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# THESIS

**EVOLVING OBSTACLES TO A EUROPEAN UNION NUCLEAR DETERRENT**

by

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This thesis evaluates the evolving obstacles to the development of a European Union (EU) nuclear deterrent. Some EU officials, prominent analysts, and political leaders in EU nations have expressed interest in exploring such a capability. The incentives for pursuing an EU nuclear deterrent include (1) increased tensions with nuclear-armed powers in Eurasia, especially Russia, China, and North Korea; (2) the perceived decline in U.S. political credibility in Europe; and (3) the EU's substantial economic status, industrial capacity, and technical expertise. The EU nations may, however, continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear protection provided via NATO, owing to the huge barriers to the construction of an EU nuclear deterrent. These barriers include (1) doubts about the strategic credibility of the EU's striving to acquire this capability; (2) the lack of mutual confidence among EU members concerning political reliability, methods of decision-making, and the formulation and implementation of a strategy for nuclear deterrence and crisis management; and (3) the growing anti-nuclear movements within EU member nations. The thesis concludes that the organization of an EU nuclear deterrent, while economically and technically feasible, remains improbable for political reasons in the foreseeable future.

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**EVOLVING OBSTACLES TO A EUROPEAN UNION NUCLEAR DETERRENT**

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# ABSTRACT

This thesis evaluates the evolving obstacles to the development of a European Union (EU) nuclear deterrent. Some EU officials, prominent analysts, and political leaders in EU nations have expressed interest in exploring such a capability. The incentives for pursuing an EU nuclear deterrent include (1) increased tensions with nuclear-armed powers in Eurasia, especially Russia, China, and North Korea; (2) the perceived decline in U.S. political credibility in Europe; and (3) the EU's substantial economic status, industrial capacity, and technical expertise. The EU nations may, however, continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear protection provided via NATO, owing to the huge barriers to the construction of an EU nuclear deterrent. These barriers include (1) doubts about the strategic credibility of the EU's striving to acquire this capability; (2) the lack of mutual confidence among EU members concerning political reliability, methods of decision-making, and the formulation and implementation of a strategy for nuclear deterrence and crisis management; and (3) the growing anti-nuclear movements within EU member nations. The thesis concludes that the organization of an EU nuclear deterrent, while economically and technically feasible, remains improbable for political reasons in the foreseeable future.

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# LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| ALCM | Air-Launched Cruise Missile |
| APRI | L'Association pour la Protection contre les Rayonnements Ionisants |
| CDU | Christian Democratic Union (Germany) |
| CND | Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament |
| CSDP | Common Security and Defense Policy |
| ECSC | European Coal and Steel Community |
| EDA | European Defense Agency |
| EEC | European Economic Community |
| ESDP | European Security and Defense Policy |
| EU | European Union |
| FIG | France-Italy-Germany |
| FRG | Federal Republic of Germany |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GLCM | Ground-Launched Cruise Missile |
| ICAN | International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons |
| INF | Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty |
| IRBM | Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile |
| MDAP | Mutual Defense Assistance Program |
| MS | Member States |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| New START | New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty |
| NNWS | Non-Nuclear-Weapon-States |
| NPT | Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons |
| NWS | Nuclear-Weapon-States |
| OEEC | Organisation for European Economic Co-operation |
| PESCO | Permanent Structured Cooperation |
| PNI | Presidential Nuclear Initiative |
| PTBT | Partial Test Ban Treaty |
| SACEUR | Supreme Allied Commander, Europe |

| | |
|---|---|
| SIPRI | Stockholm International Peace Research Institute |
| SPD | Social Democratic Party of Germany |
| TNW | Tactical Nuclear Weapon |
| TPNW | Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| UN | United Nations |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| WEU | Western European Union |

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# I. INTRODUCTION

European security has historically been vital to world stability, while the onset of upheaval in a continent at peace has also revived the debate about the politics of nuclear weapons and deterrence. The United States has undergirded the peace of European security through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) framework since 1949 with nuclear deterrence and general purpose forces of varying size and character. Two other NATO Allies—Britain and France—have developed nuclear weapons and contribute to the Alliance's overall nuclear deterrence posture. The U.S. and NATO began a regime of sharing nuclear weapons with continental NATO Allies in the late 1950s.

But a new generation has now to discover these old truths in the wake of the Crimean episode and the onset of great power competition. As the NATO Allies declared in July 2018:

> Allies' goal is to continue to bolster deterrence as a core element of our collective defence and to contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance. Following changes in the security environment, NATO has taken steps to ensure its nuclear deterrent capabilities remain safe, secure, and effective. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. The strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of Allies. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance. These Allies' separate centres of decision-making contribute to deterrence by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries. NATO's nuclear deterrence posture also relies on United States' nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and the capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies concerned. National contributions of dual-capable aircraft to NATO's nuclear deterrence mission remain central to this effort. Supporting contributions by Allies concerned to ensure the broadest possible participation in the agreed nuclear burden-sharing arrangements further enhance this mission. Allies concerned will continue to take steps to ensure sustained leadership focus and institutional excellence for the nuclear deterrence mission, coherence between

conventional and nuclear components of NATO's deterrence and defence posture, and effective strategic communications.[1]

This thesis suggests that there are fewer obstacles to establishing a European Union (EU) nuclear deterrent today than there were during the Cold War. These obstacles, however, remain substantial and the strategic risks may not be worth the rewards. The European integration process continues to move forward despite the United Kingdom's pending departure from the European Union in March 2019. Moreover, aggression by China, North Korea, and Russia could force EU members to rely more heavily on each other for support. An EU nuclear deterrent could in some circumstances, however, destroy the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), provoke further aggression by hostile nations, or damage the Atlantic Alliance. It is impossible to foresee the path that the European Union will choose, but this thesis finds that in spite of the technical and economic feasibility of establishing an EU nuclear deterrent, the potential political and strategic repercussions may still deter the member states of the European Union from pursuing such a deterrent force.

## A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

What factors explain why the European Union (EU) has historically been unable—or unwilling—to establish an EU nuclear deterrent? How have these obstacles evolved and what are the most significant current obstacles? What are the prospects for overcoming these obstacles? Because most EU members are Allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), this thesis also investigates (a) why the United States has provided extended nuclear deterrence protection to its NATO European Allies since the Alliance's establishment in 1949 and (b) why these Allies have for the most part (with the exceptions of Britain and France) chosen to rely principally on the U.S. nuclear deterrence commitments and supporting arrangements, with little attention to the hypothetical option of establishing an EU nuclear deterrent.

[1] "NATO – Official Text: Brussels Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, 11–12 July 2018, 11-Jul.-2018," para. 35, accessed October 28, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm.

## B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Understanding the obstacles to the establishment of a European Union nuclear deterrent and how they have evolved since the end of the Second World War may throw light on the possible international repercussions of such a deterrent. The European integration movement following the Second World War aimed to unite European nations in many domains, but defense matters during the Cold War were mainly the responsibility of NATO and the Western European Union (WEU).[2] The rapidly evolving international political climate since 2014 has brought the subject of integrated EU security to the forefront of discussions, reflecting a decline in confidence in some key EU leadership circles in the current U.S.-backed NATO nuclear deterrent structure.

The European Union's loss of confidence in the United States following the 2016 American presidential election is reminiscent of the initial perceived obstacles to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As Marc Trachtenberg has observed, European Community nations expressed doubts in the 1960s as to the credibility of American extended deterrence, particularly as the Soviet-U.S. nuclear arms competition advanced and the direct threat that the USSR could pose to the United States became evident.[3]

In May 2017, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, expressed comparable doubts about U.S. reliability: "We Europeans really have to take our fates in our own hands."[4] Martin Schulz, then the Social Democratic Party (SPD) leader in Germany (and Merkel's chief competitor in the September 2017 election), declared that "closer European cooperation on all fronts is the answer to Donald Trump."[5] Additionally, President Donald Trump's apparently isolationist tendencies, which have included

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[2] In practice, the WEU members relied on NATO to fulfill their Brussels Treaty obligations. The Brussels Treaty parties decided to terminate the treaty on 31 March 2010, with all remaining WEU activities to be terminated in June 2011.

[3] Marc Trachtenberg, "France and NATO, 1949–1991," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 9, no. 3 (September 2011): 186, https://doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2011.593799.

[4] Merkel quoted in "Europe Can No Longer Rely on U.S. and Britain," *Deutsche Welle*, May 28, 2017, accessed September 16, 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/merkel-europe-can-no-longer-rely-on-us-and-britain/a-39018097.

[5] Schulz quoted in "Europe Can No Longer Rely on U.S. and Britain."

comments referring to a possible U.S. withdrawal from overseas engagements, have led to a drastic drop in confidence in the reliability of the United States as a security guarantor from European counterparts.[6]

France and the United Kingdom are today the only nuclear-armed member states of the European Union, and all other EU member states are non-nuclear-weapon states party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A "nuclear umbrella" for NATO Europe is presently provided by the United States and the United Kingdom through the NATO Nuclear Planning Group framework. Moreover, the Allies included the following statement in the 2010 Strategic Concept: "The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies."[7]

A new generation of defense experts must address the renewed attention to nuclear deterrence as a vital component of the European Union's security strategy due to three factors: (1) increased tensions with nuclear-armed powers in Eurasia—especially Russia, China, and North Korea; (2) the U.S. loss of political credibility in recent years; and (3) the European Union's healthy financial status, industrial capabilities, and technological knowledge.

This thesis investigates the hypothesis that three obstacles to an EU nuclear deterrent stand out: (1) doubts about the technical and strategic credibility of the European Union's striving to acquire this capability; (2) lack of mutual confidence among EU members concerning political reliability, methods of decision-making, and the

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[6] Markus Becker, "Running Out of Allies: Trump's Election Triggers Deep Concern in Europe," *Spiegel Online*, November 10, 2016, sec. International, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/european-union-worried-about-trump-presidency-a-1120672.html.

[7] "Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation," adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, 19 November 2010, par. 18, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm?. The Allies included similar statements in the 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts and in the 1974 Ottawa Declaration.

formulation and implementation of a strategy for nuclear deterrence and crisis management; and (3) the growing anti-nuclear movements in some EU countries.

## C. LITERATURE REVIEW

From an early date, the scholarly literature has focused on the establishment and sustainment of the current U.S. "nuclear umbrella" protecting NATO Europe and the original obstacles to a Western European or EU nuclear deterrent. Additionally, some works have addressed the rise and fall in motivating factors for a collective European nuclear deterrent and an integrated European defense and security posture. The European Union, established in 1993, is the successor to a series of organizations created by the European integration movement since the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. The primary sources include public communiqués from the North Atlantic Council and the NATO Nuclear Planning Group as well as EU strategy publications articulating EU policies and priorities**,** plus policy statements by earlier European organizations. Secondary sources include studies and articles by experts analyzing past challenges faced by the European integration movement in its nuclear deterrent development, as well as the changing international atmosphere and the present-day obstacles facing the European Union.

### 1. Background of European Security following the Second World War: Institutional Evolution and New Weapons

At the end of the Second World War, most of Europe was rebuilding and recovering from the devastation wrought by Nazi Germany and other Axis powers. Key European governments sought a solution to prevent another great power war in Europe. Six countries began with an economic integration of European coal and steel resources under the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951.[8] The Treaty of Rome in 1957 further integrated participating European states with the European Economic

[8] "EUROPA – The History of the European Union," Text, European Union, June 16, 2016, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en.

Community (EEC), a common market.[9] The EEC expanded as other European countries joined the "common market," and eventually, duties and tariffs were eliminated among its members, creating the "single market" that then became the basis for the European Union.[10] In 1993, the European Union was formed, and the EEC was absorbed into the new organization, which focused on the "'four freedoms' of: movement of goods, services, people and money."[11] Since 1999, with the initiation of what was then called the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the European Union has begun to also address military European security concerns, a task previously left to the Western European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[12]

The Brussels Treaty of 1948 was the beginning of increased cooperation between Western European countries in security and defense matters. It was an important political factor in making possible NATO's establishment in 1949, and the amended Brussels Treaty furnished the basis for the formation of the WEU in 1955.[13] Originally beginning with only seven members, the WEU's purpose was the collective defense of the member states. As the importance of American aid became evident, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created to coordinate the collective defense policies of the Allies in Europe and North America.[14]

The amended Brussels Treaty that entered into force on May 6, 1955 confirmed the relationship between the WEU and NATO, stating in Article IV that "the High Contracting Parties…shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation…The Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military

[9] "EUROPA – The History of the European Union."

[10] "EUROPA – The History of the European Union."

[11] "EUROPA – The History of the European Union."

[12] "Western European Union | European Defense Organization," Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed February 8, 2018, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Western-European-Union.

[13] "Western European Union | European Defense Organization."

[14] "Western European Union | European Defense Organization."

authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters."[15] Amid the new security environment of the post 1989 order, in 1992, the Western European Union approved the "Petersburg Declaration" listing what were commonly referred to as the "Petersburg Tasks," specifically naming tasks beyond the continuing collective defense obligations of its members. The Petersburg Declaration specified that "military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of the WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking."[16]

The Western European Union continued to assist in collective defense matters until the decision was made to terminate the WEU following the 2007 EU Lisbon Treaty's entry into force on 1 December 2009.[17] The statement announcing this decision handed the reins of collective defense over to NATO due to the obligation placed on Member States to aid and assist any Member State facing armed aggression on its territory. The statement noted that "commitments and cooperation in this area [collective defense] shall be consistent with commitments in NATO, which for its members remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation."[18] Furthermore, judging that "the WEU [had] therefore accomplished its historical role…the States Parties to the Modified Brussels Treaty…collectively decided to terminate the Treaty, thereby effectively closing the organization…by the end of June 2011."[19] The

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[15] "Text of Modified Brussels Treaty," Brussels: Western European Union, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954, http://www.weu.int/Treaty.htm, art. IV.

[16] Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Bonn, "Petersburg Declaration," June 19, 1992, par. 4 of Part II, "On Strengthening WEU's Operational Role," http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf.

[17] "Statement of the Presidency of the Permanent Council of the WEU" on behalf of the High Contracting Parties to the Modified Brussels Treaty – Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, 31 March 2010, Brussels: Western European Union, March 31, 2010, 2, http://www.weu.int/index.html.

[18] Statement of the Presidency of the Permanent Council of the WEU on behalf of the High Contracting Parties to the Modified Brussels Treaty, 1.

[19] Statement of the Presidency of the Permanent Council of the WEU on behalf of the High Contracting Parties to the Modified Brussels Treaty, 1.

Western European Union transferred its responsibilities in security and defense matters to NATO, and its social and cultural activities to the European Union.[20]

Since its formation in 1949, NATO has served as a trans-Atlantic security pact and as a collective defense organization, with the parties committed to coming to the defense of any member subjected to "an armed attack."[21] In that same year, through NATO, President Harry Truman proposed the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) to assist in rebuilding Western European defenses, giving the participants an improved opportunity to resist the Soviet Union's efforts to spread communism.[22] NATO became the primary means to address Western European defense and security concerns, while the later common market growing out of the coal and steel pact of 1950 represented economic and social cooperation. After its formation, the Alliance became the framework for the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" extending over NATO Europe.[23]

The history of European security since World War II and the various organizations that were established, developed, and dissolved is well documented in official texts, treaties, and statements. There is little to debate regarding the factual events, and the political decisions behind each country's participation in the treaties will not be explored in depth in this thesis. These official resources, as well as noteworthy works of scholarship, will be cited in this study's brief background review of European security following the Second World War. The outstanding works of scholarship include Lawrence Freedman's book, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy,* for insights on national nuclear strategies since World War II,[24] as well as Leopoldo Nuti's "Italy and the

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[20] "Western European Union | European Defense Organization."

[21] "Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian," accessed February 8, 2018, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nato. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.

[22] "Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian."

[23] "Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian."

[24] Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 3rd ed (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

Nuclear Choices of the Atlantic Alliance, 1955–63" in *Securing Peace in Europe.*[25] The chapter entitled "Nuclear Weapons in Today's Europe: The Debate That Nobody Wants" in *European Security since the Fall of the Berlin Wall* by Stefanie Von Hlatky and Michel Fortmann is an illuminating discussion of the evolving strategic and nuclear culture in Europe and NATO from a realist perspective.[26] For a deeper understanding of German pacifism following World War II, a thought-provoking source is Michael Geyer's chapter "Cold War Angst: The Case of West-German Opposition to Rearmament and Nuclear Weapons" in *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968***,** edited by Hanna Schissler.[27] An impressive study on the causes of proliferation and the intertwined relationship of nuclear weapons and security is *Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation* by Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro.[28] There is no lack of resources on nuclear weapons and their role in security policy, but these stand out as some of the most thorough and comprehensive analyses. Finally, for a succinct overview of the Alliance's nuclear policies during the Cold War, Michael Wheeler's essay "NATO Nuclear Strategy, 1949–1990" is useful.[29]

### 2. History of a European Nuclear Deterrent

During the Cold War, the largest questions between the United States and its European Allies included maintaining a credible nuclear deterrence and defense posture. In the 1960s, the advent of arms control amid détente between the U.S. and USSR also led to the so called Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 served as a means to

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[25] Leopoldo Nuti, "Italy and the Nuclear Choices of the Atlantic Alliance, 1955–63," in *Securing Peace in Europe, 1945–62*, by Beatrice Heuser and Robert O'Neill, eds. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), 222–245.

[26] Stefanie Von Hlatky and Michel Fortmann, *European Security Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall*, European Union Studies (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2011).

[27] Michael Geyer, "Cold War Angst: The Case of West-German Opposition to Rearmament and Nuclear Weapons," in *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949 - 1968*, edited by Hanna Schissler (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), chap. 17.

[28] Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro, *Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 142 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

[29] Michael O. Wheeler, "NATO Nuclear Strategy, 1949–1990," in Gustav Schmidt, ed., *A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years Vol. 3* (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave, 2001), 121–139.

establish common goals regarding nuclear weapons between the five NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states that chose to participate. According to the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, the parties to the NPT agreed to three objectives: "to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament."[30] Most of the NATO European Allies relied on U.S. nuclear protection from the outset of the Alliance, before any U.S. nuclear weapons were based in Europe. According to General Lauris Norstad, "In fact, the first [U.S.] nuclear elements [tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs)] were introduced into the alliance [in Europe] in the early summer of 1952 and they have grown steadily in power and variety since that time**.**"[31] The initial weapons included "nuclear-capable F-84s on alert in England in 1952" from the U.S. Air Force.[32] The bombs were soon followed by nuclear artillery and surface to surface missiles of varying sizes. Initially, the Americans had the only means of delivering U.S. nuclear warheads, but in 1957, "the Heads of the NATO Governments, meeting in Paris, decided to establish nuclear stockpiles in Europe and to equip the allied forces with systems to deliver the warheads."[33] At issue was the posture of nuclear weapons on German soil, and the chance that the West Germans, like the UK and France, would demand their own weapons, which Norstad tried to brook with an idea of a NATO nuclear force, which never came into existence.

