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THESIS

**INTRASTATE CONFLICT RECURRENCE: LESSONS
FOR COLOMBIA**

by

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December 2018

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INTRASTATE CONFLICT RECURRENCE: LESSONS FOR COLOMBIA

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ABSTRACT

What are the conditions and factors affecting intrastate conflict recurrence? This thesis tests the effect of the type of conflict outcome, the use of peacekeeping forces, and the presence of lootable resources on the recurrence of intrastate conflict.

Using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) datasets, this thesis performs a linear regression analysis for internal conflicts from 1946 to 2014. Results confirm that the risk of conflict recurrence reduces over time. Peace agreements show a lower likelihood of conflict recurrence than military victories.

The thesis finds ambiguous results for lootable and non-lootable resources. Lootable diamonds, opium/poppy, and petroleum correlate with more conflict recurrence, whereas non-lootable diamonds correlates with less recurrence. Coca, cannabis, and opium/poppy production yielded ambiguous results. The presence of peacekeeping forces does not demonstrate a statistically significant effect on conflict recurrence.

Analyzing the conflict in Colombia, this work finds that illicit drugs and onshore oil production have led to conflict recurrence. The study also shows that peace agreements have helped Colombia avoid conflict recurrence. Overall, the study shows some dynamics of conflict recurrence and provides new venues for future research.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------|--|
| AIC | Akaike Information Criterion |
| ANAPO | National Popular Alliance |
| AUC | United Self-defenses of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) |
| BACRIM | Criminal gangs (Bandas criminales) |
| COIN | Counterinsurgency |
| ELN | National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) |
| EPL | Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación) |
| FARC | Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) |
| M-19 | 19 th of April Movement (Movimiento 19 de Abril) |
| MAS | Death to Kidnappers (Muerte a Secuestradores) |
| MOEC | Peasant Student Workers' Movement (Movimiento Obrero Estudiantil y Campesino) |
| RUF | Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone |
| UCDP | Uppsala Conflict Data Program |
| UP | Patriotic Union Party (Unión Patriótica) |

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I. INTRODUCTION

Intrastate conflicts are the most frequent and long-lasting form of war in the world. In the last ten years, many regions have had countries with some kind of intrastate armed conflict occurring. Remarkably, the most critical characteristic of these conflicts is their tendency to recur. Governments have tried to end internal armed conflicts, but the risk of resurgence¹ is present in every confrontation. In case after case, after peace negotiations and military victories, the evidence indicates that the odds are against a lasting peace.² Why do many peace treaties and military victories not last? This thesis seeks to identify the factors influencing intrastate conflict recurrence. Using a statistical analysis approach, this thesis reviews whether the type of conflict outcome (military victory and negotiated settlement), the use of peacekeeping forces, and the presence of lootable resources influence the likelihood of conflict resurgence. The thesis tests the effect of different types of lootable resources to verify their interaction with the types of conflict outcome. The thesis demonstrates that different types of conflict outcomes lead to different levels of recurrence risk. Additionally, the thesis results do not show a correlation in terms of the effect of peacekeeping forces in reducing conflict recurrence. It also shows that the effect of lootable resources is not conclusive, especially regarding illegal drug production.

The thesis ultimately applies the findings from this research to the Colombian internal conflict case to analyze the country's risk of recurrence as an example to provide policy recommendations for those countries that are in the process of establishing a lasting peace.

A. BACKGROUND

Intrastate conflict, with its different forms (e.g., insurgencies, civil wars, revolutions, and guerrilla campaigns), is the most frequent form of conflict in the world. From 1945 to 1999, there were 127 intrastate conflicts in the world, five times more than the 25 interstate

¹ This study uses the words “resurgence,” “resume,” and “relapse” as synonym of “recurrence.”

² Sebastian Merz, “Less Conflict, More Peace? Understanding Trends in Conflict Persistence,” *Conflict, Security & Development* 12, no. 3 (2012): 210, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2012.703532>. The author states that the rate of conflict recurrence is in “60 percent in the new millennium.”

conflicts that occurred in the same period.³ Intrastate conflicts also caused nearly five times more deaths than interstate wars.⁴

Several scholars report that intrastate conflicts tend to occur in the same countries, and that once a civil war has occurred in a country, that country is at high risk to have another episode of civil war. The 127 civil wars in the period 1945-1999 took place in 73 states. These data indicate that several states had more than one episode of civil war during that period.⁵ According to the World Development Report 2011, “of the 103 countries that experienced some form of civil war between 1945-2009,” 59 recurred.⁶ This report shows that the incidence of intrastate conflict recurrence is growing and that, during the 2000s, 90 percent of the intrastate conflicts occurred in a country with a previous conflict.⁷ As a possible explanation, another study highlights how conflicts and conflict episodes that started from 1992 to 2012 have been short⁸ but presents a higher tendency to recur because they ended more frequently with a less stable negotiated settlement.⁹ Thus, it is necessary to understand why intrastate conflicts recur.

Scholars have used different approaches to investigate the reasons why intrastate conflicts recur. Some studies are focused on differentiating between the types of outcome.¹⁰ Other studies focus on the participation of international peacekeeping forces as guarantors or

³ James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055403000534>.

⁴ Michael Quinn, David Mason, and Mehmet Gurses, “Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,” *International Interactions* 33, no. 2 (2007): 168, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620701277673>.

⁵ Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 75.

⁶ Barbara F. Walter, “Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace,” Background paper, *World Development Report 2011* (Washington, DC: World Bank, September 13, 2010), 1, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/9069/WDR2011_0008.pdf?sequence=1.

⁷ Walter, 2.

⁸ Merz, “Less Conflict, More Peace? Understanding Trends in Conflict Persistence,” 220.

⁹ Merz, 212.

¹⁰ Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, “Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,” 189.

enforcers of settlements.¹¹ A third approach scholars have used to assess conflict recurrence is the existence of natural resources available to fuel the conflict.¹²

Understanding this phenomenon is especially crucial for countries that are in the midst of ending an intrastate conflict and are heavily invested in ensuring that the conflict does not recur. This thesis uses the 50-year-long Colombian internal conflict to show the factors and conditions affecting conflict recurrence present in this country, and to provide policy recommendations that could apply to produce a lasting peace.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The primary question this thesis seeks to answer is what are the conditions and factors affecting conflict recurrence and lasting peace in intrastate confrontations? This question also leads to asking if there is a relationship between the conflict outcome and its recurrence. From that point, the other associated inquiries are about the effect of lootable resources, and the effect of peacekeeping forces in negotiated settlements. Once these questions are answered, the final query is how can countries like Colombia avoid the resurgence of a new generation of violent armed groups and create a lasting peace?

To answer these questions, this research uses a statistical analysis approach conducting a logistic regression. It tests the relationship between conflict recurrence and the types of conflict termination. The research tests the differences between military victory and peace agreement, and their interaction with the existence of peacekeeping forces. It also tests the effect of the existence and access to lootable resources for the actors in the conflict.

C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

Different scholars use different criteria to define when a conflict ends and whether it ended in a military victory or negotiated settlement.¹³ Regarding the criteria selection,

¹¹ Paul Collier, Anke Hoefler, and Måns Söderbom, "Post-Conflict Risks," *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 4 (2008): 461, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343308091356>.

¹² Vita Roy, "Natural Resource Production and the Risk of Conflict Recurrence," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 41, no. 1 (2018): 1, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1266896>.

¹³ Virginia Page Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War," *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 2 (2004): 277, footnote 23, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00301.x>.

the conflict outcome coding will vary among different datasets. For example, some internal conflicts that concluded with military victories are followed by a negotiation, where the main actors agreed in the terms to allow the transition to civil life for the defeated combatants. In these cases, the criteria selected for coding the conflict termination can create two different outcomes with different termination dates. Some datasets can code the termination as a military victory, whereas others can code it as a peace agreement. Similarly, the threshold selected to code the conflict onset and outcome can create differences in the dates and the types of outcome. Nicholas Sambanis mentions the complexity of coding civil war and, in the supplement of his work “What is Civil War,” he provides a comparative analysis of the differences in coding and the possible problems that can arise.¹⁴ In order to capture with higher precision the start and end of most internal conflicts, and eliminate the possible false outcomes that do not reach a higher threshold, the thesis will employ the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) datasets.¹⁵

This thesis examines only the internal armed conflicts in the period 1946-2014 regardless of the conflict’s political qualifications or the political aims of the parties involved. The research is conducted primarily at the country level. In order to be included in this study, the internal conflict has to match the threshold of 25 conflict-related deaths per year, as coded by the UCDP,¹⁶ which is the source for the conflict data set. For this reason, no distinction is made between the different types of conflicts, whether they were civil war, intrastate armed conflict, or other types of rebellion. This thesis does not try to qualify if the rebel side fulfills the category of organized armed group in the sense of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

¹⁴ Nicholas Sambanis, “What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 6 (2004): Supplement.

¹⁵ Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset,” *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 5 (2002): 619, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343302039005007>.

¹⁶ Gleditsch et al., 619. The authors define “armed conflict as a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.”

Since the thesis reviews the effect of third-party intervention by enforcers or peacekeeping forces, which incorporate the use of armed forces from different states, the thesis considers the cases where third-party states intervene in the studied conflict to facilitate negotiated settlements. The thesis does not cover those conflicts aimed at decolonization, which are in a certain way different from the current intrastate conflicts and are considered interstate conflict for the purpose of this study. Additionally, the thesis does not research other factors that can influence conflict recurrence, such as external support to the main actors of the conflict, funding from the diaspora, the reasons for spoilers and splinters, or the provisions in peace agreements, among others.

D. THESIS OUTLINE

This thesis is divided into five chapters, with Chapter I as the introduction to the study. Chapter II describes the research that scholars use to analyze the existence of conflict recurrence to identify the main factors that explain this phenomenon, and proposes six hypotheses. Chapter III covers the research methods and statistical analysis results to examine the six proposed hypotheses. Chapter IV addresses the Colombian conflict as a case study for the present research. Finally, Chapter V provides the analysis of the results and recommendations for policy making to reduce the risk of conflict recurrence in general, and in the Colombian case in particular.

E. TRANSLATIONS

Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Spanish and French are by the author.

