GUERRILLA DETERRENCE: CAN SMALL-STATE RESISTANCE PREPARATIONS HELP FEND OFF BIGGER THREATS?

by

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December 2018

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This study examines the crises of 1968 Czechoslovakia and 1981 Poland, as well as an exploratory case of 1940s Norway. The two crisis cases use demonstrated protest potential as a stand-in for resistance capacity and to highlight functional capabilities that might clearly signal potential costs the invader would suffer. Aggressor context, if it has strategic flexibility, the proximity of some sort of sponsor, and the availability of conventional military power all factor greatly into the deterrence outcome. However, given the right recognized capabilities, like effective communication, apparent social cohesion, and demonstrable cognitive liberation, protest potential may provide a significant aid to deterrence.
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ABSTRACT

Given the rise of revisionist states and recent challenges to existing alliance structures, small states now see a real possibility of having to deter their larger neighbors on their own. Some countries, specifically those in the Baltics, have established guerrilla forces and civil resistance groups as a cost-effective solution to the threat of invasion; but do predatory states understand the pain that such efforts can inflict? This project seeks to establish whether overtly prepared resistance, intended to activate after an occupation, can deter aggressors. This study examines the crises of 1968 Czechoslovakia and 1981 Poland, as well as an exploratory case of 1940s Norway. The two crisis cases use demonstrated protest potential as a stand-in for resistance capacity and to highlight functional capabilities that might clearly signal potential costs the invader would suffer. Aggressor context, if it has strategic flexibility, the proximity of some sort of sponsor, and the availability of conventional military power all factor greatly into the deterrence outcome. However, given the right recognized capabilities, like effective communication, apparent social cohesion, and demonstrable cognitive liberation, protest potential may provide a significant aid to deterrence.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations</td>
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<td>GIE</td>
<td>Government-In-Exile</td>
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<tr>
<td>KGB</td>
<td>Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NS</td>
<td>Nasjonal Samling</td>
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<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollars</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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I. INTRODUCING THE STUDY

They can get to Tallinn in two days. But they will die in Tallinn. And they know this.

—Colonel Riho Uhtegi
Commander, Estonian Special Forces

Revisionist states, like Russia, have taken advantage of an American superpower mired in two long wars. Though the U.S. military has begun to move its focus from counterinsurgency to great power competitions, smaller nations, like Estonia and Latvia, are uncertain about United States’ willingness and capability to maintain its security commitments in the face of potential Russian aggression. Even under ideal circumstances, without several more American brigades in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries in the Baltics cannot expect that help would arrive in time to save them from a Russian attack, while China’s increasing capabilities to counter U.S. power projection raise questions about the ability of U.S. forces to project power into the western Pacific. Furthermore, the United States’ commitment to Article V of the NATO treaty has

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come into question;\(^6\) Angela Merkel, the chancellor of Germany, has even expressed a need to “really take our fate into our own hands” because “the times in which we could rely fully on others—they are somewhat over.”\(^7\)

Small states, which cannot possibly sustain the military expenditures of their larger neighbors, therefore now see a real possibility of having to deter their local revisionist threats alone. As David Brin notes, “It’s the losers of the last war that plan to do everything differently.”\(^8\) In this sense, small nations like Ukraine or Georgia have lost this first round of revisionist advances; their peers were watching. Now, instead of relying entirely on conventional deterrence, some of these underdogs are playing a different game: they are openly preparing to fight after an enemy occupation. The idea of guerrilla forces, an urban update to the stories of “Forest Brothers” fighters in the Baltics, has come to the fore in discussion among such nations as Estonia, Finland, Slovenia, Sweden, Croatia, and the Czech Republic.\(^9\) Estonia has recruited tens of thousands for its civil defense corps; Lithuanians are teaching weekend guerrilla warfare courses; the Swedens are issuing survival manuals.\(^10\)

This sort of strategy would be considered “asymmetric” as described by authors like Deriglazova and Arreguin-Toft because it envisages armed conflict between states—unequal in power, resources, and status—where the weaker party tries to compensate by investing in capabilities that may exhaust the will of the stronger nation as a means to force

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\(^8\) David Brin, “Future of Conflict” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, August 7, 2018).


it to withdraw.\textsuperscript{11} Such pre-crisis resistance preparation offers a low-cost option for increasing the amount of pain a defending state can impose on the larger opponent in an attack. The preemptive development of resistance capacity clearly defines the target activity—invasion—as unacceptable, signals a willingness to punish, and demonstrates the resisting state’s resolve.\textsuperscript{12} Conventional understanding as well as empirical testing hold that a weak actor can sometimes beat a strong attacker by employing an asymmetric strategy, and the idea of armed resistance offers some attractive benefits: guerrillas are cheap in terms of manpower and technology as well as distinctly non-escalatory.\textsuperscript{13} The force ratios that an attacker understands are necessary to succeed should reasonably be greatly affected by the high cost required to subdue localized resistance and vastly increase the number of troops an attacker must deploy.\textsuperscript{14} Also, given a disparity in resources, one can assume that a big state will wield a technological advantage over its smaller opponent, but campaigns in places like Afghanistan have seen larger opponents defeated by forces at a distinct technological disadvantage, using asymmetric strategies and techniques. Guerrilla warfare is the preferred approach for smaller of opponents facing much larger challengers.\textsuperscript{15}

Unfortunately, as Jervis maintains, “signals that seem clear to the sender are missed or misinterpreted by the receiver.”\textsuperscript{16} Indeed, the predatory states that should be the audience for the deterrent display provided by a resistance enterprise may not understand the pain that their weaker opponents intend to inflict; in such a case, the effort has little to no deterrent value. Moreover, the specific inclusion of resistance in a defender’s deterrence

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Larisa Deriglazova, \textit{Great Powers, Small Wars: Asymmetric Conflict since 1945} (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), xviii.
\item Frank Harvey, “Practicing Coercion, Revisiting Successes and Failures Using Boolean Logic and Comparative Methods,” \textit{Journal of Conflict Resolution}, 43 no. 6, (December, 1999): 841, JSTOR.
\item Murumets et al., \textit{Thresholds Concept for and by Smaller states, Final Report}, 44.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
strategy is inherently handicapped in that it does not increase the capacity to punish in kind.17

Given that dedicated planning for resistance before an invasion has rarely been attempted and has not been systematically studied or tested in conflict, this thesis poses the following questions: how can small states maximize the deterrent value of resistance enterprise development during phase zero? What significance does a potential invader hold for resistance capacity? Which resistance capabilities are most coercive to an invader or potential invader? The purpose of asking these questions is to explore the possibility that evident resistance capacity can increase the possibility of successful deterrence for a small state facing a larger revisionist opponent. This project attempts to identify behaviors that deterred or frustrated a much larger aggressor in order to get a sense of what is required of future preplanned resistance elements, as a complement to conventional deterrence.

Ultimately, this project finds that the relative strategic flexibility of an aggressor and sponsorship availability for the defender held the most identifiable significance to the potential invader, in the case studies. However, the Polish case indicates that observed “protest potential” has an identifiable significance for potential invaders; resistance capacity can contribute to deterrence if it is paired with at least some conventional combat power, pervasive communication through the populace, apparent social cohesion, and demonstrable cognitive liberation.18 Furthermore, non-violent resistance costs are most visible to the invader, and therefore most coercive. Finally, the technique of Total Defense, or maximum integration of civilian support to defense institutions, allows states to optimize the deterrent value of their collective defensive enterprise development during phase zero. The desired end state is not guerrilla warfare but rather the small state pushing an aggressor’s invasion planning and, thus, his decision to a continually later date.19 The side

effect of this learning cycle is that the longer the deterred adversary accepts the opposition’s condition by not invading, the more stable the situation is likely to become.20

A. RESEARCH DESIGN

As states have recently embraced irregular strategies and stood up non-conventional forces in response to a re-emergent Russian threat, it would be tempting to assume that the absence of further offensive action on the Kremlin’s part is evidence that deterrence, conventional or asymmetric, has worked. However, Robert Jervis, a deterrence theorist, warned about this sort of confirmation bias in his seminal work, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*: actors never underestimate their influence on others and quite reliably attribute explanatory functions to their own actions relative to an opponent’s inaction.21

This project aims to discover key factors and variables that drive successful deterrence outcomes that can contribute to theory building in the area of asymmetric deterrence. The field of consideration is narrow and relatively unexamined, as overt preparation for post-occupation conflict is rare, and cases in which it has been observed affecting deterrence outcomes are non-existent. Qualitative analysis of historically oriented case studies identifies what factors most contributed to the successes and failures of these movements. Given the lack of detailed cases where training resistance members affected a deterrence outcome, this study uses cases where the visible protest potential of a threatened population can stand in for observable preparation of a resistance force. As the study uses observed protest potential to stand for overt resistance capacity—since no one has attempt resistance development in an observed deterrence crisis—only an inductive, theoretical assertion is possible.

The design is centered on comparing historical outcomes groups and organizations that displayed protest potential. The specific case areas, Poland’s Solidarity movement and

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Czechoslovakia’s Prague Spring, have been selected for the presence of a deterrence crisis, common aggressor, shared conditions of ideological assertion against that opponent as well as demonstrable protest potential, overwhelmingly seen after the 1968 invasion and right before the planned 1981 incursion. The notions of pre-conflict planned armed and/or civil resistance elements, which these two case studies examine, have been addressed in the past, though not with respect to signaling—here, of protest potential. An exploratory, additional, discussion centers on Norway’s resistance to Nazi occupation, 1940–1945; the case was chosen for availability of historical documentation of resistance capabilities highlighted in the case studies: communication capacity, apparent social cohesion, and popular cognitive liberation. The exploration of a post-invasion condition also allows discovery of key factors and variables that are not necessarily present in the case studies.

In order to isolate the conditions influencing a large state’s decision whether or not to invade a smaller one, this study assumes that real neutrality is not an available or desirable option and that the small state does not choose nuclear development. In addition, we presume that a military sponsor is not immediately available or desirable at the moment of decision but that other consequences of external sponsorship are possible. Finally, the analysis assumes that states’ positions are “hard” in that they prefer conflict to accommodation and there is “political will in favor of an irregular strategy.”

The majority of the information for this study comes from existing academic, historical, and governmental texts; some minor fieldwork, diffuse interaction with subject matter experts in European deterrence, is expected. The gathered qualitative data allow inference about the deterrent effect or demonstrated protest potential on Soviet leaders. After structured, focused comparison, the project a summary describes factor, variable, and outcome analysis that can contribute to a more complete theory of asymmetric deterrence.


B. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON ASYMMETRIC DETERRENCE

The practical groundings for unconventional warfare lie in generations of anecdotal examples, going back to Homeric Greece.25 The contemporary history of armed resistance to occupation—of a state, by the armed forces of another state—goes back to the vicious bleeding of the French First Republic by the “little war,” from which modern guerrillas take their title.26 Planning for resistance in advance is fairly recent; the United States led a few efforts of this nature during the Cold War. For example, there was the 1956 effort to prepare stay-behind organizations in South Vietnam in the event of an overt invasion by North Vietnamese forces and the Operation Gladio campaign to organize paramilitary networks for use in the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.27 Of course, these efforts were secret and, therefore, could contribute little to deterrence. Given the contemporary rise of publicized resistance preparation, we should ask if predatory states can understand the pain that such efforts can inflict. To answer the question of the deterrent value of a resistance enterprise during phase zero, this project will draw on four broad areas of academic research: (1) traditional deterrence theory, (2) small states’ considerations for deterrence, (3) unconventional warfare as national security strategy, and (4) social movement theory.

First, the literature of deterrence offers a global context for this small-state problem. Huth describes deterrence as being a policy that “seeks to convince an adversary by the threat of military retaliation that the costs of resorting to the use of military force to achieve foreign policy objectives will outweigh the benefits.”28 Deterrence can be achieved by

either the threat of denial or punishment, denial being the theoretically more promising avenue to weaker actors who lack expeditionary capabilities.\textsuperscript{29} A denial strategy is characterized by attempts to ensure that if the attacker commits, he will not attain his desired end state.\textsuperscript{30} Here, with resistance as deterrence, this idea refers specifically the power to hurt after an occupation.\textsuperscript{31} Mearsheimer asserts that “deterrence is best served when the attacker believes the only alternative is protracted war. The threat of a war of attrition is the bedrock of conventional deterrence theory.”\textsuperscript{32} Guerrilla wars certainly feature protracted attrition.

