding three similarities: sons of singlemothers who lack mentorship at home, smart young people with no discipline issues, and American and Western kids who can easily return home from training.¹³⁶ Al-Shabaab recruits using the narrative of clannism, loyalty to clan, and nationalism, which are also loosely associated with the globalized *ummah* narrative.¹³⁷

¹³⁰ *Compilation of Hearings on Islamist Radicalization - Volume I*, 34.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 183.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 94.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 64–65.

¹³⁴ Stig Jarle Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group*, 2005-2012, 2014, 16, accessed February 14, 2018, <http://ezproxy.eui.eu/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199327874.001.0001>.

¹³⁵ *Compilation of Hearings on Islamist Radicalization - Volume I*, 64–64, 94.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 112.

¹³⁷ Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia*, 140–141.

A RAND study titled *Building an Army of Believers*, states that “potential jihadist recruits in Western countries are part of a marginalized immigrant subculture or are themselves cut off even from family and friends within that community...the more vulnerable are those who are at a stage of life where they are seeking identity.”¹³⁸ The report draws on individuals and groups of terrorists who have been arrested since 9/11 and finds that many of the arrested are citizens who are young men and either born Muslim or converted, are middle-class, and are well educated.¹³⁹

The MB uses two strong incentives to recruit members: relative deprivation and identity conflict. As seen from the above examples, it is easy for the MB to capitalize on the perceived oppression of individuals and communities in both the Middle East and the United States. Additionally, identity conflict contributes greatly to feelings of disenfranchisement, especially when the individual is isolated, such as immigrants living in the United States in an environment unlike their culture or religion.

Narrative Nested Within Context and Grievance

In a study of Islam and the globalization of jihad, Thomas Hegghammer explains how the MB’s construct of a pan-Islamic identity can aggregate all transgressions against Muslims worldwide in order to create a victim narrative. The group spread this pan-Islamic identity through their publications, peppered with high gloss, close-up photos chosen for their shock value.¹⁴⁰ The experiences of Kamal Saleem in Beirut, and the recruitment messages posted in the United States, show this construct.

During his recruitment in Beirut, the MB introduced Kamal Saleem to the ‘Palestinian issue’, the targeting of Palestinian Muslims by Israeli Jews supported by the Americans. He

¹³⁸ Brian Michael Jenkins, “Building an Army of Believers,” Product Page, 3, last modified 2007, accessed December 11, 2017, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT278-1.html>.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 9.

¹⁴⁰ Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad,” *International Security* 35, no. 3 (2010): 82–83, accessed December 8, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40981252>.

would later come to realize that the MB spun the ‘Palestinian issue’, and the poor state of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon by the Christian government, into a narrative that incentivized hate for Christians and Jews, creating a fraternal sense of Muslim group disenfranchisement.¹⁴¹

Similar to the Palestinian narrative, the narrative of discrimination against Muslims in Afghanistan became a call for Muslims worldwide to mobilize against the Soviet invasion in the 1980s. Abdallah Azzam, a Palestinian preacher, propagated this message to mobilize a militant response, encouraging those who were angry about the situation to go and fight. This militant narrative benefited from the humanitarian call for assistance that had been circulating for a decade and had already primed the pan-Islamic community’s views on the conflict.¹⁴² Hegghammer concludes from his study that “the recruitment message relies not primarily on complex theological arguments, but on simple, visceral appeals to people’s sense of solidarity and altruism,” and the created transnational Muslim community can target this.¹⁴³ A secondary fertile ground for MB recruitment is within universities, targeting student unions, which the MB focused heavily on after the Egyptian government, under Anwar Sadat, lifted restrictions on them.¹⁴⁴

In Ziad Munson’s examination of Islamic mobilization, another reason he gives for the MB’s early success in Egypt was their narrative, tightly woven into the existing cultural fabric.¹⁴⁵ By nesting itself into communities, the MB could use “what variety there was within its ideological perspective to attract people in different situations.”¹⁴⁶ The public institutions the MB established in Egypt became the place of delivery for MB messaging, offering sanctuary from the

¹⁴¹ Saleem and Vincent, *The Blood of Lambs*, 82–83.

¹⁴² Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters,” 85–88.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 90.

¹⁴⁴ Thorsten Hoffmann, “Eration within an Authoritarian Environment” (Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 43.