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II. ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS STUDIES

In order to provide a framework for theory review, this chapter covers three identified currents of research about conflict recurrence, which are important for the purpose of this thesis. The first two currents are based on two conflict outcomes - military victory and negotiated settlement. The first, military victory, compares government victory and rebel victory. The second, negotiated settlement, compares the effect of a third-party guarantor of the settlement versus agreements that do not include provisions for an external guarantor. The third current to review in this chapter is the existence of natural resources in the territory of the country, and whether they are lootable or non-lootable, easy to obstruct, or illegally produced. This approach is intended to facilitate the review of factors that affect the risk of conflict recurrence. This chapter ends by introducing six hypotheses identified to frame the statistical analysis conducted in Chapter III.

A. STUDIES ON MILITARY VICTORY OUTCOMES

When analyzing conflict recurrence, several scholars have found that some types of conflict outcomes have a different probability of recurrence. Typically, intrastate conflict outcomes are coded as military victories or negotiated settlements.¹⁷ When analyzing these two types of outcomes, a study conducted using a data set with 46 civil wars in the period 1945-1993 found that 50 percent of the negotiated settlements had at least a second conflict onset, compared with a 15 percent chance of conflict recurrence for the conflicts that ended with military victory.¹⁸ The propensity for military victories to have a lower tendency of conflict recurrence was confirmed also in cases after the end of the Cold War.¹⁹ The reason for this lower conflict resurgence rate has been explained thusly: military victories clearly identify a stronger side, whereas negotiated settlements

¹⁷ Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," ed. Roy Licklider, *American Political Science Review* 89 (1995): 684.

¹⁸ Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," 685.

¹⁹ Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War," 273.

create conditions of “dual sovereignty”²⁰ associated with information problems about each side’s real relative capacity.²¹

Military victory, either by the government or rebels, indicates to the opposing side that the winning side was better able to use its resources to control the population and the contested space, thus increasing both sides’ information about their relative capacity and reducing the margin for dual sovereignty. Something interesting about military victories in these studies is that there is a different risk of recurrence between government and rebel victories. Some studies show that among the military victories, the conflicts that ended with a rebel victory have a lower incidence of conflict recurrence, compared to conflicts that ended with a government victory.²² Besides these studies’ results, in another study using the UCDP data sets, Joakim Kreutz suggests that a government victory has a lower incidence of recurrence than a rebel victory, and asserts that the result was statistically significant only for government victories.²³ Kreutz’s results gives space to think that other factors can be influencing the tendency for conflict recurrence in these outcomes, which this thesis will explore.

Among the cases where a government victory produced a lasting peace is the Bolivian conflict with the National Liberation Army (ELN), which ended in 1967 with the capture and death of Ernesto “Che” Guevara at the hands of the Bolivian Army.²⁴ Among the cases in which the rebels won and secured a lasting peace are the Costa Rican

²⁰ Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, “Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,” 173. The authors explain “a condition of dual sovereignty exists when an opposition group has the organizational capacity and popular support to initiate and sustain an armed challenge” [and as in settlement] both fighting parties “retain their organizational autonomy,” the dual sovereignty persists making possible a conflict renewal. Military victory reduces this condition.

²¹ Barbara F. Walter, “Bargaining Failures and Civil War,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 12, no. 1 (2009): 257, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.101405.135301>. According to Walter, both fighting actors have different, and probably erroneous, information about their relative strength. This information problem leads them to incorrectly over estimate their probability of victory.

²² Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, “Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,” 186.

²³ Joakim Kreutz, “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset,” *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 2 (2010): 247, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343309353108>.

²⁴ Philip E. Wise, “Pragmatic Idealism: Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara’s Strategic Choice for Bolivia” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), 1, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/55558>.

civil war of 1948, in which the government of President Teodoro Picado was defeated after he refused to recognize the election of opposition candidate Otilio Ulate;²⁵ and the Cuban revolution led by Fidel Castro that defeated the Batista dictatorship in December 1958.²⁶

B. STUDIES ON PEACE AGREEMENTS AND PEACEKEEPING FORCES

When either government or rebel forces are not able to militarily defeat the opposing side, the condition of stalemate drives to negotiation as the way to stop the fighting. Scholars have studied the various types of negotiated settlements in order to identify why some succeed and others do not. As mentioned before, “military victories do not last as long as negotiated settlements.”²⁷ Some scholars have argued the continuation of dual sovereignty conditions among the reasons for peace agreements’ higher frequency failure.²⁸ When analyzing the conditions that make settlement successful, Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie showed the presence of power sharing and third-party enforcers contributes to “enduring peace among former adversaries.”²⁹ In that study, Hartzell and Hoddie concluded that with a higher number of power-sharing arrangements (political, territorial, military, and economic), the risk of a return to civil war reduces by 53 percent for each additional category of power sharing. They further conclude that the presence of an external enforcer will “reduce the risk of settlement failure by 83 percent.”³⁰ These findings suggest that the use of a third-party enforcer, such as

²⁵ Fernando Sánchez, “Democracy Alter War: Causes and Consequences of the 1948 Civil War in Costa Rica,” 2004, 5, Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Joint Sessions of Workshops, Uppsala University (13-18 April 2004), <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/9562ceb2-3cd4-4c13-9981-c562fe96ebfe.pdf>.

²⁶ Christopher Paul, *Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies*, RR-291/1-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND2013), 27, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR291z1.html.

²⁷ Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993,” 685.

²⁸ Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, “Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,” 173.

²⁹ Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, “Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management,” *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 2 (2003): 318, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5907.00022>.

³⁰ Hartzell and Hoddie, 327.

peacekeeping forces, are an effective way to reduce the dual sovereignty effect and to increase the government's and rebels' commitment to respect the settlement.

The use of third-party enforcers is especially useful on protracted conflicts where neither the government nor rebels have been able to impose their will over the other side, resulting in a type of stalemate. In these cases, the combination of a third-party broker for the negotiation and peacekeeping forces to reinforce the agreement has a higher success probability.³¹ A research conducted by Quinn, Mason, and Gurses found that for the conflicts they studied, "the longer the peace can be sustained, the less likely it is to break down." They suggest that peacekeepers can buy the time needed to reduce the likelihood of a conflict relapse.³² This finding about the effect of time in the probability of recurrence is interesting because, although the authors did not present the results disaggregated by each type of outcome, it can provide elements of analysis for policy making.

Several internal conflicts that concluded with military victories still led to a negotiation where the conflicting parties agreed in the terms to end the fight or to make the transition to civil life for the losing-side combatants. This is important because different scholars use different criteria to define when a conflict ended in military victory or negotiated settlement.³³

Among the cases where a peace agreement succeeded in bringing an end to internal conflict is the Nicaraguan conflict with the Contras (1981-1990).³⁴ Following the Sandinistas' victory that defeated the Nicaraguan dictator Somoza in 1979,³⁵ a conflict recurrence started in 1981 between the Sandinista government and the Contras. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency backed the Contras with training, weapons, and money, and

³¹ Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, "Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence," 189.

³² Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, 189.

³³ Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War," 277.

³⁴ The Nicaragua-Contras is one of the cases where different scholars differ in the outcome classification. Hartzel and Collier, Licklider, and Walter code it as negotiated settlement, whereas the UCDP code it as a ceasefire and Paul et al. code it as a rebel victory.

³⁵ Paul, *Paths to Victory : Lessons from Modern Insurgencies*, 49.

in 1989, after several years of negotiation, the conflict concluded with a peace settlement, which also included the participation of United Nations peacekeeping forces.³⁶

The Sierra Leone conflict with the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone (RUF) is an example of a conflict where several rebel factions joined to take control of the nation, and after a multilateral UN military intervention, a peace agreement was signed in 2001 after 10 years of fighting, providing peace in this still-fragile nation.³⁷ This conflict was characterized by high levels of poverty and the presence of lootable diamonds, which leads to the third type of case this thesis addresses: the lootable resources dimension of conflict recurrence.

C. STUDIES ON THE EFFECT OF LOOTABLE RESOURCES

Several studies have mentioned the relationship between armed conflict and natural resources.³⁸ Collier and Hoeffler relate the availability of finance to the feasibility of rebellion and interpret the opportunity for extortion of commodities as a finance source.³⁹ That condition seems to induce shorter peace periods after a conflict ends by reducing the duration of peace years to almost half in conflicts related to natural resources compared to non-natural resources-related conflicts.⁴⁰ In fact, Rustad and Binningsbø argue that “peace after natural resource conflicts fails faster than after other conflicts.”⁴¹

Another resources-related factor increasing the risk of conflict recurrence during and after a military victory or a negotiated settlement is the existence of an illegal trade

³⁶ “ONUCA - Central America,” United Nations Peacekeeping, 2003, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/onuca.htm>.

³⁷ “UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone - Background,” United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping, 2009, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unamsil/background.html>.

³⁸ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (2004): 565, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpf064>.

³⁹ Collier and Hoeffler, 588.

⁴⁰ Siri Aas Rustad and Helga Malmin Binningsbø, “A Price Worth Fighting for? Natural Resources and Conflict Recurrence,” *Journal of Peace Research* 49, no. 4 (2012): 540, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312444942>.

⁴¹ Rustad and Binningsbø, 543.

funding the insurgency effort. War is costly, and the possibility of accessing resources for maintaining the military effort is a point that governments and insurgencies have to consider when making their decision to return to fighting or to keep the status quo of the outcome. Here, the effect of fighting-funding sources depends on the ability of the fighting actors to access them while the struggle is still ongoing. In the same way that international funding cuts affect the actors' decision to continue fighting or settle with no conflict recurrence,⁴² the access to other types of resources⁴³ tends to fuel conflict relapse.

When rebel groups have access to illegal sources of money, they find it easier to finance their fight. These additional funds reduce the relative power's difference with the government, increasing the conflict duration. Fearon affirms that when rebel groups use contraband (like cocaine, opium, or diamonds) to finance themselves, the estimated duration of a civil war rose from a mean of 8.8 years to 48.2 years in the cases he studied.⁴⁴ Once rebels construct an illicit-trading network⁴⁵ that provides constant money flow from contraband, this network creates additional incentives to protect that source of money, thus increasing the conflict length and challenging the government to retain its freedom of action.⁴⁶ This contraband network becomes an objective itself for some factions in the rebel group, and that objective remains after the conflict settlement, which increases the risk of conflict recurrence. In this sense, Wennmann argues that "parallel [illegal] economies contribute to the undermining of PCPB [post-conflict

⁴² Achim Wennmann, "Getting Armed Groups to the Table: Peace Processes, the Political Economy of Conflict and the Mediated State," *Third World Quarterly* 30, no. 6 (2009): 1130, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590903037416>.

⁴³ Walter, "Bargaining Failures and Civil War," 248.

⁴⁴ James D Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 284, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343304043770>. The author used a dataset including 128 cases of civil wars occurring between 1945 and 1999.