Resistance should be a powerful tool in that, according to Schelling, “the power to hurt is most successful when held in reserve” and “it is latent violence that can best influence someone’s choice.”\textsuperscript{33} It should also be a “smart” tool in that cognitive deterrence such as that posed by resistance suggests that a defender is more effective when its threat does not force the attacker into Berejikian’s losses frame, therefore neither encouraging risk-taking nor a security dilemma.\textsuperscript{34} Publicly building a resistance capability can be thought of as costless communication that incentivizes an aggressor to carefully evaluate the defender’s commitment to territorial integrity without making offensive overtures that would threaten the revisionist.\textsuperscript{35} Asymmetric defense would seem an acceptable deterrent posture, as some UN-affiliated commenters have insinuated that non-offensive defense strategies that feature force structures only capable of repulsing possible aggression provide a stable deterrent paradigm.\textsuperscript{36} Even Mikhail Gorbachev thought that a force

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{29} Murumets et al., \textit{Thresholds Concept for and by Smaller states, Final Report}, 24.
  \item \textsuperscript{30} Murumets et al., 37.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} Thomas Schelling, \textit{Arms and Influence}. (Yale University Press. New Haven. Connecticut. 1966), 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} Murumets et al., \textit{Thresholds Concept for and by Smaller states, Final Report}, 24.
  \item \textsuperscript{33} Schelling, \textit{Arms and Influence}, 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{35} Robert F. Trager, “Multidimensional Diplomacy,” \textit{International Organization} 65, no. 3, (Summer, 2011): 470, JSTOR.
\end{itemize}
structure designed to “rule out the possibility of surprise attack” would stabilize a deterrence situation.37

Second, we must define the group that is “small states” and the measures that make them so. As early as 1958, scholars realized that the “industrial character of war” made the gap between big states and small states even wider.38 The cost of one fifth-generation U.S. fighter can be more than half the national defense budget of countries like Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania.39 Even if such levels of spending are theoretically possible for small states, the political economies of many smaller nations may be unwilling to support even attempting to purchase military parity; as worldwide GDPs rise, military spending as a percentage of that amount is going down.40 Some scholars have attempted implicit definitions of the small state: authors like Marriot, Kuznets, and Barston use population and/or GDP to delimit this group.41 These criteria, however, do not necessarily capture the disparity in defense budgets between the twelve nations that constitute 75% of global military spending and the other 183 nations in the world.42

Given the wide differences in defense spending between states and the technological capacity gap that accompanies it, we require a more sweeping characterization of small states than Marriot, Kuznets, and Barston, calling all states with defense budgets that are not in the top 75th percentile—183 countries—“small states.”

Wiberg’s idea of “relational smallness,” which identifies small states as those unable to contend in war with a great power, is more useful.43 Even more precise, Handel further characterizes small states by contrasting them with large powers’ most important characteristic, their capacity for large-scale military action that returns, in kind levels of violence on the aggressor.44 Comparing the Baltics against Russia’s military might certainly fits both our budget percentile and relational smallness criteria.

We also assume that size, as previously defined, dictates a defensive position since few of the world’s small states have espoused an intent to conquer their larger neighbors. A defending state increases its likelihood of successful deterrence, in the event that accommodation is not an option, by increasing the cost of offensive action against it to a point where the aggressor’s post-attack situation is less beneficial than status quo.45 The smaller states, which do not choose to embark on inflammatory nuclear weapons programs or crushingly high levels of conventional military spending, find themselves in a reality that is divorced from the one Jervis sets out as a function of a nuclear-armed world: “deterrence by punishment is now more important than deterrence by denial” rings hollow in states without nuclear weapons or large conventional formations, which are playing a completely different, asymmetric game against their larger regional rivals.46 Robert Rothstein also calls out small states’ underestimation of their own conventional capabilities, which results in an eternal need for sponsorship.47 As such sponsorship remains elusive, and given the previously mentioned distractions occupying the attention of the American hegemon, the small states will need additional options.

Therefore, and third, this project focuses on one particular set of unconventional and less illuminated options for small-state deterrence. As such, the work probably belongs

44 Handel, Weak States in the International System, 36.
46 Jervis, Lebow, and Stein. Psychology and Deterrence, 2.
in Knopf’s “Fourth Wave” of deterrence thought, being concerned with asymmetrical conflict that may not necessarily fall under conventional military means.48 The notion that a resistance-focused strategy can succeed is empirically rooted in the strategic interaction thesis. In his book How the Weak Win Wars, Arreguiñ-Toft finds support for the argument that when large states attack with a “direct strategic approach” and small states defend with an indirect strategy such as preplanned resistance, the weaker actor tends to win.49 This finding is even more relevant today: Max Boot has more recently established that, due to the prevalence of politics, propaganda, and public opinion in contemporary warfare, an insurgent is more likely to win now than in any other period.50 Internal conflicts, like resistance against an invader, are tending to be more protracted; even if there is a solution, it is much harder for the larger state to find.51 An inclination to adapt a more Fabian strategy is not new: during the Second World War, the British even stood up two separate guerrilla forces to be prepared for short term post-invasion sabotage and long-term resistance to occupation.52 After the war, this sort of planning continued in secret plans for NATO “stay behind” commandos and a few obscure published volumes.53

More contemporary research, much of it by foreign students at the Naval Postgraduate School, offers insight into why resistance is a possible answer to small states’ dilemma. Mindaugas Rekasius, of Lithuania, firmly establishes that aggressor states do not favor the cost and unpredictability of protracted conflict. He also contends, similar to Sandor Fabian’s later work, that “by adopting a certain military strategy, an underdog may

49 Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, 39.
53 This is a reference to Operation Gladio. See Daniele Ganser’s NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe.
protract a war, notwithstanding being overwhelmingly mismatched, militarily.54 Fabian, of the Hungarian Defense Forces, also usefully identifies the possibility of a combined conventional and irregular strategy, which he supports using the case of the American Revolution.55 Fabian and Rekasius focus only on a military approach, one whose deterrence capability is solely organized as a guerrilla force.56 This focus is reasonable given Mao’s assertion that “defeat is the invariable outcome where native forces fight with inferior weapons against modernized forces on the latter’s terms,” but the weapons do not necessarily have to be lethal.57 Kuul, of the Estonian Defense Force, details the possibilities of civil resistance, mostly non-violent, as a force multiplier in defense planning.58 He further establishes that a strategy which combines civil resistance strategy and unconventional military action may complement provide a “total defense” capacity.59 Minberger and Svendsen, of Sweden and Norway respectively, also hint that military and civilian organizations working side by side make for more effective resistance.60

The literature on civil resistance as unconventional warfare, however, is only now emerging. Doowan Lee has extended the idea of supporting activist movements as a form of unconventional warfare.61 Lee and Johnson have established that a resistance campaign, UW specifically, should integrate existing social groups and networks, aiming to “organize them into a larger opposition movement.”62 Doing this before the opponent’s conventional campaign began would render the enemy powerless by isolating it “from urban

61 Lee and Johnson, “Revisiting the Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare.”
62 Lee and Johnson, “Revisiting the Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare.”
constituencies at the outset of operations.”

Social scientists have also underscored the value of civil resistance rather than the more destructive method of armed uprising: Chenoweth and Stephan have found that, over 323 political movements, nonviolence had a slight advantage over armed insurrection when facing an occupier.

Fourth, to use protest potential as a stand in variable for resistance capacity, this paper also needs to utilize Social Movement theory encapsulate what makes a recognizably strong resistance. McAdam describes a positive feedback loop that increases capacity for social mobilization: four of the contributing factors are extended political opportunity, organizational strength, established leaders in the network, and real cognitive liberation. He adds that the critical resources necessary for these groups to metastasize are membership source, solidarity incentives, and a communications network. The case studies each feature apparent leaders, political opportunity provided by threat of invasion, and cognitive liberation by the consent—tacit or specific explicit—of pre-invasion leaders. The functions of resistance in the cases that move the populace from a “passive collection of individuals” to an “active participant[s] in public life” are activisms and communicative capabilities.

In particular, McAdam found that one of the most crucial resources for resistance is a communications network—not only for planning, but also for moving narrative and exploiting operational success—finding that the success or failure of many movements had hinged on this infrastructure.

According to the Blackwell Companion to Social


68 McAdam, Political process and the development of Black insurgency, 1930–1970, 46; “Cognitive Liberation is defined as “calculation of the odds of repression and the costs of action” or in a more repressive environment “the possibility – not the certainty – that they will eventually win” in Blackwell’s Companion, 415–421.
Movements, journalistic communities provide the “back-stage production center” to work out strategy, make alliances, and conduct general cultural content production. In the discourse on social movements, we see the press, or the media, playing a crucial role in mobilizing consensus. Movements depend on the mass media as a “central instrument” to political success. Also, social integration, defined by membership in nongovernmental groups as well as intragroup solidarity, is also an important function of mobilizing resistance. This idea is supported by McAdam’s theory that persons with multiple activisms have are more likely to participate in protests which also aligns with his thoughts on membership source and solidarity incentives. This paper uses social movement theory to explore the relative levels of “organization in the aggrieved population” and “readiness” in each of the cases. The levels of observable social movement factors, specifically organizational strength and communications capacity, are key displays for a small state to show its capacity to resist.

C. ADVANCING TOWARD RESISTANCE

So, can resistance preparation in fact contribute to positively affecting the attacker’s decision? The remainder of this thesis attempts to answer that by looking at the 1968 Prague Spring as a deterrence failure and the 1981 Solidarity movement as a deterrence success. The exploratory case of actual resistance, the Nazi occupation of Norway, is used to discern some benefits and shortcomings of resistance that may apply to present-day deterrence. The combination of deterrence and wartime cases also provides some insight into how resistance functions might transpire at the outset of an adversary’s limited

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campaign, as opposed to one of total occupation. Given that building resistance capacity can contribute to deterrence, in the conclusion, we propose ways that project’s insights can be used to build an optimum resistance capability in the future.
II. UNSEEN POTENTIAL: THE PRAGUE SPRING AS A DETERRENCE FAILURE

I thought we were much freer than we were.

—Alexander Dubček
Leader, 1968 Prague Spring

The Red Army invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 without compunction, but was then caught off-guard by a defiant campaign of widespread, nonviolent resistance in the days after the occupation. Given the Soviets’ experience with post–World War II Baltic resistance, ending just a decade before, why did the invader hold so little regard for the protest potential of the Czechoslovakian resistance? In this case, we find an aggressor unburdened by the strategic quagmire it would face later in Afghanistan, a total lack of regional or U.S. sponsorship, and a defender whose conventional combat power had been rendered unavailable. Though in retrospect we can clearly observe protest potential—here, standing in for resistance capacity—in Czechoslovakia, as evidenced by the uprising that followed the invasion, it was not apparent to the invader. The Prague Spring government did not signal any effective communication apparatus, apparent social cohesion, or demonstrable cognitive liberation to that invader. This chapter uses the Prague Spring as a control case, against which to test the hypothesis that protest potential, standing in for resistance capacity, can contribute to deterring an aggressor from to invading a smaller state—as a means to contribute to theory building in asymmetric deterrence. The Czechoslovakian example provides a base case of failure from which to understand the success of the Polish deterrence, discussed in the next chapter.

76 The use of “extended” sponsorship is a reference to the United States, as opposed to Czechoslovakia’s local neighbors, and a deterrence situation where “a state may attempt to deter an attack on other states such as clients or allies” from Erich Weede, “Extended Deterrence by Superpower Alliance” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 2, (June, 1983): 234, JSTOR.
To examine the disparity between evident resistance capacity and clear disregard for it by the aggressor, this chapter examines how the Czechoslovakian government squandered the deterrent value of its intrinsic resistance enterprise, the social movement associated with the Prague Spring, prior to the 1968 Soviet invasion. This chapter begins with a short description of what led to the August 1968 crisis. It then explores several key non-resistance factors in the deterrence failure, which cannot be easily isolated from the consideration of this case or the following Polish example. The main analysis focuses on how the protest potential of the Prague Spring, as a social movement, was either insufficient to be recognized by the aggressor or had its legibility essentially diminished by the Dubcek regime. This section concludes by setting forth the implications of these findings for the research question and overall lessons learned. The key insight is that resistance capacity, as demonstrated by the protestors who filled the streets after the August invasion, is not guaranteed to have identifiable significance to a potential invader.