¹⁴⁵ Munson, “Islamic Mobilization,” 507.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 498.

government while it appearing legitimate to the public.¹⁴⁷ The MB nested itself so well into these small communities that its narrative infiltrated more than political and moral agendas; it also applied to religion, occupation, and social structure.¹⁴⁸ The same holds true for the MB in Palestine, where it also settled in neighborhoods and built schools.¹⁴⁹

Similarly, in the United States the MB creates a narrative wrapped around the global grievances of Muslims and associates that with feelings of victimhood. As The New York Times reported, “Islamist terrorist groups target the particular anxieties of Western Muslims from immigrant backgrounds, posing recruitment as a religious loyalty test...the West is at war with Islam, they say, and you must strike out to defend your fellow Muslims.”¹⁵⁰ In *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West*, Lorenzo Vidino concludes that even if modern ‘moderate’ MB members claim to denounce jihad, they duplicitously stoke a “narrative of victimhood that has created a fertile environment for violent Islamists.”¹⁵¹ The narrative of victimhood supports the advice of Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born recruiter for al-Qaeda, who said “never, ever trust a kafir [non-believer]...these non-Muslims can never be relied upon.”¹⁵²

The MB has created a narrative of globalized Muslim grievances with the ‘Palestinian Issue’ at its center. It associates this narrative with the context of its target audience, whether it is Lebanese Muslims seeing the derelict Palestinian refugee camps mismanaged by Christians, Egyptians Muslims lacking community programs and facilities, or American Muslims relating to

¹⁴⁷ Munson, “Islamic Mobilization,” 501–503.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 503–504.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 501–502; Sa’id al Ghazali, “Islamic Movement versus National Liberation,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 17, no. 2 (1988): 179, accessed December 8, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536880>.

¹⁵⁰ Shane, Pérez-Peña, and Breeden, “‘In-Betweeners Are Part of a Rich Recruiting Pool for Jihadists.’”

¹⁵¹ Lorenzo Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West*, Columbia studies in terrorism and irregular warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 221.

¹⁵² Shane, Pérez-Peña, and Breeden, “‘In-Betweeners Are Part of a Rich Recruiting Pool for Jihadists.’”

a feeling of being victimized. The MB weaves globalized group grievances together with the contextual grievances of the target community.

Recruitment

The following paragraphs will demonstrate how the MB's recruiting program adheres to the SIP model by providing examples from the Middle East and the United States. The case studies will follow the progress of Kamal Saleem's recruitment into the MB in Lebanon, and also his recruitment of Americans in the United States. His first-hand experience is supported by further examples of MB recruiting in Egypt, and the recruitment of Islamic converts and Somali immigrants in the United States.

Seduce: Promise of Incentive

The harassment and bullying Kamal Saleem received at the hands of local ethnic gangs in his hometown, Beirut, Lebanon, drove him into a mosque seeking sanctuary and protection. It was from the elders there, who were in the MB, that Saleem received shelter and protection. From this first encounter his recruitment began. What the MB offered him was the opportunity to be of value, to be respected, and to become a soldier in the MB's war.¹⁵³ Saleem's experience is not unique. Jeffrey Martini's book, *Who are the Muslim Brotherhood Youth?*, describes how members in Egypt are recruited into the MB from the time they are old enough to attend school, beginning in a youth scout program, progressing to secondary school and 'friend' status, and after several more stages, becoming full-fledged members.¹⁵⁴ In addition to elementary schools, other sources of recruitment are university campuses, where students are open-minded and independent from their families—characteristics that recruiters can use to introduce them to MB ideology. The MB in Egyptian universities found that they could offer students a “sense of purpose, belonging

¹⁵³ Saleem and Vincent, *The Blood of Lambs*, 82–83.

¹⁵⁴ Jeffrey Martini, Dalia Kaye, and Erin York, *The Muslim Brotherhood, Its Youth, and Implications for U.S. Engagement* (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2012), 8–9.

and social services” while they were separated from their communities and families.¹⁵⁵

Furthermore, the developed structure of the MB offers university recruits the opportunity to assume responsibility within the organizational hierarchy.¹⁵⁶

Olivier Roy describes eight terrorists who converted to Islam, who saw the religion as the “vanguard of an absolute opposition to so-called U.S. imperialism.” Statements such as this demonstrate how those who may not have ever been previously religiously inclined can come to see radical Islam and its organizations as an answer to their personal grievances.¹⁵⁷ He also gives evidence of western-born or second-generation Muslims who “find in radical Islam a positive protest identity” in answer to their isolation and confusion.¹⁵⁸

Induce: Transfer of Enticements and Acceptance

As a MB member in Beirut in the 1960s, Kamal Saleem participated in the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The invitation to receive training on hand-to-hand combat and weapons and to participate in missions was a valuable opportunity for him to earn friendship, respect and find a purpose.¹⁵⁹ As he continued on in the PLO, they offered him increased responsibility and prestige with each mission.¹⁶⁰ As a recruiter, Saleem later on offered similar incentives to his US recruits, such as protection in prison for a gang-member.¹⁶¹ He offered friendship, purpose, and mentorship to drifters, and essentials to the needy, to make them open-minded to Islam with the primary purpose of recruiting them into the MB.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.22–23.