⁴⁵ Roy, "Natural Resource Production and the Risk of Conflict Recurrence," 18.

⁴⁶ U.S. National Defense University, *Convergence : Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization* (Washington, DC: Published for the Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies by National Defense University Press; sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013), 176.

peacebuilding] by diverting resources away from reconstruction and state-building, and by empowering actors with little interest in peace.”⁴⁷

On the other hand, the government’s access to resources should increase its governing and control capacity, and consequently, should increase its probability of defeating a rebel group and have a more stable victory.⁴⁸ But the existence of resources accessible to both government and rebel parties seems to favor the rebel side. This is explained by Roy, according to the way the resources (legal or illegal) are extracted and transported.⁴⁹ In general, lootable resources like gold and secondary diamonds are easy to extract and do not require a big investment and infrastructure for their exploitation, allowing the rebel side to obtain funds from the extraction or by controlling the means of extraction. Non-lootable resources, like primary diamonds and oil, require big investments and infrastructure that only a government or a big company can provide. This leads to the other characteristic of the resources: how easily their transportation can be obstructed. The way the resource is transported from the extraction zone to the exporting ports or the point of transformation determines if the rebels are able to obstruct it. This means that even some non-lootable resources, such as onshore oil transported by pipeline, can be obstructed if their transportation uses means or routes where the rebels exert some level of control or presence.⁵⁰ Under this condition, easy-to-obstruct resources should have the same effect as lootable resources, which increase the rebel side’s access to funding and the risk of conflict recurrence.

Among the cases where resources-related conflicts had a successful outcome is Sierra Leone. In this conflict, the control of the diamond fields was “the primary motivation for the insurgents.”⁵¹ As mentioned before, this country had a successful peace agreement with a military intervention that allowed the country to remain free of

⁴⁷ Achim Wennmann, “Resourcing the Recurrence of Intrastate Conflict: Parallel Economies and Their Implications for Peacebuilding,” *Security Dialogue* 36, no. 4 (2005): 479, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010605060450>.

⁴⁸ Roy, “Natural Resource Production and the Risk of Conflict Recurrence,” 3.

⁴⁹ Roy, 5.

⁵⁰ Roy, 3-4.

⁵¹ Paul, *Paths to Victory : Lessons from Modern Insurgencies*, 58-59.

internal conflict. The Peruvian Shining Path conflict (1980-1992) is another case of a relatively successful outcome in a country with oil and coca production. In this conflict, the government confronted the Shining Path Maoist guerrillas, which since 1983 initiated its participation in narcotics trafficking.⁵² After capturing Shining Path leader, Abimael Guzmán,⁵³ the Peruvian government was able to target and reduce the insurgent organization to a very low level of activity. Even today, remnants of Shining Path have continued their activity in isolated regions of the country, conducting guerrilla warfare in small scale.

D. DISCUSSION

This review shows how separate scholars have varying explanations for intrastate conflict recurrence. Their analyses focus on two types of conflict settlement—peace agreement or military victory—to identify the relationship between conflict termination type and conflict recurrence. In general, these studies agree that peace agreements are more likely to have conflict recurrence than military victory. Among military victories, there is no consensus whether government or rebel victory has a higher risk of recurrence. Among peace agreements, there is some accord that the use of a third-party enforcer or peacekeeping forces has the lowest probability of conflict recurrence.

Another factor risking the peace is actors' access to natural resources to fund conflict relapse. The use of illegal contraband and the exploitation of lootable and obstructable resources by remnants of the rebel group create incentives to continue to control specific regions, and ensure that the resource flow keeps an armed group supplied, which increases its will and capacity to resume the fight.

One common factor reducing the risk of conflict recurrence in both military victory and negotiated settlement is the effect of time. The longer the peace lasts, the lower the risk of recurrence. This condition seems to explain better the reason why

⁵² Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, *Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism*, The Washington Papers, 144 (New York: Praeger, 1990), 123.

⁵³ Paul, *Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies*, 52.

negotiated settlements experience a reduced risk of recurrence when a third-party enforcer is present.

In order to test the relevance of these factors to internal conflict recurrence, this research uses a statistical analysis approach to explore the relationship between conflict recurrence and the types of conflict termination, and its interaction with the existence of peacekeeping forces and lootable resources. The analysis tests the following six hypotheses.

The first hypothesis is related to conflict outcomes. The hypothesis checks the incidence of conflict recurrence for military victory for both government and rebel victory and peace agreement outcomes.⁵⁴ Consequently, the first hypothesis tests the following:

H1: The type of conflict outcome affects its recurrence risk.

Among the tools the international community uses to address intrastate conflicts is the use of peacekeeping forces. Several studies show a positive effect of peacekeeping forces in the reduction of conflict recurrence risk, whereas other studies criticize their effectiveness. Consequently, this study tests the following hypothesis:

H2: The participation of peacekeeping forces reduces the risk of conflict recurrence.

Similarly, the duration of the peace is also related to the probability of conflict recurrence. In general, longer peace years generate a lower risk of conflict recurrence. The third hypothesis tests the effect on conflict recurrence of the peace duration in the years after a conflict resolution:

H3: The longer the duration of peace, the lower the probability of conflict recurrence.

Since *H1* tests the conflict recurrence risk by conflict outcome and *H3* tests it by the effect of peace over time, it is reasonable to evaluate how the interaction between the

⁵⁴ Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, "Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence," 188.

outcome type and the duration of the peace years that outcome produced affect the probability of conflict recurrence; hence, the fourth hypothesis to test is:

H4: The probability of conflict recurrence varies over time depending on the type of previous conflict outcome.

As mentioned before, an important number of studies talk about the effect of natural resources on conflict recurrence. The literature on this topic shows that illegal economies, easy-to-obstruct resources, and easy-to-extract resources tend to increase the probability of conflict recurrence by providing funds to the rebels to fuel the conflict, whereas difficult-to-extract resources tend to provide more resources to governments interested in fighting the internal threat and creating better conditions for their citizens to reduce the population's grievances. For the purpose of this thesis, illegal, easy-to-obstruct, and easily extractive resources are considered *lootable resources*, and difficult-to-extract resources are considered *non-lootable resources*. Based on those findings, two more hypotheses are tested in this study:

H5: Lootable resources increase the probability of conflict recurrence.

H6: Non-lootable resources reduce the probability of conflict recurrence.

III. DATA ANALYSIS OF INTRASTATE CONFLICT RECURRENCE

A. DATA SOURCES AND METHODS

The universe of internal conflicts for this study is based on the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset version 2-2015.⁵⁵ The technique to determine the existence of an internal conflict is consequently based on the UCDP 25-deaths-per-year threshold. This dataset provides the outcome information used in the present study, including outcome type and dates, among others. The UCDP Monadic Conflict Onset and Incidence Dataset⁵⁶ provides the information on conflict incidence and onset updated by Marie Allansson, Erik Melander, and Lotta Themnér.⁵⁷ The information for peacekeeping operations comes from the Virginia Fortna Peacekeeping and the Peacekept dataset, using the time-constant dummy variable for peacekeeping. This dataset has data on peacekeeping in civil wars from 1989 to 2004.⁵⁸ The information for the lootable resources comes from three different sources. The lootable and non-lootable diamond production information source is the DIADATA, which includes the dummy variable for non-lootable (primary) and lootable (secondary) diamonds used in this work.⁵⁹ For onshore and offshore oil production, the source is PETRODATA, which has the variables used in this work for onshore and offshore oil production.⁶⁰ For the illegal opium poppy,

⁵⁵ Kreutz, “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset.”

⁵⁶ Therése Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946-2014,” *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no. 4 (2015): 536-50, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343315595927>. Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946-2013,” *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 4 (July 1, 2014): 541-54, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314542076>.

⁵⁷ Marie Allansson, Erik Melander, and Lotta Themnér, “Organized Violence, 1989-2016,” *Journal of Peace Research* 54, no. 4 (2017): 574-87, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317718773>.

⁵⁸ Virginia Page. Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). The data was obtained from the University of Columbia web page, accessed the September 15, 2018, <http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/research.htm>

⁵⁹ Elisabeth Gilmore et al., “Conflict Diamonds: A New Dataset,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22, no. 3 (July 1, 2005): 257-72, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07388940500201003>.

⁶⁰ Päivi Lujala, Jan Ketil Rod, and Nadia Thieme, “Fighting over Oil: Introducing a New Dataset,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24, no. 3 (August 7, 2007): 239-56, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07388940701468526>.

coca bush, and cannabis drugs production, the source is DRUGDATA, which has the shapefiles for the countries in the world that have had any of these three illegal drugs in production.⁶¹ The countries' economic information is obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators,⁶² and the political information related to the level of democracy is from the Center for Systemic Peace Polity IV Project.⁶³ These data were updated when possible with other sources to match the research period from 1946 to 2014 (latest year available). These datasets are merged by country and year in order to use country-year as the unit of analysis. The regression is conducted with R software,⁶⁴ using the fitting of the generalized linear models function, which gives the description of the linear predictor and the margin of error.

Table 1 provides the description of the data collected for the research. The data collected includes 205 countries and has a total of 11,511 country-year observations. In the 69 years of the study period (1964-2014), 104 countries had 366 internal conflicts onsets. For these countries, it represented a total of 1,423 years with conflict, with an average conflict duration of 13.7 years. The data includes 41 peace agreements, 89 government victories, and 31 rebel victories. Based on this dataset, the expected duration of peace after these outcomes is 18.2 years for peace agreements, 15.9 years for government victories, and 14.3 years for rebel victories. For the purpose of this study, the statistical analysis uses the years following the first conflict outcome for each country that experienced internal conflict in the studied period. The extraction of the countries with no conflict and the years before the first conflict outcome in the study period leaves 3,991 country-years and 262 internal conflict recurrences for the regression models.

⁶¹ Halvard. Buhaug and Päivi Lujala, "Accounting for Scale: Measuring Geography in Quantitative Studies of Civil War," *Political Geography* 24, no. 4 (2005): 399-418, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2005.01.006>.

⁶² World Bank, "World Development Indicators | DataBank," accessed June 13, 2018, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#>.

⁶³ Monty G Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jagers, "POLITY IV PROJECT: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2016." (Center for Systemic Peace and Societal-Systems Research Inc, July 25, 2017), <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>.

⁶⁴ R Core Team, R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing (Vienna, Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Computing, 2018), <https://www.R-project.org/>.