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[30] "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – UNODA," accessed August 25, 2017, https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/.

[31] General Lauris Norstad, USAF, SACEUR from 1956 to 1963, testimony in The Atlantic Alliance, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, Part 2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1966), 69.

[32] Rebecca Grant, "Victor Alert," *Air Force Magazine*, March 2011, accessed 29 February 2018, http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2011/March%202011/0311victor.aspx. Also see F. G. Swanborough and Peter M. Bowers, *United States Military Aircraft Since 1909*, 1st ed. (London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1963), 415.

[33] Norstad, 69

Since 1992, the UK and France have been the only NPT-recognized Western European nuclear-weapon states party to the treaty. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) chose to abstain from developing nuclear weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT and underscored the disarmament aspect of the agreement. Many countries during the Cold War and subsequently have opposed the idea of the Federal Republic of Germany having any national nuclear weapons, preferring the idea of a multilateral or bilateral deterrent, which would restrict control over the actual use of the weapons.[34]

In the late 1950s, more or less as Norstad wrestled with the problem, three of the larger Western European countries (France, Italy, and West Germany) explored the possibility of a European defense independent of their American allies. In 1957–1958, the FIG countries (France-Italy-Germany) pursued an agreement to create a "nuclear capability of their own."[35] Charles de Gaulle chose not to pursue such a cooperative European strategy after his return to power in 1958, terminating the FIG discussions and instead focusing on a national nuclear program. In the fall of 1960, it should be noted, Charles de Gaulle and members of his administration met with various European leaders to discuss creating a "European Europe," in which "he envisioned that a close Franco-German relationship would form the core of this new Western Europe."[36] At one point, de Gaulle raised the idea of France working with Germany to acquire nuclear weapons on the grounds that it would be "intolerable…for our two peoples [France and Germany]…to accept that it is not up to them to defend themselves, and to accept instead that the Americans should have that responsibility."[37]

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[34] Trachtenberg, "France and NATO, 1949–1991," 188.

[35] Trachtenberg, 187–88.

[36] Benjamin Varat, "Point of Departure: A Reassessment of Charles de Gaulle and the Paris Summit of May 1960," *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 31 May 2008, 19:1, 96–124, DOI: 10.1080/09592290801913759, 112.

[37] French President Charles de Gaulle during talks with German Chancellor Adenauer in 1960 quoted in Trachtenberg, "France and NATO, 1949–1991," September 2011, 188. These passages were first quoted (in German translation) in Georges-Henri Soutou, 'De Gaulle, Adenauer und die gemeinsame Front gegen die amerikanische Nuklearstrategie', in *Politische Wandel, organisierte Gewalt und nationale Sicherheit*, ed. E.W. Hansen, G. Schreiber, and B. Wegner (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995), 498–499.

Although the proposal of a collective European nuclear deterrent arose multiple times throughout history, none was ever realized. The United Kingdom developed a national program well before the French, and**,** as noted previously, both countries have joined with their NATO Allies to state that their nuclear weapons "contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies."[38]

For both countries, they are ultimately national assets. In 2015, for example, François Hollande, then the French President, stated, "Our nuclear deterrence goes hand in hand with the constant strengthening of the Europe of Defence. But it is our own. We decide, we assess our vital interests on our own."[39] With regard to the UK, the terms of the 1962 agreement with the United States should be recalled. President John F. Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan met in Nassau on December 21, 1962, and "discussed in considerable detail policy on advanced nuclear weapon systems."[40] In a joint statement following the Nassau meeting, "the Prime Minister made it clear that except where H.M.G. may decide *that supreme national interests are at stake*, these British forces will be used for the purposes of international defense of the Western Alliance in all circumstances."[41] Signed in 1963, the Polaris Sales Agreement provided for the UK's purchase of American "Polaris missiles (less warheads), equipment, and supporting services" and was an important step in sustaining a nuclear program for the United Kingdom.[42]

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[38] North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, paragraph 62 and Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, 19 November 2010, par. 18, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm?.

[39] M. François Hollande, President of the Republic, "Visit to the Strategic Air Forces" (speech, Istres, France, February 19, 2015), French Embassy in Washington, D.C., http://www.ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?article6543

[40] Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President's Office Files, Speech Files, Kennedy-Macmillan joint statement, 21 December 1962, 1, last par., https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-042-013.aspx

[41] Papers of John F. Kennedy, par. 8.

[42] Polaris Sales Agreement, Treaty Series No. 59, April 6, 1963, 12 pp., 2.

Italy was in agreement with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that a nuclear deterrent was necessary to deter Soviet aggression. Italy participated in the trilateral FIG talks, while also discussing the deployment of American Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) in Italy under a dual-key system that had been pioneered by Norstad after 1956 or so.[43] Although there are few specifics in the public domain about the FIG discussions, former Italian Defense Minister Paolo Emilio Taviani confirmed that he met with the French and West German Defense Ministers in "at least seven trilateral meetings, two in Italy, three in Germany and two in France, during which the three Defence Ministers discussed a possible co-operation in producing a European A-bomb."[44] When Charles de Gaulle came to power in France in 1958 and ended further discussions of a joint European nuclear deterrent, Italy proceeded with the IRBM arrangement with the Eisenhower administration.[45] As part of the nuclear-sharing arrangement, the United States and Italy made the *Jupiter* deal, "which led to the deployment of 30 U.S. IRBM missiles in Italy from 1960 to 1963, under a dual key formula."[46]

With regard to developing a national nuclear deterrent, Italy faced an interesting division between military support and civilian opposition, so "any possible scientific inquiry in the military applications of nuclear energy would have [been] carried out by second rate scientists and against the opposition of the country's leading physicists."[47] Additionally, "the only interpretation that can be positively excluded is that the Italian Government ever considered the possibility of developing a totally independent nuclear force on the model of the French *force de frappe*: every time the issue came up, it was

[43] Nuti, "Italy and the Nuclear Choices of the Atlantic Alliance, 1955–63," 230.

[44] Nuti, 230.

[45] Nuti, 231.

[46] Leopoldo Nuti, "Italy's Nuclear Choices," UNISCI Discussion Papers, no. 25 (2011): 173.

[47] Nuti, 171.

rejected outright by the Government because of its financial implications, which would have hamstrung the country's economic growth."[48]

West Germany and France agreed that a collective European nuclear deterrent was not feasible. In their view, Western Europe was too weak to counter a nuclear threat from the USSR.[49] Britain and France developed their own national nuclear programs but were, in some ways, technologically dependent on the United States and unable to organize a multinational deterrent involving other European Allies. Nor was Britain or post-de Gaulle France interested in devising such an arrangement. Historically, French offers of nuclear deterrence discussions with European allies have included the stipulation that France will continue to have the final decision on the utilization of its nuclear weapons, a principle that was ultimately not applauded by German leaders due to their doubts about French dependability.[50] Through many deliberations over the decades, the United States and its NATO Allies settled on arrangements for a U.S. nuclear deterrent within the Alliance framework; one of the key elements was basing American nuclear weapons in several NATO European countries, including West Germany.[51]

The scholarly literature on the events discussed above consists of numerous resources documenting and analyzing the nuclear debate that occurred during the Cold War in Britain, France, and Germany; however, Italy's nuclear path remains relatively unstudied. Some details of the FIG talks can be found in Benjamin Varat's "Point of Departure: A Reassessment of Charles de Gaulle and the Paris Summit of May 1960" in *Diplomacy and Statecraft*.[52] Additionally, this thesis benefits from published works by

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[48] Nuti, "Italy and the Nuclear Choices of the Atlantic Alliance, 1955–63," 231.

[49] Trachtenberg, "France and NATO, 1949–1991," September 2011, 185.

[50] Ursula Jasper and Clara Portela, "EU Defence Integration and Nuclear Weapons: A Common Deterrent for Europe?," *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 2 (April 2010): 158, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010610361889.

[51] David S. Yost, "Assurance and U.S. Extended Deterrence in NATO," International Affairs 85, no. 4 (July 2009): 763, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2009.00826.x.

[52] Benjamin Varat, "Point of Departure: A Reassessment of Charles de Gaulle and the Paris Summit of May 1960," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 19, no. 1 (March 13, 2008): 96–124, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592290801913759.

Leopoldo Nuti, one of the few scholars to study nuclear issues in Italy in depth, since they are available in English and cite original Italian military and government sources. Notably, Nuti's book chapter "Italy and the Nuclear Choices of the Atlantic Alliance, 1955–63" presents remarkable insight into Italian defense strategy at the beginning of the Cold War, with an eye to nuclear matters.[53] The author's paper "Italy's Nuclear Choices" explains why the Italians sought nuclear weapons, by way of a national program or from the United States, to establish their rank in the international hierarchy and demonstrate the importance of the U.S.-Italian relationship.[54] Lastly, Leopoldo Nuti's chapter "The Richest and Farthest Master is Always Best: U.S.-Italian Relations in Historical Perspective" explores Italian foreign policy and the U.S. role from the Second World War until the Iraq War, to include discussing Italy's international standing after World War II.[55]

There are various studies of French nuclear program debate during the Cold War, but among the most exhaustive is that by author and professor Marc Trachtenberg: "France and NATO, 1949–1991."[56] His book *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* offers an enlightening perspective on international relations during the Cold War with a focus on "the German question."[57] Other sources on French nuclear deterrence policy include the following works by David S. Yost: the monographs entitled *France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe, Part 1: Capabilities and Doctrine* and *Part II: Strategic and Arms Control Implications*; the book chapter entitled "French Nuclear Targeting," and the book chapter entitled "France's

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[53] Leopoldo Nuti, "Italy and the Nuclear Choices of the Atlantic Alliance, 1955–63," in *Securing Peace in Europe, 1945–62*, by Beatrice Heuser and Robert O'Neill, eds., (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), 222–245.

[54] Nuti, "Italy's Nuclear Choices."

[55] Leopoldo Nuti, "The Richest and Farthest Master is Always the Best: US-Italian Relations in Historical Perspective," in *The Atlantic Alliance under Stress: US-European Relations after Iraq* by David M. Andrews, ed., (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 177–200.

[56] Trachtenberg, "France and NATO, 1949–1991," September 2011.

[57] Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1999).

Nuclear Deterrence Strategy: Concepts and Operational Implementation."[58] There is also a multitude of journal and newspaper articles analyzing the French nuclear program available for reference. Additionally, French newspaper and journal articles documenting the debates are cited in this thesis.

Britain, like France, pursued a national nuclear program but with the assistance of the United States, particularly after 1958; therefore, original agreements and official sources from the two countries are used as the basis for the study of the British and French forces. In particular, the Polaris Agreement, comments made by General Lauris Norstad, USAF, who served as SACEUR from 1956 to 1963, and journal articles by recognized experts are used. An excellent source for the British perspective on attaining nuclear weapons is the book by Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold: *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1945–1952*.[59]

Lastly, Germany's nuclear debate is analyzed through journal articles discussing "the German problem." Trachtenberg's book *A Constructed Peace: The Making of a European Settlement, 1945–1963,* as noted above, establishes "the German problem" as the largest motivating force for peace in Europe following World War II. Most countries in Western Europe did not want to see a strong military or nuclear capability in Germany at that time, a viewpoint affirmed in the aforementioned article "France and NATO, 1949–1991" by Marc Trachtenberg. Wolfgang Krieger's "The Germans and the Nuclear Question" occasional paper emphasizes Germany's anti-nuclear stance following German re-unification in 1990.[60] More recent NATO dilemmas with regard to nuclear weapons in

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[58] David S. Yost, France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe, Part I: Capabilities and Doctrine and Part II: Strategic and Arms Control Implications, *Adelphi Papers* no. 194 and 195 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1984/85); "French Nuclear Targeting," in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1986), 127–156; and "France Nuclear Deterrence Strategy: Concepts and Operational Implementation," in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., *Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004), 197–237.

[59] Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold, *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1952* (London [etc.]: Macmillan [for the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority], 1974).

[60] Wolfgang Krieger, *The Germans and the Nuclear Question*, vol. 5, Alois Mertes Memorial Lecture 14 (German Historical Institute, 1995), http://www.ghi-dc.org/fileadmin/user_upload/GHI_Washington/PDFs/Occasional_Papers/The_Germans_and_the_Nuclear_Question.pdf.

Germany are discussed in Michael Paul's Working Paper, "Germany and Nuclear Weapons" and highlight Germany's increasingly anti-nuclear stance, whose growing political influence poses resistance to an EU nuclear deterrent.[61]

## D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

This thesis investigates the hypothesis that the obstacles to the establishment of an EU nuclear deterrent have evolved, and that the prospect of the European Union establishing a nuclear deterrent independent from the United States has become more plausible owing to current dynamics in national and world politics. These dynamics include divergent factors, such as the rising anti-nuclear and pro-Russia movements in Western Europe, as well as the European Union's increasing unity in defense and security matters. For example, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), an agreement signed by twenty-five of the twenty-eight EU countries (all except Denmark, Malta, and the UK) at the end of 2017, committed the signatories to "fund, develop, and deploy armed forces together."[62] Although the performance of the U.S. economy has improved under President Donald Trump as of October 2018, the U.S. President continues to pressure NATO Allies to increase defense spending and to take on a larger role in burden sharing in order to maintain the current arrangement of an American nuclear umbrella within the NATO framework.[63] Short of that, the current lack of confidence in the United States in EU leadership circles and increasing threats from Russia and North Korea make EU security a high priority and could create a genuine need for an EU nuclear deterrent.

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[61] Paul, Michael, "Germany and Nuclear Weapons," Working Paper, FG03-WP No. 7 (Research Division: European and Atlantic Security, December 2010), https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/pau_AP_Januar2011_ks.pdf.

[62] Paul, Michael, "Germany and Nuclear Weapons," Working Paper, FG03-WP No. 7 (Research Division: European and Atlantic Security, December 2010), https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/pau_AP_Januar2011_ks.pdf.

[63] Anthony Mirhaydari, "What's Up With the U.S. Economy, Anyway?," *MoneyWatch*, June 6, 2017, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-economy-growth-gdp-unemployment/; Chuck Jones, "Trump's Economic Scorecard: 18 Months Into His Presidency," *Forbes*, accessed October 24, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckjones/2018/07/27/trumps-economic-scorecard-18-months-into-his-presidency/.

Following an analysis of the present obstacles to a European Union nuclear deterrent, this thesis explores the possible consequences of such a nuclear deterrent. Specifically, in the absence of a credible NATO nuclear deterrent based on U.S. capabilities and commitments, the pursuit of an EU deterrent could provoke EU non-nuclear-weapon states, such as Germany and Italy, to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and start national nuclear weapons programs due to their lack of confidence in the EU nuclear deterrent. The European Union could also form a "new federated European state" and succeed to nuclear status with respect to the NPT based on France's current nuclear-weapon state status.[64] According to U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk's report to President Lyndon Johnson in 1968,

> It [the NPT] does not deal with the problem of European unity, and would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. A new federated European state would have to control all of its external security functions including defense and all foreign policy matters relating to external security, but would not have to be so centralized as to assume all governmental functions. While not dealing with succession by such a federated state, the treaty would bar transfer of nuclear weapons (including ownership) or control over them to any recipient, including a multilateral entity.[65]

Looking to Russia for protection would represent what theorists of alliance formation such as Stephen M. Walt and Glenn H. Snyder call "bandwagoning"—that is, choosing to align with a threatening power. Such a choice would be more probable, Snyder has argued, if states "are weak, if strong allies are not available for balancing purposes, or if the threatening state is believed to be appeasable."[66] In the case under examination in this thesis, the European Union states do not regard themselves as so feeble in relation to Tehran and Pyongyang. Their preferences would probably be to preserve their security and independence via "balancing"—that is, allying themselves

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[64] Dean Rusk's "Report by Secretary of State Rusk to President [Lyndon] Johnson on the Nonproliferation Treaty, July 2, 1968," in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, 1968 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), 478.

[65] Dean Rusk, 478.

[66] Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliances, balance, and stability," *International Organization*, vol. 45, no.1 (Winter 1991), 127.

against Russia, the greatest threat at hand. Historically, since the late 1940s, even before the founding of NATO in 1949, the Western European states have chosen the option of "strong allies" for balancing, with most of them allied to the United States. A key question at issue in this thesis is whether the European Union countries might in plausible circumstances find the United States no longer a reliable nuclear guarantor and deliberately seek to construct their own nuclear deterrence capabilities to substitute for U.S. protection. This question would involve overlapping sets of theoretical issues—those concerning extended deterrence protection of allies and those regarding the "assurance" of allies as to their confidence in the guarantor's effectiveness.

Theories of extended deterrence take several factors into account. Vesna Danilovic has highlighted the guarantor's capabilities in relation to those of the adversary and relative vulnerabilities in conflict, and the interests at stake for the security guarantor, the protected allies, and the adversary. Perceptions in crises and protracted confrontations—notably involving threats to use force and displays of force—could affect alliance cohesion.[67] David Yost has suggested that the "assurance" function of U.S. extended deterrence arrangements might be defined for the United States as "communicating a credible message of confidence in the dependability of its security commitments." In Yost's view, allied "confidence in the reliability of the United States" is one of the essential elements of "assurance" in U.S. extended deterrence arrangements.[68] This thesis therefore investigates interrelated hypotheses: that lack of confidence in U.S. extended deterrence protection could erode "assurance" and alliance cohesion; that in the presence of a continuing threat from Moscow, the European Union members could be motivated by "balancing" imperatives to build their own nuclear deterrence posture, with less or no reliance on Washington; and that the European Union states could nonetheless encounter long-standing and perhaps growing internal obstacles

[67] Vesna Danilovic, *When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 59.

[68] David S. Yost, "Assurance and U.S. Extended Deterrence in NATO," *International Affairs*, vol. 85, no. 4 (July 2009), 755, 764.

to organizing an EU nuclear deterrent, including mutual mistrust and the rise of anti-nuclear movements in their societies.