¹⁵⁶ Martini, Kaye, and York, *The Muslim Brotherhood, Its Youth, and Implications for U.S. Engagement*, 24–27.

¹⁵⁷ Roy, *Globalized Islam*, 318–319.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 315–317.

¹⁵⁹ Saleem and Vincent, *The Blood of Lambs*, 92–93.

¹⁶⁰ Saleem and Vincent, *The Blood of Lambs*.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 251.

¹⁶² Ibid., 246–248.

Further recruitment in the United States by other MB affiliates offered like incentives. At a Senate hearing, Mr. Melvin Bledsoe delivered a statement describing the radicalization of his son by Hamas at a mosque in Nashville, Tennessee, while the son attended college. Although Mr. Bledsoe did not know how Hamas enticed his son to visit a mosque or learn about Islam, he described his son's transition: discarding interests from his youth, and abandoning his civil rights hero. Then while traveling abroad to pilgrimage to Mecca, MB deceived the son into attending a terrorist training camp.¹⁶³ The invitation to travel to Mecca is an indicator of the son's reception into the religion, but his training in the terrorist camp is the expression of his acceptance into the radical organization.

In 2009, as dozens of Somalian-American youths disappeared from the Minneapolis area, their parents were shocked to find that their children had been radicalized and convinced to travel abroad to participate in the fighting in Somalia.¹⁶⁴ Mr. Bihi and his Somali community were not aware of the radicalization of their children until they were gone, but in hindsight they noticed the children's changes in behavior three to four months prior. The children spent extra time at the mosque, sleeping over and staying the weekends.¹⁶⁵ Such activities show the inclusion and acceptance into fraternity and group membership.

An internal MB memorandum explains the planned 'settlement' process for the United States.¹⁶⁶ 'Settlement' is the MB strategy to nest themselves into specific US communities through a wide variety of organizations, from which to establish "a small Islamic society."¹⁶⁷ Once they establish these communities, their stated method for recruiting members is to establish alliances with individuals who subscribe to their Islamist values and seek progress through their

¹⁶³ *Compilation of Hearings on Islamist Radicalization - Volume I*, 59.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 67–68.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 113.

¹⁶⁶ "An Explanatory Memorandum: From the Archives of the Muslim Brotherhood in America," 14.

¹⁶⁷ "An Explanatory Memorandum: From the Archives of the Muslim Brotherhood in America."

membership in the organization.¹⁶⁸ This is evident in the case studies from the examples of training and responsibility offered to Saleem, the membership, protection and needs he gave to his recruits, and the membership and purpose offered to Mr. Bledsoe's son and the Somali youths.

Produce: Responsibility for Violence

The case study shows here that violent action is a potential outcome of the radical recruitment described above. Action is not necessarily the only outcome of recruitment, but it is a common one. This section examines how Kamal Saleem's recruitment was completed with violent action, as well as using further examples provide evidence of other known radical Islamsists who have conducted violence.

Kamal Saleem's participation in the final stage, Produce, is evident when he accepts his first assignment to traffic weapons for the PLO and further progresses into leadership roles overseeing other youth members.¹⁶⁹ In the Department of Justice's Investigative Project on Terrorism, which reviewed trends in convicted terrorists, radical Islamist agendas motivated eighty percent of the defendants. Furthermore, large percentages of those convicted were associated with known terror groups such as al Qaeda (30 percent), Hizballah (10.5 percent), and Hamas (9 percent).¹⁷⁰ Another study finds that, of the fifteen terror events analyzed, four were recent converts to Islam who quickly radicalized prior to their arrests, and five were associated with al-Qaeda.¹⁷¹ Although this evidence does not provide direct support for the with the SIP recruitment model, it does demonstrate that violence may be a necessary or encouraged part of membership in radical Islamist organizations.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 18.

¹⁶⁹ Saleem and Vincent, *The Blood of Lambs*.

¹⁷⁰ "Islamists Dominate DOJ's List of Terror Prosecutions," *The Investigative Project on Terrorism*, last modified March 9, 2011, accessed December 12, 2017, <http://www.investigativeproject.org/2659/islamists-dominate-doj-list-of-terror-prosecutions>.

¹⁷¹ *Compilation of Hearings on Islamist Radicalization - Volume I*, 186–189.