Table 1. Description of data

| DATA INFORMATION | | |
|---|----------|---------------------------------------|
| Observation | N | |
| Total country-years | 11,511 | |
| Country-years following 1 st onset | 3,991 | |
| Number of countries | 205 | |
| Years of the period (1946-2014) | 69 | |
| Countries with internal conflict | 104 | |
| Years with conflict | 1,423 | |
| Average conflict duration in years | 13.7 | |
| Conflicts onsets | 366 | |
| Conflict recurrences | 262 | |
| Outcomes | N | Average peace years by outcome |
| Peace agreement | 41 | 18.2 |
| Government victory | 89 | 15.9 |
| Rebel victory | 31 | 14.3 |

B. RESEARCH VARIABLES

1. Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is conflict recurrence after an intrastate conflict outcome. It is a dichotomous variable that codes 1 for every country-year with the onset of another conflict, otherwise it codes the country-year as 0. The definition of the onset of a conflict (“conflict onset”) used in this study is based on that from UCDP, which is the first year that a “contested incompatibility” inside a state’s territory, between the government of the state and a non-state actor, resulting in “at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar-year.”⁶⁵ This variable is lagged by one year using the conflict onset from the UCDP

⁶⁵ Gleditsch et al., “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset,” 619.

Monadic Conflict Onset and Incidence Dataset to code the recurrence in the studied 1946-2014 period.⁶⁶

2. Independent Variables

To test the hypotheses, the model uses several independent variables from the different datasets:

- Peace years: This is the number of peace years since all of the internal conflicts ended in the country.
- Type of outcome: This is the way in which every conflict ended. To be valid, the outcome should be followed by a one-year period with the threshold of deaths per year below the number 25. It indicates that the year that a conflict reached its outcome in the respective category. Three types of outcomes are examined:
 - Government victory
 - Rebel victory
 - Peace agreement
- Peacekeeping forces: This variable include the cases where peacekeeping forces or third-party enforcers were used in a conflict. It uses a peacekeeping dummy variable whenever any type of third-party enforcer was used in a conflict.
- Post-outcome period: This variable covers the period following the respective event outcome, starting one year after the outcome is reached, and continuing until another conflict outcome is reached. This logical variable counts as TRUE for all years following each category outcome while no other outcome is reached. Three types of post-outcome periods are coded:
 - Post-government victory period
 - Post-rebel victory period
 - Post-peace agreement period

Resources (lootable and not-lootable) were divided by type of resource. This logical variable codes every year in which the type of resource is produced in a country. Seven types of resources are examined, namely four extractive activities and the production of three types of illegal drugs:

⁶⁶ Pettersson and Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946-2014.”

- Extractable resources:
 - Offshore petroleum (used as non-lootable oil production)
 - Onshore petroleum onshore (used as lootable oil production)
 - Lootable diamonds
 - Non-lootable diamonds
- Production of illegal drugs: These are coded for every country known to have produced the following specific drugs.
 - Cannabis
 - Coca bush
 - Opium poppy

In order to check the results to verify the logic of the model, several control variables were selected from previous studies due to their significance for this thesis:

- Control variables;
 - GDP (LogGDP/capita). The model uses the natural logarithm of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita to control for countries' economic wealth.
 - Population density (Log pop. Density). For population size each year, the model uses the natural logarithm of the population density.
 - Democracy level. To control for government type, the model uses the Polity2 score for each year in the dataset.
- Interacting variables: The variables to test the interaction between peace years and the post-outcome period are:
 - Peace years * Gov. victory period
 - Peace years * Reb. victory period
 - Peace years * Agreement period

C. STATISTICAL MODEL

To test the hypotheses, this research uses a *logistic regression model* with *conflict recurrence onset* as the dependent variable. Since this research is focused on the factors influencing the tendency of the country's internal conflict to recur, the selected unit of analysis is country-year. As a country can have simultaneous intrastate conflicts with several rebel parties, each country is marked as being in conflict if it has at least one intrastate conflict over the threshold of 25 deaths per year. Every year with and without conflict is counted consecutively to generate the duration of conflict year and peace year

intervals. Every time a conflict reaches its outcome, the respective country year is coded with the specific outcome type.

A conflict recurrence is coded for the specific country every time there is a conflict onset after the first conflict onset in the 1946-2014 period. The lootable resources were coded 1 for every country-year with known production after the production year started. If a specific resource production never started or stopped, the variable was counted as 0. To test the hypotheses, the research used several variable combinations and interactions.

Model 1 is the baseline specification model, which includes the variables for the type of outcome and the post-outcome periods, and three control variables for the countries' economies, population densities, and democracy levels. Model 2 includes a dummy variable for peacekeeping operations. Model 3 includes the four extractive lootable resource variables. Model 4 includes the three illegal drugs as lootable resources and compares the results without the three control variables. Model 5 includes all the variables studied, obtaining the best model with the lowest Akaike information criterion (AIC) score.

D. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

Table 2 shows the results from the different models tested in the regression. This table reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) for the predictor variables. Positive coefficients indicate an increased risk of conflict recurrence, and negative coefficients indicate a decrease of that risk.

Table 2. Logistic regression of intrastate conflict recurrence

| Dependent variable: <i>Conflict Recurrence Onset</i> | | | | | |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Regression Model | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Peace years | -0.040*** (0.009) | -0.034*** (0.011) | | -0.037*** (0.009) | -0.021* (0.011) |
| Post-agreement period | -0.614** (0.280) | -0.565 (0.364) | -0.227 (0.377) | -0.478* (0.285) | -0.403 (0.380) |
| Post-government victory period | -0.746*** (0.203) | -0.742*** (0.221) | -0.800*** (0.218) | -0.626*** (0.199) | -0.763*** (0.227) |
| Post-rebel victory period | -0.829** (0.373) | -0.812** (0.402) | -0.519 (0.410) | -0.454 (0.381) | -0.513 (0.411) |
| Peace agreement | 1.523*** (0.494) | 1.549*** (0.573) | 1.244** (0.601) | 1.343*** (0.517) | 1.371** (0.600) |
| Government victory | 3.382*** (0.325) | 3.368*** (0.352) | 3.491*** (0.353) | 3.219*** (0.323) | 3.451*** (0.364) |
| Rebel victory | 3.563*** (0.624) | 3.519*** (0.648) | 3.488*** (0.655) | 3.514*** (0.625) | 3.389*** (0.654) |
| Peacekeeping | | -0.486 (0.359) | -0.471 (0.369) | | -0.226 (0.370) |
| Offshore petroleum | | | 0.209 (0.190) | 0.290* (0.165) | 0.402** (0.201) |
| Onshore petroleum | | | 0.780*** (0.194) | 0.347** (0.175) | 0.547*** (0.212) |
| Lootable diamonds | | | 0.877*** (0.194) | 0.925*** (0.169) | 0.659*** (0.205) |
| Non-lootable diamonds | | | -0.937** (0.374) | -0.632** (0.305) | -0.699* (0.389) |
| Cannabis | | | | -0.329 (0.246) | -0.346 (0.304) |
| Coca bush | | | | -1.465** (0.733) | -1.599 (1.036) |
| Opium poppy | | | | 0.684*** (0.173) | 0.619*** (0.204) |
| GDP (Log GDP/capita) | -0.278*** (0.077) | -0.392*** (0.093) | -0.554*** (0.094) | | -0.455*** (0.105) |
| Democracy level (polity2) | -0.005 (0.012) | 0.006 (0.013) | | | 0.007 (0.014) |
| Population density (Log pop.density) | 0.142** (0.059) | 0.152** (0.068) | 0.157** (0.063) | | 0.089 (0.072) |
| Constant (Intercept) | 0.223 (0.599) | 1.075 (0.707) | 1.393** (0.704) | -2.965*** (0.158) | 0.613 (0.779) |
| Observations | 3,883 | 2,923 | 2,977 | 3,989 | 2,923 |
| Log Likelihood | -836.051 | -637.421 | -623.286 | -816.528 | -604.039 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 1,694.102 | 1,298.842 | 1,274.572 | 1,663.056 | 1,246.078 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Data obtained from various sources outlined in this chapter.

Analyzing the data, the following results were found for each hypothesis:

H1: The type of conflict outcome affects its recurrence risk.

Table 2 shows how, in the year the outcome is reached, the countries experiencing a government victory or rebel victory have a higher risk of conflict recurrence than those that reached a peace agreement, showing the vulnerability of peace in the period following military victories. The three outcomes show statistically significant results in the different models. Across the five models, peace agreements consistently show less than half the risk of recurrence than the military victories. The government-victory and rebel-victory outcomes show differences in the proportion of risk across the models; therefore, there is no certainty about which of the two military victories has a lower recurrence risk.


H2: The participation of peacekeeping forces reduces the risk of conflict recurrence.

The results in Table 2 did not show a significant impact of peacekeeping operations on the reduction of conflict recurrence. Although the resultant effect shows a reduction in the conflict recurrence risk, it has a high margin of error, which is why it does not confirm *H2*.

H3: The longer the peace duration, the lower the probability of conflict recurrence.

The results in Table 2 show the impact of peace-years reducing the risk of conflict recurrence across the different models. This variable consistently shows how over time, the risk of conflict recurrence decreases (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Conflict recurrence risk with peace years



H4: The probability of conflict recurrence varies over time depending on the type of previous conflict outcome.

The regression results do not support a definitive conclusion for this hypothesis. When reviewing how successful the type of outcome is, Table 1 shows that the average expected duration of peace after a peace agreement is 18.2 years, after a government victory is 15.9 years, and after a rebel victory is 14.3 years. In Table 2, when considering the results for the full period following each conflict outcome, the variables' behavior changes. In model 1, which has less additional variables, the lowest risk of recurrence is for the post-rebel victory period, followed by the post-government victory period, and then by the post-agreement period. Models 2 to 5 show the variables that reduce the risk of conflict recurrence, but the results lose statistical significance. Although the three variables are statistically significant in model 1, only the post-government victory period has a statistically significant result across all the models.

Figure 2 and Figure 3 show how the risk of conflict recurrence after a government victory or after a rebel victory decreases over time compared with the other types of post-outcome periods.⁶⁷ The solid lines show the predicted probability of conflict recurrence

⁶⁷ The plots in Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 are from model 1.

across peace years. The shaded colored bands show the 95 percent confidence intervals around the model's prediction. In both cases, the risk of recurrence is higher in the first years after the end of the conflict.