A. BACKGROUND

In the decades after the Second World War, Czechoslovakia had suffered a period of economic downturn accompanied by general oppression. Czechoslovakia’s economic woes stemmed from a rapid period of post-war industrialization that was followed by economic crisis in the early 1960s. Czechoslovakia, a relative industrial powerhouse, began its communist revolution as staunchly Stalinist but was economically stagnant after two decades of flawed policy. Oppressions included the Communist government nominally abolishing religious institutions, confiscating Church property, and imprisoning clergy. This quasi-totalitarianism lasted until Stalin’s death. The initial domestic political opportunity for reformers came from a confluence of issues: Czechoslovakia’s belated de-


Stalinization, its stalled post-1963 economic reforms, and disparities in Slovak political participation in domestic politics, all cast against open dissent against and emergent cognitive liberation from intellectual reformers.\textsuperscript{80}

Some limited liberalization of the country began as a pragmatic shift for ruling elites, who wanted to preserve their power. The emerging political atmosphere led to a new penal code in 1961 and civil code in 1964; these were the first steps toward a socialist state that could be limited by laws.\textsuperscript{81} After Khruschev’s departure from the Kremlin, the overall trend for reform in Czechoslovakia quickened.\textsuperscript{82} The Czechoslovakian public, private citizens and members of the body politic, widely held the ruling communist party responsible for all the ills leading up to the a delegate revolt within the Central Committee. In 1967, a throng of college students marched on the General Secretary’s office, and later police crackdowns failed to quell an overall atmosphere of unrest.\textsuperscript{83} This wide spread dissent led to the ouster of Party First Secretary Antonin Novotny.

For eight months, between January and August of 1968, Czechoslovakia saw a massive popular uprising against its communist political establishment. A reform movement had emerged, called the Prague Spring and led by Party Secretary Alexander Dubček, and gained wide support to introduce more pluralistic policies—what Dubček called “Communism with a Human Face.”\textsuperscript{84} The resulting new regime reversed many of the prior oppressive policies, though most would be re-established after the Soviet invasion in August.\textsuperscript{85} The goal of the reforms was to expand “priestor,” or the scope of personal

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\textsuperscript{80} Jiri Valenta, “Revolutionary Change, Soviet Intervention, and ‘Normalization’ in East-Central Europe,” \textit{Comparative Politics} 16, no. 2. (January, 1984): 130, JSTOR.; “Cognitive Liberation is defined as “calculation of the odds of repression and the costs of action” or in a more repressive environment “the possibility – not the certainty – that they will eventually win” in Blackwell’s Companion 415–421.


\textsuperscript{84} Central Intelligence Agency, “A Look Back.”

\textsuperscript{85} Pedro Ramet. “The Czechoslovak Church under Pressure,” \textit{The World Today} 38, no. 9, (September, 1982): 356, JSTOR.
freedoms, and return to the prewar economic norms of private ownership. The regime also wanted to limit or redistribute the power of the Presidium, or inner circle of the party elites. The revolutionary agenda included relaxation of censorship, greater autonomy for state bureaucracies, multiple political parties, freedom of assembly, investigation of secret police, greater rights for ethnic minorities, economic reforms, and increasingly autonomous foreign policies.

By June of 1968, the government had started showing internal signs of deviation from orthodox communism unacceptable to the Soviets, which would drive what the Soviets saw as the need for incursion. It decided to crush the state-abetted dissent. On August 21, 1968, an army of perhaps 650,000 Warsaw Pact troops entered Czechoslovakia to enforce political counterreformation. The operation was, as Vladimir Kusin has identified, a “non-belligerent” operation, featuring few shots and fewer prisoners; no Czech army marched out to meet the occupiers. The most significant conflict was a nearly unanimous civil resistance to the occupation, by both Czechs and Slovaks, in the seven days following the 21 August invasion.

The ultimate causes of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 have been summarized by historians as the USSR protecting what it had attained and preventing its other possessions from becoming infected by counter-revolutionary fervor. This account does not, however, fully explain the strategic analysis and choices surrounding the invasion decision, which, within twenty four hours, turned into a major blunder as a result of the Soviets’ failure to recognize the resistance capacity of the Prague Spring movement.

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87 Valenta, “Revolutionary Change, Soviet Intervention, and “Normalization” 131.
89 Kusin, “Ten Years after the Prague Spring: Lessons for Eastern Europe,” 664.
91 Kusin, “Ten Years after the Prague Spring: Lessons for Eastern Europe,” 663.
92 Sharp, Waging Nonviolent Struggle, 195.
B. STRATEGIC CONTEXT

This failure was an easy mistake to make. Russian power seemed to be at its height, while the defender had neither moved to disrupt the coalition the Soviets were setting against it, nor had the Dubček government attained even meager sponsorship from the United States. First, the reform government seems to have declined to influence its neighbors in the Warsaw Pact to prevent them from forming a coalition with the Soviets, with the result that the Czechoslovakian reform government was left standing alone, with no friends, near or far. The party bureaucrats across the Warsaw Pact, even the non-Russian Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania, worried that the deviant ideas of the Prague Spring could spill over into their own systems.93 The Poles were particularly worried about their susceptibility to “infection,” as they had seen large student protests in March of that year.94 The growing reform movement in Czechoslovakia had been preceded by similar uprisings in Poland, East Germany and Hungary; they had all been crushed, most notably in 1956 Hungary.95 But, though the Prague Spring directly challenged authoritarian techniques of government and Soviet economic influence, it was not expressly anti-Soviet or even anti-communist in nature: the reformers in Czechoslovakia still accepted one-party communist rule and wanted to retain the nation’s Warsaw Pact membership and its position in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.9697 The Czechoslovakian communist movement had emerged organically rather from Soviet influence, unlike many of its Warsaw Pact neighbors.98 But the Dubček regime allowed the narrative about its reform to become one of external interference. Soviet leaders in favor of intervening in

93 Jiri Valenta, “The Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia,” *Political Science Quarterly* 94, no. 1, (Spring, 1979): 61, JSTOR.
94 Valenta, “63.
Czechoslovakia were then, also, able to paint the country as another Yugoslavia or Romania, where other uprisings had been crushed, and tied the escalating crisis to the invasion of Hungary in 1956.\textsuperscript{99}

The Soviets had not suffered significant consequences for any of these excursions. Still, for their part, foreign affairs leaders in the Soviet bloc worried that intervention would sully the upcoming World Communist conference and even push China into the United States’ sphere. Soviet diplomats also worried about an invasion’s potentially ill effect on ongoing Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and early SALT negotiations as well as any actions’ influence on U.S. electoral politics in the coming Presidential race.\textsuperscript{100} Nevertheless, by August 21, an army of Soviet, East German, Polish, Bulgarian, and Hungarian forces crossed the border into Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{101}

Whether due to Vietnam, racial tensions, or the presidential race, the U.S. response was muted. Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s public speeches in July led the Soviets to the comfortable conclusion that the Western superpower would not intervene.\textsuperscript{102} The only response from the United States seems to have been the Department of State cancelling cultural and educational programs with the USSR.\textsuperscript{103} The Dubcek regime itself lacked any successful external engagement: no appeals to the Church, no trade envoys, and no evident attempt to court the United States, even to communicate that there was a threat. The Soviet invasion held no sway strong enough for anyone to respond.\textsuperscript{104} Though trade lost by the Soviet Bloc during the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises, poor harvests, and loss of trade with China could have offered leverage to the United States, the White House remained visibly restrained during the crisis.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{99} Valenta, “The Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia,” 73.
\textsuperscript{100} Valenta, 62.
\textsuperscript{102} Valenta, “The Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia,” 73.
As Czechoslovakia stood alone, its next line of defense would have been its conventional combat power. Prior to 1968, Czech defense expenditures were the highest in Eastern Europe at 4.4% of GDP. Their ground forces had grown to a staggering 250,000, becoming a so-called “junior partner” to Soviet forces in deployments all around the world. Czech missile forces were even being equipped for nuclear operations, though no warheads were yet stored in the country. The Army had also moved away from the Warsaw Pact starting in 1966, moving toward, as Condoleezza Rice called it, a more “national identification” rather than a pan-communist one, and was overwhelmingly supportive of the Dubcek regime.

However, one of the more glaring characteristics of the Prague Spring is the lack of defensive response from the reform government. Despite Czechoslovakia’s advanced capabilities, whether out of naivety or fear of repercussion, the reform government had capitulated early, to the point of allowing Warsaw Pact Command to conduct military exercises on Czechoslovakian territory during June and July; this was after secret deployment orders for invasion had been sent, as the Soviets had begun to prepare for possible intervention in February and March of 1968, reaching a state of deployment readiness in early July. Their preparations both served as psychological pressure on the Dubcek government and shortened the time necessary to actually attack, should such a decision occur. After initial mobilizations in the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, on August 3, 1968, Warsaw Pact troops were fully staged for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Czech army executed no mobilization, no deployment whatsoever; it was directly restricted to its barracks by presidential decree. The Secret Police were even ordered to drain fuel from strike aircraft.

110 Valenta, 60.
111 Sharp, Waging Nonviolent Struggle, 190.
This final signal that the Czechoslovakian military would remain in barracks was perhaps the ultimate indication of weakness, but it was not the only one. Several structural flaws in the Prague Spring movement would have made it apparent to the Soviets much that Czechoslovakia would not offer significant resistance against an invasion—or so they thought.

C. VISIBLE CRACKS

After the invasion, the Soviets met a unified civilian resistance, which they had not foreseen. Why did they miss the protest potential incumbent in the Prague Spring? The indicators of this sort of protest potential—as identified by McAdam—were simply lacking in Czechoslovakia: independent communication venues were deficient, and there was no apparent social cohesion or demonstrable cognitive liberation. The Prague Spring reforms were occurring at a time when the ethnic divisions between Czechs, Slovaks, and a myriad of other people had begun to create fissures over minority suffrage. There was an enduring economic disparity between the areas populated by Czechs and those peopled by Slovaks, the latter being consistently less developed. This pattern led to a disparity in population growth rates and, eventually, an imbalance in the labor supply. The divide also had an urban/rural component that central planning attempted to rectify, investing in agricultural towns at the cost of the cities. These tensions posed a problem to any resistance movement hoping to broadcast its strength because, though reformers could mass against domestic issues, these ethnic strains showed a feebleness that was visible from Moscow. Ethno-nationalism served—and, as Chapter 3 will demonstrate, would continue to serve—as a uniting factor in homogeneous countries like Poland, but in Czechoslovakia, it set

113 Sharp, Waging Nonviolent Struggle, 197.
Czechs against Slovaks and other minorities, thereby displaying a significant structural weakness.117

Slovaks had traditionally complained that, rather than being equal, they had been ruled by the Czech majority since the establishment of Czechoslovakia in 1918. As the veil of censorship was lifted by the reform government, voices of Slovak dissent could now be heard, loud and clear.118 During the Prague Spring, Slovak calls for reform were met with an unenthusiastic response from the Czech public; the former’s priorities were seen as more focused on federalization than democratization, so legal settlement remained a lower priority for the majority. In the summer of 1968, these disagreements turned into fault lines that drove suspicion and condescension between the groups.119

Ethnic divides were not the only seams in social cohesion that the Soviets would have noticed in a prospective Czechoslovakian resistance: there was also a rising generation of the young, educated middle class who viewed contemporary elites as unqualified for their positions. These Czechoslovakian youth were generally less politically active but more critical of the establishment than the older generations.120 The reform movement also suffered a crisis of power: during the spring months, the non-party reformers realized that their momentum was being used by party insiders, who were attempting to preserve their hold on power by implementing only cosmetic reform. At the same time, grassroots workers’ councils spread through the country along with parallel citizens’ committees, which actually disaggregated political unity.121 Lacking any real nongovernmental organization, the Czechoslovkians had little in the way of activisms to unite them. These obvious seams would have both evidenced a smaller possibility of

119 Scott Brown, “Prelude to a Divorce? The Prague Spring as Dress Rehearsal for Czechoslovakia’s ‘Velvet Divorce,” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 10, (December 2008): 1790–1792, JSTOR.
121 Liehm, “The Prague Spring and Eurocommunism,” 815.
resistance and, perhaps, fueled the Soviets’ biases toward a need for intervention on behalf of stability.