The strengthening anti-nuclear movements in Western Europe, in combination with a hypothetical withdrawal of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe, could further increase support in Western and Central Europe for a nuclear-weapon-free world. If the U.S. nuclear weapons were removed, anti-nuclear movements in the respective EU states would probably strongly protest any plans for replacements. Lastly, if the European Union member states truly doubted U.S. credibility and were unable to provide for their own nuclear defense, they might turn eastward to Russia, instead of westward, to ensure their security against developing nuclear programs such as that in North Korea. In light of the pending British withdrawal from the EU (Brexit), a German expert wrote that a possible future for the EU could be "a zone of states economically aligning themselves with Germany and likely either looking to the U.S. or rather even to Russia for protection."[69]

## E. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis presents a qualitative analysis of historical obstacles to an EU nuclear deterrent and analyzes how international dynamics have changed, resulting in new and different challenges. The focus is on the larger and more influential members of the European Union—Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, while also taking into account rising social movements in other EU member states. The implications of the 2016 British referendum vote to leave the European Union and the pending "Brexit" are also considered. The analysis identifies the factors that prevented Western Europe from establishing a European nuclear deterrent during the Cold War, as well as the rising unity among Western European states since the creation of the European Union and the pursuit of its expanding responsibilities.

[69] Joachim Krause, "'The Times They Are a Changin' – Fundamental Structural Change in International Relations as a Challenge for Germany and Europe," *SIRIUS - Zeitschrift Für Strategische Analysen* 1, no. 1 (January 21, 2017): 15, https://doi.org/10.1515/sirius-2017-0025.

Through the lens of Western Europe's past, this thesis analyzes which of these obstacles continue to affect the European Union, and identifies new hurdles that the European Union would face if it sought an EU nuclear deterrent. Additionally, the thesis considers the factors influencing EU member states' possible drive to become less dependent on U.S. security protection. There is increasing evidence from statements made by European leaders that the European Union has since 1999 become a framework for more than just economic cooperation, specifically security and defense cooperation; and this might lead in some circumstances to decreased NATO participation. Lastly, aggression from China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia has revitalized the importance of nuclear deterrence in the United States and Western Europe. This thesis considers new security concerns in Western Europe as a driver for an EU nuclear deterrent, while analyzing the changing political dynamics and the challenges that anti-nuclear movements may present to EU member states.

Studies by scholars as well as statements by government officials are used to analyze the obstacles during and since the Cold War. Mainstream media articles, press releases, and speeches provide insight to evolving security policies and priorities in Western Europe and rising threats facing EU member states. Official security and defense policy statements from NATO and the European Union are used to define the goals of these organizations. Sources in French and English are consulted in the original, while other documents are translated into English when necessary. Overall, the sources provide a brief review of historical obstacles and a present-day perspective on the EU's security concerns and the challenges it would face if it were to establish an EU nuclear deterrent.

## F. THESIS OVERVIEW

Chapter II provides a brief background of the formation of the current U.S. nuclear umbrella over Europe through the NATO framework. Additionally, it provides background on the European integration movement and past attempts to develop a European multinational nuclear deterrent. Lastly, this chapter discusses the rise of the anti-nuclear movements in Europe, particularly in the larger and more influential European countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom.

Chapter III examines present-day factors that could motivate the governments of EU countries to pursue an independent European nuclear deterrent independent of the United States. In particular, the chapter highlights the United States' loss of credibility with its European Allies following (a) President Obama's decision in 2013 not to enforce the "red line" he had specified regarding Syria's use of chemical weapons and (b) the 2016 presidential election of Donald Trump. Moreover, acts of aggression by Eurasian countries such as China, North Korea, and Russia are increasing pressure on European countries and posing new threats to stability. Lastly, the technological and financial capabilities of European nations to develop, build, and maintain a nuclear deterrent is probably more feasible now than it ever was during the Cold War.

Chapter IV explores present-day obstacles to an EU nuclear deterrent. Despite the economic and technical capacity to acquire such a deterrent, the political will of European nations remains a question to be answered. Are EU nations prepared to integrate nuclear capabilities and trust each other? Additionally, the United Kingdom's scheduled exit (Brexit) from the EU will affect the EU's capacity to pursue a nuclear deterrent, but also European integration efforts. Finally, the anti-nuclear movements that first emerged during the Cold War remain active and vocal in opposing not only nuclear weapons, but nuclear energy as well. Are European governments willing to risk a test of political standing by publicly uniting in seeking a European Union nuclear deterrent?

Chapter V analyzes the possible repercussions of the establishment of an EU nuclear deterrent. Depending on the path chosen, the development of a multinational nuclear deterrent could undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), prompting some countries to invest in nuclear weapons (for example, Iran) and antagonize already defensive and aggressive nations such as Russia and North Korea. Secondly, the deterrent may be insufficient to serve its intended purpose, resulting in a weakened and vulnerable Western Europe. The ripple effects, such as damage to the NPT and possible international turmoil, might prove to be the ultimate obstacle to an EU nuclear deterrent.

Chapter VI summarizes the main findings and presents conclusions.

# II. EUROPEAN SECURITY AFTER WORLD WAR II DEVASTATION

France and the United Kingdom are today the only nuclear-armed Member States (MS) of the European Union with their status as nuclear powers recognized in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). All other EU member states are non-nuclear-weapon states. The United Kingdom and the United States, through the NATO Nuclear Planning Group framework, presently provide a "nuclear umbrella" for NATO Europe. However, France and other European countries were hesitant to rely on the United States for nuclear protection following World War II. Therefore, a brief background as to the establishment of today's framework provides insight regarding the historical obstacles to a European Union nuclear deterrent, as well as perspective as to modern challenges that continue to face the European Union in such an endeavor.

## A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S.-NATO NUCLEAR UMBRELLA

### *Role of France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom in the Development of the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella*

Following the Second World War, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) sought only security, reunification, and economic stability. In this policy existed the anxiety that a divided Germany would be abandoned by the western allies and that, in the matter of nuclear weapons, the FRG would be damned with an inferior international status.

Under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer from 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany had benefited from the Marshall Plan, which helped finance its economic recovery.[70] Once the Korean War in June 1950 made European security even more acute, Adenauer realized that the leading Western countries (Britain, France, and the United States) would not allow the Federal Republic of Germany to have nuclear weapons;

[70] "History of the Marshall Plan - George C. Marshall," accessed September 15, 2017, http://marshallfoundation.org/marshall/the-marshall-plan/history-marshall-plan/.

however, Western Europe and the United States recognized that the FRG had to be involved in security policy due to its strategic geographic location.[71] Through many negotiations, including the London and Paris agreements of 1954, the Brussels Treaty was amended and the Western European Union was established, finally making it possible for the FRG to join NATO. Adenauer renounced German manufacture of nuclear weapons on German soil.

The United States and its NATO Allies settled on reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent within the NATO structure; the arrangements included American nuclear weapons based in the FRG and other European countries.[72] The Federal Republic of Germany and France agreed in the 1950s that a European nuclear deterrent was infeasible because they viewed Western Europe as too weak to counter a nuclear threat from the USSR.[73] Many believed that the Federal Republic of Germany wanted to maintain the status quo of a U.S. nuclear deterrent to keep its strong ties with the United States; arguably, a stronger Europe would benefit the United States if Washington required fewer resources to protect Western Europe. The decision to place U.S. nuclear weapons in the FRG in the 1950s was the best way to defend against the Cold War Soviet threat and to reassure Germany's Allies and neighbors throughout the Cold War.

During the Cold War, the largest questions between the United States and its NATO Allies included maintaining a credible nuclear deterrence and defense posture. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 served as a means to establish common goals regarding nuclear weapons between the five NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon-states (NWS) (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and the non-nuclear-weapon-states (NNWS) that chose to participate. As noted in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the parties to the NPT agreed to three objectives: "to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote

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[71] Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 318.

[72] Yost, "Assurance and U.S. Extended Deterrence in NATO," 763.

[73] Trachtenberg, "France and NATO, 1949–1991," September 2011, 185.

cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament."[74] Since 1992, the United Kingdom and France have been the only NPT-recognized Western European nuclear-weapon-states party to the treaty. The Federal Republic of Germany chose to abstain from developing nuclear weapons as a party to the NPT. While the FRG endorsed the disarmament aspect of the agreement, it made the following statement on signing the NPT: "The Federal Government [of Germany] understands that . . . the security of the Federal Republic of Germany and its allies shall continue to be ensured by NATO or an equivalent security system."[75]

Great Britain was also wary of the Soviet Union and in January 1947 resumed the national nuclear weapon program that it had originally initiated in September 1941. Despite the extensive UK-U.S. cooperation on the Manhattan Project during World War II, the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1946 hindered collaboration between London and Washington until the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the 1958 U.S.-UK Mutual Defense Agreement. In 1966, General Lauris Norstad, who had served as SACEUR, testified that U.S. nuclear weapons were first deployed in Europe in 1952. In his words, "The first nuclear elements were introduced into the alliance [in Europe] in the early summer of 1952 and they have grown steadily in power and variety since that time."[76] There were "nuclear-capable F-84s on alert in England in 1952" from the U.S. Air Force.[77] Initially, the Americans had the only means of delivering these warheads, but in 1957, according to Norstad**,** "the Heads of the NATO Governments, meeting in Paris,

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[74] "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – UNODA."

[75] Statement on signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 28 November 1969, http://disarmament.un.org/treatystatus.nsf/952a13b8945f4b07852568770078d9c2/5c88b675bd2d0bb68525688f006d2653?OpenDocument

[76] General Lauris Norstad, USAF, SACEUR from 1956 to 1963, testimony in The Atlantic Alliance, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, Part 2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1966), 69.

[77] Swanborough and Bowers, *United States Military Aircraft Since 1909*, 415.

decided to establish nuclear stockpiles in Europe and to equip the allied forces with systems to deliver the warheads."[78]

Italy, as one of the major European powers at the time, also sought access to nuclear weapons and their technology. The Eisenhower administration made nuclear weapons the central pillar of NATO's security, which "clearly enhanced the interest of the Western Europeans in their control – even before the Russian technological breakthroughs of 1957 reinforced the European concern and turned the issue of *nuclear sharing* into the most critical dilemma of Transatlantic relations for the next 8–10 years."[79] As Leopoldo Nuti has pointed out, Italy "displayed from very early on a strong interest in developing an Atlantic framework to solve the problem of access to the new technology."[80] Italy participated in the trilateral FIG (France-Italy-Germany) European security talks, while also discussing the prospective deployment of American Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) to Italy under a dual-key system.[81] Although there are few specifics in the public domain about the FIG discussions, former Italian Defense Minister Paolo Emilio Taviani confirmed that he met with the French and German Defense Ministers in "at least seven trilateral meetings, two in Italy, three in Germany and two in France, during which the three Defence Ministers discussed a possible co-operation in producing a European A-bomb."[82] When Charles de Gaulle returned to power in France in 1958 and ended further discussions of a joint European nuclear deterrent, Italy proceeded with the IRBM arrangement with the Eisenhower administration.[83] As part of the nuclear-sharing arrangement, the United States and Italy

[78] Norstad, 69–70.

[79] Nuti, "Italy's Nuclear Choices," 171. Italics in original.

[80] Leopoldo Nuti, "Italy's Nuclear Choices," UNISCI Discussion Papers, no. 25 (2011): 172.

[81] Nuti, "Italy and the Nuclear Choices of the Atlantic Alliance, 1955–63," 230.

[82] Nuti, 230.

[83] Nuti, 231.

made the *Jupiter* deal, "which led to the deployment of 30 U.S. IRBM missiles in Italy from 1960 to 1963, under a dual key formula."[84]

With regard to developing a national nuclear deterrent, Italy faced a complex division between military support and civilian opposition, so "any possible scientific inquiry in the military applications of nuclear energy would have to be carried out by second rate scientists and against the opposition of the country's leading physicists."[85] Additionally, "the only interpretation that can be positively excluded is that the Italian Government ever considered the possibility of developing a totally independent nuclear force on the model of the French *force de frappe*: every time the issue came up, it was rejected outright by the Government because of its financial implications, which would have hamstrung the country's economic growth."[86]

France was not initially opposed to an American nuclear umbrella, but it sought greater influence in Europe and did not want to rely on the United States to maintain the extended nuclear umbrella. However, according to Marc Trachtenberg, an award-winning historian of the Cold War, "the French could not feel comfortable relying so heavily on American power, especially over the long run. A foreign power based thousands of miles away, no matter how well-intentioned, was bound to see things differently, bound to have its own interests which were not totally identical with those of France."[87] In 1958, the French briefly considered a shared European deterrent with Italy and Germany, called the FIG agreement, but President Charles de Gaulle discarded this plan when he returned to office.[88] The French nuclear program began in October 1948, but gained public support in 1957 due to "strong nationalist pressures" favoring a "national nuclear weapons

[84] Nuti, "Italy's Nuclear Choices," 173.

[85] Nuti, 171.

[86] Nuti, "Italy and the Nuclear Choices of the Atlantic Alliance, 1955–63," 231.

[87] Trachtenberg, "France and NATO, 1949–1991," 186.

[88] Trachtenberg, "France and NATO, 1949–1991," 188.

program," and France tested its first nuclear weapon in February 1960.[89] Just two years later, in 1960, Charles de Gaulle and members of his administration met with various European leaders, including Konrad Adenauer, to discuss creating a "European Europe," in which "he envisioned that a close Franco-German relationship would form the core of this new Western Europe."[90] At one point, de Gaulle raised the idea of France working with Germany to acquire nuclear weapons on the grounds that it would be "intolerable…for our two peoples [France and Germany]…to accept that it is not up to them to defend themselves, and to accept instead that the Americans should have that responsibility."[91] Charles de Gaulle saw French nuclear weapons as central to any European nuclear deterrent, stating:

> In order for Europe to exist, it is necessary that she should take charge…of her defence, and in order to do this…she should have at her disposal nuclear weapons. Once we get there, we will see that the French ownership of national nuclear weapons will be the keystone of the European construction.[92]

Under de Gaulle, France left the NATO integrated military structure in 1966 due to strained ties with the United States and other Allies. During this period, the strained ties with France had led Americans to reconsider any bilateral nuclear arrangements previously discussed with the French. American policy-makers preferred acting within the NATO framework for any cooperation or nuclear sharing programs, and thought "it would be bad policy to reward General de Gaulle by nuclear sharing with him after his

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[89] National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 184, Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, "French Position on Disarmament May Be Shifting," *Current Intelligence Bulletin Document 9*, May 29, 1957. "French Nuclear Weapons Program," *Current Intelligence Weekly, Document 10*, September 18, 1958. "French Nuclear Test Plans*," Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, Document 13*, February 25, 1960, available at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB184/index.htm.

[90] Varat, "Point of Departure," 112.

[91] French President Charles de Gaulle during talks with German Chancellor Adenauer on 29 July 1960 quoted in Trachtenberg, "France and NATO, 1949–1991," September 2011, 188. These passages were first quoted (in German translation) in Georges-Henri Soutou, 'De Gaulle, Adenauer und die gemeinsame Front gegen die amerikanische Nuklearstrategie', in *Politische Wandel, organisierte Gewalt und nationale Sicherheit*, ed. E.W. Hansen, G. Schreiber, and B. Wegner (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995), 498–9.

[92] Charles de Gaulle quoted in Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 169.

continuous non-cooperation with NATO."[93] The West Germans again broached the subject of a European nuclear deterrent in the 1970s, but "the French evaded those overtures."[94] Intermittent discussions of a multilateral or bilateral European nuclear deterrent occurred repeatedly throughout the Cold War, but did not lead to action.

Even as late as 1992, President François Mitterrand stated during a meeting on European integration, "The issue of compatibility between the French nuclear forces and European defence would have to be addressed."[95] He later asked "Is it possible to conceive of a European [nuclear] doctrine? This question will quickly become one of the major questions in the construction of a common European defense."[96] Deputy Defense Minister Jacques Mellick provided further specifics on an approach called *"dissuasion concertée.*"[97] The French distinguished between extended nuclear deterrence, or *la dissuasion élargie,* and a united European deterrent under a French nuclear umbrella, *la dissuasion concertée*.[98] The introduction of this term into French discussions demonstrates that they were considering a European nuclear deterrent. The dialogue on European nuclear cooperation continued unofficially until 1997, but the European Union was not prepared structurally or politically to handle this responsibility. Coincidentally, 1992 was also the year that the French realized that signing the NPT would give them an

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[93] Dillon-Gates-McCone meeting, U.S. Department of State Archive [online], August 24, 1960, *NP/85/ Atomic-Nuclear Policy 1960 (2)/DDEL*, 3.

[94] Trachtenberg, "France and NATO, 1949–1991," 189–90.

[95] Jasper and Portela, "EU Defence Integration and Nuclear Weapons," 157. Originally quoted in Pascal Boniface, 1996. "Dissuasion concertée: Le sens de la formule" [Concerted Deterrence: The Meaning of the Formula], *Relations Internationales et Stratégiques 21*: 102.

[96] "La construction communautaire et l'avenir de la force de dissuasion La France suggère à ses partenaires d'étudier une 'doctrine' nucléaire pour l'Europe Un tabou écorné," *Le Monde*, January 12, 1992, sec. Archives, https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1992/01/12/la-construction-communautaire-et-l-avenir-de-la-force-de-dissuasion-la-france-suggere-a-ses-partenaires-d-etudier-une-doctrine-nucleaire-pour-l-europe-un-tabou-ecorne_3880632_1819218.html?xtmc=la_france_suggere_a_ses_partenaires_d_etudier_une_doctrine_nucleaire_pour_l_europe&xtcr=1.

[97] Jasper and Portela, "EU Defence Integration and Nuclear Weapons," 157.

[98] Jasper and Portela, 157.

opportunity to influence nuclear non-proliferation diplomacy, and under Mitterrand, they became a nuclear-armed party to the NPT.[99]

Ultimately, Trachtenberg gives the following reasons that French favor shifted to support for U.S. extended nuclear deterrence via NATO: "the reluctance of the French to allow the Germans to get any control over nuclear weapons," the belief that "German power could…be contained only within the framework of a strong U.S.-dominated system," and the reality that "France herself was not strong enough to play a major independent role in world politics."[100] A collective European deterrent, argues Trachtenberg, "would have been better, from the U.S. point of view, at least in principle, if the Europeans could ultimately balance Soviet power on their own."[101] According to Trachtenberg,

> The West Germans, especially during the second half of Konrad Adenauer's chancellorship, that is, from the mid-1950s to early 1963, were also very interested in building a system of that sort. Adenauer in particular felt that West Germany, in the long run, had to be able to defend itself, and that meant that it had to have some kind of nuclear capability...And it was quite clear also that a European force could only be built in cooperation with the French.[102]

The idea of a "European Europe" originated with the French, through Charles de Gaulle, whose "basic philosophy, the idea that Europe had to be European, that it had to be independent of both East and West, and that it therefore had to be able to defend itself, implied that something of the sort could not simply be ruled out."[103]

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[99] Trachtenberg, "France and NATO, 1949–1991," September 2011, 191.

[100] Trachtenberg, "France and NATO, 1949–1991," 186, 189, 190.