Figure 2. Conflict recurrence risk after government victory





Figure 3. Conflict recurrence risk after rebel victory



A comparison of Figure 2 and Figure 3 reveals the risk of recurrence is higher after a rebel victory, but the risk decreases rapidly, whereas the risk of recurrence after

government victory is about 90 percent that of government victory. Over time, however, it is almost equal (see Figure 4).⁶⁸ Additionally, the confidence interval is more accurate when predicting the conflict recurrence in the post-government victory period than in post-rebel victory period.

Figure 4. Conflict recurrence risk after government and rebel victory





Figure 5 shows the conflict recurrence risk after a peace agreement. Here the risk is similar to the government victory risk, with a slightly higher margin of error.

⁶⁸ Figure 4 is an artistic creation using Paint 3D.

Figure 5. Conflict recurrence risk after peace agreement.



Since the margin of error for post-rebel victory and post-agreement periods are higher than their coefficients, there is not enough evidence to conclude which outcome would have a lower probability of conflict recurrence over time.

The results of the two lootable resource hypotheses are described simultaneously:

H5: Easily lootable resources increase the probability of conflict recurrence.

H6: Non-lootable resources reduce the probability of conflict recurrence.

The effect of lootable resources is different from the expected result. Table 2 shows that non-lootable offshore petroleum does not reduce the risk of conflict recurrence, suggesting that this type of resource does not guarantee that the government will effectively use it to maintain the obtained peace. Lootable onshore petroleum has the expected result, providing conditions that favor conflict recurrence, a condition demonstrated with a high statistical significance across several models.

The effect of diamond mines showed the expected behavior, with lootable diamonds increasing the risk of recurrence across the different models, whereas non-lootable diamonds worked to reduce the recurrence risk.

The effect of illegal drugs showed mixed results among the three selected drugs. Opium cultivation increased the risk of conflict recurrence as expected. On the other

hand, the cultivation of cannabis and coca bush both reduced the risk of conflict recurrence, although these results are statistically significant for coca bush only in one model. The result for cannabis is not statistically significant since the margin of error is bigger than the respective coefficient in the two models tested.

Among the control variables, the GDP per capita had the strongest impact on the reduction of conflict recurrence. This result confirms the previous investigations about the effect of state capacity and the incidence of internal conflict.

E. CONCLUSION

The present study on intrastate conflict recurrence confirms the findings of several scholars that the risk of recurrence is higher in the first years after the conflict ends. This behavior is the same for the three types of outcome studied, showing a lower recurrence risk for conflicts ending in peace agreement. The participation of peacekeeping forces does not show a significant reduction in the risk of conflict recurrence. Although the result shows a small reduction effect, its magnitude was in the same range as the margin of error, so no inferences can be drawn about whether the presence of peacekeeping forces affect the risk of conflict recurrence. The presence of lootable resources shows different results among the types of resources in the study. Both onshore and offshore oil production increase the risk of conflict recurrence, with a higher risk of recurrence for onshore production. The findings in the study confirm the effect of lootable diamonds increasing the risk of conflict recurrence, whereas non-lootable diamonds reduce the risk of conflict recurrence.

The results for the production of three types of illegal drugs are mixed, with opium poppy increasing the risk for conflict recurrence, and coca bush and cannabis showing an insignificant effect across the models. The results are not conclusive with respect to the illicit drug analysis. According to the results, not all types of illegal drugs have the same effect in conflict recurrence. Further review is needed to assess the impact of this type of illegal activity. Updated and reliable data are important in order to be able to assess the impact of these types of resources.

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IV. COLOMBIA'S INTERNAL CONFLICT

The Colombian conflict is historically one of the oldest internal armed conflicts in the world. Rooted in inter-parties' political violence and in the grievances of peasants and workers, and boosted by the communist expansion of the 1960s, the conflict continues actively in 2018 with one guerrilla group, the ELN, still fighting against the government. With a peace agreement with the partially demobilized FARC in its implementation phase, and peace talks underway with the last guerrilla group fighting, the conflict is near its end. However, the existence of some of the factors related to conflict recurrence creates concerns about Colombia's ability to reconcile in a successful settlement.

This chapter analyzes the current status of the Colombian conflict, employing the logistic regression results reported in Chapter III. The chapter starts with a discussion of the origins of the conflict, its evolution, and its main characteristics associated with the factors this thesis reviews. Then, it verifies the factors' effects in the conflict and the way these factors have shaped the conflict.

A. THE ORIGINS OF THE COLOMBIAN INTERNAL CONFLICT

Colombia's internal armed conflict is the product of three conditions that shaped the first half of the nation's 20th century: the confrontation of traditional political parties, the grievances of peasants and workers, and the expansion of communism in Latin America.

1. Confrontation of Traditional Political Parties

Created in the middle of the 19th century, the Liberal Party (1848) and the Conservative Party (1849) had different opinions about the government's relationship with the Catholic Church, the role of government in the economy, the protection of property rights, and property security.⁶⁹ Although both parties functioned as unifying factors for nation building because they were present throughout the territory and serving

⁶⁹ Michael J. LaRosa and Germán R. Mejía, *Colombia: A Concise Contemporary History* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 84-85.

as references for cross-social identity, their differences grew during the 19th century. The Liberal Party ruled the government after the Constitution of Rionegro (1863-1886) consolidated individual liberties. In 1886, a political shift gave the Conservative Party control of the government, and a new Constitution gave the government a more protectionist character. In 1899, after 13 years in the political opposition and excluded from public office, Liberals initiated a revolutionary upheaval known as The One Thousand Days War.⁷⁰ From 1899 to 1902, Colombia was in a civil war until the government conservative forces won, when the liberal General Herrera surrendered and signed a peace agreement aboard the *USS Wisconsin*.⁷¹

The political relationship between the parties continued with difficulties. In 1946, after 16 years of Liberal control, a Conservative candidate won the presidency, creating additional tension between the parties.⁷² In 1948, the assassination of the Liberal politician Jorge Eliecer Gaitan began the ten-year period known as *La Violencia*.⁷³ In this period the two main political parties, Liberals and Conservatives, again engaged in a bloody fight that extended from Bogota to most cities and countryside regions of Colombia. Under the influence of the Colombian Communist Party (PCC), peasants organized self-defense and guerrilla groups to protect themselves from the attacks of Liberals and Conservatives, and started to create self-protected regions in the countryside called “independent republics.”⁷⁴ During this period, some Liberals organized into guerrilla squads to fight the Conservative government forces, especially in the eastern plains of the country.

⁷⁰ Meredith Reid; Sarkees, *Resort to War, 1816-2007*, Resort to War, 1816-2007 (Washington: CQ Press, 2010), 341-42, <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781608718276>. The author codes in the Correlates of War Project (COW) five intra-state wars in Colombia from 1818 to 1895, four of which were started by the Liberals or Conservatives parties.

⁷¹ G. Demarest, “War of the Thousand Days,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 12, no. 1 (March 1, 2001): 24, <https://doi.org/10.1080/714005374>.

⁷² Norman Offstein and Carolina Aristizabal, “An Historical Review and Analysis of Colombian Guerrilla Movements: FARC, ELN and EPL,” *Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad* [Development and Society Journal], no. 52 (September 2003): 101, <https://doi.org/10.13043/dys.52.4>.

⁷³ Offstein and Aristizabal, 101.

⁷⁴ Marcella Ribetti, “The Unveiled Motivations of Violence in Intra-State Conflicts: The Colombian Guerrillas,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 18, no. 4 (2007): 704, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592310701778548>.

To end *La Violencia*, in 1957 the leadership of both Liberals and Conservatives made a pact to share power spanning a 16-year period. In the accord, both parties would take turns in the Colombian presidency from 1958 to 1974 and would divide power in state institutions, taking equal seats in key positions and sharing it with their political allies. Although this agreement successfully ended the two-party struggle, it created three unexpected results: the exclusion from power of other political parties, the exclusion of peasants' interests in land distribution, and the mobilization of some liberal guerrilla remnants to guard the independent peasant republics.

2. Grievances and the Building of Peasant Organizations

Land distribution has been Colombian peasants' grievance since the beginning of the 20th century. Big landowners used force to displace the first occupier-peasants who colonized the land, and then legalized the landowners' possession by registering title deeds.⁷⁵ During the 1920s, in an attempt to force reform in land distribution, a land-oriented peasant uprising against regional elites took place in some Colombian regions. Although these uprisings were militarily controlled, they planted the seeds for the future resistance movement. From this uprising, the first peasant self-defense groups emerged to protect the regions where displaced peasants had moved to find new land for their cultures. Expanding the agricultural border into mountainous and jungle areas, the peasants created areas free of the influence of both the government and the elite landowners. These areas would become important for their evolution 20 years later, during the period known as *La Violencia*, when they were renamed "independent republics."

3. The Expansion of Communism in Latin America

In Colombia the communist expansion began after World War I had its most visible expression with the establishment of the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) in

⁷⁵ Daniel Pécaut, "La « guerre Prolongée » Des FARC [The « protracted » War of the FARC]," *EchoGéo* (2008), 2008, <http://journals.openedition.org/echogeo/10163>.

1930.⁷⁶ Born from remnants of communist organizations that had failed to consolidate during the 1920s, the PCC incorporated the grievances of workers, artisans, and peasants into its revolutionary character, using a Marxist-Leninist ideology aligned to Soviet Union principles.⁷⁷ In connection with the peasant organization that appeared in early self-defense efforts during the 1920s and 1930s, the PCC strengthened its influence among peasants during the *La Violencia* confrontations.

The Cuban revolution that overcame the Batista regime in December 1958 and the subsequent adoption of socialism in revolutionary Cuba during 1961 worked to show that “the people in arms” can organize as guerrillas to defeat an oppressor regime. During the 1960s, several guerrilla movements started in Latin America, and the communists in Colombia saw a new opportunity to influence an aggrieved people to rise against the government.

The U.S. Containment Policy in Latin America had focused mainly on stopping the rise of socialist governments in the region, with some poor results. An example of how this policy backfired was the United States’ covert support for the 1954 overthrow of the Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz, for his relationship with socialist countries.⁷⁸ As a reaction to the Cuban revolution and the communist expansion in Latin America, the U.S. government initiated actions to control this risk. In Colombia, the United States reoriented its policy and started economic and military cooperation programs to handle the issue better. One U.S. initiative, known as the LAZO plan,⁷⁹ was used by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas as part of its narrative against U.S. intervention.

⁷⁶ Javier Duque Daza, “Communists: The Colombian Communist Party in the Post National Front,” *Estudios Políticos [Medellin]* 41 (2012): 128.

⁷⁷ Duque Daza, 127.