The cognitive seam produced by ethnic tensions and other gaps were magnified by the KGB’s domination of the information environment leading up to the invasion. The Czechoslovakian reform groups manifestly lacked the concerted independent communication venues necessary to push back against, and be seen to push back against, the Soviet command of the narrative. During the reform movement, leading intellectuals, who up to that point were party members and still sympathetic communists, began pouring cultural satire into the information environment; regime-leering films were released, psychedelic rock bands formed, travel restrictions were lifted, and subversive essays widely disseminated. None of this was systematic, and, though it was subversive, such media did not offer Czechoslovakians a collective narrative of resistance. And, though much of the Soviet Committee for State Security’s (KGB) intelligence apparatus was dismantled and their past operations exposed during the reforms, the agency was able to conduct influence operations aimed at both Czech and Soviet audiences. They fabricated “proofs of counterrevolution” and “Western subversion” in Czechoslovakia with false-flag anti–people’s militia leaflets and a planted cache of American-made weapons. The KGB also distributed anti-Dubček leaflets and published threatening and discrediting articles against Czechoslovak reformist ministers like J. Smrkovsky and J. Pavel. After the invasion, we see Czechoslovakian protestors had only newly opened media channels with which to communicate messages and coordinate. In fact, the protestors had to commandeer an old Army radio system to get any message out.

The most conspicuous weakness, in the Prague Spring’s protest potential, was the lack of legible cognitive liberation. The popular movement for reform seems to have

\[\text{\cite{122}\cite{123}\cite{124}\cite{125}}\]
peaked in autumn of 1967.\textsuperscript{126} Whether because the Prague leadership believed that the
Kremlin tacitly approved or because the reform movement had died down, no mass
marchers or communication evidenced a significant cognitive liberation, which would
support any protest potential.\textsuperscript{127} What is more a tolerance of collaborators, like the Nazis
in Norway that Chapter 4 will discuss, meant that the Kremlin was being fed information
that reforms were the agenda of a small party of elites rather than a large movement.
Russia’s Leonid Brezhnev had a ready Czech collaborator, Gustáv Husák.\textsuperscript{128} Husák had,
at his back, an anti-reformist coalition attempting to discredit the Dubček’s group as
counterrevolutionary. This effort was domestic and international, as Husák provided
intelligence material to the Soviet Politburo in an effort to secure “fraternal assistance,”
another name for a Soviet countercoup.\textsuperscript{129} Well misled, the Kremlin clearly did not expect
the backlash that it would eventually face, given it had no acceptable rejoinder to the
emerging protest; it was not until September 25 that an official response was
disseminated.\textsuperscript{130} The reformers were making legitimate progress, and their movement was
fracturing, so cognitive liberation would not have been as noticeable as during the spring
marches. Kremlin leaders, even without the benefit of McAdam’s research on activisms
and press capabilities, must have naturally understood that the Prague Spring was not a
tactical hazard.

D. \textbf{SUMMARY}

Observing the visible weakness in the Czechoslovakian social movement led Soviet
diplomats and the KGB to provided deeply flawed assessments of the Prague Spring right
up until the invasion. They portrayed Dubček’s groups as a minority force reliant on the
support of radical fringes as well as those deemed “agents of the imperialist powers,” and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{126}Liehm, “The Prague Spring and Eurocommunism,” 809.
\item \textsuperscript{127}Stoneman, “Socialism with a Human Face: The Leadership and Legacy of the Prague Spring,”
107.
\item \textsuperscript{128}This is in reference to the NS party in Norway which courted Hitler before 1940 invasion and took
local power after.
\item \textsuperscript{129}Valenta, “The Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia,” 64.
\item \textsuperscript{130}Milan Svec, “The Prague Spring: 20 Years Later,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 66, no. 5, (Summer 1988): 985,
JSTOR.
\end{itemize}
the anti-reformists as “representatives of a widespread opposition among the healthy party cadres.”¹³¹

What can we draw from the Czechoslovakian government’s failure to deter their larger neighbor and its peers? Given the strategic flexibility enjoyed by the Soviet aggressor, sponsorship plight of the Dubček government, and lack of substantive military defense, the Kremlin’s decision to invade was seemingly reasonable - though illiberal. This case study suggests that the Czechoslovakian government, in a bid to placate its aggressor, failed to nurture any resistance enterprise and, thereby, lost any deterrent value such a capability could have provided. The Soviet Union did not recognize the resistance potential in Czechoslovakia, capacity that would become quite clear the day after their invasion. Without effective information operations, apparent social cohesion, or demonstrable cognitive liberation, the Kremlin had no reason to be deterred, and so this case offers a useful control for comparison with the Polish case in the next chapter.

III. OBSERVED HAZARDS: POLAND’S SOLIDARITY AS A DETERRENCE SUCCESS

Even if angels entered Poland, they would be treated as bloodthirsty vampires and the socialist ideas would be swimming in blood.132

—Stanisław Kania
Former General Secretary PUWP

In the late summer of 1981, the Soviet Union again found itself having to decide whether to invade a purported ally. As in Czechoslovakia thirteen years before, the superpower was faced with a reform movement that threatened its ideological authority, but unlike in 1968, this movement was so powerful that it posed a real dilemma for the Kremlin. Why did the Soviets, still led by Leonid Brezhnev, who had ordered the 1968 invasion, hold off crushing the Polish civil resistance? In this case, we find a prospective aggressor burdened by strategic quagmire abroad, a present U.S. sponsorship, and a defender whose conventional combat power was at least available. More importantly for this project, the aggressor could clearly observe protest potential—which we have identified as an index of resistance capacity—in Poland; this potential was evidenced by Solidarity’s effective communication apparatus, apparent social cohesion, and demonstrable cognitive liberation. Solidarity, unlike the Prague Spring movement, mobilized a national strike at the decisive moment when Soviet forces were poised to intervene, collapsing all plans for invasion. The Soviet leaders were ultimately deterred not by military force but by the appearance of a vast resistance mobilization and the increasing specter of the costs that would be required to put it down. The Solidarity movement, wittingly or unwittingly, increased the deterrent value of Poland’s intrinsic resistance enterprise and helped prevent a replay of the 1968 Soviet invasion.

This chapter uses the Polish Solidarity as a treatment case, with which to substantiate the hypothesis that protest potential, standing in for resistance capacity, can

contribute to small-state deterrence against a larger aggressor—as a means to contribute to theory building in asymmetric deterrence. The chapter will begin with a short description of what led to the crisis and eventual crackdown. It will then explore several key non-resistance factors in the success of the Polish deterrence, which cannot be easily isolated from that success. The main analysis will focus on how the protest potential of the social movement Solidarity was recognized by the aggressor and affected its deterrence decision-making. This section will conclude by setting forth the implications of these findings for the research question and overall lessons learned. The key insight that applies to this project is that resistance potential, given the right recognized capabilities and aggressor context, can have identifiable significance to a potential invader.

A. BACKGROUND

“Solidarnosc,” or Solidarity, was a labor movement that emerged out of the Polish seaside town of Gdansk. The story has it all: the CIA, the Church, an aloof “intelligentsia,” and a plucky “working class” hero. The initial strikes were about workers’ rights—specifically the firing of a female crane operator just months before she was to retire. As the strike spread to other factories and towns, the movement became a sort of social collective defense: the workers understood that the national security forces could pacify some factories but not all of them at the same time. The collective, albeit ungoverned, unity of nearly the entire population around this group was, in the words of one Polish activist, “the greatest threat to the Communists. They could not divide the society anymore.”

43 years of Soviet control.137 This great social movement challenged Poland’s communist dictator and, by proxy, the grip of Soviet power.138

As Solidarity gained momentum, a Soviet Emissary at one point reported that Polish leadership saw themselves as unable to tackle Solidarity on their own, hoping to elicit military assistance from sympathetic neighbors.139 The Warsaw governments believed that the Polish regime’s deviation from strict Leninist communism was the root of their problems; they thought the Poles were being too soft on their citizens.140 As with the Prague spring, the Solidarity movement not only alarmed the government in Moscow but also several allied countries in the Warsaw pact: East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The incumbents were worried that counterrevolutions could threaten their own hold on power; they were also concerned about the strategic gap a non-Leninist Poland would leave in the alliance.141 This concern was magnified by the presence of Polish workers based in other Warsaw countries, like Latvia, who were seen as transmission nodes for the counterrevolutionary virus.142 There seems to have been prevailing fear of “uncontrolled anticommunist spillover” that looked a lot like U.S. Domino Theory.143

Military intervention was the preferred tool of the Brezhnev government in Moscow, and the threat of military force against Poland began to metastasize in late summer of 1980. In August, a Soviet study group called the Suslov Commission developed a plan to intervene in Poland with tanks and mechanized divisions. The plan was approved by the Politburo, and forces were ordered to three military districts on the Polish border. The intervention would fall under the guise of a regularly scheduled Warsaw Pact exercise

137 Goodwin, Breaking the Barrier, The Rise of Solidarity in Poland, xiv.
in the spring of 1981.\textsuperscript{144} This force was to be the first wave of a massive contingency force that would bring the errant nation back into the fold.\textsuperscript{145} The sitting members of the Politburo—Brezhnev, Andropov, Ustinov, and Gromyko—though not professional military officers, had been raised on interventions and executed a few themselves.\textsuperscript{146} The people in Gdansk fully expected a Russian invasion, as there was a long tradition of such incursions; the armies of the Warsaw Pact were certainly expecting to enforce Soviet will on the Poles.\textsuperscript{147} Why, then, did they relent?

B. A DISTRACTED AGGRESSOR

While Solidarity’s protest potential, as recognized by the Kremlin, would be essential to deterring Soviet aggression, it occurred in the context of a number of other important factors that decreased the probability of intervention. Foremost were the numerous Soviet military adventures abroad. Any consideration of Soviet decision-making vis-à-vis Poland in 1981 must begin far to the east, in Afghanistan. Though only 100,000 troops of 2 million in the standing Soviet army would ever be committed to the losing fight in Afghanistan, by 1981, the Soviet military was focused on the gravity of its commitment of forces there.\textsuperscript{148} By the time Solidarity was gaining prominence, up to 80,000 Soviet troops were already required to fight the Mujahedeen.\textsuperscript{149} Soviet military outlays rose by 6.36 billion rubles per annum in the years leading up to the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. The military adventure doubled that rise.\textsuperscript{150} The rubles spent on military programs and

\begin{enumerate}
\item Gompert, Binnendijk and Lin, \textit{Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn}, 143.
\item Gompert, Binnendijk and Lin,141.
\item Goodwin, \textit{Breaking the Barrier, The Rise of Solidarity in Poland}, 3.
\end{enumerate}
adventures were a heavy burden on the Soviet people. In addition to Afghanistan, Vietnam and Cuba continued to consume sparse foreign resources; Soviet forces were also backing conflict in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Kampuchea, and Angola. Evidence in the Konoplev report, a declassified document from the Brezhnev era, shows that military spending was a much heavier liability for the Soviet government than even the most optimistic contemporary Western analysis had indicated.

The United States, meanwhile, was now out of Vietnam and thus gave the Soviet military an ever more able peer opponent to worry about, especially in terms of strategic forces. The Soviets had no reason to believe that NATO would intervene militarily if they took action in Poland. However, any further military action on the part of the Soviet Union would infringe on the dependency that it had developed with the capitalist world, and Moscow needed access to international markets for capital inflows and technology imports because its internal economic processes had become too byzantine to drive business innovation.

Indeed, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. president Jimmy Carter, in addition to rhetorical protest, embargoed grain going to the Soviet Union, and the ensuing domestic problems ultimately further tempered Soviet aggression and diminished the likelihood of further interventions. The grain embargo fell heavily on the Soviet Union; international prices for wheat added another billion dollars to the yearly expenses for feeding the Russian people. Moscow also had to deal with meat and dairy shortages driven

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154 Hohmann, Nove, and Vogel, Economics and Politics in the USSR, 110.
155 Gompert, Binnendijk and Lin, Blunders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn, 144.
157 Ouimet.
by lack of cattle feed. The invasion also hurt Soviet standing on the world stage—its “soft power.” The United States and over 60 other countries announced a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games because of the Soviets’ actions in Afghanistan. As tensions grew and indicators of a Soviet invasion of Poland increased, the Carter administration warned that it would impose harsh consequences if the Soviets intervened militarily.