[101] Trachtenberg, "France and NATO, 1949–1991," 187.

[102] Trachtenberg, "France and NATO, 1949–1991," 187.

[103] Trachtenberg, "France and NATO, 1949–1991," 188.

## B. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION MOVEMENT AND MULTINATIONAL NUCLEAR DETERRENT DEBATE

After the Second World War, European integration and cooperation were considered imperative by U.S. and European makers of policy in order to avoid another world war, along with the consequent devastation. The United Nations (UN) was founded in 1945 "by 51 countries committed to maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations and promoting social progress, better living standards and human rights."[104] Due to the "breakdown in U.S.-Soviet relations and the failure of the UN to keep the peace," Europeans "hoped that, through greater unity, they could form a 'third force' to match America and Russia."[105] The economic situation of Western Europe following World War II meant that a "third force" was not possible, but the Marshall Plan of 1947 led to economic unification, and "West European states created the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) to supervise the Marshall aid programme."[106] The OEEC served as a framework for European economic integration and has been known since 1961 as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Other integrated European organizations were created in the 1950s, culminating in the formation of the European Union (EU) in 1993.

The European Union is a present-day organization that resulted from previous institutional manifestations of the European integration movement, including the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of 1951 (The Treaty of Paris) and the European Economic Community (ECC) in 1957 (The Treaty of Rome).[107] The Schuman Declaration in May 1950, articulated by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, was

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[104] "History of the UN | United Nations Seventieth Anniversary," accessed March 12, 2018, http://www.un.org/un70/en/content/history.

[105] John W. Young, *Cold War Europe, 1945–89: A Political History* (London ; New York : New York, NY: E. Arnold ; Routledge, Chapman and Hall [distributor], 1991), 29.

[106] Young, 30.

[107] Michael Wilkinson, "What Is the EU, Why Was It Created and When Was It Formed?," *The Telegraph*, February 21, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/what-is-the-eu-why-was-it-formed-and-when-was-it-created/.

the organizational start of the European unification effort.[108] Schuman was a proponent of bringing Europe together. As Jean Monnet said of him, "For a long time, people spoke of European unity. But words, general ideas, good intentions were not enough. Concrete action was necessary to bring that idea to reality. That action was started by the Schuman Plan."[109] In 1993, the European Union was formed**,** and the EEC was absorbed into the new organization, which focused on the "'four freedoms' of: movement of goods, services, people and money."[110] Since 1999, with the initiation of what was then called the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the European Union has begun to also address military European security concerns, a task previously left to the Western European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[111]

The Brussels Treaty of 1948 was the beginning of increased cooperation between Western European countries in security and defense matters. It was an important political factor in making possible NATO's establishment in 1949**,** and the amended Brussels Treaty furnished the basis for the formation of the WEU in 1955.[112] Originally beginning with only seven members, the WEU's purpose was the collective defense of the member states. As the importance of American aid became evident, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created to coordinate the collective defense policies of the Allies in Europe and North America.[113]

The amended Brussels Treaty that entered into force in May 1955 confirmed the relationship between the WEU and NATO, stating in Article IV that "the High Contracting Parties…shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation…[T]he Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military

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[108] Wilkinson.

[109] Jean Monnet at a ceremony at Scy-Chazelles in honor of Robert Schuman, 3 October 1965, cited in Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, "General de Gaulle's Europe and Jean Monnet's Europe," *The World Today*, vol. 22, no. 1 (January 1966), p.9.

[110] "EUROPA – The History of the European Union."

[111] "Western European Union | European Defense Organization."

[112] "Western European Union | European Defense Organization."

[113] "Western European Union | European Defense Organization."

authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters."[114] In 1992, the Western European Union signed the "Petersburg Declaration" listing what are commonly referred to as the "Petersburg Tasks," and specifically addressing the continuing collective defense obligations of its members. The tasks clarified that, in addition to collective defense, "military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of the WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking."[115]

The Western European Union continued to assist in collective defense matters until the decision was made to terminate the WEU following the 2007 Lisbon Treaty's entry into force on 1 December 2009.[116] The statement announcing this decision handed the reins of collective defense over to NATO due to the obligation placed on Member States to aid and assist any Member States facing armed aggression on their territory and that "commitments and cooperation in this area [collective defense] shall be consistent with commitments in NATO, which for its members remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation."[117] Furthermore, believing that "the WEU [had] therefore accomplished its historical role…the States Parties to the Modified Brussels Treaty…collectively decided to terminate the Treaty, thereby effectively closing the organization…by the end of June 2011."[118] The Western

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[114] "Text of Modified Brussels Treaty," Brussels: Western European Union, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954, Texts of the Treaty and the Protocols, Brussels: Western European Unionhttp://www.weu.int/Treaty.htm, art. IV.

[115] Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Bonn, June 19, 1992, "Petersburg Declaration," par. 4 of Part II, "On Strengthening WEU's Operational Role," Available at http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf.

[116] Statement of the Presidency of the Permanent Council of the WEU on behalf of the High Contracting Parties to the Modified Brussels Treaty – Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, 31 March 2010, Brussels: Western European Union, 31.03.2010. 2 p. http://www.weu.int/index.html.

[117] Statement of the Presidency of the Permanent Council of the WEU on behalf of the High Contracting Parties to the Modified Brussels Treaty, 1.

[118] Statement of the Presidency of the Permanent Council of the WEU on behalf of the High Contracting Parties to the Modified Brussels Treaty, 1.

European Union transferred its responsibilities in security and defense matters to NATO, and its social and cultural activities to the European Union.[119]

Since its formation in 1949, NATO has served as a collective defense organization, with the parties committed to coming to the defense of any member subjected to "an armed attack."[120] In that same year, through NATO, President Harry Truman proposed the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) to assist in rebuilding Western European defenses, giving the participants an improved opportunity to resist the Soviet Union's spread of communism.[121] NATO became the primary means to address Western European defense and security concerns, while the European Union represented economic and social cooperation. After its formation, the Alliance became the framework for the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" extending over NATO Europe.[122]

Most recently, on December 14, 2017, 25 EU governments signed the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) pact to "fund, develop and deploy armed forces together," officially uniting most of the 28 member states of the European Union in security matters (the exceptions are Denmark, Malta, and the UK).[123] The participating EU governments confess that rising tensions with Russia and declining confidence in the United States due to President Trump were both motivating factors.[124]

## C. RISE OF THE ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT IN EUROPE

As the European integration movement rose at the same time that the British, French, and U.S. developed and fielded nuclear weapons, so did the anti-nuclear movement. The anti-nuclear movements in Europe have generally not distinguished

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[119] "Western European Union | European Defense Organization."

[120] "Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian."

[121] "Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian."

[122] "Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian."

[123] Robin Emmott, "'Bad News for Our Enemies': EU Launches Defense Pact," *Reuters*, December 14, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-defence/bad-news-for-our-enemies-eu-launches-defense-pact-idUSKBN1E82BA.

[124] Emmott, "'Bad News for Our Enemies': EU Launches Defense Pact."

between nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, in spite of attempts by state leaders to separate the two technologies. According to Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollack from Cornell University's Program on Science, Technology and Society, "Nuclear power is, above all, a symbol associated with death and war, and this is what drives the nuclear debate… Nuclear advocates use linguistic tactics to dissociate civilian from military uses of atomic energy."[125]

Following the U.S. bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 1945, the horrid effects of nuclear weapons shocked the world**,** and anti-nuclear movements formed in protest in many European countries**,** including Austria, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Starting in the late 1950s, this movement continued to grow in Europe, exacerbated in the mid-1980s by nuclear accidents in Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima. The anti-nuclear movement opposes nuclear arms and power, which could hinder any attempts to create an EU nuclear deterrent in the future.

The British anti-nuclear social movement solidified with the formation of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in January 1958, coming "together…at the annual marches between the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston (in Berkshire), and London."[126] The CND has always demanded universal nuclear disarmament and pushes for the abolishment of the British Trident nuclear program.[127] In nearby Ireland, a song, "The House Down in Carne," criticizing nuclear weapons became known as "The Ballad of Nuke Power" and it was sung at the "Get the Point

[125] Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollak, "Ideology as Strategy: The Discourse of the Anti-Nuclear Movement in France and Germany," *Science, Technology, & Human Values* 5, no. 30 (1980): 4.

[126] Holger Nehring, *Politics of Security: British and West German Protest Movements and the Early Cold War, 1945–1970* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 65, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199681228.001.0001.

[127] "The History of CND," accessed March 12, 2018, http://www.cnduk.org/about/item/437.

Festival in 1978… [It] was a culmination of anti-nuclear discontent encompassing all sections of Irish society."[128]

In 1997, Ireland was central to a nuclear disarmament initiative and recruited seven other neutral countries (Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Slovenia, and Sweden) to form the New Agenda Coalition, pushing for the nuclear weapon states to rapidly disarm.[129] More recently, in 2017, Ireland "played a leading role" in establishing the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).[130]

Other European anti-nuclear grassroots movements gained widespread traction in the 1970s.[131] In Austria, anti-nuclear sentiments emerged specifically with the proposed construction of a nuclear power plant in Zwentendorf, where the small movement held its first rally.[132] A referendum against the power plant was held and won in 1978, resulting in a completed reactor that has never been used.[133] Austria does not use nuclear energy for power**,** and the Austrian anti-nuclear movement continues to push, even today, for nuclear-free energy worldwide.[134]

Popular movements in Benelux or "low countries" have also opposed nuclear weapons. The crux of the Dutch anti-nuclear movement rests with the Interchurch Peace Council, which began in the late 1950s, but gained support in the 1970s and 1980s, in

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[128] Cian Manning, "Ireland's Woodstock: The Anti-Nuclear Protests at Carnsore Point," Headstuff, accessed March 12, 2018, https://www.headstuff.org/history/1900-present/ireland-anti-nuclear-protests-at-carnsore-point/.

[129] Karen Birchard, "Ireland Launches Nuclear-Disarmament Initiative," *The Lancet* 351, no. 9119 (June 20, 1998): 1870, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(05)78829-2.

[130] "Disarmament - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade," Ireland Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, accessed August 30, 2018, https://www.dfa.ie/our-role-policies/international-priorities/peace-and-security/disarmament/#.

[131] London Staff, "Early Defections in March to Aldermaston | 1950–1959," *The Guardian*, accessed March 12, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/century/1950-1959/Story/0,,105488,00.html.

[132] Peter Weish, "Austria's No to Nuclear Power" (Presentation, Tokyo, Kyoto and Wakayama, Japan, April 1988). http://homepage.univie.ac.at/peter.weish/schriften/austrias_no_to_nuclear_power.pdf.

[133] Heinz Stockinger, "30 Years No To Zwentendorf," *Wise International*, March 12, 2008, https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/680/30-years-no-zwentendorf.

[134] "Atomstopp," Atomstopp Atomkraftfrei Leben, accessed October 29, 2017, http://www.atomkraftfrei-leben.at.

part due to the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983 in direct opposition to British advice.[135] European countries viewed this as an indication that they had no influence over the United States and were uneasy about the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory. The government in the Netherlands faced strong anti-nuclear sentiments, and the Interchurch Peace Council remains active today. Anti-nuclear protests and sentiments were strong in Belgium and Luxembourg as well, with close to 200,000 protestors marching in Brussels against Belgian acceptance of U.S. nuclear cruise missiles in 1985.[136]

In February 2010, it was reported that Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway planned to ask the United States to remove nuclear weapons from Europe following a statement calling for a nuclear weapon free world by President Barack Obama.[137] In April 2010, the *New York Times* reported that "the United States is parrying a push by several NATO allies to withdraw its aging stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe."[138] Additionally, according to Tom Sauer, "a large majority of the public in Belgium opposes keeping the B61 nuclear weapons on Belgian territory," and in 2013, Belgium had the first national protest against the remaining B61s in Belgium since the 1980s.[139] The anti-nuclear sentiment dominating the public has had little impact on the Belgian government because of a disconnect between the anti-nuclear movement and the political parties in power.[140] However, there remains a strong public

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[135] Jon Nordheimer, "Dutch Protests Revived by Invasion," *The New York Times*, October 29, 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/10/29/world/dutch-protests-revived-by-invasion.html.

[136] "Anti-Cruise Crowds Jam Into Brussels by the Thousands," *The Globe and Mail*, March 18, 1985, 1985 edition, 386543163, ProQuest Central.

[137] Julian Borger, "Five NATO States to Urge Removal of U.S. Nuclear Arms in Europe," *The Guardian*, February 22, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/22/nato-states-us-nuclear-arms-europe.

[138] Mark Landler, "U.S. Resists Push by Allies for Tactical Nuclear Cuts," *The New York Times*, April 22, 2010, sec. Europe, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/world/europe/23diplo.html.

[139] Tom Sauer, "Ceci n'est Pas Une…American Nuclear Weapon in Belgium," *European Security* 23, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 62–63, https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2013.851675.

[140] Sauer, 70.

opposition to nuclear weapons in general and, more specifically, to nuclear weapons based in Belgium.

In the early 1970s the Swedish public was generally uninformed on the nuclear subject and were "ignorant" about the parliament's plans for eleven nuclear reactors.[141] When the Center Party went against the grain in 1973 and publicly announced opposition to nuclear energy, public support soon followed.[142] The Swedish anti-nuclear movement gained momentum from the mid to late 1970s, and increased following the Three Mile Island incident in the USA in 1979.[143] Plans were put into place to phase out nuclear reactors by 2010, and nuclear "fears were exacerbated with the 1986 Chernobyl disaster."[144] However, lacking other energy options, Sweden decided to continue with nuclear power plants in 1997.[145] Although a bill was passed in 2010 to replace existing and fatigued reactors, the anti-nuclear movement remains strong in Sweden with the intent to eventually close all nuclear power plants.[146] As for nuclear weapons, "the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963 and the Swedish Foreign Minister Undén's proposal in 1961 at the UN to form an non-nuclear club against nuclear weapons were important steps to consolidate Sweden's nuclear weapons [research program] exit."[147] After signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, "non-proliferation was policy

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[141] Soren Holmberg, "The Impact of Party on Nuclear Power Attitudes in Sweden," SKN Report 48, (Goteborg University, April 1991), 5.

[142] Holmberg, 5.

[143] Holmberg, 10.

[144] Gwladys Fouche and Niklas Pollard, "Sweden Eyes Nuclear Revival 30 Years after Ban," *Reuters*, March 22, 2010, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sweden-nuclear/sweden-eyes-nuclear-revival-30-years-after-ban-idUSTRE62L35F20100322.

[145] Fouche and Pollard.

[146] "Nuclear Energy in Sweden - World Nuclear Association," accessed March 12, 2018, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/sweden.aspx.

[147] Lars van Dassen, "Sweden and the Making of Nuclear Non-Proliferation: From Indecision to Assertiveness" (Uppsala, Sweden: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, March 1997), 17, http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/29/032/29032967.pdf.

and master."[148] Nuclear energy has remained in Sweden for now, but seems to have been relegated to "necessary evil" status.

French opposition to nuclear power and weapons was conquered by Charles de Gaulle's admirable drive to make France a major power again. The French organization, *l'Association pour la Protection contre les Rayonnements Ionisants* (APRI), was founded in 1962, two years after the French had already begun nuclear tests in the Sahara.[149] The anti-nuclear movement was less prominent in France because "the French political opportunity structure is closed" and "social movements [in France] are not based on an existing strong organizational field."[150] However, the anti-nuclear movement continued to grow until 1977**,** "when both left-wing parties announced that they were supportive of French nuclear weapons."[151] The closed political structure in France prevented protestors and participants in the anti-nuclear movement from influencing French nuclear policy. Anti-nuclear sentiment remains in France, as evidenced by protests in Bure on March 8, 2018 fighting plans to bury nuclear waste in the village.[152] France is working towards nuclear disarmament as per the NPT and plans to reduce reliance on nuclear energy, perhaps influenced by improved relations with the strongly anti-nuclear Germany.

The protest movement in the Federal Republic of Germany "proposed a policy of disarmament in 1950."[153] Further protest campaigns resisted nuclear power plants in 1977 and the 1979 agreement to station of ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing

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[148] Lars van Dassen, 20.

[149] "A.P.R.I.," accessed March 14, 2018, http://apri.fr.free.fr/. French Nuclear Testing see "CTBTO Preparatory Commission: 13 February 1960 - The First French Nuclear Test," accessed March 10, 2018, https://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/13-february-1960-the-first-french-nuclear-test.

[150] Tapio Litmanen, "International Anti-Nuclear Movements in Finland, France and the United States," *Peace Research* 30, no. 4 (November 1998): 5.

[151] Tapio Litmanen, 6.

[152] "The Tiny Village Leading France's Anti-Nuclear Movement | Environment," *Deutsche Welle*, accessed March 8, 2018, http://www.dw.com/en/the-tiny-village-leading-frances-anti-nuclear-movement/a-42885537.

[153] Arthur Neil Black, "Protest Movements and the Security Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany Since 1950" (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1983), 21, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/28476.

II ballistic missiles on German soil, depending on the results of nuclear arms control agreements with Moscow.[154] The 1950s protest movement in the FRG included people from the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the science community, and the Protestant Church.[155] As NATO decided to base nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic of Germany and other European countries in December 1979, depending on the outcome of negotiations with Moscow, opposition was no longer limited to these three categories of people; rather the German anti-nuclear movement spanned "more than 1400 different organizations."[156]

In the summer of 1975, the anti-nuclear power plant movement grew stronger and successfully occupied the site of a planned power plant in Wyhl, stopping construction.[157] Ultimately, the protest was successful, blocking the construction entirely in 1983 when the "Prime Minister of Baden-Württemberg announced that there was no longer a need to build the plant."[158] Today, mention of basing American nuclear weapons on German soil or construction of nuclear power plants results in protests, and Germany has plans to close all nuclear power plants by 2022.[159] The German anti-nuclear movement is one of the greatest hurdles to an EU nuclear deterrent, as Germany would be at the core of any collective arrangement and Berlin's assistance would be required to support the efforts financially and technologically.

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[154] Arthur Neil Black, 22.

[155] Arthur Neil Black, 35.

[156] Arthur Neil Black, 53.

[157] Stephen Milder, "The New Watch on the Rhine: Anti-Nuclear Protest in Baden and Alsace," Environment & Society Portal, *Arcadia*, no. 6 (2013), Rachel Carson Center for Environment and Society, https://doi.org/10.5282/rcc/5257.

[158] Tina Flegel, "Public Protests Against Nuclear Power in Germany," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 9, no. 2 (September 5, 2010): 110.

[159] "Germany's Nuclear Phase-out Explained," *Deutsche Welle*, June 15, 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/germanys-nuclear-phase-out-explained/a-39171204.