⁷⁸ Central Intelligence Agency, “Congress, the CIA, and Guatemala, 1954 — Central Intelligence Agency,” August 3, 2011, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol44no5/html/v44i5a03p.htm>.

⁷⁹ Dennis Rempe, “Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics: U.S. Counter-Insurgency Efforts in Colombia, 1959-1965,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 6, no. 3 (1995): 312. The LAZO plan was an U.S. backed initiative to control the communist expansion in the early 1960s using military and socio-economic alternatives to dismantle the Independent Republics.

After the Colombian government managed to dismantle the “independent republics,” remnants of the Marquetalia independent republic joined with other peasant organizations and created the FARC in 1964.⁸⁰ That same year, oil workers, students, members of the Peasant Student Workers Movement (MOEC),⁸¹ and priests with a Cuban revolutionary ideology created the National Liberation Army (ELN),⁸² and later dissident members of the PCC created the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) with a Chinese-Maoist orientation.⁸³ In 1972, radicals from the National Popular Alliance (ANAPO) created a fourth guerrilla group named the 19th of April Movement (M-19), after the allegedly fraudulent presidential elections of 1970.⁸⁴

B. EVOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT

1. Early Beginning (1964-1978)

Following their creation in the mid-1960s, the three first leftist guerrilla groups (FARC, ELN, and EPL) struggled to organize and grow, while the government successfully expanded its counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign to defeat them. In its early stages, the ELN was the most active group, but internal disputes and Colombian Army operations had weakened the group by the mid-1970s.⁸⁵ This kept the ELN’s guerrilla activity at a low level, reducing its actions to isolated rural areas where the groups struggled to stay safe from the security forces’ operations. Government programs to improve the agricultural and rural conditions worked to reduce the influence and expansion of the guerrillas.⁸⁶

⁸⁰ Rempe, “Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics: U.S. Counter-Insurgency Efforts in Colombia, 1959-1965,” 321.

⁸¹ Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), 40.

⁸² Daniel García-Peáa, “The National Liberation Army (ELN) Creates a Different Peace Process,” *NACLA Report on the Americas* 34, no. 2 (2000): 34, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2000.11722631>.

⁸³ Offstein and Aristizabal, “An Historical Review and Analysis of Colombian Guerrilla Movements: FARC, ELN and EPL,” 18.


⁸⁴ Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956*, 212.

⁸⁵ García-Peáa, “The National Liberation Army (ELN) Creates a Different Peace Process,” 34.

⁸⁶ Offstein and Aristizabal, 105.

Following their almost near-defeat by the mid-1970s, the guerrilla groups benefited from the growth and expansion of illicit drug production during the second half of the 1970s.⁸⁷ Offstein states that the areas controlled by the guerrillas offered the lands needed for the illicit industry, and the FARC especially gave protection for illicit drug cultivation and production.⁸⁸ Figure 6 shows the three main guerrilla groups' armed actions during the 1960s and 1970s, with an increase of FARC activity in 1977 and 1978.

Figure 6. Armed actions of the FARC, ELN, and EPL between 1965 and 1978.⁸⁹



For their funding, the guerrilla groups started with peasant contributions and criminal activities such as ransom and the extortion of farmers. This funding further evolved to kidnappings and the extortion of commerce and oil companies, and bank robberies. Although the incursion in drug production provided additional resources, most guerrillas continued using robbery, extortion, and kidnapping to earn alternative funds.

⁸⁷ Offstein and Aristizabal, 108.

⁸⁸ Offstein and Aristizabal, 108.

⁸⁹ Mario Aguilera, *Guerrilla y Población Civil. Trayectoria de Las FARC 1949-2013* [Guerrilla and Civil Population. Trajectory of the FARC 1949-2013], Third edition, Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica [National Center of Historical Memory] (Bogota D.C.: Imprenta Nacional de Colombia, 2014), 78, <http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2013/farc/guerrilla-y-poblacion-civil-jun-2016.pdf>.

2. Narcotics Trafficking and the First Peace Processes (1978-1990)

The guerrilla groups benefited from their relationship with the origin of the drug cartels in the second half of the 1970s. The guerrillas provided security for drug production, and the cartels provided funds and weapons for the guerrillas. In 1978, when the expansion of drug production was evident, Colombian President Turbay Ayala started the war on drugs. Despite the counter-drug effort, during the 1980s the narcotics trafficking continued to grow, as well as the guerrilla groups' influence and attacks. As mentioned by Offstein, the presence of guerrilla movements is "correlated with drug production" in several Colombian departments. He asserts that the biggest size increase of the guerrilla movement occurred when the groups became involved in narcotics trafficking and illicit activities.⁹⁰

The expansion of Colombia's oil production in this period provided an additional source of funding to the guerrilla groups.⁹¹ The ELN took advantage of its ties with oil worker organizations to extort the oil companies.⁹² In the 1980s, after being reduced to about 40 members,⁹³ the ELN was reborn thanks to millions of dollars received from the extortion of oil companies during the construction of the Caño Limón oil pipeline.⁹⁴ The ELN kept its connection to oil extortion, playing "a dominant role in the oil-producing area of Barrancabermeja,"⁹⁵ and other areas with oil production such as Arauca, Santander, and Norte de Santander departments. Since this period, the ELN and the

⁹⁰ Offstein and Aristizabal, "An Historical Review and Analysis of Colombian Guerrilla Movements: FARC, ELN and EPL," 111.

⁹¹ The oil & gas year, "Colombia's Offshore Potential," *The Oil & Gas Year Information Is Power* (blog), 2016, <https://www.theoilandgasyear.com/interviews/developing-colombias-offshore/>. The Colombian oil and gas production is located mainly onshore. The offshore is reduced to gas with no offshore oil active production.

⁹² Thad Dunning and Leslie Wirpsa, "Oil and the Political Economy of Conflict in Colombia and beyond: A Linkages Approach," *Geopolitics* 9, no. 1 (2004): 88, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650040412331307842>.

⁹³ Dunning and Wirpsa, 87.

⁹⁴ García-Peáa, "The National Liberation Army (ELN) Creates a Different Peace Process," 34.

⁹⁵ Paul J. Tompkins et al., *Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Colombia (1964-2009)*, Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: United States Army Special Operations Command and Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, National Security Analysis Department, 2014), 199, https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo72762/ARIS_Colombia-BOOK.pdf.

FARC especially benefited from the taxing of oil enterprises, “using kidnaps [sic], extortion, and bombings of oil pipelines as leverage.”⁹⁶

During the term of President Belisario Betancourt, peace negotiations led to a short-lived ceasefire with several guerrilla groups in 1984.⁹⁷ As a result of these peace negotiations with the Colombian government, some FARC members demobilized and created the Patriotic Union Party (UP) but did not dismantle the FARC’s armed capabilities. Even more, FARC’s armed actions during that period made this guerrilla movement look like the military wing of the UP party, diminishing the trust in this political organization and making it a target of counter-leftist organizations. Divisions arose among FARC insurgents, and some of them also targeted members of the UP party.⁹⁸ This political party disappeared after the killing of most of its members, a situation that reinforced the armed agenda in the FARC organization.

During the early 1980s, due to guerrilla kidnappings of drug cartel members’ relatives, drug dealers organized the group Death to Kidnappers (MAS) to find and kill the kidnapper guerrillas. This group later transformed into self-defense groups⁹⁹ by joining landowners’ and cattle breeders’ security groups¹⁰⁰ to organize the United Self-Defenses of Colombia (AUC). Funded through cattle ranchers’ money, and in some cases drug production, the AUC was able to contest the guerrillas’ advances in several regions of the country by using selective killings and massacres.¹⁰¹

During the presidency of Virgilio Barco, peace negotiations with the M-19 concluded with the demobilization of this guerrilla group on November 2, 1989. As part

⁹⁶ Dunning and Wirpsa, “Oil and the Political Economy of Conflict in Colombia and beyond: A Linkages Approach,” 88.

⁹⁷ García-Peáa, “The National Liberation Army (ELN) Creates a Different Peace Process,” 34.

⁹⁸ Offstein and Aristizabal, “An Historical Review and Analysis of Colombian Guerrilla Movements: FARC, ELN and EPL,” 110.

⁹⁹ Tompkins et al., *Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Colombia (1964-2009)*, 274.

¹⁰⁰ Tompkins et al., 272. According to the authors, these security groups have their origins in 1950s militias hired to counter liberal guerrilla groups.

¹⁰¹ Tompkins et al., 303.

of this negotiation, a new political constitution was created for Colombia, and the M-19 became a political party.¹⁰² This peace process with M-19 worked since the former guerrilla members obtained 19 of the 70 seats in the National Constituent Assembly, the board assigned to build a new political constitution for the country. In the same way, during the 1990 elections, the M-19 obtained 22 seats of Congress.¹⁰³ With these results, the M-19 members succeeded in their political objective to gain political representation.

Later, in 1991, the EPL demobilized and some of its members join the M-19 political party,¹⁰⁴ while a small dissident group within it decided to continue fighting the government in the Norte de Santander department.¹⁰⁵ These EPL dissidents' stronghold is in the rich region of Catatumbo, located on the border with Venezuela where cocaine is cultivated and produced. This EPL dissident group is nowadays still active and strangely coexists with the stronger ELN.

It seems that for most M-19 and some EPL members, the political inclusion of some of the guerrilla group members in politics was enough to counter the effect of narcotics trafficking funds that was used by guerrillas to attract their constituents and resume the conflict.

3. The FARC's Strongest Period (1991-2002)

After the demobilization of the M-19 and the EPL, the FARC became the strongest guerrilla organization in Colombia, followed by the ELN. Both groups were able to control areas of the country while simultaneously fighting government security forces. In this period, the violence reached high levels due to the United Self-defense of Colombia (AUC) killings to counter the guerrilla expansion. The second half of the 1990s

¹⁰² Tompkins et al., *Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Colombia (1964-2009)*, 253.

¹⁰³ Tompkins et al., 255.

¹⁰⁴ Tompkins et al., 254.