As a result, dealing with Polish labor strikes would stretch a Soviet security mechanism already taxed by Afghanistan. The protests occurring there were a testament to Poland’s non-violent strength but also deprived the Soviets of vital coal resources during strikes. The Soviets even sent $1.3 billion USD in aid to Poland in an attempt to quell its economic turmoil—scarce funds the Soviets could otherwise have used for weapons manufacturing or deploying troops. Eventually, Moscow became less concerned with Prague Spring–style protests or guerrillas than it was with domestic economic stability and strategic security. As Solidarity rose in prominence, in August of 1980, the Soviet Union was starting to feel the negative effects of its invasion of Afghanistan, to fear the relative advantage of NATO militaries, and to understand an increasing cohesion in the Alliance. Finally, the threat of Western sanctions, expected as response to any intervention, arrived just as flaws in the Communist economy, including failing capital creation and


161 Gompert, Binnendijk and Lin, Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn, 143.


163 Byrne, From Solidarity to Martial Law, xxxviii.
ungovernable market friction, were starting to boil over.\textsuperscript{164} This threat of economic response and the distraction of Afghanistan was only half of the dilemma facing the Politburo, however; the other half consisted of most of the population of Poland, which Solidarity had enrolled during the last four months of 1980.\textsuperscript{165}

\section*{C. BUILDING EVIDENT SOLIDARITY}

In the last case study, we found that the Soviet Union did not recognize the resistance capacity in Czechoslovakia and committed to an invasion; in Poland, Moscow \textit{did} comprehend Solidarity’s protest potential, manifested via its effective communication apparatus, apparent social cohesion, and demonstrable cognitive liberation, and called off its incipient invasion partly due to that understanding. Whereas the Prague Spring’s protest potential looked feeble to Moscow, Solidarity appeared much stronger. However, as in the Czech case, there was no way that even a fully mobilized Polish military and civil resistance could have stopped the Red Army had it been unleashed on the Środkowoeuropejska lowlands, but it still held the potential to disrupt and delay the already mired superpower.

Indeed, the first key difference in the two resistance cases was that, unlike the 1968 Czech Army, the Polish military could not be guaranteed to sit out an invasion of its homeland, which creating, at least, uncertainty about the amount of actual combat that an invasion would incur. Their abject military overmatch, however much assumed, was not a comfort for Moscow. Though the Poles had only 15 Divisions and 20 attack aircraft regiments, while the Soviets had 197 Divisions and 14 air armies, Soviet leaders were concerned with the idea of an invasion encountering fierce resistance from reformists and Communist patriots alike.\textsuperscript{166} The Polish Communist Party leaders warned the Soviets that an invasion would be met with large-scale violence. One prominent official declared, “if there were an intervention there would be a national uprising. Even if angels entered

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Gompert, Binnendijk and Lin, \textit{Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn}, 141.
\item Goodwin, \textit{Breaking the Barrier, The Rise of Solidarity in Poland}, i.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Poland,” he continued, “they would be treated as bloodthirsty vampires and the socialist ideas would be swimming in blood.”167 Soviet intelligence as well as Polish leaders’ commentary to Moscow, indicated that the Army would perhaps rebel and fight any invading forces. The military commanders had already overruled any possibility that they would act against the strikers.168 This uncertainty led to planning for a second wave of Soviet forces that would have included mobilization of an additional five to seven divisions, to be used if “the main forces of the Polish Army [went] over to the side of the counterrevolutionary forces.”169

The second key difference in the two resistance cases is that, where Czechoslovakia was broken up into four major ethnic groups. The Poles were majority Catholic and thus possessed very apparent social cohesion, which made them a unitary opponent and might negate the KGB’s primary Active Measures tool of sowing dissent among diverging ethnicities.170 In fact, the election of a Polish Pope in 1978 incited a wave of nationalism among Polish Catholics. Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, even prophesized that John Paul II would have a similar effect as Ayatollah Khomeini had on his Iranian fellows.171 The KGB reported Poland as the only Warsaw country in which the Church functioned freely, and the Central Committee Secretariat worried about the Vatican’s meddling “in the internal affairs of the fraternal nations” and fretted that Catholic “propaganda” would lead to separatism along with other nations’ faithful.172 The surge of Catholic mobilization led to an integrated propaganda, repression, and counter-

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168 Sharp, Waging Nonviolent Struggle, 225.
169 Gompert, Binnendijk and Lin, Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn, 144.
mobilization effort on the part of the Soviets. But religious nationalism was not the only hazard that worried Moscow in the days before their April 1981 decision: the tidal wave of Polish dissent that so scared the Soviets and the wider Warsaw Pact was part of a national tradition of protest and marches going back to at least 1830. The emerging labor movement had foundations that reached back to the 1968 student riots and yearly worker risings from 1970–1973. The Soviets knew, reflexively, that any effort to put down this emerging uprising would be quite disruptive to their system and its resources.

The third key difference in the two resistance cases was communications capability: whereas Czechoslovakia popular communication was stunted, Solidarity could quickly mobilize vast numbers. The initial striking workers and their contacts with existing opposition circles had given them access to uncensored printing venues. Moreover, the U.S. intelligence community had begun what would become “an intricate supply network and with the secret support of the Vatican”; this channel would eventually provide support of about $8 million USD per year to Solidarity’s communications and mobilization efforts. From its very beginnings, Solidarity also had the monetary and advisory support of the AFL-CIO for its engagement efforts. These combined programs provided “presses, copiers, and other materials for the underground to publish.” Eventually, the opposition possessed around a thousand printing and distribution centers, powered by several hundred printing devices, capable of producing millions of leaflets, which the

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175 Goodwin, Breaking the Barrier, The Rise of Solidarity in Poland, 30.
Communist regime deemed “hostile publications.”\textsuperscript{180} The Poles therefore possessed what their Czechoslovakian forebears lacked: and integrated communication mechanisms. At the decisive moment, the movement’s red and white banners were even accompanied by the word “Solidarity” flashing on television screens across the nation.\textsuperscript{181}

That moment would also showcase the fourth difference between Polish success and the Prague Spring’s failure: obvious cognitive liberation, the indomitable will to resist which would make any incursion a very long-term affair. The crisis came to a definitive head in late March of 1981. By this time, the protests in Poland had lasted longer than those of the Prague Spring, and the progress of free trade had gone farther.\textsuperscript{182} The so-called “Bydgoszcz incident” instigated a decisive protest event that left no doubt about Solidarity’s ability to mass against foreign authority; this mid-March 19 incident involved Solidarity activists being assaulted by local hardliners popularly perceived to be acting under official Polish government sanction. The action resulted in renewed nationwide outrage, and the resulting 27 March protest, the “four-hour warning strike,” ground all of Polish society to a halt.\textsuperscript{183} The resulting non-violent protest, the largest in the communist regime’s 36 years, saw the majority of Poland’s 13 million laborers stop working for half a day. Solidarity then threatened a general and indefinite strike, to start four days later.\textsuperscript{184} Moscow’s KGB country team demanded immediate martial law and trials of Solidarity leaders. However, given the military’s hesitation at intervention in the protest, the enormous display had ended any high-level hopes of Polish military assistance with an invasion. The Polish United Workers’ Party leadership panicked.\textsuperscript{185} The party had lost its credibility with the people, and its 3 million members were demoralized and divided,

\textsuperscript{180} Marek Jastrzębski and Ewa Krysiak, “Avoiding Censorship: The “Second Circulation” of Books in Poland,” \textit{Journal of Reading} 36, no. 6, (March 1993): 472, JSTOR.
\textsuperscript{182} Adam Bromke, “Poland’s Upheaval—An Interim Report,” \textit{The World Today} 37, no. 6, (June 1981): 211, JSTOR.
\textsuperscript{183} Mastny, \textit{The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980/81 and the End of the Cold War}, 20.
\textsuperscript{184} Mastny.
\textsuperscript{185} Mastny.
desperately afraid of losing their position and privileges but unable to exert internal control.\textsuperscript{186} The Defense Ministry, seemingly the only functioning office, began working toward a compromise.\textsuperscript{187}

\textbf{D. ENDGAME}

After this massive demonstration, the regime leaders in Poland met, dejectedly, with their Soviet collaborators and declared that invasion was absolutely impossible.\textsuperscript{188} The Central Military Committee cautioned its civilian masters to conserve the nation’s strength. The Warsaw allies would not be much help; efforts to mobilize troops in the Carpathian, Byelorussian, and Baltic districts for an intervention in Poland revealed a pitiful state of military readiness.\textsuperscript{189} The Kremlin, with neither internal Polish support nor overwhelming force available, had no alternative but to abandon the invasion.\textsuperscript{190}

The sentiment in Moscow, now echoed by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov, simply became one of resignation: “we do not intend to introduce troops into Poland. … Even if Poland falls under the control of Solidarity, so be it. … We must be concerned above all with our own country.”\textsuperscript{191} Andropov’s statement was an about-face from collective sentiment just two years earlier. In 1979, Aleksei Kosygin, the sitting Chairman of the Council of Ministers, noted, “We are all of one mind[,] we cannot let Afghanistan go. Hence, we must work out first of all a political document and use all possible political means to help the Afghani government to fortify itself, to offer assistance, which we already noted, and as an extreme measure, to consider a resolution on military action” as

\textsuperscript{186} Bromke, “Poland’s Upheaval—An Interim Report,” 216.
\textsuperscript{187} Mastny, \textit{The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980/81 and the End of the Cold War}, 20.
\textsuperscript{188} Mastny, 22.
\textsuperscript{189} Hohmann, Nove, and Vogel, \textit{Economics and Politics in the USSR}, 114.
\textsuperscript{190} Mastny, \textit{The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980/81 and the End of the Cold War}, 22.
\textsuperscript{191} Gompert, Binnendijk and Lin. \textit{Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn}, 139.
justification for invading Afghanistan. It seems that the diplomatic and economic consequences of the 1979 intervention there were harder to bear than Moscow expected.

So, the Soviets did not invade. The Polish authorities implemented a carefully and secretly planned martial law on 13 December, 1981. Ultimately, Poland’s Solidarity protestors paid a high price for having led the way to multiparty reform, but the movement’s fight against economic stagnation, intellectual dissent, and social alienation was the example needed to catalyze the breakdown of Soviet-style socialism. The 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was a lasting testament that Moscow considered upholding Leninist communism in Eastern Europe a vital interest, seeing Ukraine, Belarus, and Baltics as extensions of its own borders. Now, the leaders in Moscow clearly saw the Eastern European crises as external liabilities that could not be mitigated without threatening the stability of their own government. The Polish government’s successful implementation of martial law allowed the Soviet leaders to conceal the flinch, the decision to not impose their will on a client state; they buried it, and, according to Ouimet, the faltered plan for invasion became a “closely guarded secret known only to Moscow’s top political and military leaders.”

E. SUMMARY

Though strategic dilemmas surrounding the war in Afghanistan as well as the Soviets’ economic need for access to Western technology and capital, framed the Soviets’ thinking in early 1981, Polish tanks and possibility of massive protests drove the Soviet decision not to intervene. The invader clearly recognized the protest potential in Poland—a measure of resistance capacity. The Polish movement had evident communication

193 Ouimet, 717.
197 Ouimet, 710.
198 Ouimet, 711.
apparatus, social cohesion, and demonstrable cognitive liberation made Solidarity, unlike the Prague Spring. The Soviet Leadership was ultimately deterred, not by military force but by the appearance of a vast resistance mobilization and the increasing specter of the costs that would be required to put it down. Though not specifically measurable, we can conclude that the Solidarity movement produced a discernable deterrent effect through the mobilization of a four-hour national strike at the decisive moment. Brezhnev, who had shown a past proclivity for military intervention, was deterred; the Soviets blinked. Resistance potential, given the right recognized capabilities and aggressor context, can have identifiable significance to a potential invader. This treatment case offers a confirmation that protest potential, standing in for resistance capacity, can contribute to small-state deterrence against a larger aggressor, information which can be used to further develop the theory of asymmetric deterrence.
IV. COLD RESPONSE: LESSONS FROM NORWAY’S RESISTANCE

If there is anyone who doubts the democratic will to win, I say, let him look to Norway.