Analysis

Researchers can use the MB agenda of creating an “Islam applicable to all times and places,” to explain why MB recruits represent a diverse population. If Islam is meant to apply to all times and places, then it must consist of Muslims from all times and places. This requires the MB and Islamists to have a narrative attractive and relatable to many different populations around the globe. The ‘Palestinian issue’ and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are just two examples of how the MB leverages the globalized Muslim community to depict grievances that all Muslims can either relate to or become sympathetic to. Whatever issue is chosen, a narrative of global grievances is related to an individual’s context and associated with his/her personal sense of disenfranchisement. Since the MB is an organization founded on religion, the grievance narrative is presented in the context of faith: Jews and Christians are targeting the Palestinians because they are Muslims. A Muslim who is in the midst of an identity crisis, unable to resolve differences between the rules of religion and society or politics, and already feeling vulnerable as a member of a minority community, can immediately relate to the isolation of other Muslims by non-Muslims. This tactic contributed to the recruitment of Kamal Saleem; he joined the PLO in order to fight the Israelis, the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the Christians in Beirut during the Lebanese Civil War. Similarly, the Somali youth who lived in their community in Minneapolis were isolated from the larger American society. Leaders recruited them using a similar message, that of creating an Islamic state in Somalia, their ethnic and cultural homeland. The youth in universities in Egypt were victim to a similar narrative, built around the establishment of an Islamic state.

As evident in the case studies, the biggest incentive MB offers to seduce recruits is an outlet to address those grievances. Roy’s analysis of eight terrorists opposed to “American imperialism” saw radicalization as a way to address it. The MB community programs in Egypt provide resources where none or few existed before. The Muslim mosques in Minneapolis offered the same, and communal participation, to the Somali youth. Later, the same organization

provided them a way to respond to injustices against their kin or clan in Somalia. Kamal Saleem saw his membership in the MB as a means for protection, and then a way to earn respect from his family and neighborhood bullies.

In some the case studies, there is very little space or time between the Induce and the Produce phases. As in the example of the Somali youth, to all appearances al-Shabaab accepted them and ushered them off to fight in Somalia at the same time. No further evidence exists to show how long their Induce phase continued before they participated in, or Produced, violence in Somalia. The action of leaving their homes and traveling appears to be a precursor to imminent participation in violence. In the example of Kamaal Saleem, he spent a great deal of time in training and preparation before his first assignment to participate in a mission; in this case the Induce phase did occur some time prior to the Produce phase. The MB and PLO continued to provide inducements after his first mission through escalating offers of responsibility. The intent was to keep him engaged through opportunities for glory by intensifying the visibility and risk of the missions they assigned to him. Dr. Bledsoe's son's phase of Inducement occurred with his invitation to pilgrimage and then entrance into a training camp. In all of the above examples, the manifestation of acceptance into the organization materialized as either a journey abroad or training.

There are many examples of the Produce phase, as every act of violence committed by radicals can demonstrate, however it is not easy to evaluate the specific moment of transition from the Induce to the Produce phase, when a recruit makes a final commitment to violence. There are only examples of the act itself, not the choice to act. While specific transition points are difficult to pinpoint, the case study of the MB's techniques in the US and the Middle East support this paper's overall framework of the recruitment and SIP radicalization models.

Conclusion

This paper examined what traits facilitate radicalization and how organizations recruit people. What this study uncovered was that radicalization is a means to an end; it serves the purpose of setting the conditions for change or to achieve power. Radical organizations pull new members into the movement predominantly through their social connections. This recruitment most commonly occurs through identity conflict or relative deprivation. These feelings are subjective, and the subjectivity of grievances may contribute to the wide variety of demographics represented by members of radical organizations.

This study examined the radical recruitment process, and created a new model, the Seduce-Induce-Produce (SIP) framework, to better describe how this process occurs. The Seduce phase is the method by which any given radical organization attracts recruits. The Induce phase occurs when recruits have fully committed to the radical organization and are inculcated through assigned membership status and responsibilities. The Produce phase is when members demonstrate their full commitment by participating in violent events that contribute to the organization's goals.

The case studies examined the radicalization and recruitment techniques of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East and the United States. The case studies found evidence to support the radicalization conditions described by this paper's model; many examples were found of individuals that experienced identity conflict or relative deprivation and then radicalized. Recruits also related to globalized Muslim grievances of being mistreated. How well they related to global grievances and were disturbed by a sense of disenfranchisement depended on how well the MB narrative was tied to their personal context. While transitions between the different phases—Seduce, Induce, and Produce—were difficult to specifically identify, the overall process suggested by the model was supported by the overall strategy pursued by the MB, though this strategy was expressed in varying ways, depending on the location and context of the recruits.

The intention of this paper was to improve the understanding of radical targeting. With this improved understanding, future research should focus on pinpointing vulnerable populations and direct resources to them in order to undermine radical recruiting efforts. This examination reinforced the idea that individuals and communities susceptible to radical recruitment are vulnerable due to many different varieties of conditions, and no community or individual profile is an accurate indicator of future radicalization. Rather, it is the overall process, described in this paper's radicalization and recruitment models, which can provide a framework to assess the vulnerability of a given community, and understand the ways in which the radicalization process progresses.

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