¹⁰⁵ Luis Fernando Trejos Rosero, "Aproximaciones a La Actividad Internacional de Una Organizacion Insurgente Colombiana. El Ejercito Popular de Liberacion (EPL). De China a Cuba via Albania [Approaches to the International Activity of a Colombian Insurgent Organization. The Popular Liberation Army (EPL). From China to Cuba via Albania]," *Investigación & Desarrollo* 21, no. 2 (2013): 384, <https://doi.org/10.14482/i&d.v21i2.5543>.

was characterized by the FARC military expansion. In several isolated areas, the FARC was able to conduct attacks against small towns and patrolling army units, which ended in the killing and capture of many police and army members.¹⁰⁶

In the period between 1994 and 2002, the FARC was able to threaten the military capabilities of the state by defeating army and marine bases in the jungles, attacking populations, destroying national police stations, and beginning to surround Bogota, the Colombian capital city, and other Department capitals.¹⁰⁷ This period was also marked by the loss of credibility of the Colombian presidency after allegations of drug cartels' money being used in the presidential campaign of the elected president, Ernesto Samper. The loss of credibility resulted in the loss of political, economic, and military support of the United States to Colombia.¹⁰⁸

During this period, the FARC showed an increasing military capability supported by the revenue obtained by drug trafficking, which allowed the guerrilla force to expand its armed men to more than 18,000,¹⁰⁹ with about an equivalent quantity in its supporting network. This expansion, initiated after the FARC's Eight Conference in 1993,¹¹⁰ showed that the guerrilla organization was working on the implementation of its strategic plan, named the Bolivarian Campaign for the New Colombia, aimed at increasing its armed force and isolating Bogota. This strategy brought the war to the population living in Colombia's centers of power, who witnessed how the government's security forces were losing the fight for control of the country. Kidnappings, murders, and drug trafficking rose while the government showed an inability to control the guerrillas' advancement. This period is also led to the massive expansion of self-defense groups

¹⁰⁶ Tompkins et al., *Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Colombia (1964-2009)*, 144.

¹⁰⁷ Tompkins et al., 122.

¹⁰⁸ Tompkins et al., 144.

¹⁰⁹ Sibylla Brodzinsky, "In Colombia, FARC Rebels Strike Back.," *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 9, 2009, 6.

¹¹⁰ Tompkins et al., *Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Colombia (1964-2009)*, 143.

created by the population to oppose the expansion of the FARC and other guerrilla organizations, which created a situation of mass human rights violations.

In 1998, Colombians elected Andres Pastrana for president, favoring his initiative for peace in a context where the FARC had obtained such victories over the government armed forces that the best option for most Colombians was to sign a peace agreement before the FARC was able to take power by force. The peace negotiations, conducted in the Caguan region, were used by the FARC to obtain international visibility and to show it was like a state inside Colombia. President Pastrana granted the FARC 42,000 square kilometers of land to act as a free zone where the FARC become the only authority.¹¹¹ The FARC used this area as a strategic rearguard to recruit and train new members, as well as a stronghold from which to launch new attacks on the population and the military, and to send kidnapped hostages.¹¹² The last four years of this period were characterized by the FARC's advance towards Bogota, the Colombian people's fear of traveling by land or by plane, and the sense that the government was losing the fight against the guerrillas.

4. The Last Period (2002 to present)

However, by 2002 the scenario was different for the FARC. The 9/11 attacks in the United States had changed the world's perception of the FARC. The U.S. government authorized the use of the resources previously designated exclusively to aid the war on drugs to be used to fight the FARC. Additionally, the "Colombian Plan" provided new resources to train and equip the Colombian army.¹¹³ After the failure of the peace process in 2002, the Colombian citizens elected Alvaro Uribe as president with a different mandate: this time the Colombian voters selected the full use of the state force to defeat the guerrilla groups. Uribe's government reduced the guerrillas' advance over

¹¹¹ Tompkins et al., 153.

¹¹² Tompkins et al., 145.

¹¹³ Austin Long, *Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and beyond : Challenges and Best Practices from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia*, [Research Report] Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond (Santa Monica, California: Rand National Defense Research Institute, 2015), 61, <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=2167261#>.

Bogota and other cities and signed a justice submission agreement with the AUC leadership, demobilizing nearly 31,000 AUC members between 2005 and 2007.¹¹⁴ Since the AUC represented a threat for the guerrilla groups in the case of a weapons release, the demobilization of this self-defense movement would seem to suggest that the guerrillas would have an additional incentive for negotiation. However, negotiations with the guerrilla groups did not succeed. What did happen is that remnants from the AUC expanded their actions into the illicit drug business. With no objective other than to control the areas for drug cultivation, narcotics production, and narcotics trafficking, these groups became criminal gangs (BACRIM).

After eight years of intense counterinsurgency offensives led by the government of President Uribe (2002-2010), President Juan Manuel Santos took a new approach that allowed the start of peace negotiations with the FARC in 2012.¹¹⁵ This negotiation concluded in November 2016 with the signing of a peace accord that allowed the reintegration of most FARC leadership and cadres.¹¹⁶ In the same way, in 2014, the Santos government and the ELN publicly announced that they had started exploratory talks since January to create an agenda for formal peace negotiations.¹¹⁷ While the negotiations with the FARC advanced, however, the ELN's armed activity increased, not only in the traditionally ELN areas of influence, but also in other places where the ELN presence had been reduced in the previous decade. On March 30, 2016, the government announced the end of the exploratory dialogs, and in February 8, 2017, the negotiators of

¹¹⁴ Tompkins et al., *Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Colombia (1964-2009)*, 364.

¹¹⁵ Tompkins et al., 382.

¹¹⁶ Juan M. Santos and Timoleón Jiménez, "Acuerdo final para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera [Final Agreement for Ending Conflict and Building a Stable and Long-Lasting Peace]," Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz [Office of the High Commissioner for Peace], November 24, 2016, 62, <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y-conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf>.

¹¹⁷ Kyra Gurney, "Colombia Announces Peace Talks with ELN Guerrillas," *InSight Crime* (blog), June 11, 2014, <https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/colombia-announces-peace-talks-with-eln-guerrillas/>.

the government and the ELN started peace negotiations.¹¹⁸ Shockingly, the intensity and frequency of the ELN attacks continued as dissident factions of the FARC joined the ELN.

While the government and the FARC reached a peace agreement in November 2016 that demobilized most of that guerrilla group, some members of the group decided the agreement did not provide better conditions than what they had if they continued the fight. The agreement gave the FARC five seats in the Senate and five in the Chamber of Representatives for eight years,¹¹⁹ distribution of land properties, projects for economic development, and even a monthly salary for the former guerrilla combatants. That peace agreement also had provisions for a United Nations political mission of unarmed international observers¹²⁰ to monitor and accompany the actors in the peace effort and enhance the trust and commitment of the FARC and the government. This peace agreement is currently in its implementation phase, but several dissident factions withdrew from the accord and decided to return to their activities, or to join the ELN in its effort to control the areas that the FARC abandoned.¹²¹ While the negotiation with the FARC proposed economic incentives for the voluntary eradication of coca crops, the amount of land cultivated increased from 50,000 hectares in 2014 to 171,000 hectares in 2018,¹²² providing an expected increase on resources to fund the rebels' fight against the government. The future of the agreement with the FARC and the negotiation with the ELN has, in the increase of coca cultivation, a new threat that the government has to

¹¹⁸ Presidencia de la República, "Diálogos Por La Paz [Dialogues for the peace]," Presidencia de la República, accessed September 3, 2018, <http://especiales.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/20180125-dialogos-por-la-paz/dialogos-paz.html>.

¹¹⁹ Santos and Jiménez, "Acuerdo final para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera [Final Agreement for Ending Conflict and Building a Stable and Long-Lasting Peace]," 71.

¹²⁰ United Nations, "UN Mission in Colombia," UN Mission in Colombia, accessed November 8, 2018, <https://unmc.unmissions.org/en>.

¹²¹ InSight Crime, "ELN," *InSight Crime*, October 16, 2018, <https://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/el-profile/>.

¹²² United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Coca Crops in Colombia at All-Time High, UNODC Report Finds," September 19, 2018, <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2018/September/unodc-monitoring-survey-reports-a-slight-increase-of-coca-bush-cultivation-in-bolivia-during-2017.html>.

control. In addition, the BACRIM activity represents another threat for the security of the space needed for peace to last.

C. ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS' INFLUENCE IN THE CONFLICT

This section analyzes the Colombian internal conflict using the results obtained in Chapter III. Emphatically, the internal conflicts originated in the first half of the 20th century; the One Thousand Days War and *La Violencia* had a political bipartisan character, which was settled by government military victory in the case of the former, and by negotiation in the case of the latter.¹²³ The fact that *La Violencia* created the peasant self-defense groups that later became the pro-communist guerrillas of the mid-1960s make the guerrillas' confrontation a recurrence during the *La Violencia* conflict. Alternatively, this conflict relapse was a self-defense response to the campaign launched by the government to take control of the independent republics. The decision to organize and fight to overcome the government was encouraged by a foreign, communist ideology.

Testing the *H1*, the logistic regression shows that conflicts ending in both government victory and rebel victory have a higher probability of recurrence than peace agreements. Ending internal conflicts in Colombia has been traditionally difficult since remnants from the rebels have found a way to resume their fight or to join other illegally armed organizations. The initial military successes that the government had by the mid-1970s did not stop the guerrilla groups from rebuilding their strength and, after some years, the conflict relapsed. These past experiences show the difficulties the government has had in militarily defeating the armed insurgencies.

In Colombia, peace negotiations between the government and the guerrilla groups have had mixed results, depending on the actors' perspective on the benefits the negotiation could provide. The peace negotiations of the early 1980s failed due to the lack of commitment among some rebel groups, and the action of spoilers in the

¹²³ Sarkees, *Resort to War, 1816-2007*, 410. In the Colombia case study, *La Violencia* is considered as an internal conflict, or Intra-state war as coded by COW, with the liberals as the rebel side opposing the conservative government. Rather than classifying the outcome as government win as COW does, in the present analysis *La Violencia* is considered an agreement since both parties agreed to share the control of the state government.

government and among extreme-right groups. These negotiations showed how the guerrilla groups used the peace talks as a strategy to reorganize and to increase their international visibility. This was a behavior that the FARC displayed during the Caguan negotiations with President Pastrana in 1999-2002. Despite these negative results, from the end of the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s, some peace negotiations did produce a lasting peace, as is the case with the M-19, and, with less success, with the EPL and the AUC. These three negotiations showed that the groups' commitment during the negotiation lasted into the peace period. If the negotiation continues and the agreement is signed, then there is a good probability of peace success. However, dissidents from demobilized groups and remaining fighters have traditionally found space to join other insurgencies or criminal organizations involved in illicit drug production and trafficking, thus maintaining the risk of a new conflict beginning. Although the political choices and the commitment of the actors are not tested in this thesis, it seems to influence their decisions in Colombia where the actors have access to drug trafficking funding.