—President Franklin Roosevelt

With a sample of only two cases, this project must look farther afield to confirm its initial findings. Given that building resistance capacity can contribute to deterrence, as we saw in the Polish case, the study will look past deterrence failure and into occupation, specifically that of 1940s Norway, in order to investigate contexts not available in the Soviet cases. SIVORG, the civil resistance component of the Nordic resistance, displays many of the features we saw in Solidarity but found lacking in the Prague Spring. This chapter uses Norway’s resistance to Nazi occupation as an exploratory case to corroborate the decisive nature of protest potential, in form of pervasive communication capabilities, apparent social cohesion, and demonstrable cognitive liberation, as well as consider some negative impacts, liabilities, of resistance forces in order to complete the project’s contribution to the theory of asymmetric deterrence. This chapter begins by outlining the historical context of the Norwegian resistance, then examines the features of its resistance capacity shared with the other studies, and finishes with a discussion of some liabilities surrounding armed resistance and sponsorship that came to light during the research.

A. BACKGROUND

As the Second World War escalated, neutrality was the dominant political doctrine in Norway. Norway’s pseudo-neutrality—it cooperated with the Allies to some extent—kept it out of the war, but only until Germany needed to guarantee its own access to the Atlantic and thus needed to secure the Skagerrak straits and access to the Norwegian port of Narvik. Thus, on 9 April 1940, the Nazis’ Operation Weserübung opened the

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preemptive invasion of an unprepared Norwegian state. The elected government was slow to respond and waffling in resolve. There was a short-lived defensive campaign, lasting a little under two months, of delaying actions against the invader. The invading enemy was quick to establish civil control over the populace, as they had ready collaborators in form of Vidkun Quisling’s Nasjonal Samling (NS) Fascist party and a hastily assembled Administrative Council. The speed of invasion and the native character of the proxy government precluded much preparation by the Norwegians for an underground movement; the elements of resistance had to emerge organically.

After the Battle of Narvik and during the majority of the occupation, Norwegian guerrilla forces, called MILORG, did not engage in much open fighting but instead kept up a slow stream of small attacks. The MILORG in Norway was divided up into two main factions that sometimes were and sometimes were not aligned: there were the MILORG, or home forces, who were sanctioned by the Government in Exile, and also communist-backed troops, reporting to Soviet Russia. Even combined, they were under-resourced and outmanned.201 The non-violent movement was the most visible form of resistance; protests were fairly constant from September 1940 until 1944, when the armed resistance really picked up. The underground organization that ran the Norwegian civil resistance was called SIVORG. SIVORG was born of a healthy pre-War press, which contributed somehow, and diverse but well integrated network of non-governmental organizations. Liddell Hart reported during his post-war interviews with German commanders that the Nazis had much more difficulty with the civil resistance in Norway than they had from any of the local armed groups. They simply did not know what to do, and everything they tried seemed to make things worse.202

Norway’s organized lethal resistance against occupation, such as those highlighted in today’s resistance preparation efforts, was intentionally restrained until the very end of the war. The enemy outnumbered and outgunned Norwegian armed forces, both

conventional and guerrilla: at one point, the Germans had 400,000 troops in Norway, where the total resistance numbered only a few tens of thousands.\textsuperscript{203} As a counterinsurgent force, this group provided a 1 to 10 force to population ratio—contemporary manuals talk about 1 to 20 or 25 as an aim point.\textsuperscript{204} MILORG’s intent in adopting this “passive” posture was to preserve combat power and limit reprisals when not presented with appropriately valuable targets.\textsuperscript{205} MILORG satisfied two noteworthy requirements: they famously disrupted Nazi atomic research and, less famously but quite critically, they seized control of civilian authority during the eventual Nazi capitulation.\textsuperscript{206}

Once the Soviet Union had liberated a piece of Norway and the idea of German capitulation caught on, the government-in-exile (GIE) was introduced to the Allies’ planning process for an operation to liberate the rest of Norway. Unfortunately, this plan was integrated into the Scotland-based 4\textsuperscript{th} Army, which was a fictitious unit and part of the Normandy deception; Norway would be on its own until full German surrender.\textsuperscript{207}

While the fighting and protesting in Norway were ongoing, much work was being done in London. Contemporary studies find that “weak actors must have or gain access to the physical or political sanctuary necessary to make an indirect strategy a viable choice.”\textsuperscript{208} The GIE did certainly provide this sanctuary. The GIE maintained arrangements for safe haven for the resistance across the border in Sweden and their resupply by sea, air, and land. They kept some business as usual, tending the evacuated gold reserves of Norway and taxing the expatriate fishing and merchant fleets; these actions

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{203} Chris Maan, \textit{Hitler’s Arctic War: the German campaigns in Norway, Finland, and the USSR, 1940–1945.} (Brown Partworks. London. 2002), 210.
  \item \textsuperscript{206} Foot, 282.
  \item \textsuperscript{208} Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” \textit{International Security} 26, no. 1, (Summer, 2001): 123, JSTOR.
\end{itemize}
kept the returning government fiscally solvent. The GIE also arranged for “police” schooling in Sweden as well as commando training in Scotland and permissive infiltration corridors, allowed a slow buildup of the armed personnel who secured governmental authority from the NS at war’s end. Also, the ability to move in and out of a safe haven like Sweden was instrumental to coordinating a resistance and a source of resolve in that the civil resistance could evacuate protestors or movement leaders’ families if the occupier closed in. The GIE’s most important acts occurred at the very outset of hostilities and provide examples of how to build and maintain the cognitive liberation necessary to overcome an enormously powerful aggressor.

B. PREVAILING RESISTANCE CAPACITY

In the long fight against an occupier, it is essential for combatants to maintain the notion that they will eventually win. The “Lawfare” conducted by the GIE seeded the ground for this mindset quite well. While the Germans were hastily gaining territory, the Storting—the Norwegian legislature—was to be evacuated. They had one final majority meeting in Elverum before leaving; during this meeting, they passed a law—what would eventually be called the Elverum Authorization—that essentially allowed the cabinet and monarch in exile to maintain the interests of the country and make decisions on the legislature’s behalf that were needed to maintain the country’s security and future. The law was to be in effect until the Storting’s “next ordinary session.” Since those representatives were scattered by the war, no proxy-government law was legitimate; the legislators had voted away any legal authority that the NS collaborators could have had.

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209 Udgaard, Great Power politics and Norwegian foreign policy. A study of Norway’s foreign relations November 1940 - February 1948, 23.


212 Udgaard, Great Power Politics, 21.
Next, King Haakon’s public refusal to abdicate his authority, after barely escaping the Germans, at the request of the Nazi-backed Administrative Council rallied nationalistic pride and further denied any potential legitimacy to the new regime.\footnote{Olav Riste and Berit Nokleby, \textit{Norway 1940–45 The Resistance Movement}, (Oslo: Tanum-Norli, 1984), 12.} The governing council also announced they would resign after returning as not to fix the people to any wartime policy.\footnote{Udgaard. \textit{Great Power politics and Norwegian foreign policy. A study of Norway’s foreign relations November 1940 - February 1948}, 30.} Individual acts of heroism during the short conventional fight were also sources of great inspiration during the resistance.\footnote{Tore Gjelsvik, \textit{Norwegian Resistance, 1940–1945}, (Montreal: McGill-Queen University, 1979), 1.} Furthermore, small attacks throughout the war essentially served to communicate to the populace that the fight was still on as well as keep the occupiers from establishing rapport since they could not trust the civilians they were dealing with. That communication occurred through conduits that were already present in Norway before the Nazis’ first thoughts of northward expansion, including a wealth of newspapers and civic organization periodicals which formed the core of the resistance propaganda enterprise.

The Norwegian resistance propaganda machine was at first somewhat primitive, essentially stenciled letters and circulars, but SIVORG’s communication capabilities quickly solidified into a neural network for protest.\footnote{Gjelsvik, 15.} The “free press” owed its origination to the multiplicity of newspapers that Norway had before the resistance. Traditional news outlets like \textit{Aftenposten}, political circulars like the communist \textit{Arbendeed}, and the union periodicals like the labor \textit{Arbbeider bladat} all added up to a capable press.\footnote{Gjelsvik, 12.} These printers were the original transmission conduits for King Haakon’s resounding rejection of Nazi authority when he denounced the Administrative Council.\footnote{Riste and Nokleby, \textit{Norway 1940–45 The Resistance Movement}, 13.} The free press was always the target of Nazi forces. Nevertheless, at their peak SIVORG, could produce up to 500,000 leaflets a month.\footnote{Gjelsvik, \textit{Norwegian Resistance, 1940–1945}, 107.}
The Norwegian resistance did not only communicate amongst themselves but also to critical external sponsors. Kepe and Osburg describe the need for a continuing struggle against an invader that sends a message of continued resistance to Allies and the world at large.\(^{220}\) The GIE’s external audience engagement was critical for disrupting the Nazi/NS cabal by providing material sponsorship and safe havens. For the Norwegians, this support came in the form of foreign journalists like *Chicago Tribune* journalist Leland Stowe. He carried the story of Quisling’s treachery and the fighting in Narvik to the world.\(^{221}\) The best example, however, is Monterey’s own John Steinbeck: after meeting with Norwegian government officials, he wrote *The Moon is Down*; the novel became a U.S. War Department film and is still available on YouTube today.\(^{222}\)

The NS initially only censored the papers, but eventually it crushed them altogether.\(^{223}\) The Gestapo rounded up resistance newspapers and their distribution networks, but the suppression of the press simply increased the demand for illicit news: the Norwegians gobbled up illicit press coverage because they were used to a steady stream of public news. Where Solidarity, in 1980 Poland, needed the U.S. intelligence community to supply communication equipment, specifically printing presses, the Norwegians already possessed this capability, in spades.\(^{224}\) The Nordic citizens also possessed a ready supply of activisms—provided by their membership in a variety of civic organizations—which provided for incredibly robust social cohesion.

SIVORG was able to utilize the resulting “protest potential of urban individuals” because they had an engaged civil society of unions and sports clubs and political parties

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that produced a system of activisms—before the war.\textsuperscript{225} For the Norwegians, their very healthy civic society made for a diverse array of personal and local connections that formed the initial networks of resistance coordination.\textsuperscript{226} Soldiers, defeated after the final battle at Narvik, returned home to their sports clubs, among other organizations, which allowed them to continue resistance.\textsuperscript{227}

The NS eventually disbanded any formal organizations that would not submit to Nazi dictums.\textsuperscript{228} In response, athletes were arrested for going on strike, and many officials resigned from government and civic organizations when the proxy party mandated some Nazi policy. There was the “Silent protest” of April 9 1941—everyone just stopped in the middle of the day for a half an hour, on the roads, in offices, on the streets. Unions and sports groups were all important, but the critical moment was when the Norwegian political parties, except the NS and the communists, essentially came to a peace agreement for the duration of the war.\textsuperscript{229} The Norwegian experience provides an example not only of how the threat of occupation provided a nationally unifying moment—above divisive politics—but also of how a sense of purpose channeled citizens’ energies toward collective survival.\textsuperscript{230} Social mobilization for protest actions effectively denied the NS and their Nazi sponsors any legitimacy.

\section*{C. STRATEGIC LIABILITIES}

As in the Prague Spring case, in Norway’s invasion, we find that some confused communication produced difficulties for the Norwegian government, in extremis and then in exile. These experiences are what contemporary doctrine would call \textit{information fratricide}, or “the adverse effects resulting from a failure to synchronize the messaging,

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Claesenn, “The Urban Individual Unassailable Source of Power in Twenty-First Century Armed Conflicts,” 9.}
\footnote{Gjelsvik, \textit{Norwegian Resistance, 1940–1945}, viii.}
\footnote{Riste and Nokleby, \textit{Norway 1940–45 The Resistance Movement}, 16.}
\footnote{Gjelsvik, \textit{Norwegian Resistance, 1940–1945}, 15.}
\footnote{Gjelsvik.}
\footnote{Riste and Nokleby, \textit{Norway 1940–45 The Resistance Movement}, 90.}
\end{footnotes}
either misalignment of words and deeds or conflicting statements.”\textsuperscript{231} There were three distinct cases of such conflicting narratives in the Norway case: Nazi collaborators, external sponsorship as an escalatory factor, and disunity between MILORG, backed by Britain, and Norway’s communist-backed guerrillas.