## D. CONCLUSION

NATO Europe has relied on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence as part of its security policy since the founding of the Alliance. The possible establishment of a collective European nuclear deterrent was discussed in the FIG talks, during bilateral French-German meetings, and within NATO as the European integration movement gained momentum. However, the interests of the participating parties did not line up, and this prevented a collective solution outside the NATO framework and independent of U.S. involvement. As demonstrated in France during the Cold War, anti-nuclear movements could have been squashed in the beginning when the Soviet threat was prevalent. The strong French response to protests included tear gas and other means, largely deterring further action.[160] Similar methods in other European countries might have slowed the growth of anti-nuclear movements and might have resulted in a greater number of nuclear-armed European states. Since the fall of the USSR, anti-nuclear movements have strongly affected government policy in Western democracies, and environmentalists increasingly influence Western politics. The slowly building opposition to nuclear energy and arms could be one of the greatest obstacles to a united EU nuclear security policy.

[160] Dieter Rucht, "Campaigns, Skirmishes and Battles: Anti-Nuclear Movements in the USA, France and West Germany," *Industrial Crisis Quarterly* 4, no. 3 (January 1990): 194, https://doi.org/10.1177/108602669000400304.

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# III. CATALYSTS TO AN EU NUCLEAR DETERRENT

Following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, many commentators in Western countries questioned the need to keep nuclear weapons and pushed for their complete abolition, a goal**,** which was endorsed by the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union was considered the largest threat to the United States due to the size and capability of the Soviet arsenal, but as the USSR disintegrated into fifteen successor states, some people saw an opportunity to eliminate nuclear weapons once and for all. In fact, as recently as the New START agreement of 2010, both Russia and the United States showed an effort and willingness to work towards denuclearization via force reductions.

However, various factors in international relations indicate that support for the retention of nuclear weapons persists today. The international status quo is changing and nuclear deterrence is reemerging as a vital element of security strategy in NATO Europe, owing to three factors: (1) increased tensions with nuclear-armed powers in Eurasia—especially Russia, China, and North Korea; (2) the U.S. loss of political credibility in Europe; and (3) the European Union's healthy financial status, industrial capacity and technological knowledge.

## A. RISING AGGRESSION FROM THE EAST

Russia's increasingly belligerent actions have unsettled NATO European countries and led them to reconsider their security strategies. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 highlighted the country's desire to be recognized as a world power. Its aggressive behavior continues to make the United States and its NATO Allies uneasy as each year brings further escalation. In 2015 "President Vladimir Putin boasted that the Russian military will soon receive 40 missiles, capable of penetrating the missile shield

being developed by the U.S. and NATO allies over Eastern Europe."[161] Then in 2016, it was reported that "Ukraine's military intelligence claims Russia's nuclear forces have begun training, simulating the conditions of a large-scale conflict."[162] To make matters worse, Russia appears to be moving closer to China, becoming "China's single largest oil supplier for 2016…[and] for most of this year [2017]."[163] Furthermore, "the [Russian-led] Eurasian alliance set about aiding and abetting 'rogue' nations like Iran, North Korea and Syria, judging by their numerous trade agreements, military cooperation and cyber-security arrangements threatening to disrupt the new world order."[164] Russian cooperation with Turkey also hints at a "nefarious NATO agenda" for Russia, and it is more than a little disconcerting for the United States and its NATO allies because, according to some public sources, "more than fifty U.S. B-61 hydrogen bombs are stored in the underground vaults at Turkey's Incirlik Airbase."[165]

In March 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia intends to defeat the U.S. missile defense systems that have been developed since the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002 with new delivery systems.[166] One such system is an air-launched missile that "is a low-flying stealth missile carrying a nuclear warhead, with almost an unlimited range, unpredictable trajectory and ability to bypass interception boundaries. It is *invincible* against all existing and prospective missile defence and counter-air defence systems."[167] A second weapon

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[161] Damien Sharkov, "Ukraine Reports Russia Is Practicing Its Readiness For Nuclear Conflict," *Newsweek*, September 21, 2016, http://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-reports-russia-checking-readiness-nuclear-conflict-501175.

[162] Damien Sharkov.

[163] Tsvetana Paraskova, "Russia and China Continue to Boost Oil Ties," *USA Today*, accessed December 14, 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/10/11/russia-and-china-continue-boost-oil-ties/749757001/.

[164] Hasnet Lais, "The Russian Bear Is Rising," *Huffington Post* (blog), September 2, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hasnet-lais/the-russian-bear-is-risin_b_11793266.html.

[165] Lais.

[166] Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, "Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly," Team of the Official website of the President of Russia, accessed October 26, 2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957.

[167] Russia. Italics added.

is an unmanned underwater vehicle capable of carrying "either conventional or nuclear warheads, which enables them to engage various targets."[168]

The heightened tensions with Russia were further exacerbated in October 2018 when U.S. President Donald Trump announced the U.S. intention to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, contending that "[Russia has] been violating it for many years, and we're not going to let them violate a nuclear agreement and go out and do weapons and we're not allowed to."[169] The statement is counter to one made by U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis last year: "Our effort is to bring Russia back into compliance. It is not to walk away from the treaty."[170] In October 2018, Mattis said that "The current situation with Russia in blatant violation of this treaty is untenable."[171] According to *Washington Post* correspondents, the dissolution of the INF Treaty "is likely to be controversial with U.S. allies in NATO, further splitting the alliance at a difficult time for transatlantic relations" and "is also likely to undermine the 2010 New START treaty governing U.S. and Russian long-range nuclear systems."[172] Although Russia denies violating the treaty, "at their summit in July, NATO leaders stated that Russian violation is 'the most plausible assessment' of the available evidence."[173] Russia's advancements in nuclear weapons and associated capabilities

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[168] Russia.

[169] U.S. President Donald Trump quoted in Alex Leary and Peter Nicholas, "Trump Says U.S. to Withdraw From Nuclear Treaty With Russia," *Wall Street Journal*, October 20, 2018, sec. US, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-threatens-to-withdraw-u-s-from-nuclear-arms-treaty-with-russia-1540078280.

[170] Leary and Nicholas.

[171] "News Conference by Secretary Mattis at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Be," U.S. Department of Defense, accessed October 26, 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1654419/news-conference-by-secretary-mattis-at-nato-headquarters-brussels-belgium/.

[172] James Cameron, "What the INF Treaty Means for the U.S. and Europe — and Why Trump Mentioned China," *The Washington Post*, accessed October 26, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/10/22/what-the-inf-treaty-means-for-the-u-s-and-europe-and-why-trump-mentioned-china/?noredirect=on.

[173] James Cameron, "What the INF Treaty Means for the U.S. and Europe — and Why Trump Mentioned China."

demonstrate the growing nuclear threat to the NATO Allies in Europe and North America.

Russia is not the only country in the East to cause concern among NATO and EU members. Recent nuclear tests by North Korea are prompting increased attention to the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear attacks. Although North Korea's Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Un directs most of his antagonistic comments towards the United States and U.S. President Trump, uncertainty surrounds the world's knowledge of North Korea's nuclear program and intentions. According to physicist David Wright, on November 28, 2017 North Korea launched a missile with "more than enough range to reach Washington, D.C., and in fact any part of the continental United States."[174] There remain uncertainties about the missile's range once the North Koreans add the extra weight of a nuclear warhead. French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel issued a joint statement following North Korea's test of a hydrogen bomb in 2017 and said "in addition to the United Nations Security Council, the European Union also has to act now" and called the test "a new dimension of provocation."[175] In 2016, following a nuclear test by North Korea on 9 September, Jean-Marc Ayrault, then the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, released a statement concerning North Korea's behavior, condemning "in the strongest possible terms this latest provocation by a regime that bears responsibility for destabilizing an entire region."[176] German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel issued a statement following the 2017 nuclear explosive test, saying "Not only do North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile tests violate the applicable UN Security Council resolutions in the gravest way,

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[174] David Wright, "North Korea's Longest Missile Test Yet," All Things Nuclear, November 28, 2017, https://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/nk-longest-missile-test-yet.

[175] Lydia Smith, "North Korea Nuclear Test: Merkel and Macron Condemn 'new Dimension of Provocation' after H-Bomb 'Detonated,'" *The Independent*, accessed October 26, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/atomic-bomb-kim-jong-un-nuclear-weapon-threat-south-korea-pyongyang-donald-trump-a7926881.html.

[176] Jean-Marc Ayrault, "Corée du Nord - Essai nucléaire nord-coréen - Déclaration de Jean-Marc Ayrault (09 septembre 2016)," France Diplomatie : : Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères, accessed October 29, 2018, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/coree-du-nord/evenements/article/coree-du-nord-essai-nucleaire-nord-coreen-declaration-de-jean-marc-ayrault-09.

the country's irresponsible and illegal conduct is also aggravating tensions on the Korean peninsula."[177] Suffice it to say that the EU member countries have good reason to worry about Europe's security.

Pakistan's nuclear program also ranks high on the European Union's list of potential nuclear threats. The country's arsenal is estimated at 110 to 130 nuclear bombs, and it now seeks a nuclear triad of its own.[178] Pakistan claims that it needs nuclear weapons as a deterrent against India, and some observers consider it "the epicenter of global jihadi terrorism."[179] The European Union should consider the possibility of "rogue actors" gaining control of Pakistan's formidable stockpile of nuclear weapons, a possibility that underscores the need for robustness in the European Union's security position. Without explicitly naming Pakistan, Michele Alliot-Marie, then the French Minister of Defense, emphasized the threat posed by this possibility in a speech on 1 February 2006: "Facing also states armed with weapons of mass destruction whose governments could have failed, transforming them into lawless zones, [France] must be consider the implications that would follow seizure of power by a terrorist network."[180]

There are multiple factors driving discussions on a more independent European Union, which would be less reliant on American protection, but the dire situation in Eastern Europe and Eurasia makes it critical for the European Union to make a decision. EU members are no longer confident that they can expect unwavering support from their transatlantic allies, and the relative calm seen immediately after the Cold War appears to be at its end. The European Union may feel pressured by circumstances to create its own

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[177] Sigmar Gabriel, "Statement by Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel

on North Korea's Latest Missile Test," Auswärtiges Amt DE, accessed October 29, 2018, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/170915-bm-nordkorea-raketentest/292414.

[178] Kyle Mizokami, "Pakistan Is Planning to Fight a Nuclear War," *The National Interest*, March 25, 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-pakistan-planning-fight-nuclear-war-19897.

[179] Sajid Farid Shapoo, Indian Police Service Officer, "The Dangers of Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons," *The Diplomat*, accessed December 15, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/02/the-dangers-of-pakistans-tactical-nuclear-weapons/.

[180] Michele Alliot-Marie, Ministre de La Défense, audition du 1 février 2006 devant la Commission des Affaires Étrangères, de La Défense et des Forces Armées, Senat, cited in David S. Yost, "France's New Nuclear Doctrine," *International Affairs* 82, no. 4 (July 2006): 703, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00564.x.

nuclear deterrent or build on the existing nuclear capabilities of France and the United Kingdom; it is entirely capable, both financially and technologically, of moving forward with an EU nuclear deterrent. The United Kingdom's withdrawal from the EU could complicate involving London in an EU nuclear deterrent.

## B. THE U.S. LOSS OF CREDIBILITY

Confidence in the United States and its willingness to provide for the protection of the European Union and NATO European countries is waning. Two of the European Union's largest members, France and Germany, have shown a propensity to promote a more unified Europe since Donald Trump's election as the U.S. president in 2016.[181]

In 2004, Alyson J.K. Bailes, then the Director of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), warned that "at [the] political level, any harder-line U.S. President is likely ultimately to force Europeans into a stronger common front, while any more multilateralist one would only encourage the Europeans to keep doing more of what they do best."[182] The election of "hard-liner" President Donald Trump is proving the Bailes's words to be prescient.

Concerns repeatedly expressed by the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, highlight a loss of confidence in the United States. "We Europeans really have to take our fates in our own hands," she said after contentious NATO and G7 summits in 2017. Martin Schulz, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) leader in Germany (and Merkel's chief competition in the September 2017 election) declared in 2017 that "closer European cooperation on all fronts is the answer to Donald Trump."[183] Many European observers hold that Trump's remarks regarding foreign policy and nuclear armament are unraveling the gains in trans-Atlantic relations steadily achieved over the last 70 years.

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[181] "Merkel: Europe Can No Longer Rely on U.S. and Britain," *Deutsche Welle*, accessed September 16, 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/merkel-europe-can-no-longer-rely-on-us-and-britain/a-39018097.

[182] Alyson J. K. Bailes, "Differentiated Risk and Threat Perceptions of EU Members and Their Impact on European Security Cooperation," *Dis-Politika/Foreign Policy*, (journal of the Turkish Foreign Policy Society), XXIX, no. 3–4 (2004): 54.

[183] "Merkel: Europe Can No Longer Rely on U.S. and Britain."

The decline in European confidence in the United States accelerated with the election of President Donald Trump following inflammatory comments he made during his election campaign, calling NATO "obsolete" and the European Union "a vehicle for Germany."[184] Additionally, Donald Trump's erratic behavior and his administration's potentially isolationist policies, including comments about a possible U.S. withdrawal from overseas engagements, are leading to a drastic drop in European confidence in the United States.[185] Secretary of Defense James Mattis has been essential to reassuring the United States' NATO Allies and stated, as part of a news conference at NATO on 4 October 2018, that "the United States is reviewing options in our diplomacy and defense posture to do just that [respond to Russia's disregard of the INF Treaty] *in concert with our allies*, as always."[186] Mattis further emphasized that "American lawmakers did not reduce funding for the European Deterrence Initiative by a single cent" in the fiscal year 2019 defense spending bill and that other examples of cooperation "demonstrate an enduring American bipartisan commitment in Washington to keeping the fabric of our trans-Atlantic alliance strong and a clear recognition that NATO is central to American national security interests."[187]

Since his election, President Trump has continued to pressure NATO member states to increase their defense spending and meet the agreed upon goal of 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ahead of the 2024 deadline endorsed in the 2014 Wales Summit

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[184] Henry Mance, Shawn Donnan, and James Shotter, "Donald Trump Takes Swipe at EU as 'Vehicle for Germany,'" *Financial Times*, January 15, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/1f7c6746-db75-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce.

[185] Markus Becker, "Running Out of Allies: Trump's Election Triggers Deep Concern in Europe," *Spiegel Online*, November 10, 2016, sec. International, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/european-union-worried-about-trump-presidency-a-1120672.html.

[186] "News Conference by Secretary Mattis at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Be," U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, accessed October 26, 2018, italics added, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1654419/news-conference-by-secretary-mattis-at-nato-headquarters-brussels-belgium/.

[187] "News Conference by Secretary Mattis at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Be."

Declaration.[188] Following the May 2017 terrorist bombing in Manchester, England, Trump told NATO Allies that "These grave security concerns are the same reason that I have been very, very direct ... in saying that NATO members must finally contribute their fair share."[189] A year later, in July 2018, President Trump continued to lean on the European Allies at the summit in Brussels, accusing Germany of being "a captive of Russia, calling members of the alliance 'delinquent' in their defense spending and insisting they increase it 'immediately.'"[190]

At a later point in the summit, Trump reportedly broached the issue again, suggesting an increase in member contributions to 4% of GDP.[191] The American president's feelings were further expressed after the summit when he tweeted, "What good is NATO if Germany is paying Russia billions of dollars for gas and energy? Why are there only 5 out of 29 countries that have met their commitment? The U.S. is paying for Europe's protection, then loses billions on Trade. Must pay 2% of GDP IMMEDIATELY, not by 2025."[192] According to Christian Hacke, a prominent professor in Germany, President Trump "is chumming up with dictators and squandering America's reputation as a responsible global power. He is giving up crucial influence, which could lead to alarming shifts of power to the detriment of the free world."[193]

President Trump is not the first American president to pressure the NATO allies to increase defense spending. The 2% agreement was the result of appeals by President

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[188] NATO, "Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales," NATO, accessed July 16, 2018, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm. Italics added.

[189] Donald J. Trump quoted in Robin Emmott and Steve Holland, "Trump Directly Scolds NATO Allies, Says They Owe 'massive' Sums," *Reuters*, May 26, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-europe/trump-faces-rougher-reception-in-nato-eu-meetings-idUSKBN18K34D.

[190] Zachary Cohen, Michelle Kosinski, and Barbara Starr, "Trump's Barrage of Attacks 'Beyond Belief,' Reeling NATO Diplomats Say," *CNN*, July 12, 2018, sec. Politics, Accessed July 12, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/11/politics/trump-nato-diplomats-reaction/index.html.

[191] Zachary Cohen, Michelle Kosinski, and Barbara Starr.

[192] Donald J. Trump, Twitter post, *@realDonaldTrump*, July 11, 2018, 10:07 AM, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1017093020783710209?lang=en

[193] Christian Hacke, "Why Germany Should Get the Bomb," trans. Michael Trinkwalder, *The National Interest*, August 12, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/why-germany-should-get-bomb-28377.

Obama at the Wales Summit in 2014 for NATO members to increase their defense contributions.[194] The exceptional tone of President Trump's approach to NATO allies has led European leaders to reconsider their ties to the United States. For example, following the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018, European "commentators have declared the transatlantic relationship dead and reiterated calls for European 'strategic autonomy.'"[195] Additionally, President Trump mentioned the possibility of removing U.S. troops from Europe during his election campaign, planting seeds of doubt about U.S. reliability in the minds of European leaders.[196] The European Council president, Donald Tusk, stated that "with friends like that who needs enemies… But frankly speaking, Europe should be grateful to President Trump. Because thanks to him we have got rid of all illusions."[197]

These doubts gave rise to questions concerning the credibility of the current U.S. nuclear umbrella arrangement with NATO, and this became a hot topic among informed and interested experts. For example, Roderich Kiesewetter, a lawmaker and foreign policy spokesman with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Germany's largest party, was one of the few officials that broached the subject of an EU nuclear deterrent following President Trump's election, saying, "My idea is to build on the existing weapons in Great Britain and France."[198]

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[194] Ewen MacAskill and defence correspondent, "US Presses Nato Members to Increase Defence Spending," *The Guardian*, June 23, 2014, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/23/us-nato-members-increase-defence-spending. NATO, "Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales," NATO, accessed July 16, 2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.

[195] James Hoobler, "Assessing Transatlantic Fallout After the U.S. Withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal," May 31, 2018, https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/05/assessing-transatlantic-fallout-after-the-us-withdrawal.html.

[196] Becker, "Running Out of Allies."

[197] Laurence Norman, "European Leaders Vent Over Trump Policies," *Wall Street Journal*, May 16, 2018, sec. World, https://www.wsj.com/articles/european-leaders-vent-over-trump-policies-1526501344.