In the *H3* test, the effect of time showed a positive correlation with more peace years producing a lower risk of conflict recurrence. The effect of maintaining the peace for longer periods does reduce the probability of recurrence, but in order to make it work, the government has to take measures to change the perceptions of the population. In Colombian history, the mechanism of the National Front worked well to finish the fight among Liberals and Conservatives. In the same way, the provisions for the agreement with the M-19 prevented this guerrilla group from restarting its fight. However, some remaining fighters in both cases joined existent rebel groups to continue their fight.

The test of *H4* shows statistically significant results for government victory across the models, but does not show it for peace agreements and rebel victory. However, the experience in the conflict in Colombia shows that the peace agreements have longer periods of peace, at least among the actors involved in the agreement. Arguably, the only military victory the government has won over the rebels was during the One Thousand Days War when the Liberals surrendered to the government Conservative forces. But even in that moment, the end of the conflict was settled in a peace agreement. The experience with the leftist guerrillas in the 1960s and 1970s shows how the military

superiority of the government worked to reduce the rebels' activity, but it did not guarantee peace.

Note that in Colombia, there has not been the participation of peacekeeping forces, and the test of *H2* does not confirm the effect of peacekeeping forces on the reduction of the conflict recurrence risk. The peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC has a political mission under the UN Department of Political Affairs. Nevertheless, this political mission is not considered a peacekeeping mission and its main purpose is to work as an observer of the government and FARC binding to the accord.

While the test of *H5* shows ambiguous results depending on the type of lootable resource, the Colombian experience with oil production and illegal drug production confirms the negative effect of these resources on the peace process. In the conflict in Colombia, the lootable resources have produced conflict recurrence and have helped the conflict to last. The ELN used the extortion of oil companies to resume its organization in the 1980s and continues using the oil industry as its main target. Currently the ELN maintains a presence in the oil-producing regions of Colombia's border with Venezuela.

The FARC's increase in activity after the mid-1970s shows how the relapse of violence was influenced by the use of illegal drug-related funds. Funds from narcotics trafficking have strengthened the FARC and the other guerrilla groups since the 1980s. Those guerrilla organizations that demobilized during the early 1990s had many cadres moving into the narcotics business, but it is probable that the political access obtained in those negotiations avoided the failure of those peace processes. The same behavior is found in the remnants of the demobilized AUC in the 2000s, known now as BACRIM. Several BACRIM gangs are involved in the production and trafficking of cocaine, and have made it the core of its criminal activity. In some regions of Colombia, the BACRIM and the guerrilla groups have built networks to protect profitable drug trafficking from the government security forces.

In the test of *H5*, the presence of coca crops and cannabis crops show a reduction in the risk of conflict recurrence. The fact that the reduction is not statistically significant

could be an indicator that the dissident groups may want to continue with control of the illicit drug business, but its willingness to fight the government could be limited to the protection of the illicit enterprise. However, the effect of these crops increasing the strength of the rebel groups, and consequently the length of the conflict, increases the need for controlling this illegal activity. Although narcotics trafficking could allegedly reduce the share of the leftist doctrines in the guerrilla groups, the effect of maintaining interconnected criminal networks with the BACRIM is a destabilizing factor to consider. This network associated with transnational narcotics trafficking creates additional bridges that can provide access to other illegal markets like the black weapons markets. With the power that drug-related funds provide, it is easier for the guerrilla organizations to have access to more sophisticated and powerful weapons. This, combined with increased production in the drug cultivation area in Colombia adds the peasant population to this factor, because they also derive their livelihood from the illicit crops. This population sees the guerrillas as the protector of their culture, and consequently, any action the government takes to destroy drug cultivation activities goes against that population's interests.

As the implementation phase of the peace process with the FARC is in progress, the Colombian government has to identify the way to tackle the expansion of illicit drug cultivation, without creating a new source of recruits for the FARC dissidents, the ELN, and the BACRIM.

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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As stated in this and previous research, intrastate conflicts are the most frequent and long-lasting form of war in the world¹²⁴ that, additionally, have a high tendency to recur.¹²⁵ Using a logistic regression analysis, this thesis searches for the conditions and factors affecting conflict recurrence and lasting peace in intrastate confrontations. Specifically, this work tests the effect of three factors: the type of conflict outcome, the use of peacekeeping forces, and the presence of lootable resources. The results of the statistical analysis are used as a lens to review the internal conflict in Colombia in order to identify how these three factors have shaped this conflict.

A. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

The logistic regression shows the positive impact of peace years reducing the risk of conflict recurrence across the different models. This variable consistently shows how the risk of conflict recurrence decreases over time, agreeing with previous analyses' results.¹²⁶ This result indicates that the higher risk of recurrence exists in the first years of the conflict outcome and thus, this is the moment when higher attention and support is required from the international community and from the actors previously involved in the conflict, to avoid conflict recurrence.

The statistical analysis also shows how different outcomes produce different levels of recurrence risk. In the results, the negotiated settlement produces at least half of the risk of conflict recurrence than military victories. These results are significant for peace agreement outcomes regarding the use of peacekeeping forces, the effect of which does not show a statistically significant value reducing the conflict recurrence risk. The test of the variation over time of the risk for the three outcomes does not allow this thesis to draw a definite conclusion. Therefore, additional research is required.

¹²⁴ Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," 75.

¹²⁵ Walter, "Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace," 2.

¹²⁶ Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, "Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence," 189.

The internal conflict in Colombia has had several peace agreements with different guerrilla groups. These agreements have obtained different results. In some cases, the negotiations did not conclude with an agreement between the actors and were used by the rebel side as a way to obtain higher political and military advantage. A case illustrating this behavior was the negotiation with the FARC during the presidency of Andres Pastrana (1998-2002).¹²⁷ In those cases, where the negotiation concluded with an agreement, the action of spoilers and dissident groups reduced the effectiveness of the accord. Allegedly in these cases, the main factor reducing the probability of recurrence has been the government's lack of mechanisms to consolidate the areas where the demobilized guerrilla group had influence. The most successful agreement was negotiated with the M-19, which allowed for the reintegration of most guerrilla members into society.¹²⁸

In the statistical analysis, the effect of lootable resources in the probability of conflict recurrence shows ambiguous results, with diamonds affecting as predicted, but with oil and illegal drug production showing different and inconsistent results. Non-lootable diamonds show a reduction in the risk of conflict recurrence, whereas lootable diamonds show an increase in the risk of recurrence. The production of onshore petroleum shows an increase of conflict recurrence, but offshore petroleum does not show a statistically significant effect. Among the cultivation of illicit drugs, opium production shows expected behavior increasing the risk of conflict recurrence, but coca and cannabis crops show a tendency to reduce the risk of recurrence, although their results are not statistically significant.

Despite the fact that the linear regression does not show a relevant effect of the coca and cannabis crops in the probability of conflict recurrence, the influence of these crops has stopped the resolution of the conflict in Colombia. The military success obtained by the government during the late 1960s and early 1970s against the nascent leftist guerrilla groups did not produce a lasting peace, due to the effect of illicit drug

¹²⁷ Tompkins et al., *Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Colombia (1964-2009)*, 153.

¹²⁸ Tompkins et al., 344.

production. Similarly, the extortion of oil companies has contributed to the relapse of the conflict and, together with coca production, has increased the conflict duration by providing additional incentives to dissident guerrilla groups

B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

This work proposes three levels of recommendations to reduce the probability of internal conflict recurrence. The first is at the state level regarding mechanisms to settle an internal conflict, and the provisions to establish governance in contested areas and in areas with lootable resources available. Since the statistical analysis and Colombia's conflict show that negotiated settlements have a better result than military victories, when an internal conflict ends with a military victory, the winning actor should provide conditions to close the conflict with the opposing actor in a negotiation. This would not only reduce the risk of the conflict relapse, but would probably prevent the onset of a new conflict with another actor threatening the obtained victory. In the same way, since the access to lootable resources would probably increase the emergence of dissidents and spoilers, special attention is required to control the regions where these resources exist. Providing security measures to these resources and facilities for communities' livelihood could reduce the destabilizing effect of lootable resources.

The second recommendation, at the international community level, is related to the support to countries that have found an outcome to an internal conflict. The international community should take actions to help stabilize the country. These actions should start as soon as possible in order to increase the probability of peace success. The actions should provide incentives to create an agreement among the confronted actors, which includes the conditions for the return of former combatants to productive activities and their reintegration into society. Other actions could include favorable conditions for the export of agricultural products farmed in the regions of conflict. These and other actions should aim to support the substitution of drug production efforts through productivity programs that guarantee the production will be purchased. Similar efforts can enhance the basic services for the communities in affected areas, such as access to potable water, education, and health services.

The third level of recommendations is for Colombia's specific situation. The government should increase actions to avoid the proliferation of dissidents. These actions should start by providing the guerrillas concentrated in temporary hamlet zones the services included in the peace agreement. It is important to implement the actions to comply with the agreement faster, to send a signal of government commitment during the early years, which are the years with higher risk of agreement failure. Provisions for expanding governance to the regions where the FARC demobilized should include law enforcement infrastructure. This law enforcement infrastructure should be prioritized in the zones affected by illegal drug production, since these are the places where competing illegal groups will try to establish operation zones. Also, as the past experiences in Colombia show, the spaces for political participation of the former combatants should be maintained since this is a way to reduce the probability of conflict relapse.

Finally, the effectiveness of the Colombian government to comply with the peace agreement, control the regions the FARC has left, and counter the spread of dissidents will enhance the credibility of the government's commitment and increase its bargaining power in the negotiations with the ELN.

C. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

The main limitation for the research was access to information directly from the source. With up-to-date information from multilateral organizations such as the UN, it is possible to develop better analysis and better responses. This in turn can generate better recommendations to these organizations' response. The UN can increase the resources available to researchers in the topics related to the organization's intervention in different conflicts. A systematic coding of the activities that peacekeeping and political missions develop can create better tools to increase the understanding of lasting peace or conflict recurrences. This can help the UN prepare better responses to different conflicts and thus guarantee better results after each intervention. With information properly classified and structured, the UN can reduce intervention costs while increasing effectiveness.

Future research analyzing the effect of lootable resources and testing different types of resources at the country level is also needed. Testing the effect of resources in

the municipalities where the conflict has taken place can improve the understanding of the mechanisms influencing conflict recurrence. With an increase in the systems used for data processing and the new developments in big data analyses, it is possible to integrate other sources of information. Integrating different datasets with information at the municipality level can generate a better understanding of the effects that different human activities produce in conflict recurrence.

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