Prior to the invasion, anti-Nazi sentiment was not homogenous in Norway; there was even an idea that Hitler had reputedly eliminated unemployment in the occupied territories, which was seen as a positive. Vidkun Quisling, the chairman of the NS, had many supporters in the rural areas, which had been significantly affected by the Great Depression.\textsuperscript{232} Quisling actually met Hitler in December of 1939.\textsuperscript{233} During this meeting, he gossiped that there was a secret alliance between London and Oslo. He proposed a coup, backed by German naval infantry, to join his Nordic birthplace with the Fatherland. Though his offer was declined, the NS’s treachery was only the first informational seam.\textsuperscript{234}

Also, which nation was responsible for the escalation to war in Norway was a matter of conflict. Communist newspapers blamed Britain for the Nazi attack—confusing the narrative and splitting the people.\textsuperscript{235} The charges were not entirely unfounded. Norway was a neutral country, but both Hitler and Churchill, still the First Lord of the Admiralty, knew that Germany could be severely hampered by British control of Narvik, a northern Norwegian port. Churchill attempted plan after plan, with the Allied Supreme War Command, to disrupt German access to the port. After the \textit{Altmark} incident, in which the British Navy stopped a previously Norwegian-inspected German supply ship and found Royal Navy sailors prisoners hidden below, London’s patience wore thin.\textsuperscript{236} The Royal Navy dispatched minelayers to the Nordic coast, thus giving Germany a meagerly

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{232} Gjelsvik, \textit{Norwegian Resistance, 1940–1945}, xi.
\item \textsuperscript{233} Hans Fredrik Dahl. \textit{Quisling: A Study in Treachery}. (Cambridge University Press, January 7, 2008), 150.
\item \textsuperscript{234} Fuegner, \textit{Beneath the Tyrant’s Yoke, Norwegian Resistance to the German Occupation of Norway 1940–1945}, 10.
\item \textsuperscript{235} Gjelsvik, \textit{Norwegian Resistance, 1940–1945}, 4.
\item \textsuperscript{236} Fuegner, \textit{Beneath the Tyrant’s Yoke, Norwegian Resistance to the German Occupation of Norway 1940–1945}, 14.
\end{itemize}
defensible justification for a convenient invasion. In fact, on the day of the invasion, the German emissary to Norway told his hosts that “the sole aim of the German military operations is to protect the North against the intended occupation of bases in Norway by Anglo-French forces. The German government is convinced that in taking these actions they are at the same time serving the interests of Norway.”237 This is not to say that the Norwegians or British “caused” the Nazi invasion of Norway, but the doubt was a narrative gap throughout the war.

Finally, whereas the Norwegian case is an example of enviable transition from guerrilla movement to civilian control, many exertions of non-uniformed forces go awry. Norway’s communist guerrillas, supported by the Soviet Union, were a continual headache for the resistance. At first, they even advocated peace with the Germans.238 On 22 June 1941, once the Nazis’ had invaded Russia, the communists began to enter the ranks of the resistance but conducting a war of words with the SIVORG in their propaganda newspapers because they wanted higher-tempo guerrilla operations. They also had their own Liberation Radio operation and clandestine press, which were promoting “all out guerrilla war”—out of line with the GIE and a source of diplomatic consternation with Britain as well. Perhaps most significantly, they were conducting unsanctioned attacks that led to harsh reprisals, even robbing banks, which led the entire armed movement to be branded by sympathizers and moderates as bandits.239 Unifying the message between resistance components is perhaps one of the few negative lessons we can take from the Norwegian episode. The exploitable British sponsorship, information fratricide, and liabilities of uncontrolled armed groups did not significantly disrupt Norwegian resistance but present system behaviors which must be accounted for in the future.

239 Gjelsvik, 126.
D. SUMMARY

The sustained resistance of 1940s Norway displays many of the features we saw in Solidarity but found lacking in the Prague Spring. We learned that the capabilities necessary to build protest potential, or resistance capacity, can be produced ahead of time, though the Norwegians did not do so intentionally. Norway’s World War II resistance has provided confirming examples of the project’s findings on effective communication, apparent social cohesion, and demonstrable cognitive liberation as common capabilities of healthy resistance capacity. Norway also provides examples of liabilities with sponsorship, information fratricide, and armed banditry that can disrupt social cohesion and cognitive liberation that aide protest potential. Given that building resistance capacity can contribute to deterrence, in the conclusion, we will propose ways that the previous insights—combined with those of the Poland and Czechoslovakia cases—can be used to build an optimum resistance capability in the future.
V. CONCLUSION: REFLECTION ON PROTEST POTENTIAL AS RESISTANCE CAPACITY

The Nuclear age turned strategy into deterrence, and deterrence into an esoteric intellectual exercise.²⁴⁰

—Henry Kissinger

If war, as Schelling believes, is a bargaining contest of endurance, nerve, resolve, and tolerance for pain, then the small state planning to deter a larger neighbor must display an overwhelming capacity for each.²⁴¹ This thesis set out to contribute a small piece of theory building in asymmetric deterrence. Using the Prague Spring as a control case and Polish Solidarity as a treatment case, as close to twins as two deterrence situations can be, we examined the hypothesis that understood protest potential, standing in for resistance capacity, can deter an aggressor looking to invade a smaller state. In order to do this, the project identified capabilities that might signaled clear protest potential, pervasive communication capabilities, apparent social cohesion, and demonstrable cognitive liberation, and will suggest ways to highlight or maximize those relevant signals. What is more, this study also encountered difficulties that may be faced while building such faculties during competition short of armed conflict.²⁴²

The project focused on Central and Northern Europe because it is currently home to several countries overtly planning resistance movements against a real threat. Each has varied geographic challenges as well as societal dynamics, but their unifying feature is fear of revisionist aggression and the New Generation Warfare means of prosecuting that threat. This chapter will first address the highlights of the case studies of civil resistance, setting forth insights for future resistance planning. The section then delves into some unconsidered costs and risks of unconventional strategies that were encountered over the course of the research project. Then the chapter discusses how nonviolent protest potential

²⁴¹ Schelling, Arms and Influence, 7.
²⁴² The phrase “Competition Short of Armed Conflict” is borrowed from the U.S. Joint Staff’s Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning.
may have greater utility and signaling value than armed resistance capacity; though there is little data that enables a quantitative measure of the signaling value of overt armed versus civil resistance, we can show some contrast. Finally, this chapter recommends areas for further study that are outside the scope of this project but emerge from its findings.

A. COMPARING THE CASES

The cases studies in this project set out to analyze protest potential as a stand-in for resistance capacity, evidenced by the uprising that followed the invasion. Czechoslovakia’s Prague Spring and Poland’s Solidarity movements both led to the threat of overwhelming Soviet invasion because of their sponsor state’s fear of economic and social reform in their clients. The revolutionary agendas, which included things like labor organization, relaxation of censorship, freedom of assembly, and investigation of secret police, were seen as unacceptable deviation from orthodox communism by the Kremlin. In both cases, immediate overmatch in combat capabilities was both easy to achieve and not a significant factor in the executive decision making in the Kremlin. Combat forces and reserves were committed, then the policy makers moved on.

In Czechoslovakia, we found an aggressor that acted with no countervailing strategic dilemmas and a defender without total local or extended sponsorship. The signal that the Czechoslovakian military would remain in barracks was perhaps the final signal of weakness, but it was not the only one. Given the advantage of hindsight, we can clearly see the protest potential in the Prague Spring as proven by the uprising that followed the invasion, though such capacity was not apparent to the invader. Several structural flaws in the Prague Spring movement made it apparently unable to offer significant protest. The aggressor was not presented with a movement that possessed an effective communication apparatus, apparent social cohesion, or demonstrable cognitive liberation. The Czech government did not counter KGB-fabricated false-flag leaflets or discrediting articles against its ministers, nor did it control the ideological escalation with Moscow. Social

243 The use of “extended” sponsorship is a reference to the United States, as opposed to Czechoslovakia’s local neighbors, and a deterrence situation where “a state may attempt to deter an attack on other states such as clients or allies” from Erich Weede, “Extended Deterrence by Superpower Alliance” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 2, (June, 1983): 234, JSTOR.
cohesion was limited by ethnic and economic division. And, whether because reform fervor had faded or the Kremlin was misinformed, the populace was not apparently “liberated” enough to be perceived as a threat. Ultimately, the Czechoslovakian example provides a base case of failure from which to understand the success of the Polish deterrence.

In Poland, we found an aggressor burdened by a strategic commitment in Afghanistan, a participatory American sponsor, and a real possibility—unlike in Czechoslovakia— that the defender would commit conventional combat power. More importantly for this project, the aggressor could clearly observe protest potential, which was evidenced by an effective communication apparatus, apparent social cohesion, and demonstrable cognitive liberation. Furthermore, Solidarity mobilized a national strike at the decisive moment when Soviet forces were poised to intervene, collapsing all plans for invasion. Soviet leaders were ultimately deterred, not by military force but by the appearance of a vast resistance mobilization and the increasing specter of the costs that would be required to put it down. At this point, leadership in Moscow now clearly saw the Eastern European crises as external liabilities that could not be mitigated without threatening the stability of their own government. The key insight that applies to this project is that resistance potential, given the right recognized capabilities and aggressor context, can have identifiable significance to a potential invader.

With that insight, the study looked into occupation, specifically that of 1940s Norway. The civil resistance component of the Nordic resistance, called SIVORG, shared many features with Solidarity. This exploratory case confirmed that effective communication, apparent social cohesion, and demonstrable cognitive liberation—capabilities that, when signaled to a potential aggressor, have deterrent value—are also among the capabilities of a healthy resistance capacity. This venture also provided awareness of some liabilities of armed resistance and sponsorship that may be important to future resistance planning. The key lesson from the Norwegian case is that non-violent resistance costs were what most disrupted the invader, in that the Germans simply did not know what to do and everything they tried seemed to make things worse. The most imminent implication of the study, though, is the liability presented by the communist guerrillas in Norway. Their attacks increased reprisal and created informational fratricide,
which, applied today, reveal a disadvantage of armed resistance in that it is an attack surface for hybrid threats.

**B. UNCONVENTIONAL RISKS**

Though there are some readily apparent benefits of preparing for an armed resistance movement—before an occupation—this study encountered some limitations of the technique in contrast to the capabilities of a civil resistance, which in turn can also inoculate a society against “hybrid influence” applied in New Generation Warfare. In particular, armed resistance has little use in countering “salami slicing attacks, does not contribute to countering Gerasimov techniques, and provide a narrative seam for the attacker to exploit.

First, counter-occupation efforts have little value in countering “salami slicing,” or short invasion without full occupation. For example, the Suwalki gap, the corridor separating Russia’s Kaliningrad territory from the larger country, is the likely target of any conventional attack. Resistance fighters could perhaps, slightly, disrupt offensive operations here, around Vilnius, but the gap is so small that the distributed effects of an insurgency would be less than decisive. The lessons of Ukraine’s 2014 fight also bear this out. In a similar vein, resistance efforts from an alliance member cannot contribute to collective defense against other states so invaded. Though non-conventional forces, like

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244 According to NATO, hybrid operations are those that employ a coordinated mixture of military and non-military components to achieve political ends, this term simply characterizes those ends as influence related. Henrik Praks, *Hybrid or Not: Deterring and Defeating Russia’s Way of Warfare in the Baltics – the Case of Estonia*, (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Research Division, Rome, December 2015) 2.


guerrillas, can extract significant long-term costs, they have little value outside of the narrow scope of total occupation.248

Additionally, armed resistance forces are of little help in a Hybrid, or Non-linear, campaign. The first several phases of the Gerasimov model of offense, blending diplomatic, economic, conventional force, guerrilla movement, terrorism, and information warfare competitions, are nonlethal and feature low-intensity strategies; armed resistance offers no defense against these techniques.249 Also, countries like Norway believe that full-fledged military conflicts in the North, based on regional differences, are unlikely for the foreseeable future.250 In fact, some analysts even assert “a full scale military invasion of a NATO country is practically inconceivable.”251 These conditions all present possible futures in which a force optimized for post-occupation operations may never get to deploy for its intended purpose. Even if hostilities were to break out, the “grey zone” emergence of crisis may prevent a government from determining if the threat is an internal, societal, issue or one of external, or national security.252 In this way, activating resistance effects too early would become a physical and narrative risk.