[198] Max Fisher, "Fearing U.S. Withdrawal, Europe Considers Its Own Nuclear Deterrent," *The New York Times*, March 6, 2017, sec. Europe, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/world/europe/european-union-nuclear-weapons.html.

Although it remains difficult to find official comments regarding an EU nuclear deterrent, this is not wholly unexpected since, according to Max Fisher of *The New York Times,* "negotiations would most likely remain secret for fear of giving Mr. Trump an excuse to withdraw—or of triggering a reaction from Russia."[199] For the time being, the possibility of German participation in an EU nuclear deterrent is officially denied in public forums, with a spokesman for Angela Merkel saying, "There are no plans for nuclear armament in Europe involving the federal government."[200]

As the U.S. president pushes NATO allies, there are "concerns that the conflict over defense spending is fueling perceived cracks within NATO at a time when the alliance should be projecting strength"[201] Such cracks are exactly what Russian President Vladimir Putin seeks to exploit to divide NATO and prevent further expansion of Western influence. According to Douglas E. Schoen and Evan Roth Smith, respectively a political analyst and a co-founder of the political consulting firm Slingshot Strategies, "Putin is a calculating master of geopolitics with a master plan to divide Europe, destroy NATO, reestablish Russian influence in the world, and, most of all, marginalize the United States and the West in order to achieve regional hegemony and global power. And his plan is working."[202]

## C. EUROPEAN UNION MEMBERS' FINANCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPACITY

Shortly after World War II, France and the United Kingdom began developing their own nuclear weapons, though economically and technologically far behind the United States. Germany, completely devastated by the war, was in no position to pursue

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[199] Fisher.

[200] Justin Huggler, "Merkel Forced to Deny Germany Planning to Lead a European Nuclear Superpower," *The Telegraph*, accessed August 19, 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/09/merkel-forced-deny-germany-planning-lead-european-nuclear-superpower/.

[201] Zachary Cohen, Michelle Kosinski, and Barbara Starr, "Trump's Barrage of Attacks 'Beyond Belief,' Reeling NATO Diplomats Say."

[202] Douglas E. Schoen and Evan Roth Smith, *Putin's Master Plan: To Destroy Europe, Divide NATO, and Restore Russian Power and Global Influence*, First American edition (New York: Encounter Books, 2016), 2.

its own nuclear weapons: the western part of the country was rebuilding with the benefit of funds through the U.S. Marshall Plan, many German technical experts fled Europe during the war, and the United States and other Western countries (as well as the Soviet Union) were vehemently opposed to West Germany acquiring control over nuclear weapons.[203] The financial challenges of recovering from the destruction of the Second World War were widespread in Europe.

In contrast, today a large number of EU member states lead the world in per capita GDP. The EU is thriving economically and financial obstacles to pursuing military capabilities have diminished. In February 2017, it was reported that "Germany overtook the UK as the fastest growing among the G7 states during 2016."[204] With Article IV of the NPT guaranteeing the sharing of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes with non-nuclear weapon states, several EU countries with the full nuclear fuel cycle are also capable of producing fissile materials and could request assistance, guidance, or contributions from France in view of its advanced nuclear weapons program. The other EU member that is also a Party to the NPT as an NWS, the United Kingdom, has announced its intention to withdraw from the EU in March 2019.

As German scientists before and during World War II were rumored to have been working on atomic weapons, scientists in the United States began pursuing the development of nuclear weapons, resulting in the world's first nuclear bombs. Britain, France, and the Soviet Union judged that nuclear weapons would be a prerequisite to any major power in the future and began their own national research programs. Britain resumed its independent national nuclear weapons program in 1947, while France pursued the technology independently**.** French efforts during the Fourth Republic were intensified and accelerated under President Charles de Gaulle, the founder of the Fifth Republic. Under the guidance of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, West Germany opted not to pursue a national nuclear weapons program for fear of antagonizing the Soviet Union,

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[203] Trachtenberg, "France and NATO, 1949–1991," September 2011, 191.

[204] Angela Monaghan and Graeme Wearden, "Germany Overtakes UK as Fastest-Growing G7 Economy," *The Guardian*, February 23, 2017, sec. Business, http://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2017/feb/23/germanys-gdp-shows-19-rise-over-last-year.

the United States, and the largest Western European powers. Italy sought a multilateral or burden-sharing arrangement in cooperation with the United States and NATO.

The U.S. extended nuclear deterrent currently shields Western Europe from nuclear attacks, but technology is no longer an obstacle for EU members. Even with the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union, France remains an important nuclear-armed EU member. The French developed nuclear technology independently. While France's arsenal is relatively small compared to those of the United States and Russia, the fact remains that the French possess the technical capacity. Furthermore, the European Union could use France's current nuclear-weapon state status as a foundation to form a "new federated European state" and succeed to an existing state's nuclear-weapon status with respect to the NPT.[205] As U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk reported to President Lyndon Johnson in 1968,

> [The NPT] does not deal with the problem of European unity, and would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. A new federated European state would have to control all of its external security functions including defense and all foreign policy matters relating to external security, but would not have to be so centralized as to assume all governmental functions. While not dealing with succession by such a federated state, the treaty would bar transfer of nuclear weapons (including ownership) or control over them to any recipient, including a multilateral entity.[206]

The British and French arsenals already "contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the [NATO] Allies."[207] The European Union could legally negotiate an extended nuclear deterrent under a Franco-British umbrella, although this might complicate the pursuit of the disarmament aspect of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the current arsenals might not be deemed adequate as a means to protect the

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[205] Dean Rusk's "Report by Secretary of State Rusk to President [Lyndon] Johnson on the Nonproliferation Treaty, July 2, 1968," in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, 1968 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), 478.

[206] Dean Rusk, 478.

[207] North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, paragraph 62 and Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, 19 November 2010, par. 18, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm?.

European Union as a whole. If the British refrain from any nuclear technology sharing cooperation, the European Union will continue to have the French weapons and technology at their disposal (if France agrees to take this course). Unlike the challenges during the Cold War, atomic weapons and associated technologies have become more accessible, and they have spread beyond the P-5 to India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan.

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# IV. OBSTACLES IN 2018 TO AN EU NUCLEAR DETERRENT

The purpose of this chapter is to identify and analyze today's obstacles to a European Union nuclear deterrent in light of recent events, which could be interpreted as creating incentives for the European Union to take more responsibility for European defense. The arms competition during World War II and the early Cold War initially included nuclear programs in larger European countries such as France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Some of these countries succeeded in acquiring nuclear technology and building nuclear weapons in their national programs (France and the United Kingdom). Others were too slow and unable to surmount the political and financial barriers to pursuing nuclear arms on their own, owing in part to the rebuilding required following World War II. Western Europe was devastated following the Second World War, and most countries were unable to fund a national nuclear program. The USSR's dogged pursuit of atomic superiority and the spread of communism left Western Europe in a precarious position.

The past obstacles proved to be too great for most Western European countries to overcome, and the only feasible solution was the U.S. "umbrella" through the NATO framework.[208] These hindrances included: (1) the limited finances and technological capabilities of Western European countries following World War II, (2) the traditionally turbulent relationship between Germany and France, exacerbated by two world wars, and (3) the rise of anti-nuclear movements in Europe. Presently, international relations in Western Europe and the North Atlantic region have changed and European economies, particularly in Germany, are vastly improved. Additionally, the European integration movement continues (despite Brexit, the scheduled March 2019 UK withdrawal from the EU) to improve Western European unity and to strengthen the European Union (EU). In spite of this, new and old obstacles continue to impede the possibility of organizing a purely European nuclear deterrent. The present-day obstacles include: (1) doubts about

[208] Marc Trachtenberg, "France and NATO, 1949–1991," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 9, no. 3 (September 1, 2011): 186, https://doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2011.593799.

the technical and strategic credibility of the European Union's striving to acquire this capability; (2) the lack of mutual confidence among EU members, concerning political reliability, methods of decision-making, and the formulation and implementation of a strategy for nuclear deterrence and crisis management; and (3) the growing anti-nuclear movements within the European Union and beyond.

## A. TECHNOLOGICAL AND STRATEGIC CREDIBILITY OF FRENCH AND BRITISH ARSENALS

*If the European Union established a nuclear deterrent, in what circumstances would it be credible in the eyes of the European Union's adversaries?*

The same simplistic question regarding nuclear weapons has been posed since their inception: "How many nuclear weapons are necessary for an effective, reliable deterrent?"[209] Freedman describes a minimum deterrent as "the possession of sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict grievous harm on the enemy in retaliation, but no more."[210] The amount of nuclear weapons that would suffice as a credible minimum deterrent has been one of the questions in a continuing and inconclusive debate. Whether "minimum deterrence" would provide credible "extended deterrence" appears unlikely.

In the early days of the Cold War, Western European countries doubted their ability, even combined, to counter the Soviet nuclear threat unless assisted by the United States.[211] As Trachtenberg states of the French, "Western Europe, in their view, was simply not strong enough to stand up to Soviet military power by itself, and indeed, as they saw it, German power could also be contained only within the framework of a strong

[209] Robert Gard and Greg Tarryn, "American Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Minimal-Deterrence Policy," *National Interest*, accessed March 18, 2018, http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/american-nuclear-strategy-the-case-minimal-deterrence-policy-11755.

[210] Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 195.

[211] Trachtenberg, "France and NATO, 1949–1991," 185.

U.S.-dominated system."[212] The present-day British and French nuclear arsenals, the only European nuclear capabilities in Western Europe, are considered insufficient.[213]

According to Oliver Thränert**,** a German analyst, the United Kingdom and France "would not have the requisite capabilities [to extend a nuclear umbrella over Europe]… as the French and British arsenals almost exclusively consist of ballistic missiles tipped with high-yield nuclear warheads stationed on submarines."[214] These types of weapons mean that both countries "only have limited credible flexibility," and it is open to debate if their minimum deterrents would suffice for extended deterrence.[215] As recently as 2003, "Anders Fogh Rasmussen, then prime minister of Denmark,…justified his support for the invasion of Iraq by emphasizing the centrality of the USA to Danish security: 'Who else could guarantee our security? Could France – could Germany?'"[216]

Without the United Kingdom, a similar predicament could arise for the European Union in a more acute form. The United Kingdom will no longer be in a position to participate in an EU nuclear deterrent, unless the United Kingdom and the European Union make special arrangements for that purpose.

## B. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S LIMITED POLITICAL CAPACITY TO FULFILL THIS ROLE

The European Union is currently comprised of 28 sovereign member states. Standing in the way of many EU policy decisions are the incompatible security and policy priorities in these countries. EU attempts to address security and defense concerns have been riddled with problems in the past, from varying perspectives on what

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[212] Trachtenberg, 185.

[213] Berthold Kohler, "Nach Trumps Wahlsieg: Das ganz und gar Undenkbare," *FAZ.NET*, November 27, 2016, sec. Politik, http://www.faz.net/1.4547858.

[214] Oliver Thränert, "No Shortcut to a European Deterrent," *Policy Perspective* 5, no. 2 (February 2017), http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/PP5-2.pdf.

[215] Thränert.

[216] Anders Rasmussen in "PM Delivers Blunt Message on European Defence," *Copenhagen Post*, 28 March 2003, cited in Ursula Jasper and Clara Portella, "EU Defence Integration and Nuclear Weapons: A Common Deterrent for Europe?," *Security Dialogue*, vol. 41, no. 2 (2010), 162.

constitutes a threat to uneven contributions to multilateral missions and operations. Mai'a Cross discusses the EDA's limitations in relation to Max Weber's "value spheres," analyzing norm resistance in EU member states due to differences between international and domestic value spheres.[217] When the domestic values of the member states do not overlap enough, there can be incongruities with the international value sphere, which prohibit successful integration in the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). One key example noted by Cross is Germany's national identity and "*desire…not to allow the EU to become excessively militaristic*" as the reason that Germany has proven resistant to European Defense Agency (EDA) norms.[218]

The EDA was meant to unify EU members in security and defense policy definition and execution; however, the European Union lacks the political capacity to enact policies in certain topic areas (including nuclear deterrence) due to the sovereignty maintained by the individual members. Rather than openly thwarting EDA policy-making, norm-resistant members fail to implement or fully support the policies in the form agreed upon. Unfortunately, this deficiency showcases the European Union's toothless bite for the rest of the world to see.

One major security controversy in the European Union revolves around defining threats and delineating which European organization should handle the situation. Western Europe faces two flanks of contention, East and South. According to member states' geographic position and domestic interests, conflicts along these flanks take on different priorities and divide the European Union. Since the 2014 annexation of Crimea, Russian aggression has threatened members of the European Union and the Russians have taken action **"**on both flanks… so a counteracting strategy has to include and consider both flanks."[219] Since the "Arab Spring," the South flank has become equally disruptive, and

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[217] Mai'a K. Davis Cross, "The European Defence Agency and the Member States: Public and Hidden Transcripts," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 20, no. Special Issue (2015): 85.

[218] Mai'a K. Davis Cross, 95. Italics in original.

[219] Alina Inayeh, Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, and Michal Baranowski "Avoiding the East-South Divide Ahead of the NATO Summit," The German Marshall Fund of the United States, June 8, 2016, http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2016/06/08/avoiding-east-south-divide-ahead-nato-summit.

conflicts in Libya and Syria (and elsewhere in North Africa and the greater Middle East) have led to a migration crisis in Europe. Russian aggression and the large-scale movements of migrants are creating security risks on both flanks for an even larger percentage of EU members.[220] "Mass migration," according to Patrick Keller, "has fundamentally changed the EU border regime and EU solidarity, the administrative capacities as well as the deportation and integration policies of the EU member states, and the very cohesion of national governments and national identities."[221] As long as the EU members disagree about which threats to prioritize, it seems unlikely to find harmonious European security solutions in the conventional or nuclear realms.

Further complicating Western European Union threat assessments are the diverse forms of present-day security challenges, ranging from the more familiar armed conflicts to terrorist attacks by non-state actors and hybrid warfare (such as malicious cyber assaults and information operations, including "fake news"). The somewhat ambiguous and nebulous methods of political manipulation being utilized by Moscow mask both "intent and attribution"[222] of these attacks. The amorphous nature of these actions makes it difficult for the threat to be ranked with violent conflicts and migration crises, leading to further divisions in the EU and the erosion of EU unity. As Dave Johnson has astutely stated, "the strategic ambiguity created by the breadth of the Russian approach and the contradictory or unclear messages deliberately sent by Russia…can mask intentions, confuse adversaries, slow down their decision making and impede effective responses."[223] The Russian strategy also exploits an already inefficient decision-making process within the European Union.

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[220] Robin Simcox, "Angela Merkel Refugee Policy Threatens German Security," *National Review*, accessed March 24, 2018, https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/08/angela-merkel-refugee-policy-threatens-german-security-islamist-terrorism/.

[221] Patrick Keller, "Divided by Geography? NATO's Internal Debate about the Eastern and Southern Flanks," in *NATO and Collective Defence in the 21st Century: An Assessment of the Warsaw Summit*, ed. Karsten Friis (London ; New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2017), 53.

[222] Dave Johnson, "Russia's Approach to Conflict – Implications for NATO's Deterrence and Defence," *Research Division - NATO Defense College, Rome*, no. 111 (April 2015): 1.

[223] Johnson, 11.

EU security policy-making is considered flawed; "it codifies *how* to do things—but it does not tell us [Europeans] *what* to do."[224] The highly prized sovereignty of EU member states slows the formulation of policy decisions in the European Union and poses a challenge to European integration, particularly in the domain of security and defense. Alyson Bailes highlighted this conundrum:

> As also noted, decision making within the European Union's security and defense policies is not (yet) "supranationalized" but works much the same way as in NATO or regional groupings elsewhere. This makes it hard to swing the huge material resources of the European Union as an economic entity behind its politically defined strategic goals, and even joint funding for military deployments is minimal.[225]

If the EU member states built a nuclear deterrent, it would be critical for them to improve their policy and decision making in order to have political capacity on the international stage. Failures to act, or delays at crucial moments, such as the annexation of Crimea, would allow Russian "salami tactics" to succeed. EU forces, nuclear or otherwise, will quickly lose legitimacy and credibility if their awesome power never extends beyond a conference room.

## C. BRITISH REFERENDUM TO LEAVE THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union's political capacity could also be affected by the proposed British exit (Brexit) from the EU. Initial concerns with Brexit focused on economic issues that may result from the referendum vote.[226] However, European defense also arose as an important issue, with the European Parliament voting in favor of a vaguely defined EU defense union. Experts and officials have raised questions about the European Union's

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[224] Jochen Rehrl, "Handbook for Decision Makers: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union" (Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2014), 21.

[225] Alyson J. K. Bailes, "Europe's Security: Attitudes, Achievements, and Unsolve Challenges," in *Rewiring Regional Security in a Fragmented World*, ed. Chester A. Crocker et al., vol. 11 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2011), 293.

[226] Patrick Keller, "Divided by Geography? NATO's Internal Debate about the Eastern and Southern Flanks," in *NATO and Collective Defence in the 21st Century: An Assessment of the Warsaw Summit*, ed. Karsten Friis (London ; New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2017), 53.

ability to provide such a force without Britain.[227] The 2017 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) pact between 25 of the 28 members of the European Union (all except Denmark, Malta, and the United Kingdom) will integrate EU security forces**.** Britain's role in the future cooperation, if any, remains unclear.[228]

Removing the United Kingdom from the European Union will leave France as the only remaining nuclear-weapon-state EU member party to the NPT. Attentive publics have speculated about future EU nuclear deterrence options independent of the United States, such as the United Kingdom sharing its nuclear capabilities as part of the Brexit agreement with the European Union; the United Kingdom providing extended nuclear deterrence through the NATO framework (much like the status quo with the U.S.); or even a French-armed E.U. nuclear deterrent.[229] Experts bandy about these options, but larger obstacles remain, including uncertainty about France's willingness to protect all members of the European Union and complicated intra-E.U. dynamics.

## D. LACK OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AMONG EU MEMBER STATES

### 1. World War II Emotional Remnants and the Effects on Political Reliability

Previous attempts to establish a multinational European agreement for nuclear deterrence failed, particularly due to a lack of confidence among the participating European states and the availability of an American solution.[230] The adversarial

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[227] Shehab Khan, "European Parliament Backs Plans to Create a Defence Union," *The Independent*, November 22, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/european-parliament-nato-backs-plans-create-defence-union-a7432706.html. With regards to Brexit's effect on EU defense, Robin Emmott, "Brexit Casts Doubt over New EU and NATO Defense Strategy," *Reuters*, June 28, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-defence-analysis/brexit-casts-doubt-over-new-eu-and-nato-defense-strategy-idUSKCN0ZE0LE.