Furthermore, going back to the communist guerrillas in Norway reveals another disadvantage of armed resistance and an attack surface for hybrid threats. These non-uniformed forebears to today’s pre-planned guerrillas provide examples of risk political disruption and informational fratricide. Like communist resistance fighters in Norway, other non-uniformed armed groups have shown a propensity to get out of control.

Government-sponsored, non-uniformed, armed groups have been a feature of politics in Nicaragua since the Eighties. The Turbas Divinas, or Divine Mobs, emerged as rightwing political dissidents in 1980 but were eventually commissioned, as early as 1986,
by the Interior Ministry’s federal police and used to enforce the regime’s will.253 Officially “volunteer police,” the groups were initially only armed with rocks.254 The latest manifestation comes armed with AK-47s, RPG-7 as well as Dragunov sniper rifles and travel in convoys of Toyota Hiluxes.255 In today’s Nicaraguan turmoil, over hundreds of people have been killed and thousands more injured as the Turbas crack down on protestors.256 In Venezuela, colectivos have arisen as a similar state liability—civilian groups that are armed and organized for tactical cooperation with the armed security forces in support of the sitting government.257 Born in the 1960s as underground left-wing dissidents, these groups built their own politically autonomous zones that were folded into the Chavez government in his 1992 coup.258

Not only can armed militia groups pose a threat to the civilian populace; they also represent a narrative seam. Some of the key border Baltic regions have significant ethnic Russian populations, who inhabit a separate information space—controlled by Moscow’s news outlets—from the rest of the country.259 For many years, the Kremlin has attempted to influence these populations, and the protest potential incumbent in sometimes disenfranchised minorities, which they seek to exploit, could produce an escalation cycle


259 Praks, Hybrid or Not: Deterring and Defeating Russia’s Way of Warfare in the Baltics – the Case of Estonia, 4–5.
that government armed, but non-uniformed, militia groups could only enflame.\textsuperscript{260} Hybrid influence efforts have generally featured attempts to portray target governments as illiberal, and abusive, non-uniformed armed groups are worth baiting or waiting for any group of two or more militia members to do violence to Russian speakers to create a propaganda event.

Civil resistance, though, is much less risky and can contribute to countering the hybrid threat. A highly cohesive civil society and diverse press landscape in pre-war Norway proved to be the strength of the civil resistance’s resilient ability to organize. It turns out that inclusive governance and policy that strengthens internal social cohesion is an important element in resisting hybrid threats.\textsuperscript{261}

C. PILLARS OF AN ALTERNATIVE TECHNIQUE

Civil resistance, evidenced by demonstrations of effective communication, apparent social cohesion, and demonstrable cognitive liberation like those this project has examined, can be more public than any possible display of overt armed resistance. Besides: contemporary threats appear unimpressed with armed guerrillas. Russian press coverage of Baltic armed resistance preparations for invasion is very nearly laughing at them—describing “bizarre” rantings of unit leaders, “hysterical” paranoia, and focusing on “embarrassing” exercises as well as covering the apathy of local residents.\textsuperscript{262} Accordingly, these preparations seem not to have had any effect: the ground forces in Northwest Russia are still assessed as having relatively modest presence, with no major numerical changes since Russia’s 2014 Ukraine campaign.\textsuperscript{263} The causality of any change to the ratio of forces deployed to border areas, to theoretically bolster the regional army’s capacity to deal


\textsuperscript{261} Praks, \textit{Hybrid or Not: Deterring and Defeating Russia’s Way of Warfare in the Baltics – the Case of Estonia}, 8.


with irregular defense forces, is nearly unknowable. What little evidence we do have, including changes to military spending, does not indicate a response to bolstered Baltic resistance, as Russian military spending has decreased, and outlays focus more on advanced conventional weapons as threatened nations were announcing these plans. In short, the current regional efforts to build resistance capability do not seem to have elicited any specific response from the hypothetical aggressor.

What the Kremlin is not laughing at is the idea of Color Revolutions, which it understands as a source of protest potential, and thus fears them as an infection risk for their illiberal system. From Liddell Hart, we know that civil resistance in Norway proved an intractable operational problem for the Nazis. In Lithuania, it was non-violent resistance, not the storied Forest Brothers guerrillas, who forced the Soviet withdrawal. The fear of sponsored popular dissent still pervades Russian speech and writings on National Security from Vladimir Putin to Valerie Gerasimov. In fact, just the idea of externally supporting internal dissent, like the Color Revolutions, has been identified as possibly escalatory in the eyes of the Kremlin. However, there were discussions, at the highest levels of the Kremlin, on whether to fully occupy Ukraine in 2014. If eventual declassified documents reveal this decision to have been an attempt to avoid prolonged struggle with Ukrainian guerrilla or Euromaidan protestors, future analysts could begin to quantify the deterrent effect of either type of resistance.

Given that hybrid threats attack the societal integration and trust in the press, government activities may be able to strengthen them to the point that civic engagement and healthy journalism serve as a check on “gray zone” incursion. The integration of

Norwegian civil society and the interconnectedness of Poland’s Solidarity were key, observable, features of their resistance potential. Anticipating Russian threats, we see that countries with weakly developed civil societies appear to be most vulnerable to hybrid influence. Participation in a diversity of social groups is something that a government can promote and it may be an activity that both increases the protest potential of a population as well as making that populace less susceptible to gray zone techniques.

Also, the strength of the Norwegian underground press and Solidarity’s sponsored printing capacity were important, and very apparent, qualities of their resistance potential. Those printing presses that illegally circulated news of King Haakon’s denial of Nazi authority were also creating the “cognitive liberation” that McAdam finds as crucial to any social movement. Today, state focus on maintaining and strengthening independent journalistic networks is seen as a technique for disrupting hybrid influence. Incentivizing a strong press corps another possible measure that a government can stimulate and it could be a pursuit that, also, simultaneously increases a society’s protest capability as well as inoculating the whole against threat disinformation.

Resistance capacity, evaluated here as protest potential, may not be recognized by an aggressor. Aggressor context, whether or not it has strategic flexibility, the proximity of some sort of sponsor, and the availability of conventional military power all factor greatly into the deterrence outcome. However, given the right recognized capabilities, like effective communication, apparent social cohesion, and demonstrable cognitive liberation, protest potential can have identifiable significance to a potential invader. Nonviolent protest potential has the added benefit of possibly inoculating a society against “hybrid influence” applied in New Generation Warfare.

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269 Conley, Mina, Stefanov, and Vladimirov, The Kremlin Playbook Understanding Russian Influence in Central and Eastern Europe, xv.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Two questions for follow-on work have become apparent during the course of this research: What deterrence capacity can multidimensional network engagement produce? And how can the capabilities of Total Defense, define, be combined with the signaling capacity of civil resistance to maximize deterrence?

Multidimensional signaling is, as Schelling would put it, “fashioning a campaign of inducements and pressures” that can potentially alter the behavior of state actors without conflict.270 Finnish Strategist Jan Hanka found that “deterrence has many other aspects than that of strictly military measures and means” and that small powers must also deftly wield the other the elements of their national power to deter larger attackers.271 Multidimensional diplomacy increases interaction opportunities that shape perceptions.272 Kinne found a pacifying function in mutual IGO membership where credible signaling could take place.273 Furthermore, Papayoanou found that stable deterrence is most likely in conditions where “extensive economic ties among status quo powers” in parallel to “few or no such links between them and perceived threatening powers.”274

We saw how Czechoslovakia failed to prevent a coalition from forming around it, providing a welcoming path to Soviet military intervention, while, in the second case, economic conditions restrained similar action against Poland. Asymmetric deterrence requires a multidimensional effort to signal costs to an opponent, for which preplanned armed resistance does not possess clear utility but close integration of other avenues could perhaps lower tension. The capacity for finding leverage in international organizations, whether by hosting headquarters and events or putting citizens into key leadership positions, provides “diplomatic space, information networks, and a place to coordinate

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271 Murumets et al., Thresholds Concept for and by Smaller states, Final Report, 35.
272 Trager, “Multidimensional Diplomacy,” 492.
collective action.” Leadership in international organizations also allows small states to shape agendas, challenge existing norms, and even change international behaviors and outcomes. More systematic study is required of how non-military network engagement, like quiet agreements of international cooperation against revisionist policy, affects military force.

Total Defense, a multifunction alternative to armed resistance, has emerged in many Northern European countries. Sweden and Finland, and Norway are all re-invigorating their total defense arrangements, which entail plans for mobilizing the maximum civilian support to territorial defense. These concepts date either to the end of WWII or the end of the Soviet occupations but have been updated to include contingency contracting, mobilizable uniformed militia, disaster preparedness, and community engagement. These concepts feature ways to ensure the maximum utilization of a nation's resources in war or crisis. Modern Total Defense efforts are developing civil defense capacity, that is private companies’ and local communities’ total mobilization capacity puts all of society “in the direction of solving, in the worst case, a military attack” according to Sweden’s Defence Commission secretariat chief.

Crucially, forces and groups organized under Total Defense can assist with floods, forest fires, and terrorist attacks but non-uniformed resistance may not. Funds spent on Total Defense go to the statutory requisition of functions like emergency services, the

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278 Aaron Mehta, “Fortress Sweden: Inside the plan to mobilize Swedish society against Russia.”
health-care system, emergency power solutions, food and water supplies, cyber resilience and psychological defense which are all less a liability than non-uniformed combatants.280

In Norway, the Army, specifically the Home Guard, patrolled the streets after the devastating 22 July 2011 murders.281 Capabilities acquired in a Total Defense framework are sustainable, preventing duplication of equipment investments with other institutions while making existing assets all available for employment in support of conventional alerts.282 Indeed, Ukraine’s example has shown that paramilitaries can, instead of fighting behind enemy lines, protect public and constitutional order.283 More study is required to assess how these civil mobilization efforts can generate a similar cognitive liberation, communicative capability, and social cohesion as civil resistance can.

E. FINAL THOUGHTS

The campaign to build a credible defense posture takes decades, and most nations, excepting the big spenders, connect their defense policy to specific scenarios and expected national roles within those possible futures, since few governments are willing to pay for high-end multi-role platforms that may or may not be adaptable to a changing world.284 However, in the case of resistance as deterrence, any decision to rely heavily on armed resistance equates to a monolithic, single-role platform—the deterrent value of which there is little available evidence to support. In today’s ambiguous and complex environment, the need to communicate clear but flexible capability is paramount. To succeed in deterring a would-be attacker, the defender must communicate “clear and believable threats” to the

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281 This is the incident referred to in the Guardian’s Post of the events of that day (https://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2011/jul/23/norway-attacks-live-coverage); the author learned that the most immediately available, and deployed, army units were of the Heimevernet, or Home Guard, during research in Norway.

282 Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defense Policy, Unified Effort, 64, 82.

283 Praks, Hybrid or Not: Deterring and Defeating Russia’s Way of Warfare in the Baltics – the Case of Estonia, 9.

284 Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defense Policy, Unified Effort, 16; Murumets et al., Thresholds Concept for and by Smaller states, Final Report, 3.
aggressor state.\textsuperscript{285} This thesis has found that a sponsored civil resistance capacity, armed with effective communication, apparent social cohesion, and demonstrable cognitive liberation, can contribute to such communication.

Though the concept of the guerrilla warfare has some power as an idea of national struggle and would certainly be operationally disruptive for an invader, it has limitations. The method for bringing the most people to bear on an occupier, and the type of unconventional cost most distinctly recognized by aggressors, is non-violent resistance. Norway showed how civil resistance could be a serious problem for invaders. Modern research by Chenoweth and Stephan backs this idea, finding that nonviolent protest is a more effective political tool than armed insurrection. Most notably, though neither form of resistance to occupation does much to mitigate “grey zone” tactics, the tasks required to build civil resistance may double as antibodies to hybrid warfare.

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