[228] Emmott, "'Bad News for Our Enemies': EU Launches Defense Pact."

[229] Graham Vanbergen, "Will Britain Be Handing Over Its Nuclear Deterrent As Part Of The Brexit Deal with the EU?," *TruePublica*, March 27, 2017, http://truepublica.org.uk/united-kingdom/will-britain-handing-nuclear-deterrent-part-brexit-deal-eu. David Ellis, "Exclusive: EU To Take Control Of British Nuclear Deterrent," *UK Column*, January 25, 2017, http://www.ukcolumn.org/article/exclusive-eu-take-control-british-nuclear-deterrent.

[230] Ronald J. Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949–1966* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), 102.

relationship between France and Germany following World War II appears to have dissipated since the 1950s. Both German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron have publicly advocated a more unified Europe with a greater defense dimension. The improved relations are fortunate for the European Union in relation to the EU nuclear deterrent option because France would likely be a key element in any framework. "French policy already allows for, though does not require, using nuclear weapons in defense of an ally."[231] The main reasons why previous discussions of a multinational nuclear deterrent involving the French failed included: (a) France's refusal to delegate authority over its nuclear weapons to any country and (b) the lack of confidence that other countries had in France. Some Europeans thought that France might have offered extended deterrence only as "a strategy…that essentially treated German territory as a buffer zone."[232] On most levels, the European Union appears to be past its tumultuous history, but Brexit has lessened its perceived stability and could be an indication of underlying disagreements among member states.

Removing the United Kingdom will eliminate an important security and defense contributor from the European Union. At the least, the sensitivity to Germany's aggressive behavior during two World Wars appears to have faded in France. However, mutual mistrust could hinder or slow the creation of an EU nuclear deterrent.[233] Western Europe has a long history of conflict, and previous disagreements are never entirely forgotten, so the memories of Franco-German discord following World War I and II constitute one of many tensions that EU politics might cause to resurface in seeking an alignment of EU member states' values.

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[231] Fisher, "Fearing U.S. Withdrawal, Europe Considers Its Own Nuclear Deterrent."

[232] Jasper and Portela, "EU Defence Integration and Nuclear Weapons," 158. With regard to French nuclear strategy, see Melandri, 'La France et l'Alliance atlantique', 543–4, cited in Trachtenberg, "France and NATO, 1949–1991," September 2011, 190.

[233] Christopher Woody, "Doubts about Trump, U.S. Defense Spark Nuclear Weapons Debate in Germany," *Business Insider*, accessed October 29, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/doubts-about-trump-us-defense-spark-nuclear-weapons-debate-in-germany-2018-8.

### 2. Methods of Decision-Making

One contentious point in previous attempts to organize a multi-national nuclear program was the disagreement as to which country held the final authority in employing nuclear weapons. France, as previously noted, was hesitant to trust Washington to employ nuclear weapons in defense of an attack on France when the current U.S. nuclear umbrella was being established. "To defend the integrity, sovereignty, and survival of one's own nation, it was realistic to threaten the use of nuclear weapons; to defend a neighbor, even a friendly one, it was absurd."[234]

Historically, Germany held the same doubts about France and was uneasy about a French nuclear umbrella since the original Pluton missile only had a range of 120km and French nuclear strategy called for a "warning" strike, which might have ultimately been on German soil.[235] In the 1980s, France developed the Hadès ground-launched missile that would "enable France to execute its tactical warning strike without hitting West German soil."[236] In spite of this, Grant reported in 1985, "West Germans continue to express dissatisfaction with French defense policy. Their perception that French nuclear forces almost exclusively serve French interests has not changed."[237] Contention over command and control has always surrounded the topic of a European nuclear deterrent, in particular the "fear of putting West German fingers close to the trigger of the French force."[238]

A present-day EU nuclear deterrent would not be isolated from such debate. France developed the *force de frappe* as a national deterrent and under Charles de Gaulle, the French strongly opposed any loss of sovereignty or control over the nuclear arsenal. If

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[234] Philip H. Gordon, *A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1993), 58.

[235] Robert Grant, "French Defense Policy and European Security," *Political Science Quarterly* 100, no. 3 (1985): 418, https://doi.org/10.2307/2151065.

[236] Grant, 419.

[237] Grant, 420.

[238] Stanley Hoffmann, "France's Relations With West Germany," *German Studies Newsletter*, no. 4 (1985): 8.

the European Union created a joint nuclear deterrent in the name of collective defense, policies would have to be established delineating the authority on its deployment within the short time constraints inherent to a nuclear crisis. Would French President Macron be willing to relinquish or share control if the French nuclear deterrent became the basis for an EU nuclear umbrella? If not, would the other EU member states have the same level of confidence in French deterrence as they currently have in the American nuclear shield? "Will unanimous consent be required on the part of all states? If not, what safeguards will there be to prevent the tyranny of a nuclear-armed majority?"[239] Surely, these questions must all be answered before any financial commitments toward an EU nuclear deterrent would be forthcoming.

### 3. Conflicting International and National Values

Angela Bourne focuses on territorial conflicts that could unintentionally arise, stating that "the opportunities European integration appears to provide for re-imagining territorial identities and redefining ambitions for control over territory may merely reproduce old tensions as parties to a conflict try to interpret intentions behind the redefinition of constitutional ambitions."[240] Lisa Roller provides another example of the discord that can occur between international, national, and regional value spheres in discussing Catalonia in Spain. Roller points out, "Spain's membership of the EU since 1986 has blurred the distinction between domestic and foreign matters and has challenged the domestic distribution of powers."[241] The blurred lines of authority created by participation in the European Union could create domestic issues and ultimately prevent the establishment of a united EU nuclear deterrent as member states are forced to turn their security focus inwards.

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[239] Alexander Lanoszka, "Why Eurodeterrent Will Not Work," *Stratfor*, accessed October 26, 2018, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/why-eurodeterrent-will-not-work.

[240] Angela K. Bourne, "The EU, Conflict and Co-operation within Member States: Conclusion," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 4, no. 3 (September 2003): 531, https://doi.org/10.1080/15705850308438875.

[241] Lisa Roller, "Conflict and Co-Operation in EU Policy-Making: The Case of Catalonia," in *EU and Territorial Politics Within Member States: Conflict or Co-Operation?*, ed. Angela K. Bourne (Brill, 2004), 83.

## E. GROWING ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE

The anti-nuclear movement is on the rise and remains a hindrance to a nuclear deterrent for the European Union nationally and among EU members. As the tensions of the unstable international climate during the Cold War settled down, multiple Western European countries began to take an anti-nuclear stance. The catastrophes of Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011) further stimulated European anti-nuclear movements. Germany has already gotten rid of most of its nuclear power plants and has taken a very anti-nuclear stance; protestors have even demanded the removal of American nuclear weapons from German soil.[242]

Austria, Ireland, and Sweden also have growing national anti-nuclear movements. In September 2017 these three EU members, along with 50 other countries, signed a United Nations (UN) treaty to ban nuclear weapons.[243] "Since the late 1970s, Austria has been fiercely anti-nuclear, starting with an unprecedented vote by its population that prevented the country's only plant from providing a watt of power."[244] In 2017, the anti-nuclear organization known as the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, a decision which was lauded by many Europeans. These strong anti-nuclear sentiments could pose a problem for champions of an EU nuclear deterrent.

### 1. Austria

The website for the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Austria declares Austria's position on nuclear weapons, stating that "nuclear disarmament, the non-proliferation of

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[242] Josef Joffe, "Germany Has Taken Itself out of the Nuclear Running: OPINION," *Financial Times; London (UK)*, February 14, 2017.

[243] "Signature/Ratification Status of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons | ICAN," accessed October 24, 2017, http://www.icanw.org/status-of-the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/. Margot Wallström, "Wallström: A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Is Achievable," Text, Government Offices of Sweden, August 29, 2017, http://www.government.se/articles/2017/08/wallstrom-a-nuclear-weapon-free-world-is-achievable/.

[244] Nina Lamparski, "Green Austria on Warpath against Nuclear Power in Europe," accessed December 15, 2017, https://phys.org/news/2015-07-green-austria-warpath-nuclear-power.html.

nuclear weapons and ultimately a world free of weapons of mass destruction are a priority of Austria's foreign and security policy."[245] In 2015, the then Austrian Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz spoke at a Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT) review conference, arguing that "the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons will never be used again is through their total elimination."[246] At this United Nations meeting, the Austrian foreign minister found support from a number of nations for a ban on nuclear weapons; however, the NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon-states (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States) opposed the initiative.[247] In October 2017, Sebastian Kurz became the Austrian Chancellor in a center right government whose attitude to EU defense was colored by a pro-Russian wing in the coalition FPÖ party. While he is strongly against nuclear weapons and energy, deeper ties with Germany and a "pro-European" Europe also rank high on his political agenda.[248] His anti-nuclear stance bodes well for improving relations with Germany, but it could also unite like-minded EU member state leaders and preclude any EU nuclear deterrent endeavors. The chancellor's rise to power is a clear indication of Austrian opinions on nuclear weapons. But focus in Austria's external relations are scarcely on fission and fusion in politics, but on the centrifugal tendency in the EU to disintegration in the face of integral nationalism and the purported political effects of the 2015 refugee crisis.

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[245] "Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Terrorism – BMEIA, Außenministerium Österreich," Federal Ministry Republic of Austria, accessed March 22, 2018, https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/european-foreign-policy/disarmament/weapons-of-mass-destruction/nuclear-weapons-and-nuclear-terrorism/.

[246] Austrian Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz, quoted in Louis Charbonneau, "Austria, Backed by 159 Nations, Calls for Ban on Nuclear Weapons," *Reuters*, April 29, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-un-austria/austria-backed-by-159-nations-calls-for-ban-on-nuclear-weapons-idUSKBN0NJ2I220150429.

[247] Charbonneau, "Austria, Backed by 159 Nations, Calls for Ban on Nuclear Weapons."

[248] "Austria's Sebastian Kurz Wants Deeper Ties with Germany," *Deutsche Welle*, accessed March 22, 2018, http://www.dw.com/en/austrias-sebastian-kurz-wants-deeper-ties-with-germany/a-41837161; "Austria's Sebastian Kurz Assures pro-Europe Government in Deal with Far-Right Party," *Deutsche Welle*, accessed March 22, 2018, http://www.dw.com/en/austrias-sebastian-kurz-assures-pro-europe-government-in-deal-with-far-right-party/a-41799121.

### 2. Germany

Germany security policy aspires to derive insights from the destruction in Europe wrought by the country during two world wars. Along with a skepticism about force in statecraft is an anti-nuclear posture that is the result of the Cold War and the air war against Germany in 1939–1945. This German abhorrence of nuclear weapons would greatly impede a European Union decision to pursue an EU nuclear deterrent. Germany is critical to European defense and security due to its economic strength and its central geographic location in Europe. Following the Second World War, the United States and Western European countries faced a conundrum; Germany had to be defended due to its position, but nobody wanted a strong Germany that could incite another world war. Trachtenberg accurately framed the issue:

> A Europe able to defend itself would have to include a Germany able to defend itself, and that meant a Germany armed with nuclear weapons. But that prospect the Kennedy administration found utterly unacceptable; it followed that there could be no purely European solution to the problem of the defence of Europe and that the Americans could therefore not withdraw from Western Europe.[249]

Hans Kundnani reaffirms the internal challenge facing Germany as the international political order undergoes shifts, including changes in the Trans-Atlantic relationship, and argues that "public opinion makes it difficult to imagine — even now — Germany seeking to develop nuclear weapons."[250]

Activist movements increased protests in the 1970s and again following the Chernobyl incident in 1986. "This strong anti-nuclear influence is most commonly used against nuclear power generation, such as Germany's decision to phase out nuclear power after the Fukushima disaster, but also with regard to nuclear weapons. The vast majority of the German people want American [nuclear] weapons out of Germany, and ultimately want them globally banned. Such popular opposition would not tolerate a government

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[249] Trachtenberg, "France and NATO, 1949–1991," 188.

[250] Hans Kundnani, "The New Parameters of German Foreign Policy," *Transatlantic Academy* 2017 Paper Series, no. No. 3 (n.d.): 5.

shift in policy that would result in the abandonment of the NPT and the development of nuclear weapons."[251] Today, protests arise against nuclear weapons and energy any time the subject returns to the fore. Multiple anti-nuclear movement websites report that activists broke into the Büchel Air Base in Germany in 2017, allegedly a storage site for B61s bombs. These claims do not appear to have been substantiated.[252]

The joint development of the Eurofighter—between Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain—also shows Germany's reluctant involvement in further nuclear endeavors because the Eurofighter has not been nuclear-certified and therefore is unable to carry B-61 bombs—the American nuclear weapons currently based in Europe for possible operations using U.S. and European air assets.[253] Some Germans say that Berlin may buy F-16s or F-35s, perhaps thereby gaining the ability to deliver B61 bombs.[254]

In 2011 German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced plans to shut down all German nuclear power plants by 2022, and Germany will be joining the ranks of other nuclear-energy-free countries such as Austria and Italy. Germany is vital to any plans for an EU nuclear deterrent due to its geographic location and economic stature, so any plan would require German approval and participation in some form. Although resistance to nuclear weapons and energy has been present in some circles since atomic power was harnessed, German leaders seem to be acquiescing to public desires in ways previously

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[251] John Ashley, "Mein Gott! Would Germany Build a Bomb?," *Charged Affairs* (blog), September 3, 2018, https://chargedaffairs.org/german_bomb/.

[252] John LaForge, "Activists Cut Fences, Occupy Nuclear Weapons Bunker in Protest of U.S. Nukes in Germany," *The Nuclear Resister*, accessed March 20, 2018, http://www.nukeresister.org/2017/07/18/activists-cut-fences-occupy-nuclear-weapons-bunker-in-protest-of-u-s-nukes-in-germany/; "Activists Challenge U.S. Nukes in Germany, Occupy Nuclear Weapons Bunker," *Duluth Reader*, accessed March 20, 2018, http://duluthreader.com/articles/2017/07/20/10620_activists_challenge_us_nukes_in_germany_occupy.

[253] Eben Harrell, "What to Do About Europe's Secret Nukes," *Time*, January 4, 2010, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1943799,00.html.

[254] Alex Lockie, "The F-35 May Carry One of the US's Most Polarizing Nuclear Weapons Sooner than Expected," *Business Insider*, January 12, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/f-35-b-61-nuclear-bomb-sooner-than-expected-2017-1.

unseen. German support for an EU nuclear deterrent may be difficult to find, or at the very least cause domestic discord if the leadership acts counter to public preferences.

### 3. Ireland

Ireland has worked with the United Nations (UN) and other organizations and countries to promote non-proliferation and the complete abolishment of nuclear weapons since as early as the "Irish Revolution" of 1961, resulting in a UN resolution on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.[255] In 1998, Ireland held "secret meetings with Sweden, South Africa, and New Zealand to draw up the wording of a declaration…Mexico, Slovenia, Brazil, and Egypt have joined the original four to become the New Agenda Coalition."[256] The objective of this coalition was to promote disarmament and "a nuclear weapons free world."[257] As in Germany and Austria, the anti-nuclear movement continues to gain momentum in Ireland. A rally to protest nuclear weapons took place in 1978 at Carnsore Point on land set aside for a future nuclear power plant; this town continues to represent the ongoing anti-nuclear views of the Irish.[258]

### 4. Sweden

Sweden began nuclear research in 1947, creating the company Aktiebolaget Atomenergi. Former Swedish Supreme Commander Stig Synnergren said in 1985:

> Our [Sweden's] objective was to make all the military preparations so that in the shortest time possible we could start the industrial manufacture of nuclear weapons in Sweden. The task of Atomenergi was, roughly, to adapt the civilian program accordingly.'[259]

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[255] Karen Birchard, "Ireland Launches Nuclear-Disarmament Initiative."

[256] Karen Birchard.

[257] Karen Birchard.

[258] Manning, "Ireland's Woodstock: The Anti-Nuclear Protests at Carnsore Point - Headstuff."

[259] Quoted in Cole, Paul M., "Sweden Without The Bomb: The Conduct of a Nuclear-Capable Nation Without Nuclear Weapons" (Rand, 1994), 10.

"Before 1959, the Swedish government began to slow down the pace of research that was specifically dedicated to the production of nuclear weapons."[260] In Sweden, commercial nuclear power has been around since 1975, but any drive to build nuclear weapons was abandoned after the country ratified the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon-state in 1969.[261] In 1979, the Three Mile Island incident influenced nuclear policy in many countries, including Sweden. Between 1957 and 1967, Swedish public support for the acquisition of nuclear weapons dropped from 40 percent to 17 percent, and anti-nuclear sentiment began to grow.[262] In 1980, Swedish Prime Minister Torbjorn Falldin called for a referendum offering three phaseout options.[263] The initial intention was to phase out nuclear power plants in Sweden by 2010 but the phaseout plan was advanced, reversed, and canceled multiple times, with the final decision in 1997 to close two plants in Barsebäck due to their proximity to Copenhagen, while maintaining or replacing the rest.[264] For now, Sweden will continue to rely on nuclear energy.

At the end of 2017, the UN presented a new nuclear weapons ban, which put Sweden in the hot seat with the major powers in NATO—France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. According to some reports, "U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis sent a letter to his Swedish counterpart threatening to end security cooperation with Stockholm if the agreement is signed."[265] The UN resolution would "ban signatories from either delivering or receiving nuclear weapons, or from stationing

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[260] Cole, Paul M., 100.

[261] "Nuclear Energy in Sweden - World Nuclear Association"; George H. Quester, "Sweden and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," *Cooperation and Conflict* 5, no. 1 (March 1970): 60, https://doi.org/10.1177/001083677000500103.

[262] Cole, Paul M., "Sweden Without The Bomb: The Conduct of a Nuclear-Capable Nation Without Nuclear Weapons," 94.

[263] John C. H. Lindberg, "Power Market Development: Sweden's Silent Phaseout:," *Nuclear Engineering International* Vol. 62 (758) (2017): 12–13.

[264] "Nuclear Energy in Sweden - World Nuclear Association."

[265] Allison Fedirka, "In Sweden, an Ethical Dilemma of Nuclear Proportions," Geopolitical Futures, September 8, 2017, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/sweden-ethical-dilemma-nuclear-proportions/.

nuclear weapons on their territory."[266] Allison Fedirka points out the gravity of the situation:

> The consequences are especially dire for the United States; U.S. military doctrine does not permit officers to disclose what types of weapons are on their vessels. In effect, all U.S. military vessels and aircraft would lose access to Swedish sea ports and air bases. This could severely limit NATO's operational capabilities in the event of a military conflict, particularly a conflict with Russia over the Baltics.

Due to Sweden's anti-nuclear stance since the late 1960s, the country found itself at risk of losing vital partners in security cooperation owing to its support for the nuclear weapons ban, although Sweden has yet to sign or ratify the treaty.[267] Considering the ramifications exposed through this incident, the European Union can anticipate complicated intra-EU relations should it choose to seek an EU nuclear deterrent. Staunchly anti-nuclear countries such as Sweden and Germany can be persuaded to support U.S. priorities as long as they depend on the United States for their security. If the United States was no longer providing an extended nuclear deterrent to Western Europe, these nuclear-resistant opinions would hinder EU discussions of nuclear deterrence.

Europe's obstacles during the Cold War were substantial enough to prevent the establishment of any multilateral European nuclear deterrents. Now that there is a perceived risk of the United States withdrawing the extended nuclear deterrent from Western Europe, the hurdles to an EU nuclear deterrent have become the focal point once again. The European Union would need to establish that it has the political capacity to create an effective nuclear deterrent. Additionally, the EU member states would face difficulties in balancing the national and international security value spheres, which might be further complicated by residual conflicts among EU countries. Even if these two obstacles were surmounted, EU members would have to decide what makes for a credible

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[266] Fedirka, "In Sweden, an Ethical Dilemma of Nuclear Proportions."

[267] "Signature/Ratification Status of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons | ICAN," accessed October 24, 2017, http://www.icanw.org/status-of-the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/.

nuclear deterrent and address the “how”—not just the “what”—for policy implementation and action. If the EU member states followed the common governance style of establishing policies to protect their citizens as opposed to letting public opinion guide them, an EU nuclear deterrent could become a definite possibility. However, some EU members have shown a propensity to follow public opinion, which could present a very real and firm obstacle to any EU nuclear umbrella.

# V. POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS OF AN EU NUCLEAR DETERRENT

## A. THE BREAKING OF A TREATY

### 1. Independent National Nuclear Deterrents

One of the most prominent obstacles to a European Union nuclear deterrent is the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which limits signatories to status as either nuclear-weapon states (NWS) or non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). Germany, along with most other European countries, signed the NPT as a NNWS and promised "not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons…or of control over such weapons…directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons…and not to seek or receive assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons."[268] The text of the treaty makes it clear that an independent national nuclear deterrent would require the signatory to withdraw from the agreement, which could be done with as little as three months' notice.

The most significant risk to such a maneuver would be a domino effect of other nations losing confidence in the NPT and choosing to withdraw and create national nuclear weapons programs and deterrents, ultimately risking a nuclear arms race in Western Europe. The threat of the domino effect is not lessened by lack of financial means or technological know-how to the same extent as during the Cold War. Since NWS were also obligated "to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes," the NNWS have access to significant nuclear technologies.[269] Additionally, India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and are not Parties to the NPT; therefore, these

[268] "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)" (1970), 2, Article II, https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/aptnpt_1.pdf?_=1430761933.

[269] "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)," 2, Article III.

countries could assist any nation that chose to withdraw from the NPT without violating the agreement.[270] According to John Ashley, the 2017 Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (YPFP) Nuclear Security Fellow, "North Korea withdrawing from the NPT to go nuclear did not have a great deal of impact on the treaty due to the 'rogue' status of the Pyongyang government. But if Germany, one of the leading voices for disarmament, left the NPT to develop nuclear weapons, the treaty would be dealt a body blow that it may not recover from."[271] Lastly, Europe long ago recovered economically from World War II and is slowly recovering from the economic crisis of 2008, although that growth rate is slowing.[272]

### 2. Joint EU Nuclear Deterrent

Another possibility for an EU nuclear deterrent that could keep the NPT intact would be the transformation of the EU into a federated state which could then succeed to the NPT as an NWS by incorporating France and its NWS status as a Party to the NPT. The value in this option is the reduced risk of multiple independent European countries pursuing national nuclear programs because the current French NWS status would extend to all EU members. However, such a path would require the other EU nations to trust that the French would willingly employ their nuclear weapons in defense of the European Union.

Altogether, there is a hypothetical possibility of protecting the Non-Proliferation Treaty while pursuing an EU nuclear deterrent. The most significant obstacle, as previously discussed in this thesis, is building confidence among EU members in a joint

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[270] For a list of NPT signatories see "Disarmament Treaties Database: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)," accessed October 21, 2018, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt; "Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance," Arms Control Association, accessed October 21, 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat; Israeli nuclear weapons are suspected, but unconfirmed. For more information see: Avner Kōhēn, *The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Avner Kōhēn, *Israel and the Bomb* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

[271] Ashley, "Mein Gott! Would Germany Build a Bomb?"

[272] Sabina Tuca, "The Stage of the European Union's Economic Recovery," *Procedia Economics and Finance* 16 (2014): 374–80, https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671(14)00816-8; "EU Economic Growth Forecast Reduced," *Deutsche Welle*, accessed October 24, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/eu-economic-growth-forecast-reduced/a-44649654.

defense. The collapse of the NPT would not appeal to any EU member, but an increasing number of non-NPT-parties armed with nuclear weapons—such as India, North Korea and Pakistan—could create dire circumstances and force independent nations to take drastic measures to ensure their security.

## B. DEFENSE OR PROVOCATION?

As previously discussed, German sentiment against nuclear weapons and nuclear energy is increasing, limiting the likelihood that an EU nuclear deterrent could be installed on German soil if the U.S. nuclear umbrella via NATO was dissolved. There might be an option to instead base an EU nuclear deterrent on the territory of Eastern European members such as Poland or one of the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) close to Russia. Matthew Kroenig discusses multiple options under the current NATO framework which could be implemented as an EU nuclear deterrent as well, including either Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) or a new Tactical Nuclear Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) based in these Eastern European nations or at existing European bases.[273] Kroenig deems a tactical ALCM as the most feasible and palatable option to pose a viable deterrent to Russian aggression, describing it as "the most desirable option for developing a credible deterrent to a Russian nuclear 'de-escalation' strike."[274] By Kroenig's logic, tactical ALCMs offer a low-yield option that could penetrate Russian air defenses**.** According to Kroenig, "there would be less danger that their use on the battlefield would risk escalation to other regions**,**" and "it would not contravene the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty], the PNIs [Presidential Nuclear Initiatives], or the NATO-Russia Founding Act."[275]

The downside to placing any nuclear weapons on Eastern European soil is the possible Russian perception of such a move. The Russians may consider the deployment

[273] Matthew Kroenig, "Toward a More Flexible NATO Nuclear Posture," Atlantic Council: Issue Brief, November 14, 2016, 9.

[274] Kroenig, 11.

[275] Kroenig, 9–10.

of nuclear weapons of any sort on their border to be an aggressive act and "as contravening NATO's promises to Russia not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of NATO's new member states."[276] NATO reassured Russia that it desired regional stability and made the following promise as part of the NATO-Russia Founding Act:

> The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and do not foresee any future need to do so. This subsumes the fact that NATO has decided that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory of those members, whether through the construction of new nuclear storage facilities or the adaptation of old nuclear storage facilities. Nuclear storage sites are understood to be facilities specifically designed for the stationing of nuclear weapons, and include all types of hardened above or below ground facilities (storage bunkers or vaults) designed for storing nuclear weapons.[277]

Because Russia has violated the NATO-Russia Founding Act by invading and annexing part of Ukraine, some NATO Allies question whether the Alliance should continue to uphold it. Moreover, the European Union (unlike NATO) has no such agreement at this time, and under an EU nuclear umbrella, such previous pledges could be ignored or re-addressed bilaterally between Russia and the European Union.

Europe's, and in particular Germany's, reliance on Russian energy resources would also understandably lead to hesitation to risk provoking Russia. With the Nord Stream 1 pipeline and the upcoming Nord Stream 2 line, Russia will be able to supply "almost a quarter of total demand across the European Union."[278] There is a lot of debate over the Nord Stream 2 pipeline both within Europe and in the Atlantic Alliance, with President Donald Trump going so far as to say that Germany is "captive to Russia

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[277] NATO, "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation Signed in Paris, France," NATO, sec. IV, accessed October 29, 2018, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm.

[278] Tobias Buck, "How Russian Gas Became Europe's Most Divisive Commodity," *Financial Times*, accessed October 21, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/e9a49e8c-852c-11e8-a29d-73e3d454535d.

because it's getting so much of its energy from Russia."[279] Additionally, Germany's goal since 2011 of closing its nuclear power plants increases its reliance on Russian gas.[280] Simon Serfaty portrayed a widespread European sentiment accurately: "[Russia] is too big, too close, and too nuclear to be provoked; but it is also too demanding, too resentful, and too threatening to be indulged."[281]

The question becomes: will the European Union countries decide that building up their military posture is the only way to contain Russian imperialism and desires for grandeur? Serfaty suggests a mutual acceptance by the United States and Russia of a stalemate.[282] However, according to by Douglas E. Schoen and Evan Roth Smith, such a truce seems impossible. The authors declare that "[Putin's] plan is to unmake the world order that has stood since the end of the Cold War, especially in Europe, and replace it with one where Russia has the power, influence, and military strength to get its way on any issue."[283] Therefore, the current Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) agreement in the European Union is a logical integration of military efforts to defend against rising aggression, and some EU leaders may be assessing the merits of an EU nuclear deterrent.

## C. THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE

One final and seemingly extreme scenario is that EU members might begin to see a larger value in Russian cooperation than in the Atlantic Alliance. As previously observed, Western and Central Europe are very reliant on economic cooperation with Russia to fulfill their energy demands. Additionally, it is unlikely that the United States would become an adversary of the EU if it chose to cooperate more closely with Russia

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[279] Steven Erlanger and Julie Hirschfield Davis, "Trump vs. Merkel: Blistering Salvo Meets Quiet Rejoinder," *The New York Times*, accessed October 21, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/11/world/europe/germany-merkel-russia-trump-nato.html.

[280] Kirill Kudryavstev, "EU Even More Dependent on Russian Gas," *The National*, accessed October 21, 2018, https://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/eu-even-more-dependent-on-russian-gas-1.695131.

[281] Simon Serfaty, "Don't Let Russia Be Russia: Neither Provoke Nor Indulge," *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations* 7, no. 1 (2015): 59.

[282] Serfaty, 60.

[283] Schoen and Smith, *Putin's Master Plan*, 13.

so long as no threats crossed the Atlantic and economic relations continued. The idea of such a turn to Moscow for protection may seem absurd to those on the conference circuit centered on Washington and London, but less so on the circuit that is made up of, say, Berlin, Vienna, and elsewhere in Central or "Eastern" Europe. However, Russia is an NWS Party to the NPT with a vast nuclear arsenal that could easily supply the same nuclear umbrella protection against nuclear-armed non-NPT-parties, as under the current setup with the United States and NATO, while greatly reducing any direct threat from Russia. Admittedly, a nuclear sharing arrangement comparable to the current setup between the United States and certain NATO Allies has never been ventured by Russia. Lastly, cooperation and a closer alliance with Russia would greatly benefit Western European economies and reduce the strain on European security. Western Europe could theoretically maintain close ties with the United States while fostering better relations with its Eastern neighbor. In another time, unknown to most alive today, the 1967 Harmel Report reaffirmed the strength of the NATO Alliance in the changed political environment from 1949, and a scenario where Western and Eastern Europe unite would be in line with the report's statement that "the participation of the USSR and the USA will be necessary to achieve a settlement of political problems in Europe."[284] This policy looked forward to 1989, but it did not foresee 2014.

The largest obstacle to such an arrangement would be the diametrically oppositional political regimes. Russia would need to set aside its desire for supreme dominance, but functioning as the European protector could satisfy this craving. The countries of Western and Central Europe would have to accept the faux democracy established in Russia and place great trust in Russia's willingness to employ nuclear weapons in their defense. It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine states such as the Baltic countries, Poland, Romania, and other EU members setting aside their fear and distrust of Russia dating back many decades to accept Russian protection in today's political environment. Lastly, Russia's current ties to North Korea and Syria as well as

[284] NATO, "The Future Tasks of the Alliance: Report of the Council ('The Harmel Report')," NATO, accessed October 24, 2018, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_26700.htm.

other questionable actors would need to be resolved, but these ties might further benefit Western Europe by further stabilizing the continent and reducing neighboring threats.

Along this same thread, Britain's exit from the European Union could even leave an opening for Russia to join the European Union. Current aggressive Russian behavior to the side, economically and geographically, Russia and the European Union would make logical partners. Due to the often-overlapping history in Europe, "much of the infrastructure needed for trade…[is] already connected" and "it would…finally make Europe a true superpower with the ability to take on China and the U.S. both economically and militarily."[285] In 2016, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev stated, regarding EU sanctions on Russia, that "sooner or later common sense will prevail, and sanctions will be lifted. But for this to happen we [the European Union and Russia] need to make steps toward each other."[286] From lifting sanctions against Russia to inviting Russia to become an EU member is a huge leap, and such a concept remains a speculative and remote hypothesis considering the lingering negative relations between Russia and many EU members, including the aforementioned Baltic countries, Poland, and Romania. The indications are that a mutually beneficial arrangement could hypothetically be made, but only time would tell if this, like the European Union, could extend from economic cooperation to defense cooperation.

## D. CONCLUSION

There are three real options for an EU nuclear deterrent, and none **is** free of obstacles. Members of the EU could form independent nuclear programs, a joint EU nuclear deterrent would be possible based on the current French arsenal or an enhanced one under France's NWS status, or the European Union could work with Russia to make amends and create a powerful Europe consisting of the European Union and Russia. The three options are hypothetically feasible, but none of them will happen overnight. It is not

[285] Cyrus Sanati, "Brexit Could Open the Door to Russia Joining the EU," *Fortune*, accessed October 21, 2018, http://fortune.com/2016/06/28/russia-brexit-eu-membership/.

[286] Ksenia Zubacheva, "Russia-EU Relations in 2016: Looking for a Way out," *Russia Direct*, January 14, 2016, https://russia-direct.org/analysis/russia-eu-relations-2016-looking-way-out.

likely that EU members will announce a break from the U.S. nuclear umbrella via NATO before having an adequate alternative solution established and waiting in the wings. The EU countries would presumably be prudent enough not to publicize a break-up until they were ready to stand on their own.

# VI. CONCLUSION

The return of great power conflict in Europe also means the reappearance of nuclear weapons and deterrence in European security discussions and rising doubts about the Atlantic Alliance's cohesion. With so many strategic surprises in the recent past, it is impossible to predict the future of the European Union's collective defense framework or the subsequent ripple effects that might follow. However, the current fluctuations in American and European policy can be closely analyzed, and the day might come when the incentives to pursue an EU nuclear deterrent overpower and outweigh the associated obstacles. Those who must anticipate the unthinkable must embrace a range of options, even the unthinkable options, despite how distasteful they are to convention and common opinion.

As tensions rise with nuclear-armed powers in Eurasia, a NATO failure to provide a sufficiently effective deterrence posture to counter aggression could permit the threats to grow. Hostile states could join forces and act more overtly. EU member states are presently only slightly uneasy about reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. If the United States provides further reassurance to bolster confidence in Europe, an aggressive state alone is unlikely to spark the development and establishment of an EU nuclear deterrent. In particular, doubts about the political, technical, and strategic credibility of an EU nuclear deterrent serve as amorphous obstacles. It is impossible to say how many nuclear weapons and launch systems would be enough to serve as a credible nuclear deterrent because that would be scenario-dependent and the mentalities and thresholds of adversaries differ.

If the United States suffered a complete loss of credibility with the European Union and its NATO Allies, the European Union might have sufficient impetus to break away from the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Due to increasingly anti-nuclear sentiments within EU states as well as among them on the international stage, the schism might not result in an EU nuclear deterrent, but it would definitely weaken trans-Atlantic relations and leave Western and Central European countries vulnerable to attack or invasion in the absence of a nuclear deterrent. In light of this circumstance, this thesis suggests that such a radical

failure in the Atlantic Alliance would lead to high pressure for the French and the British to assist their European neighbors with nuclear defense.

The member states of the European Union have recovered economically since World War II and the 2008 financial crisis. Despite the United Kingdom's pending 2019 exit from the European Union, France maintains a nuclear arsenal that could serve as the foundation for an EU nuclear deterrent, and EU members could contribute financially to expand on French capabilities and quantities. The question of the credibility of nuclear deterrence is an unending debate, and decision-making processes would have to be clearly defined in a manner that would sufficiently deter any aggressive states or non-state actors from attacking an EU member.

Since the discovery of nuclear technology and its military applications in the form of nuclear weapons, states have raced to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities and optimize their performance. European countries found themselves situated between two great powers armed with possibly devastating technology. As this thesis has discussed, European nations recognized the importance of possessing nuclear weapons to maintain power and security on the international stage, but they faced many obstacles to obtaining nuclear technology and weapons. International political dynamics have changed, and states are no longer hindered to the same extent as they were following World War II. This thesis concludes that EU member states, combined, possess the economic and technological ability to build an EU nuclear deterrent but that any joint effort will not be an easy choice or pursued in haste.

Continuing security competitions and greater understanding of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear explosions have motivated countries to seek nuclear technology, as well as to fear the devastation that nuclear arms could cause. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) essentially froze the nuclear armament status of the treaty parties (except for North Korea), so any EU nuclear deterrent option involving the withdrawal of a party from the NPT could reverse all arms control efforts made since the Cold War. Considering the strong anti-nuclear sentiments in many EU countries, the NPT is likely to serve as an obstacle to an EU nuclear deterrent as well. It would be imperative for the EU members to work together and with their Atlantic Allies to ensure

credible collective defense of EU states while preserving the NPT to the maximum extent possible.

Although this thesis briefly discusses the option of an EU-Russia arrangement, European memories, like their histories, are long and riddled with scars of past conflicts. Some EU members would forcefully oppose any sort of *rapprochement* with Russia (particularly Russian membership in the European Union), rendering such an option close to moot. The economic ties and the European Union's reliance on Russian energy resources prevent complete isolation between the two sides of Europe, but also provide Russia with an incentive to limit its imperialist behavior out of fear of devastating the Russian economy. For now, the European Union is reliant on the United States and NATO for nuclear deterrence, and any other path will not be established quickly.

It is important that the United States reassure its NATO Allies as to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but the Allies must also reconsider the financial burden sharing of the Alliance and do their part in reassuring the United States of the credibility of their promised support. Presently, ties among the NATO nations are strained, but French President Macron and German Chancellor Merkel appear committed to finding a way through these precarious times that ends with a strong, united Alliance. Any perceived weakness could leave all members vulnerable to incursion or attack by China, Iran, North Korea, or Russia, be it in the cyber realm or the physical one.

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